Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy

From Thales to Aristotle

Edited by S. Marc Cohen,
Patricia Curd,
and C.D.C. Reeve

Fifth Edition

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*Except where noted, translations of the Presocratics and Sophists are by Richard D. McKirahan

{viii} INTRODUCTION

This anthology is intended to introduce readers to a broad selection of the writings of some of the greatest of the ancient Greek philosophers—Heraclitus, Parmenides, Democritus, Protagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and many others. Together these thinkers brought about one of the most significant revolutions we know of, one that set the Western world on a path that—with minor and not so minor deviations—it has followed ever since. What they did, to put it boldly and oversimply, was to invent critical rationality and embody it in a tradition; for the theories they advanced, whether on the nature and origins of the cosmos or on ethics and politics, were not offered as gospels to be accepted on divine or human authority but as rational products to be accepted or rejected on the basis of evidence and argument: do not listen to me, Heraclitus says, but to my account. Every university and college, every intellectual discipline and scientific advance, every step toward freedom and away from ignorance, superstition, and enslavement to repressive dogma is eloquent testimony to the power of their invention. If they had not existed, our world would not exist.

Obviously, there is more to say about the achievements of Greek philosophy than this. But bold and oversimple as our claim is, and standing in need of modification and elaboration as it does, it points nonetheless to something central and vital, something that will surely be borne in upon any reader of the texts collected here: the world of Greek philosophy is an argumentative world.

As we weigh and consider the ideas and evaluate the arguments contained in the following pages, we will find ourselves thinking about the ultimate structure of reality, about the mind, about the nature of knowledge and scientific theorizing, about ethical values, and about the best kind of society for people to live in. Some of what we uncover we will no doubt find congenial; some we will want to criticize or reject. But as long as evidence and argument remain our touchstone, we will be joining in the enterprise that these

philosophers both invented and did so much to develop. In the process, we will be to some degree becoming what some of them thought was the best thing to be—fully rational human beings.

This may sound attractive, but it may also seem one-sided, so it is perhaps important to add that the critical rationality vital to successful theorizing, while it is recommended as a crucial ingredient in the best kind of life, is certainly not all that is recommended to us by these philosophers. For many of them, a successful life is one in which all the elements in our characters—needs, desires, emotions, and beliefs—are harmoniously integrated and in which we ourselves are harmoniously integrated with others into a flourishing society that is itself in harmony with the larger world of which it is a part. Moreover, many of the Greek philosophers—like their fellow poets and tragedians—recognized that there were profoundly nonrational elements in the world: the same Heraclitus who asks us to listen to his account also reminds us that "the Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign"; Socrates, the patron saint of rational self-scrutiny, is also a servant of the god Apollo. Indeed, one of the most attractive features of Greek philosophy is its inclusivity, its manifest wish to see the world whole and see it right. Few contemporary philosophers offer us such all-encompassing visions of ourselves and our world as we find in Plato and Aristotle; few have the audacity to reach as far or as wide as the great Presocratics. That is not, surely, the only reason to make friends with these splendid thinkers, but it is, nonetheless, one major reason why they have never lost their power to challenge, inspire, and enlighten those who do befriend them.

We have divided the selection of readings into three sections, each with a separate introduction. Patricia Curd is primarily responsible for the section on the Presocratics and Sophists; {ix} David Reeve for the section on Plato; and Marc Cohen for the section on Aristotle. An excellent anthology of later Greek philosophical writers that nicely complements this one is B. Inwood and L. P. Gerson (eds.), *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, second edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

The fifth edition of *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy* features an extensive revision in the Plato and Aristotle units, which had been untouched since the appearance of the first edition in 1995. In the Plato unit, the translations of the Meno and Republic are new, and in the Aristotle unit virtually all the translations are new, and were either prepared especially for this volume or extracted from complete translations recently published or forthcoming from Hackett. There have also been extensive additions to the excerpts from Aristotle's works. In particular, we have added *Topics* I.1, 4; *De Anima* II.6–7; *Metaphysics* VI.1–2, VII.7–8, 12, VIII.3, IX.6, XII.4–5, 10, and XIII.10; *Nicomachean Ethics* II.7, 9, III.10, V.5, 10, VI.3, 6, 8–9, 11, IX.8, and X.1, 4–5; and *Politics* I.3–6, 8–10, 13, and III.2–3, 5. The Glossary for Aristotle has also been entirely revised and rewritten.

To make room for this expansion of the selections from Aristotle, we have deleted two chapters (*Met*. XII.8 and *Pol*. III.11) that were deemed less important to include in this book. The unit on the Presocratics and the Sophists has also been streamlined in a way that will still leave ample material for thorough coverage of these philosophers as they are treated in typical junior and senior level courses in ancient Greek philosophy. While the selections in the Plato unit remain unchanged, the *Meno* and the *Republic* appear in new translations.

The entire book has been reformatted with two columns of text per page, making it easier to read and using space more efficiently.

References to the Greek philosophers make use of certain standard editions of their works. Thus references to the Presocratics employ "Diels-Kranz numbers" because H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1903) was the first authoritative collection of Presocratic texts. Testimonia about a philosopher written by someone else are identified by the letter "A," and fragments of the philosopher's own works by the letter "B." "22A2," for instance, refers to the second of the testimonia listed on Heraclitus, to whom the number 22 is assigned; 28B1 refers to the first fragment of Parmenides. References to Plato are to the edition of his works produced by Henri Estienne (known as Stephanus) in 1578, and are given by title and "Stephanus" page number" (e.g., *Republic* 464d).

References to Aristotle are to Immanuel Bekker's edition (1831) and are given by title and "Bekker page and line number" (e.g., *Politics* 1252a10). Asterisks in the translations of Aristotle's works mark places where the Greek text being translated deviates from that in the standard (usually OCT) edition. Details about these textual deviations are provided in the Notes on the Text of Aristotle at the end of the book, where they are listed by Bekker number.

Marginal line numbers and references to them refer to the original text and are only approximate in the translations themselves. (In this ebook, the marginal numbers are enclosed in square brackets and embedded in the text.)

{x} The Eastern Mediterranean

{xi} Sicily and Southern Italy

{xii} Greece and Western Asia Minor


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SICILY
? MELISSUS
ANAXAGORAS
HERACLITUS
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ANAXIMANDER
THALES
ARISTOTLE
PLATO
CRITIAS
DEMOCRITUS
DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA
? LEUCIPPUS
SOCRATES
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PHILOLAUS
ZENO
EMPEDOCLES
PARMENIDES
PYTHAGORAS OF SAMOS
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Given the uncertainty of our evidence for the dates of the Presocratic philosophers, this time line is only approximate.

{xiv} ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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{1} THE PRESOCRATICS AND THE SOPHISTS

1. Introduction

Ancient tradition says that Thales of Miletus predicted an eclipse of the sun. Although we know none of the details of this supposed prediction, the event (an eclipse in 585 BCE) has traditionally marked the beginning of philosophy and science in Western thought. Aristotle, who was one of the earliest to think critically about the history of philosophy, speculated about why this kind of inquiry should have begun in Miletus, a Greek city on the Ionian coast of Asia minor (in what is now Turkey); like later scholars who have asked this question, Aristotle was unable to find an answer. The circumstances surrounding the beginning of philosophy remain unclear; perhaps the question is unanswerable. Nevertheless, Thales, the titular first philosopher, stands at the beginning of a great tradition of rational inquiry and critical thought about the world and the place of human beings in it that continues to the present day.

Thales was the first of a succession of thinkers known as the Presocratics who lived in Greece in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE.[1] These thinkers do not belong to any unified school of thought, and they differed dramatically in their views. Yet they share intellectual attitudes and assumptions and they all display an enthusiasm for inquiry that justifies studying them as a group. It cannot be merely Thales' reported prediction of an eclipse that can justify our thinking of him as the first Western philosopher and

scientist—after all, both the Babylonians and the Egyptians had complex astronomies. Nevertheless, for Aristotle and those who came after him, Thales, and his fellow-Milesians Anaximander and Anaximenes, shared an outlook that truly marks the beginning of philosophical inquiry. Part of this was a willingness to speculate and give reasons based on evidence and argument. Another aspect was a commitment to the view that the natural world (the entire universe) can be explained without needing to refer to anything beyond nature itself. For instance, Thales seems to have thought that everything is from water (although it is not clear whether he thought that water is the origin of all things, or that everything really is water in some form or another). This may strike us as a naïve and overly simplistic claim. Yet Aristotle saw in Thales' views something that suggested that Thales had reasons and arguments for them: [T]hey do not all agree about how many or what kinds of such principles there are, but Thales, the founder of this kind of philosophy, stated it to be water. (This is why he declared that the earth rests on water.) He may have gotten this idea from seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist, and that even the hot itself comes to be from this {2} and lives on this (the principle of all things is that from which they come to be) —getting this idea from this consideration and also because the seeds of all things have a moist nature; and water is the principle of the nature of moist things. (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.3 983b18–27 = DK 11A12) We may contrast Thales' account of the character of the natural world with the story Hesiod tells (probably in the century before Thales) about the origin of the cosmos: Tell me these things, Muses, who dwell on Olympus,
From the beginning, and tell me, which of them was born first.
First of all Chaos came into being. Next came
broad-breasted Gaia [Earth], the secure dwelling place forever of all
the immortals who hold the peak of snowy Olympus.
And murky Tartaros [Underworld] in a recess of the broad-roaded Earth,
and Eros [Love], who is the most beautiful among the immortal gods, who
loosens the limbs and overpowers the intentions and sensible plans

of all the gods and all humans too . . .

(Hesiod, *Theogony* 114–23, 37–38) Hesiod requests the help of the Muses for the claims he will make. He then reports on the births of the gods with the Muses' authority as his source. In relying on the Muses, Hesiod does not infer his account of the cosmos from natural evidence. Nor does he think that appeals to evidence are necessary: the divine warrant offered by the Muses is sufficient for his purposes. Hesiod's account of the origins of the universe (his cosmogony) is in fact a story of the origins of the gods (a theogony). Each aspect of the cosmos is identified with the distinct characteristics and personality of a god, who controls that part of the universe. The change from the state of chaos to the presence of Gaia (Earth), Tartaros (the deepest underworld), Eros (desire), Erebos (the darkness under the earth), and Night is not explained in this passage.[2] Earth, Tartaros, and Eros simply came to be; there is no attempt to explain how this happened or justify why they came to be at exactly this moment rather than another. Once Eros is present, the model of generation is primarily sexual, although we are told that Gaia gave birth to Pontos (sea) "without delightful love." These gods who, in some sense, *are* the different parts of the universe, behave like humans in their desires, emotions, and purposes. As in the Egyptian and Sumerian creation myths, the Hesiodic story makes no clear distinction between a personality and a part of the cosmos: the natural and the supernatural coincide. Since Hesiod feels no compunction about asserting his claims without reasons to support them, he seems to think that the proper response to the story is acceptance. The hearer or reader should not subject it to critical scrutiny followed by rational agreement or disagreement.

While the Presocratics rejected both the kind of account that Hesiod gave and his attitude toward uncritical belief, we must take care not to overstate the case: in the fragments of the Presocratics we shall find gaps in explanation, appeals to the Muses, apparent invocation of divine warrant, breaks in the connection between evidence and assertion. Despite all these apparent shortcomings, these early Greek thinkers took a bold leap in adopting a critical attitude. In the case of

the Milesians, for instance, we find each proposing something different as the ultimate foundational reality of the cosmos. Anaximander, who followed Thales, apparently rejected the idea that water is the basic stuff; in its place he posited a single reality {3} that he called the boundless (or the indefinite), something with no specific characteristics, out of which arise the other ingredients of the cosmos. Anaximander's follower Anaximenes, in turn rejects the boundless, apparently arguing that it was just too indefinite to do the job Anaximander required of it. Anaximenes claimed that air was the foundational stuff. Moreover, he seems to have seen that there was a gap in the earlier Milesian theories: Thales and Anaximander provided no mechanism to account for the transformations of their basic stuff. Anaximenes remedies this by proposing the processes of condensation and rarefaction: as air becomes more rarified or compacted, other stuffs are produced. Despite the disagreements among them, even this brief view shows that the Milesians worked within a shared framework of argument and justification.

Having adopted this critical attitude, the early Greek thinkers faced the question of what a human could justifiably claim to know. The Milesians might make claims about the basic stuff of the cosmos, and might give arguments for these claims, but how could they claim to have knowledge about an original or basic state of the universe, which they had never experienced? Hesiod would have an answer to this question: he could say that his information came from the Muses, and he could call on them to authenticate the truth of his claims about the coming-to-be of the gods. In the same way, we find Homer calling on the Muses when he wants to offer a catalogue of the leaders of the expedition to Troy. Because the Muses are divine they are immortal; since they were present for the gathering of the ships, they are appropriate as witnesses and can provide assurance that the story Homer tells is true: Tell me now Muses, who have dwellings in Olympus
for you are goddesses and present and know everything,
while we hear only rumor and we know nothing;
Who were the Greek commanders and leaders?
The throngs I could never tell nor name,

Not even if ten tongues, ten mouths belonged to me,
a voice unbroken, and a bronze heart within me,
Unless the Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-holding
Zeus, put into my mind those who came below Ilion.

(Homer, *Iliad* 2.484–92; tpc) Although the contexts differ, Homer and Hesiod use the invocation of the Muses to guarantee their claims: historical for Homer, religious and cosmogonical for Hesiod. Xenophanes of Colophon specifically rejects this justification. “By no means,” he says (21B18), “did the gods intimate all things to mortals from the beginning, but in time, by inquiring, they discover better” (tpc). In rejecting divine authority for their claims, the Presocratics invite inquiry into the sources of human knowledge. A tantalizing mention of this problem appears in a fragment from Alcmaeon, who echoes Homer’s claims that the gods know all things, but apparently offers a more pessimistic outlook for humans: “Concerning the unseen, the gods have clarity, but it is for men to conjecture from signs . . .” (DK 24B1; tpc). We do not have the end of the fragment, but it is clear that Alcmaeon is contrasting the limited epistemic status of humans with the exalted certainty that the gods enjoy.

We find the Presocratics considering what separates sure and certain knowledge from opinion or belief, and the roles of sense perception and thought in acquiring knowledge, and, indeed, worrying about the very possibility of such knowledge. Moreover, as competing theories about the cosmos appear, the problem of theory justification comes to the fore. Sometimes, as with the three Milesians, justification might be a question of which theory appears to fit the evidence best; but there is another aspect to theory justification, and that is {4} the metatheoretical question about what constitutes a genuine theory, regardless of the particular content. This problem is raised most strikingly by Parmenides of Elea, and his powerful arguments about what can be genuinely thought and said haunt the Greek thinkers who come after him, including Plato and Aristotle.

Although we call these early Greek thinkers “philosophers,” they would probably not have called themselves by that name.[3] They were active in many fields, and would not have thought that astronomy,

physics, practical engineering, mathematics, and what we call philosophy were separate disciplines, and most would not have thought that engaging in study of any of these areas would preclude them from being active in politics. In a society that was still more oral than literary, in which books (as scrolls, not codices) were just beginning to be written and distributed, the Presocratics thought and wrote about an astounding number of things. In the ancient testimonies about the Presocratics, we find reports of writings on physics, ethics, astronomy, epistemology, the gods and human worship of them, mathematics, metaphysics, meteorology, geometry, politics, the mechanism of sense perception, history (including the history of their own field), and even painting and travel. They wrote in poetry and they wrote in prose. They were as interested in the question of how a human being ought to live as in the question of the basic stuffs of the cosmos. Struggling to make philosophical notions clear in a language that did not yet have technical philosophical terms, they used elegant images and awkward analogies, straightforward arguments and intricate paradoxes. Much of their work has not survived, and we know of most of it only through the reports and quotations given by later philosophers and historians.[4] These later scholars preserved or referred to those parts of Presocratic thought that were most relevant for their own work; therefore most of what has come down to us are fragments of and testimonia about their views on natural philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, and so the bulk of material included in this volume is on those topics.

In the latter part of the fifth century BCE, there was great interest in social, political, and moral questions, and a number of thinkers explored these topics almost exclusively. They were called Sophists, and they were independent and often itinerant teachers of wisdom and practical political skills. Many of them were accomplished and flamboyant rhetoricians. They investigated questions about the nature of moral virtue and the best way for a city to be governed, taking on paying pupils to whom they taught their rhetorical skills and their social and political views. Most of them were contemporaries of Socrates and some of Plato (who despised them). Aristophanes, the

great comic poet, represents Socrates himself as a Sophist in *Clouds* (423 BCE, revised 418–416). In the play, the character Socrates has the traditional Presocratic interests in cosmological and meteorological subjects (although in Plato's dialogue *Phaedo*, Socrates stresses that he gave up studying these questions). Moreover, at the same time as philosophy was developing, so was medicine. Ancient medical practitioners were also interested in theory, and in the medical literature (collected in what is called the Hippocratic Corpus) there are overlaps with questions and problems that the Presocratics explored. All this suggests that absolute distinctions among Sophists, medical practitioners, and philosophers are too extreme.

In studying the Presocratics, the earliest Greek philosophers, we find ourselves at the beginning of a great intellectual adventure. The metaphysical, epistemological, logical, and ethical {5} problems and puzzles that engaged them became part of the philosophical project that Plato and Aristotle inherited and then passed on to other, later thinkers, including ourselves. We may find some of their assumptions and views to be strange, even a bit bizarre, and we may find some of their arguments difficult to comprehend. But these early Greek philosophers understood the importance of sustained rational inquiry and the critical evaluation of arguments and evidence. As we join them in this adventure, we, too, become part of that intellectual tradition that goes back to Miletus.

SOURCES

No Presocratic book has survived intact; what we know of the early Greek philosophers is gathered from other works or fragments of manuscripts. The Presocratics were quoted or referred to in many ancient works, ranging from philosophical treatises to works on

grammar or discourses on proper behavior. Our evidence is of two sorts: direct quotations (“fragments”) and summaries of views or references to particular thinkers and their theories (“testimonia”). One must take care in using these materials, because the extent of a quotation is often unclear, and there can be important disagreements about the proper text when more than one source provides evidence. The sources who quote or refer to the Presocratics have their own reasons for doing so: few are disinterested historians of ideas, and so their surrounding comments may mislead us about the actual view of the thinker quoted. It is important to keep in mind that interpretations are tentative, based on the best reconstruction of a view that one can offer, and using as much evidence as one can.

Plato and **Aristotle** refer to their predecessors and occasionally quote them; but special care is needed in dealing with these passages. Both used the views that they attributed to earlier philosophers for polemical purposes, and often phrased these views in their own later, and more technical, language. **Theophrastus**, **Eudemus**, and **Meno** were associates of Aristotle and, in a project organized by Aristotle, wrote treatises on the Presocratics. Theophrastus wrote on their theories of perception and their natural philosophy; Eudemus concentrated on astronomy, mathematics, and theology; Meno on medicine. Sadly, except for parts of Theophrastus’ *On Sensation*, most of these works are lost and survive only in fragments quoted by later scholars; but where they are available, they can provide valuable evidence. The Roman politician and orator **Cicero** (first century BCE) was a serious student of philosophy, and quotes and refers to the early Greek thinkers in his own works. In the second century CE, **Clement of Alexandria** wrote a treatise called *Miscellanies*, comparing Greek and Christian thought, in the course of which he often quotes Presocratics. Also in the second century, **Plutarch**, author of many essays (collected under the title *Moralia*), quotes from many of our early Greek thinkers, while the Skeptic **Sextus Empiricus** provides considerable evidence for Presocratic views on perception and knowledge. Also from the second century, the *Placita* (*Opinions*) contains information about Presocratic thought. Although the work was formerly attributed to Plutarch, it was in fact compiled by

someone else, about whom we know nothing else, and who is referred to as **pseudo-Plutarch**. The *Placita* was based on an earlier, now lost work, as is the fifth-century CE *Selections on Natural Philosophy* (*Eclogae Physicae*) by **John Stobaeus**. The lost work, by **Aëtius** (c. 100 CE), was itself based on earlier collections, and probably goes back to Theophrastus. In the late second or early third century CE, a bishop of Rome, **Hippolytus**, wrote the *Refutation of All Heresies*, in which he linked contemporary Christian heresies to Greek philosophical thought. In this he includes {6} summaries of Presocratic theories and provides extensive quotations from several of the Presocratics. The third century was also the time of **Diogenes Laertius**' entertaining, wide-ranging, and not entirely reliable *Lives of the Philosophers*, containing biographical reports, lists of book titles, and summaries of views; it is to be used with caution as it contains legends and inventions as well as some reliable information. The Neoplatonic philosopher **Simplicius** is a much later source: in the sixth century CE he wrote detailed commentaries on Aristotle, including a long commentary on Book I of the *Physics* (in which Aristotle discussed views of his predecessors). Simplicius is one of the most valuable sources for Presocratic philosophy, for in his commentaries he provides quotations from several important early philosophers, especially Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles (in all three cases, Simplicius is our only source for some passages; he tells us that he gives longer quotations than necessary from Parmenides because manuscripts of Parmenides have become rare and the material ought to be preserved). **Alexander of Aphrodisias** (c. 200 CE) and Simplicius' contemporary **John Philoponus** also preserved material through their philosophical commentaries.

On Abbreviations and Notes

The standard text collection for the Presocratics is H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th edition, Berlin, 1951, and later printings), commonly referred to as *DK*. This collection has defined the scholarly conventions for referring to Presocratic texts, whether in Greek, Latin, or a modern translation. For each Presocratic philosopher DK assigns an identifying number: for example, Heraclitus is 22 and Anaxagoras is 59. DK uses the letter *A* to indicate testimony from ancient sources about that person, and the letter *B* to refer to what are taken to be direct quotations from that figure's work. These quotations are also referred to as the *fragments*, since all we have are small sections from longer works. Furthermore, DK identifies the testimonia and fragments by unique numbers. Thus text identified as 22A2 refers to Heraclitus (22) testimony (A) number two (2); and text identified as 59B12 refers to Anaxagoras (59) fragment (B) number twelve (12).

For those texts that are not included in DK, the standard textual identification for the source is given along with the indication "not in DK." Where proper names follow the textual references, they refer to the editor(s) of the standard edition of the relevant text. References to two major papyrus collections use the standard abbreviations and numberings "P.Herc." (the Herculaneum Papyri) and "P.Oxy." (the Oxyrhynchus Papyri).

Unless otherwise indicated, translations are by Richard D. McKirahan. In the few places where I have modified his translations, "tmpc" appears in the source identification line; where I have translated the entire passage, "tpc" appears. All of the translations in Chapter 9 (Anaxagoras) are mine.

Notes on the texts are scattered throughout this collection. Notes from the translator (McKirahan) are marked as such; all other notes are mine.

Finally, in the translations of quoted passages from ancient authors, I use a system of brackets: (. . .) Parenthetical comment in the ancient text

<. . .> Supplements to the text (either proposed by scholars or added by the translator for the sake of clarity)

[. . .] Alternative possible translations, explanatory remarks, or context for the quoted passage {7} 2. THE MILESIANS

THALES, ANAXIMANDER, AND ANAXIMENES were all from the city of Miletus in Ionia (now the western coast of Turkey) and make up what is referred to as the Milesian "school" of philosophy. Tradition reports that Thales was the teacher of Anaximander, who in turn taught Anaximenes. Aristotle begins his account of the history of philosophy as the search for causes and principles (in Metaphysics I) with these three.

2.1. Thales

THALES APPEARS ON lists of the seven sages of Greece, a traditional catalog of wise men. The chronicler Apollodorus suggests that he was born around 625 BCE. We should accept this date only with caution, as Apollodorus usually calculated birth dates by assuming that a man was forty years old at the time of his "acme," or greatest achievement. Thus, Apollodorus arrives at the date by assuming that Thales indeed predicted an eclipse in 585 BCE, and was forty at the time. Plato and Aristotle tell stories about Thales which show that even in ancient times philosophers had a mixed reputation for practicality.

1. (11A9) They say that once when Thales was gazing upwards while doing astronomy, he fell into a well, and that a witty and charming Thracian serving-girl made fun of him for being eager to know the things in the heavens but failing to notice what was just behind him and right by his feet.

(Plato, *Theaetetus* 174a) **2.** (11A10) The story goes that when they were reproaching him for his poverty, supposing that philosophy is useless, he learned from his astronomy that the olive crop would be large. Then, while it was still winter, he obtained a little money and made deposits on all the olive presses both in Miletus and in Chios, and since no one bid against him, he rented them cheaply. When the time came, suddenly many requested the presses all at once, and he rented them out on whatever terms he wished, and so he made a great deal of money. In this way he proved that

philosophers can easily be wealthy if they wish, but this is not what they are interested in.

(Aristotle, *Politics* I.11 1259a9–18) THALES REPORTEDLY STUDIED astronomy (there is evidence for his interest in eclipses, whether or not he had anything to say about the eclipse of 585 BCE), geometry (he was said to have introduced the subject to Greece from Egypt), and engineering (Herodotus reports that he changed the course of the Halys River in order to aid the Lydian army). In his account of the cosmos, Thales reportedly said that the basic stuff was water: this could mean that everything comes from water as the originating source, or that everything really is water in one form or another. Aristotle, the source of the reports, seems unsure about which of these propositions Thales adopted. This shows that even by Aristotle's time, Thales was probably not known by any direct written evidence but only indirectly. According to the tradition that Aristotle follows, Thales also said that the earth rests or floats on water. Aristotle also reports that Thales thought that soul produces motion and that a magnetic lodestone has soul because it causes iron to move.

{8} **3.** (11A12) Of those who first pursued philosophy, the majority believed that the only principles of all things are principles in the form of matter. For that of which all existing things are composed and that from which they originally come to be and that into which they finally perish—the substance persisting but changing in its attributes—this they state is the element and principle of the things that are. . . . For there must be one or more natures from which the rest come to be, while it is preserved. However, they do not all agree about how many or what kinds of such principles there are, but Thales, the founder of this kind of philosophy, stated it to be water. (This is why he declared that the earth rests on water.) He may have gotten this idea from seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist, and that even the hot itself comes to be from this and lives on this (the principle of all things is that from which they come to be)—getting this idea from this consideration and also because the seeds of all things have a moist nature; and water is the principle of the nature of moist things.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.3 983b6–27) **4.** (11A14) Some say [the earth] rests on water. This is the oldest account that we have inherited, and they say that Thales of Miletus said this. It rests because it floats like wood or some other such thing (for nothing is by nature such as to rest on air, but on water). He says this just as though the same argument did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself!

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* II.13 294a28–34; tpc) **5.** (11A22) Some say the soul is mixed in with the whole universe, and perhaps this is why Thales supposed that all things are full of gods. From what is related about him, it seems that Thales too held that the soul is something productive of motion, if indeed he said that the lodestone has soul, because it moves iron.

(Aristotle, *De Anima* I.2 405a19–21; tpc) 2.2. Anaximander

DIOGENES LAERTIUS SAYS that Anaximander was sixty-four years old in 547/6 BCE, and this dating agrees with the ancient reports that say that Anaximander was a pupil or follower of Thales. He was said to have been the first person to construct a map of the world, to have set up a gnomon at Sparta, and to have predicted an earthquake. Anaximander makes the originating stuff of the cosmos something indefinite or boundless (*apeiron* in Greek; later the word can also mean “infinite”). This indefinite stuff is moving, directive of other things, and eternal; thus it qualifies as divine. The *apeiron* gives rise to something productive of hot and cold, but Anaximander does not say what this “something productive of hot and cold” is. The hot takes the form of fire, the origin of the sun and the other heavenly bodies; while the cold is a dark mist that can be transformed into air and earth. Both air and earth are originally moist, but become drier because of the fire. In the first changes from the originating *apeiron*, Anaximander postulates substantial opposites (the hot, the cold) that act on one another and that are in turn the generating stuffs for the sensible world. The reciprocal action of the opposites is the subject of B1, the only direct quotation we have from Anaximander (and the extent of the quotation is disputed by scholars). Here he stresses that changes in the world are not capricious, but are ordered; with the mention of justice and retribution he affirms that there are lawlike

forces guaranteeing the orderly processes of change between opposites. Anaximander also had theories about the natures of the heavenly bodies and why the earth remains fixed where it is. He made claims about meteorological phenomena, and about the origins of living things, including human beings.

{9} **1.** (12A9 + 12B1) Of those who declared that the *archē*[5] is one, moving and *apeiron*, Anaximander . . . said that the *apeiron* was the *archē* and element of things that are, and he was the first to introduce this name for the *archē* [that is, he was the first to call the *archē apeiron*]. (In addition he said that motion is eternal, in which it occurs that the heavens come to be.) He says that the *archē* is neither water nor any of the other things called elements, but some other nature which is *apeiron*, out of which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them. The things that are perish into the things from which they come to be, according to necessity, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice in accordance with the ordering of time, as he says in rather poetical language.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 24.13–21) **2.** (12A11) He says that the *archē* is neither water nor any of the other things called elements, but some nature which is *apeiron*, out of which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them. This is eternal and ageless and surrounds all the worlds. . . . In addition he said that motion is eternal, in which it occurs that the heavens come to be.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.6.1–2) **3.** (12A10) He declares that what arose from the eternal and is productive of [or, "capable of giving birth to"] hot and cold was separated off at the coming to be of this *kosmos*, and a kind of sphere of flame from this grew around the dark mist about the earth like bark about a tree. When it was broken off and enclosed in certain circles, the sun, moon, and stars came to be.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 2) **4.** (12A21) Anaximander says that the sun is equal to the earth, and the circle where it has its vent and on which it is carried is twenty-seven times <the size> of the earth.

(Aëtius 2.21.1)

5. (12A18) Anaximander says that the stars are borne by the circles and spheres on which each one is mounted.

(Aëtius 2.16)

6. (12A11) The earth is aloft and is not supported by anything. It stays at rest because its distance from all things is equal. The earth's shape is curved, round, like a stone column. We walk on one of the surfaces and the other one is set opposite. The stars come to be as a circle of fire separated off from the fire in the *kosmos* and enclosed by dark mist. There are vents, certain tube-like passages at which the stars appear. For this reason, eclipses occur when the vents are blocked. The moon appears sometimes waxing, sometimes waning as the passages are blocked or opened. The circle of the sun is twenty-seven times <that of the earth and> that of the moon <eighteen times>, and the sun is highest, and the circles of the fixed stars are lowest. Winds occur when the finest vapors of dark mist are separated off and collect together and then are set in motion. Rain results from the vapor arising from the earth under the influence of the sun. Lightning occurs whenever wind escapes and splits the clouds apart.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.6.3–7) **7.** (12A23) Anaximander says that these [thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, waterspouts, and hurricanes] all result from wind. For whenever it [wind] is enclosed in a thick cloud and forcibly escapes because it is so fine and light, then the bursting [of the cloud] creates the noise and the splitting creates the flash against the blackness of the cloud.

(Aëtius 3.3.1)

8. (12A26) Some, like Anaximander . . . declare that the earth stays at rest because of equality. For it is no more fitting for what is situated at the center and is equally far from the extremes to move up rather than down or sideways. And it is impossible for it to move in opposite directions at the same time. Therefore, it stays at rest of necessity.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* II.13 295b11–16) {10} **9.** (12A30) Anaximander says that the first animals were produced in moisture, enclosed in thorny barks. When their age advanced they came out onto the drier part, their bark broke off, and they lived a different mode of life for a short time.

(Aëtius 5.19.4)

10. (12A10) He also declares that in the beginning humans were born from animals of a different kind, since other animals quickly manage on their own, and humans alone require lengthy nursing. For this reason they would not have survived if they had been like this at the beginning.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Opinions* 2) **11.** (12A30) Anaximander . . . believed that there arose from heated water and earth either fish or animals very like fish. In these, humans grew and were kept inside as embryos up to puberty. Then finally they burst, and men and women came forth already able to nourish themselves.

(Censorinus, *On the Day of Birth* 4.7)

2.3. Anaximenes

ANCIENT SOURCES SAY that Anaximenes was a younger associate or pupil of Anaximander. Like Anaximander he agrees with Thales that there is a single originative stuff, but he disagrees with both Thales and Anaximander about what it is. He calls this basic stuff *aēr* (usually translated "air," although *aēr* is more like a dense mist than what we think of as air, which is ideally transparent). Aēr is indefinite enough to give rise to the other things in the cosmos, but it is not as vague as Anaximander's *apeiron* (or indefinite). Anaximander seems to have left it unclear just what it is that comes from the *apeiron* and then produces the hot and the cold, and Anaximenes could well have argued that the *apeiron* was simply too indefinite to do the cosmic job Anaximander intended for it. In a major step away from Thales and Anaximander, Anaximenes explicitly includes condensation and rarefaction as the processes that transform *aēr* and the other stuffs of the cosmos. Like the other Presocratics, Anaximenes gave explanations of all sorts of meteorological and other natural phenomena.

1. (13A5) Anaximenes . . . like Anaximander, declares that the underlying nature is one and unlimited [*apeiron*] but not indeterminate, as Anaximander held, but definite, saying that it is air. It differs in rarity and density according to the substances <it becomes>. Becoming finer, it comes to be fire; being condensed, it comes to be wind, then cloud; and

when still further condensed, it becomes water, then earth, then stones, and the rest come to be from these. He too makes motion eternal and says that change also comes to be through it.

(Theophrastus, quoted by Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 24.26–25.1) **2.** (13B2) Just as our soul, being air, holds us together and controls us, so do breath and air surround the whole *kosmos*.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Opinions* 876AB) **3.** (13A10) Anaximenes determined that air is a god and that it comes to be and is without measure, infinite, and always in motion.

(Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.10.26) **4.** (13A7) Anaximenes . . . declared that the principle is unlimited [*apeiron*] air, from which come to be things that are coming to be, things that have come to be, and things that will be, and gods and divine things. The rest come to be out of the products of this. The form of air is the following: when it is most even, it is invisible, but it is revealed by the cold and the hot and the wet, and by its motion. It is always moving, for all the things that undergo change would not change if it were not moving. For when it becomes condensed or finer, it appears different. For {11} when it is dissolved into a finer condition it becomes fire, and on the other hand air being condensed becomes winds. Cloud comes from air through felting,[6] and water comes to be when this happens to a greater degree. When condensed still more it becomes earth, and when it reaches the absolutely densest stage it becomes stones.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.7.1–3) **5.** (13B1) Or as Anaximenes of old believed, let us leave neither the cold nor the hot in the category of substance, but <hold them to be> common attributes of matter, which come as the results of its changes. For he declares that the contracted state of matter and the condensed state is cold, whereas what is fine and "loose" (calling it this way with this very word) is hot. As a result he claimed that it is not said unreasonably that a person releases both hot and cold from his mouth. For the breath becomes cold when compressed and condensed by the lips, and when the mouth is relaxed, the escaping breath becomes warm because of rareness.

(Plutarch, *The Principle of Cold* 7 947F) **6.** (13A6) When the air was being felted the earth was the first thing to come into being, and it is very flat. This is why it rides upon the air, as is reasonable.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 3) **7.** (13A20) Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Democritus say that its flatness is the cause of its staying at rest. For it does not cut the air below but covers it like a lid, as bodies with flatness apparently do; they are difficult for winds to move because of their resistance. They say that the earth does this same thing with respect to the air beneath because of its flatness. And the air, lacking sufficient room to move aside, stays at rest in a mass because of the air beneath.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* II.13 294b13–20) **8.** (13A7) Likewise the sun and moon and all the other heavenly bodies, which are fiery, ride upon the air on account of their flatness. The stars came into being from the earth because moisture rises up out of it. When the moisture becomes fine, fire comes to be and the stars are formed of fire rising aloft. There are also earthen bodies in the region of the stars carried around together with them. He says that the stars do not move under the earth as others have supposed, but around it, as a felt cap turns around our head. The sun is hidden not because it is under the earth but because it is covered by the higher parts of the earth and on account of the greater distance it comes to be from us. Because of their distance the stars do not give heat.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.7.4–6) **9.** (13A17) Anaximenes stated that clouds occur when the air is further thickened. When it is condensed still more, rain is squeezed out. Hail occurs when the falling water freezes, and snow when some wind is caught up in the moisture.

(Aëtius 3.4.1)

10. (13A21) Anaximenes declares that when the earth is being drenched and dried out it bursts, and earthquakes result from these hills breaking off and collapsing. This is why earthquakes occur in droughts and also in heavy rains. For in the droughts, as was said, the earth is broken while being dried out, and when it becomes excessively wet from the waters, it falls apart.

(Aristotle, *Meteorology* II.7 365b6–12) {12}

3. Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism

Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos in the eastern Aegean some time around 570 BCE; according to tradition his father was a gem-cutter or engraver. He reportedly traveled in Egypt and Babylonia, leaving Samos around 530 to escape the rule of the tyrant Polycrates. Eventually, Pythagoras settled in Croton, in southern Italy. There he was well respected and gained political influence. He founded a community for himself and his followers that was philosophical, political, and religious. The exclusivity of the group angered some, and in about 500 there was an uprising in Croton (and elsewhere in Italy) against the Pythagoreans. The Pythagoreans were temporarily driven out of Croton, and many were killed. Pythagoras himself took refuge in Metapontum and died not long afterward (some say he starved himself to death in a temple). Despite these and other setbacks—some Pythagoreans departed for the Greek mainland—there continued to be groups of Pythagoreans in southern Italy until about 400. Even then Archytas of Tarentum remained. He was a great mathematician and a friend of Plato.

Little is known of the views of Pythagoras himself, except that he had a reputation for great learning—a reputation that would later be mocked by Heraclitus—and that he was most likely the originator of the important and influential Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, a view that Xenophanes ridiculed. This difficulty is noted by those in the ancient world who wrote about Pythagoras (see selection number 6 below). Sometime during his life or after his death, Pythagoras' followers split into two groups, which mirrored the two aspects of Pythagorean teaching. These groups were the *mathēmatikoi* and the *akousmatikoi*.[7] The *akousmatikoi* were disciples who venerated Pythagoras' teachings on religion and the proper way to live, but had little interest in the philosophical aspects of Pythagoreanism. The *mathēmatikoi* had a great reputation in the ancient world for philosophical, mathematical, musical, and astronomical knowledge, while still following a Pythagorean way of life. All these different branches of study were connected in

Pythagorean thought, for the Pythagoreans believed that number was the key to understanding the cosmos. Their original insight seemed to be that the apparent chaos of sound can be brought into rational, hence knowable, order by the imposition of number. They reasoned that the entire universe is a harmonious arrangement (kosmos in Greek), ordered by and so knowable through number. The Pythagoreans apparently rejected the Ionian methods of inquiry, and turned from searching out the basic stuff of the universe to a study of the form that makes it a *kosmos.*

Note on the texts: The evidence about Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism is to be found in several chapters in DK. In the texts given here, the first number in parentheses is the DK number for the chapter in which the passage occurs.

{13} **1.** (21B7) Once he passed by as a puppy was being beaten, the story goes, and in pity said these words: “Stop, do not beat him, since it is the soul of a man, a friend of mine, which I recognized when I heard it crying.”

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.36) **2.** (36B4) Thus he [Pherecydes] excelled in both manhood and reverence
and even in death has a delightful life for his soul,
if indeed Pythagoras was truly wise about all things,
he who truly knew and had learned thoroughly the opinions of men.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.120) **3.** (31B129) There was a certain man among them who knew very holy matters,
who possessed the greatest wealth of mind,
mastering all sorts of wise deeds.
For when he reached out with all his mind,
easily he would survey every one of the things that are,
yea, within ten and even twenty generations of humans.[8]

(Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 30) **4.** (14.10)[9] Is Homer said to have been during his life a guide in education for people who delighted in associating with him and passed down to their followers a Homeric way of life? Pythagoras himself was greatly admired for this, and his followers even

nowadays name a way of life Pythagorean and are conspicuous among others.

(Plato, *Republic* X 600a–b) **5.** (14.1) The Egyptians were the first to declare this doctrine, too, that the human soul is immortal, and each time the body perishes it enters into another animal as it is born. When it has made a circuit of all terrestrial, marine, and winged animals, it once again enters a human body as it is born. Its circuit takes three thousand years. Some Greeks have adopted this doctrine, some earlier and some later, as if it were peculiar to them. I know their names, but do not write them.

(Herodotus, *Histories* 2.123) **6.** (14.8a) What he said to his associates, no one is able to say with any certainty, for they kept no ordinary silence among themselves. But it was especially well-known by all that first he declares that the soul is immortal; then that it changes into other kinds of animals; in addition that things that happen recur at certain intervals, that nothing is absolutely new, and that all things that come to be alive must be thought akin. Pythagoras seems to have been the first to introduce these opinions into Greece.

(Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 19) **7.** (58B40) Some of them [the Pythagoreans] declared that the soul is the motes in the air, and others that it is what makes the motes move.

(Aristotle, *De Anima* I.2 404a17) **8.** (14.8) Heraclides of Pontus says that Pythagoras said the following about himself. Once he had been born Aethalides and was believed to be the son of Hermes. When Hermes told him to choose whatever he wanted except immortality, he asked to retain both alive and dead the memory of what happened to him. . . . Afterwards he entered into Euphorbus and was wounded by Menelaus. Euphorbus said that once he had been born as Aethalides and received the gift from Hermes, and told of the migration of his soul and what plants and animals it had belonged to and all it had experienced in Hades. When Euphorbus died his soul entered Hermotimus, who, wishing to provide evidence, went to Branchidae, entered the sanctuary of Apollo, and showed the shield {14} Menelaus had dedicated. (He said that when Menelaus was sailing away from Troy he dedicated the shield to Apollo.) The shield had already rotted

away and only the ivory facing was preserved. When Hermotimus died, it [the soul] became Pyrrhus the Delian fisherman and again remembered everything. . . . When Pyrrhus died it became Pythagoras and remembered all that had been said.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.4–5) **9.** (18,2, 58C4) There are two kinds of the Italian philosophy called Pythagorean, since two types of people practiced it—the *akousmatikoi* and the *mathēmatikoi*. Of these, the *akousmatikoi* were admitted to be Pythagoreans by the others, but they, in turn, did not recognize the *mathēmatikoi* but claimed that their pursuits were not those of Pythagoras, but of Hippasus. . . . The philosophy of the *akousmatikoi* consists of unproved and unargued *akousmata* to the effect that one must act in appropriate ways, and they also try to preserve all the other sayings of Pythagoras as divine dogma. These people claim to say nothing of their own invention and say that to make innovations would be wrong. But they suppose that the wisest of their number are those who have got the most *akousmata*.

(Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 81, 82; from Aristotle?) **10.** (58C4) All the *akousmata* referred to in this way fall under three headings: (a) Some indicate what something is; (b) others indicate what is something in the greatest degree; and (c) others what must or must not be done. (a) The following indicate what something is. What are the Isles of the Blest? Sun and Moon. What is the oracle at Delphi? The tetractys, which is the harmony in which the Sirens sing. (b) Others indicate what is something in the greatest degree. What is most just? To sacrifice. What is the wisest? Number, and second wisest is the person who assigned names to things. What is the wisest thing in our power? Medicine. What is most beautiful? Harmony.

(Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 82; from Aristotle?) **11.** (58C3) <Pythagoras ordered his followers> not to pick up <food> which had fallen, to accustom them not to eat self-indulgently or because it fell on the occasion of someone’s death . . . not to touch a white rooster, because it is sacred to the Month and is a suppliant; it is a good thing, and is sacred to the Month because it indicates the hours, and white is of the nature of good, while black is of the nature of evil . . . not to break bread, because friends

long ago used to meet over a single loaf just as foreigners still do, and not to divide what brings them together. Others <explain this practice> with reference to the judgment in Hades, others say that it brings cowardice in war, and still others that the whole universe begins from this.

(Aristotle, *fr.* 195 [Rose], quoted in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.34ff.) **12.** (58C6) Do not stir the fire with a knife.
Rub out the mark of a pot in the ashes.
Do not wear a ring.
Do not have swallows in the house.
Spit on your nail parings and hair trimmings.
Roll up your bedclothes on rising and smooth out the imprint of the body.
Do not urinate facing the sun.

(Selections from Iamblichus, *Protrepticus* 21; from Aristotle?) **13.** The tetractys is a certain number, which being composed of the four first numbers produces the most perfect number, 10. For 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 come to be 10. This number is the first tetractys and is called the source of ever-flowing nature, since according to them the entire *kosmos* is organized according to *harmonia*, and *harmonia* is a system of three concords, the fourth, the fifth, and the octave, and the proportions of these three concords are found in the aforementioned four numbers.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.94–95; not in DK) **14.** (58B4) At the same time as these [Leucippus and Democritus] and, before them, those called Pythagoreans took hold of mathematics {15} and were the first to advance that study; and being brought up in it, they believed that its principles are the principles of all things that are. Since numbers are naturally first among these, and in numbers they thought they observed many resemblances to things that are and that come to be . . . and since they saw the attributes and ratios of musical scales in numbers, and other things seemed to be made in the likeness of numbers in their entire nature, and numbers seemed to be primary in all nature, they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all things that are.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.5 985b23–28; 33–986a2) **15.** (58B5) Others of this same school declare that there are ten principles arranged in parallel columns:

limit unlimited

odd even

one plurality

right left

male female

at rest moving

straight bent

light darkness

good evil

square oblong

This is how Alcmaeon of Croton too seems to have understood things, and either he took this theory from them or they from him. . . . He says that most human matters are pairs, identifying as the oppositions not definite ones like the Pythagoreans . . . but the Pythagoreans described how many and what the oppositions are.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.5 986a22–b2)

4. Xenophanes of Colophon

Born in Colophon, a city on the west coast of what is now Turkey, near Miletus (home to Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes) and Ephesus (the city of Heraclitus), Xenophanes was an itinerant poet and philosopher. On his own evidence, he lived to a great age, and although the subjects discussed in the surviving fragments and testimonia give evidence of the scope of his travels, the details of his life are hazy. He was born c.570 BCE and seems to have left Colophon after it fell to the Medes in 546/5. He refers to Pythagoras and the doctrine of transmigration of souls in one fragment, and some in the ancient tradition say that he was a teacher of Parmenides (this is most unlikely).

Xenophanes wrote in verse, and while some of the surviving fragments deal with typical poetic topics, he also addressed what would now be called theological and philosophical questions. He rejected the traditional views of the Olympian gods, such as are found in Homer and Hesiod, and claimed that there was a supreme non-anthropomorphic god, who controls the cosmos by thought. Whether Xenophanes claimed that there was a single god or only that the supreme god was the greatest of an unnamed number of gods is debated by scholars. He rejected divination and the view that natural phenomena, such as rainbows, have divine significance and claimed that there is no divine communication to human beings. Humans must find out for themselves by inquiry; moreover, Xenophanes raises questions about the possibility of sure and certain knowledge, and suggests that humans must be satisfied with belief or opinion, although he probably thought that this must be backed with evidence. He had a keen interest in the natural world, which is not surprising,

given his commitment to inquiry. He noted fossils of sea creatures in the mountains and developed a complicated “cloud astrophysics” to explain the phenomena of the heavens. He argued that {16} the earth is indefinitely broad and extends downward indefinitely, thus rejecting the view that the sun travels under the earth. Even in “traditional” areas for poets he seems to have held strong views: he gives instructions for a symposium (a drinking party) and laments the over-glorification of athletes. Recent scholarship has come to appreciate Xenophanes as a crucial figure in early Greek thought, whose views on knowledge and the divine were important for later thinkers.

1. (B1) For now the floor is clean, and the hands of all,
and the cups. One is putting on the woven wreaths,
another is offering fragrant myrrh in a bowl,
a mixing bowl stands full of joy,
another wine, gentle and scented of flowers, is at hand in wine-jars
and boasts that it will never betray us.
In the middle, frankincense is sending forth its holy scent.
There is cold water sweet and pure.
Golden loaves of bread are served and a magnificent table
is laden with cheese and rich honey.
In the center an altar is completely covered in flowers
and the rooms are full of song and good cheer.
Cheerful men should first sing a hymn to the god
with well-omened words and pure speech.
When they have poured an offering and prayed to be able to do acts of justice
(for indeed these are the first things to pray for),
it is not going too far (*hubris*) if you drink only as much as permits you to reach
home without assistance (unless you are very aged).
Praise the man who after drinking behaves nobly
in that he possesses memory and aims for excellence (*aretē*)
and relates neither battles of Titans nor Giants
nor Centaurs—the fictions of our fathers—

nor violent conflicts; there is no use in these,
but it is good always to have high regard for the gods.

(Athenaeus, *Scholars at Dinner* 11.462c; tmpc) **2.** (B2) If anyone were to achieve a victory
at Zeus's sanctuary at Olympia by the streams of Pisa
in a foot race or the pentathlon or in wrestling
or the painful art of boxing
or the frightful contest they call the pankration,[10]
he would be more glorious in the eyes of the citizens.
They would grant him a seat of honor at the games,
he would enjoy meals at public expense
and a gift from the city for his children to inherit.
Even if he were to be victorious with horses he would obtain these things.
Though he is not as worthy of them as I. For superior to the strength
of men or horses is my wisdom.
But these ways are misguided and it is not right
to put strength ahead of wisdom, which is good.
If an excellent boxer were among the people
or someone excellent at the pentathlon or in wrestling
or in the foot race (which is the most highly honored
display of strength of all men's deeds in the contests);
that would not make a city be any more in a state of *eunomia*.[11]
A city will find little joy in a person
who wins in the contests by the banks of Pisa,
since this does not fatten the city's storerooms.

(Athenaeus, *Scholars at Dinner* 10.413f) **3.** (B7) Once he passed by as a puppy was being beaten,
the story goes, and in pity said these words:
"Stop, do not beat him, since it is the soul of {17} a man, a friend of mine,
which I recognized when I heard it crying."[12]

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.36) **4.** (B8) Already there are sixty-seven years

tossing my speculation throughout the land of Greece,
and from my birth there were twenty-five in addition to these,
if indeed I know how to speak truly about these matters.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.19) **5.** (B10) Ever since the beginning all have learned according to Homer . . .

(Herodian, *On Doubtful Syllables* 296.6; tpc) **6.** (B11) Both Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all deeds
which among men are matters of reproach and blame:
thieving, adultery, and deceiving one another.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.193) **7.** (B12) . . . as they sang of many illicit acts of the gods
thieving, adultery, and deceiving one another.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 1.289; tpc) **8.** (B14) But mortals suppose that the gods are born,
have human clothing, and voice, and bodily form.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.109) **9.** (B15) If horses had hands, or oxen or lions,
or if they could draw with their hands and produce works as men do,
then horses would draw figures of gods like horses, and oxen like oxen,
and each would render the bodies
to be of the same frame that each of them have.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.110; tpc) **10.** (B16) Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and dark,
Thracians, that theirs are grey-eyed and red-haired.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 7.22; tpc) **11.** (B18) By no means did the gods intimate all things to mortals from the beginning,
but in time, inquiring, they discover better.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.8.2; tpc) **12.** (B23) One god, greatest among gods and men,
not at all like mortals in form or thought.

(Clement, *Miscellanies,* 5.109; tpc) **13.** (B24) . . . whole [he] sees, whole [he] thinks, and whole [he] hears.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.144; tpc) **14.** (B26) . . . always [he] remains in the same [state], changing not at all, nor is it fitting that [he] come and go to different places at different times.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 23.10; tpc) **15.** (B25) . . . but completely without toil [he] agitates all things by the will of his mind.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 23.19; tpc) **16.** (B27) For all things are from the earth and all return to the earth in the end.

(Theodoretus, *Treatment of Greek Conditions* 4.5) **17.** (B28) The earth's upper limit is seen here at our feet,
touching the air. But the lower part goes down without limit.

(Achilles Tatius, *Introduction to the Phaenomena of Aratus* 4.34.11) **18.** (B29) All things that come into being and grow are earth and water.

(John Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1.5.125) **19.** (B30) Sea is the source of water and the source of wind.
For not without the wide sea would there come to be
{18} in clouds the force of wind blowing out from within,
nor streams of rivers nor rain water from the sky,
but the great wide sea is the sire of clouds and winds and rivers.

(Geneva Scholium on *Iliad* 21.196) **20.** (B31) . . . the sun passing high over the earth and warming it.

(Heraclitus Homericus, *Homeric Allegories* 44.5; tpc) **21.** (B32) She whom they call Iris, this too is by nature cloud:
purple, and red, and greeny-yellow to behold.

(Scholium BLT on *Iliad* 11.27; tpc) **22.** (B33) We all come into being out of earth and water.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 10.314) **23.** (B34) . . . and of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen

nor will there be anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things;
for even if, in the best case, someone happened to speak what has been brought to pass,
nevertheless, he himself would not know, but opinion is ordained for all.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.49.110; tpc) **24.** (B35) Let these things be believed as resembling the truth.

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 9.7.746b) **25.** (B36) . . . however many they have made evident for mortals to behold.

(Herodian, *On Doubtful Syllables* 296.9) **26.** (B38) If god had not fashioned yellow honey, they would say that figs are far sweeter.

(Herodian, *On Peculiar Speech* 41.5) **27.** (A12) Xenophanes used to say that those who say that the gods are born are just as impious as those who say that they die, since either way it follows that there is a time when the gods do not exist.

(Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II.23 1399b6–9) **28.** (A30) Some declared the universe to be a single substance . . . not supposing, like some of the natural philosophers, that what-is is one, and generating <the universe> out of the one as out of matter, but speaking differently. For the others add change, since they generate the universe, but these people say it is unchangeable. . . . Xenophanes, who was the first of these to preach monism (Parmenides is said to have been his student) made nothing clear . . . but looking off to the whole heaven he declares that the one is god.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.5 986b10–25) **29.** (A32) He says that the sun is gathered together from many small fires. . . . He declares that the earth is without limit and is not surrounded by air in every direction, that all things come into being from the earth. And he says that sun and stars come into being from the clouds.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* 4) **30.** (A40) The sun <is constituted> out of incandescent clouds.[13]

(Stobaeus, *Opinions* 2.20.3) **31.** (A38) <The stars> are constituted out of ignited clouds that die down every day but become fiery again by night, just like coals.

(Aëtius 2.13.13)

32. (A44) All things of this sort [comets, shooting stars, etc.] are aggregations of incandescent clouds.

(Aëtius 3.2.11)

33. (A33) [Xenophanes] says that the sun comes to be each day from the gathering together of many small fires, that the earth is unlimited and surrounded by neither the air nor the heavens. There are unlimited numbers of suns and moons, and everything is from the earth. He declared that the sea is salty because many mixtures flow together in it. . . . Xenophanes believes that earth is being mixed into the sea {19} and over time it is dissolved by the moisture, saying that he has the following kinds of proofs: sea shells are found in the middle of earth and in mountains, and imprints of fish and seals have been found at Syracuse in the quarries, and the imprint of coral [or, "of a laurel leaf"] in the depth of the stone in Paros, and on Malta flat impressions of all forms of marine life. He says that these came about when all things were covered with mud long ago and the impressions were dried in the mud. All humans perish when the earth is carried down into the sea and becomes mud, and then there is another beginning of generation, and this change occurs in all the *kosmoi* [that is, in every such cycle].

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.14.3–6) **34.** (A39) <Concerning the stars that are called the *Dioscuri*>[14] Xenophanes says that the things like stars that appear on boats are small clouds that glimmer as a result of a certain kind of motion.

(Aëtius 2.18.1)

5. Heraclitus of Ephesus

According to Diogenes Laertius, Heraclitus of Ephesus was born around 540 BCE. He was a member of one of the aristocratic families of that city, but turned his back on the sort of political life normally associated with persons of rank, ceding his hereditary ruling position to his brother. In the ancient world, he had a reputation for both misanthropy and obscurity—among his traditional nicknames were "the Obscure," and "the Riddler." The reputation is no doubt based on his rude comments about other philosophers, historians, and people in general, the nicknames on the enigmatic paradoxes he uses to present his views. He is said to have written a single book, of which fragment 1 was likely the beginning (or very near the beginning).

Although Heraclitus has cosmological views, many of which seem to have been influenced by Xenophanes, he is as interested in exploring questions about knowledge, the soul, and the human condition as in making claims about the physical world. He asserted that a single divine law controls and steers the cosmos. He calls this the logos. The word logos means, among other things, "account," or "thing said," or even "word." As with the English word "account," to give a *logos* is to say something, but also to give an explanation. Heraclitus is well aware of the ambiguities and complications possible in the words he uses, and he takes full advantage of the flexibility of the Greek language to make multiple points. Although the logos is an objective and independent truth available to all, Heraclitus is convinced that most people do not exercise the capacities required to come to understand it, and instead act like dreamers asleep in their own private worlds. Treating the logos as the divine law of the cosmos, the content of which is a truth to be grasped by humans who can (with difficulty) come to understand the cosmos, Heraclitus attempts to bridge the gap between divine and human knowledge pointed out by Homer, Hesiod, and Alcmaeon. The soul that understands the logos can, apparently, have the sure and certain knowledge that Xenophanes claimed "no man has seen." The path to this understanding is not, Heraclitus thinks, just the inquiry

recommended by Xenophanes: Heraclitus ridicules those who have much learning but little {20} understanding. The accumulation of facts without insight into the divine law-like workings of the cosmos is useless. Understanding how all things form a unity is a fundamental part of the necessary insight. Heraclitus offers signs of this unity in his paradoxical claims about the identity of opposites, insisting that despite unceasing change in the cosmos, there is an unchanging principle—the *logos*—that both governs and explains these changes. The physical sign of the logos is fire: always changing yet always the same.

Note on the order of the fragments: Sextus Empiricus, our source for the first two fragments, says that they occurred at or near the beginning of Heraclitus' book, but we do not have similar information for the rest of the fragments. Their ordering is a controversial issue, as a particular order can impose an interpretation. In DK the fragments are ordered alphabetically by the name of the source. Here, the fragments are grouped more or less thematically, beginning with B1 and B2, and then going on to some general comments about the inadequacies of other thinkers and ordinary people. There are then observations on the difficulty of learning about the *logos*, but also encouraging remarks suggesting that proper thinking can lead people to the truth contained in the *logos*. There follow claims about the content of the *logos*, opposition and the unity of opposites, and the cosmos. Finally, there are fragments on soul, the human condition, and some remarks on religion. The reader should keep in mind that most Heraclitean sentences address several philosophical problems, and can be relevant for making a number of philosophical points. Fragments whose authenticity is disputed are marked with an asterisk (*).

1. (22B1) Although this *logos* holds always humans prove unable to understand it both before hearing it and when they have first heard it. For although all things come to be [or, "happen"] in accordance with this *logos*, humans are like the inexperienced when they experience such words and deeds as I set out, distinguishing each thing in accordance with

its nature (*physis*) and saying how it is. But other people fail to notice what they do when awake, just as they forget what they do while asleep.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.132) **2.** (B2) For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common. But although the *logos* is common, most people live as if they had their own private understanding.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.133) **3.** (B40) Much learning [“polymathy”] does not teach insight. Otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras and moreover Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.1) **4.** (B129) Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus practiced inquiry [*historiē*] more than all other men, and making a selection of these writings constructed his own wisdom, polymathy, evil trickery.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.6) **5.** (B42) Heraclitus said that Homer deserved to be expelled from the contests and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.1) **6.** (B39) In Priene was born Bias, son of Teutames, whose worth (*logos*) is greater than the others’.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.88) {21} **7.** (B57) Most men’s teacher is Hesiod. They are sure he knew most things—a man who could not recognize day and night; for they are one.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.2) **8.** (B104) What understanding (*noos*) or intelligence (*phrēn*) have they? They put their trust in popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, unaware that most people are bad, and few are good.

(Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I* 117, Westerink) **9.** (B86) Divine things for the most part escape recognition because of unbelief.

(Plutarch, *Life of Coriolanus* 38 = Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.88.4) **10.** (B108) Of all those whose accounts (*logoi*) I have heard, no one reaches the point of recognizing that what is wise is set apart from all.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.174) **11.** (B50) Listening not to me, but to the *logos*, it is wise to agree that all things are one.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.1) **12.** (B123) Nature (*physis*) loves to hide.

(Themistius, *Orations* 5.69) **13.** (B107) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to people if they have barbarian[15] souls.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.126) **14.** (B34) Uncomprehending when having heard, they are like the deaf. The saying describes them: being present they are absent.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.115.3; tpc) **15.** (B93) The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals but gives a sign.

(Plutarch, *On the Pythian Oracle* 404D) **16.** (B113) Thinking (*phronein*) is common to all.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.179) **17.** (B112) Right thinking (*sōphronein*) is the greatest excellence, and wisdom (*sophia*) is to speak the truth and act in accordance with nature (*physis*) while paying attention to it.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.178) **18.***(B73) One ought not to act and speak like people asleep.

(Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 4.43) **19.** (B89) For the waking there is one common world, but when asleep each person turns away to a private one.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Superstition* 166c) **20.** (B26) A man in the night kindles a light for himself when his sight is extinguished; living he touches[16] the dead when asleep, when awake he touches the sleeper.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.141.2) **21.** (B21) What we see when awake is death, what we see asleep is sleep.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 3.21.1) **22.** (B114) Those who speak with understanding (*noos*) must rely firmly on what is common to all as a city must rely on [its?] law, and much more firmly. For all human laws are

nourished by one law, the divine law; for it has as much power as it wishes and is sufficient for all and is still left over.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.179) **23.** (B18) Unless he hopes for the unhoped for, he will not find it, since it is not to be hunted out and is impassable.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 2.17.4) **24.** (B22) Those who seek gold dig up much earth but find little.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.4.2) **25**. (B17) For many, in fact all that come upon them, do not understand such things, nor when they have noticed them do they know them, but they seem to themselves <to do so>.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 2.8.1) **26.***(B72) They are at odds with the *logos*, with which above all they are in continuous {22} contact, and the things they meet every day appear strange to them.

(Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 4.46) **27.***(B70) [Heraclitus judged human opinions to be] children's playthings.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 2.1.16) **28.** (B19) [Rebuking some for their unbelief, Heraclitus says,] Knowing neither how to hear nor how to speak.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 2.24.5) **29.** (B28) The knowledge of the most famous persons, which they guard, is but opinion. . . . Justice will convict those who fabricate falsehoods and bear witness to them.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.9.3) **30.** (B87) A fool is excited by every word (*logos*).

(Plutarch, *On Listening to Lectures* 40f–41a) **31.** (B97) Dogs bark at everyone they do not know.

(Plutarch, *Should Old Men Take Part in Politics?* 787c) **32.** (B56) People are deceived about the knowledge of obvious things, like Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks. For children who were killing lice deceived him by saying, "All we saw and caught we have left behind, but all we neither saw nor caught we bring with us."

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5) **33.** (B47) Let us not make random conjectures about the greatest matters.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.73) **34.** (B116) It belongs to all people to know themselves and to think rightly (*sōphronein*).

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.5.6) **35.** (B35) Men who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things indeed.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.140.5) **36.** (B101) I searched [*or:* inquired into] myself.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1118C) **37.** (B54) An unapparent connection (*harmonia*) is stronger than an apparent one.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5) **38.** (B12) Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and again different waters flow.

(Arius Didymus, *fr.* 39.2 = *Dox. Gr.* 471.4–5) **39.** (B91) [It is not possible to step twice into the same river]. . . . It scatters and again comes together, and approaches and recedes.

(Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi* 392b) **40.*** (B49a) We step into and we do not step into the same rivers. We are and we are not.

(Heraclitus Homericus, *Homeric Questions* 24) **41.** (B78) Human nature has no insight, but divine nature has it.

(Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.12) **42.** (B45) You would not discover the limits of the soul although you traveled every road: so deep a *logos* does it have.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.7) **43.***(B115) The soul has a self-increasing *logos*.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.180) **44.** (B30) This *kosmos*, the same for all, none of gods nor humans made, but it was always and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindled in measures and extinguished in measures.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.103.3; tpc) **45.** (B41) The wise is one (*to sophon*), to know the intelligent plan (*gnōmē*) by which all things are steered through

all.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.1; tpc) **46.** (B32) The wise (*to sophon*) is one alone, both unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.115.1; tpc) **47.** (B64) Thunderbolt steers all things.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.7) **48.** (B90) All things are an exchange for fire and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods.

(Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi* 338d–e) **49.** (B65) Fire is want and satiety.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.7) {23} **50.** (B36) For souls to become water is to die; for water to become earth is to die; but from earth, water comes to be; from water, soul.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 6.17.2; tpc) **51.** (B118) Gleam of light: the dry soul, wisest (*sophōtate*) and best.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.5.8) **52.** (B117) A man when drunk is led by a boy, stumbling and not knowing where he goes, since his soul is moist.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.5.7) **53.** (B84a) Changing it rests.

(Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.8.1) **54.** (B125) Even the *Kykeōn* [posset][17] falls apart if it is not stirred.

(Theophrastus, *On Vertigo* 9; tpc) **55.** (B80) It is necessary to know that war is common and justice is strife and that all things happen in accordance with strife and necessity.

(Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.42) **56.** (B53) War is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as humans; some he makes slaves, others free.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.4) **57.** (B8) What is opposed brings together; the finest harmony [*harmonia*] is composed of things at

variance, and everything comes to be [or, “occurs”] in accordance with strife.

(Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII.2 1155b4) **58.** (B10) Things taken together are whole and not whole, <something that is> being brought together and brought apart, in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity and out of a unity all things.

([Aristotle], *De Mundo* 5 396b20) **59.** (B51) They do not understand how, though at variance with itself, it agrees with itself.[18] It is a backwards-turning[19] attunement like that of the bow and lyre.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.2) **60.** (B55) All that can be seen, heard, experienced—these are what I prefer.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.5) **61.** (B101a) Eyes are more accurate witnesses than the ears.

(Polybius, *Histories* 12.27.1) **62.** (B7) If all things were smoke, nostrils would distinguish them.

(Aristotle, *Sense and Sensibilia* 5 443a23) **63.** (B98) Souls [have use of the sense of] smell in Hades.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 943E) **64.** (B48) The name of the bow is life, but its work is death.[20]

(*Etymologium Magnum* sv. *bios*) **65.** (B59) The track of writing [or, “the path of the carding wheels”][21] is straight and crooked.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.4) **66.** (B60) The road up and the road down are one and the same.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.4) {24} **67.** (B61) The sea is the purest and most polluted water: to fishes drinkable and bringing safety, to humans undrinkable and destructive.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.5) **68.** (B13) Pigs rejoice in mud more than in pure water.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 1.2.2) **69.** (B9) Asses would choose rubbish rather than gold.

(Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X.5 1176a7) **70.** (B4) We would call oxen happy when they find bitter vetch to eat.

(Albertus Magnus, *On Vegetables* 6.401) **71.** (B37) Pigs wash themselves in mud, birds in dust or ash.

(Columella, *On Agriculture* 8.4.4) **72.** (B11) Every beast is driven to pasture by blows.

([Aristotle], *De Mundo* 6 401a10) **73.** (B102) To god all things are beautiful and good and just, but humans have supposed some unjust and others just.

(Porphyry, *Notes on Homer*, on *Iliad* 4.4) **74.** (B124) The most beautiful *kosmos* is a pile of things poured out at random.

(Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 15) **75.** (B103) The beginning and the end are common on the circumference of a circle.

(Porphyry, *Notes on Homer*, on *Iliad* 24.200) **76.** (B126) Cold things grow hot, a hot thing cold, a moist thing withers, a parched thing is moistened.

(John Tzetzes, *Notes on the Iliad*, p. 126 Hermann) **77.** (B67) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger, but changes the way <fire,(?)> when mingled with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.8) **78.** (B88) The same thing is both living and dead, and the waking and the sleeping, and young and old; for these things transformed are those, and those transformed back again are these.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius* 106E) **79.** (B23) They would not have known the name of justice if these things [unjust things] did not exist.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.9.7) **80.** (B111) Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.178) **81.** (B58) Physicians who cut and burn complain that they receive no worthy pay, although they do these things.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.3) **82.** (B62) Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living the death of the others and dying their life.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.6) **83.** (B31) The turnings of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery waterspout. . . . Earth is poured out as sea, and is measured according to the same ratio (*logos*) it was before it became earth.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.104 3,5) **84.** (B3 + B94) The sun by its nature is the width of a human foot, not exceeding in size the limits of its width . . . Otherwise, the Erinyes, ministers of Justice, will find him out.

(Derveni Papyrus, col. IV)

85. (B6) The sun is new each day.

(Aristotle, *Meteorology* II.2 355a13) **86.** (B99) If there were no sun, as far as concerns all the other stars it would be night.

(Plutarch, *Is Water or Fire the More Useful?* 957A) **87.** (B136) Souls slain in war are purer than those that perish of diseases.

(Bodleian Scholium on Epictetus, lxxi Schenkel) {25} **88.** (B24) Gods and humans honor those slain in war.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.16.1) **89.** (B25) Greater deaths win greater destinies.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.49.2) **90.** (B27) Things unexpected and unthought of await humans when they die.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.22.144) **91.** (B63) They arise and become vigilant guardians of the living and the dead.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.6) **92.** (B20) When they are born, they are willing to live and to have their destinies, and they leave children behind to become their destinies.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 3.14.1) **93.** (B16) How could one fail to be seen by that which does not set?

(Clement, *Pedagogue* 2.99.5) **94.** (B96) Corpses are more fit to be thrown out than dung.

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 669A) **95.** (B121) Every grown man of the Ephesians should hang himself and leave the city to the boys; for they banished Hermodorus, the best man among them, saying "let no one of us excel, or if he does, be it elsewhere and among others."

(Strabo, *Geography* 14.25) **96.** (B125a) May wealth never leave you, Ephesians, lest your wickedness be revealed.

(John Tzetzes, Scholium on Aristophanes' *Wealth* 88) **97.** (B49) One person is ten thousand to me if he is best.

(Theodorus Prodromus, *Letters* 1) **98.** (B52) A lifetime is a child playing, playing checkers; the kingdom belongs to a child.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.94) **99.** (B44) The people must fight for the law as for the city wall.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.2) **100.** (B43) Willful violence [*hubris*] must be quenched more than a fire.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.3) **101.** (B119) A person's character is his divinity [or, "guardian spirit," *daimōn*].

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 4.40.23) **102.** (B110) It is not better for humans to get all they want.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.176) **103.** (B95) It is better to conceal ignorance.

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 644F) **104.** (B85) It is difficult to fight against anger, for whatever it wants it buys at the price of the soul.

(Plutarch, *Life of Coriolanus* 22.2) **105.** (B5) They vainly purify themselves with blood when defiled with it, as if a man who had stepped into mud were to wash it off with mud. He would be thought mad if anyone noticed him acting thus.

(Aristocritus, *Theosophia* 68; Origen, *Against Celsus* 7.62) **106.** (B15) If it were not for Dionysus that they hold processions and sing hymns to the shameful parts [*phalli*], it would be a most shameless act; but Hades and Dionysus are the same, in whose honor they go mad and celebrate the Bacchic rites.

(Clement, *Protreptic* 34.5) **107.** (B14) Nightwalkers, Magi, Bacchoi, Lenai, and the initiated. [These people Heraclitus threatens with what happens after death. . . .] For the secret rites practiced among humans are celebrated in an unholy manner.

(Clement, *Protreptic* 22) **108.** (B92) The Sibyl with raving mouth uttering mirthless [and unadorned and unperfumed phrases, reaches a thousand years in her voice on account of the god].

(Plutarch, *On the Oracles at Delphi* 397A) {26}

6. Parmenides of Elea

The most reliable reports on the life of Parmenides of Elea (an Italian town today called Velia near what is now Naples) imply that he was born around 515 BCE. Diogenes Laertius says that he was a pupil of Xenophanes, “but did not follow him” (i.e., he did not adopt Xenophanes’ views). Diogenes Laertius also says that Parmenides was, at some time in his life associated with the Pythagoreans. There is no way of knowing whether these reports are true, but it seems clear that Parmenides is concerned with answering questions about knowledge that are generated by Xenophanes’ views. (It is less clear that, as sometimes claimed, Xenophanes’ account of his greatest god [see Section 4 fragment 12] influenced Parmenides’ account of what-is.) It would not be surprising that Parmenides should know about Pythagoreanism, as Elea is in the southern part of Italy, which was home to the Pythagorean movement.

Like Xenophanes, Parmenides wrote in verse: His poem is in Homeric hexameters, and there are many Homeric images, especially from the Odyssey. In the poem Parmenides presents a young man (*kouros*, in Greek), who is taken in a chariot to meet a goddess. He is told by her that he will learn "all things"; moreover, while the goddess says that what the *kouros* is told is true, she stresses that he himself must test and assess the arguments she gives. Parmenides is one of the most important and most controversial figures among the early Greek thinkers, and there is much disagreement among scholars about the details of his views. The poem begins with a long introduction (*The Proem*, B1); this is followed by a section traditionally called *Truth* (B2–B8.50). This is followed by the so-called *Doxa* section ("beliefs" or "opinions")—a cosmology that, the goddess warns, is in some way deceptive. In *Truth*, Parmenides argues that genuine thought and knowledge can only be about what genuinely is (what-is), for what-is-not is literally unsayable and unthinkable. Parmenides warns against what he calls the "beliefs of mortals," based entirely on sense experience; in these, the goddess says, "there is no true trust." Rather, one must judge by understanding (the capacity to reason) what follows from the basic claim that what-is must be, and what-is-not cannot be. The poem proceeds (in the crucial fragment B8) to explore the features of genuine being: what-is must be whole, complete, unchanging, and one. It can neither come to be nor pass away, nor undergo any qualitative change. Only what is in this way can be grasped by thought and genuinely known.

Given these arguments, the accounts of the way things are given by Parmenides' predecessors cannot be acceptable. The earlier views required fundamental changes in their theoretically basic entities, or relied on the reality of opposites and their unity; Parmenides argues that all these presuppose the reality of what-is-not, and so cannot succeed. For modern scholars, one particularly intriguing aspect of Parmenides' thought is that, having apparently rejected the world of sensory experience as unreal, the goddess then goes on, in the *Doxa*, to give a cosmological account of her own. Is this meant to be a parody of other views? Is it the best that can be said for the world that appears to human senses? Is it a lesson for the hearer, to test whether

any cosmology could ever be acceptable on Parmenidean grounds? There is little agreement among Parmenides' readers on this. While Parmenides clearly shares with Xenophanes and Heraclitus interests in metaphysical and epistemological questions, Parmenides is the first to see the importance of metatheoretical questions about philosophical theories themselves, and to provide comprehensive arguments for his claims. These arguments are powerful, and Parmenides' views about knowledge, being, and change were a serious theoretical challenge, not only to later Presocratic thinkers, but also to Plato and Aristotle.

{27} **1.** (28B1) The mares which carry me as far as my spirit ever aspired
were escorting me, when they brought me and proceeded along the renowned route
of the goddess, which brings a knowing mortal to all cities one by one.
On this route I was being brought, on it wise mares were bringing me,
straining the chariot, and maidens were guiding the way. *5*
The axle in the center of the wheel was shrilling forth the bright sound of a musical pipe,
ablaze, for it was being driven forward by two rounded
wheels at either end, as the daughters of the Sun
were hastening to escort <me> after leaving the house of Night
for the light, having pushed back the veils from their heads with their hands. *10*
There are the gates of the roads of Night and Day,
and a lintel and a stone threshold contain them.
High in the sky they are filled by huge doors
of which avenging Justice holds the keys that fit them.
The maidens beguiled her with soft words *15*
and skillfully persuaded her to push back the bar for them
quickly from the gates. They made
a gaping gap of the doors when they opened them,
swinging in turn in their sockets the bronze posts
fastened with bolts and rivets. There, straight through them then, *20*
the maidens held the chariot and horses on the broad road.
And the goddess received me kindly, took my

right hand in hers, and addressed me with these words:
Young man, accompanied by immortal charioteers,
who reach my house by the horses which bring you, *25*
welcome—since it was not an evil destiny that sent you forth to travel
this route (for indeed it is far from the beaten path of humans),
but Right and Justice. It is right that you learn all things—
both the unshaken heart of well-persuasive Truth
and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no true trust. *30*
But nevertheless you will learn these too—how it were right that the
things that seem
be reliably, being indeed, the whole of things.

(lines 1–30: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.111–14; lines 28–32: Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens*, 557.25–558.2; tmpc) **2.** (B2) But come now, I will tell you—and you, when you have heard the story, bring it safely away—
which are the only routes of inquiry that are for thinking:
the one, that is and that it is not possible for it not to be,
is the path of Persuasion (for it attends upon Truth),
the other, that it is not and that it is right that it not be, *5*
this indeed I declare to you to be a path entirely unable to be investigated:
For neither can you know what is not (for it is not to be accomplished)
nor can you declare it.

(Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* 1.345.18; lines 3–8: Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 116.28; tmpc) **3.** (B3) . . . for the same thing is for thinking and for being.[22]

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 6.23; Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.1.8) **4.** (B4) But gaze upon things which although absent are securely present to the mind.
{28} For you will not cut off what-is from clinging to what-is,
neither being scattered everywhere in every way in order
nor being brought together.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.15) **5.** (B5) . . . For me, it is indifferent from where I am to begin: for that is where I will arrive back again.

(Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* 1.708) **6.** (B6) It is right both
to say and to think that it is what-is: for it can be,
but nothing is not: these things I bid you to ponder.

For I < [23] > you from this first route of inquiry,
and then from that, on which mortals, knowing nothing,
wander, two-headed: for helplessness in their
breasts steers their wandering mind. They are borne along
deaf and blind alike, dazed, hordes without judgment
for whom to be and not to be are thought to be the same
and not the same, and the path of all is backward-turning.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 86.27–28; 117.4–13; tmpc)
7. (B7) For in no way may this prevail, that things that are not are;
but you, hold your thought back from this route of inquiry
and do not let habit, rich in experience, compel you along this route
to direct an aimless eye and an echoing ear
and tongue, but judge by reasoning (*logos*) the much-contested
examination spoken by me.

(lines 1–2: Plato, *Sophist* 242a; lines 2–6: Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.114; tmpc) **8.** (B8) . . . Just one story of a route
is still left: that it is. On this [route] there are signs
very many, that what-is is ungenerated and imperishable,
a whole of a single kind, unshaken, and complete.
Nor was it ever, nor will it be, since it is now, all together
one, holding together: For what birth will you seek out for it?
How and from what did it grow? From what-is-not I will allow
you neither to say nor to think: For it is not to be said or thought
that it is not. What need would have roused it,
later or earlier, having begun from nothing, to grow?
In this way it is right either fully to be or not.
Nor will the force of true conviction ever permit anything to come to be
beside it from what-is-not. For this reason neither coming to be
nor perishing did Justice allow, loosening her shackles,
but she [Justice] holds it fast. And the decision about these things is in this:

is or is not; and it has been decided, as is necessary,
to leave the one [route] unthought of and unnamed (for it is not a true
route), so that the other [route] is and is genuine.
But how can what-is be hereafter? How can it come to be?
For if it came to be, it is not, not even if it is sometime going to be.
Thus coming-to-be has been extinguished and perishing cannot be
investigated.
Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike,
and not at all more in any way, which would keep it from holding together,
{29} or at all less, but it is all full of what-is.
Therefore it is all holding together; for what-is draws near to what-is.
But unchanging in the limits of great bonds
it is without starting or ceasing, since coming-to-be and perishing
have wandered very far away; and true trust drove them away.
Remaining the same and in the same and by itself it lies
and so remains there fixed; for mighty Necessity
holds it in bonds of a limit which holds it in on all sides.
For this reason it is right for what-is to be not incomplete;
for it is not lacking; otherwise, what-is would be in want of everything.
What is for thinking is the same as that on account of which there is
thought.
For not without what-is, on which it depends, having been solemnly
pronounced,
will you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will be
except what-is, since precisely this is what Fate shackled
to be whole and changeless. Therefore it has been named all things
that mortals, persuaded that they are true, have posited
both to come to be and to perish, to be and not,
and to change place and alter bright color.
But since the limit is ultimate, it [namely, what-is] is complete
from all directions like the bulk of a ball well-rounded from all sides
equally matched in every way from the middle; for it is right
for it to be not in any way greater or lesser than in another.
For neither is there what-is-not—which would stop it from reaching
the same—nor is there any way in which what-is would be more than what-
is in one way

and in another way less, since it is all inviolable;
for equal to itself from all directions, it meets uniformly with its limits.
At this point, I end for you my reliable account and thought
about truth. From here on, learn mortal opinions,
listening to the deceitful order of my words.

For they established two forms to name in their judgments,[24]
of which it is not right to name one—in this they have gone astray—
and they distinguished things opposite in body, and established signs
apart from one another—for one, the aetherial fire of flame,
mild, very light, the same as itself in every direction,
but not the same as the other; but that other one, in itself
is opposite—dark night, a dense and heavy body.
I declare to you all the ordering as
it appears,
so that no mortal judgment may ever overtake you.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 145.1–146.25 [lines 1–52]; 39.1–9 [lines 50–61]; tmpc) **9.** (B9) But since all things have been named
light and night
and the things which accord with their powers have been assigned to these
things and those,
all is full of light and obscure night together,
of both equally, since neither has any share of nothing.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 180.9–12) **10.** (B10) You
shall know the nature of the Aithēr and all the signs in the Aithēr and the
destructive deeds of the shining sun's pure
torch and whence they came to be,
{30} and you shall learn the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon
and its nature, and you shall know also the surrounding heaven,
from what it grew and how Necessity led and shackled it
to hold the limits of the stars.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.14; 138.1) **11.** (B11) . . . how earth and sun and
moon
and the Aithēr that is common to all and the Milky Way and

furthest Olympus and the hot force of the stars surged forth
to come to be.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 559.22–25) **12.** (B12) For the narrower <wreaths> were filled with unmixed fire,
the ones next to them with night, but a due amount of fire is inserted among it,
and in the middle of these is the goddess who governs all things.
For she rules over hateful birth and union of all things,
sending the female to unite with male and in opposite fashion,
male to female.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 39.14–16 [lines 1–3], 31.13–17 [lines 2–6]) **13.** (B13) First of all gods she contrived Love.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 39.18) **14.** (B14) Night-shining foreign light wandering around earth.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1116A) **15.** (B15) Always looking toward the rays of the sun.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 929A) **16.** (B16) As on each occasion
there is a mixture of the much-wandering limbs,
so is mind present to humans; for the same thing
is what the nature of the limbs thinks in men,
both in all and in each; for the more is thought.

(Theophrastus, *On the Senses* 3; tpc) **17.** (B17) [That the male is conceived in the right part of the uterus has been said by others of the ancients. For Parmenides says:]
<The goddess brought> boys <into being> on the right <side of the uterus>,
girls on the left.

(Galen, Co*mmentary on Book VI of Hippocrates' Epidemics II* 46) **18.** (B18) As soon as woman and man mingle the seeds of love
<that come from> their veins, a formative power fashions well-constructed bodies
from their two differing bloods, if it maintains a balance.
For if when the seed is mingled the powers clash

and do not create a single <power> in the body resulting from the mixture, with double seed they will dreadfully disturb the nascent sex <of the child>.

(Caelius Aurelianus, *On Chronic Diseases* VI.9) **19.** (B19) In this way, according to opinion (*doxa*), these things have grown and now are and afterwards after growing up will come to an end.
And upon them humans have established a name to mark each one.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 558.9–11) {31}

7. Zeno of Elea

Almost everything we think we know about the life of Zeno of Elea comes from Plato's dialogue *Parmenides.* According to Plato, Zeno was about twenty-five years younger than Parmenides and was reported to have been his lover as well as his philosophical associate. If Plato's claims are accepted, Zeno was born around 490 BCE, and he and Parmenides visited Athens in about 450 when Socrates was a young man. (It is quite unlikely that the conversation Plato reports took place, but the chronological information from Plato may be based on fact.) The only other biographical claims about Zeno come from Diogenes Laertius' not entirely reliable *Lives of the Philosophers* (9.25–29); according to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno bravely resisted a political tyranny and, despite being tortured, did not betray his comrades. Zeno explores the consequences of Parmenides' claims about what-is: in his ingenious arguments he purports to show that neither plurality nor motion is compatible with Parmenides' requirements for reality. Zeno challenges the seemingly incontrovertible evidence of our senses, and his arguments have worried and fascinated philosophers from ancient times to the present.

1. (29A11, A12) Once Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens for the Great Panathenaic festival. Parmenides was quite an elderly man, very gray, but fine and noble in appearance, just about sixty-five years old. Zeno was then almost forty, of a good height and handsome to see. The story goes that he had been Parmenides' young lover. . . . Socrates and many others <were> eager to listen to Zeno's treatise, for he had then brought it to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then very young. Zeno himself read

it to them. . . . When Socrates had heard it, he asked Zeno to read again the first hypothesis of the first argument. When he had read it, he said, “How do you mean this, Zeno? If things that are are many, they must therefore be both like and unlike, but this is impossible. For unlike things cannot be like, nor can like things be unlike. Isn’t that what you are saying?”

—ZENO: Yes.

—SOCRATES: Now if it is impossible for unlike things to be like and for like things to be unlike, is it also impossible for things to be many? For if they were many they would have impossible attributes. Is this the point of your arguments—to contend, against all that is said, that things are not many? And do you think that each of your arguments proves this?

—ZENO: You have well understood the purpose of the whole work.

—SOCRATES: I understand, Parmenides, that Zeno here wants to be identified with you by his treatise as well as his friendship, for he has written somewhat in the same style as you, but by changing it he is trying to make us think he is saying something else. For in your poem you declare that the all is one and you do a good job of proving this, while he declares that it is not many, and furnishes many impressive proofs. Now when one of you says it is one and the other that it is not many, and each speaks so as to seem not to have said any of the same things, though you are saying practically the same things, what you have said appears beyond the rest of us.

—ZENO: Yes, Socrates, but you have not completely understood the truth of the treatise. . . . It is actually a defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who try to make fun of it, saying that if what-is is one, the argument has many ridiculous consequences which contradict it. Now my treatise opposes the advocates of plurality and pays them back the same and more, aiming to prove that their hypothesis, “if there are many things,” suffers still more ridiculous consequences than the hypothesis that there is one, if anyone follows it through sufficiently. I wrote it in this spirit {32} of competitiveness when I was young, and then someone stole it, so I did not even have the chance to consider whether it should be made public.

(Plato, *Parmenides* 127b–128d) **2.** (A16) Zeno stated that if anyone could make clear to him what the one is, he would be able to speak of the things that are.

(Eudemus, *Physics fr.* 7, quoted in Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 97.12–13) **3.** (B2) For if it should be added to something else that exists, it would not make it any larger. For if it were of no size and were added, nothing it is added to could increase in size. And so it follows immediately that what is added is nothing. But if the other thing is no smaller when it is subtracted and it is not increased when it is added, clearly the thing added or subtracted is nothing.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 139.11–15) **4.** (B1) If it is, each thing must have some size and thickness, and part of it must be apart from the rest. And the same reasoning holds concerning the part that is in front. For that too will have size, and part of it will be in front. Now to say this once is the same thing as to keep saying it forever. For no such part of it will be the last or unrelated to another. Therefore if there are many things, they must be both small and large; so small as not to have size, but so large as to be infinite.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 141.2–8) **5.** (B3) If there are many, they must be just as many as they are, neither more nor less. But if they are as many as they are, they must be limited. If there are many things, the things that are are unlimited, since between things that are there are always others, and still others between those. Therefore the things that are are unlimited.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 140.29–33) **6.** (A25) There are four of Zeno's arguments about motion that present difficulties for those who try to solve them. First is the argument that says that there is no motion because that which is moving must reach the midpoint before the end. . . . It is always necessary to traverse half the distance, but these are infinite, and it is impossible to get through things that are infinite. . . .

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.9 239b9–13; *Physics* VIII.8 263a5–6) **7.** (A26) The second <argument> is the one called the Achilles. This is to the effect that the slowest as it runs will never be caught by the quickest. For the pursuer must first reach the point from which the pursued departed, so that the slower must always be some distance in front. This is the same argument as the Dichotomy,[25] but it differs in not dividing the given magnitude in half.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.9 239b14–20) **8.** (A25) For this reason Zeno's argument falsely assumes that it is impossible to traverse or come into contact with an infinite number of things individually in a finite time. For both length and time and generally everything that is continuous are called infinite in two ways: infinite in division and infinite with respect to their extremities. Now it is impossible to come into contact with things infinite in quantity in a finite time, but it is possible to do so with things that are infinite in division. For time itself too is infinite in this way. And so, it follows that it traverses the infinite in an infinite and not a finite time, and comes into contact with infinite things in infinite, not finite times.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.2 233a21–31) **9.** (A27) Zeno makes a mistake in reasoning. For if, he says, everything is always at rest when it occupies a space equal to itself, and what is moving is always "at a now," the moving arrow is motionless.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.9 239b5–7) The third argument is the one just stated, that the arrow is stopped while it is moving. This follows from assuming that time is composed {33} of "nows." If this is not conceded, the deduction will not go through.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.9 239b30–33) **10.** (A28) The fourth argument is about equal bodies moving in a stadium alongside equal bodies in the opposite direction, the one group moving from the end of the stadium, the other from the middle, at equal speed. He claims in this argument that it follows that half the time is equal to the double. The mistake is in thinking that an equal magnitude moving with equal speed takes an equal time in passing something moving as it does in passing something at rest. But this is false. Let *A*'s represent the equal stationary bodies, *B*'s the bodies beginning from the middle, equal in number and size to the *A*'s, and *C*'s the bodies beginning from the end, equal in number and size to these and having the same speed as the *B*'s. It follows that the first *B* is at the end at the same time as the first *C*, as the *B*'s and *C*'s move alongside one another, and the first *C* has completed the process of coming alongside all the *B*'s, but the first *B* has completed the process of coming alongside half the *A*'s. And so the time is half. For each of them is alongside each thing for an equal time. It follows simultaneously that the first *B* has moved alongside all the *C*'s,

for the first *C* and the first *B* will be at the opposite ends simultaneously, because both have been alongside the *A*'s for an equal amount of time.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VI.9 239b33–240a17) **11.**[26] (A24) If place exists, where is it? For everything that exists is in a place. Therefore if place exists, then place is in a place. This goes on to infinity. Therefore, place does not exist.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 562.3–6; Aristotle, *Physics* IV.3 210b22–23, IV.1 209a23–25; Eudemus, *Physics fr.* 42, quoted by Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 563.25–28) **12.** (A29) —ZENO: Tell me, Protagoras, does a single millet seed make a noise when it falls, or one ten-thousandth of a millet seed?

—PROTAGORAS: No.
—ZENO: Does a bushel of millet seeds make a noise when it falls, or doesn't it?
—PROTAGORAS: It does.
—ZENO: But isn't there a ratio between the bushel of millet seeds and one millet seed, or one ten-thousandth of a millet seed?
—PROTAGORAS: Yes there is.
—ZENO: So won't there be the same ratios of their sounds to one another? For as the things that make the noise <are to one another>, so are the noises <to one another>. But since this is so, if the bushel of millet seeds makes a noise, so will a single millet seed and one ten-thousandth of a millet seed.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1108.18–25)

8. EMPEDOCLES OF ACRAGAS

BORN IN ACRAGAS, in Sicily, around 492 BCE, Empedocles belongs to the generation of Presocratics who come after Parmenides. He is known to have visited the southern Italian mainland, and while his work shows his familiarity with Parmenides, there are also signs of the influence of Pythagoreanism, the other great southern Italian philosophical movement. At home in Acragas, he seems to have been an active politician, supporting democracy against oligarchy, even though his own aristocratic family connections might have made {34}

that support unexpected. Empedocles was a philosopher, a medical man, and a truly flamboyant figure. According to ancient reports, he dressed ostentatiously (there are stories of rich purple robes, a golden diadem, and bronze sandals), he claimed remarkable powers for himself, and in fragment B112 (no. 1 below) he says of himself, “I go about among you, an immortal god, no longer mortal, / honored among all, as it seems, / wreathed with headbands and blooming garlands.” There are many stories of his fantastic activities: reportedly a woman with no pulse who had stopped breathing was kept alive by him for a month; he diverted two streams in the city of Selinus (on the south coast of Sicily) in order to rid the city of a plague (and was said to have been honored as a god as a result). Empedocles was exiled from his home and was said to have died in the Peloponnese, although, given his character, it is not surprising that more exciting tales were told about his death. Diogenes Laertius reports that Empedocles, desiring to demonstrate that he was indeed a god, leapt into the crater of Mount Aetna.

Although these stories suggest a flashy and eccentric figure, we should not lose sight of the fact that Empedocles constructed a serious and complicated theory of the cosmos and the place of human beings in it. Like Parmenides, he wrote in verse; his subjects included both natural philosophy (physics and the development of the cosmos) and inquiry into how human beings ought to live (ethical and religious topics). For a long time scholars debated how, if at all, these two main areas of interest were related. New study, and the discovery of some new texts, now show without a doubt that Empedocles regarded these questions as connected, and that the material from the two was thoroughly integrated. There remains the question of how many different works Empedocles composed; traditionally there have been thought to be at least two separate poems, usually called Physics and Purifications. Although we now know that the physical and purificatory material were not viewed by Empedocles as entirely distinct, the question of how many poems Empedocles wrote remains open.

Empedocles claimed that the numerous basic realities of the cosmos are entities with the features of basic reality for which Parmenides

had argued. Although these basic entities are eternally real and unchanging in their natures, their mixture and separation cause the world of the senses. Empedocles says that there are six such basic things in the cosmos, each a genuine being in the Parmenidean sense: the roots (as Empedocles refers to them) Earth, Water, Air, and Fire (later called “elements” by Aristotle), and two forces, Love and Strife. The roots are mixed and separated (by Love and Strife) to produce the world that we sense and are a part of; this mixture and separation take the place of coming-to-be and passing-away, since the ingredients remain all through the changes. In selections 79 (B96) and 80 (B98) Empedocles provides “recipes” for such phenomenal things as bone and blood. At the same time, under the waxing and waning of the comparative strengths of the forces of Love and Strife the cosmos undergoes cycles from complete mixture of the roots to their complete separation: how many cycles there are, and the events within those cycles are subjects of controversy among commentators. Within the cycles, living things come to be and pass away; Empedocles’ system includes *daimones* (singular, *daimōn*) which are divinities of some sort. These *daimones* undergo many lives, apparently because of some transgression. Although they, like the gods, are called “long-lived” by Empedocles, they are not immortal, for they, like the roots of which they are made, are all absorbed into the complete mixture of the roots at the height of Love’s power. Only the roots and Love and Strife are genuinely immortal, subject neither to coming-to-be or passing-away. The destiny of the *daimones* is connected with the sorts of lives they lead, and it is in the nature, behavior, and fates of the *daimones* that Empedocles’ natural and religious views come together.

{35} **Note on the text and the order of the fragments:** In the 1990s scholars discovered that previously unexamined papyrus fragments contained some seventy-four lines of poetry (in varying states of completeness). Because the papyrus contained previously known lines as well as new, previously unknown material, the editors were able to identify the author as Empedocles. The Strasbourg Papyrus (so named because it has been in the collections of the Strasbourg library

since the early part of the twentieth century), reconstructed and translated, provided important new material for Empedocles studies, and that material is included here. The ordering of the fragments of Empedocles is controversial; scholars have strong views and serious disagreements about the proper order. Here, the order is that of the translator, Richard McKirahan.[27]

1. (31B112) Friends who dwell in the great city on the yellow Acragas
on the heights of the citadel, you whose care is good deeds,
respectful havens for strangers, untouched by evil,
hail! I go about among you, an immortal god, no longer mortal,
honored among all, as it seems,
wreathed with headbands and blooming garlands.
Wherever I go to their flourishing cities,
I am revered by all—men and women. And they follow together
in tens of thousands, inquiring where lies the path to profit,
some in need of prophecy, while others,
pierced for a long time with harsh pains,
asked to hear the voice of healing for all diseases.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.61–2 [lines 1–10]; Clement, *Miscellanies* 6.30 [lines 9–11]) **2.** (B114) Friends, I know that truth is in the words
I will speak. But very difficult
for men and spiteful is the invasion of conviction into their minds.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.9) **3.** (B113) But why do I insist on these matters
as if I were accomplishing something great,
if I am superior to mortal humans who perish many times?

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 1.302) **4.** (B128) Nor was
there any god Ares among them nor Kudoimos [“battle-din”]
nor King Zeus, nor Kronos nor Poseidon,
but there was Queen Cypris. . . .
Her they propitiated with reverent statues
and painted figures and unguents with varied odors,
and with offerings of unmixed myrrh and fragrant frankincense,

pouring on the ground libations of yellow honey.
No altar was drenched with the unspeakable slaughter of bulls,
but this was the greatest abomination among humans,
to tear out life and devour the noble limbs.

(Porphyry, *On Abstinence* 2.20 [lines 1–8]; 2.27 [lines 8–11]) **5.** (B130) All were tame and kindly toward humans—
both animals and birds—and friendliness burned brightly.

(Scholium in Nicander, *Antidotes against Poisonous Bites* 453) **6.** (B132) Blessed is he who possesses wealth of divine intelligence
but wretched he is whose concern is a dim opinion about the gods.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.140) **7.** (B115) There is an oracle of Necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
eternal and sealed with broad oaths,
that whenever anyone pollutes his own dear limbs with the sin of bloodshed,
{36} . . .[28] commits offense and swears a false oath
—divinities (*daimones*) who possess immensely long life
he wanders away from the blessed ones for thrice ten thousand seasons,
through time growing to be all different kinds of mortals,
taking the difficult paths of life one after another.
For the force of Aithēr pursues them to the sea
and the sea spits them out onto the surface of the earth, and the
earth into the rays
of the shining sun, and he [the sun] casts them into the vortices of Aithēr.
One receives them after another, but all hate them.
Of these I am now one, a fugitive from the gods and a wanderer,
putting my reliance on raving Strife.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 7.29.14–23 [lines 1–2, 4–14]; Plutarch, *On Exile* 607C [lines 1, 3, 5–13]) **8.** (B142) Neither, then, the roofed halls of aegis-bearing Zeus
nor the house of Hades <? receives> him.

(Voll. Herc. N 1012 col. 18)

9. (B125) For from living forms it [? Strife] was making dead
ones, changing them.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 3.14.2) **10.** (B126) Wrapping <it> in an alien garb
of flesh.

(Plutarch, *On Eating Flesh* 998c) **11.** (B117) For I have already been born
as a boy and a girl
and a bush and a bird and a <mute> fish <from the sea>.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.77) **12.** (B118) I wept and
wailed upon seeing the unfamiliar place.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 3.14) **13.** (B121) . . . Joyless place,
where bloodshed, anger, and tribes of other spirits of death
and squalid diseases, rotting, and works of dissolution
wander in darkness through the meadow of Disaster (*atē*).

(Hierocles, *Commentary on the Golden Verses* 54.2–3; Proclus,
Commentary on Plato's Cratylus 97.23) **14.** (B124) Alas! Wretched race of
mortals! Unfortunate!
Out of such quarreling and groaning were you born.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 3.14) **15.** (B136) Will you not cease from harsh-
sounding bloodshed? Do you not see
that you are devouring each other in the carelessness of your thought?

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.119) **16.** (B138) Having
drawn off life [*psychē*] with bronze.

(Aristotle, *Poetics* 1457b13) **17.** (B137) A father lifts up his own dear son
who has changed form,
and, praying, slaughters him, committing a great folly. And they are at a
loss,
sacrificing him as he entreats them. But he, refusing to hear the cries,
slaughters him and attends an evil feast in his halls.
Likewise a son seizes his father and children their mother,
and tearing out their life, devour the dear flesh.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.129) **18.** (B145)
Therefore, distraught with harsh evils,
you will never relieve your spirit from wretched distress.

(Clement, *Protrepticus* 2.27.3) {37} **19.** (B135) But what is lawful for all
extends far through the wide-ruling
Aithēr and through the immense glare.

(Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I.13 1373b6–17) **20.** (B140) Keep completely away
from laurel leaves!

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 646d) **21.** (B141) Wretched, wholly wretched! Keep
your hands off beans!

(Aulus Gellius, *Athenian Nights* 4.11.1–2 and 4.11.9–10) **22.** (B127)
Among beasts they come into being as lions whose lairs are in the
mountains
and their beds on the ground, and as laurels among shaggy trees.

(Aelian, *Natural History* 12.7) **23.** (B146) In the end they are prophets and
bards and physicians
and chiefs among men on earth,
and from there they arise as gods mightiest in honors.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 4.150) **24.** (B147) Sharing the same hearth and table
with other immortals
relieved of manly distress, unwearied.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.122) **25.** (B133) It is not possible to reach and
approach <the divine> with our eyes
or grasp it with our hands, by which the most powerful
highway of persuasion strikes the minds of men.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.81) **26.** (B131) For if, immortal Muse, for the sake
of any ephemeral creature
it pleased you that our concerns should come to your thoughts,
be present once again to me, Kalliopeia, now as I pray,
as I reveal a good account about the blessed gods.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 7.31.3) **27.** (B1) But you listen, Pausanias, son of wise-minded Anchites.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.60) **28.** (B111) You will learn all the drugs there are as a safeguard against evils and old age, since for you alone shall I bring to pass all these things.
You will stop the force of the tireless winds that rush
over the earth and devastate the plowed fields with their blasts.
And, if you wish, you will arouse their breath again.
You will change black rain into seasonable dryness
for people, and summer drought you will change
into tree-nourishing waters that dwell in the sky.
And you will bring back from Hades the strength of a dead man.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.59) **29.** (B5) [Empedocles advised Pausanias] to cover up [his teachings] within a voiceless heart (*phrēn*).

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 728E) **30.** (B4) It is highly typical of evil people to mistrust what prevails;
but learn how the trustworthy reports from our Muse command,
by splitting apart the account (*logos*) in your entrails.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.18.4) **31.** (B2) Narrow are the means of apprehension spread throughout the limbs.
Many wretched things burst in which blunt the thoughts.
People see a tiny part of life during their time
and swift-fated they are taken away and fly like smoke,
persuaded only of whatever each of them has chanced to meet
as they were driven everywhere; but everyone boasts that he discovered the whole.
These things are not in this way to be seen or heard by men
or grasped with the mind. But you, since you have turned aside to this place,
{38} will learn; mortal cunning has reached no further.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.123) **32.** (B3b) Nor will it
compel you to take away the blossoms of fair-famed honor from mortals
on the condition that you say in rashness more than is holy—
and <only> then sit upon the summits of wisdom.
But come, look with every means of apprehension, in whatever way each
thing is clear,
not holding any sight more in trust than <what comes> through hearing, *5*
or loud-sounding hearing above the things made clear by the tongue,
and do not at all hold back trust in any of the other limbs,
wherever there is a channel for understanding, but
understand each thing in whatever way it is clear.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.125) **33.** (B3a) But, gods,
avert their madness from my tongue,
and lead a pure stream from holy mouths.
And you, much-remembering maiden Muse with white arms,
I entreat—bring the things it is right for creatures of a day
to hear, driving your easily-steered chariot from the halls of reverence.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.123) **34.** (B6) Hear first
the four roots of all things:
shining Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus
and Nestis, who with her tears gives moisture to the source of mortals.

(Aëtius 1.3.20)

35. (B8) I will tell you another thing. There is coming-to-be of not a single
one of all
mortal things, nor is there any end of destructive death,
but only mixture, and separation of what is mixed,
and nature (*phusis*) is the name given to them by humans.
(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1111F–12A) **36.** (B11) Fools. For their thoughts
are not far-reaching—
those who expect that there comes to be what previously was not,
or that anything perishes and is completely destroyed.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1113C) **37.** (B9) Whenever they arrive in the
Aithēr mixed so as to form a man
or one of the wild beasts or bushes
or birds, that is when <people> speak of coming into being;
and whenever they are separated, that <is what they call> the ill-starred fate
of death.
They do not call it as is right, but I myself too assent to their convention. *5*

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1113D) **38.** (B15) A man who is wise in his
thoughts (*phrēn*) would not divine such things as this—
that as long as they live what they in fact call life
they are, and have things wretched and good,
but before they took on the fixed form of mortals and after they have
dissolved, they are then nothing.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1113D) **39.** (B12) For it is impossible to come to
be from what in no way is,
and it is not to be accomplished and is unheard of that what is perishes
absolutely.
For it will always be where a person thrusts it each time.

([Aristotle], *Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias* 2 975b1–4) **40.** (B13) None of
the whole is either empty or overfull.

(Aëtius 1.18.2)

41. (B14) Of the whole, nothing is empty; from where, then, could anything
come to be added to it?
([Aristotle], *Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias* 2 976b23) {39} **42.** (B16) For
they are as they were previously and will be, and never, I think,
will endless time be empty of both of these.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 7.29.9) **43.** (B17 + Strasbourg
Papyrus, *ensemble* a)
I will tell a double story. For
at one time they grew to be only one *(232)*[29]
out of many, but at another they grew apart to be many out of one.

Double is the generation of mortal things, and double their decline.
For the coming together of all things gives birth to one [namely,
generation and decline] and destroys it, *(235)*
and the other is nurtured and flies away when they grow apart again. *5*
And these never cease continually interchanging,
at one time all coming together into one by Love
and at another each being borne apart by the hatred of Strife.
Thus in that they have learned to grow to be one out of many *(240)*
and in that they again spring apart as many when the one grows apart, *10*
in that way they come to be, and their life is not lasting,
but in that they never cease interchanging continually,
in this way they are always unchanging in a cycle.
But come, listen to my words, for learning increases wisdom. *(245)*
For as I previously said, while declaring the bounds of my words, *15*
I will tell a double story. For at one time they grew to be only one
out of many, but at another they grew apart to be many out of one:
fire and water and earth and the immense height of air,
and deadly Strife apart from them, equal in all directions *(250)*
and Love among them, equal in length and breadth. *20*
Behold her with your mind, and do not sit with your eyes staring in
amazement.
She is also recognized as innate in mortal limbs.
Through her they have kindly thoughts and do peaceful deeds,
calling her by the appellation Joy and also Aphrodite. *(255)*
No mortal man has seen her spinning *25*
among them. But listen to the undeceitful course of my account.
For these [the four elements] are all equal and of the same age,
but each rules in its own province and possesses its own individual
character,
but they dominate in their turn as time revolves. *(260)*
And nothing is added to them or
subtracted, *30*
for if they were perishing continuously, they would no longer be.
But what could increase this totality? And where would it come from?
And how could it perish, since nothing is empty of these?
But there are just these very things, and running through one another *(265)*

at different times they come to be different things and yet are always and continuously the same. *35*

{But under Love}[30] we come together into {40} one *kosmos*,
{whereas under Strife it [that is, the ordered whole] grew apart, so as} to be many from one,
from which [that is, many things] all things that were and are and will be in the future
have sprouted: trees and men and
women, *(270)*
and beasts and birds and fishes nurtured in water, *40*
and long-lived gods highest in honors.
{Under her [that is, Strife]} they never cease, continually darting in dense whirls . . .
without pausing, and never . . . *(275)*
but {many} lifetimes before . . . *45*
before passing from them . . .
{and never cease} continually darting {in all directions}
for neither the sun . . .
{the onrush full of this} . . . *(280)*
nor any of the others . . . *50*
but interchanging in a circle {they dart in all directions}
for at that time the impassable earth runs, and the sun as well
{and the sphere [that is, the celestial sphere]} as large as even now {it is judged} by men {to be}
in the same way all these things {were running} through one another *(285)*
{and having been driven away, each of them reached} different {and peculiar} places *55*
{self-willed}; and we were coming together in the mid-most places to be only one.
But when indeed Strife passed through {and reached} the depths
{of the swirl,} and Love {comes to be} in the midst of the vortex,
{then} indeed all these things come together to be only one. *(290)*
{Strive eagerly} so that {my account may arrive} not only through ears, *60*
{and behold} the unerring truths that are around while you listen to me.
I shall show you also through your eyes {where they [that is, the elements]

find} a larger body:
first, the coming together and development {of the offspring} . . . and all
that now still remain of this {generation} *(295)*
both among the {wild species} of mountain-roaming beasts *65*
and among the twofold offspring of men, {and also among}
the offspring of root-bearing {fields} and vine-mounting {clusters of grapes}.
From these stories bring back to your mind undeceiving evidence,
for you will see the coming together and development of the offspring. *(300)*
(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 158.1–159.4 [lines 1–35] + Strasbourg Papyrus *ensemble* a [lines 26–69]) **44.** (B20 + Strasbourg Papyrus, *ensemble* c) {Where Love and Strife have} their guiding {counsels} *(301)*
This is very clear in the mass of mortal limbs:
sometimes we come together through Love into one, all the
limbs that have obtained a body, at the peak of flourishing life,
while at other times, split apart through evil quarrels *(305) 5*
they wander each kind separately on the furthest shore of life.
And it happens the same way for bushes and water-homed fishes
and mountain-dwelling beasts and wing-propelled birds.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1124.7–18 + Strasbourg Papyrus *ensemble* c) **45.** (B21) But come, behold this witness of my previous discourse, *(309)*
if anything in the foregoing was feeble in form:
the sun, brilliant to see and hot everywhere,
all the immortal things that are drenched in the heat and shining light,
and rain, in all things dark and cold, *5*
{41} and from earth stream forth things rooted and solid.
In Anger they are all apart and have separate forms, *(315)*
but they come together in Love and yearn for one another.
From these all things that were and are and will be in the future
have sprouted: trees and men and women, *10*
and beasts and birds and fishes nurtured in water,
and long-lived gods highest in honors. *(320)*

For there are just these things, and running through one another
they come to have different appearances, for mixture changes them.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 159.13–26) **46.** (B76 + Strasbourg Papyrus, *ensemble* b)
This [i.e., fire] is found in the case of heavy-backed shells of sea-dwelling creatures. *(324)*
. . . *(325)*
There you will see earth {dwelling} in the uppermost parts of the flesh . . . *(327)*
and indeed truly [in the flesh] of stony-skinned tritons and turtles
. . . of horned stags
. . . saying *(330)* (Plutarch, *The Face in the Moon* 14 927F–928A and *Table Talk* 1.2.5 618B + Strasbourg Papyrus, *ensemble* b) **47.** (B23) As when painters decorate votive offerings—
men through cunning well taught in their skill—
who when they take the many-colored pigments in their hands,
mixing in harmony more of these and less of those,
out of them they produce shapes similar to all things, *5*
creating trees and men and women
and beasts and birds and fishes nurtured in water
and long-lived gods highest in honors.
So let not deception compel your mind (*phrēn*) to believe that there is from anywhere else
a source of mortal things, all the endless numbers of *10*
things that have come to be manifest,
but know these things distinctly, having heard the story from a god.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 160.1–11) **48.** (B26) They dominate in turn as the cycle evolves,
and they decrease into one another and grow in their turn, as destined.
For there are just these things, and running through one another
they come to be both humans and the tribes of other beasts,
at one time coming together into a single *kosmos* by Love *5*
and at another each being borne apart again by the hatred of Strife,
until they grow together into one, the whole, and become subordinate.

Thus in that they have learned to grow to be one out of many
and in that they again spring apart as many when the one grows apart,
in that way they come to be and their life is not lasting,
but in that these never cease interchanging continually,
in this way they are always unchanging in a cycle.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 33.19–34.3) **49.** (B139 + Strasbourg Papyrus, *ensemble* d)
. . . to fall apart from one another and encounter their fate
very much against their will, rotting through mournful necessity;
But for those who now have Love . . .
the Harpies will be present with the tokens {in the lottery} of death.
Alas that the pitiless day did not destroy me
before I devised with my claws wicked deeds for the sake of eating flesh.
{But now} in vain in this {storm} I wet my cheeks
{for we are approaching} a very deep {whirl,} I think,
{42} {and} although they do not wish it, {tens of thousands of} pains will be present in their mind
{to humans,} but we will again mount {you} on {that} account:
{when} an untiring flame happened to meet
. . . bringing on a woeful mixture
. . . things that could produce offspring were born
. . . I entered the final place
. . . with a scream and a cry
. . . having obtained {the meadow of Disaster}
. . . around . . . earth.

(Strasbourg Papyrus *ensemble* d + Porphyry *On Abstinence* 2.31 [lines 5–6]) **50.** (B22) For all these things—shining sun and earth and heaven and sea—are united with their own parts,
all that are split off and have come to be in mortal things.
In the same way, all that are more fitted for mixture
are made alike by Aphrodite and have come to love one another.
But greatest enemies are those furthest separated from one another
in birth and mixture and molded forms,

in every way unaccustomed to be together and very mournful
through their birth in Strife, because their births were in anger.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 160.26) **51.** (B91) <Water>
has a greater affinity with wine, but with olive oil
it is unwilling <to mix>.

(Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's Generation of Animals* 123.19–20)
52. (B33) As when sap from a fig tree curdles and binds white milk.

(Plutarch, *On Having Many Friends* 95A–B) **53.** (B34) Having glued barley
groats with water.

(Aristotle, *Meteorology* 381b31) **54.** (B92) . . . like copper mixed with tin.

(Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* II.8 747b3)[31]

55. (B93) The brightness of gleaming saffron is mixed with linen.
(Plutarch, *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* 433b) **56.** (B81) Wine is water
from grape skin fermented in wood.

(Plutarch, *Natural Phenomena* 912b–c) **57.** (B27) There neither the swift
limbs of the sun are discerned,
nor the shaggy force of earth nor the sea.
Thus by the dense concealment of Harmonia is held fast
a rounded sphere, exulting in its joyous solitude.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 926E; Simplicius, *Commentary on
Aristotle's Physics* 1183.24) **58.** (B27a) No dissent or unseemly battle in its
limbs.

(Plutarch, *Philosophers and Princes* 777c) **59.** (B28) But equal to itself on
all sides, and wholly without limit,
a rounded sphere, exulting in its joyous solitude.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.15.2) **60.** (B29) For two branches do not spring
from its back
nor do feet or swift knees or organs of generation,
but it was a sphere and equal to itself on all sides.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 7.19.13) **61.** (B134) For he is not
furnished in his limbs with a human head.
Two branches do not spring from his back.
{43} He has no feet, no swift knees, no hairy genitals,
but is only mind (*phrēn*), holy and indescribable,
darting through the entire *kosmos* with his swift thoughts. *5*

(Ammonius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation* 249.1) **62.** (B30)
But when great Strife had been nourished in its limbs
and leapt up to its prerogatives as the time was being fulfilled,
that is established for them in turn by a broad oath . . .

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1184.12–13) **63.** (B31) All
the limbs of the god trembled, each in turn.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1184.3) **64.** (B90) Thus
sweet caught hold of sweet, bitter rushed toward bitter,
sour went to sour, and hot coupled with hot.

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 4.1.3 663A; Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 7.5.17–18) **65.**
(B38) But come, I shall first tell you the beginning . . .
from which all that we now look upon came to be clear—
earth and the sea with many waves and moist air
and the Titan Aithēr, squeezing all things round about in a circle.

(Clement, *Miscellanies* 5.48.3) **66.** (B53, B54) For it sometimes happened
to run this way, but often otherwise. . . .
Aithēr sank beneath the deep-rooted earth.

(Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* II.6 334a1–5) **67.** (B47) For
<the moon> gazes straight at the pure circle of her lord [i.e., the sun].

(Anonymous, *Useful Expressions, Anecdota Graeca* 1.337.13) **68.** (B43)
Thus the sunlight, having struck the broad circle of the moon . . .

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 929E) **69.** (B45) A round alien light
spins around the earth.

(Achilles, *Introduction to Aratus* p.16 43.2–6) **70.** (B46) It spins <around the earth> like the track of a chariot, and around the extremity it . . .

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 925B) **71.** (B48) Earth makes night by obstructing <the sun's> rays.

(Plutarch, *Platonic Questions* 1006e) **72.** (B94) In the depths of a river, a dark color arises from the shadow,
and is observed as well in deep caves.

(Plutarch, *Natural Phenomena* 39) **73.** (B55) The sea is the earth's sweat.

(Aristotle, *Meteorology* 357a24) **74.** (B56) Salt is solidified when blasted by the force of the sun.

(Hephaiston, *Handbook* 1.3, p. 2.13) **75.** (B71) If your faith in these matters were at all faint—
<about> how when water, earth, Aithēr, and sun
are mixed, as many shapes and colors of mortals came to be
as now have come to be, fitted together by Aphrodite . . .

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 529.28) **76.** (B73) As then Cypris, busily working on shapes moistened earth in rain,
and gave it to swift fire to strengthen . . .

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 530.6–7) **77.** (B85) Mildly-shining flame chanced upon a little earth.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 331.3) **78.** (B86) From which [the roots] divine Aphrodite fashioned tireless eyes.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 529.21) **79.** (B96) Pleasant earth in her well-made crucibles
{44} obtained two parts of bright Nestis out of the eight,
and four of Hephaestus, and white bones came into being,
fitted together by the divine glues of Harmonia.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 300.21–24) **80.** (B98) Earth came together by chance in about equal quantity to these,

Hephaestus and rain and all-shining Aithēr,
anchored in the perfect harbors of Cypris,
either a bit more or a bit less of it among more of them.
From them blood came into being and other forms of flesh. *5*

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 32.6–10) **81.** (B82) The same things become hairs and leaves and dense feathers of birds, and scales on stout limbs.

(Aristotle, *Meteorology* 397b4) **82.** (Empedocles *fr.* 152 in Wright's edition)
For all of them that exist with closely-packed roots below,
flourishing with more widely spaced shoots.

(Herodian, *Universal Prosody*; not in DK) **83.** (B75) . . . all of them that are dense within, while their exterior parts
are formed in a loose texture,
because they met with such moisture through the devices of Cypris.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 530.9–10) **84.** (B83) . . . but in hedgehogs
sharp-pointed hairs bristle on their backs.

(Plutarch, *On Chance* 98D) **85.** (B79) In this way tall trees first lay eggs in the form of olives.

(Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* I.23 731a4) **86.** (B80) Therefore pomegranates and succulent apples are produced late in the season.

(Plutarch, *Table Talk* 683d) **87.** (B62) Come now, hear how, as fire was being separated,
it raised up the nocturnal shoots of men and women, full of wailing.
For the story is not off the point or ignorant.
First the whole-natured forms rose up out of the earth,
having a portion of both water and heat. *5*
These the fire sent up, desiring to come to its like,
and they did not yet show at all the lovely shape of limbs
or a voice or the member native to men.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 381.29) **88.** (B64) Indeed, longing for sexual intercourse comes upon him through sight.

(Plutarch, *Natural Phenomena* 917c) **89.** (B66) Divided meadows of Aphrodite.[32]

(Scholium on Euripides, *Phoenician Women* line 18) **90.** (B65) They were poured in clean <places>. Some, encountering cold, become women.

(Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* I.18 723a24) **91.** (B67) That which has to do with males came to be in the warmer part of the earth, and this is why men are dark and have stronger limbs and more hair.

(Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics* 6, 2.46) **92.** (B68) On the tenth day of the eighth month <the blood> becomes white pus.

(Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* IV.8 777a7) **93.** (B35) But I shall return to that path of songs
that I recounted before, drawing off this account from another one.
When Strife had reached the lowest depth
of the vortex, and Love comes to be in the middle of the whirl,
at this point all these things come together to be one single thing,
{45} not at once, but willingly combining, different ones from different places.
As they were being mixed, myriads of tribes of mortal things poured forth,
but many remained unmixed alternately with those that were being mingled —
all that Strife still held back aloft. For it had not
entirely completed its blameless retreat from them to the furthest limits of the circle,
but some of its limbs remained, while others had departed.
But however far it kept running out ahead, there followed in pursuit
the gentle immortal onset of blameless Love.
And immediately things grew to be mortal that formerly had learned to be immortal,

and things previously unmixed <grew to be> mixed, interchanging their paths. *15*
And as they were mixed, myriads of tribes of mortal things poured forth,
joined closely together with all kinds of forms, a wonder to behold.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 529.1–15 [lines 1–15]; *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 32.13–33.2 [lines 3–17]) **94.** (B36)
And when they were coming together, Strife was retreating to the extremity.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.10.11) **95.** (B57) By her [Love] many neckless faces sprouted,
and arms were wandering naked, bereft of shoulders,
and eyes were roaming alone, in need of foreheads.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 586.12; 587.1–2) **96.** (B58) [In this situation, the limbs were still] single-limbed [as the result of the separation caused by Strife, and] they wandered about [aiming at mixture with one another.]

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 587.18–19) **97.** (B60) Wobbly-footed with countless hands.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1123B) **98.** (B61) Many grew with faces and chests on both sides,
man-faced ox-progeny, and some to the contrary rose up
as ox-headed things with the form of men, compounded partly from men and partly from women, fitted with shadowy parts.

(Aelian, *The Nature of Animals* 16.29) **99.** (B59) But when divinity was mixed to a greater extent with divinity,
these things began to fall together, however they chanced to meet,
and many others in addition arose continuously.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 587.20, 23) **100.** (B84, B87)
As when someone planning for a journey prepares a lamp,
a flame of blazing fire in the wintry night,
attaching lantern-screens to protect it from all kinds of winds,

scattering the blast of the blowing winds,
but the light springs out, since it is finer,
and shines across the threshold with unwearying beams,
in the same way, after Aphrodite had enclosed the primeval fire
in membranes and equipped it with pegs of love,
she poured round-eyed Kore in fine-textured garments
that keep back the depth of water that flows around
but let the fire pass through since it is finer,
where they are pierced through with marvelous funnels.

(Aristotle, *Senses and Sensibilia* 2 437b24–438a5; Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 529.21 [line 8]) **101.** (B99) Fleshy twig [what Empedocles called the ear].

(Theophrastus, *On Sensation* 9) **102.** (B100) This is how all inhale and exhale: in all of them bloodless
{46} tubes of flesh extend deep in the body.
At the mouths of the tubes, the furthest extremities of the nostrils
are pierced through with closely arranged holes, so that they retain the blood, but a clear path for Aithēr is cut through.
Then whenever the delicate blood leaps back from there
the bubbling air leaps in with a raging swell,
and when it [the blood] springs up, the animal exhales again, as when a young girl
playing with a clepsydra of shining bronze
puts the passage of the pipe against her pretty hand
and dunks it into the delicate body of silvery water,
no liquid enters the vessel, but the bulk of air,
pressing from inside on the close-set holes, keeps it out
until she uncovers the compressed stream. But then
when the air is leaving, the water duly enters.
In the same way, when water occupies the vessel and the bronze
mouth and passage is blocked by mortal flesh,
the air striving eagerly to get in from without restrains the liquid,
commanding the approaches around the gates of the gurgling strainer,

until she removes her hand. At that point again, in reverse order,
as the air enters, the water duly runs out.
In the same way, when delicate blood in violent motion through the limbs
springs backward to the inmost recesses,
immediately a stream of air raging in a swell comes in,
and when the blood swells up, it exhales an equal amount back again.

(Aristotle, *On Respiration* 473a15) **103.** (B101) Hunting with its nostrils the
fragments of animals' limbs . . .
which they were leaving behind from their feet on the soft grass . . .

(Plutarch, *On Being a Busybody* 520e; *Natural Phenomena* 917e; Pseudo-Alexander, *Problems* 3.102) **104.** (B102) So in this way all things have
obtained both breathing and
the sense of smell.

(Theophrastus, *On Sensation* 22) **105.** (B104) And to the extent that they
happened to fall together at great intervals . . . [or, "the finest things
happened to fall together"].

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 331.41) **106.** (B109) For by
earth we see earth, by water, water,
by Aithēr, divine Aithēr, and by fire, destructive fire,
yearning by yearning, and strife by mournful strife.

(Aristotle, *De Anima* I.2 404b11–15) **107.** (B110) If you fix them in your
strong intelligence
and gaze upon them propitiously with pure attention,
these things will all be very much present to you all your life long,
and from them you will obtain many others. For these very things
grow into each kind of character, depending on each person's nature.
But if you reach out for other kinds of things, such as the millions
of wretched things that are found among men that blunt their thoughts,
indeed they will quickly leave you as time revolves,
longing to come to their own dear kind.
For know that all things possess thought and a portion of intelligence.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 7.29.25) **108.** (B106) Wisdom grows
in humans in relation to what is present.

(Aristotle, *De Anima* III.4 427a21–23) {47} **109.** (B107) For from these
[the roots] all things are joined and compounded,
and by these they think and feel pleasure and pain.

(Theophrastus, *On Sensation* 10) **110.** (B105) <The heart is> nurtured in the
seas of rebounding blood,
where most especially is what is called thought by humans,
for the blood around the heart in humans is thought.

(Porphyry, quoted by Stobaeus in *Selections* 1.49.53) **111.** (B108) Insofar as
they change and become different, so far
are different thoughts always present to them.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.5 1009b19) 9. ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE

ALTHOUGH PRESOCRATIC THINKERS after Parmenides had their own views and theories about many of the traditional subjects, they were faced with the problem of how to reconcile giving a successful rational account of the changing world of sense experience with Parmenides' arguments against coming-to-be and passing-away and his requirements for genuine being. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae proposed one of the most intriguing of these theories. Like the earlier Ionians he had an interest in explaining the cosmos, but that interest was tempered by an awareness of the metaphysical implications of the work of Parmenides. (As in Empedocles, some of the passages in Anaxagoras are echoes of Parmenides.) Anaxagoras was born in Clazomenae, in Ionia, probably around 500 BCE. He went to Athens, the first of the early Greek philosophers to live there, and spent about thirty years in the city, where he became an associate of Pericles, the politician. He was said to have predicted the fall of a meteorite at Aegospotami in 467. This is no doubt connected with his view that the sun and the other stars are fiery stones that are snatched up from the surface of the earth by the force of the revolving mass of ingredients and sometimes fall back to earth when shaken loose from

their orbits. His political associations combined with his nonconformist views (he said that the heavenly bodies are stones and that none is a god) resulted in his being prosecuted for impiety, a charge the Athenians would later make against both Socrates and Aristotle. Convicted, Anaxagoras was exiled from the city and went to Lampsacus, in northern Ionia. He was much revered in that city, and died there about 428. According to Aristotle, Anaxagoras was older than Empedocles, but his work became known later than Empedocles' did.

Anaxagoras envisions an original state of the cosmos in which, as he says, "All things were together." All things except Mind (*Nous*), which is pure and unmixed, and which knows and controls all things. At some point *Nous* sets the original mixture of ingredients into motion: a rotation begins, and spreads out through the unlimited mass of ingredients. As a result, ingredients begin to be separated and recombined with one another, eventually producing the world that we perceive. The details of Anaxagoras' theory are controversial, but it is clear that he thinks that it is ingredients that are basic rather than perceptible objects such as human beings, geological formations like mountains, plants, and other animals, which are temporary emergences from the mixture of ingredients.

Note on the texts: The translations of the fragments and testimonia given here are slightly revised versions of those by Patricia Curd in *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae*.

{48} **1.** (59B1) All things were together, unlimited both in amount and in smallness, for the small, too, was unlimited. And because all things were together, nothing was evident on account of smallness; for air and Aithēr dominated all things, both being unlimited, for these are the greatest among all things both in amount and in largeness.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 155.26–30) **2.** (B2) . . . for both air and Aithēr are being separated off from the surrounding mass, and what is surrounding is unlimited in extent.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 155.31–156.1) **3.** (B3) Nor of the small is there a smallest, but always a smaller (for what-is cannot not

be)—but also of the large there is always a larger. And [the large] is equal to the small in extent (*plēthos*), but in relation to itself each thing is both large and small.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 155.26–30) **4.** (B4) Since these things are so, it is right to think that there are many different things present in everything that is being combined, and seeds of all things, having all sorts of forms, colors, and flavors, and that humans and also the other animals were compounded, as many as have soul. Also that there are cities that have been constructed by humans and works made, just as with us, and that there are a sun and a moon and other heavenly bodies for them, just as with us, and the earth grows many different things for them, the most valuable of which they gather together into their household and use. I have said this about the separation off, because there would be separation off not only for us but also elsewhere. . . . Before there was separation off, because all things were together, there was not even any color evident; for the mixture of all things prevented it, of the wet and the dry and of the hot and the cold and of the bright and the dark, and there was much earth present and seeds unlimited in number, in no way similar to one another. For no one of the others is similar to another. Since these things are so, it is right to think that all things were present in the whole.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 34.29–35.9, 34.21–26) **5.** (B5) Even though these things have been dissociated in this way, it is right to recognize that all things are in no way less or more (for it is impossible that they be more than all), but all things are always equal.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 156.10–12) **6.** (B6) Since the shares of the large and the small are equal in number, in this way too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible that [anything] be separate, but all things have a share of everything. Since it is not possible that there is a least, it would not be possible that [anything] be separated, nor come to be by itself, but just as in the beginning, now too all things are together. In all things there are many things present, equal in number, both in the greater and in the lesser of the things being separated off.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 164.26–165.1) **7.** (B7) . . . so as not to know the extent of the things being separated off, either in word or in deed.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 608.26)

8. (B8) The things in the one *kosmos* have not been separated from one another, nor hacked apart with an axe—neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 175.12–14; 176.29) **9.** (B9) . . . as these things are revolving in this way and being separated off by force and swiftness, the swiftness produces force; and their swiftness resembles the swiftness of nothing that is now present among humans, but is altogether many times as fast.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 35.14–18) {49} **10.** (B10) For how . . . can hair come from what is not hair, and flesh from what is not flesh?

(Scholium on Gregory of Nazianzus, *Patrologia Graeca* 36.911) **11.** (B11) In everything there is a share of everything except *Nous* (Mind), but there are some things in which *Nous*, too, is present.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 164.22) **12.** (B12) The other things have a share of everything, but *Nous* is unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is alone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with anything else, then it would partake of all things, if it had been mixed with anything (for there is a share of everything in everything, just as I have said before); and the things mixed together with it would thwart it, so that it would control none of the things in the way that it in fact does, being alone by itself. For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and indeed it maintains all discernment (*gnōmē*) about everything and has the greatest strength. And *Nous* has control over all things that have soul, both the larger and the smaller. And *Nous* controlled the whole revolution, so that it started to revolve in the beginning. First it began to revolve from a small region, but it is revolving yet more, and it will revolve still more. And *Nous* knew (*egnō*) them all: the

things that are being mixed together, the things that are being separated off, and the things that are being dissociated. And whatever sorts of things were going to be, and whatever sorts were and now are not, and as many as are now and whatever sorts will be, all these *Nous* set in order. And *Nous* also ordered this revolution, in which the things being separated off now revolve, the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the Aithēr. This revolution caused them to separate off. The dense is being separated off from the rare, and the warm from the cold, and the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist. But there are many shares of many things; nothing is completely separated off or dissociated one from the other except *Nous.* All *Nous* is alike, both the greater and the smaller. Nothing else is like anything else, but each one is and was most manifestly those things of which there are the most in it.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 164.24–25, 156.13–157.4) **13.** (B13) When *Nous* began to move [things], there was separation off from the multitude that was being moved, and whatever *Nous* moved, all this was dissociated; and as things were being moved and dissociated, the revolution made them dissociate much more.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 300.31–301.1) **14.** (B14) *Nous*, which always is, most assuredly is even now where all the other things also are, in the surrounding multitude, and in the things that were joined together and in the things that have been separated off.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 157.7–9) **15.** (B15) The dense and the wet and the cold and the dark came together here, where <the> earth is now; but the rare and the hot and the dry <and the bright> moved out to the far reaches of the Aithēr.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 179.3–6) **16.** (B16) From these, as they are being separated off, earth is compacted; for water is separated off from the clouds, and earth from the water, and from the earth stones are compacted by the cold, and these stones move farther out than the water.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 179.8–10; 155.21–23) **17.** (B17) The Greeks do not think correctly about coming-to-be and passing-away; for no thing comes to be or passes away, but is mixed together and dissociated from the things that are. And thus they would be correct to call coming-to-be mixing-together and passing-away dissociating.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 163.20–24) {50} **18.** (B18) The sun places the light in the moon.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon* 929b) **19.** (B19) We call the reflection of the sun in the clouds a rainbow.

(Scholium on *Iliad* 17.547) **20.** (B21) Owing to their [the senses'] feebleness, we are not able to determine the truth.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.90) **21.** (B21a) Appearances are a sight of the unseen . . .

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.140) **22.** (B22) . . . egg whites are bird's milk.

(Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner* 2.57B) **23.** (A102) But in all these [physical skills that animals possess] we are more unfortunate than the beasts, but by experience and memory and wisdom and art according to Anaxagoras, we make use of their activity (?) and take their honey and milk them and herding them together, use them as we will. There is nothing of chance here, but all is wisdom and forethought.[33]

(Plutarch, *On Fortune* 3 98F) **24.** (A52) Anaxagoras probably supposed [the principles] to be unlimited in this way because he accepted as true the common opinion of the physicists that nothing comes to be from what is not. That is why they say: "all things were together," and why Anaxagoras makes the generation of a thing of a certain sort into alteration.

(Aristotle, *Physics* I.4 187a23–b6) **25.** (A43) Anaxagoras says just the opposite of Empedocles about the elements. For [Empedocles] claims that fire and earth, and things of the same rank, are elements of bodies and that all things are compounded of them; but Anaxagoras says the opposite. For

he claims that the homogeneous stuffs are elements—I mean, for instance, flesh and bone and each of the things of that sort—and that air and fire are mixtures of them and of all the other seeds; for each of them is a collection of all the invisible homogeneous stuffs.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* III.3 302a28) **26.** (A46) [Anaxagoras] makes the homogeneous stuffs elements, for instance, bone and flesh and marrow and the others of which the part is called by the same name [as the whole].

(Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* I.1 314a18) **27.** (A58) When someone said that *Nous* is present—in nature just as it is in animals—as the cause of the *kosmos* and of all its order, he appeared as a sober man among the random chatterers who preceded him. We know that Anaxagoras clearly held these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae gets the credit for holding them earlier.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.3.984b15) **28.** (A117) Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that plants are moved by desire, and they also assert that they sense and can be made sad and happy. Anaxagoras said that they are animals and feel joy and sadness, taking the fall of their leaves as evidence.

. . .

([Aristotle], *On Plants* I.1 815a15) {51}

10. Leucippus and Democritus: Fifth-Century Atomism

Almost nothing is known of Leucippus, who was the founding theorist of Atomism. Epicurus, a post-Aristotelian philosopher who adopted certain aspects of Presocratic Atomism is even said to have denied that Leucippus existed. Leucippus' birthplace is variously given as Miletus, Abdera, and Elea (Miletus and Elea could represent the Milesian and Eleatic influences on his work, and Democritus, his pupil and associate, was from Abdera). It is likely that Leucippus proposed the atomic system sometime around 440 to 430 BCE, thus he is contemporary with the other post-Eleatic thinkers Anaxagoras and Empedocles as well as Melissus. Two books are attributed to Leucippus: *On Mind* and *The Great World System (Makrokosmos).*

Democritus himself says that he was young when Anaxagoras was an old man; his birth date is usually placed at about 460; he lived well into the fourth century (tradition says he lived to be about 100 years old), and so was a contemporary of Socrates, Plato, and perhaps even the young Aristotle. Democritus was born in Abdera, in Thrace, a birthplace he shares with the Sophist Protagoras, but he traveled widely throughout the ancient world (later sources say he went to India, but this is doubtful). Ancient sources list about seventy titles of books by Democritus on all sorts of subjects, both philosophical (on natural philosophy, ethics, mathematics, literature, and grammar) as well as on other perhaps more popular topics: he apparently wrote books on his travels; there are also reports of treatises on medicine, farming, military science, and painting. One of his books was called *The Little World System (Mikrokosmos)*, in obvious homage to his teacher and associate Leucippus.

The selections included here concentrate on atomism, the scientific and metaphysical theory begun by Leucippus and continued by Democritus. Unfortunately, very few passages from Leucippus and Democritus on atomism survive; most of the evidence we have about the view comes from Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators.[34] We must keep in mind that these reports will also involve interpretation; atomism, which is a mechanistic theory, was the major competitor to the teleological systems of both Plato and Aristotle. The word *atomos* in Greek means “uncuttable,” and so atoms are things that cannot be cut, split, or actually divided. The Atomists claim that there is an indefinite number of these atoms, each of which is uniform, not subject to coming-to-be or passing-away, and unchangeable in any other way, except position, an external change that does not affect the inner core of atomic being. Atoms thus satisfy the Parmenidean requirements for reality. Individual atoms are imperceptible: most of them are very small, though Democritus may have said that there could be an atom as large as the cosmos. All atomic stuff is the same; atoms differ from one another only in shape and size (there is controversy about whether pre-Platonic Atomists considered weight as a property of atoms).

The second player in the atomic system is “the empty” (void). Void is where the atoms are not, and atoms are able to move into the empty. The Atomists explicitly call the void “the nothing” or the “what-is-not,” whereas atoms are called “the something” or the “what-is.” Hence they explicitly challenge Parmenides’ proscription against what-is-not; yet there is good evidence that they insisted that the void is real in its own right, and not simply the negation {52} of what-is. Void separates atoms, which allows them to move and come close to one another without melding into each other. The mixing together and separating of the different types of atoms into different arrangements is responsible for all the aspects of the sensible world, and so what looks like coming-to-be and passing-away is merely rearrangement of the basic entities—atoms and void. All else is, as Democritus says, “by convention.” Democritus offered complex accounts of the structure of physical objects (i.e., arrangements of atoms) and of perception, thought, and knowledge, as well as of many other aspects of human life. There are many fragments on ethical matters attributed to him, but the authenticity of these is unclear.

1. (67B2) No thing happens at random but all things as a result of a reason and by necessity.[35]

(Aëtius 1.25.4)

2. (67A1) Leucippus’ opinion is this: All things are unlimited and they all turn around one another; the all [the universe] is both the empty [void] and the full. The worlds come to be when the atoms fall into the void and are entangled with one another. The nature of the stars comes to be from their motion, and from their increase [in entanglements]. The sun is carried around in a larger circle around the moon; and whirled around the center, the earth rides steady; its shape is drumlike. He was the first to make the atoms first principles.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.30; tpc) **3.** (67A6) Leucippus and his associate Democritus declare the full and the empty [void] to be the elements, calling the former “what-is” (*to on*) and the other “what-is-not” (*to mē on*). Of these, the one, “what-is,” is full and solid, the other, “what-is-not,” is empty [void] and rare. (This is why they say that

what-is is no more than what-is-not, because the void is no less than body is.) These are the material causes of existing things. . . . They declare that the differences <among these> are the causes of the rest. Moreover, they say that the differences are three: shape, arrangement, and position. For they say that what-is differs only in "rhythm," "touching," and "turning"—and of these "rhythm" is shape, "touching" is arrangement, and "turning" is position. For *A* differs from *N* in shape, *AN* from *NA* in arrangement, and *Z* from *N* in position. Concerning the origin and manner of motion in existing things, these men too, like the rest, lazily neglected to give an account.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.4 985b4–20) **4.** (67A9) After establishing the shapes, Democritus and Leucippus base their account of alteration and coming-to-be on them: coming-to-be and perishing by means of separation and combination, alteration by means of arrangement and position. Since they held that the truth is in the appearance, and appearances are opposite and infinite, they made the shapes infinite, so that by reason of changes of the composite, the same thing seems opposite to different people, and it shifts position when a small additional amount is mixed in, and it appears completely different when a single thing shifts position. For tragedy and comedy come to be out of the same letters.

(Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* I.1 315b6–15) **5.** (68A37) Democritus believes that the nature of the eternal things is small substances (*ousiai)*[36] infinite in number. As a place for these he hypothesizes something else, infinite in size, and he calls their place by the names "the void," "not-hing" (*ouden*) and "the unlimited" [or, "infinite"] and he calls each of the substances "hing" (*den*) and "the compact" and "what-is." He holds that {53} the substances are so small that they escape our senses. They have all kinds of forms and shapes and differences in size. Out of these as elements he generates and forms visible and perceptible bodies. <These substances> are at odds with one another and move in the void because of their dissimilarity and the other differences I have mentioned, and as they move they strike against one another and become entangled in a way that makes them be in contact and close to one another but does not make any thing out of them that is truly one, for it is quite foolish <to think> that two or more things could ever come to be one. The grounds he

gives for why the substances stay together up to a point are that the bodies fit together and hold each other fast. For some of them are rough, some are hooked, others concave, and others convex, while yet others have innumerable other differences. So he thinks that they cling to each other and stay together until some stronger necessity comes along from the environment and shakes them and scatters them apart. He describes the generation and its contrary, separation, not only for animals but also for plants, *kosmoi*, and altogether for all perceptible bodies.

(Aristotle, *On Democritus*, quoted by Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 295.1–22) **6.** (67A8, 68A38) Leucippus . . . did not follow the same route as Parmenides and Xenophanes concerning things that are, but seemingly the opposite one. For while they made the universe one, immovable, ungenerated, and limited, and did not even permit the investigation of what-is-not, he posited the atoms as infinite and ever-moving elements, with an infinite number of shapes, on the grounds that they are no more like this than like that and because he observed that coming-to-be and change are unceasing among the things that are. Further, he posited that what-is is no more than what-is-not, and both are equally causes of things that come to be. For supposing the substance of the atoms to be compact and full, he said it is what-is and that it moves in the void, which he called "what-is-not" and which he declares is no less than what-is. His associate, Democritus of Abdera, likewise posited the full and the void as principles, of which he calls the former "what-is" and the latter "what-is-not." For positing the atoms as matter for the things that are, they generate the rest by means of their differences. These are three: rhythm, turning, and touching, that is, shape, position, and arrangement. For by nature like is moved by like, and things of the same kind move toward one another, and each of the shapes produces a different condition when arranged in a different combination. Thus, since the principles are infinite, they reasonably promised to account for all attributes and substances—how and through what cause anything comes to be. This is why they say that only those who make the elements infinite account for everything reasonably. They say that the number of the shapes among the atoms is infinite on the grounds that they are no more like this than like that. For they themselves assign this as a cause of the infiniteness.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 28.4–26) **7.** (67A7) Leucippus and Democritus have accounted for all things very systematically and in a single theory, taking the natural starting point as their own. For some of the early philosophers held that what-is is necessarily one and immovable. For the void is not, and motion is impossible without a separate void, nor can there be many things without something to keep them apart. . . . But Leucippus thought he had arguments that assert what is generally granted to perception, not abolishing coming-to-be, perishing, motion, or plurality. Agreeing on these matters with the phenomena and agreeing with those who support the one [that is, the Eleatics] that there could be no motion without void, he asserts that void is what-is-not and that nothing of what-is is not, since what strictly is is completely full. But this kind of thing is not one thing but things that are infinite in number and invisible because of the minuteness of their size. These move in the void (for there {54} is void), and they produce coming-to-be by combining and perishing by coming apart, and they act and are acted upon wherever they happen to come into contact (for in this way they are not one), and they generate <compounds> by becoming combined and entangled. A plurality could not come to be from what is in reality one, nor one from what is really many, but this is impossible.

(Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* I.8 324b35–325a36) **8.** (67A19) They declare that their [atoms'] nature is but one, as if each one were a separate piece of gold.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* I.7 275b32–276a1) **9.** (68A59) Plato and Democritus supposed that only the intelligible things are true (or, "real"); Democritus <held this view> because there is by nature no perceptible substrate, since the atoms, which combine to form all things, have a nature deprived of every perceptible quality.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 8.6) **10.** (68A47) Democritus specified two <basic properties of atoms>: size and shape; and Epicurus added weight as a third.

(Aëtius 1.3.18)

11. (67A15) Since the bodies differ in shape, and the shapes are infinite, they declare the simple bodies to be infinite too. But they did not determine further what is the shape of each of the elements, beyond assigning a spherical shape to fire. They distinguished air and water and the others by largeness and smallness.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* III.4 303a11–15) **12.** (67A14) These men [Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus] said that the principles are infinite in multitude, and they believed them to be atoms and indivisible and incapable of being affected because they are compact and have no share of void. (For they claimed that division occurs where there is void in bodies.)

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 242.18–21) **13.** (67A13) Those who abandoned division to infinity on the grounds that we cannot divide to infinity and as a result cannot guarantee that the division cannot end, declared that bodies are composed of indivisible things and are divided into indivisibles. Except that Leucippus and Democritus hold that the cause of the primary bodies' indivisibility is not only their inability to be affected but also their minute size and lack of parts.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 925.10–15) **14.** (68A48b) Democritus would appear to have been persuaded by arguments that are appropriate to the science of nature. The point will be clear as we proceed. For there is a difficulty in supposing that there is a body, a magnitude, that is everywhere divisible and that this [the complete division] is possible. For what will there be that escapes the division? . . . Now since such a body is everywhere divisible, let it be divided. What, then, will be left? A magnitude? But that cannot be. For there will be something that has not been divided, whereas we supposed that it was everywhere divisible. But if there is no body or magnitude left and yet the division will take place, either <the original body> will consist of points and its components will be without magnitude, or it will be nothing at all so that even if it were to come to be out of nothing and be composed of nothing, the whole thing would then be nothing but an appearance. Likewise, if it is composed of points it will not be a quantity. For when they were in contact and there was a single magnitude and they coincided, they made the whole thing no larger. For when it is divided into two or more, the whole is no smaller or larger than before. And so even if all the points are put together they will not make any

magnitude. . . . These problems result from supposing that any body whatever of any size is everywhere divisible. . . . And so, since magnitudes cannot be composed of contacts or points, it is necessary for there to be indivisible bodies and magnitudes.

(Aristotle, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* I.2 316a13–b16) {55} **15.** (67A7) When Democritus said that the atoms are in contact with each other, he did not mean contact, strictly speaking, which occurs when the surfaces of the things in contact fit perfectly with one another, but the condition in which the atoms are near one another and not far apart is what he called contact. For no matter what, they are separated by void.

(Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption* 158.27–159.3) **16.** (68B156) [When Democritus declares that] There is no more reason for the "hing" {Greek: *den*} to be than the nothing {Greek: *mēden*, not-hing}, [he is calling thing body and nothing void, and declaring that this too (void) has some nature and existence of its own.]

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 1108F; tpc) **17.** (67A19) By "void" people mean an interval in which there is no perceptible body. Since they believe that everything that is is body, they say that void is that in which there is nothing at all. . . . So it is necessary to prove[37] . . . that there is no interval different from bodies . . . which breaks up the totality of body so that it is not continuous, as Democritus, Leucippus, and many other natural philosophers say, or that there is anything outside the totality of body, supposing that it is continuous. . . . They say that (1) there would be no change in place (that is, motion and growth), since it does not seem that there would be motion unless there were void, since what is full cannot admit anything else. . . . (2) Some things are seen to contract and be compressed; for example, they say that the jars hold the wine along with the wineskins, since the compressed body contracts into the empty places that are in it. Further, (3) all believe that growth takes place through void, since the nourishment is a body and two bodies cannot coincide. (4) They also use as evidence what happens with ash: it takes no less water to fill a jar that contains ashes than it does to fill the same jar when it is empty.

(Aristotle, *Physics* IV.6 213a27–b22) **18.** (67A16) This is why Leucippus and Democritus, who say that the primary bodies are always moving in the void (that is, the infinite) must specify what motion they have and what is their natural motion.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* III.2 300b8–11) **19.** (68A58) They say that motion occurs because of the void. For they, too, say that nature undergoes motion in respect of place.

(Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.9 265b24–25) **20.** (67A16) Leucippus and Democritus said that their primary bodies, the atoms, are always moving in the infinite void by compulsion.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 583.18–20) **21.** (68A47) Democritus says that the primary bodies (these are the compact things) do not possess weight but move by striking against one another in the infinite, and there can be an atom the size of a *kosmos.*

(Aëtius 1.12.6)

22. (68A58) They said that moving by virtue of the weight in them, <the atoms> move with respect to place through the void, which yields and does not resist. For they said that they "are hurled all about." And they attribute this motion to the elements as not just their primary but in fact their only motion, whereas things composed of the elements have the other kinds of motion. For they grow and decrease, change, come to be, and perish through the combination and separation of the primary bodies.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 1318.35–1319.5) **23.** (68A60) Those <who call the primary bodies> solid can rather say that the larger ones are heavier. But since compounds do not appear to behave in this way, and we see many that are smaller in bulk but heavier, as bronze is heavier than wood, some think and say that the cause is different—that the void enclosed within makes the bodies light and sometimes {56} makes larger things lighter, since they contain more void. . . . Those who make these distinctions must add not only that something contains more void if it is lighter but also that it contains less solid.

(Aristotle, *On the Heavens* IV.2 309a1–14) **24.** (68A66) Democritus leaves aside purpose but refers all things which nature employs to necessity.

(Aristotle, *Generation of Animals* V.8 789b2–4) **25.** (68A66) <Concerning necessity> Democritus <says it is> the knocking against <each other> and the motion and "blow" of matter.

(Aëtius 1.26.2)

26. (68A68) <Democritus> seemed to employ chance in his cosmogony, but in his detailed discussions he declares that chance is the cause of nothing, and he refers to other causes.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 330.14–17) **27.** (67A14) These atoms, which are separate from one another in the infinite void and differ in shape and size and position and arrangement, move in the void, and when they overtake one another they collide, and some rebound in whatever direction they may happen to, but others become entangled by virtue of the way their shapes, sizes, positions, and arrangements correspond, and they stay together, and this is how compounds are produced.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 242.21–26) **28.** (68A57) What does Democritus say? That atomic substances infinite in number, not different in kind, and moreover incapable of acting or being acted upon, are in motion, scattered in the void. When they approach one another or collide or become entangled, the compounds appear as water or fire or as a plant or a human, but all things are atoms, which he calls forms; there is nothing else. For there is no coming-to-be from what-is-not, and nothing could come to be from things that are, because on account of their hardness the atoms are not acted upon and do not change.

(Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 8 1110F–1111A) **29.** (68B155) If a cone is cut by a plane parallel to the base, what should we think about the surfaces of the segments? Do they prove to be equal or unequal? If they are unequal they will make the cone uneven, with many step-like notches and rough spots, but if they are equal the segments will be equal, and the cone will appear to

have the character of a cylinder, being composed of equal not unequal circles, which is most absurd.

(Plutarch, *Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions* 1079E) **30.** (67A14) Leucippus and Democritus, calling the smallest and primary bodies atoms, <say> that by virtue of differences in their shapes and position and order, some bodies come to be hot and fiery—those composed of rather sharp and minute primary bodies situated in a similar position, while others come to be cold and watery—those composed of the opposite kinds of bodies. And some come to be bright and shining, while others come to be dim and dark.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 36.1–7) **31.** (68A129) He makes sweet that which is round and good-sized; astringent that which is large, rough, polygonal, and not rounded; sharp-tasting, as its name indicates, sharp and angular in body, bent, fine, and not rounded; pungent, round, small, angular, and bent; salty, angular, good-sized, crooked, and equal-sided; bitter, round, smooth, crooked, and small-sized; oily, fine, round, and small.

(Theophrastus, *Causes of Plants* 6.1.6) **32.** (68A135) Iron is harder and lead is heavier, since iron has its atoms arranged unevenly and has large quantities of void in many places . . . while lead has less void, but its atoms are arranged evenly throughout. This is why it is heavier but softer than iron.

(Theophrastus, *On Sensation* 62) {57} **33.** (67A1) <Leucippus> declares the universe to be infinite. . . . Of this, some is full and some is empty [void], and he declares these [full and void] to be elements. An infinite number of *kosmoi* arise out of these and perish into these. The *kosmoi* come into being in the following way. Many bodies of all sorts of shapes, being cut off from the infinite, move into a great void. They collect together and form a single vortex. In it they strike against one another and move around in all different ways, and they separate apart, like to like. When they are no longer able to rotate in equilibrium, the fine ones depart into the void outside as if sifted. The rest remain together, become entangled, move together in unison, and form a first spherical complex. This stands apart like a membrane, enclosing all kinds of bodies in it. As these whirl around by

virtue of the resistance of the center, the surrounding membrane becomes thin, since the adjacent atoms join the motion when they come into contact with the vortex. And the earth came into being in this way when the atoms moving to the center remained together. And again the surrounding membrane-like thing itself grows because of the accretion of bodies from outside. As it moves in a vortex it acquires whatever it comes into contact with. Some of these become intertwined and form a complex that is at first damp and muddy, but when they have dried out and rotate with the vortex of the whole, they catch fire and form the nature of the stars.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.31–32) **34.** (68B164) Animals flock together with animals of the same kind—doves with doves, cranes with cranes, and likewise for the other irrational kinds. It is the same for inanimate things, as can be seen in the cases of seeds being sifted and pebbles on the shore. For through the swirling and separating motion of the sieve, lentils wind up together with lentils, wheat with wheat, and barley with barley, and through the motion of the waves, elongated pebbles are pushed to the same place as other elongated ones, and round ones to the same place as round ones, as if the similarity in these had some mutually attractive force for things.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.116) **35.** (68A40) There are an infinite number of *kosmoi* of different sizes. In some there is no sun or moon. In some the sun and moon are larger than ours, and in others there are more. The distances between the *kosmoi* are unequal, and in one region there are more, in another fewer. Some are growing, some are at their peak, and some are declining, and here one is coming into being, there one is ceasing to be. They perish when they collide with one another. Some *kosmoi* have no animals, plants, or any moisture. In our own *kosmos* the earth came into being before the stars. The moon is lowest, then the sun, then the fixed stars. The planets too have unequal heights. A *kosmos* is at its peak until it is no longer able to take anything in from outside.

(Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.13.2–4) **36.** (67A1) The orbit of the sun is furthest out, that of the moon is nearest, and the others are in between. All the stars are on fire because of the speed of their motion; the sun too is on fire because of the stars, while the moon has only a small

share of fire. The sun and moon suffer eclipses . . . [something is missing from the text—probably a reference to the ecliptic] because the earth is tilted toward the south. The regions to the north are always covered with snow and are very cold and frozen. The sun is eclipsed rarely, but the moon is eclipsed often because their orbits are unequal.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.33) **37.** (68A93) Democritus stated that thunder results from an uneven compound forcing the surrounding cloud to move downward. Lightning is the collision of clouds, as a result of which the atoms that generate fire are filtered through interstices containing much void (a process that involves friction) and collect in the same place. A thunderbolt occurs when there is a violent motion of fire-producing atoms that {58} are very pure, fine, even, and "close-fitted" (the word Democritus himself uses). A waterspout occurs when compounds of fire containing much void are held back in regions with a lot of void and are wrapped in special membranes, and form bodies because of this rich mixture and make a rush toward the depth.

(Aëtius 3.3.11)

38. (68A104) Some say that the soul moves the body in which it is found in the same way as it is itself moved: Democritus, for example, who has a view like Philippos the comic poet, who says that Daedalus made the wooden statue of Aphrodite move by pouring quicksilver into it. Democritus speaks similarly, since he says that the indivisible spheres are in motion because their nature is never to stay still, and to draw the entire body along with them and move it. But we will ask if these same things also produce rest. How they will do so is difficult or impossible to state. In general, the soul does not appear to move the body in this way, but through choice of some kind and through thought.

(Aristotle, *De Anima* I.3 406b16–25) **39.** (68A135) The visual impression is not formed directly in the pupil, but the air between the eye and the object is contracted and stamped by the seen object and by the seeing thing. For there is a continual effluence from everything. Then this [air], which is solid and has a different color, forms an impression in the eyes, which are moist.

(Theophrastus, *On Sensation* 50) **40.** (68B9) Nonetheless [Democritus] is found condemning them [the senses]. For he says, “We in fact understand nothing exactly [or, “exact”], but what changes according to the disposition both of the body and of the things that enter it and offer resistance to it.”

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.136) **41.** (68B11) There are two kinds of judgment, one legitimate and the other bastard. All the following belong to the bastard: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is legitimate and is separate from this. When the bastard one is unable to see or hear or smell or taste or grasp by touch any further in the direction of smallness, but <we need to go still further> toward what is fine, <then the legitimate one enables us to carry on>.[38]

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.138) **42.** (68B9) By convention [or, “custom”], sweet; by convention, bitter; by convention, hot; by convention, cold; by convention, color; but in reality, atoms and void.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.135) **43.** (68B6) A person must know by this rule [*kanōn*: measuring stick, standard] that he is separated from reality.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.136) **44.** (68B8) In fact it will be clear that to know in reality what each thing is like is a matter of perplexity [or, “that people are at a loss to know in reality what each thing is like”].

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.136) **45.** (68B7) In reality we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a reshaping [of the soul-atoms by the atoms entering from without].

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.136) **46.** (68A112) Either nothing is true, or at least to us it is unclear [or, “hidden”]. It is because these thinkers suppose intelligence to be sensation, and that, in turn, to be an alteration, that they say that what appears to our senses must be true (or, “real”).

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV.5 1009b11–15) **47.** (68B117) In reality we know nothing, for truth is in the depths.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.72) {59} **48.** (68B125) Wretched mind, do you take your evidence from us and then throw us down? Throwing us down is a fall for you!

(Galen, *On Medical Experience* 15.8) **49.** (68B166) Democritus says that certain images of atoms approach humans, and of them some cause good and others evil, and as a result he prayed "to meet with propitious images." These are large and immense, and difficult to destroy though not indestructible. They indicate the future in advance to people when they are seen and emit voices. As a result people of ancient times, upon perceiving the appearances of these things, supposed that they are a god, though there is no other god aside from these having an indestructible nature.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.19) **50.** (68B191) Cheerfulness arises in people through moderation of enjoyment and due proportion in life. Deficiencies and excesses tend to change suddenly and give rise to large movements in the soul. Souls that undergo motions involving large intervals are neither steady nor cheerful . . .

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.1.120) **51.** (68A1) The goal of life is cheerfulness, which is not the same as pleasure . . . but the state in which the soul continues calmly and stably, disturbed by no fear or superstition or any other emotion. He also calls it "well-being" and many other names.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.45) 11. MELISSUS OF SAMOS

MELISSUS WAS AN admiral as well as a philosopher. Although he lived on Samos (an island in the eastern Aegean that was the birthplace of Pythagoras), he adopted Parmenides' arguments. We do not know the year of his birth, but in 441 BCE he was the admiral of a fleet that defeated the Athenians under Pericles. Melissus' treatise was a sustained exploration of the consequences of Parmenides' views, and he even extends Parmenides' arguments. Melissus argues that only one thing can be, and that among other characteristics, the One (as he called it) must be changeless and full, not subject to changes in density and rarity, not subject to rearrangement, and not subject to pain or pleasure. These arguments seemingly take on the Milesians;

Anaxagoras and the Atomists, whose many ingredients change place and are rearranged (in addition, the Atomists are committed to the reality of void); and Empedocles, who has four ingredients that are rearranged, and whose divine sphere "rejoices." Melissus was roundly abused by Aristotle, who said Melissus was somewhat unrefined in his views, but Melissus sets out his arguments clearly and uses Parmenides' claims about what-is to challenge the truth of the evidence of the senses, and to call into question some basic assumptions of post-Parmenidean theories.

1. (30B1) Whatever was, always was and always will be. For if it came to be, it is necessary that before it came to be it was nothing. Now if it was nothing, in no way could anything come to be out of nothing.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 162.23–26) **2.** (B2) Now since it did not come to be, it is and always was and always will be, and it does not have a beginning or an end, but it is unlimited. For if it had come to be it would have a beginning (for if it had come to be it would have begun at some time) and an end (for if it had come to be it would have ended at some {60} time).[39] But since it neither began nor ended, and always was and always will be, it does not have a beginning or end. For whatever is not entire [or, "all"] cannot always be.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 29.22–26, 109.20–25) **3.** (B3) [Just as he says that what came to be at some time is limited in its being, he also wrote clearly that what always is is unlimited in being, saying:] But just as it always is, so also it must always be unlimited in magnitude. [But by "magnitude" he does not mean what is extended in space.][40]

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 109.29–32) **4.** (B4) Nothing that has both a beginning and an end is either eternal or unlimited.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 110.2–4) **5.** (B5) If it is not one, it will come to a limit in relation to something else.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 110.5–6) **6.** (B6) For if it is <unlimited>, it will be one. For if there were two, they could not be

unlimited, but they would have limits in relation to each other.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 557.14–17) **7.** (B7)
Thus it is eternal and unlimited and one and all alike.

And it cannot perish or become greater or be rearranged, nor does it feel pain or distress. For if it underwent any of these, it would no longer be one. For if it becomes different, it is necessary that what-is is not alike, but what previously was perishes, and what-is-not comes to be. Now if it were to become different by a single hair in ten thousand years, it would all perish in the whole of time.

But it is not possible for it to be rearranged either. For the arrangement that previously was is not destroyed, and an arrangement that is not does not come to be. But when nothing either comes to be in addition or is destroyed or becomes different, how could there be a rearrangement of things-that-are? For if it became at all different, it would thereby have in fact been rearranged.

Nor does it feel pain. For it could not be entire [or, "all"] if it were feeling pain. For a thing feeling pain could not always be. Nor does it have equal power to what is healthy. Nor would it be alike if it were feeling pain. For it would be feeling pain because something is either being taken away or added, and it would no longer be alike.

Nor could what is healthy feel pain. For what is healthy and what-is would perish and what-is-not would come to be.

And the same argument applies to feeling distress as to feeling pain.

Nor is any of it empty [or void]. For what is empty is nothing, and of course what is nothing cannot be. Nor does it move. For it cannot give way anywhere, but it is full. For if it were empty, it would give way into the empty part. But since it is not empty it has nowhere to give way.

It cannot be dense and rare. For it is impossible for the rare to be equally full as the dense, but the rare thereby proves to be emptier than the dense.

And we must make this the criterion of full and not full: If something yields or is penetrated, it is not full. But if it neither yields nor is penetrated, it is full.

Hence it is necessary that it is full if it is not empty. Hence if it is full it does not move.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 111.18–112.15) **8.** (B8) [After saying of what-is that it is one and ungenerated and motionless and interrupted by no void, but is a whole full of itself, he goes on:] Now this argument is the strongest indication that there is only one thing. But the following are indications too.

{61} If there were many things, they must be such as I say the one is. For if there are earth and water and air and fire and iron and gold and the living and the dead and black and white and all the other things that people say are real—if these things really are and if we see and hear correctly, then each of them ought to be just as we thought at first, and it should not change or come to be different, but each thing always ought to be just as it is. But in fact we say that we see and hear and understand correctly.

We think that what is hot becomes cold and what is cold hot, that what is hard becomes soft and what is soft hard, and that the living dies and that it comes to be from the nonliving, and that all these things come to be different and that what was and what is now are not at all alike, but that iron, although hard, is worn away by contact with the finger, and also gold and stone and anything else that we think is enduring,[41] and that earth and stone come to be from water.

Hence these things do not agree with one another. For although we say that there are many eternal things that have definite forms and endurance, we think that all of them become different and change from what we see at any moment.

Hence it is clear that we do not see correctly and we are incorrect in thinking that those many things are. For they would not change if they were real, but each one would be just as we thought. For nothing can prevail over what is real.

But if it changes, what-is was destroyed, and what-is-not has come to be. Thus, if there are many things, they must be such as the one is.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens* 558.19–559.12) **9.** (B9) [That he intends what-is to be bodiless he indicated, saying:] Now if it is, it must be one. But being one, it must not have body. But if it had thickness, it would have parts and no longer would be one.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 109.34–110.2) **10.** (B10) [For he himself proves that what-is is indivisible.] For if what-is is divided, it moves. But if it moved, it would not be.

(Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 109.32–34) **11.** (A5) Being one it is all alike. For if it were unlike, being more, it would no longer be one, but many.

(Pseudo-Aristotle, *On Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias* 1 974a12–14) 12.

PHILOLAUS OF CROTON

PHILOLAUS WAS BORN in Croton, the center of Pythagoreanism in southern Italy. The date of his birth is controversial, and is given from anywhere around 470 to about 430 BCE. He certainly never knew Pythagoras himself, who died before 490. He was probably the first of the Pythagoreans to write a book, which may have been one of Aristotle's chief sources for his accounts of Pythagoreanism. In Plato's *Phaedo*, two associates of Socrates who are present at his death, Simmias and Cebes, are represented as Pythagoreans and said to have studied with Philolaus in Thebes when he visited mainland Greece. According to Philolaus, the cosmos is made up of what he calls limiters and unlimiteds, fitted together in what he calls a *harmonia* (literally a carpenter's joint; also a musical fitting together or harmony). A *harmonia* {62} is expressible in a numerical ratio, and thus, according to Philolaus, can be known. On this view, the cosmos as a series of numerical relationships becomes intelligible to humans. In Philolaus, we see Pythagorean assumptions about the power of number at work, although it is possible that Aristotle's famous claim that the Pythagoreans said that everything is number is Aristotle's own interpretation rather than something any of the Pythagoreans actually said. It is not, for instance, present in any of the extant fragments of Philolaus.

1. (44B1) Nature in the *kosmos* was joined from both unlimiteds and limiters, and the entire *kosmos* and all the things in it.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.85) **2.** (B2) It is necessary that the things that are be all either limiters or unlimited or both limiters and

unlimited; but not in all cases only unlimited. Now since it is evident that they are neither from things that are all limiters nor from things that are all unlimited, it is therefore clear that both the *kosmos* and the things in it were joined together from both limiters and unlimiteds. The behavior of these things in turn makes it clear. For those of them that are from limiters limit, those that are from both limiters and unlimiteds both limit and do not limit, and those that are from unlimiteds will evidently be unlimited.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.7a) **3.** (B3) There will not be anything that is going to know at all, if all things are unlimited.

(Iamblichus, *Commentary on Nicomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic* 7.8) **4.** (B4) And in fact all the things that are known have number. For it is not possible for anything at all either to be comprehended or known without this.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.7b) **5.** (B5) In fact, number has two proper kinds, odd and even and a third kind even-odd from both mixed together. Of each of the two kinds there are many forms, of which each thing itself gives signs.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.7c) **6.** (B6) Concerning nature and *harmonia* this is how it is: the being of things, which is eternal—that is, in fact, their very nature—admits knowledge that is divine and not human, except that it was impossible for any of the things that are and are known by us to have come to be if there did not exist the being of the things from which the *kosmos* is constituted—both the limiters and the unlimiteds. But since the principles are not similar or of the same kind, it would be completely impossible for them to be brought into order [or, "for them to be kept in an orderly arrangement (*kosmos*)"] if *harmonia* had not come upon them in whatever way it did. Now things that are similar and of the same kind have no need of *harmonia*, but those that are dissimilar and not of the same kind or of the same speed must be connected together in *harmoniai* if they are going to be kept in an orderly arrangement (*kosmos*).

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.7d) **7.** (B6a) The magnitude of the *harmonia* is the fourth plus the fifth. The fifth is greater than the fourth by a 9:8 ratio.

For from the lowest string to the second string is a fourth, and from the second string to the highest string is a fifth, but from the highest string to the third string is a fourth, and from the third string to the lowest string is a fifth. What is between the third string and the second string is a 9:8 ratio; the fourth has a 4:3 ratio, the fifth a 3:2 ratio, and the octave a 2:1 ratio. Thus the *harmonia* is five 9:8 ratios plus two half tones, the fifth is three 9:8 ratios plus one half-tone, and the fourth two 9:8 ratios plus one half-tone.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.7d) **8.** (B7) The first thing that was joined [harmonized], the one in the middle of the sphere, is called the hearth.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.21.8) {63} **9.** (B17) The *kosmos* is one. It began to come to be right up at the middle, and from the middle <it came to be> in an upward direction in the same way as it did in a downward direction, and the things above the middle are symmetrical with those below. For, in the lower <regions> the lowest part is like the highest part <in the upper regions>, and similarly for the rest. For both <the higher and the lower> have the same relationship to the middle, unless they have been moved to another location.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.15.7; based on Huffman's translation) **10.** (B16) Some *logoi* are stronger than we are.

(Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics* II.8 1225a30; Huffman's translation) **11.** (B20) [Philolaus correctly called] the number 7 motherless. [For it alone is of a nature neither to generate nor to be generated.]

(John the Lydian, *On the Months* 2.12) **12.** (B13) The head <is the location> of intellect, the heart of soul and sensation, the navel of the taking root and growth of the first <part>, the genital organs of the depositing of seed and of generation. The brain contains the principle of man, the heart <contains the principle> of animals, the navel that of plants, and the genital organs that of them all. For they all both flourish and grow from seed.

(Pseudo-Iamblichus, *Theological Arithmetic* 25.12) **13.** (58B8) The Pythagoreans similarly posited two principles, but added something peculiar to themselves, not that the limited and the unlimited are distinct

natures like fire or earth or something similar, but that the unlimited itself and the one itself are the substance of what they are predicated of. This is why they call number the substance of all things.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.5 987a13–19) **14.** (58B4) In numbers they [Pythagoreans] thought they observed many resemblances to the things that are and that come to be . . . such and such an attribute of numbers being justice, another being soul and intellect, another being decisive moment, and similarly for virtually all other things . . . since all other things seemed to be made in the likeness of numbers in their entire nature.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.5 985b28–33)

13. The Sophists

From the time of Homer onward, Greek writers were concerned with questions about the best way of life for a human being and just what virtues or excellences a good person needed to cultivate. Herodotus and other early historians had also provided information about other cultures and their social and political systems and compared these with the Greeks. Yet it was primarily in the fifth century BCE that theories about moral, political, and social questions began to be developed. It was primarily the Sophists who raised and discussed these issues, although as we have seen, some of the Presocratic philosophers were also participants in these debates. Most of the Sophists were professional teachers and rhetoricians, but some active politicians in Athens came to be considered Sophists, and although they did not form a single school or group, there were enough similarities in their activities and viewpoints for them to be considered together. The word "sophist" has its roots in *sophos* meaning "wise," and, in its earliest uses, someone who was a *sophistēs* was a master in his craft or an expert. In general, the Sophists can be considered as practitioners and teachers of wisdom. This obviously raises the question "What is wisdom?" and the Sophists aimed to answer that question, as well as questions about the other excellences or virtues needed by a successful citizen of a Greek city-state, {64} or polis. Traveling throughout Greece, teaching, giving rhetorical displays, and competing with one another for paying students and audiences, the Sophists were a major part of social and

intellectual life, for the questions they raised were fundamental to life in a Greek polis.

Our information about the Sophists comes mainly from Plato, who was not an impartial witness. Like Socrates, his intellectual hero, Plato was suspicious of Sophistic teaching and claims to knowledge, and was scandalized by the fact that the Sophists charged for their teaching and would take on any pupil who could afford the price. Many of Plato's dialogues show Socrates demonstrating that one Sophist or another fails to understand his own views or the nature of the wisdom that the Sophist purports to teach. In his writings, Plato explicitly contrasts Socrates, the independent lover of wisdom (the *philosophos*) with the mere expert technician (the *sophistēs*) who pleases crowds rather than searching seriously for the truth. We should be wary of accepting Plato's views uncritically, and we should treat his evidence about the Sophists—in such dialogues as *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and the two named after Hippias—with great care.

The Sophists included here are representative of the movement and its methods; there are short claims illustrating views about knowledge and some longer speeches. The texts given here show that a sharp distinction between the philosophers and the Sophists may be untenable.

13.1. Protagoras

PROTAGORAS WAS PERHAPS the most famous of the early Sophists. He was born in Abdera (home of Democritus as well) around 490 BCE and died about 420. He was often in Athens and part of the circle around Pericles (one wonders if he knew Anaxagoras), but he was also very well known in the western Greek cities of Sicily and Southern Italy. Plato's dialogue Protagoras presents an unforgettable (if perhaps not entirely trustworthy) picture of the excitement that Protagoras could generate.

1. (80A5) [Protagoras on what he teaches and the value of his teachings.] My boy, if you associate with me, the result will be that the very day you

begin you will return home a better person, and the same will happen the next day too. Each day you will make constant progress toward being better. . . . [Protagoras teaches a young man] Good counsel concerning his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also concerning the city's affairs, so that as far as the city's affairs go he may be most powerful in acting and in speaking.

(Plato, *Protagoras* 318a, 318e–319a) **2.** (80B3) Teaching requires nature and training. . . . Learning must begin at an early age.

(*Anecdota Parisiensia* I 171, 31) **3.** (80B10) Art (*tekhnē*) without practice and practice without art are nothing.

(Stobaeus, *Selections* 3.29.80) **4.** (80B11) Education is not implanted in the soul unless one reaches a greater depth.

(Pseudo-Plutarch, *On Training* 178.25) **5.** (80B4) Concerning the gods I am unable to know either that they are or that they are not or what their appearance is like. For many are the things that hinder knowledge: the obscurity of the matter and the shortness of human life.

(Eusebius, *Preparation of the Gospel* 14.3.7) **6.** (80B7) [It is not true that geometry studies perceptible magnitudes . . .] For perceptible lines are not the kind of things the geometer talks about, since no perceptible thing is straight or curved in that way, nor is a circle tangent to a {65} ruler at a point, but the way Protagoras used to say in refuting the geometers.

(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III.2 997b34–998a4) **7.** Protagoras says of mathematics, the subject matter is unknowable and the terminology distasteful.

(Philodemus of Gadara, *On Poetry* P.Herc. 1676, col. 1.12–13; not in DK) **8.** (80B1) A person is the measure of all things—of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.60) **9.** (80A1) He was the first to use in dialectic the argument of Antisthenes that attempts to prove that contradiction is impossible.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.53) **10.** (80A1) Protagoras was the first to declare that there are two mutually opposed arguments on any subject.

(Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.51) **11.** (80A21) Protagoras made the weaker and stronger argument and taught his students to blame and praise the same person.

(Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. *Abdera*) **12.** (80A21) [Aristotle on Protagoras' method.] This is making the weaker argument stronger. And people were rightly annoyed at Protagoras' promise.

(Aristotle, *Rhetoric* II.24 1402a24–26)

WHAT FOLLOWS IS an extract from the anonymous *Dissoi Logoi* (*Twofold Arguments* or *Contrasting Arguments*), a sample collection of arguments for and against various claims, such as for and against Good and Bad, Truth and Falsity, Just and Unjust, and so on. It gives a sample of the sorts of arguments Protagoras or another Sophist might give.

13. (90, 4) (1) Twofold arguments are also stated concerning the false and the true, of which one declares that true *logos* [speech, statement] and false *logos* are different from one another, and others that they are the same. (2) And I say the following. First, that true and false *logos* are expressed in the same words. Second, when a *logos* is spoken, if events have occurred the way the *logos* is spoken, the *logos* is true, but if they have not occurred, the same *logos* is false. (3) Suppose it accuses someone of sacrilege. If the deed took place, the *logos* is true, but if it did not take place, it is false. And the *logos* of the defendant is the same. And the courts judge the same *logos* to be both false and true. (4) Next, if we are seated one next to the other, and we [each] say "I am an initiate of the mysteries," we will all say the same thing, but only I will be truthful, since in fact I am <the only> one <who is>. (5) Now it is obvious that the same *logos* is false whenever falsehood is present to it and true whenever truth is, in the same way a person is the same individual as a boy and as a youth and as an adult and as an old man. (6) It is also stated that false *logos* and true *logos* are different from one another, differing in name just as they

differ in fact. For if anyone asks those who say that the same *logos* is both false and true which of the two [namely, false and true] the *logos* that they are stating is, then if it is false, clearly they [the true *logos* and the false *logos*] are two [and therefore not the same]. But if it is true, this same *logos* is also false. And if anyone has ever spoken or borne witness of things that are true, it follows that these same things are false. And if he knows any man to be true, also he knows the same man to be false. (7) As a result of the argument they say these things because if the thing occurred the *logos* is true, but if it did not then it is false. Therefore it is not their name that differs, but the fact of the matter. (8) Moreover, if anyone should ask the jurors what they are judging (since they are not present at the events), (9) these people too agree that the *logos* with which falsehood is mixed is false, and that with which truth is mixed is true. This is the entire difference.

(*Dissoi Logoi* 90.4) {66} 13.2. Gorgias

GORGIAS OF LEONTINI in Sicily was a contemporary of Protagoras and was also born around 490 BCE; there are reports that he was well over 100 years old when he died. As well-known as Protagoras, Gorgias described himself as a teacher of rhetoric, and it appears that his formal and elaborate writing style was influential. He came to Athens on a diplomatic mission in 427 and was famous for his speeches, which he would give in public displays, some of which survive, and two of which are included below. One, a defense of Helen of Troy, explores the power of persuasion through rhetoric. The other, a fascinating response to (or parody of?) Eleatic metaphysics is called *On What Is Not or On Nature*, or, *On What Is Not.* This essay, written in the 440s and so contemporary with Melissus, influenced later philosophers, including Plato, and so it is given in full here.

1. (82B11) *Praise of Helen* [in part] (5) I will set forth the reasons for which it was likely that Helen's voyage to Troy took place. (6) She did what she did through the will of Fate and the designs of the gods and decrees of Necessity or because she was taken by force, persuaded by words (*logoi*), or conquered by Love. . . . (8) Not even if speech (*logos*) persuaded and deceived her soul, is it hard to make a defense against this charge and free

her from blame, as follows. *Logos* is a powerful master, which by means of the smallest and most invisible body accomplishes most divine deeds. For it can put an end to fear, remove grief, instill joy, and increase pity. I will prove how this is so. (9) But it is to the opinion of my audience that I must prove it. I both consider and define all poetry to be speech (*logos*) with meter. Those who hear it are overcome with fearful shuddering, tearful pity, and mournful yearning, and over the good fortunes and ill-farings of other people and their affairs the soul experiences a feeling of its own, through the words (*logoi*). Come now, let me shift from one argument (*logos*) to another. (10) Inspired incantations bring on pleasure and bring away grief through words (*logoi*). For conversing with the soul's opinion the power of incantation charms, persuades, and changes it by witchcraft. Two arts of witchcraft and magic have been discovered—errors of the soul and deceptions of opinion. (11) All who have persuaded or who persuade anyone of anything do so by fashioning false *logos*. For if on all subjects everyone had memory of the past, <a conception> of the present, and foreknowledge of the future, *logos* would not be similarly similar as it is for people who, as things are, cannot easily remember the past, consider the present, or divine the future. Thus, on most matters, most people make opinion an adviser to their soul. But opinion is fallible and uncertain and involves those who make use of it in fallible and uncertain successes. (12) What, then, keeps us from supposing that Helen too, against her will, came under the influence of *logoi* just as if she had been taken by the force of mighty men? For it was possible to see how persuasion prevails, which lacks the appearance of necessity but has the same power.[42] For *logos*, which persuaded, compelled the soul, which it persuaded, both to believe what was said and to approve what was done. Therefore, the one who persuaded, since he compelled, is unjust, and the one who was persuaded, since she was compelled by *logos*, is wrongly blamed. (13) As to the fact that persuasion added to *logos* makes whatever impression it likes on the soul, one should attend first to the accounts (*logoi*) of the astronomers, who replace one opinion with another and so make things incredible and unclear seem apparent to the eyes of opinion; {67} second, to compulsory competitions that use speeches (*logoi*) in which a single *logos* written with art (*tekhnē*) but not spoken with truth

delights and persuades a large crowd; and third, to contests of philosophers' accounts (*logoi*), in which is revealed how easily the swiftness of thought makes our confidence in our opinion change. (14) The power of *logos* has the same relation (*logos*) to the order of the soul as the order of drugs has to the nature of bodies. For as different drugs expel different humors from the body, and some put an end to sickness and others to life, so some *logoi* cause grief, others joy, some fear, others render their hearers bold, and still others drug and bewitch the soul through an evil persuasion. (15) It has been stated that if she was persuaded by *logos* she did not do wrong but was unfortunate. . . . (21) By my account (*logos*) I have removed ill fame from a woman. I have stayed faithful to the rule (*nomos*) I stipulated at the beginning of my *logos.* I have attempted to put an end to the injustice of blame and the ignorance of opinion. I wanted to write the *logos* as a praise of Helen and an entertainment for myself.

2. (82B3)[43] *On What Is Not or On Nature* (66) He concludes as follows that nothing is: if <something> is, either what-is is or what-is-not <is>, or both what-is and what-is-not <are>. But it is the case neither that what-is is, as he will show, nor that what-is-not is, as he will justify, nor that both what-is and what-is-not are, as he will teach this too. Therefore, it is not the case that anything is.

(67) And in fact, what-is-not is not. For if what-is-not is, it will be and not be at the same time. For in that it is considered as not being, it will not be, but in that it *is* not being, on the other hand, it will be. But it is completely absurd for something to be and not be at the same time. Therefore, it is not the case that what-is-not is.

And differently: if what-is-not is, what-is will not be, since they are opposites, and if being is an attribute of what-is-not, not-being will be an attribute of what-is. But it is certainly not the case that what-is is not, and so neither will what-is-not be.

(68) Further, neither is it the case that what-is is. For if what-is is, it is either eternal or generated or eternal and generated at the same time. But it is neither eternal nor generated nor both, as we will show. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is. For if what-is is eternal (we must begin at this point), it does not have any beginning. (69) For everything that comes to

be has some beginning, but what is eternal, being ungenerated did not have a beginning. But if it does not have a beginning it is unlimited, and if it is unlimited it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that in which it is is different from it, and so what-is will no longer be unlimited, since it is enclosed in something. For what encloses is larger than what is enclosed, but nothing is larger than what is unlimited, and so what is unlimited is not anywhere. (70) Further, it is not enclosed in itself, either. For "that in which" and "that in it" will be the same, and what-is will become two, place and body (for "that in which" is place, and "that in it" is body). But this is absurd, so what-is is not in itself, either. And so, if what-is is eternal it is unlimited, but if it is unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it is not. So if what-is is eternal, it is not at all.

(71) Further, what-is cannot be generated either. For if it has come to be it did so either from a thing that is or from a thing that is not. But it has come to be neither from what-is (for if it is a thing that is, it has not come to be, but already is), nor from what-is-not (for what-is-not cannot generate anything, since what generates anything must of necessity share in existence). Therefore it is not the case that what-is is generated either. (72) In the same ways, it is not both eternal and generated at the same time. For these exclude one another, and if what-is is eternal it has not come to be, and if it has come to be it is not eternal. So if what-is is neither eternal nor generated nor both together, what-is would not be.

{68} (73) And differently, if it is, it is either one or many. But it is neither one nor many, as will be shown. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is. For if it is one, it is either a quantity or continuous or a magnitude or a body. But whichever of these it is, it is not one, but being a quantity, it will be divided, and if it is continuous it will be cut. Similarly if conceived as a magnitude it will not be indivisible. And if it chances to be a body, it will be three-dimensional, for it will have length, width, and depth. But it is absurd to say that what-is is none of these. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is one. (74) Further, it is not many. For if it is not one it is not many either. For the many is a compound of individual ones, and so since <the thesis that what-is is> one is refuted, <the thesis that what-is is> many is refuted along with it. But it is altogether clear from this that neither what-is nor what-is-not is.

(75) It is easy to conclude that neither is it the case that both of them are, what-is and what-is-not. For if what-is-not is and what-is is, then what-is-not will be the same as what-is as regards being. And for this reason neither of them is. For it is agreed that what-is-not is not, and what-is has been shown to be the same as this. So it too will not be. (76) However, if what-is is the same as what-is-not, it is not possible for both to be. For if both <are>, then they are not the same, and if <they are> the same, then <it is> not <the case that> both <are>. It follows that nothing is. For if neither what-is is nor what-is-not nor both, and nothing aside from these is conceived of, nothing is.

(77) Next in order is to teach that even if something is, it is unknowable and inconceivable by humans. For if things that are thought of, says Gorgias, are not things-that-are, what-is is not thought of. And reasonably so. For just as if things that are thought of have the attribute of being white, being thought of would be an attribute of white things, so if things that are thought of have the attribute of not being things-that-are, not to be thought of will necessarily be an attribute of things-that-are. (78) This is why the claim that if things that are thought of are not things-that-are, then what-is is not thought of is sound and preserves the sequence of argument. But things that are thought of (for we must assume this) are not things-that-are, as we will show. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is thought of. Further, it is completely clear that things that are thought of are not things-that-are. (79) For if things that are thought of are things-that-are, all things that are thought of are—indeed, however anyone thinks of them. But this is apparently false. For if someone thinks of a person flying or chariots racing in the sea, it is not the case that forthwith a person is flying or chariots racing in the sea. And so, it is not the case that things that are thought of are things-that-are. (80) In addition, if things that are thought of are things-that-are, things-that-are-not will not be thought of. For opposites have opposite attributes, and what-is-not is opposite to what-is. For this reason, if being thought of is an attribute of what-is, not being thought of will assuredly be an attribute of what-is-not. But this is absurd. For Scylla and Chimaera and many things-that-are-not are thought of. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is thought of. (81) And just as things that are seen are called visible because they are seen and things that are heard are called audible because they are heard, and we do not reject

visible things because they are not heard or dismiss audible things because they are not seen (for each ought to be judged by its own sense, not by another), so also things that are thought of will be, even if they may not be seen by vision or heard by hearing, because they are grasped by their own criterion. (82) So if someone thinks that chariots race in the sea, even if he does not see them, he ought to believe that there are chariots racing in the sea. But this is absurd. Therefore it is not the case that what-is is thought of and comprehended.

(83) But even if it should be comprehended it cannot be expressed to another. For if things-that-are are visible and audible and generally perceptible and in fact are external {69} objects, and of these the visible are comprehended by vision and the audible by hearing and not vice versa, how can these be communicated to another? (84) For that by which we communicate is *logos*, but *logos* is not the objects, the things-that-are. Therefore it is not the case that we communicate things-that-are to our neighbors, but *logos*, which is different from the objects. So just as the visible could not become audible and vice versa, thus, since what-is is an external object, it could not become our *logos*. (85) But if it were not *logos*, it would not have been revealed to another. In fact, *logos*, he says, is composed from external things, that is, perceptible things, falling upon us. For from encountering flavor there arises in us the *logos* that is expressed with reference to this quality, and from the incidence on the senses of color arises the *logos* with reference to color. But if so, it is not the *logos* that makes manifest the external <object>, but the external <object> that comes to be communicative of the *logos*. (86) Further, it is not possible to say that *logos* is an object in the way visible and audible things are, so that objects that are can be communicated by it, which is an object that is. For, he says, even if *logos* is an object, it anyway differs from all other objects, and visible bodies differ most from *logos*. For the visible is grasped by one organ, *logos* by another. Therefore it is not the case that *logos* makes manifest the great number of objects, just as they do not reveal the nature of one another.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.65–86) 13.3. Prodicus

PRODICUS WAS BORN on Ceos, an Aegean island near Attica, around 460 BCE, and probably lived into the fourth century. Growing

wealthy from his teaching and speech giving, he was well traveled and was an acquaintance of Socrates (in some Platonic dialogues Socrates says that he had been a student of Prodicus; there is disagreement about how seriously to take this claim). Surviving fragments indicate that Prodicus was interested in rhetoric and logic, ethics and virtue, and the origins of religion: he was said to have denied the reality of the gods.

1. There is a reference to the paradoxical view of Prodicus that contradiction is impossible. What does this mean? It goes against everyone's judgment and opinion. For in both practical and intellectual matters we are constantly conversing with people who contradict us. He says dogmatically that contradiction is impossible, because if two people contradict one another they are both speaking, but they cannot both be speaking with reference to the same fact. He says that only the one who speaks the truth is reporting the fact as it is, while the person who contradicts him does not state the fact.

(Didymus the Blind, *Commentary on Ecclesiastes*; not in DK) **2.** (84B5) The ancients believed that the sun and moon, rivers and springs, and in general everything that benefits our life were gods because of the benefit deriving from them.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.18) **3.** He says that the gods worshipped by men neither exist nor have knowledge, but that the ancients exalted crops and everything else that is useful for life.

(P.Herc. 1428 col. 19.12–19; not in DK) {70} 13.4. Hippias

HIPPIAS WAS BORN in Elis, near Olympia in the Peloponnese; his birth date is unknown, but he was still living in the year of Socrates' death. He was another wealthy and successful Sophist. Plato makes fun of him as a polymath who can even make his own shoes, and presents him as rather dim-witted, but this is clearly a caricature. Hippias taught rhetoric, including mnemonics, and was interested in mathematics and geometry, where he made an important discovery, as well as in the arts. He was famous both for his rhetorical displays, many given at Olympia during the games, and for his

"improvisational sophistry"—making speeches on any subject proposed by a member of his audience. He was also an early historian, compiling a list of Olympic victors, and most significantly, he collected texts of poets and philosophers, thus beginning the tradition of the history of philosophy.

1. (86B6) Some of these things may have been said by Orpheus, some by Musaeus—in short, in different places by different authors—some by Hesiod, Homer, or other poets, and some in prose works by Greeks or foreigners. From all of them I [Hippias] have collected the most important ones that are related, and I will compose out of them this original and multiform account.

(Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 6.2.15) **2.** How can anyone suppose that laws are a serious matter or believe in them, since it often happens that the very people who make them repeal them and substitute and pass others in their place?[44]

(Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.14; not in DK) 13.5. Antiphon

THE SOPHIST WE know as Antiphon is probably Antiphon of Rhamnous. He was thus a native of Attica and a citizen of Athens and so was eligible to hold political office in Athens. Born around 480 BCE, he had wide philosophical and scientific interests, but it is for his views on justice that he is best known. Here he considers the relation between nature (*phusis*) and law or customs (*nomos*, pl. *nomoi*).

1. (87A44a) (1) Justice is a matter of not transgressing what the *nomoi* prescribe in whatever city one is a citizen. A person would make most advantage of justice for himself if he treated the *nomoi* as important in the presence of witnesses and treated the decrees of *phusis* as important when alone and with no witnesses present. For the decrees of *nomoi* are extra additions, those of *phusis* are necessary; those of the *nomoi* are the products of agreement, not of natural growth, whereas those of *phusis* are the products of natural growth, not of agreement. (2) If those who made the agreement do not notice a person transgressing the prescriptions of *nomoi*, he is free from both disgrace and penalty, but not so if they do

notice him. But if, contrary to possibility, anyone violates any of the things that are innate by *phusis*, the harm is no less if no one notices and no greater if all observe. For he does not suffer harm as a result of opinion but as a result of truth. . . .

{71} This is the entire purpose of considering these matters—that most of the things that are just according to *nomos* are established in a way that is hostile to *phusis.* For *nomoi* have been established for the eyes as to what they must (3) see and what they must not, and for the ears as to what they must hear and what they must not, and for the tongue as to what it must say and what it must not, and for the hands as to what they must do and what they must not, and for the feet as to where they must go and where they must not, and for the mind as to what it must desire and what it must not. Now the things from which the *nomoi* deter humans are no more in accord with or suited to *phusis* than the things that they promote.

Living and dying are matters of *phusis*, and living results for them from what is advantageous, dying from what is not advantageous. (4) But the advantages that are established by the *nomoi* are bonds on *phusis*, and those established by *phusis* are free.

And so things that cause pain, at least when thought of correctly, do not help *phusis* more than things that give pleasure. Therefore it will not be painful things that are advantageous rather than pleasant things. For things that are truly advantageous must not cause harm but benefit. Now the things that are advantageous by *phusis* are among these. . . .

<But according to *nomos*, those are correct> who defend themselves after suffering (5) and are not first to do wrong, and those who do good to parents who are bad to them, and who permit others to accuse them on oath but do not themselves accuse on oath. You will find many of these cases hostile to *phusis*. They permit people to suffer more pain when less is possible and to have less pleasure when more is possible and to receive injury when it is not necessary.

Now if some assistance came from the *nomoi* for those who submitted to these conditions and some damage to those who do not submit but resist, (6) obedience to the *nomoi* would not be unhelpful. But as things are, it is obvious that the justice that stems from *nomos* is insufficient to aid those who submit. In the first place, it permits the one who suffers to suffer and the wrongdoer to do wrong, and it was not at the time of the wrongdoing

able to prevent either the sufferer from suffering or the wrongdoer from doing wrong. And when the case is brought to trial for punishment, there is no special advantage for the one who has suffered over the wrongdoer. For he must persuade the jury that he suffered and that he is able to exact the penalty. And it is open to the wrongdoer to deny it. . . . (7) However convincing the accusation is on behalf of the accuser, the defense can be just as convincing. For victory comes through speech.[45]

(Oxyrhynchus Papyrus XI no. 1364, col. 1, line 6 to col. 7, line 15) AS THE PASSAGE from Antiphon shows, the question of whether law and morality are grounded in nature or convention was a major subject of debate. Here are two texts that explore that question, the first from Critias, an aristocratic Athenian (related to Plato) and an associate of Socrates, who became one of the Thirty Tyrants after the defeat of Athens by Sparta in 404 BCE. Critias defends *nomos* as the source of civilization. Finally, there is a late (for the Presocratic period) anonymous text called the *Anonymus Iamblichi* (usually dated to about 400), which argues that *nomos* is grounded in *phusis.*

2. (88B25 lines 1–8) *Critias on nomos*

There was a time when human life was without order,
on the level of beasts, and subject to force;
when there was no reward for the good
or punishment for the bad.
And then, I think, humans established
nomoi as punishers, so that justice would be the mighty ruler
{72} of all equally and would have violence (*hubris*) as its slave,
and anyone who did wrong would be punished.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 9.54) **3.** (DK89.6 and 7) Selections from *The Anonymus Iamblichi* (6.1) No one should set out to maximize his own advantage or suppose that power used for one's advantage is *aretē* [virtue] and obedience to *nomoi* is cowardice. This is the most wicked thought, and it results in everything diametrically opposed to what is good: evil and harm. For if humans were by *phusis* unable to live singly but yielding to necessity came together to live with one another and discovered all their life and their contrivances for living, but it is impossible for them to live with one another and to conduct their lives in the absence of *nomoi* (since that way they would suffer more damage than they would by

living alone)—on account of these necessities *nomos* and justice are kings among humans, and in no way can they depart. For they are firmly bound into our *phusis*.

(6.2) If, then, someone were born who had from the beginning the following sort of *phusis*: invulnerable in his flesh, not subject to disease, without feelings, superhuman, and hard as steel in body and soul—perhaps one might have thought that power used for personal advantage would be sufficient for such a person, since such a person could be scot-free even if he did not subject himself to the law (*nomos*). But this person does not think correctly. (6.3) Even if there were such a person, though there could not be, he would survive by being an ally of the laws (*nomoi*) and of justice, strengthening them and using his might for them and for what assists them, but otherwise he could not last. (6.4) For it would seem that all people would become enemies of a person with such a nature [*phunti*, related to *phusis*], and through their own observance of *nomos* and their numbers they would overcome him by craft or force and would prevail. (6.5) So it is obvious that power itself—real power—is preserved through *nomos* and justice.

(7)[46] It is worthwhile to learn these facts about *eunomia* and *anomia*—how big the difference is between them, and that *eunomia* is the best thing both for the community and for the individual, and *anomia* is the worst, for the greatest harm arises immediately from *anomia*. Let us begin by indicating first what results from *eunomia*. (7.1) In the first place, trust arises from *eunomia*, and this benefits all people greatly and is one of the great goods. For as a result of it, money becomes available, and so even if there is little it is sufficient, since it is in circulation, but without it not even a great deal of money would be enough. (7.2) Fortunes and misfortunes in money and life are managed most suitably for people as a result of *eunomia*. For those enjoying good fortune can use it in safety and without danger of plots, while those suffering ill fortune are aided by the fortunate through their mutual dealings and trust, which result from *eunomia*. (7.3) Through *eunomia*, moreover, the time people devote to *pragmata* [a word that can mean “government,” “public business,” or “troubles”] is idle, but that devoted to the activities of life is productive. (7.4) In *eunomia* people are free from the most unpleasant concern and

engage in the most pleasant, since concern about *pragmata* is most unpleasant and concern about one's activities is most pleasant. (7.5) Also when they go to sleep, which is a rest from troubles for people, they go to it without fear and unworried about painful matters, and when they rise from it they have other similar experiences and do not suddenly become fearful. Nor after this very pleasant change [that is, sleep] do they expect the day to bring poverty but they look forward to it without fear directing their concern without grief toward the activities of life, lightening their labors with trust and confident hopes that they will get good {73} things as a result. For all these things *eunomia* is responsible.

(7.6) And war, which is the source of the greatest evils for people, leading as it does to destruction and slavery—this too comes more to those who practice *anomia*, less to those practicing *eunomia*. (7.7) There are many other goods found in *eunomia* that assist life, and also from it comes consolation for our difficulties. These are the evils that come from *anomia*. (7.8) In the first place, people do not have time for their activities and are engaged in the most unpleasant thing—*pragmata*, not activities—and because of mistrust and lack of mutual dealings they hoard money and do not make it available, so it becomes rare even if there is much. (7.9) Ill fortune and good fortune minister to the opposite results [from what occurs under *eunomia*]: good fortune is not safe in *anomia* but is plotted against, and bad fortune is not driven off but is strengthened through mistrust and the absence of mutual dealings. (7.10) War from outside is more frequently brought against a land, and domestic faction comes from the same cause, and if it did not occur earlier it happens then. Also it happens that people are always involved in *pragmata* because of plots that come from one another, which force them to live constantly on guard and to make counterplots against each other. (7.11) When they are awake their thoughts are not pleasant, and when they go to sleep their receptacle [that is, sleep] is not pleasant but full of fear, and their awakening is fearful and frightening and leads a person to sudden memories of his troubles. These and all the previously mentioned evils result from *anomia*.

(7.12) Also tyranny, so great and so foul an evil, arises from nothing else but *anomia*. Some people suppose—all who do not understand correctly—that a tyrant comes from some other source, and that people are deprived of their freedom without being themselves responsible but compelled by

the tyrant when he has been established. But they do not consider this correctly. (7.13) For whoever thinks that a king or a tyrant arises from anything else than *anomia* and personal advantage is an idiot. For when everyone turns to evil, this is what happens. For it is impossible for humans to live without *nomoi* and justice. (7.14) So when these two things —*nomos* and justice—are missing from the mass of the people, that is exactly when the guardianship and protection of them passes to a single person. How else could solitary rule be transferred to a single person unless the *nomos* had been driven out that benefited the mass of the people? (7.15) For this man who is going to destroy justice and abolish *nomos*, which is common and advantageous to all, must be made of steel if he intends to strip these things from the mass of the people, he being one and they many. (7.16) But if he is made of flesh and is like the rest, he will not be able to accomplish this, but on the contrary if he reestablishes what is missing, he might rule alone. This is why some people fail to notice this occurring when it does.

(*Anonymus Iamblichi fr.* 6 and 7 = DK 89, 6; Vol. 2 402.21–404.32)

1. The name “Presocratics” comes from nineteenth-century classical scholars, who saw a fundamental break between the interests and methods of our group of thinkers and Socrates (470–399 BCE), and who regarded Socrates’ interests in ethics as a radical advance in Western thought. Few would now agree with that evaluation, and it is worth pointing out that several of our Presocratics were actually contemporaries of or younger than Socrates. So, as a descriptive label, the name “Presocratics” is misleading, but as a designator for a recognized group of thinkers, it is quite useful, and I shall use it here in that sense. For more on this issue, see articles in Long.
2. Hesiod says that Chaos “came into being”; there is no explanation for this coming-to-be.
3. The first use of the term may be in Heraclitus; it is Plato who tries to restrict the name to a certain group of thinkers.
4. In the 1990s, fragments of a papyrus scroll in Strasbourg were pieced together and discovered to contain text from Empedocles of Acragas. The Strasbourg Papyrus has both known and previously unknown lines, and may well be the only direct transmission of a Presocratic text that we know (although scholars disagree about this). Translations of the new material are included in Chapter 8, Empedocles of Acragas.
5. The word *archē* is left untranslated here. It means “originating point” or “first principle.”
6. Translator’s note: “Felting” is the production of nonwoven fabric by the application of heat, moisture, and pressure, as felt is produced from wool. The term here is extended to describe any other process in which the product is denser than and so has different properties from the ingredients.
7. The word *akousmatikoi* comes from *akousmata*, “things heard.” The word *mathēmatikoi* comes from *mathēmata*, “things studied” or “learned.” The later Pythagoreans Philolaus and Archytas

(active in the first half of the fourth century) were members of the *mathēmatikoi*. Some scholars think the division belongs to later stages of Pythagoreanism.

8. This passage is from Empedocles, who does not mention Pythagoras by name here, and there is doubt (both ancient and modern) whether he meant to praise Pythagoras here or someone else. (Diogenes Laertius suggested that the verse was meant to honor Parmenides.)

9. The Pythagoras chapter of DK (14) is not divided into subsections, as are most of the rest of the chapters; thus there is no indication of "A" or "B" in references to texts collected there.

10. *Pankration*: a vicious sport combining boxing, wrestling, and kickboxing.

11. Translator's note: *Eunomia*: the condition in a city where the laws are good and people abide by them.

12. "He" is usually taken to be Pythagoras; see fr. 1 in the Pythagoras section.

13. Translator's note: The translation of this and the following two passages is indebted to Mourelatos.

14. Translator's note: Literally, "sons of Zeus"; the term was used to refer to Castor and Polydeuces (Pollux). The phenomenon referred to is St. Elmo's Fire.

15. Translator's note: A *barbaros* was originally anyone who did not speak Greek. Heraclitus uses the word here of people who do not understand the *logos*.

16. Translator's note: The Greek word for "kindles" and "touches" is the same.

17. The *Kykeōn* is a potion made of ground barley, grated cheese, and wine (sometimes with honey).

18. Translator's note: Or, "how by being at variance with itself it agrees with itself"; more literally, "how (by) being brought apart it is brought together."

19. Reading *palintropos* here. Translator's note: The sources disagree; some give *palintonos*, "backwards-stretching." There is no scholarly consensus on which word Heraclitus used.

20. Translator's note: The fragment exploits the identical spelling of the Greek words for bow (*biós*) and life (*bíos*); they differed in the accented syllables, but in Heraclitus' time accents were not yet written. Also, the fragment does not contain the word *biós* (bow), but uses the more common word *toxon*, thus requiring Heraclitus' readers (or hearers) to make the essential association themselves.

21. Translator's note: The manuscript reading *gnapheiōn* ("carding wheels") is emended by some editors to *grapheiōn* ("writing").

22. Translator's note: Alternative translations: "for the same thing both can be thought of and can be"; "for thinking and being are the same."

23. There is a lacuna (gap) in all the manuscripts at this point. Diels supplied *eirgō*, so the line would be translated "I hold you back." (This would imply that there are three routes.) Two recent suggestions from scholars supply forms of the verb *archein*, "to begin," so the goddess says either "I begin for you," or "You will begin." (This implies two routes.)

24. Translator's note: Other manuscripts give a different form of the word rendered "judgment" that requires another translation: "established judgments" (i.e., decided).

25. Dichotomy: Aristotle's name for Zeno's first argument (A25, no. 6 above).

26. Translator's note: This argument is reported variously; what follows is the gist of the argument.

27. There are a few exceptions and omissions in the texts given here. For a discussion of McKirahan's ordering principles, see his *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 2nd edition, p. 230 n. 1.

28. The first part of the line is missing, so lines 4 and 5 are unclear. They probably, as McKirahan says, "elaborate 'anyone' in line 3."

29. Translator's note: The line numbers in parentheses are given as Empedocles' text is reconstructed by Primavesi (2008). This numbering is based on the identification of the three hundredth line in the poem by a mark in the margin of the last line in *ensemble a* of the Strasbourg Papyrus.

30. Translator's note: At this point begins the section for which the papyrus is our only evidence. There are numerous gaps in the preserved text, some of which can be restored with a good degree of confidence from other Empedoclean verses. For the rest, the choice is either to stay close to what the papyrus contains or to fill in the gaps by conjecture informed by one's knowledge of the author's vocabulary, style, and views. The translation provided is based on two versions of the Greek text and the accompanying translations: the original publication by Martin and Primavesi (1999), and the text printed in Inwood (2001). Inwood is more conservative, staying closer to the papyrus text, while Martin and Primavesi are more willing to propose ways to restore missing material. The words enclosed in curly brackets translate supplements of Martin and Primavesi that Inwood does not include. The purpose has been to offer a readable translation while marking places where there is a good chance that the text translated is not what Empedocles wrote.
31. Aristotle's comments in *Generation of Animals* II.8 747a34–b3: "On the question why mules are sterile, Empedocles explains that the mixture of seeds becomes thick, although the seed of both the horse and the ass is soft. For the hollow parts of each fit together with the thick parts of the other, and as a result hard substances comes from soft ones."
32. Translator's note: A "disgraceful" expression used of the female genitalia, according to the source.
33. This phrase was given by DK as B21b. Following other scholars, I think it more likely that the passage is a testimonium. There are textual problems here; I read *sphōn ti* instead of *te*.
34. Aristotle wrote a multivolume work on Democritus; only fragments survive, thanks to Simplicius, who quotes some passages (see selection 5, below).
35. This is one of the few fragments that can be assigned to Leucippus with some confidence. Leucippus' DK number is 67, while Democritus' is 68.
36. Translator's note: *Ousia*, "substance," is a noun derived from the verb *einai*, "to be." There is a connection in language and meaning between *ousia* and *on*.
37. Translator's note: This passage forms part of Aristotle's treatment of void, in which he both presents the arguments offered in favor of the thesis that void exists and shows why they fail. Aristotle here says that he needs to refute the view that void exists.
38. Translator's note: This fragment trails off into corruption, but there is general agreement about the sense of what is missing.
39. Translator's note: Although a better attested manuscript reading yields the translations "it would have begun coming to be at some time," and "it would have ended coming to be at some time," it is difficult to make sense of these claims.
40. Simplicius' comments are included in square brackets.
41. Translator's note: I follow Barnes (1979/1982) in omitting the words "so that it happens that we neither see nor know the things that are," which are found in this place in the manuscripts.
42. Translator's note: The text of this sentence is corrupt. I follow Diels' suggestions (DK vol. 2, p. 291).
43. Translator's note: This is a translation of the version in Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.65–86 = DK 82B3. The shorter summary in pseudo-Aristotle, *On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias*, Chs. 5–6 (not in DK), is preferable at some points.
44. Translator's note: This passage occurs in conversation with Socrates in a work by Xenophon. How closely it reflects the actual views of Hippias is impossible to say.
45. Translator's note: The last part of the text is uncertain.
46. Translator's note: Here the *Anonymus Iamblichi* contrasts *eunomia* (a condition where the *nomoi* are good and people abide by them) and *anomia* (the opposite of *eunomia*), which the author seems

to conceive as a condition in which each person pursues his or her own advantage in competition with others.

{74} PLATO

Plato is traditionally thought to have been born in 428 BCE and to have died in 347/8. His father, Ariston, was descended—or so legend has it—from Codrus, the last king of Athens; his mother, Perictione, was related to Solon, the first architect of the Athenian constitution. His family was aristocratic and well off. He had two brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, both of whom appear in the Republic, and a sister, Potone. While Plato was still a boy, his father died and his mother married Pyrilampes, a friend of the great Athenian statesman Pericles. Thus, even from childhood, Plato was no stranger to Athenian political life. Because he was eighteen in 409, when the Peloponnesian War with Sparta was still in progress, he almost certainly served in the military in that period. He may have served again around 395, when Athens was involved in the so-called Corinthian War.

Given his social class and family connections it would have been natural for Plato to take a prominent role in Athenian political life. He did not do so, however, and in his Seventh Letter, written when he was himself over seventy, he explains why: As a young man I went through the same experiences as many others, I thought that as soon as I became my own master, I'd devote myself to public affairs. Now, it happened that the course of political events gave me the chance to do just that. The existing constitution came to be reviled by many people, so that a revolution occurred . . . and thirty rulers were set up with supreme powers. Some of these happened to be relatives and friends of mine, and they immediately called on me to join them, on the assumption that theirs was the sort of work appropriate for someone like me. It's no wonder, since I was a young man, that my feeling was that they would govern the city by leading it from an unjust way of life to a just one, and I was intensely interested to see what would happen. But after a short time, I saw that these men made

the former constitution seem like a golden age by comparison. Among other things, they sent my aged friend Socrates, whom I wouldn't hesitate to call the most just man of his time, along with some others to fetch one of their fellow citizens by force, so that he could be executed. Their purpose was to involve Socrates in their activities, whether he wished it or not. He refused, however, and risked the most extreme penalties rather than take part in their unholy deeds. When I saw all this, and other similarly significant things, I withdrew in disgust from the evils then being practiced. Not long after that the Thirty and their entire constitution were overthrown. Then, once more, but this time more hesitantly, I was moved by the desire to take part in public affairs and politics. To be sure, many offenses continued to take place in those troublesome times as well, and it is hardly surprising that during these revolutions some people took excessive revenge on their enemies. But in general the restored democratic exiles exhibited considerable decency. As it chanced, however, some of those in control summoned our companion Socrates before the lawcourts and brought a most unholy charge against him, one that he least of all deserved. For they charged him with impiety, and the people condemned and put to death the very man who, on the earlier occasion, when they themselves had the misfortune to be exiles, had refused to take part in the arrest of one of their friends. . . . The result was that I, who had at first been full of eagerness for public affairs, when I considered all this and saw how things were shifting about every which way, at last became dizzy. I didn't cease to consider ways of improving this particular situation, however, and, indeed, of reforming the whole constitution. But as far as action was concerned, I kept waiting for favorable {75} moments, and finally saw clearly that the constitutions of all actual cities are bad, and that their laws are almost beyond redemption without extraordinary resources and luck as well. Hence I was compelled to say in praise of the true philosophy that it enables us to discern what is just for a city or an individual in every case, and that the human race will have not respite from evils until those who are really and truly philosophers acquire political power or until, through some divine dispensation, those who rule and have political authority in cities become real philosophers.

(324b–326b) At the heart of Plato's refusal to participate actively in politics, then, at the heart of his turn from practical politics to political philosophy and education, we find the enigmatic figure of Socrates (470–399 BCE).

Many of Socrates' contemporaries (for example, Aristophanes and Xenophon) wrote about him, but it is exclusively Plato's portrait that we meet in the following pages. In the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Republic I this portrait is probably a close approximation to the historical Socrates. In the Protagoras and Gorgias, the approximation remains fairly close, but the Socrates who appears in the Meno, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II–X, Parmenides, and other later dialogues is a mouthpiece for Plato's own doctrines. No doubt the true story is more complex than this—scholars continue to disagree about how to tell it—but for present purposes the simple version will do.

Philosophy for Socrates seems to have consisted almost entirely in examining people about justice, piety, courage, moderation, wisdom, friendship, and the other conventionally recognized virtues. He is always asking *Ti esti?* or What is it? about each of them. And he seems to presuppose that there are definite, unique answers to these questions, that justice, piety, courage, and the rest are each some definite characteristic—some definite *form*—whose nature can be captured in a unique definition or account (see *Euthyphro* 6d–e).

Socrates' method of examining is the so-called elenchus—we see it in operation in *Euthyphro*, *Crito*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic* I. The following example from the *Euthyphro* will help clarify its nature. Euthyphro defines piety as what is dear to the gods (7a). Socrates shows him that this is inconsistent with other things he firmly believes. The result is that Euthyphro modifies his original definition—piety is what is dear to *all* the gods (9e). Socrates shows them that this too is inconsistent with other beliefs he has. In the ideal situation, this process continues, until a satisfactory definition emerges, one that is not inconsistent with other firmly held beliefs.

Most of the definitions Socrates encounters in the course of his elenctic examination of others prove unsatisfactory, but a few doctrines do emerge more or less unscathed. Among them are the

following four quintessentially Socratic doctrines: (1) The conventionally distinguished virtues—justice, piety, courage, and the rest—are all in fact identical to a single state of the soul, namely, wisdom or knowledge (*Meno* 87d–89a; cf. *Protagoras* selections). (2) Possession of this knowledge is necessary and sufficient for happiness (*Crito* 48b; *Gorgias* 470e; *Republic* 353e–354a). (3) No one ever does what one knows or believes to be other than the best, so that weakness of will, or acting against what one knows or believes to be best, is impossible (*Protagoras* selections). (4) It is better to suffer injustice than to do it (*Apology* 28b; *Gorgias* selection).

The goal of an elenchus is not simply to reach adequate definitions of the virtues or seemingly paradoxical doctrines about weakness of will and virtues, however; it also aims at moral reformation. For Socrates believes that regular elenctic philosophizing—leading the examined life—makes people happier and more virtuous than anything else (see *Apology* 30a, 36c–e, 38a, 41b–c). Perhaps he believes this because he believes that virtue is the very knowledge to which the elenchus leads. In any case, philosophizing is so important for human welfare, in Socrates' view, that he is willing to accept execution rather than give it up (29b–d).

{76} I say "human" welfare advisedly, because one of the most striking facts about Socrates is his willingness to examine pretty well anyone—famous Sophists (Gorgias, Protagoras, Thrasymachus), illustrious generals, poets, politicians, ordinary Greek craftsmen, foreigners, women, even slaves. Everyone, it seems, has what it takes to lead the elenctically examined life and to benefit from leading it. Moreover, he believes that virtue is the same for all of them, Greek and foreigner, man and woman, slave and free. In these respects, he stands in marked contrast not only to the Sophists, who teach only those who can afford to pay, but also to Plato and Aristotle, both of whom have a far more elitist conception of philosophy and a far less egalitarian conception of virtue.

Going hand in hand with the use of the elenchus and the various philosophical doctrines that emerge from it are other Socratic claims and disclaimers that seem to stand in an uneasy and unstable relationship to them: (1) Socrates presents himself in the *Apology* as

someone who questions others about virtue and refutes them by means of an elenchus when they have answered inadequately. He also presents himself, however, as the servant of Apollo, as someone whose divinely inspired mission is not simply to refute people but to get them to care about virtue and their souls above everything else. How are we to reconcile the mission with the means of executing it? How are we to reconcile Socrates' commitment to the elenctic philosophy with his equally strong commitment to Apollonian religion?

(2) In addition to presenting himself as the servant of Apollo, Socrates often makes the disclaimer traditionally captured in the slogan "Socrates knows only that he knows nothing." But as we have seen, he makes a number of other specific claims which strongly suggest that this disclaimer is false or misleading. If he knows nothing, how does he know that virtue is knowledge, and so on? This problem is sharp enough, but it is further sharpened by the very content of these doctrines, for if Socrates' disclaimer of knowledge is sincere and if knowledge is indeed virtue, Socrates must lack not just knowledge but virtue too. Yet he seems to be virtuous and to present himself as such.

(3) Socrates is often characterized as a teacher—indeed, he has been called "the greatest teacher in European history." Yet he denies that he is a teacher, and he makes the denial part of his defense against the charge that he has corrupted the youth (*Apology* 33a–b). Is he lying to save his neck? Is he playing with us and with the jurors? Is he consciously and deliberately seeking martyrdom? Is he implicitly distinguishing elenctic philosophizing from teaching as traditionally conceived?

(4) Many have argued that if Socrates' disclaimers of knowledge and teaching are to be consistent with his possession of the knowledge he disclaims and with his elenctic activities, they must be *ironical*. The problem is to find a plausible role for irony in elenctic examination. That is difficult enough. But these Socratic disclaimers are not just restricted to the elenctic situation; they are also key components of his legal defense. If we resort to irony to solve the

problems of Socratic ignorance and teaching, we must, therefore, find a plausible role for irony in that defense.

These four problems help to explain both why it is so difficult to command a clear view of Socrates and why he has fascinated so many different sorts of people for so long, achieving a place in popular thought that few philosophers of any age can equal.

It is obvious from the *Meno, Phaedo, Symposium*, and *Republic* that Plato shares Socrates' preoccupation with ethics, knowledge, and definitions, but it also seems obvious—especially perhaps from the *Republic*—that he soon abandons or significantly modifies Socrates' method of inquiry as well as some of his specific doctrines. After Book I, for example, the elenchus is conspicuous by it absence: "Socrates" stops merely asking questions and begins to give long {77} and complex answers of his own. In Book VII, Plato suggests that the use of the elenchus on or by young people may result in their becoming immoral sensualists (538c ff.). That seems to be one reason why dialectic—which is a descendant of the Socratic elenchus—must be practiced only by mature people who have mastered the mathematical sciences (531d ff.). In Book IV, a subtle argument for the tripartition of the psyche or soul seems in part designed to allow for the possibility of some kinds of weakness of will (439e ff.). But despite these differences, Plato, like Socrates, is absolutely convinced that philosophy holds the key to human virtue and with it the key to human happiness and welfare (see 473c–e, 499a–c).

Socrates was no doubt the most important single influence on Plato, but there were others as well. Aristotle tells us, for example, that Plato was acquainted with the Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus "from his youth" (*Metaphysics* 987a32). Now, Cratylus, like his master Heraclitus, but perhaps carrying his doctrines to yet further extremes, believes that "everything flows," that everything is always changing, always in a state of flux. A similar doctrine is found in *Republic* V, where sensible things and characteristics—things and characteristics perceived by the senses—are described as "rolling around between what is not and what purely is" (*Republic* 479d; cf. *Timaeus* 52a). But whether this doctrine is a legacy of Cratylus' tutelage, it left Plato with a difficult problem. For if sensible things and characteristics are

always in flux, how can justice and the other virtues be stable forms; how can there be fixed answers to Socrates' questions? And if there are no fixed answers to them, how can there be such a thing as ethical knowledge? More generally, if sensible things and characteristics are always in flux, always becoming, how can anything actually be something definite or determinate? If nothing actually is something definite or determinate, how can one know what anything is? It was reflection on these questions, Aristotle tells us, that led Plato to "separate" the forms from sensible things and characteristics (*Metaphysics* 987a29–b1). The Allegories of the Sun, Line, and Cave, which divide reality into the intelligible and the visible (sensible), seem to embody this separation, as does the account of the creation of the universe in the *Timaeus* (especially 51b–e). Just what it amounts to is a matter of dispute: nonetheless, it is clear that Plato thought it held the solution to the metaphysical and epistemological problems to which flux gives rise.

But, like many proposed solutions to philosophical problems, Plato's raises new problems of its own. If forms really are separate from the world of flux our senses reveal to us, how can we know them? If items in the world of flux really are separate from forms, how can they owe whatever determinate being they have to forms? In the *Meno* and *Phaedo*, certainly, and perhaps also in the *Republic*, Plato answers the first of these questions with the so-called theory of recollection; we have knowledge of forms through prenatal direct contact with them; we forget this knowledge when our souls become embodied at birth; then we "recollect" it in this life when our memories are appropriately jogged (for example, when we undergo elenctic examination). In those same dialogues, he answers the second question by saying that items in the world of flux "participate" in forms by resembling them. The Allegories of the Line and Cave in the *Republic* constitute his most detailed attempt to explain just how this resemblance is to be understood. But Plato will continue to reinvestigate and worry at these and other aspects of the theory of forms pretty much until the end of his life.

After the death of Socrates, Plato and some other Socratics seem to have taken refuge in Megara with the philosopher Eucleides, a

follower of Parmenides of Elea, whose doctrines are discussed in the Presocratics section of the present book. Eucleides seems to have tried to combine these puzzling doctrines with Socrates' ethical teaching, arguing that god, reason, the virtues, as well as the one unchanging being apparently defended by Parmenides are {78} all identical with the good. The resulting metaphysical views find many echoes in Plato's writings: things owe not just their knowability but their very being to the form of the good (*Republic* 509b), and forms in general seem to have most of the traits of Parmenidean being (see *Symposium* 211a–d; *Timaeus* 51b–52a).

When Plato was around forty, he may have made another journey away from Athens, this time to Italy and Sicily. It seems likely that he did so in order to visit the Pythagorean philosophers living there, especially the philosopher-statesman Archytas of Tarentum. (Some ancient sources actually list the Pythagorean Philolaus along with Cratylus as one of Plato's teachers.) But whether Plato went to Italy for this purpose or not, his dialogues clearly show the influence of Pythagorean doctrine, with its near-obsessive focus on number and ratio as the key to reality (see *Timaeus* selection). Archytas himself, for example, among many other significant achievements in mathematics and mechanics, discovered the ratios that underlie the relations between the successive notes in the enharmonic, harmonic, and chromatic scales. And one can easily imagine Plato seeing in such achievements the possibility of giving precise definitions in wholly mathematical terms of all characteristics, including such apparently vague and evaluative ones as harmony and disharmony, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, good and evil, and the other things of which Socrates sought definitions. Certainly the *Republic* itself provides strong evidence that Plato thought that forms could not satisfactorily be defined in terms of sensible characteristics, but only in terms of numbers, ratios, and other precise mathematical notions (see 530d–533e).

The emergence to prominence of mathematics and science may seem like a major departure from the early dialogues in which ethics and politics are the near-exclusive focus. But it is also possible to see it as a deeper probing of the problems raised in those dialogues.

Ethics and politics remain central, but Plato has become aware that they need to be treated as component parts of a much wider and deeper philosophical theory. The *Republic* offers us a brilliant attempt to articulate that theory, but it is characteristic of Plato's profoundly dialectical cast of mind—revealed in his unwillingness ever to appear as a speaker in his own dialogues—that no sooner has he laid this theory before us than he begins to criticize it. Indeed, some of the most apparently devastating criticisms of his own theory are developed in the *Parmenides*, a dialogue widely held to have been written soon after the *Republic* (see *Parmenides* section). However, if the *Timaeus* is indeed one of Plato's latest works, as most scholars think it is, then Plato cannot have thought these criticisms to be fatal, since he there once again makes use of the theory of forms, adapting it to new purposes in cosmology.

From Italy Plato traveled to Sicily, where he made ardent friends with Dion, brother-in-law of the ruling tyrant Dionysius I. Dion became, in effect, Plato's pupil and under his influence came to prefer goodness to the pleasure and luxury with which he was surrounded. Exactly what subsequently transpired in Sicily is unclear, as is the precise length of Plato's stay. There is some reason to believe, however, that Plato was expelled by Dionysius and perhaps even sold into slavery by him, only to be rescued from the slave market by a benevolent stranger. But whatever happened, Plato returned to Athens, bought some land in the precinct of the hero Academus, and there, around 385, founded his famous school, the Academy, which lasted until 529 CE. With a few interruptions, Plato spent the remainder of his life as director of studies in the Academy (see *Republic* 528b–c).

It is not clear that Plato's school was the first European university—a prize that some would award to schools supposed to predate it on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor (the birthplace of Heraclitus and Herodotus, among others)—but it is the first of which we have any real knowledge, although that knowledge is far from extensive or detailed. Nonetheless, what {79} evidence we do have makes it clear that the Academy was a center of research both in theoretical subjects and also in more practical ones. Metaphysics, epistemology,

psychology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics all grew and developed there, as did mathematical science. Eudoxus (who gave a geometrical explanation of the revolutions of the sun, moon, and planets, and developed a general theory of proportion applicable to commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes) studied and taught in the Academy, as did Theaetetus (who developed solid geometry) and Heraclides Ponticus (who discovered the revolution of Venus and Mercury around the Sun)—Aristotle studied there for twenty years. But members of the Academy were also invited by a variety of cities—Arcadia, Pyrrha, Cidus, and Stagira are all mentioned—to help them develop new political constitutions. Thus it would be quite wrong to think that Plato and the other Academicians perpetually had their heads in the clouds. If this were so, they would hardly have been much use to politicians confronting practical constitutional problems.

The mixture of theory and practice—abstract speculation and more practical application—was, no doubt, part of philosophy from its very founding. (Even for us, indeed, the word "wisdom" continues to connote both the esoteric and the down-to-earth.) But Plato does more, perhaps, than any of his predecessors to convince us that we may have to cast our net very wide and dig very deep—that we may have to understand how things in the broadest sense of the term hang together in the broadest sense of the term—if we are to obey the Socratic commandment to know ourselves or discover how best to live.

Euthyphro Apology Crito

In 399 BCE at the age of seventy, Socrates was brought to trial by Meletus on a writ of impiety. In the Euthyphro, he is on his way to a preliminary hearing at which he will hear Meletus' formal charges for

the first time and at which the official in charge of impiety cases—the King Archon—will determine whether there is a case to answer. Appropriately enough, the topic of the dialogue is the nature of piety. The Apology is (or purports to be) the speech of defense given at the trial itself. Under examination by Socrates, Meletus identifies his charges as these: Socrates is an atheist, who believes in strange daimonic activities, in the visitation of a daimonion, or divine voice; he corrupts the youth by teaching these beliefs to them. A majority of the jurors found Socrates guilty of these charges. Athenian law allowed him to propose a counterpenalty to the death penalty demanded by Meletus and required the jury to choose which of them to impose. A yet larger majority of them voted for the death penalty. In the Crito, Socrates is in prison awaiting death by hemlock poisoning. Crito wants him to escape; Socrates explains why he cannot. The topic is legal or political obligation.

{80} EUTHYPHRO

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

[*2a*] EUTHYPHRO:[1] What's new, Socrates, to make you leave the Lyceum,[2] where you usually spend your time, to spend it here today at the court of the King Archon?[3] Surely, you don't have some sort of lawsuit before the King, as I do.

SOCRATES: Athenians don't call it a lawsuit, Euthyphro, but an indictment.

[*b*] EUTHYPHRO: What? Someone has indicted you, apparently, for I'm not going to accuse you of indicting someone else!

SOCRATES: No, I certainly haven't.

EUTHYPHRO: But someone else has indicted you?

SOCRATES: Exactly.

EUTHYPHRO: Who is he?

SOCRATES: I hardly know the man myself, Euthyphro. He's young and unknown, it seems. But I believe his name's Meletus. He belongs to the Pitthean deme—if you recall a Meletus from that deme,[4] with straight hair, not much of a beard, and a slightly hooked nose?

EUTHYPHRO: No, I don't recall him, Socrates. But tell me, what indictment has he brought [*c*] against you?

SOCRATES: What indictment? Not a trivial one, it seems to me. I mean, it's no small thing for a young man to have come to know such an important matter. You see, according to him, he knows how the young men are being corrupted, and who's corrupting them. He's probably a wise man, who's seen that my own ignorance is corrupting his contemporaries, and is coming to accuse me to their mother the city, so to speak. In fact, he seems to me to be the only one who's starting up in politics correctly. [*d*] For it is correct to take care of the young first, to make them the best possible, just as it's reasonable for a good farmer to take care of the young plants first and all the others [*3a*] afterward. And so Meletus, too, is presumably first weeding out those of us who corrupt the young shoots, as he claims. Then, after that, he'll clearly take care of the older people and bring about the greatest goods, both in number and in quality, for the city. That, at any rate, is the likely outcome of such a start.

EUTHYPHRO: I hope it happens, Socrates, but I'm terribly afraid the opposite may result. You see, by attempting to do an injustice to you, it seems to me he's simply starting out by wronging the city at its very hearth.[5] Tell me, what on earth does he say you're doing that corrupts the young?

SOCRATES: Strange things, my excellent [*b*] friend, at any rate on first hearing: he says I'm an inventor of gods. And because I invent new gods, and don't acknowledge the old ones, he's indicted me for the latter's sake, so he says.

EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates. That's no doubt because you say your daimonic sign comes to you on each occasion. So he has written this indictment against you for making innovations in religious matters and comes before the court to slander you, knowing that such things are easy {81} to misrepresent to the majority of people.[6] Why, they even mock me as if I were crazy, when I speak in the Assembly on religious matters and

predict the future for them! And yet not one of my predictions has failed to come true. But all the [*c*] same, they envy anyone like ourselves.[7] We mustn't give them a thought, though. Just meet them head on.

SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Euthyphro, but being mocked is presumably nothing to worry about. Athenians, it seems to me, aren't much concerned if they think someone's clever, so long as he doesn't teach his own wisdom. But if they think he's making other people [*d*] wise like himself, they get angry, whether out of envy, as you say, or for some other reason.

EUTHYPHRO: As to that, I certainly have no desire to test their attitude toward *me*.

SOCRATES: Don't worry. They probably think you rarely put yourself at other people's disposal, and aren't willing to teach your own wisdom. But I'm afraid they think my love of people makes me tell whatever little I know unreservedly to any man, not only without charging a fee, but even glad to lose money, so long as someone cares to listen [*e*] to me. So, as I was just saying, if they were going to mock me, as you say they do you, there'd be nothing unpleasant about their spending time in the law court playing around and laughing. But if they're going to be serious, the outcome's unclear, except to you prophets.

EUTHYPHRO: Well, it will probably come to nothing, Socrates, and you'll fight your case satisfactorily, as I think I'll fight mine.

SOCRATES: But now, Euthyphro, what is this case of yours? Are you defending or prosecuting?

EUTHYPHRO: Prosecuting.

SOCRATES: Whom?

[*4a*] EUTHYPHRO: Someone I'm again thought to be crazy for prosecuting.

SOCRATES: What's that? Is your prosecution a wild-goose chase?

EUTHYPHRO: The goose is long past chasing: he's quite old.

SOCRATES: Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO: My father.

SOCRATES: My good man! Your own *father*?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: But what's the charge? What's the lawsuit about?

EUTHYPHRO: Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES: In the name of Heracles![8] Well, [*b*] Euthyphro, I suppose most people don't know how it can be correct to do this. I mean, I can't imagine any ordinary person taking that action correctly, but only someone who's already far advanced in wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, far advanced indeed.

SOCRATES: Is the man your father killed one of your relatives then? Of course he must be, mustn't he? You'd hardly be prosecuting him for murder on behalf of a stranger.[9]

EUTHYPHRO: It's ridiculous, Socrates, for you to think it makes any difference whether the dead man's a stranger or a relative. It's ridiculous not to see that the sole consideration should be whether the killer killed justly or not. If he did, let him go, if he didn't, prosecute—if, that is to say, the killer shares your own hearth and table.[10] For the [*c*] pollution's the same if you knowingly associate with such a person and don't cleanse yourself and him by bringing him to justice.

In point of fact, though, the victim was a day laborer of mine, and when we were farming on Naxos, he worked the land there for us. Well, he got drunk, became enraged with one of our household slaves, and cut his throat. So my father tied him hand and foot, threw him in a ditch, and sent a man here to find out from the official interpreter what should be done. In the meantime, he ignored and neglected his captive as a [*d*] murderer, thinking it mattered nothing if he did {82} die. And that's just what happened: hunger, cold, and being tied up caused his death before the messenger got back from the interpreter.

That's precisely why my father and my other relatives are angry with me: because I'm prosecuting my father for murder on the murderer's behalf, when my father didn't even kill him, so they claim, and when, even if he definitely did kill him, it's wrong—since the dead man was a murderer—to concern yourself with the victim [*e*] in that case. You see, it's impious, they say, for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Little do they know, Socrates, about the gods' position on the pious and the impious!

SOCRATES: But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think *you* have such exact knowledge about the positions the gods take, and about the pious and the impious, that in the face of these events, you've no fear of acting impiously yourself in bringing your father to trial?

EUTHYPHRO: I'd be no use at all, Socrates, and [*5a*] Euthyphro would be no different from the majority of people, if I didn't have exact knowledge of all such things.

SOCRATES: So, my excellent Euthyphro, the best thing, it seems, is for me to become your student, and to challenge Meletus on this very point before his case comes to trial, telling him that even in the past I always considered it of great importance to know about religious matters, and that now, when he says I've done wrong through improvising and innovating concerning the gods, I've become your student. Shouldn't I say to him, "Meletus, if you agree that Euthyphro is wise about the gods, you should also regard me [*b*] as correctly acknowledging them and drop the charge. But if you don't agree, prosecute this teacher of mine rather than me, for corrupting the old men—myself and his own father, me by his teaching, and his father by admonishment and punishment." If he isn't convinced by me, and doesn't drop the charge or prosecute you instead of me, shouldn't I say the same things in court as in my challenge to him?

[*c*] EUTHYPHRO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, and if he tried bringing an indictment against *me*, I think I'd soon find his weak spots, and the question in court would very quickly be about him rather than about me.

SOCRATES: I realize that as well as you do, my dear friend, and that's why I'm eager to become your student. I know that this Meletus, as well as others no doubt, pretends not to notice *you* at all, whereas he has seen *me* so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety.

Now then, in the name of Zeus, tell me what you were just claiming to know so clearly. What sort of thing would you say the holy and the unholy are, whether in cases of [*d*] murder or of anything else? Or isn't the pious itself the same as itself in every action? And conversely, isn't the impious entirely the opposite of the pious? And whatever's going to count as impious, isn't it itself similar to itself—doesn't it, as regards impiety, possess one single characteristic?

EUTHYPHRO: Absolutely, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what do you say the pious and the impious are?

EUTHYPHRO: Very well, I say that what's pious is precisely what I'm doing now: prosecuting those who commit an injustice, such as murder or temple robbery, or those who've done some [*e*] other such wrong, regardless of

whether they're one's father or one's mother or anyone else whatever. Not prosecuting them, on the other hand, is what's impious.

Why, Socrates, look at the powerful evidence I have that the law requires this—evidence I've already offered to show other people that such actions are right, that one must not let an impious person go, no matter who he may happen to be. You see, those [*6a*] very people acknowledge Zeus as the best and most just of the gods, and yet they agree that he put his own father in fetters because he unjustly swallowed down his children, and that *he*, in his turn, castrated his father because of other similar injustices.[11] Yet they're extremely angry with *me*, because I'm prosecuting my father for his injustice. And so they contradict themselves in what they say about the gods and about me.

SOCRATES: Could this be the reason, Euthyphro, I face indictment, that when people say {83} such things about the gods, I find them somehow hard to accept? That, it seems, is why some people will say I'm a wrongdoer. But now if you, who know so much about such matters, share these views, it seems that the rest of us must assent to them too. I mean, [*b*] what can we possibly say in reply, when we admit ourselves that we know nothing about them? But tell me, by the god of friendship, do you really believe those stories are true?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and still more amazing things, Socrates, that the majority of people don't know.

SOCRATES: And do you believe that there really is war among the gods? And terrible hostilities and battles, and other such things of the sort the poets relate, and that the good painters embroider on our sacred objects—I'm thinking particularly of the robe covered [*c*] with embroideries of such scenes that's carried up to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaean festival?[12] Are we to say that these are true, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO: Not only those, Socrates, but as I mentioned just now, I will, if you like, tell you lots of other things about religious matters that I'm sure you'll be amazed to hear.

SOCRATES: I wouldn't be surprised. But tell me about them some other time, when we've the leisure. Now, however, try to answer more clearly the very question I asked before. [*d*] You see, my friend, you didn't teach me

adequately earlier when I asked what the pious was, but you told me that what you're now doing is pious, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and what I said was true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Perhaps. But surely, Euthyphro, there are also many other things you call pious.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, that what I urged you to do wasn't to teach me about one or two of the many pieties, but rather about the form itself, by virtue of which all the pieties are pious? You see, you said, I believe, that it was by virtue of one characteristic [*e*] that the impieties are impious, and the pieties pious. Or don't you remember?

EUTHYPHRO: I do indeed.

SOCRATES: Then teach me what that characteristic itself is, in order that by concentrating on it and using it as a model, I may call pious any action of yours or anyone else's that is such as it, and may deny to be pious whatever isn't such as it.

EUTHYPHRO: If that's what you want, Socrates, that's what I'll tell you.

SOCRATES: That *is* what I want.

[*7a*] EUTHYPHRO: In that case: what's loved by the gods is pious, and what's not loved by the gods is impious.

SOCRATES: Excellent, Euthyphro! You've now given the sort of answer I was looking for. Whether it's true, however, that I don't know. But clearly you'll go on to demonstrate fully that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, let's examine what it is we're saying. A god-loved thing or a god-loved person is pious, whereas a god-hated thing or a god-hated person is impious. And the pious isn't the same as the impious, but its exact opposite. Isn't that what we're saying?

EUTHYPHRO: It is indeed.

SOCRATES: And does it seem to be true?

[*b*] EUTHYPHRO: It does seem so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And haven't we also said that the gods quarrel and differ with one another, and that there's mutual hostility among them?

EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, we did say that.

SOCRATES: But what are the issues, my good friend, on which differences produce hostility and anger? Let's examine it this way. If you and I differed

about which of two groups was more numerous, would our differences on this issue make us hostile and angry toward one another? Or would we turn to calculation and quickly resolve our [*c*] differences?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Again, if we differed about which was larger or smaller, we'd turn to measurement and quickly put a stop to our difference.

{84} EUTHYPHRO: That's right.

SOCRATES: And we'd turn to weighing, I imagine, to settle a dispute about which was heavier or lighter?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then what sorts of issues *would* make us angry and hostile toward one another if we disagreed about them and were unable to reach a settlement? Perhaps you can't say just offhand. But examine, while I'm speaking, whether they're issues about the just and unjust, fine and shameful, good and bad. [*d*] Whenever we become enemies, aren't these the issues on which disagreement and an inability to reach a settlement make enemies of us—both you and I and all other human beings?

EUTHYPHRO: That is the difference, Socrates, and those are the things it has to do with.

SOCRATES: And what about the *gods*, Euthyphro? If indeed they differ, mustn't it be about those same things?

EUTHYPHRO: Absolutely.

[*e*] SOCRATES: Then, according to your account, my noble Euthyphro, different sets of gods, too, consider different things to be just, or fine or shameful, or good or bad. For if they didn't differ about these, they wouldn't quarrel, would they?

EUTHYPHRO: That's right.

SOCRATES: Then are the very things that each group of them regards as fine, good, and just also the ones they love, and are the opposites of these the ones they hate?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: But the very same things, so you say, that some gods consider to be just and [*8a*] others unjust are also the ones that lead them to quarrel and war with one another when they have disputes about them. Isn't that right?

EUTHYPHRO: It is.

SOCRATES: Then the same things, it seems, are both hated and loved by the gods, and so the same things would be both god-hated and god-loved.

EUTHYPHRO: It seems that way.

SOCRATES: So, on your account, Euthyphro, the same things would be both pious and impious.

EUTHYPHRO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: So, you haven't answered my question, my excellent friend. You see, I wasn't asking you what the selfsame thing is that's both pious and impious. But a thing that's [*b*] god-loved is, it seems, also god-hated. It follows, Euthyphro, that it wouldn't be at all surprising if what you're now doing in prosecuting your father was something pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus and Uranus, or lovable to Hephaestus and displeasing to Hera,[13] and similarly for any other gods who may differ from one another on the matter.

EUTHYPHRO: But, Socrates, I think that on this point, at least, none of the gods do differ—that anyone who has unjustly killed another should be punished.

SOCRATES: Is that so? Well, what about men, Euthyphro? Have you never heard them arguing that someone who has killed unjustly or done anything else unjustly should *not* be punished? [*c*]

EUTHYPHRO: Why yes, they never stop arguing like that, whether in the law courts or in other places. For people who've committed all sorts of injustices will do or say anything to escape punishment.

SOCRATES: But do they agree, Euthyphro, that they've committed injustice, and, in spite of agreeing, do they still say that they shouldn't be punished?

EUTHYPHRO: No, they certainly don't say that.

SOCRATES: So it isn't just anything that they'll do or say. You see, I don't think they'd dare to say or argue that if they act *unjustly*, they should not be punished. Instead, I think [*d*] they deny acting unjustly, don't they?

EUTHYPHRO: That's true, they do.

SOCRATES: So they don't argue that someone who acts unjustly should not be punished, though they do, perhaps, argue about *who* acted unjustly, *what* his unjust action consisted of, and *when* he did it.

EUTHYPHRO: That's true.

{85} SOCRATES: Then doesn't the very same thing happen to the gods as well—if indeed they do quarrel about just and unjust actions, as on your account they do, and if one lot says that others have done wrong, and another lot denies it? For surely no one, my excellent [*e*] friend, whether god or human being, dares to say that one who acts unjustly should not be punished.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, what you say is true, Socrates, at least the main point.

SOCRATES: I think that men and gods who argue, Euthyphro, if indeed gods really do argue, argue instead about *actions*. It's about some action that they differ, some of them saying that it was done justly, others unjustly. Isn't that so?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

[*9a*] SOCRATES: Come then, my dear Euthyphro, and teach me, too, that I may become wiser. A man committed murder while employed as a day laborer and died as a result of being tied up before the master who tied him up found out from the proper authorities what to do about him. What evidence do you have that all the gods consider this man to have been killed unjustly, and that it's right for a *son* to prosecute and denounce his [*b*] *father* for murder on behalf of such a man? Come, try to give me a clear proof that all gods undoubtedly consider this action to be right. If you can give me adequate proof of that, I'll never stop praising your wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO: But presumably that's no small task, Socrates, though I could of course prove it to you very clearly.

SOCRATES: I understand. You think I'm a slower learner than the jury, since it's clear that you'll prove to *them* that those actions of your father's were unjust and that the gods all hate them.

EUTHYPHRO: I'll prove it to them very clearly, Socrates, provided they'll listen to what I say.

[*c*] SOCRATES: They'll listen all right, provided you seem to speak well. But a thought occurred to me while you were speaking, and I'm still examining it in my own mind: "Suppose Euthyphro so taught me that I became thoroughly convinced that all the gods do consider a death like that to be unjust. What more would I have learned from Euthyphro about what the pious and the impious are? *That action* would indeed be god-hated, so it seems. Yet it became evident just now that the pious and the impious aren't defined by that fact, since it became evident that what's god-hated is also

god-loved. So I'll let you off on that point, Euthyphro. If you like, let's suppose that all the gods [*d*] consider the action unjust, and that they all hate it. Is that, then, the correction we're now making in the account, that what *all* the gods hate is impious while what they *all* love is pious, and that whatever some love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you'd now like us to define the pious and the impious?

EUTHYPHRO: What's to prevent it, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Nothing on my part, Euthyphro. But you examine your own view, and whether by assuming it you'll most easily teach me what you promised.

[*e*] EUTHYPHRO: All right, I'd say that the pious is what all the gods love, and its opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.

SOCRATES: Then aren't we going to examine that in turn, Euthyphro, to see whether what we said is true? Or are we going to let it alone and accept it from ourselves and from others just as it stands? And if someone merely asserts that something is so, are we going to concede that it's so? Or are we going to examine what the speaker says?

EUTHYPHRO: We're going to examine it. However, I for my part think that this time what we said *is* true.

SOCRATES: Soon, my good friend, we'll be [*10a*] better able to tell. Consider the following: is the pious loved by the gods because it's pious? Or is it pious because it's loved?

EUTHYPHRO: I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES: All right, I'll try to put it more clearly. We speak of a thing's being carried or carrying, and of its being led or leading, and of being seen or seeing. And you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ?

EUTHYPHRO: I think I understand, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Then is there also something that's loved, and is it different from something that's loving?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then tell me whether the carried [*b*] thing is a carried thing because it's carried or because of something else.

EUTHYPHRO: No, it's because of that.

{86} SOCRATES: Again, the led thing is so, then, because it's led and the seen thing because it's seen?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: So it's not seen because it's a seen thing; on the contrary, it's a seen thing because it's seen; nor is it because it's a led thing that it's led, rather it's because it's led that it's a led thing; nor is something carried because it's a carried thing, rather it's a carried thing because it's carried. So is what I mean completely clear, Euthyphro? I mean [*c*] this: if something's changed in some way or affected in some way, it's not changed because it's a changed thing; rather, it's a changed thing because it's changed. Nor is it affected because it's an affected thing; rather, it's an affected thing because it's affected. Or don't you agree with that?

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: Then isn't a loved thing, too, either a thing changed or a thing affected by something?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: And so the same holds of it as of our earlier examples: it's not because it's a loved thing that it's loved by those who love it; rather it's because it's loved that it's a loved thing?

EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily.

[*d*] SOCRATES: Now what are we saying about the pious, Euthyphro? On your account, isn't it loved by all the gods?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: So is that because it's pious or because of something else?

EUTHYPHRO: No, it's because it's pious.

SOCRATES: So it's loved because it's pious, not pious because it's loved?

EUTHYPHRO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, what's god-loved is loved—that is to say, god-loved—because the gods love it?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then the god-loved is not what's pious, Euthyphro, nor is the pious what's god-loved, as you claim, but one differs from the other.

[*e*] EUTHYPHRO: How so, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Because we agreed that the pious is loved because it's pious, not pious because it's loved. Didn't we?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: The god-loved, on the other hand, is so because it is loved by the gods; it's god-loved by the very fact of being loved. But it's not because

it’s god-loved that it’s being loved.

EUTHYPHRO: That’s true.

SOCRATES: But if the god-loved and the pious were really the same thing, my dear Euthyphro, then, if the pious were loved because it’s pious, what’s god-loved would in [*11a*] turn be loved because it’s god-loved; and if what’s god-loved were god-loved because it was loved by the gods, the pious would in turn be pious because it was loved by them. But, as it is, you can see that the two are related in the opposite way, as things entirely different from one another. For one of them is lovable because it’s loved, whereas the other is loved because it’s lovable.

And so, Euthyphro, when you’re asked what the pious is, it looks as though you don’t want to reveal its being to me, but rather to tell me one of its affections—that this happens to the pious, that it’s loved by all the gods. What explains its being loved, however, you still haven’t said. [*b*] So please don’t keep it hidden from me, but rather say again from the beginning what it is that explains the pious’s being loved by the gods or having some other affection—for we won’t disagree about which ones it has. Summon up your enthusiasm, then, and tell me what the pious and the impious are.

EUTHYPHRO: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind. For whatever proposals we put forward keep somehow moving around and won’t stay put.

[*c*] SOCRATES: Your proposals, Euthyphro, seem to be the work of my ancestor, Daedalus! Indeed, if I were to state them and put them forward myself, you might perhaps make a joke of me, and say that it’s because of my kinship with him that my works of art in words run away and won’t stay put.[14] But, as it is, the proposals are your own. So you need a different joke, since it’s for you that they won’t stay put, as you can see yourself.

{87} EUTHYPHRO: But it seems to me, Socrates, that pretty much the same joke does apply in the case of our definitions. You see, I’m not the one who makes them move around and not stay put. Rather, you seem to me to be the Daedalus, since as far as I’m concerned [*d*] they would have stayed put.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, it looks as though I’ve grown cleverer in my area of expertise than my venerated ancestor, in that he made only his own works not stay put, whereas I do this to my own, it seems, and also to other people’s. And the most subtle thing about my area of expertise is that I’m

wise in it without wanting to be. You see, I'd prefer to have accounts stay put and be immovably established for me than to acquire the [*e*] wealth of Tantalus[15] and the wisdom of Daedalus combined. But enough of this. Since you seem to me to be getting sated, I'll do my best to help you teach me about the pious—and don't you give up before you do. See whether you don't think that the pious as a whole must be just.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

[*12a*] SOCRATES: Then is the just as a whole also pious? Or while the pious as a whole is just, is the just as a whole not pious, but part of it pious and part of it something else?

EUTHYPHRO: I don't follow what you're saying, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet you're as much younger as wiser than I. But as I say, your wealth of wisdom has weakened you. Well, pull yourself together, my dear fellow. What I'm saying isn't hard to understand. You see, what I'm saying is just the opposite of what the poet said, who wrote: With Zeus the maker, who caused all these things to come about,

[*b*] You will not quarrel, since where there's dread there's shame too.[16]

I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you where?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: It doesn't seem to me that "where there's dread there's shame too." For many people seem to me to dread disease and poverty and many other things of that sort, but though they dread them, they feel no shame at what they dread. Or don't you agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: But where there's shame, there is also dread. For if anyone feels shame at a certain action—if he's ashamed of it—doesn't he fear, doesn't he dread, a reputation for wickedness at the same time? [*c*]

EUTHYPHRO: He certainly does dread it.

SOCRATES: Then it isn't right to say that "where there's dread, there's shame too." But where there's shame there's also dread, even though shame isn't found everywhere there's dread. You see, dread is broader than shame, I think. For shame is a part of fear, just as odd is of number. Hence where there's a number, there isn't something odd too, but where there's something odd there is also a number. Do you follow me now at least?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, that's the sort of thing I was asking just now: whenever there's [*d*] something just, is there also something pious? Or is something just whenever it's pious, but not pious whenever it's just, because the pious is part of the just? Is that what we're to say, or do you disagree?

EUTHYPHRO: No, let's say that, since it seems to me you're right.

SOCRATES: Then consider the next point. If the pious is a part of what's just, we must, it seems, find out what part of the just the pious is. Now if you asked me about one of the things we just mentioned, for example, which part of number is the even—that is to say, what sort of number it is—I'd say that it's any number not indivisible by two, but divisible by it. Or don't you agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Then you try to teach me in the [*e*] same fashion what part of the just is pious. Then we can tell Meletus not to treat us unjustly any longer or indict us for impiety, since I've now been sufficiently instructed by you about what things are holy or pious and what aren't.

{88} EUTHYPHRO: Well then, it seems to me, Socrates, that the part of the just that's holy or pious is the one concerned with tending to the gods, while the remaining part of the just is concerned with tending to human beings.

SOCRATES: You seem to me to have put that very well, Euthyphro. But I'm still lacking [*13a*] one small piece of information. You see, I don't yet understand this tending you're talking about. You surely don't mean that in just the way that there's tending to other things, there's tending to the gods too. We do speak this way, don't we? We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to tend to horses, but only horse trainers. Isn't that right?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Because horse training is expertise in tending to horses?

[*b*] EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Nor does everyone know how to tend to dogs, but only dog trainers.

EUTHYPHRO: That's right.

SOCRATES: Because dog training is expertise in tending to dogs.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And cattle breeding is expertise in tending to cattle.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, but piety or holiness is tending to the gods, Euthyphro? That's what you're saying?

EUTHYPHRO: It is.

SOCRATES: But doesn't all tending accomplish the same end? I mean something like some good or benefit for what's being tended to—as you see that horses tended to by horse trainers are benefited and made better. Or don't you agree that they are?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: And so dogs, of course, are benefited by dog training and cattle by cattle [*c*] breeding, and similarly for all the others. Or do you think that tending aims to harm what's being tended?

EUTHYPHRO: No, by Zeus, I don't.

SOCRATES: Rather, it aims to benefit it?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then if piety is tending to the gods, does it benefit the gods and make the gods better? Would you concede that whenever you do something pious, you're making some god better?

EUTHYPHRO: No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

SOCRATES: No, I didn't think that that was what you meant, Euthyphro—far from it. But [*d*] it is why I asked what you did mean by tending to the gods, because I didn't think you meant that sort of tending.

EUTHYPHRO: And you were right, Socrates, since that's not the sort I meant.

SOCRATES: All right. But then what sort of tending to the gods would the pious be?

EUTHYPHRO: The very sort of tending, Socrates, that slaves provide to their masters.

SOCRATES: I understand. Then it would seem to be some sort of service to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: It is indeed.

SOCRATES: Now could you tell me about service to doctors? What result does that service—insofar as it is service—aim to produce? Don't you think it aims at health?

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: What about service to shipbuilders? [*e*] What result does the service aim to produce?

EUTHYPHRO: Clearly, Socrates, its aim is a ship.

SOCRATES: And in the case of service to builders, I suppose, the aim is a house?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then tell me, my good friend, at what result does service to the gods aim? Clearly, you know, since you say you've a finer knowledge of religious matters than any other human being.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and what I say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then tell me, in the name of Zeus, what is that supremely fine result that the gods produce by using our services?

EUTHYPHRO: They produce many fine ones, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So too do generals, my friend. [*14a*] Nonetheless, you could easily tell me the main one, which is to produce victory in war, is it not?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And farmers, too, I think, produce many fine results. Nonetheless, the main one is to produce food from the earth.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: What, then, about the many fine results that the gods produce? Which is the main one they produce?

{89} EUTHYPHRO: I told you a moment ago, Socrates, that it's a pretty difficult task to learn [*b*] the exact truth about all these matters. But to put it simply: if a person knows how to do and say the things that are pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice—those are the ones that are pious. And actions like them preserve both the private welfare of households and the common welfare of the city, whereas those that are the opposite of pleasing are unholy, and they, of course, overturn and destroy everything.

SOCRATES: If you'd wanted to, Euthyphro, you could have put the main point I asked about much more briefly. But you're not eager to teach me—that's clear. You see, when [*c*] you were just now on the point of answering you turned away. If you had given the answer, I'd already have been adequately instructed by you about piety. But as it is, the questioner must follow the one being questioned wherever he leads. Once again, then, what are you saying that the pious, or piety, is? Didn't you say that it was some sort of knowledge of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I did.

SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and praying is asking from them?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates.

[*d*] SOCRATES: So, on that account, piety would be knowing how to ask from the gods and how to give to them.

EUTHYPHRO: You've grasped my meaning perfectly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, that's because I really desire your wisdom and apply my mind to it, so that what you say won't fall on barren ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it's asking for things from them and giving things to them?

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: Well then, wouldn't asking in the right way consist of asking for the things we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO: What else could it be?

[*e*] SOCRATES: And, conversely, giving in the right way would consist of giving them, in turn, the things they need from us? For surely giving someone what he didn't at all need isn't something that an expert in the art of giving would do.

EUTHYPHRO: That's true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, would be a sort of expertise in mutual trading between gods and men.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, trading, if that's what you prefer to call it.

SOCRATES: I don't prefer anything, if it isn't true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods get from the gifts they receive from us? I mean, what they give is clear to everyone, since [*15a*] we possess nothing good that they don't give us. But how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we get so much the better of them in the trade that we receive all our good things from them while they receive nothing from us?

EUTHYPHRO: But Socrates, do you really think gods are benefited by what they receive from us?

SOCRATES: If not, Euthyphro, what could those gifts of ours to gods possibly be?

EUTHYPHRO: What else do you think but honor and reverence and—as I said just now—what's pleasing to them.

[*b*] SOCRATES: So is the pious pleasing to the gods, Euthyphro, but not beneficial to them or loved by them?

EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that it's in fact the most loved of all.

SOCRATES: So, once again, it seems, the pious is what's loved by the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Well, if you say that, can you wonder that your accounts seem not to stay put but to move around? And will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them move, when you yourself are far more expert than Daedalus in the art of making them move in a circle? Or don't you see that our account has circled back again to the same [*c*] place? For surely you remember that earlier we discovered the pious and the god-loved are not the same, but different from one another. Or don't you remember that?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Then don't you realize that you're now saying the pious is what the gods love? And that's the same, isn't it, as what's god-loved? Or is that not so?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course, it is.

SOCRATES: Then either we weren't right to agree before, or, if we were right, our present suggestion is wrong.

{90} EUTHYPHRO: So it seems.

SOCRATES: So we must examine again from the [*d*] beginning what the pious is, since I won't willingly give up until I learn this. Don't scorn me, but apply your mind to the matter in as many ways and as fully as you can, and then tell me the truth—for you must know it, if indeed any human being does, and, like Proteus,[17] you mustn't be let go until you tell it. For if you didn't know with full clarity what the pious and the impious are, you'd never have ventured to prosecute your old father for murder on behalf of a day laborer. On the contrary, you wouldn't have risked acting wrongly because you'd have [*e*] been afraid before the gods and ashamed before men. As things stand, however, I well know that you think you have fully clear knowledge of what's pious and what isn't. So tell me what you think it is, my excellent Euthyphro, and don't conceal it.

EUTHYPHRO: Some other time, Socrates. You see, I'm in a hurry to get somewhere, and it's time for me to be off.

SOCRATES: What a way to treat me, my friend! Going off like that and dashing the high hopes I had that I'd learn from you what things are pious and what aren't. Then I'd [*16a*] escape Meletus' indictment by showing him

that Euthyphro had now made me wise in religious matters, and ignorance would no longer cause me to improvise and innovate about them. What's more, I'd live a better way for the rest of my life.

1. Euthyphro was a mantis, or prophet (3b–c, 3e), a self-proclaimed authority on Greek religion (4e–5a), who takes very literally the stories embodied in its myths (5e–6b).
2. The Lyceum was one of three great gymnasia outside the city walls of Athens.
3. The nine archons, chosen annually, were the chief public officials in Athens: one was civilian head of state, one was head of the army (polemarchos), and six had judicial roles (thesmothetai). The King Archon dealt with important religious matters (such as the indictment against Socrates for impiety) and also with homicide (the subject of Euthyphro's indictment). The king's court, or porch (stoa), was in the marketplace (agora).
4. A deme was a relatively independent administrative unit rather like a village or township. Athens consisted of 139 of them.
5. The reference is to the communal hearth in the Prytaneum, which was the symbolic center of Athens.
6. Five hundred (or 501) of whom will serve on the jury that will eventually try Socrates.
7. That is, people who have the gift of prophecy. Socrates' sign is mantic, or prophetic (Apology 40a).
8. Heracles (Hercules) was a hero of legendary strength. His famous labors—twelve extraordinarily difficult tasks—are alluded to at Apology 22a.
9. Normally, the close relatives of the victim took responsibility for prosecuting the murderer.
10. It is because Euthyphro shares hearth and table with his father—and so risks being contaminated by the pollution (miasma) thought to adhere to murderers—that he feels especially obliged to prosecute him.
11. Cronus mutilated his father, Uranus (Sky), by cutting off his genitals when he was copulating with Gaia (Earth). He ate the children he had with his sister Rhea. Aided by her, however, their son Zeus escaped, overthrew Cronus, and fettered him.
12. The Acropolis, set on the steep rocky hill that dominates Athens, was the central fortress and principal sanctuary of the goddess Athena. It was the site of the Parthenon, as well as of other temples. The Great Panathenaean festival took place every four years and was a more elaborate version of the yearly festival that marked Athena's birthday. At it, her statue in the Parthenon received a new robe embroidered with scenes from the mythical battle of the gods and the giants.
13. Hephaestus, the god of fire and of blacksmithing, was armor maker to the gods. His mother, Hera, the wife and sister of Zeus, threw Hephaestus off Olympus because he was lame and deformed. This act pleased her, not him. In revenge, Hephaestus made her a throne that held her captive when she sat on it. This act pleased him, not her. Similarly, Cronus cannot have been pleased at being fettered by Zeus.
14. Daedalus was a legendary sculptor of great skill. His statues were so lifelike that they moved around by themselves just like living things. Socrates' father, Sophroniscus, is alleged to have been a

sculptor or stone-carver, and some of the statues on the Acropolis may have been attributed to Socrates himself.

15. Tantalus, son of Zeus, was a legendary king proverbial for his wealth, who enjoyed the privilege of dining with the gods. He killed and cooked his son Pelops, and mixed pieces of his flesh in with the gods' food to see whether they could detect it. He was punished in Hades by being "tantalized"—any food or water he reached for always eluded his grasp.

16. Author unknown.

17. Proteus, the Old Man of the Sea, was a god who could change himself into any shape he wished. In this way, he avoided being captured, until his daughter, Eidothea, revealed this secret: keep tight hold of him, no matter what he changes into.

APOLOGY

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

[*17a*] I don't know, men of Athens, how you were affected by my accusers. As for me, I was almost carried away by them, they spoke so persuasively. And yet almost nothing they said is true. Among their many falsehoods, however, one especially amazed me: that you must be careful not to be deceived by me, since I'm a dangerously clever speaker. [*b*] That they aren't ashamed at being immediately refuted by the facts, once it becomes apparent that I'm not a clever speaker at all, that seems to me most shameless of them. Unless, of course, the one they call "clever" is the one who tells the truth. If that's what they mean, I'd agree that I'm an orator—although not one of their sort. No, indeed. Rather, just as I claimed, they have said little or nothing true, whereas from me you'll [*c*] hear the whole truth. But not, by Zeus, men of Athens, expressed in elegant language like theirs, arranged in fine words and phrases. Instead, what you hear will be spoken extemporaneously in whatever words come to mind, and let none of you expect me to do otherwise—for I put my trust in the justice of what I say. After all, it wouldn't be appropriate at my age, gentlemen, to come before you speaking in polished, artificial language like a young man.

Indeed, men of Athens, this I positively entreat of you: if you hear me making my defense using the same sort of language that I'm accustomed to use both in the marketplace next to the bankers' tables—where many of you have heard me—and also in other places, please don't be surprised or create an uproar on that account. For the fact is [*d*] that this is the first time I've appeared before a law court, although I'm seventy years old. So the language of this place is totally foreign to me. Now, if I were really a foreigner, you'd certainly forgive me if I spoke in the accents and manner in which I'd [*18a*] been raised. So now, too, I'm asking you, justly it seems to me, to overlook my manner {91} of speaking (maybe it will be less good, maybe it will be better), but consider and apply your mind to this alone, whether I say what's just or not. For that's the virtue or excellence of a juror,[1] just as the orator's lies in telling the truth.

The first thing justice demands, then, men of Athens, is that I defend myself from the first false accusations made against me and from my first accusers, and then from the later accusations and the later accusers. You see, many people have been accusing me in [*b*] front of you for very many years now—and nothing they say is true. And I fear them more than Anytus[2] and the rest, though the latter are dangerous as well. But the earlier ones, gentlemen, are more dangerous. They got hold of most of you from childhood and persuaded you with their accusations against me—accusations no more true than the current ones. They say there's a man called Socrates, a "wise" man, a thinker about things in the heavens, an investigator of all things below the earth, and [*c*] someone who makes the weaker argument the stronger. Those who've spread this rumor, men of Athens, are my dangerous accusers, since the people who hear them believe that those who investigate such things do not acknowledge the gods either. Moreover, those accusers are numerous and have been accusing me for a long time now. Besides, they also spoke to you at that age when you would most readily believe them, when some of you were children or young boys. Thus they simply won their case by default, as there was no defense. But what's most unreasonable in all this is that I can't [*d*] discover even their names and tell them to you—unless one of them happens to be a comic playwright. In any case, the ones who used malicious slander to persuade you—as well as those who persuaded others after having been persuaded

themselves—all of these are impossible to deal with. One cannot bring any of them here to court or cross-examine them. One must literally fight with shadows to defend oneself and cross-examine with no one to respond.

So you too, then, should allow, as I claimed, that there are two groups of accusers: those who accused me just now and the older ones I've been discussing. Moreover, you [*e*] should consider it proper for me to defend myself against the latter first, since you've heard them accusing me earlier, and at much greater length, than these recent ones here.

All right. I must defend myself, then, men of Athens, and try to take away in this [*19a*] brief time prejudices you acquired such a long time ago. Certainly, that's the outcome I'd wish for—if it's in any way better for you and for me—and I'd like to succeed in my defense. But I think it's a difficult task, and I am not at all unaware of its nature. Let it turn out, though, in whatever way pleases the god. I have to obey the law and defend myself.

Let's examine, then, from the beginning, what [*b*] the charge is from which the slander against me arose—the very one on which Meletus relied when he wrote the present indictment of me. Well, then, what exactly did the slanderers say to slander me? Just as if they were real accusers their affidavit must be read. It's something like this: Socrates commits injustice and is a busybody, in that he investigates the things beneath the earth and in the heavens, makes the weaker argument the stronger, [*c*] and teaches these things to others.

Indeed, you saw these charges expressed yourselves in Aristophanes' comedy.[3] There, some fellow named Socrates swings around claiming he's walking on air and talking a lot of other nonsense on subjects that I know neither a lot nor a little but nothing at all about. Not that I mean to disparage this knowledge, if anyone's wise in such subjects—I don't want to have to defend myself {92} against more of Meletus' lawsuits!—but I, men of Athens, take no part in them. I call on the majority of you as witnesses to this, and I appeal to you [*d*] to make it perfectly plain to one another—those of you who've heard me conversing (as many of you have). Tell one another, then, whether any of you has ever heard me discussing such subjects, either briefly or at length, and from this you'll realize that the other things commonly said about me are of the same baseless character.

In any case, none of them is true. And if you've heard from anyone that I undertake to educate people and charge fees, that's not true either. Although, it also seems to me to be a fine thing if anyone's able to educate people in the way Gorgias of [*e*] Leontini does, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis.[4] For each of them, gentlemen, can enter any city and persuade the young—who may associate with any of their own fellow citizens they want to free of charge—to abandon those associations, and [*20a*] associate with them instead, pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides.

Since we're on that topic, I heard that there's another wise gentleman here at present, from Paros. For I happened to run into a man who has spent more money on Sophists than everyone else put together—Callias, the son of Hipponicus.[5] So I questioned him, since he has two sons himself.

"Callias," I said, "if your two sons had been born colts or calves, we could engage and pay a knowledgeable supervisor—one of those expert horse breeders or farmers—who [*b*] could turn them into fine and good examples of their proper virtue or excellence. But now, seeing that they're human beings, whom do you have in mind to engage as a supervisor? Who is it that has the knowledge of *this* virtue, the virtue of human beings and of citizens? I assume you've investigated the matter, because you have two sons. Is there such a person," I asked, "or not?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Who is he?" I said.

"His name's Evenus, Socrates," he replied, "from Paros. He charges five minas."[6]

I thought Evenus blessedly happy if he truly [*c*] did possess that expertise and taught it for so modest a fee. I, at any rate, would pride myself and give myself airs if I had knowledge of those things. But in fact, men of Athens, I don't know them.

Now perhaps one of you will interject: "But Socrates, what, then, is *your* occupation? What has given rise to these slanders against you? Surely if you weren't in fact occupied with something out of the ordinary, if you weren't doing something different from most people, all this rumor and talk wouldn't have arisen. Tell us, then, [*d*] what it is, so that we don't judge you hastily." These are fair questions, I think, for the speaker to ask, and I'll try

to show you just what it is that has brought me this slanderous reputation. Listen, then. Perhaps, some of you will think I'm joking. But you may be sure that I'll be telling you the whole truth.

You see, men of Athens, I've acquired this reputation because of nothing other than a sort of wisdom. What sort of wisdom, you ask, is that? The very sort, perhaps, that is *human* wisdom. For it may just be that I really do have that sort of wisdom, whereas the people I mentioned just now may, perhaps, be wise because they possess *superhuman* [*e*] wisdom. I don't know what else to call it, since I myself certainly don't possess that knowledge, and whoever says I do is lying and speaking in order to slander me.

Please don't create an uproar, men of Athens, even if you think I'm somehow making grand claims. You see, I'm not the author of the story I'm about to tell, though I'll refer you to a reliable source. In fact, as a witness to the existence {93} of my wisdom—if indeed it is a sort of wisdom—and to its nature, I'll present the god at Delphi to you.[7]

You remember Chaerephon, no doubt.[8] He was a friend of mine from youth and [*21a*] also a friend of your party, who shared your recent exile and restoration.[9] You remember, then, what sort of man Chaerephon was, how intense he was in whatever he set out to do. Well, on one occasion in particular he went to Delphi and dared to ask the oracle[10]—as I said, please don't create an uproar, gentlemen—he asked, exactly as I'm telling you, whether anyone was wiser than myself. The Pythia drew forth the response that no one is wiser. His brother here will testify to you about it, since Chaerephon himself is dead.[11]

[*b*] Please consider my purpose in telling you this, since I'm about to explain to you where the slander against me has come from. You see, when I heard these things, I thought to myself as follows: "What can the god be saying? What does his riddle mean? For I'm only too aware that I've no claim to being wise in anything either great or small. What can he mean, then, by saying that I'm wisest? Surely he can't be lying: that isn't lawful for him."

For a long time I was perplexed about what he meant. Then, very reluctantly, I proceeded to examine it in the following sort of way. I

approached one of the people thought to be wise, assuming that in his company, if anywhere, I could refute the pronouncement and say to the oracle, “Here’s someone wiser than I, yet you said I was [*c*] wisest.”

Then I examined this person—there’s no need for me to mention him by name; he was one of our politicians. And when I examined him and talked with him, men of Athens, my experience was something like this: I thought this man seemed wise to many people, and especially to himself, but wasn’t. Then I tried to show him that he thought [*d*] himself wise, but wasn’t. As a result, he came to dislike me, and so did many of the people present. For my part, I thought to myself as I left, “I’m wiser than that person. For it’s likely that neither of us knows anything fine and good, but he thinks he knows something he doesn’t know, whereas I, since I don’t in fact know, don’t think that I do either. At any rate, it seems that I’m wiser than he in just this one small way: that what I don’t know, I don’t think I know.” Next, I approached another man, one of those thought [*e*] to be wiser than the first, and it seemed to me that the same thing occurred, and so I came to be disliked by that man too, as well as by many others.

After that, then, I kept approaching one person after another. I realized, with distress and alarm, that I was arousing hostility. Nevertheless, I thought I must attach the greatest importance to what pertained to the god. So, in seeking what the oracle meant, I [*22a*] had to go to all those with any reputation for knowledge. And, by the dog, men of Athens—for I’m obliged to tell the truth before you—I really did experience something like this: in my investigation in response to the god, I found that, where wisdom is concerned, those who had the best reputations were practically the most deficient, whereas men who were thought to be their inferiors were much better off. Accordingly, I must present all my wanderings to you as if they were labors of some sort that I undertook in order to prove the oracle utterly irrefutable.

You see, after the politicians, I approached the poets—tragic, dithyrambic,[12] and [*b*] the rest—thinking that in their company I’d catch myself in the very act of being more ignorant than {94} they. So I examined the poems with which they seemed to me to have taken the most trouble and questioned them about what they meant, in order that I might also learn something from them at the same time.

Well, I'm embarrassed to tell you the truth, gentlemen, but nevertheless it must be told. In a word, almost all the people present could have discussed these poems better than their authors themselves. And so, in the case of the poets as well, I soon realized it [*c*] wasn't wisdom that enabled them to compose their poems, but some sort of natural inspiration, of just the sort you find in seers and soothsayers. For these people, too, say many fine things, but know nothing of what they speak about. The poets also seemed to me to be in this sort of situation. At the same time, I realized that, because of their poetry, they thought themselves to be the wisest of people about the other things as well when they weren't. So I left their company, too, thinking that I had gotten the better of them in the very same way as of the politicians.

Finally, I approached the craftsmen. You see, I was conscious of knowing [*d*] practically nothing myself, but I knew I'd discover that they, at least, would know many fine things. And I wasn't wrong about this. On the contrary, they did know things that I didn't know, and in that respect they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good craftsmen also seemed to me to have the very same flaw as the poets: because he performed his own craft well, each of them also thought himself to be wisest about the other things, the most important ones; and this error of theirs seemed to overshadow their [*e*] wisdom. So I asked myself on behalf of the oracle whether I'd prefer to be as I am, not in any way wise with their wisdom nor ignorant with their ignorance, or to have both qualities as they did. And the answer I gave to myself, and to the oracle, was that it profited me more to be just the way I was.

From this examination, men of Athens, much hostility has arisen against me of a [*23a*] sort that is harshest and most onerous. This has resulted in many slanders, including that reputation I mentioned of being "wise." You see, the people present on each occasion think that I'm wise about the subjects on which I examine others. But in fact, gentlemen, it's pretty certainly the god who is really wise, and by his oracle he meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And it seems that when he refers to the Socrates here [*b*] before you and uses my name, he makes me an example, as if he were to say, "That one among you is wisest, mortals, who, like Socrates, has recognized that he's truly worthless where wisdom's concerned."

So even now I continue to investigate these things and to examine, in response to the god, any person, citizen, or foreigner I believe to be wise. Whenever he seems not to be so to me, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he's not wise. Because of this occupation, I've had no leisure worth talking about for either the city's affairs or [*c*] my own domestic ones; rather, I live in extreme poverty because of my service to the god.

In addition to these factors, the young people who follow me around of their own accord, those who have the most leisure, the sons of the very rich, enjoy listening to people being cross-examined. They often imitate me themselves and in turn attempt to cross-examine others. Next, I imagine they find an abundance of people who think they possess some knowledge, but in fact know little or nothing. The result is that those they question are angry not at themselves, but at me, and say that Socrates is a thoroughly [*d*] pestilential fellow who corrupts the young. Then, when they're asked what he's doing or teaching, they've nothing to say, as they don't know. Yet, so as not to appear at a loss, they utter the stock phrases used against all who philosophize: "things in the sky and beneath the earth," and "not acknowledging the gods," and "making the weaker argument the stronger." For they wouldn't be willing to tell the truth, I imagine: that it has become manifest they pretend to know, but know nothing. So, seeing that these people are, I imagine, ambitious, vehement, and numerous, [*e*] and have been speaking earnestly and persuasively about me, they've long been filling your ears with vehement slanders. On the basis of these slanders, Meletus has brought his charges against me, and Anytus and Lycon along with him: Meletus is aggrieved on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the artisans and politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. So, as I [*24a*] began by saying, I'd be amazed if I could rid your minds of this slander in the brief time available, when there's so much of it in them.

{95} There, men of Athens, is the truth for you. I've spoken it without concealing or glossing over anything, whether great or small. And yet I pretty much know that I make enemies by doing these very things. And that's further evidence that I'm right—that this is the prejudice against me and these its causes. Whether you investigate these matters [*b*] now or later, you'll find it to be so.

Enough, then, for my defense before you against the charges brought by my first accusers. Next, I'll try to defend myself against Meletus—who is, he claims, both good and patriotic—and against my later accusers. Once again, then, just as if they were really a different set of accusers, their affidavit must be examined in turn. It goes something like this: Socrates is guilty of corrupting the young, and of not acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges, but new daimonic activities instead.

[*c*] Such, then, is the charge. Let us examine each point in this charge.

Meletus says, then, that I commit injustice by corrupting the young. But I, men of Athens, reply that it's Meletus who is guilty of playing around with serious matters, of lightly bringing people to trial, and of professing to be seriously concerned about things he has never cared about at all—and I'll try to prove this.

Step forward, Meletus, and answer me. You regard it as most important, do you not, that our young people be as good as possible?

[*d*] I certainly do.

Come, then, and tell these jurors who improves them. Clearly you know, since you care. For having discovered, as you assert, the one who corrupts them—namely, myself—you bring him before these jurors and accuse him. Come, then, speak up, tell the jurors who it is that improves them. Do you see, Meletus, that you remain silent and have nothing to say? Yet don't you think that's shameful and sufficient evidence of exactly what I say, that you care nothing at all? Speak up, my good man. Who improves them?

The laws.

[*e*] But that's not what I'm asking, my most excellent fellow, but rather which *person*, who knows the laws themselves in the first place, does this?

These gentlemen, Socrates, the jurors.

What are you saying, Meletus? Are they able to educate and improve the young?

Most certainly.

All of them, or some but not others?

All of them.

That's good news, by Hera, and a great abundance of benefactors that you speak of! What, [*25a*] then, about the audience present here? Do they improve the young or not?

Yes, they do so too.

And what about the members of the Council?[13]

Yes, the councilors too.

But, if that's so, Meletus, surely those in the Assembly, the assemblymen, won't corrupt the young, will they? Won't they all improve them too?

Yes, they will too.

But then it seems that all the Athenians except for me make young people fine and good, whereas I alone corrupt them. Is that what you're saying?

Most emphatically, that's what I'm saying.

I find myself, if you're right, in a most unfortunate situation. Now answer me this. [*b*] Do you think that the same holds of horses? Do people in general improve them, whereas one particular person corrupts them or makes them worse? Or isn't it wholly the opposite: one particular person—or the very few who are horse trainers—is able to improve them, whereas the majority of people, if they have to do with horses and make use of them, make them worse? Isn't that true, Meletus, both of horses and of all other animals? Of course it is, whether you and Anytus say so or not. Indeed, our young people are surely in a very happy situation if only one person corrupts them, whereas all the rest benefit them.

Well then, Meletus, it has been adequately [*c*] established that you've never given any thought to young people—you've plainly revealed your indifference—and that you care nothing about the issues on which you bring me to trial.

{96} Next, Meletus, tell us, in the name of Zeus, whether it's better to live among good citizens or bad ones. Answer me, sir. Surely, I'm not asking you anything difficult. Don't bad people do something bad to whoever's closest to them at the given moment, whereas good people do something good?

Certainly.

[*d*] Now is there anyone who wishes to be harmed rather than benefited by those around him? Keep answering, my good fellow. For the law requires you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be harmed?

Of course not.

Well, then, when you summon me here for corrupting the young and making them worse, do you mean that I do so intentionally or unintentionally?

Intentionally, I say.

What's that, Meletus? Are you so much wiser at your age than I at mine, that you know bad people do something bad to whoever's closest to them at the given moment, [*e*] and good people something good? Am I, by contrast, so very ignorant that I don't know even this: that if I do something bad to an associate, I risk getting back something bad from him in return? And is the result, as you claim, that I do so very bad a thing intentionally?

I'm not convinced by you of that, Meletus, and neither, I think, is anyone else. No, either I'm not corrupting the young or, if I am corrupting them, it's unintentionally, so that in either case what you say is false. But if I'm corrupting them unintentionally, the law doesn't require that I be brought to court for such mistakes—that is, unintentional ones—but that I be taken aside for private instruction and admonishment. For it's clear [*26a*] that if I'm instructed, I'll stop doing what I do *un*intentionally. You, however, avoided associating with me and were unwilling to instruct me. Instead, you bring me here, where the law requires you to bring those in need of punishment, not instruction.

Well, men of Athens, what I said before is absolutely clear by this point, namely, [*b*] that Meletus has never cared about these matters to any extent, great or small. Nevertheless, please tell us now, Meletus, how is it you say I corrupt the young? Or is it absolutely clear, from the indictment you wrote, that it's by teaching them not to acknowledge the gods the city acknowledges, but new daimonic activities instead? Isn't that what you say I corrupt them by teaching?

I most emphatically do say that.

Then, in the name of those very gods we're now discussing, Meletus, speak yet [*c*] more clearly, both for my sake and for that of these gentlemen. You see, I'm unable to tell what you mean. Is it that I teach people to acknowledge that some gods exist—so that I, then, acknowledge their existence myself and am not an out-and-out atheist and am not guilty of that—yet not, of course, the very ones acknowledged by the city, but different ones? Is that what you're charging me with, that they're different ones? Or are you saying that I myself don't acknowledge any gods at all, and that that's what I teach to others?

That's what I mean, that you don't acknowledge any gods at all.

You're a strange fellow, Meletus! What makes [*d*] you say that? Do I not even acknowledge that the sun and the moon are gods, then, as other men do?

No, by Zeus, gentlemen of the jury, he doesn't, since he says that the sun's a stone and the moon earth.

My dear Meletus, do you think it's Anaxagoras[14] you're accusing?

Are you that contemptuous of the jury? Do you think they're so illiterate that they don't know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of such arguments? And, in particular, do young people learn these views from me, views they can [*e*] occasionally acquire in the Orchestra[15] for a drachma at most and that they'd ridicule Socrates for pretending were his own—especially as they're so strange? In the name of Zeus, is that really how I seem to you? Do I acknowledge the existence of no god at all?

No indeed, by Zeus, none at all.

You aren't at all convincing, Meletus, not even, it seems to me, to yourself. You see, men {97} of Athens, this fellow seems very arrogant and intemperate to me and to have written this indictment simply out of some sort of arrogance, intemperance, and youthful [*27a*] rashness. Indeed, he seems to have composed a sort of riddle in order to test me: "Will the so-called wise Socrates recognize that I'm playing around and contradicting myself? Or will I fool him along with the other listeners?" You see, he seems to me to be contradicting himself in his indictment, as if he were to say, "Socrates is guilty of not acknowledging gods, but of acknowledging gods." And that's just childish playing around, isn't it?

Please examine with me, gentlemen, why it seems to me that this is what he's [*b*] saying. And you, Meletus, answer us. But you, gentlemen, please remember what I asked of you at the beginning: don't create an uproar if I make my arguments in my accustomed manner.

Is there anyone, Meletus, who acknowledges that human activities exist but doesn't acknowledge human beings? Make him answer, gentlemen, and don't let him make one protest after another. Is there anyone who doesn't acknowledge horses but does acknowledge equine activities? Or who doesn't acknowledge that musicians exist but does acknowledge musical activities? There's no one, best of men—if you don't want to answer, I must answer for you and for the others here. But at least answer my next

question. Is there anyone who acknowledges the existence of daimonic activities but [*c*] doesn't acknowledge daimons?

No, there isn't.

How good of you to answer, if reluctantly and when compelled to by these gentlemen. Well then, you say that I acknowledge daimonic activities, whether new or familiar, and teach about them. But then, on your account, I do at any rate acknowledge daimonic activities, and to this you've sworn in your indictment against me. However, if I acknowledge daimonic activities, surely it's absolutely necessary that I acknowledge daimons. Isn't that so? Yes, it is—I assume you agree, since you don't answer. But don't [*d*] we believe that daimons are either gods or, at any rate, children of gods? Yes or no?

Of course.

Then, if indeed I do believe in daimons, as you're saying, and if daimons are gods of some sort, that's precisely what I meant when I said that you're presenting us with a riddle and playing around: you're saying that I don't believe in gods and, on the contrary, that I do believe in gods, since in fact I do at least believe in daimons. But if, on the other hand, daimons are children of gods, some sort of bastard offspring of a nymph, or of whomever else tradition says each one is the child, what man could possibly believe that children of gods exist, but not gods? That would be just as unreasonable as believing in [*e*] the children of horses and asses—namely, mules—while not believing in the existence of horses and asses.

Well then, Meletus, you must have written these things to test us or because you were at a loss about what genuine injustice to charge me with. There's no conceivable way you could persuade any man with even the slightest intelligence that the same person believes in both daimonic activities and gods, and, on the contrary, that this same person [*28a*] believes neither in daimons, nor in gods, nor in heroes.[16]

In fact, then, men of Athens, it doesn't seem to me to require a long defense to show that I'm not guilty of the charges in Meletus' indictment, but what I've said is sufficient. But what I was also saying earlier, that much hostility has arisen against me and among many people—you may be sure that's true. And it's what will convict me, if I am convicted: not Meletus or Anytus, but the slander and malice of many people. It has

certainly convicted many other good men as well, and I imagine it will do so again. [*b*] There's no danger it will stop with me.

But perhaps someone may say, "Aren't you ashamed, Socrates, to have engaged in the sort of occupation that has now put you at risk of death?" I, however, would be right to reply to him, "You're not thinking straight, sir, if you think that a man who's any use at all should give any opposing weight to the risk of living or dying, instead of looking to this alone whenever he does anything: whether his actions are just or unjust, the deeds of a good or bad man. You see, on your account, all those demigods who died [*c*] on {98} the plain of Troy were inferior people, especially the son of Thetis, who was so contemptuous of danger when the alternative was something shameful. When he was eager to kill Hector, his mother, since she was a goddess, spoke to him, I think, in some such words as these: 'My child, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and slay Hector, you will die yourself immediately,' so the poem goes, 'as your death is fated to follow next after Hector's.' But though he heard that, he was contemptuous of death and danger, for he was far more afraid of living as a bad man and of failing to avenge his [*d*] friends: 'Let me die immediately, then,' it continues, 'once I've given the wrongdoer his just deserts, so that I do not remain here by the curved ships, a laughingstock and a burden upon the earth.' Do you really suppose he gave a thought to death or danger?"

You see, men of Athens, this is the truth of the matter: Wherever someone has stationed himself because he thinks it best, or wherever he's been stationed by his commander, there, it seems to me, he should remain, steadfast in danger, taking no account at all of death or of anything else, in comparison to what's shameful. I'd [*e*] therefore have been acting scandalously, men of Athens, if, when I'd been stationed in Potidea, Amphipolis, or Delium[17] by the leaders you had elected to lead me, I had, like many another, remained where they'd stationed me and run the risk of death. But if, when the god stationed me here, as I became thoroughly convinced he did, to live practicing [*29a*] philosophy, examining myself and others, I had—for fear of death or anything else—abandoned my station.

That would have been scandalous, and someone might have rightly and justly brought me to court for not acknowledging that gods exist, by

disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I wasn't. You see, fearing death, gentlemen, is nothing other than thinking one is wise when one isn't, since it's thinking one knows what one doesn't know. I mean, no one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all goods for people, but they fear it as if they knew for certain that it's the worst thing of [*b*] all. Yet surely this is the most blameworthy ignorance of thinking one knows what one doesn't know. But I, gentlemen, may perhaps differ from most people by just this much in this matter too. And if I really were to claim to be wiser than anyone in any way, it would be in this: that as I don't have adequate knowledge about things in Hades, so too I don't think that I have knowledge. To act unjustly, on the other hand, to disobey someone better than oneself, whether god or man, that I do know to be bad and shameful. In any case, I'll never fear or avoid things that may for all I know be good more than things I know are bad.

Suppose, then, you're prepared to let me go [*c*] now and to disobey Anytus, who said I shouldn't have been brought to court at all, but that since I had been brought to court, you had no alternative but to put me to death because, as he stated before you, if I were acquitted, soon your sons would all be entirely corrupted by following Socrates' teachings. Suppose, confronted with that claim, you were to say to me, "Socrates, we will not obey Anytus this time. Instead, we are prepared to let you go. But on the following [*d*] condition: that you spend no more time on this investigation and don't practice philosophy, and if you're caught doing so, you'll die." Well, as I just said, if you were to let me go on these terms, I'd reply to you, "I've the utmost respect and affection for you, men of Athens, but I'll obey the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able, I won't give up practicing philosophy, exhorting you and also showing the way to any of you I ever happen to meet, saying just the sorts of things I'm accustomed to say: My excellent man, you're an Athenian, you belong to the greatest city, renowned for its wisdom and strength; are you not ashamed that you take care to acquire as [*e*] much wealth as possible—and reputation and honor—but that about wisdom and truth, about how your soul may be in the best possible condition, you take neither care nor thought?

Then, if one of you disagrees and says that he *does* care, I won't let him go away immediately, but I'll question, examine, and test him. And if he

doesn’t seem to me to possess virtue, though {99} he claims he does, I’ll reproach him, saying that he treats the most [30a] important things as having the least value, and inferior ones as having more. This I will do for anyone I meet, young or old, alien or fellow citizen—but especially for you, my fellow citizens, since you’re closer kin to me. This, you may be sure, is what the god orders me to do. And I believe that no greater good for you has ever come about in the city than my service to the god. You see, I do nothing else except go around trying to [*b*] persuade you, both young and old alike, not to care about your bodies or your money as intensely as about how your soul may be in the best possible condition. I say, It’s not from wealth that virtue comes, but from virtue comes money, and all the other things that are good for human beings, both in private and in public life.

Now if by saying this, I’m corrupting the young, *this* is what you’d have to think to be harmful. But if anyone claims I say something other than this, he’s talking nonsense.”

“It’s in that light,” I want to say, “men of Athens, that you should obey Anytus or not, and let me go or not—knowing that I wouldn’t act in any other way, not even if I [*c*] were to die many times over.”

Don’t create an uproar, men of Athens. Instead, please abide by my request not to create an uproar at what I say, but to listen. For I think it will profit you to listen. You see, I’m certainly going to say some further things to you at which you may perhaps exclaim—but by no means do so.

You may be sure that if you put me to death—a man of the sort I said I was just now—you won’t harm me more than you harm yourselves. Certainly, Meletus or Anytus [*d*] couldn’t harm me in any way: that’s not possible. For I don’t think it’s lawful for a better man to be harmed by a worse. He may, of course, kill me, or perhaps banish or disenfranchise me. And these *he* believes to be very bad things, and others no doubt agree. But I don’t believe this. Rather, I believe that doing what he’s doing now—attempting to kill a man unjustly—is far worse.

So, men of Athens, I’m far from pleading in my own defense now, as might be supposed. Instead, I’m pleading in yours, so that you don’t commit a great wrong against [*e*] the god’s gift to you by condemning me. If you put me to death, you won’t easily find another like me. For, even if it seems ridiculous to say so, I’ve literally been attached to the city, as if to a large thoroughbred horse that was somewhat sluggish because of its size

and needed to be awakened by some sort of gadfly. It's as just such a gadfly, it seems to me, that the god has attached me to the city—one that awakens, cajoles, and reproaches each and every one of you and never stops alighting everywhere on you the whole day. You won't easily find another like that, gentlemen. So if you obey me, you'll [*31a*] spare my life. But perhaps you'll be resentful, like people awakened from a doze, and slap at me. If you obey Anytus, you might easily kill me. Then you might spend the rest of your lives asleep, unless the god, in his compassion for you, were to send you someone else.

That I am indeed the sort of person to be given as a gift to the city by the god, you [*b*] may recognize from this: it doesn't seem a merely human matter—does it?—for me to have neglected all my own affairs and to have put up with this neglect of my domestic life for so many years now, but always to have minded your business, by visiting each of you in private, like a father or elder brother, to persuade you to care about virtue. Of course, if I were getting anything out of it or if I were being paid for giving this advice, my conduct would be intelligible. But, as it is, you can plainly see for yourselves that my accusers, who so shamelessly accused me of everything else, couldn't bring themselves to be so utterly shameless as to call a witness to say that I ever once accepted or asked for payment. In fact, it's I who can call what I think [*c*] is a sufficient witness that I'm telling the truth—my poverty.

But perhaps it may seem strange that I, of all people, give this advice by going around and minding other people's business in private, yet do not venture to go before your Assembly and give advice to the city in public. The reason for that, however, is one you've heard me give many times and in many places: A divine and daimonic thing comes to me—the very thing Meletus made mocking allusion to in the indictment he wrote. [*d*] It's something that began happening to me in {100} childhood: a sort of voice comes, which, whenever it does come, always holds me back from what I'm about to do but never urges me forward. *It* is what opposes my engaging in politics—and to me, at least, its opposition seems entirely right. For you may be sure, men of Athens, that if I'd tried to engage in politics I'd have perished long ago and have benefited neither you nor myself.

[*e*] Please don't resent me if I tell you the truth. The fact is that no man will be spared by you or by any other multitude of people if he genuinely

opposes a lot of unjust and unlawful actions and tries to prevent them from happening in the city. On the contrary, anyone who really fights for what's just, if indeed he's going to survive for [*32a*] even a short time, must act privately not publicly.

I'll present substantial evidence of that—not words, but what you value, deeds. Listen, then, to what happened to me, so you may see that fear of death wouldn't lead me to submit to a single person contrary to what's just, not even if I were to perish at once for not submitting. The things I'll tell you are of a vulgar sort commonly heard in the law courts, but they're true nonetheless.

[*b*] You see, men of Athens, I never held any other public office in the city, but I've served on the Council. And it happened that my own tribe, Antiochis, was presiding[18] when you wanted to try the ten generals—the ones who failed to rescue the survivors of the naval battle—as a group.[19] That was unlawful, as you all came to recognize at a later time. On that occasion, I was the only presiding member opposed to your doing something illegal, and I voted against you. And though the orators were ready to lay information against me and have me summarily arrested, and you were shouting and urging them on, I thought that I should face danger on the side of law and justice, [*c*] rather than go along with you for fear of imprisonment or death when your proposals were unjust.

This happened when the city was still under democratic rule. But later, when the oligarchy had come to power, it happened once more. The Thirty[20] summoned me and four others to the Tholus[21] and ordered us to arrest Leon of Salamis[22] and bring him from Salamis to die. They gave many such orders to many other people too, of course, since they wanted to implicate as many as possible in their crimes. On *that* occasion, however, [*d*] I showed once again not by words but by deeds that I couldn't care less about death—if that isn't putting it too bluntly—but that all I care about is not doing anything unjust or impious. You see, that government, powerful though it was, didn't frighten me into unjust action: when we came out of the Tholus, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, whereas I left and went home. I might have died for that if the government hadn't fallen shortly afterward.

There are many witnesses who will testify [*e*] before you about these events.

Do you imagine, then, that I'd have survived all these years if I'd been regularly active in public affairs, and had come to the aid of justice like a good man, and regarded that as most important, as one should? Far from it, men of Athens, and neither would any [*33a*] other man. But throughout my entire life, in any public activities I may have engaged in, it was evident I was the sort of person—and in private life I was the same—who {101} never agreed to anything with anyone contrary to justice, whether with others or with those who my slanderers say are my students. In fact, I've never been anyone's teacher at any time. But if anyone, whether young or old, wanted to listen to me while I was talking and performing my own task, I never begrudged that to him. Neither do I [*b*] engage in conversation only when I receive a fee and not when I don't. Rather, I offer myself for questioning to rich and poor alike, or, if someone prefers, he may listen to me and answer my questions. And if any one of these turned out well, or did not do so, I can't justly be held responsible, since I never at any time promised any of them that they'd learn anything from me or that I'd teach them. And if anyone says that he learned something from me or heard something in private that all the others didn't also hear, you may be sure he isn't telling the truth.

Why, then, you may ask, do some people enjoy spending so much time with me? [*c*] You've heard the answer, men of Athens. I told you the whole truth: it's because they enjoy listening to people being examined who think they're wise but aren't. For it's not unpleasant. In my case, however, it's something, you may take it from me, I've been ordered to do by the god, in both oracles and dreams, and in every other way that divine providence ever ordered any man to do anything at all.

All these things, men of Athens, are both true and easily tested. I mean, if I really do corrupt the young or have corrupted them in the past, surely if any of them had recognized when they became older [*d*] that I'd given them bad advice at some point in their youth, they'd now have come forward themselves to accuse me and seek redress. Or else, if they weren't willing to come themselves, some of their family members—fathers, brothers, or other relatives—if indeed their kinsmen had suffered any harm from me—would remember it now and seek redress.

In any case, I see many of these people present here: first of all, there's Crito, my [*e*] contemporary and fellow demesman, the father of Critobulus here;[23] then there's Lysanius of Sphettus, father of Aeschines here;[24] next, there's Epigenes' father, Antiphon of Cephisia here.[25] Then there are others whose brothers have spent time in this way: Nicostratus, son of Theozotides,[26] brother of Theodotus—by the way, Theodotus is dead, so that Nicostratus is at any rate not being held back by him; and Paralius here, son of [*34a*] Demodocus, whose brother was Theages;[27] and there's Adeimantus, the son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Aeantodorus, whose brother here is Apollodorus.[28] And there are many others I could mention, some of whom Meletus most certainly ought to have called as witnesses in the course of his own speech. If he forgot to do so, let him call them now—I yield time to him. Let him tell us if he has any such witness. No, it's entirely the opposite, gentlemen. You'll find that they're all prepared to come to my aid, their corruptor, the one who, Meletus and Anytus claim, is doing harm to their families. Of course, the corrupted ones themselves might indeed have reason to come to my aid. [*b*] But the *un*corrupted ones, their relatives, who are older men now, what reason could they possibly have to support me, other than the right and just one: that they know perfectly well that Meletus is lying, whereas I am telling the truth?

Well then, gentlemen, those, and perhaps other similar things, are pretty much all I have to say in my defense. But perhaps one of you might be resentful when he recalls [*c*] his own behavior. Perhaps when he was contesting even a lesser charge than this charge, he positively entreated the jurors with copious tears, bringing forward his children and many other relatives and friends {102} as well, in order to arouse as much pity as possible. And then he finds that I'll do none of these things, not even when I'm facing what might be considered the ultimate danger. Perhaps someone with these thoughts might feel more willful where I'm concerned and, made angry by these very same thoughts, cast his vote in anger. Well, if there's someone like that among you—of course, [*d*] I don't expect there to be, but *if* there is—I think it appropriate for me to answer him as follows: "I do indeed have relatives, my excellent man. As Homer puts it,[29] I too 'wasn't

born from oak or from rock' but from human parents. And so I do have relatives, sons too, men of Athens, three of them, one already a young man while two are still children. Nonetheless, I won't bring any of them forward here and then entreat you to vote for my acquittal."

Why, you may ask, will I do none of these things? Not because I'm willful, men [*e*] of Athens, or want to dishonor you—whether I'm boldly facing death or not is a separate story. The point has to do with reputation—yours and mine and that of the entire city: it doesn't seem noble to me to do these things, especially at my age and with my reputation—for whether truly or falsely, it's firmly believed in any case that Socrates is [*35a*] superior to the majority of people in some way. Therefore, if those of you who are believed to be superior—in either wisdom or courage or any other virtue whatever—behave like that, it would be shameful.

I've often seen people of this sort when they're on trial: they're thought to be someone, yet they do astonishing things—as if they imagined they'd suffer something terrible if they died and would be immortal if only you didn't kill them. People like that seem to me to bring such shame to the city that any foreigner might well suppose that [*b*] those among the Athenians who are superior in virtue—the ones they select from among themselves for political office and other positions of honor—are no better than women. I say this, men of Athens, because none of us who are in any way whatever thought to be someone should behave like that, nor, if we attempt to do so, should you allow it. On the contrary, you should make it clear you're far more likely to convict someone who makes the city despicable by staging these pathetic scenes than someone who minds his behavior.

Reputation aside, gentlemen, it doesn't seem just to me to entreat the jury—nor to [*c*] be acquitted by entreating it—but rather to inform it and persuade it. After all, a juror doesn't sit in order to grant justice as a favor, but to decide where justice lies. And he has sworn on oath not that he'll favor whomever he pleases, but that he'll judge according to law. We shouldn't accustom you to breaking your oath, then, nor should you become accustomed to doing so—neither of us would be doing something holy if we did. [*d*] Hence don't expect me, men of Athens, to act toward you in ways I consider to be neither noble, nor just, nor pious—most especially, by Zeus, when I'm being prosecuted for *impiety* by Meletus here. You see, if I tried to persuade and to force you by entreaties, after you've sworn an oath,

I clearly would be teaching you not to believe in the existence of gods, and my defense would literally convict me of not acknowledging gods. But that's far from being the case: I do acknowledge them, men of Athens, as none of my accusers does. I turn it over to you and to the god to judge me in whatever way will be best for me and for yourselves.

[The jury returns a guilty verdict. Meletus proposes the death penalty.]

There are many reasons, men of Athens, [*e*] why I'm not resentful at this outcome—that you voted to convict me—and this outcome wasn't unexpected by me. I'm much [*36a*] more surprised at the number of votes cast on each side: I didn't think that the decision would be by so few votes but by a great many. Yet now, it seems, that if a mere thirty votes had been cast differently, I'd have been acquitted. Or rather, it seems to me that where Meletus is concerned, I've been acquitted even as things stand. And not merely acquitted. On the contrary, one thing at least is clear to everyone: if Anytus had not come forward with Lycon to accuse me, Meletus would have been fined a thousand [*b*] drachmas, since he wouldn't have received a fifth of the votes.

{103} But be that as it may, the man demands the death penalty for me. Well then, what counterpenalty should I now propose to you, men of Athens? Or is it clear that it's whatever I deserve? What then should it be? What do I deserve to suffer or pay just because I didn't mind my own business throughout my life? Because I didn't care about the things most people care about—making money, managing an estate, or being a general, a popular leader, or holding some other political office, or joining the cabals and factions that come to exist in a city—but thought myself too decent, in truth, to engage in [*c*] these things and survive? Because I didn't engage in things, if engaging in them was going to benefit neither you nor myself, but instead went to each of you privately and tried to perform what I claim is the greatest benefaction? That was what I did. I tried to persuade each of you to care first not about any of his possessions, but about himself and how he'll become best and wisest; and not primarily about the city's possessions, but about the city itself; and to care about all other things [*d*] in the same way.

What, then, do I deserve to suffer for being such a man? Something good, men of Athens, if I'm indeed to propose a penalty that I truly deserve. Yes, and the sort of good thing, too, that would be appropriate for me. What, then, is appropriate for a poor man who is a public benefactor and needs to have the leisure to exhort you? Nothing could be more appropriate, men of Athens, than for such a man to be given free meals in the Prytaneum—much more so for him, at any rate, than for any one of you who has won a victory at Olympia, whether with a single horse or with a pair or a team of four.[30] You see, he makes you think you're happy, whereas I make you actually happy. Besides, he [*e*] doesn't need to be sustained in that way, but I do need it. So if, as justice demands, [*37a*] I must propose a penalty I deserve, that's the penalty I propose: free meals in the Prytaneum.

Now perhaps when I say this, you may think I'm speaking in a quite willful manner—just as when I talked about appeals to pity and supplications. That's not so, men of Athens, rather it's something like this: I'm convinced that I never intentionally do injustice to any man—but I can't get you to share my conviction, because we've talked [*b*] together a short time. I say this, because if you had a law, as other men in fact do, not to try a capital charge in a single day, but over several, I think you'd be convinced. But as things stand, it isn't easy to clear myself of huge slanders in a short time.

Since *I'm* convinced that I've done injustice to no one, however, I'm certainly not likely to do myself injustice, to announce that I deserve something bad and to propose a penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I do that? In order not to suffer what Meletus proposes as a penalty for me, when I say that I don't know whether it's a good or a bad thing? As an alternative to that, am I then to choose one of the things I know very well to [*c*] be bad and propose it? Imprisonment, for example? And why should I live in prison, enslaved to the regularly appointed officers, the Eleven?[31] All right, a fine with imprisonment until I pay? But in my case the effect would be precisely the one I just now described, since I haven't the means to pay.

Well then, should I propose exile? Perhaps that's what *you*'d propose for me. But I'd certainly have to have an excessive love of life, men of Athens, to be so irrational as to do that. I see that you, my fellow citizens, were unable to tolerate my discourses and [*d*] discussions but came to find them

so burdensome and odious that you're now seeking to get rid of them. Is it likely, then, that I'll infer that others will find them easy to bear? Far from it, men of Athens. It would be a fine life for me, indeed, a man of my age, to go into exile and spend his life exchanging one city for another, because he's always being expelled. You see, I well know that wherever I go, the young will come to hear me speaking, just as they do here. And if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to expel me; whereas if I don't drive them away, their fathers and [*e*] relatives will expel me because of these same young people.

{104} Now perhaps someone may say, "But by keeping quiet and minding your own business, Socrates, wouldn't it be possible for you to live in exile for us?" This is the very hardest point on which to convince some of you. You see, if I say that to do *that* would be to disobey the god, and that this is why I can't mind my own business, you won't [*38a*] believe me, since you'll suppose I'm being ironical. But again, if I say it's the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day, and the other things you've heard me discussing and examining myself and others about, on the grounds that the unexamined life isn't worth living for a human being, you'll believe me even less when I say that. But in fact, things are just as I claim them to be, men of Athens, though it isn't easy to convince you of them. At the same time, I'm not accustomed to thinking that I deserve [*b*] anything bad. If I had the means, I'd have proposed a fine of as much as I could afford to pay, since that would have done me no harm at all. But as things stand, I don't have them—unless you want me to propose as much as I'm in fact able to pay. Perhaps I could pay you about a mina of silver. So I propose a fine of that amount.

One moment, men of Athens. Plato here, and Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus as well, are urging me to propose thirty minas and saying that they themselves will guarantee it.[32] I propose a fine of that amount, therefore, and these men will be sufficient guarantors to you of the silver.

[The jury votes for the death penalty and Socrates begins the final part of this speech.]

[*c*] For the sake of a little time, men of Athens, you're going to earn from those who wish to denigrate our city both the reputation and the blame for

having killed Socrates—that wise man. For those who wish to reproach you will, of course, claim that I'm wise, even if I'm not. In any case, if you'd waited a short time, this would have happened of its own accord. You, of course, see my age, you see that I'm already far along in life and close to death. I'm saying this not to all of you, but to those who voted [*d*] for the death penalty. And to those same people I also say this: Perhaps you imagine, gentlemen, that I was convicted for lack of the sort of arguments I could have used to convince you, if I'd thought I should do or say anything to escape the penalty. Far from it. I *have* been convicted for a lack—not of arguments, however, but of bold-faced shamelessness and for being unwilling to say the sorts of things to you you'd have been most pleased to hear, with me weeping and wailing, and doing and saying many other [*e*] things I claim are unworthy of me, but that are the very sorts of things you're used to hearing from everyone else. No, I didn't think then that I should do anything servile because of the danger I faced, and so I don't regret now that I defended myself as I did. I'd far rather die after such a defense than live like that.

You see, whether in a trial or in a war, neither I nor anyone else should contrive to [*39a*] escape death at all costs. In battle, too, it often becomes clear that one might escape death by throwing down one's weapons and turning to supplicate one's pursuers. And in each sort of danger there are many other ways one can contrive to escape death, if one is shameless enough to do or say anything. The difficult thing, gentlemen, isn't escaping [*b*] death; escaping villainy is much more difficult, since it runs faster than death. And now I, slow and old as I am, have been overtaken by the slower runner while my accusers, clever and sharp-witted as they are, have been overtaken by the faster one—vice. And now I take my leave, convicted by you of a capital crime, whereas they stand forever convicted by the truth of wickedness and injustice. And just as I accept my penalty, so must they. Perhaps, things *had* to turn out this way, and I suppose it's good they have.

Next, I want to make a prophecy to those who [*c*] convicted me. Indeed, I'm now at the point at which men prophesy most—when they're about to die. I say to you men who condemned me to death that as soon as I'm dead vengeance will come upon you, and it will be much harsher, by Zeus, than the vengeance you take in killing me. You did this now in the belief that you'll escape giving an account of your lives. But I say that quite the

opposite will happen to you. There will be more people to test you, whom I now [*d*] restrain, {105} though you didn't notice my doing so. And they'll be all the harsher on you, since they're younger, and you'll resent it all the more. You see, if you imagine that by killing people you'll prevent anyone from reproaching you for not living in the right way, you're not thinking straight. In fact, to escape is neither possible nor noble. On the contrary, what's best and easiest isn't to put down other people, but to prepare oneself to be the best one can. With that prophecy to those of you who voted to convict me, I take my leave.

[*e*] However, I'd gladly discuss this result with those who voted for my acquittal while the officers of the court are busy and I'm not yet on my way to the place where I must die. Please stay with me, gentlemen, just for that short time. After all, there's nothing to prevent us from having a talk with one another while it's still in our power. To you whom [*40a*] I regard as friends I'm willing to show the meaning of what has just now happened to me. You see, gentlemen of the jury—for in calling *you* "jurors" I no doubt use the term correctly—an amazing thing has happened to me. In previous times, the usual prophecies of my daimonic sign were always very frequent, opposing me even on trivial matters, if I was about do something that wasn't right. Now, however, something has happened to me, as you can see for yourselves, that one might think to be, and that's generally regarded as [*b*] being, the worst of all bad things. Yet the god's sign didn't oppose me when I left home this morning, or when I came up here to the law court, or anywhere in my speech when I was about to say something, even though in other discussions it has often stopped me in the middle of what I was saying. Now, however, where this affair is concerned, it has opposed me in nothing I either said or did.

What, then, do I suppose is the explanation for that? I'll tell you. You see, it's likely that what has happened to me is a good thing and that those of you who suppose [*c*] death to be bad make an incorrect supposition. I've strong evidence of this, since there's no way my usual sign would have failed to oppose me, if I weren't about to achieve something good.

But let's bear in mind that the following is also a strong reason to hope that death may be something good. Being dead is one of two things: either the dead are nothing, as it were, and have no awareness whatsoever of anything at all; or else, as we're told, it's some sort of change, a migration

of the soul from here to another place. Now, if there's in [*d*] fact no awareness, but it's like sleep—the kind in which the sleeper has no dream whatsoever—then death would be an amazing advantage. For I imagine that if someone had to pick a night in which he slept so soundly that he didn't even dream and had to compare all the other nights and days of his life with that one, and then, having considered the matter, had to say how many days or nights of his life he had spent better or more pleasantly than that night—I imagine that not just some private individual, but [*e*] even the great king,[33] would find them easy to count compared to the other days and nights. Well, if death's like that, *I* say it's an advantage, since, in that case, the whole of time would seem no longer than a single night.

On the other hand, if death's a sort of journey from here to another place, and if what we're told is true, and all who've died are indeed there, what could be a greater [*41a*] good than that, gentlemen of the jury? If on arriving in Hades and leaving behind the people who claim to be jurors here, one's going to find those who are truly jurors or judges, the very ones who are said to sit in judgment there too—Minos,[34] Rhadamanthys, Aeachus, Triptolemus, and all the other demigods who were just in their own lifetimes—would the journey be a wretched one?

Or again, what would any one of you not give to talk to Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer?[35] I'd be willing to die many times over, if that were true. You see, [*b*] for myself, at any rate, spending time there would be amazing: when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telemon, or anyone else of old who died because of an unjust verdict, I could compare my own experience with theirs—as I suppose it wouldn't be unpleasing {106} to do. And in particular, the most important thing: I could spend time examining and searching people there, just as I do here, to find out who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, but isn't.

What wouldn't one give, gentlemen of the jury, to be able to examine the leader [*c*] of the great expedition against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,[36] or countless other men and women one could mention? To talk to them there, to associate with them and examine them, wouldn't that be inconceivable happiness? In any case, the people there certainly don't kill one for doing it. For if what we're told is true, the people there are both

happier in all other respects than the people here and also deathless for the remainder of time.

But you too, gentlemen of the jury, should be of good hope in the face of death, [*d*] and bear in mind this single truth: nothing bad can happen to a good man, whether in life or in death, nor are the gods unconcerned about his troubles. What has happened to me hasn't happened by chance; rather, it's clear to me that to die now and escape my troubles was a better thing for me. It was for this very reason that my sign never opposed me. And so, for my part, I'm not at all angry with those who voted to condemn me or with my accusers. And yet this wasn't what they had in mind when they were condemning and accusing me. No, they thought to harm me—and for that they deserve to be blamed.

This small favor, however, I ask of them. [*e*] When my sons come of age, gentlemen, punish them by harassing them in the very same way that I harassed you, if they seem to you to take care of wealth or anything before virtue, if they think they're someone when they're no one. Reproach them, just as I reproached you: tell them that they don't care for the things they should and think they're someone when they're worth [*42a*] nothing. If you will do that, I'll have received my own just deserts from you, as will my sons.

But now it's time to leave, I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to the better thing, however, is unclear to everyone except the god.

1. A member of an Athenian jury (a *dikastēs*) combined the responsibilities that are divided between judge and jury in our legal system. Hence *dikastēs* is sometimes translated as "judge" and sometimes (as in the present translation) as "juror."

2. Anytus was a democratic leader who helped restore democracy to Athens in 403 BCE after the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants (32c note), under whom he had lost most of his wealth.

3. Aristophanes was an Athenian comic dramatist (c. 450–385 BCE). The version of his play *Clouds* referred to here, which is earlier than the revised version we possess, was first staged in 423 BCE.

4. All three, like Evenus of Paros mentioned below, were Sophists—itinerant professors who charged sometimes substantial fees for popular lectures and specialized instruction in a wide variety of fields,

including natural science, rhetoric, grammar, ethics, and politics. Sophists did not constitute a single school or movement, however, and were neither doctrinally nor organizationally united.

5. Callias was one of the richest men in Greece and a patron of the Sophists. Plato's *Protagoras* is set in his house.

6. Evenus is described as a poet (*Phaedo* 60c–e) and as an orator (*Phaedrus* 267a). A few fragments of his elegies survive. A drachma was a day's pay for someone engaged in public works; a mina was a hundred silver drachmas.

7. Apollo, who was god of, among other things, healing, prophecy, purification, care for young citizens, music, and poetry.

8. A long-time companion of Socrates.

9. Members of the democratic party left Athens when the Thirty Tyrants came to power in 404 BCE. They returned to power when the tyrants were overthrown in 403.

10. The Delphic oracle was one of the most famous in antiquity. There were two methods of consulting it. One method, involving the sacrifice of sheep and goats, was quite expensive but resulted in a written response. The other—the so-called method of the two beans—was substantially cheaper but resulted only in a response by lot. Since Chaerephon was notoriously poor, it is probable that he consulted the oracle by the latter method (something also suggested by Socrates' characterization of the priestess as *drawing forth* the response at 21a).

11. The brother is Chaerecrates.

12. A dithyramb was a choral song in honor of the god Dionysus.

13. The Council consisted of five hundred male citizens over the age of thirty, elected annually by lot, fifty from each of the ten tribes of Athens. The Council met daily (except for some holidays and the like) as a steering committee for the Assembly.

14. Some of the views of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are discussed at *Phaedo* 97b–99d.

15. The Orchestra was part of the marketplace (*agora*) in Athens.

16. Heroes are demigods (28c), children of gods and mortals, whose existence therefore entails the existence of gods.

17. Three battles in the Peloponnesian War between Athens and its allies and Sparta and its allies.

18. A *phulē* is not a tribe in our sense, but an administrative division of the citizen body, most probably of military origin. The presiding committee of the Council (25a note) consisted of the fifty members of one of the ten tribes, selected by lot to serve for one-tenth of the year. It arranged meetings of the Council and Assembly, received envoys and letters to the state, and conducted other routine business.

19. After the naval battle at Arginusae on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor (406 BCE), ten Athenian generals were indicted for failing to rescue survivors and to pick up the bodies of the dead. Both Council and Assembly voted to try them as a group, which was against Athenian law.

20. When Athens was defeated by Sparta in 404 BCE, its democratic government was replaced by a brutal oligarchy, the so-called Thirty Tyrants, which survived barely eight months. Two members of the Thirty—Critias and Charmides—were relatives of Plato and appear as Socratic interlocutors in the dialogues named after them. Socrates' association with them is often thought to have been one of the things that led to his indictment.

21. The Tholus was a dome-shaped building. The presiding committee of the Council (32b note) took its meals there.

22. Leon is otherwise unknown.

23. Crito was a well-off farm owner, able and willing to help his friends financially (38b, *Crito* 44b–c).

24. Aeschines of Sphettus (fourth century BCE) was a devoted follower of Socrates, present at his death (*Phaedo* 59b). He taught oratory and wrote speeches for the law courts. He also wrote Socratic dialogues, only fragments of which are extant.
25. Epigenes was present at Socrates' death (*Phaedo* 59b) and was a member of his circle.
26. Theozotides introduced two important democratic reforms after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants (32c note).
27. Otherwise largely unknown.
28. Apollodorus, an enthusiastic follower of Socrates, given to emotion (*Phaedo* 59a–b, 117c–d), is the narrator in the *Symposium*.
29. Homer, *Odyssey* xix.163.
30. See *Euthyphro* 3a note.
31. Officials appointed by lot to be in charge of prisons and executions.
32. Thirty minas (3,000 silver drachmas) was almost ten years' salary for someone engaged in public works.
33. The king of Persia, whose wealth and power made him a popular exemplar of human success and happiness.
34. Minos was a legendary king of Crete.
35. Orpheus was a legendary bard and founder of the mystical religion of Orphism. Musaeus, usually associated with Orpheus, was also a legendary bard.
36. Sisyphus was a legendary king and founder of Corinth.

CRITO

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

[*43a*] SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Isn't it still early?

CRITO: It is indeed.

SOCRATES: About what time?

CRITO: Just before dawn.

SOCRATES: I'm surprised the prison warden was willing to let you in.

CRITO: He knows me by now, Socrates, I come here so often. And besides I've done him a good turn.

SOCRATES: Have you just arrived or have you been here for a while?

CRITO: For quite a while.

[*b*] SOCRATES: Then why didn't you wake me right away, instead of sitting there in silence?

CRITO: In the name of Zeus, Socrates, I wouldn't do that! I only wish I weren't so sleepless and distressed myself. I've been amazed all this time to see how peacefully you were sleeping, and I deliberately kept from waking you, so that you could pass the time as pleasantly as possible. In the past—indeed, throughout my entire life—I've often counted you happy in your disposition, but never more so than in this present misfortune. You bear it so easily and calmly.

SOCRATES: Well, Crito, it would be an error for someone of my age to complain when the time has come when he must die.

CRITO: Other people get overtaken by such [*c*] misfortunes too, Socrates, but their age doesn't {107} prevent them in the least from complaining about their fate.

SOCRATES: That's right. But tell me, why *have* you come so early?

CRITO: I bring bad news, Socrates. Not bad in your view, it seems to me, but bad and hard in mine and that of all your friends—and hardest of all, I think, for me to bear.

SOCRATES: What news is that? Or has the ship returned from Delos, at whose return I [*d*] must die?[1]

CRITO: No, it hasn't returned *yet*, but I think it will arrive today, judging from the reports of people who've come from Sunium,[2] where they left it. It's clear from these reports that it will arrive today. And so tomorrow, Socrates, you must end your life.

SOCRATES: I pray that it may be for the best, Crito. If it pleases the gods, let it be so. All the same, I don't think it will arrive today.

[*44a*] CRITO: What evidence have you for that?

SOCRATES: I'll tell you. I must die on the day after the ship arrives.

CRITO: That's what the authorities say, at least.

SOCRATES: Then I don't think it will arrive today, but tomorrow. My evidence for this comes from a dream I had in the night a short while ago. So it looks as though you chose the right time not to wake me.

CRITO: What was your dream?

SOCRATES: I thought a beautiful, graceful woman came to me, robed in white. She called [*b*] me and said, "Socrates, you will arrive 'in fertile Phthia' on the third day."[3]

CRITO: What a strange dream, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Yet its meaning is quite clear, Crito—at least, it seems so to me.

CRITO: All too clear, apparently. But look here, Socrates, it's still not too late to take my advice and save yourself. You see, if you die, I won't just suffer a single misfortune. On the contrary, not only will I lose a friend the like of whom I'll never find again, but, in addition, many people, who don't know you or me well, will think that I didn't care about [*c*] you, since I could have saved you if I'd been willing to spend the money. And indeed what reputation could be more shameful than being thought to value money more than friends? For the majority of people won't believe that it was you yourself who refused to leave this place, though we were urging you to do so.

SOCRATES: But my dear Crito, why should we care so much about what the majority think? After all, the most decent ones, who are worthier of consideration, will believe that matters were handled in just the way they were in fact handled.

CRITO: But you can surely see, Socrates, that [*d*] one should care about majority opinion too. Your present situation itself shows clearly that the majority can do not just minor harms but the very worst things to someone who's been slandered in front of them.

SOCRATES: I only wish, Crito, that the majority *could* do the very worst things, then they might also be able to do the very best ones—and everything would be fine. But as it is, they can do neither, since they can't make someone either wise or unwise—the effects *they* produce are really the result of chance.

CRITO: Well, if you say so. But tell me this, [*e*] Socrates. You're not worried about me and your other friends, are you—fearing that if you escaped, the informers[4] would give us trouble, and that we might be forced to give up all our property, pay heavy fines, or even [*45a*] suffer some further penalty? If you're afraid of anything like that, dismiss it from your mind. After all, we're surely justified in running this risk to save you {108} or an even greater one if need be. Now take my advice, and don't refuse me.

SOCRATES: Yes, those things do worry me, Crito, among many others.

CRITO: Then don't fear them: the sum of money that certain people I know will accept in order to save you and get you out of here isn't that large. Next, don't you see how cheap these informers are and how little money is

needed to deal with them? My own wealth's *b*] available to you, and it, I think, should be enough. Next, even if your concern for me makes you unwilling to spend my money, there are foreign visitors here who are willing to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has even brought enough money for this very purpose; and Cebes, too, and a good many others are also willing to contribute. So, as I say, don't let these fears make you hesitate to save yourself. And don't let it trouble you, as you were saying in court, that if you went into exile you [*c*] wouldn't know what to do with yourself. You see, wherever else you may go, there'll be people to welcome you. If you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who'll make much of you and protect you, so that no one in Thessaly will give you any trouble.[5]

Besides, Socrates, I think that what you're doing isn't just: throwing away your life, when you could save it, and hastening the very sort of fate for yourself that your enemies would hasten—and indeed have hastened—in their wish to destroy you. What's more I think you're also betraying those sons of yours by going away and deserting them [*d*] when you could bring them up and educate them. So far as you're concerned, they must take their chances in life; and the chance they'll get, in all likelihood, is just the one that orphans usually get when they lose their parents. No. Either one shouldn't have children at all, or one ought to see their upbringing and education through to the end. But you seem to me to be choosing the easiest way out, whereas one should choose whatever a good and brave man would choose—particularly when one claims to have cared about virtue throughout one's life.

I feel ashamed on your behalf and on behalf [*e*] of myself and your friends. I fear that it's going to seem that this whole business of yours has been handled with a certain cowardice on our part. The case was brought to court when it needn't have been brought. Then there was the actual conduct of the trial. And now, to crown it all, this absurd finale to the affair. It's going to seem that we let the opportunity slip because of [*46a*] some vice, such as cowardice, on our part, since we didn't save you nor did you save yourself, although it was quite possible had we been of even the slightest use.

See to it, then, Socrates, that all this doesn't turn out badly and a shameful thing both for you and for us. Come, deliberate—or rather, at this hour it's not a matter of deliberating but of having deliberated already—and only one decision remains. You see, everything must be done this coming night; and if we delay, it will no longer be possible. For all these reasons, Socrates, please take my advice and don't refuse me.

SOCRATES: My dear Crito, your enthusiasm's [*b*] most valuable, provided it's of the right sort. But if it isn't, the greater it is, the more difficult it will be to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should do what you advise or not. You see, I'm not the sort of person who's just now for the first time persuaded by nothing within me except the argument that on rational reflection seems best to me; I've *always* been like that. I can't now reject the arguments I stated before just because this misfortune has befallen me. On the contrary, they seem pretty much the same to me, and I respect and [*c*] value the same ones as I did before. So if we have no better ones to offer in the present situation, you can be sure I won't agree with you—not even if the power of the majority to threaten us, as if we were children, with the bogeymen of imprisonment, execution, and confiscation of property were far greater than it is now.

What, then, is the most reasonable way to examine these matters? Suppose we [*d*] first take up the argument you stated about people's opinions. Is it true or not that one should pay attention to some opinions but not to others? Or was it true before I had to die, whereas it's now clear that it was stated idly, for the sake of argument, and is really just childish nonsense? For my part, I'm {109} eager to join you, Crito, in a joint examination of whether this argument will appear any differently to me, now that I'm here, or the same, and of whether we should dismiss it from our minds or be persuaded by it.

It used to be said, I think, by people who thought they were talking sense, that, as I said a moment ago, one should take some people's opinions seriously but not others. By [*e*] the gods, Crito, don't you think that was true? You see, in all human probability, *you* are not going to die tomorrow, and so the present situation won't distort your judgment. Consider, then, don't you think it's a sound argument that one shouldn't value [*47a*] all the opinions people have, but some and not others, and not those of everyone,

but those of some people and not of others? What do you say? Isn't that true?

CRITO: It is.

SOCRATES: And we should value good opinions, but not bad ones?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the good ones are those of wise people and the bad ones those of unwise people?

CRITO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Come then, what of such questions as this? When a man's primarily engaged [*b*] in physical training, does he pay attention to the praise or blame or opinion of every man or only to those of the one man who's a doctor or a trainer?

CRITO: Only to those of the one man.

SOCRATES: Then he should fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man, but not those of the majority of people.

CRITO: Clearly.

SOCRATES: So his actions and exercises, his eating and drinking, should be guided by the opinion of the one man, the knowledgeable and understanding supervisor, rather than on that of all the rest?

CRITO: That's right.

[*c*] SOCRATES: Well, then, if he disobeys that one man and sets no value on his opinion or his praises but values those of the majority of people who have no understanding, won't something bad happen to him?

CRITO: Of course.

SOCRATES: And what is this bad effect? Where does it occur? In what part of the one who disobeys?

CRITO: Clearly, it's in his body, since that's what it destroys.

SOCRATES: That's right. And isn't the same true in other cases, Crito? No need to go through them all, but, in particular, in cases of just and unjust things, shameful and fine ones, good and bad ones—in cases of what we're now deliberating about—is it the opinion of the majority we should follow and fear? Or is it the opinion of the one man—[*d*] if there is one who understands these things—we should respect and fear above all others? On the grounds that, if we don't follow it, we shall seriously damage and maim that part of us which, as we used to say, is made better by what's just but is destroyed by what's unjust. Or is there no truth in that?

CRITO: I certainly think there is, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Come then, suppose we destroy the part of us that is made better by what's healthy but is seriously damaged by what causes disease when we don't follow the opinion of people who have understanding. Would our lives be worth living once it has [*e*] been seriously damaged? And that part, of course, is the body, isn't it?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then are our lives worth living with a wretched, seriously damaged body?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But our lives *are* worth living when the part of us that's maimed by what's [*48a*] unjust and benefited by what's just is seriously damaged? Or do we consider it—whichever part of us it is to which justice and injustice pertain—to be inferior to the body?

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, it's more valuable?

CRITO: Far more.

SOCRATES: Then, my very good friend, we should not give so much thought to what the majority of people will say about us, but think instead of what the person who understands just and unjust things will say—the one man and the truth itself. So your first claim—that we should give thought to the opinion of the majority about what's just, fine, good, and their opposites—isn't right.

"But," someone might say, "the majority can put us to death."

CRITO: That's certainly clear too. It would indeed be [*b*] said, Socrates.

{110} SOCRATES: That's right. And yet, my dear friend, the argument we've gone through still seems the same to me, at any rate, as it did before. And now examine this further one to see whether we think it still stands or not: the most important thing isn't living, but living well.

CRITO: Yes, it still stands.

SOCRATES: And the argument that living well, living a fine life, and living justly are the same—does it still stand or not?

CRITO: It still stands.

SOCRATES: Then in the light of these agreements, we should examine whether or not it [*c*] would be just for me to try to get out of here when the

Athenians haven't acquitted me. And if it does seem just, we should make the attempt, and if it doesn't, we should abandon the effort.

As for those other considerations you raise about loss of money and people's opinions and bringing up children—they, in truth, Crito, are appropriate considerations for people who readily put one to death and would as readily bring one back to life again if they could, without thinking; I mean, the majority of people. For us, however, the argument has made the decision. There's nothing else to be examined besides the very thing we just mentioned: whether we—both the ones who are rescued and also the rescuers themselves—will be acting justly if we pay money to those who would get me [*d*] out of here and do them favors, or whether we will in truth be acting unjustly if we do those things. And if it appears that we will be acting unjustly in doing them, we have no need at all to give any opposing weight to our having to die—or suffer in some other way—if we stay here and mind our behavior when the alternative is doing injustice.

CRITO: What you *say* seems true to me, Socrates. But I wish you'd consider what we're to *do*.

SOCRATES: Let's examine that question together, my dear friend, and if you can oppose [*e*] anything I say, oppose it, and I'll be persuaded by you. But if you can't, be a good fellow and stop telling me the same thing over and over, that I should leave here against the will of the Athenians. You see, I think it very important that I act in this matter having persuaded you, rather than against your will. Consider, then, the starting point of our inquiry, to see if you find it adequately formulated, and try to answer my questions as you [*49a*] really think best.

CRITO: I'll certainly try.

SOCRATES: Do we say that one should never do injustice intentionally? Or may injustice be done in some circumstances but not in others? Is doing injustice never good or fine, as we have often agreed in the past? Or have all these former agreements been discarded during these last few days? Can you and I at our age, Crito, have spent so long in serious [*b*] discussion with one another without realizing that we ourselves were no better than a pair of children? Or is what we used to say true above all else: that whether the majority of people agree or not, and whether we must suffer still worse things than at present or ones that are easier to bear, it's true, all the same,

that doing injustice in any circumstances is bad and shameful for the one who does it? Is that what we say or not?

CRITO: It is what we say.

SOCRATES: So one should never do injustice.

CRITO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: So one shouldn't do injustice in return for injustice, as the majority of people think—seeing that one should *never* do injustice.

CRITO: Apparently not. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Well then, should one do wrong or not?

CRITO: Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, what about when someone does wrong in return for having suffered wrongdoing? Is that just, as the majority of people think, or not just?

CRITO: It's not just at all.

SOCRATES: No, for there's no difference, I take it, between doing wrong and doing injustice?

CRITO: That's right.

SOCRATES: So one must neither do injustice in return nor wrong any man, no matter what one has suffered at his hands. And, Crito, in agreeing to this, watch out that you're not [*d*] agreeing to anything contrary to what you believe. You see, I know that only a few people do believe or will believe it. And between those who believe it and those who don't, there's no common basis for deliberation, but each necessarily regards the other with contempt when they see their deliberations. {111} You too, then, should consider very carefully whether you share that belief with me and whether the following is the starting point of our deliberations: that it's never right to do injustice, or to do injustice in return, or to retaliate with bad treatment when one has been treated badly. Or do you disagree and not share this starting point? You see, I've believed this for a long time myself and [*e*] still believe it now. But if you've come to some other opinion, say so. Instruct me. If you stand by the former one, however, then listen to my next point.

CRITO: Yes, I do stand by it and share it with you, so go on.

SOCRATES: Then I'll state the next point—or rather, ask a question: should one do the things one has agreed with someone to do, provided they are just, or should one cheat?

CRITO: One should do them.

SOCRATES: Then consider what follows. If we leave this place without having persuaded [*50a*] the city, are we treating some people badly—and those whom we should least of all treat in that way—or not? Are we standing by agreements that are just or not?

CRITO: I can't answer your question, Socrates, since I don't understand it.

SOCRATES: Well, look at it this way. Suppose we were about to run away from here—or whatever what we'd be doing should be called. And suppose the Laws and the city community came and confronted us, and said, "Tell us, Socrates, what do you intend to do? Do you intend anything else by this act you're attempting than to destroy us Laws, and the city as a whole, to the extent that [*b*] you can? Or do you think that a city can continue to exist and not be overthrown if the legal judgments rendered in it have no force, but are deprived of authority and undermined by the actions of private individuals?"

What shall we say in response to that question, Crito, and to others like it? For there's a lot that one might say—particularly, if one were an orator—on behalf of this law we're destroying, the one requiring that legal judgments, once rendered, have authority. [*c*] Or shall we say to them, "Yes, that's what we intend, for the city treated us unjustly and didn't judge our lawsuit correctly." Is that what we're to say—or what?

CRITO: Yes, by Zeus, that's what we're to say, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then what if the Laws replied, "Was that also part of the agreement between you and us, Socrates? Or did you agree to stand by whatever judgments the city rendered?" Then, if we were surprised at the words, perhaps they might say, "Don't be surprised at what we're saying, Socrates, but answer us—since you're so accustomed to [*d*] using question and answer. Come now, what charge have you to bring against the city and ourselves that you should try to destroy us? In the first place, wasn't it we who gave you birth—wasn't it through us that your father married your mother and produced you? Tell us, do you have some complaint about the correctness of those of us Laws concerned with marriage?"

"No, I have no complaint," I'd reply.

"Well then, what about the Laws dealing with the bringing up and educating of children, under which you were educated yourself? Didn't those of us Laws who regulate that area prescribe correctly when we ordered your father to educate you in the arts and physical training?"

"They prescribed correctly," I'd reply.

"Good. Then since you were born, brought [*e*] up, and educated, can you deny, first, that you're our offspring and slave, both yourself and your ancestors? And if that's so, do you think that what's just is based on an equality between you and us, that whatever we try to do to you it's just for you to do to us in return? As regards you and your father (or you and your master, if you happened to have one), what's just isn't based on equality, and so you don't return whatever treatment you receive—answering back [*51a*] when you're criticized or striking back when you're struck, or doing many other such things. As regards you and your fatherland and its Laws, then, are these things permitted? If we try to destroy you, believing it to be just, will you try to destroy us Laws and your fatherland, to the extent that you can? And will you claim that you're acting justly in doing so—you the man who really cares about virtue? Or are you so wise that it has escaped your notice that your fatherland is more worthy of honor than your mother [*b*] and father and all your other ancestors; that it is more to be revered and more sacred and is held in greater esteem both {112} among the gods and among those human beings who have any sense; that you must treat your fatherland with piety, submitting to it and placating it more than you would your own father when it is angry; that you must either persuade it or else do whatever it commands; that you must mind your behavior and undergo whatever treatment it prescribes for you, whether a beating or imprisonment; that if it leads you to war to be wounded or killed, that's what you must do, and that's what is just—not to give way or retreat or leave where you were stationed, but, on the contrary, in war and law courts, and everywhere else, to do whatever your city or [*c*] fatherland commands or else persuade it as to what is really just; and that while it is impious to violate the will of your mother or father, it is yet less so than to violate that of your fatherland."

What are we to say to that, Crito? Are the Laws telling the truth or not?

CRITO: Yes, I think they are.

SOCRATES: "Consider, then, Socrates," the Laws might perhaps continue, "whether we're also telling the truth in saying this: that you aren't treating us justly in what you're now trying to do. You see, we gave you birth, upbringing, and education, and have provided [*d*] you, as well as every other citizen, with a share of all the fine things we could. Nonetheless, if

any Athenian—who has been admitted to adult status and has observed both how affairs are handled in the city and ourselves, the Laws—is dissatisfied with us and wishes to leave, we grant him permission to take his property and go wherever he pleases. Not one of us Laws stands in his way or forbids it. If any one of you is dissatisfied with us and the city and wishes to go to a colony or to live as an alien [*e*] elsewhere, he may go wherever he wishes and hold on to what's his.

"*But* if any of you stays here, after he has observed the way we judge lawsuits and the other ways in which we manage the city, then we say that he has agreed with us by his action to do whatever we command. And we say that whoever does not obey commits a threefold injustice: he disobeys us as his parents; he disobeys us as those who brought him up; and, after having agreed to obey us, he neither obeys nor persuades us, if we're doing something that isn't right. Yet we offer him a choice and do not harshly command [*52a*] him to do what he's told. On the contrary, we offer two alternatives: he must either persuade us or do what we say. And he does neither. These, then, are the charges, Socrates, to which we say you too will become liable, if you do what you have in mind—and you won't be among the least liable of the Athenians, but among the most."

Then, if I were to say, "Why is that?" perhaps they might justifiably reproach me by saying that I am among the Athenians who have made that agreement with them in the strongest terms.

"Socrates," they would say, "we have the strongest [*b*] evidence that you were satisfied with us and with the city. After all, you'd never have stayed at home here so much more consistently than all the rest of the Athenians if you weren't also much more consistently satisfied. You never left the city for a festival, except once to go to the Isthmus.[6] You never went anywhere else, except for military service. You never went abroad as other people do. You had no desire to acquaint yourself with other cities or [*c*] other laws. On the contrary, we and our city sufficed for you. So emphatically did you choose us and agree to live as a citizen under us, that you even produced children here. *That's* how satisfied you were with the city.

"Moreover, even at your very trial, you could have proposed exile as a counterpenalty if you'd wished, and what you're now trying to do against the city's will, you could then have done with its consent. On that occasion,

you prided yourself on not feeling resentful that you had to die. You'd choose death before exile—so you said. Now, however, you feel no shame at those words and show no regard for us Laws as you try to [*d*] destroy us. You're acting exactly the way the most wretched slave would act by trying to run away, contrary to your commitments and your agreements to live as a citizen under us.

"First, then, answer us on this very point: are we telling the truth when we say that you agreed, by deeds not words, to live as a citizen under us? Or is that untrue?"

{113} What are we to reply to that, Crito? Mustn't we agree?

CRITO: We must, Socrates.

SOCRATES: "Well then," they might say, "surely you're breaking the commitments and [*e*] agreements you made with us. You weren't coerced or tricked into agreeing or forced to decide in a hurry. On the contrary, you had seventy years in which you could have left if you weren't satisfied with us or if you thought those agreements unjust. You, [*53a*] however, preferred neither Sparta nor Crete—places you often say have good law and order—nor any other Greek or foreign city. On the contrary, you went abroad less often than the lame, the blind, or other handicapped people. Hence it's clear that you, more than any other Athenian, have been consistently satisfied with your city and with us Laws—for who would be satisfied by a city but not by its laws? Won't you, then, stand by your agreements now? Yes, you will, if you're persuaded by us, Socrates, and at least you won't make yourself a laughingstock by leaving the city.

"For consider now: if you break those agreements, if you commit any of these [*b*] wrongs, what good will you do yourself or your friends? You see, it's pretty clear that your friends will risk being exiled themselves as well as being disenfranchised and having their property confiscated. As for you, if you go to one of the nearest cities, Thebes or Megara—for they both have good laws—you will be arriving there, Socrates, as an enemy of their political systems, and those who care about their own cities will look on you with suspicion, regarding you as one who undermines laws. You will also confirm your jurors in their opinion, so that they will think they judged your lawsuit correctly. For [*c*] anyone who undermines laws might very well be considered a corruptor of young and ignorant people.

“Will you, then, avoid cities with good law and order, and men of the most respectable kind? And if so, will your life be worth living? Or will you associate with these people and be shameless enough to converse with them? And what will you say, Socrates? The very things that you said here, about how virtue and justice are man’s most valuable possessions, along with law and lawful conduct. Don’t you think Socrates and everything about him will look unseemly? Surely, you must.

“Or will you keep away from those places and [*d*] go to Crito’s friends in Thessaly? After all, there’s complete disorder and laxity there, so perhaps they’d enjoy hearing about your absurd escape from prison when you dressed up in disguise, wore a peasant’s leather jerkin or some other such escapee’s outfit, and altered your appearance. [*e*] And will no one remark on the fact that you, an old man, with probably only a short time left to live, were so greedy for life that you dared to violate the most important laws? Perhaps not, provided you don’t annoy anyone. Otherwise, you’ll hear many disparaging things said about you. Will you live by currying favor with every man and acting the slave—and do nothing in Thessaly besides eat, as if you’d gone to live in Thessaly for a [*54a*] good dinner? As for those arguments about justice and the rest of virtue, where, tell us, will they be?

“Is it that you want to live for your children’s sake, then, to bring them up and educate them? Really? Will you bring them up and educate them by taking them to Thessaly and making foreigners of them, so they can enjoy that privilege too? If not, will they be better brought up and educated here without you, provided that you’re still alive? ‘Of course,’ you may say, because your friends will take care of them. Then will they take care of them if you go to Thessaly, but not take care of them if you go to Hades? If [*b*] those who call themselves your friends are worth anything at all, you surely can’t believe that.

“No, Socrates, be persuaded by us who reared you. Don’t put a higher value on children, on life, or on anything else than on what’s just, so that when you reach Hades you may have all this to offer as your defense before the authorities there. For if you do do that, it doesn’t seem that it will be better for you *here*, or for any of your friends, or that it will be more just or more pious. And it won’t be better for you when you arrive *there* either. As it is, you’ll leave here—if you do leave—as one who has been treated [*c*]

unjustly not by us Laws, but by men. But suppose you leave, suppose you return injustice for injustice and bad treatment for bad treatment in that shameful way, breaking your agreements and commitments {114} with us and doing bad things to those whom you should least of all treat in that way —yourself, your friends, your fatherland, and ourselves. Then we'll be angry with you while you're still alive, and our brothers, the Laws of Hades, won't receive you kindly there, knowing that you tried to destroy us to [*d*] the extent you could. Come, then, don't let Crito persuade you to follow his advice rather than ours."

That, Crito, my dear friend, is what I seem to hear them saying, you may be sure. And, just like those Corybantes who think they are still hearing the flutes, the echo of their arguments reverberates in me and makes me incapable of hearing anything else. No, as far as my present thoughts go, at least, you may be sure that if you argue against them, you will speak in vain. All the same, if you think you can do any more, please tell me.

CRITO: No, Socrates, I've nothing to say.

SOCRATES: Then, let it be, Crito, and let's act [*e*] in that way, since that's the way the god is leading us.

1. Legend had it that Athens was once obliged to send King Minos of Crete an annual tribute of seven young men and seven maidens to be given to the Minotaur—a monster, half man and half bull, that he kept in a labyrinth. With the help of a thread given to him by Minos' daughter Ariadne, Theseus, a legendary king of Athens, made his way through the labyrinth, killed the Minotaur, and escaped, thus ending the tribute. Each year, Athens commemorated these events by sending a mission of thanks to the sanctuary of Apollo on the sacred island of Delos. No executions could take place in Athens until the mission returned from its voyage. See Phaedo 58a–c.

2. A headland on the southeast coast of Attica, about thirty miles from Athens.

3. Homer, Iliad ix.363.

4. The sukophantai were individuals who prosecuted others in order to get the reward offered in Athenian law to successful prosecutors, or as a way of blackmailing someone who would pay to avoid prosecution, or for personal or political gain of some other sort.

5. Thessaly is a region in the north of Greece.

6. The Isthmus is the narrow strip of land connecting the Peloponnese to the rest of Greece, where the Isthmian Games were held.

PROTAGORAS

(317e–334c, 348c–362a)
Translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell.

IN THE FOLLOWING selections, the great Sophist Protagoras (some fragments of whose actual writings are included in the Presocratics section of this anthology) is made to explain his view of virtue. When he finishes, Socrates begins to examine him on a series of related topics that are central to his view: the unity of the virtues, the possibility of weakness of will, the identity of virtue and knowledge, and their bearing on the teachability of virtue. The discussion ends in apparent aporia, or puzzlement, because the positions adopted and defended on these topics seem inconsistent.

[*317e*] When we had all taken our seats, Protagoras said, "Now, then, Socrates, since these gentlemen also are present, would you please say what it was you brought up to me a little while ago on the young man's behalf."

[*318a*] "Well, Protagoras," I said, "as to why we have come, I'll begin as I did before. Hippocrates here has gotten to the point where he wants to be your student, and, quite naturally, he would like to know what he will get out of it if he does study with you. That's really all we have to say."

Protagoras took it from there and said, "Young man, this is what you will get if you study with me: The very day you start, you will go home [*b*] a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and better."

When I heard this I said, "What you're saying, Protagoras, isn't very surprising, but quite likely. Why, even you, though you are so old and wise, would get better if someone taught you something you didn't happen to know already. But what if the situation were a little different, and Hippocrates here all of a sudden changed his mind and set his heart on [*c*] studying with this young fellow who has just come into town, Zeuxippus of Heraclea,[1] and came to him, as he now comes to you, and heard from him the very same thing as from you—that each day he spent with him he would become better and make progress. If Hippocrates asked him in what way he would become better, and toward what he {115} would be making progress,

Zeuxippus would say at painting. And if he were studying with Orthagoras of Thebes[2] and he heard from him the same thing as he hears from you and asked him in what he would be getting better every day he studied with him, Orthagoras would say at flute-playing. It is in this way [*d*] that you must tell me and the young man on whose behalf I am asking the answer to this question: If Hippocrates studies with Protagoras, exactly how will he go away a better man and in what will he make progress each and every day he spends with you?"

Protagoras heard me out and then said, "You put your question well, Socrates, and I am only too glad to answer those who pose questions well. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience what he would if he studied with some other sophist. The others abuse young men, steering [e] them back again, against their will, into subjects the likes of which they have escaped from at school, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, and poetry"—at this point he gave Hippias a significant look—"but if he comes to me he will learn only what he has come for. What I teach is sound deliberation, both in domestic matters—how best to manage [*319a*] one's household, and in public affairs—how to realize one's maximum potential for success in political debate and action."

"Am I following what you are saying?" I asked. "You appear to be talking about the art of citizenship, and to be promising to make men good citizens."

"This is exactly what I claim, Socrates."

"Well, this is truly an admirable technique you have developed, if indeed you have. There is no point in my saying to you anything other than [*b*] exactly what I think. The truth is, Protagoras, I have never thought that this could be taught, but when you say it can be, I can't very well doubt it. It's only right that I explain where I got the idea that this is not teachable, not something that can be imparted from one human being to another. I maintain, along with the rest of the Greek world, that the Athenians are wise. And I observe that when we convene in the Assembly and the city has to take some action on a building project, we send for builders to advise us; if it has to do with the construction of ships, we send for shipwrights; and so forth for everything that is considered learnable and [*c*] teachable. But if anyone else, a person not regarded as a craftsman, tries to advise them, no

matter how handsome and rich and well-born he might be, they just don't accept him. They laugh at him and shout him down until he either gives up trying to speak and steps down himself, or the archer-police remove him forcibly by order of the board. This is how they proceed in matters which they consider technical. But when it is a matter [*d*] of deliberating on city management, anyone can stand up and advise them, carpenter, blacksmith, shoemaker, merchant, ship-captain, rich man, poor man, well-born, low-born—it doesn't matter—and nobody blasts him for presuming to give counsel without any prior training under a teacher. The [*e*] reason for this is clear: They do not think that this can be taught. Public life aside, the same principle holds also in private life, where the wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they possess. Look at Pericles,[3] the father of these young men here. He [*320a*] gave them a superb education in everything that teachers can teach, but as for what he himself is really wise in, he neither teaches them that himself nor has anyone else teach them either, and his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up virtue on their own wherever they might find it. Take a good look at Clinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades here. When Pericles became his guardian he was afraid that he would be corrupted, no less, by Alcibiades. So he separated them and placed Clinias in Ariphron's house and tried to educate him there. Six months later he [*b*] gave him back to Alcibiades because he couldn't do anything with him. I could mention a great many more, men who are good themselves but have never succeeded in making anyone else better, whether family members or total strangers. Looking at these things, Protagoras, I just don't think that virtue can be taught. But when I hear what you have to say, I waver; I think there must {116} be something in what you are talking about. I consider you to be a person of enormous experience who has learned much from others and thought through a great many things for himself. So if you can clarify for us how virtue is teachable, please don't begrudge us your explanation."

[*c*] "I wouldn't think of begrudging you an explanation, Socrates," he replied. "But would you rather that I explain by telling you a story, as an older man to a younger audience, or by developing an argument?"

The consensus was that he should proceed in whichever way he wished. "I think it would be more pleasant," he said, "if I told you a story.

[*d*] “There once was a time when the gods existed but mortal races did not. When the time came for their appointed genesis, the gods molded them inside the earth, blending together earth and fire and various compounds of earth and fire. When they were ready to bring them to light the gods put Prometheus and Epimetheus in charge of decking them out and assigning to each its appropriate powers and abilities.

“Epimetheus begged Prometheus for the privilege of assigning the abilities himself. ‘When I’ve completed the distribution,’ he said, ‘you can inspect it.’ Prometheus agreed, and Epimetheus started distributing abilities.

[*e*] “To some he assigned strength without quickness; the weaker ones he made quick. Some he armed; others he left unarmed but devised for them [*321a*] some other means for preserving themselves. He compensated for small size by issuing wings for flight or an underground habitat. Size was itself a safeguard for those he made large. And so on down the line, balancing his distribution, making adjustments, and taking precautions against the possible extinction of any of the races.

“After supplying them with defenses against mutual destruction, he devised for them protection against the weather. He clothed them with [*b*] thick pelts and tough hides capable of warding off winter storms, effective against heat, and serving also as built-in, natural bedding when they went to sleep. He also shod them, some with hooves, others with thick pads of bloodless skin. Then he provided them with various forms of nourishment, plants for some, fruit from trees for others, roots for still others. And there were some to whom he gave the consumption of other animals as their sustenance. To some he gave the capacity for few births; to others, ravaged by the former, he gave the capacity for multiple births, and so ensured the survival of their kind.

“But Epimetheus was not very wise, and he absentmindedly used up [*c*] all the powers and abilities on the nonreasoning animals; he was left with the human race, completely unequipped. While he was floundering about at a loss, Prometheus arrived to inspect the distribution and saw that while the other animals were well provided with everything, the human race was naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and it was already the day on which all of them, human beings included, were destined to emerge from the earth into the light. It was then that Prometheus, desperate to [*d*] find some means of survival for the human race, stole from Hephaestus and

Athena wisdom in the practical arts together with fire (without which this kind of wisdom is effectively useless) and gave them outright to the human race. The wisdom it acquired was for staying alive; wisdom for living together in society, political wisdom, it did not acquire, because that was in the keeping of Zeus. Prometheus no longer had free access to the high citadel that is the house of Zeus, and besides this, the guards there were terrifying. But he did sneak into the building that Athena and Hephaestus [*e*] shared to practice their arts, and he stole from Hephaestus the art of fire and from Athena her arts, and he gave them to the human race. And it [*322a*] is from this origin that the resources human beings needed to stay alive came into being. Later, the story goes, Prometheus was charged with theft, all on account of Epimetheus.

"It is because humans had a share of the divine dispensation that they alone among animals worshipped the gods, with whom they had a kind of kinship, and erected altars and sacred images. It wasn't long before they were articulating speech and words and had invented houses, clothes, shoes, and blankets, and were nourished by food from the earth. Thus [*b*] equipped, human beings at first lived in scattered isolation; there were no cities. They were being destroyed by wild beasts because they were weaker in every {117} way, and although their technology was adequate to obtain food, it was deficient when it came to fighting wild animals. This was because they did not yet possess the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part. They did indeed try to band together and survive by founding cities. The outcome when they did so was that they wronged each other, because [*c*] they did not possess the art of politics, and so they would scatter and again be destroyed. Zeus was afraid that our whole race might be wiped out, so he sent Hermes to bring justice and a sense of shame to humans, so that there would be order within cities and bonds of friendship to unite them. Hermes asked Zeus how he should distribute shame and justice to humans. 'Should I distribute them as the other arts were? This is how the others were distributed: one person practicing the art of medicine suffices for many ordinary people; and so forth with the other practitioners. Should [*d*] I establish justice and shame among humans in this way, or distribute it to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus, 'and let all have a share. For cities would never come to be if only a few possessed these, as is the case with the other arts.

And establish this law as coming from me: Death to him who cannot partake of shame and justice, for he is a pestilence to the city.'

"And so it is, Socrates, that when the Athenians (and others as well) are debating architectural excellence, or the virtue proper to any other professional specialty, they think that only a few individuals have the right [*e*] to advise them, and they do not accept advice from anyone outside these select few. You've made this point yourself, and with good reason, I might add. But when the debate involves political excellence, which must proceed [*323a*] entirely from justice and temperance, they accept advice from anyone, and with good reason, for they think that this particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared by all, or there wouldn't be any cities. This must be the explanation for it, Socrates.

"And so you won't think you've been deceived, consider this as further evidence for the universal belief that all humans have a share of justice and the rest of civic virtue. In the other arts, as you have said, if someone claims to be a good flute-player or whatever, but is not, people laugh at [*b*] him or get angry with him, and his family comes round and remonstrates with him as if he were mad. But when it comes to justice or any other social virtue, even if they know someone is unjust, if that person publicly confesses the truth about himself, they will call this truthfulness madness, whereas in the previous case they would have called it a sense of decency.

[*c*] They will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human.

"This, then, is my first point: It is reasonable to admit everyone as an adviser on this virtue, on the grounds that everyone has some share of it. Next I will attempt to show that people do not regard this virtue as natural or self-generated, but as something taught and carefully developed in those in whom it is developed.

[*d*] "In the case of evils that men universally regard as afflictions due to nature or bad luck, no one ever gets angry with anyone so afflicted or reproves, admonishes, punishes, or tries to correct them. We simply pity them. No one in his right mind would try to do anything like this to someone who is ugly, for example, or scrawny or weak. The reason is, I assume, that they know that these things happen to people as a natural process or by chance, both these ills and their opposites. But in the case of

the good things that accrue to men through practice and training and [*e*] teaching, if someone does not possess these goods but rather their corresponding evils, he finds himself the object of anger, punishment, and reproof. Among these evils are injustice, impiety, and in general everything [*324a*] that is opposed to civic virtue. Offenses in this area are always met with anger and reproof, and the reason is clearly that this virtue is regarded as something acquired through practice and teaching. The key, Socrates, to the true significance of punishment lies in the fact that human beings consider virtue to be something acquired through training. For no one [*b*] punishes a wrong-doer in consideration of the simple fact that he has done wrong, unless one is exercising the mindless vindictiveness of a beast. Reasonable punishment is not vengeance for a past wrong—for one cannot undo what has been done—but is undertaken with a view to the future, to deter both the wrong-doer and {118} whoever sees him being punished from [*c*] repeating the crime. This attitude toward punishment as deterrence implies that virtue is learned, and this is the attitude of all those who seek requital in public or in private. All human beings seek requital from and punish those who they think have wronged them, and the Athenians, your fellow citizens, especially do so. Therefore, by my argument, the Athenians are among those who think that virtue is acquired and taught. So it is with good reason that your fellow citizens accept a blacksmith’s or a cobbler’s advice in political affairs. And they do think that virtue is acquired [*d*] and taught. It appears to me that both these propositions have been sufficiently proved, Socrates.

“Now, on to your remaining difficulty, the problem you raise about good men teaching their sons everything that can be taught and making them wise in these subjects, but not making them better than anyone else in the particular virtue in which they themselves excel. On this subject, Socrates, I will abandon story for argument. Consider this: Does there or [*e*] does there not exist one thing which all citizens must have for there to be a city? Here and nowhere else lies the solution to your problem. For if such a thing exists, and this one thing is not the art of the carpenter, the blacksmith, or the potter, but justice, and temperance, and piety—what I [*325a*] may collectively term the virtue of a man, and if this is the thing which everyone should share in and with which every man should act whenever he wants to learn anything or do anything, but should not act without it, and if we

should instruct and punish those who do not share in it, man, [*b*] woman, and child, until their punishment makes them better, and should exile from our cities or execute whoever doesn’t respond to punishment and instruction; if this is the case, if such is the nature of this thing, and good men give their sons an education in everything but this, then we have to be amazed at how strangely our good men behave. For we have shown that they regard this thing as teachable both in private and public life. Since it is something that can be taught and nurtured, is it possible that they have their sons taught everything in which there is no death penalty for not understanding it, but when their children are faced with [*c*] the death penalty or exile if they fail to learn virtue and be nurtured in it—and not only death but confiscation of property and, practically speaking, complete familial catastrophe—do you think they do not have them taught this or give them all the attention possible? We must think that they do, Socrates.

“Starting when they are little children and continuing as long as they [*d*] live, they teach them and correct them. As soon as a child understands what is said to him, the nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself fight for him to be as good as he possibly can, seizing on every action and word to teach him and show him that this is just, that is unjust, this is noble, that is ugly, this is pious, that is impious, he should do this, he should not do that. If he obeys willingly, fine; if not, they straighten him out with threats and blows as if he were a twisted, bent piece of wood. After this [*e*] they send him to school and tell his teachers to pay more attention to his good conduct than to his grammar or music lessons. The teachers pay attention to these things, and when the children have learned their letters and are getting to understand writing as well as the spoken language, they are given the works of good poets to read at their desks and have to [*326a*] learn them by heart, works that contain numerous exhortations, many passages describing in glowing terms good men of old, so that the child is inspired to imitate them and become like them. In a similar vein, the music teachers too foster in their young pupils a sense of moral decency and restraint, and when they learn to play the lyre they are taught the [*b*] works of still more good poets, the lyric and choral poets. The teachers arrange the scores and drill the rhythms and scales into the children’s souls, so that they become gentler, and their speech and movements become more rhythmical and harmonious. For all of human life requires a high degree of rhythm and harmony. On top

of all this, they send their children to an athletic trainer so that they may have sound bodies in the service [*c*] of their now fit minds and will not be forced to cowardice in war or other activities through physical deficiencies.

"This is what the most able, i.e., the richest, do. Their sons start going [*d*] to school at the earliest age and quit at the latest age. And when they quit school, the city in turn compels them to learn {119} the laws and to model their lives on them. They are not to act as they please. An analogy might be drawn from the practice of writing-teachers, who sketch the letters faintly with a pen in workbooks for their beginning students and have them write the letters over the patterns they have drawn. In the same way the city has drawn up laws invented by the great lawgivers in the past and compels them to govern and be governed by them. She punishes anyone who goes beyond these laws, and the term for this punishment in your city and [*e*] others is, because it is a corrective legal action, 'correction.'

"When so much care and attention is paid to virtue, Socrates, both in public and private, are you still puzzled about virtue being teachable? The wonder would be if it were not teachable.

"Why, then, do many sons of good fathers never amount to anything? I want you to understand this too, and in fact it's no great wonder, if what I've just been saying is true about virtue being something in which no one [*327a*] can be a layman if there is to be a city. For if what I am saying is true—and nothing could be more true: Pick any other pursuit or study and reflect upon it. Suppose, for instance, there could be no city unless we were all flute-players, each to the best of his ability, and everybody were teaching everybody else this art in public and private and reprimanding the poor players and doing all this unstintingly, just as now no one begrudges or [*b*] conceals his expertise in what is just and lawful as he does his other professional expertise. For it is to our collective advantage that we each possess justice and virtue, and so we all gladly tell and teach each other what is just and lawful. Well, if we all had the same eagerness and generosity in teaching each other flute-playing, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good flute-players than the sons of poor flute-players? I don't think so at all. When a son happened to be naturally disposed toward flute-playing, he would progress [*c*] and become famous; otherwise, he would remain obscure. In many cases the son of a good player would turn out to be a poor one, and the son of a

poor player would turn out to be good. But as flute-players, they would all turn out to be capable when compared with ordinary people who had never studied the flute. Likewise you must regard the most unjust person ever reared in a human society under law as a paragon of justice compared [*d*] with people lacking education and law courts and the pervasive pressure to cultivate virtue, savages such as the playwright Pherecrates[4] brought on stage at last year's Lenaean festival. There's no doubt that if you found yourself among such people, as did the misanthropes in that play's chorus, you would be delighted to meet up with the likes of Eurybatus and [*e*] Phrynondas[5] and would sorely miss the immorality of the people here. As it is, Socrates, you affect delicate sensibilities, because everyone here is a teacher of virtue, to the best of his ability, and you can't see a single one. You might as well look for a teacher of Greek; you wouldn't find a [*328a*] single one of those either. Nor would you be any more successful if you asked who could teach the sons of our craftsmen the very arts which they of course learned from their fathers, to the extent that their fathers were competent, and their friends in the trade. It would be difficult to produce someone who could continue their education, whereas it would be easy to find a teacher for the totally unskilled. It is the same with virtue and everything else. If there is someone who is the least bit more advanced in virtue than ourselves, he is to be cherished.

"I consider myself to be such a person, uniquely qualified to assist others [*b*] in becoming noble and good, and worth the fee that I charge and even more, so much so that even my students agree. This is why I charge according to the following system: a student pays the full price only if he [*c*] wishes to; otherwise, he goes into a temple, states under oath how much he thinks my lessons are worth, and pays that amount.

"There you have it, Socrates, my mythic story and my argument that virtue is teachable and that the Athenians consider it to be so, and that it is no wonder that worthless sons are born of good {120} fathers and good sons of worthless fathers, since even the sons of Polyclitus, of the same age as [*d*] Paralus and Xanthippus here, are nothing compared to their father, and the same is true for the sons of other artisans. But it is not fair to accuse these two yet; there is still hope for them, for they are young."

Protagoras ended his virtuoso performance here and stopped speaking. I was entranced and just looked at him for a long time as if he were going to say more. I was still eager to listen, but when I perceived that he had really stopped I pulled myself together and, looking at Hippocrates, barely [*e*] managed to say: “Son of Apollodorus, how grateful I am to you for suggesting that I come here. It is marvelous to have heard from Protagoras what I have just heard. Formerly I used to think there was no human practice by which the good become good, but now I am persuaded that there is, except for one small obstacle which Protagoras will explain away, I am [*329a*] sure, since he has explained away so much already. Now, you could hear a speech similar to this from Pericles or some other competent orator if you happened to be present when one of them was speaking on this subject. But try asking one of them something, and they will be as unable to answer your question or to ask one of their own as a book would be. Question the least little thing in their speeches and they will go on like bronze bowls that keep ringing for a long time after they have been struck and prolong the sound indefinitely unless you dampen them. That’s how [*b*] these orators are: Ask them one little question and they’re off on another long-distance speech. But Protagoras here, while perfectly capable of delivering a beautiful long speech, as we have just seen, is also able to reply briefly when questioned, and to put a question and then wait for and accept the answer—rare accomplishments these.

“Now, then, Protagoras, I need one little thing, and then I’ll have it all, if you’ll just answer me this. You say that virtue is teachable, and if there’s [*c*] any human being who could persuade me of this, it’s you. But there is one thing you said that troubles me, and maybe you can satisfy my soul. You said that Zeus sent justice and a sense of shame to the human race. You also said, at many points in your speech, that justice and temperance and piety and all these things were somehow collectively one thing: virtue. [*d*] Could you go through this again and be more precise? Is virtue a single thing, with justice and temperance and piety its parts, or are the things I have just listed all names for a single entity? This is what still intrigues me.”

“This is an easy question to answer, Socrates,” he replied. “Virtue is a single entity, and the things you are asking about are its parts.”

“Parts as in the parts of a face: mouth, nose, eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the parts of gold, where there is no difference, except for size, between parts

or between the parts and the whole?”

“In the former sense, I would think, Socrates: as the parts of the face [*e*] are to the whole face.”

“Then tell me this. Do some people have one part and some another, or do you necessarily have all the parts if you have any one of them?”

“By no means, since many are courageous but unjust, and many again are just but not wise.”

“Then these also are parts of virtue—wisdom and courage?”

“Absolutely, and wisdom is the greatest [*330a*] part.”

“Is each of them different from the others?”

“Yes.”

“And does each also have its own unique power or function? In the analogy to the parts of the face, the eye is not like the ear, nor is its power or function the same, and this applies to the other parts as well: They are not like each other in power or function or in any other way. Is this how it is with the parts of virtue? Are they unlike each other, both in themselves [*b*] and in their powers or functions? Is it not clear that this must be the case, if our analogy is valid?”

“Yes, it must be the case, Socrates.”

“Then, none of the other parts of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like piety?”

“Agreed.”

“Come on, then, and let’s consider together what kind of thing each of [*c*] these is. Here’s a good first question: Is justice a thing or is it not a thing? I think it is. What about you?”

“I think so too.”

“The next step, then: Suppose someone asked us, ‘Protagoras and Socrates, tell me about this {121} thing you just named, justice. Is it itself just or unjust?’ My answer would be that it is just. What would your verdict be? The same as mine or different?”

“The same.”

“Then justice is the sort of thing that is just. That’s how I would reply to the questioner. Would you also?”

“Yes.”

“Suppose he questioned us further: ‘Do you also say there is a thing [*d*] called piety?’ We would say we do, right?”

“Right.”

“ ‘Do you say this too is a thing?’ We would say we do, wouldn’t we?”

“That too.”

“ ‘Do you say that this thing is by nature impious or pious?’ Myself, I would be irritated with this question and would say, ‘Quiet, man! How [*e*] could anything else be pious if piety itself is not?’ What about you? Wouldn’t you answer in the same way?”

“Absolutely.”

“Suppose he asked us next: ‘Then what about what you said a little while ago? Maybe I didn’t hear you right. I thought you two said that the parts of virtue are related to each other in such a way that no part resembles any other.’ [*331a*] I would answer, ‘There’s nothing wrong with your hearing, except that I didn’t say that. Protagoras here said that in answer to my question.’ If he were to say then, ‘Is he telling the truth, Protagoras? Are you the one who says that one part of virtue is not like another? Is this dictum yours?’ how would you answer him?”

“I would have to admit it, Socrates.”

“Well, if we accept that, Protagoras, what are we going to say if he asks next, ‘Isn’t piety the sort of thing that is just, and isn’t justice the sort of thing that is pious? Or is it the sort of thing which is not pious? Is piety [*b*] the sort of thing to be not just, and therefore unjust, and justice impious?’ What are we going to say to him? Personally, I would answer both that justice is pious and piety is just, and I would give the same answer on your behalf (if you would let me), that justice is the same thing as piety, or very similar, and, most emphatically, that justice is the same kind of thing as piety, and piety as justice. What do you think? Will you veto this answer, or are you in agreement with it?”

“It’s not so absolutely clear a case to me, [*c*] Socrates, as to make me grant that justice is pious, and piety just. It seems a distinction is in order here. But what’s the difference? If you want, we’ll let justice be pious and piety just.”

“Don’t do that to me! It’s not this ‘if you want’ or ‘if you agree’ business I want to test. It’s you and me I want to put on the line, and I think the argument will be tested best if we take the ‘if’ out.”

“Well, all right. Justice does have some resemblance [*d*] to piety. Anything at all resembles any other thing in some way. There is a certain way in

which white resembles black, and hard soft, and so on for all the usual polar opposites. And the things we were just talking about as having [*e*] different powers or functions and not being the same kinds of things—the parts of the face—these resemble each other in a certain way, and they are like each other. So by this method you could prove, if you wanted to, that these things too are all like each other. But it's not right to call things similar because they resemble each other in some way, however slight, or to call them dissimilar because there is some slight point of dissimilarity."

I was taken aback, and said to him, "Do you consider the relationship between justice and piety really only one of some slight similarity?"

"Not exactly, but not what you seem to think [*332a*] it is either."

"Well, then, since you seem to me to be annoyed about this, let's drop it and consider another point that you raised. Do you acknowledge that there is such a thing as folly?"

"Yes."

"And diametrically opposed to it is wisdom?"

"It seems so to me."

"And when people act correctly and beneficially, do they seem to you to be acting temperately or the opposite?"

"Temperately."

"Then it is by temperance that they act temperately?"

"It has to be." [*b*]

"And those who do not act correctly act foolishly, and those who act this way do not act temperately?"

{122} "I agree."

"And the opposite of acting foolishly is acting temperately?"

"Yes."

"And foolish behavior is done with folly, just as temperate behavior is done with temperance?"

"Yes."

"And if something is done with strength, it is done strongly; if done with weakness, it is done weakly?"

"I agree."

"If it is done with quickness, it is done quickly, and if with slowness, slowly?"

"Yes."

“So whatever is done in a certain way is done from a certain quality, [*c*] and whatever is done in the opposite way is done from its opposite?”

“I agree.”

“Then let’s go. Is there such a thing as beauty?”

“Yes.”

“Is there any opposite to it except ugliness?”

“There is not.”

“Is there such a thing as goodness?”

“There is.”

“Is there any opposite to it except badness?”

“There is not.”

“Is there such a thing as a shrill tone?”

“There is.”

“Is there any opposite to it except a deep tone?”

“No, there is not.”

“So for each thing that can have an opposite, there is only one opposite, [*d*] not many?”

“I agree.”

“Suppose we now count up our points of agreement. Have we agreed that there is one opposite for one thing, and no more?”

“Yes, we have.”

“And that what is done in an opposite way is done from opposites?”

“Yes.”

“And have we agreed that what is done foolishly is done in a way opposite to what is done temperately?”

“We have.”

“And that what is done temperately is done from temperance, and what is done foolishly is done from folly?”

“Agreed.”

“And it’s true that if it’s done in an opposite [*e*] way, it is done from an opposite?”

“Yes.”

“And one is done from temperance, the other from folly?”

“Yes.”

“In an opposite way?”

“Yes.”

“From opposites?”

“Yes.”

“Then folly is the opposite of temperance?”

“It seems so.”

“Well, then, do you recall our previous agreement that folly is the opposite of wisdom?”

“Yes, I do.”

“And that one thing has only one opposite?”

“Of course.”

“Then which of these propositions should we [*333a*] abandon, Protagoras? The proposition that for one thing there is only one opposite, or the one stating that wisdom is different from temperance and that each is a part of virtue, and that in addition to being distinct they are dissimilar, both in themselves and in their powers or functions, just like the parts of a face? Which should we abandon? The two statements are dissonant; they [*b*] are not in harmony with one another. How could they be, if there is one and only one opposite for each single thing, while folly, which is a single thing, evidently has two opposites, wisdom and temperance? Isn’t this how it stands, Protagoras?”

He assented, although very grudgingly, and I continued:

“Wouldn’t that make wisdom and temperance one thing? And a little while ago it looked like justice and piety were nearly the same thing. Come on, Protagoras, we can’t quit now, not before we’ve tied up these loose ends. So, does someone who acts unjustly seem temperate to you in that he acts unjustly?”

“I would be ashamed to say that is so, Socrates, [*c*] although many people do say it.”

“Then shall I address myself to them or to you?”

“If you like, why don’t you debate the majority position first?”

“It makes no difference to me, provided you give the answers, whether it is your own opinion or not. I am primarily interested in testing the {123} argument, although it may happen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested.”

At first Protagoras played it coy, claiming the argument was too hard [*d*] for him to handle, but after a while he consented to answer.

“Let’s start all over, then,” I said, “with this question. Do you think some people are being sensible when they act unjustly?”

“Let us grant it,” he said.

“And by ‘sensible’ you mean having good sense?”

“Yes.”

“And having good sense means having good judgment in acting unjustly?”

“Granted.”

“Whether or not they get good results by acting unjustly?”

“Only if they get good results.”

“Are you saying, then, that there are things that are good?”

“I am.”

“These good things constitute what is advantageous to people?”

“Good God, yes! And even if they are not advantageous to people, I [*e*] can still call them good.”

I could see that Protagoras was really worked up and struggling by now and that he was dead set against answering any more. Accordingly, I carefully modified the tone of my questions.

“Do you mean things that are advantageous to no human being, Protagoras, [*334a*] or things that are of no advantage whatsoever? Do you call things like that good?”

“Of course not,” he said. “But I know of many things that are disadvantageous to humans, foods and drinks and drugs and many other things, and some that are advantageous; some that are neither to humans but one or the other to horses; some that are advantageous only to cattle; some only to dogs; some that are advantageous to none of these but are so to trees; some that are good for the roots of a tree, but bad for its shoots, such as [*b*] manure, which is good spread on the roots of any plant but absolutely ruinous if applied to the new stems and branches. Or take olive oil, which is extremely bad for all plants and is the worst enemy of the hair of all animals except humans, for whose hair it is beneficial, as it is for the rest of their bodies. But the good is such a multifaceted and variable thing that, in the case of oil, it is good for the external parts of the human body [*c*] but very bad for the internal parts, which is why doctors universally forbid their sick patients to use oil in their diets except for the least bit, just enough to dispel a prepared meal’s unappetizing aroma.”

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“Protagoras,” I said, “I don’t want you to think [*348c*] that my motive in talking with you is anything else than to take a good hard look at things that continually perplex me. I think that Homer said it all in the line, Going in tandem, one perceives before the other.[6] [*d*]

Human beings are simply more resourceful this way in action, speech, and thought. If someone has a private perception, he immediately starts going around and looking until he finds somebody he can show it to and have it corroborated. And there is a particular reason why I would rather talk with you than anyone else: I think you are the best qualified to investigate the sort of things that decent and respectable individuals ought [*e*] to examine, and virtue especially. Who else but you? Not only do you consider yourself to be noble and good but, unlike others who are themselves decent and respectable individuals yet unable to make others so, you are not only good yourself but able to make others good as well, and you have so much self-confidence that instead of concealing this skill, as others do, you advertise it openly to the whole Greek world, calling yourself [*349a*] a sophist, highlighting yourself as a teacher of virtue, the first ever to have deemed it appropriate to charge a fee for this. How could I not solicit your help in a joint investigation of these questions? There is no way I could not.

“So right now I want you to remind me of some of the questions I first asked, starting from the beginning. Then I want to proceed together to [*b*] take a good hard look at some other questions. {124} I believe the first question was this: Wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and piety—are these five names for the same thing, or is there underlying each of these names a unique thing, a thing with its own power or function, each one unlike any of the others? You said that they are not names for the same thing, that [*c*] each of these names refers to a unique thing, and that all these are parts of virtue, not like the parts of gold, which are similar to each other and to the whole of which they are parts, but like the parts of a face, dissimilar to the whole of which they are parts and to each other, and each one having its own unique power or function. If this is still your view, say so; if it’s changed in any way, make your new position clear, for I am certainly not going to hold you accountable for what you said before if you

want [*d*] to say something at all different now. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you were just trying out something on me before."

"What I am saying to you, Socrates, is that all these are parts of virtue, and that while four of them are reasonably close to each other, courage is completely different from all the rest. The proof that what I am saying is true is that you will find many people who are extremely unjust, impious, intemperate, and ignorant, and yet exceptionally courageous."

[*e*] "Hold it right there," I said. "This is worth looking into. Would you say courageous men are confident, or something else?"

"Confident, yes, and ready for action where most men would be afraid."

"Well, then, do you agree that virtue is something fine, and that you offer yourself as a teacher of it because it is fine?"

"The finest thing of all, unless I am quite out of my mind."

"Then is part of it worthless and part of it fine, or all of it fine?"

"Surely it is all as fine as can be."

[*350a*] "Do you know who dives confidently into wells?"

"Of course, divers."

"Is this because they know what they are doing, or for some other reason?"

"Because they know what they are doing."

"Who are confident in fighting from horseback? Riders or nonriders?"

"Riders."

"And in fighting with shields? Shieldmen or nonshieldmen?"

"Shieldmen, and so on down the line, if that's what you're getting at. Those with the right kind of knowledge are always more confident than those without it, and a given individual is more confident after he acquires it than he was before."

"But haven't you ever seen men lacking [*b*] knowledge of all of these things yet confident in each of them?"

"I have, all too confident."

"Is their confidence courage?"

"No, because courage would then be contemptible. These men are out of their minds."

"Then what do you mean by courageous men? Aren't they those who are confident?"

"I still hold by that." [*c*]

“Then these men who are so confident turn out to be not courageous but mad? And, on the other side, the wisest are the most confident and the most confident are the most courageous? And the logical conclusion would be that wisdom is courage?”

“You are doing a poor job of remembering what I said when I answered your questions, Socrates. When I was asked if the courageous are confident, I agreed. I was not asked if the confident are courageous. If you had asked [*d*] me that, I would have said, ‘Not all of them.’ You have nowhere shown that my assent to the proposition that the courageous are confident was in error. What you did show next was that knowledge increases one’s confidence and makes one more confident than those without knowledge. In consequence of this you conclude that courage and wisdom are the same thing. But by following this line of reasoning you could conclude that strength and wisdom are the same thing. First you would ask me if [*e*] the strong are powerful, and I would say yes. Then, if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful than those who do not, and if individual wrestlers became more powerful after they learn than they were before. Again I would say yes. After I had agreed to these things, it would be open to you to use precisely these points of agreement to prove that wisdom is strength. But nowhere in this process do I agree that the powerful are strong, only that the {125} strong are powerful. Strength and power are not [*351a*] the same thing. Power derives from knowledge and also from madness and passionate emotion. Strength comes from nature and proper nurture of the body. So also confidence and courage are not the same thing, with the consequence that the courageous are confident, but not all those who are confident are courageous. For confidence, like power, comes from skill (and from passionate emotion and madness as well); courage, from nature and the proper nurture of the soul.”

“Would you say, Protagoras, that some people live well and others [*b*] live badly?”

“Yes.”

“But does it seem to you that a person lives well, if he lives distressed and in pain?”

“No, indeed.”

“Now, if he completed his life, having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well?”

“It seems that way to me.”

“So, then, to live pleasantly is good, and unpleasantly, bad?” [*c*]

“Yes, so long as he lived having taken pleasure in honorable things.”

“What, Protagoras? Surely you don’t, like most people, call some pleasant things bad and some painful things good? I mean, isn’t a pleasant thing good just insofar as it is pleasant, that is, if it results in nothing other than pleasure; and, on the other hand, aren’t painful things bad in the same way, just insofar as they are painful?”

“I don’t know, Socrates, if I should answer as simply as you put the [*d*] question—that everything pleasant is good and everything painful is bad. It seems to me to be safer to respond not merely with my present answer in mind but from the point of view of my life overall, that on the one hand, there are pleasurable things which are not good, and on the other hand, there are painful things which are not bad but some which are, and a third class which is neutral—neither bad nor good.”

“You call pleasant things those which partake of pleasure or produce [*e*] pleasure?”

“Certainly.”

“So my question is this: Just insofar as things are pleasurable are they good? I am asking whether pleasure itself is not a good.”

“Just as you always say, Socrates, let us inquire into this matter, and if your claim seems reasonable and it is established that pleasure and the good are the same, then we will come to agreement; otherwise we will disagree.”

“Do you wish to lead this inquiry, or shall I?”

“It is fitting for you to lead, for it is you who brought up the idea.”

“All right, will this help to make it clear? When someone evaluates a [*352a*] man’s health or other functions of the body through his appearance, he looks at the face and extremities, and might say: ‘Show me your chest and back too, so that I can make a better examination.’ That’s the kind of investigation I want to make. Having seen how you stand on the good and the pleasant, I need to say something like this to you: Come now, [*b*] Protagoras, and reveal this about your mind: What do you think about knowledge? Do you go along with the majority or not? Most people think this way about it, that it is not a powerful thing, neither a leader nor a ruler. They do not think of it in that way at all; but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge but

rather anything else—sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes [*c*] pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave. Now, does the matter seem like that to you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing capable of ruling a person, and if someone were to know what is good and bad, then he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than knowledge dictates, and intelligence would be sufficient to save a person?"

"Not only does it seem just as you say, Socrates, but further, it would [*d*] be shameful indeed for me above all people to say that wisdom and knowledge are anything but the most powerful forces in human activity."

"Right you are. You realize that most people aren't going to be convinced by us. They maintain that most people are unwilling to do what is best, even though they know what it is and are able to do it. And when I have asked them the reason for this, they say that those who act that way do [*e*] so because they are overcome by pleasure or pain or are being ruled by one of the things I referred to just now."

{126} "I think people say a lot of other things erroneously too, Socrates."

[*353a*] "Come with me, then, and let's try to persuade people and to teach them what is this experience which they call being overcome by pleasure, because of which they fail to do the best thing when they know what it is. For perhaps if we told them that what they were saying isn't true, but is demonstrably false, they would ask us: 'Protagoras and Socrates, if this is not the experience of being overcome by pleasure, but something other than that, what do you two say it is? Tell us.' "

"Socrates, why is it necessary for us to investigate the opinion of ordinary people, who will say whatever occurs to them?"

[*b*] "I think this will help us find out about courage, how it is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are willing to go along with what we agreed just now, that I will lead us toward what I think will turn out to be the best way to make things clear, then fine; if you are not willing, I will give it up."

"No, you are right; proceed as you have begun."

[*c*] "Going back, then; if they should ask us: 'We have been speaking of "being overcome by pleasure." What do you say this is?' I would reply to them this way: 'Listen. Protagoras and I will try to explain it to you. Do you hold, gentlemen, that this happens to you in circumstances like these—you

are often overcome by pleasant things like food or drink or sex, and you do those things all the while knowing they are ruinous?' They would say yes. Then you and I would ask them again: 'In what sense do you call these things ruinous? Is it that each of them is pleasant in itself [*d*] and produces immediate pleasure, or is it that later they bring about diseases and poverty and many other things of that sort? Or even if it doesn't bring about these things later, but gives only enjoyment, would it still be a bad thing, just because it gives enjoyment in whatever way?' Can we suppose then, Protagoras, that they would make any other answer than that bad things are bad not because they bring about immediate pleasure, but rather because of what happens later, disease and things like that?"

"I think that is how most people would answer." [*e*]

"'And in bringing about diseases and poverty, do they bring about pain?' I think they would agree."

"Yes."

" 'Does it not seem to you, my good people, as Protagoras and I maintain, that these things are bad on account of nothing other than the fact that [*354a*] they result in pain and deprive us of other pleasures?' Would they agree?"

Protagoras concurred.

"Then again, suppose we were to ask them the opposite question: 'You who say that some painful things are good, do you not say that such things as athletics and military training and treatments by doctors such as cautery, surgery, medicines, and starvation diet are good things even though painful?' Would they say so?"

"Yes."

" 'Would you call these things good for the reason that they bring about [*b*] intense pain and suffering, or because they ultimately bring about health and good condition of bodies and preservation of cities and power over others and wealth?' Would they agree?"

"Yes."

" 'These things are good only because they result in pleasure and in the relief and avoidance of pain? Or do you have some other criterion in view, other than pleasure and pain, on the basis of which you would call these things good?' They say no, I [*c*] think."

"And I would agree with you."

“ ‘So then you pursue pleasure as being good and avoid pain as bad?’ ”

“Yes.”

“ ‘So this you regard as bad, pain, and pleasure, you regard as good, since you call the very enjoying of something bad whenever it deprives us of greater pleasures than it itself provides, or brings about greater pains [*d*] than the very pleasures inherent in it? But if you call the very enjoying of something bad for some other reason and with some other criterion in view than the one I have suggested, you could tell us what it is; but you won’t be able to.’ ”

“I don’t think they’ll be able to either.”

“ ‘And likewise concerning the actual state of being in pain? Do you call the actual condition of being in pain good, whenever it relieves pains [e] greater than the ones it contains or brings {127} about greater pleasures than its attendant pains? Now, if you are using some other criterion than the one I have suggested, when you call the very condition of being pained good, you can tell us what it is; but you won’t be able to.’”

“Truly spoken.”

“Now, again, gentlemen, if you asked me: ‘Why are you going on so much about this and in so much detail?’ I would reply, forgive me. First of all, it is not easy to show what it is that you call ‘being overcome by [*355a*] pleasure,’ and then, it is upon this very point that all the arguments rest. But even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is anything other than pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain. Or is it enough for you to live life pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you are not able to say anything else than that the good and the bad are that which result in pleasure and pain, listen to this. For I say to you that if this is so, your position will become absurd, when you [*b*] say that frequently a man, knowing the bad to be bad, nevertheless does that very thing, when he is able not to do it, having been driven and overwhelmed by pleasure; and again when you say that a man knowing the good is not willing to do it, on account of immediate pleasure, having been overcome by it. Just how absurd this is will become very clear, if we do not use so many names at the same time, ‘pleasant’ and ‘painful,’ ‘good’ and ‘bad’; but since these turned out to be only two things, let us instead [*c*] call them by two names, first, ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ then later, ‘pleasant’ and ‘painful.’ On that basis, then, let us say that a man knowing bad things to be bad, does

them all the same. If then someone asks us: ‘Why?’ ‘Having been overcome,’ we shall reply. ‘By what?’ he will ask us. We are no longer able to say ‘by pleasure,’—for it has taken on its other name, ‘the good’ instead of ‘pleasure’—so we will say and reply that ‘he is overcome . . .’ ‘By what?’ he will ask. ‘By the good,’ we will say, ‘for heaven’s sake!’ If [*d*] by chance the questioner is rude he might burst out laughing and say: ‘What you’re saying is ridiculous—someone does what is bad, knowing that it is bad, when it is not necessary to do it, having been overcome by the good. So,’ he will say, ‘within yourself, does the good outweigh the bad or not?’ We will clearly say in reply that it does not; for if it did, the person who we say is overcome by pleasure would not have made any mistake. ‘In virtue of what,’ he might say, ‘does the good outweigh the bad [*e*] or the bad the good? Only in that one is greater and one is smaller, or more and less.’ We could not help but agree. ‘So clearly then’ he will say, ‘by “being overcome” you mean getting more bad things for the sake of fewer good things.’ That settles that, then.

“So let’s now go back and apply the names ‘the pleasant’ and ‘the painful’ to these very same things. Now let us say that a man does what before we called ‘bad’ things and now shall call ‘painful’ ones, knowing they are painful [*356a*] things, but being overcome by pleasant things, although it is clear that they do not outweigh them. But how else does pleasure outweigh pain, except in relative excess or deficiency? Isn’t it a matter (to use other terms) of larger and smaller, more or fewer, greater or lesser degree?

“For if someone were to say: ‘But Socrates, the immediate pleasure is very much different from the pleasant and the painful at a later time,’ I would reply, ‘They are not different in any other way than by pleasure [*b*] and pain, for there is no other way that they could differ. Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures together and the pains together, both the near and the remote, on the balance scale, and then say which of the two is more. For if you weigh pleasant things against pleasant, the greater and the more must always be taken; if painful things against painful, the fewer and the smaller. And if you weigh pleasant things against painful, and the painful is exceeded by the pleasant—whether the near by the remote or the remote by the near—you have to perform that action in which the pleasant prevails; on the other hand, if the pleasant is exceeded [*c*] by the painful, you have to

refrain from doing that. Does it seem any different to you, my friends?' I know that they would not say otherwise."

Protagoras assented.

"Since this is so, I will say to them: 'Answer me this: Do things of the same size appear to you larger when seen near at hand and smaller when seen from a distance, or not?' They would say they do. 'And similarly for thicknesses and pluralities? And equal sounds seem louder when near at hand, softer when farther away?' They would {128} agree. 'If then our well-being [*d*] depended upon this, doing and choosing large things, avoiding and not doing the small ones, what would we see as our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement or the power of appearance? While the power of appearance often makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choices with respect to things large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make the appearances lose their power [*e*] by showing us the truth, would give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and would save our life.' Therefore, would these men agree, with this in mind, that the art of measurement would save us, or some other art?"

"I agree, the art of measurement would."

"What if our salvation in life depended on our choices of odd and even, when the greater and the lesser had to be counted correctly, either the same kind against itself or one kind against the other, whether it be near or remote? [*357a*] What then would save our life? Surely nothing other than knowledge, specifically some kind of measurement, since that is the art of the greater and the lesser? In fact, nothing other than arithmetic, since it's a question of the odd and even? Would these men agree with us or not?"

Protagoras thought they would agree.

"Well, then, my good people: Since it has turned out that our salvation [*b*] in life depends on the right choice of pleasures and pains, be they more or fewer, greater or lesser, farther or nearer, doesn't our salvation seem, first of all, to be measurement, which is the study of relative excess and deficiency and equality?"

"It must be."

"And since it is measurement, it must definitely be an art, and knowledge."

"They will agree."

“What exactly this art, this knowledge is, we can inquire into later; that it is knowledge of some sort is enough for the demonstration which [*c*] Protagoras and I have to give in order to answer the question you asked us. You asked it, if you remember, when we were agreeing that nothing was stronger or better than knowledge, which always prevails, whenever it is present, over pleasure and everything else. At that point you said that pleasure often rules even the man who knows; since we disagreed, you went on to ask us this: ‘Protagoras and Socrates, if this experience is not [*d*] being overcome by pleasure, what is it then; what do you say it is? Tell us.’ If immediately we had said to you ‘ignorance,’ you might have laughed at us, but if you laugh at us now, you will be laughing at yourselves. For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge, and not merely a lack of knowledge [*e*] but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was measurement. And the mistaken act done without knowledge you must know is one done from ignorance. So this is what “being overcome by pleasure” is—ignorance in the highest degree, and it is this which Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias claim to cure. But you, thinking it to be something other than ignorance, do not go to sophists yourselves, nor do you send your children to them for instruction, believing as you do that we are dealing with something unteachable. By worrying about your money and not giving it to them, you all do badly in both private and public life.

“This is how we would have answered the [*358a*] many. Now, I ask you, Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras—this is your conversation also—to say whether you think what I say is true or false.” They all thought that what I said was marvelously true.

“So you agree that the pleasant is good, the painful bad. I beg indulgence of Prodicus who distinguishes among words; for whether you call it ‘pleasant’ [*b*] or ‘delightful’ or ‘enjoyable,’ or whatever way or manner you please to name this sort of thing, my excellent Prodicus, please respond to the intent of my question.” Prodicus, laughing, agreed, as did the others.

“Well, then, men, what about this? Are not all actions leading toward living painlessly and pleasantly honorable and beneficial? And isn’t honorable activity good and beneficial?”

They agreed.

“Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there [*c*] is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better. To give in to {129} oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom.”

They all agreed.

“Well, then, do you say that ignorance is to have a false belief and to be deceived about matters of importance?”

They all agreed on this.

“Now, no one goes willingly toward the bad or what he believes to be [*d*] bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser.”

They agreed with all of that too.

“Well, then, is there something you call dread or fear? And I address this to you, Prodicus. I say that whether you call it fear or dread, it is an expectation of something bad.”

Protagoras and Hippias thought that this was true of both dread and [*e*] fear, but Prodicus thought it applied to dread, but not to fear.

“Well, it does not really matter, Prodicus. This is the point. If what I have said up to now is true, then would anyone be willing to go toward what he dreads, when he can go toward what he does not? Or is this impossible from what we have agreed? For it was agreed that what one fears one holds to be bad; no one goes toward those things which he holds to be bad, or chooses those things willingly.”

[*359a*] They all agreed.

“Well, Prodicus and Hippias, with this established, let Protagoras defend for us the truth of his first answer. I don’t mean his very first answer, for then he said that while there are five parts of virtue, none is like any other, but each one has its own unique power or function. I’m not talking about this now, but about what he said later. For later he said that four of them [*b*] are very similar to each other, but one differs very much from the others, namely courage. And he said that I would know this by the following evidence: ‘You will find, Socrates, many people who are extremely impious, unjust, intemperate, and ignorant, and yet exceptionally

courageous; by this you will recognize that courage differs very much from all the other parts of virtue.' I was very surprised at his answer then, and even more so now that I have gone over these things with you. I asked him then if he said that the courageous were confident. And he said, 'Yes, and ready [*c*] for action too.' Do you remember giving this answer?"

He said he did.

"Well, then, tell us, for what actions are the courageous ready? The same actions as the cowardly?"

"No."

"Different actions?"

"Yes."

"Do the cowardly go forward to things which inspire confidence, and the courageous toward things to be feared?"

"So it is said by most people."

"Right, but I am not asking that. Rather, what [*d*] do you say the courageous go boldly toward: toward things to be feared, believing them to be fearsome, or toward things not to be feared?"

"By what you have just said, the former is impossible."

"Right again; so, if our demonstration has been correct, then no one goes toward those things he considers to be fearsome, since not to be in control of oneself was found to be ignorance."

He agreed.

"But all people, both the courageous and the [*e*] cowardly, go toward that about which they are confident; both the cowardly and the courageous go toward the same things."

"But, Socrates, what the cowardly go toward is completely opposite to what the courageous go toward. For example, the courageous are willing to go to war, but the cowardly are not."

"Is going to war honorable or is it disgraceful?"

"Honorable."

"Then, if it is honorable, we have agreed before, it is also good, for we agreed that all honorable actions were good."

"Very true, and I always believed this."

"And rightly; but who would you say are not [*360a*] willing to go to war, war being honorable and good?"

"The cowardly."

“If a thing is noble and good, is it also pleasant?”

“That was definitely agreed upon.”

“So, the cowardly, with full knowledge, are not willing to go toward the more honorable, the better, and more pleasant?”

{130} “If we agree to that, we will undermine what we agreed on earlier.”

“What about the courageous man: Does he go toward the more honorable, the better, and more pleasant?”

“We must agree to that.”

“So, generally, when the courageous fear, their fear is not disgraceful; nor when they are confident is their confidence disgraceful.”

[*b*] “True.”

“If not disgraceful, is it honorable?”

He agreed.

“If honorable, then also good?”

“Yes.”

“Whereas the fear and confidence of the cowardly, the foolhardy, and madmen are disgraceful?”

He agreed.

“Is their confidence disgraceful and bad for any reason other than ignorance and stupidity?”

[*c*] “No, it isn’t.”

“Now then; that through which cowardly people are cowardly, do you call it cowardice or courage?”

“Cowardice.”

“And aren’t cowards shown to be so through their ignorance of what is to be feared?”

“Absolutely.”

“So they are cowards because of that ignorance?”

He agreed.

“You agreed that it is through cowardice that they are cowards?”

He said he did.

“So, can we conclude that cowardice is ignorance of what is and is not to be feared?”

He nodded.

[*d*] “Now, courage is the opposite of cowardice.”

He said yes.

“So then, wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is the opposite of this ignorance?”

He nodded again.

“And this ignorance is cowardice?”

He nodded again, very reluctantly.

“So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?”

He would not even nod at this; he remained silent.

And I said, “What’s this, Protagoras? Will you not say yes or no to my question?”

“Answer it yourself.”

“I have only one more question to ask you. Do you still believe, as you [*e*] did at first, that some men are extremely ignorant and yet still very courageous?”

“I think that you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and that is why you are forcing me to answer. So I will gratify you and say that, on the basis of what we have agreed upon, it seems to me to be impossible.”

“I have no other reason for asking these things than my desire to answer these questions about virtue, especially what virtue is in itself. For I know [*361a*] that if we could get clear on that, then we would be able to settle the question about which we both have had much to say, I—that virtue cannot be taught, you—that it can.

“It seems to me that our discussion has turned on us, and if it had a voice of its own, it would say, mockingly, ‘Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both of you. Socrates, you said earlier that virtue cannot [*b*] be taught, but now you are arguing the very opposite and have attempted to show that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, courage—in which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable. On the other hand, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, as Protagoras has been trying to say, then it would clearly be unteachable. But, if it turns out to be wholly knowledge, as you now urge, Socrates, it would be very surprising indeed if virtue could not be taught. Now, Protagoras maintained at first [*c*] that it could be taught, but now he thinks the opposite, urging that hardly any of the virtues turn out to be knowledge. On that view, virtue could hardly be taught at all.’

“Now, Protagoras, seeing that we have gotten this topsy-turvy and [*d*] terribly confused, I am most eager to clear it all up, and I would like us, having come this far, to continue until we come through to what virtue is in itself, and then to return to inquire about whether it can or cannot be taught, so that Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time in this inquiry, as he neglected us in the distribution of powers and abilities in your story. I liked the Prometheus character in your story better than Epimetheus. Since I take promethean forethought over my life as a whole, I pay attention to these things, and if you are willing, as I {131} said at the beginning, I would be pleased to investigate them along with you.”

[*e*] “Socrates, I commend your enthusiasm and the way you find your way through an argument. I really don’t think I am a bad man, certainly the last man to harbor ill will. Indeed, I have told many people that I admire you more than anyone I have met, certainly more than anyone in your generation. And I say that I would not be surprised if you gain among men high repute for wisdom. We will examine these things later, whenever you wish; now it is time to turn our attention elsewhere.”

“That is what we should do, if it seems right [*362a*] to you. It is long since time for me to keep that appointment I mentioned. I stayed only as a favor to our noble colleague Callias.”

Our conversation was over, and so we left.

1. Zeuxippus (more commonly spelled Zeuxis), a painter who flourished in the late fifth century.
2. Orthagoras, renowned for his excellent playing on the flute (aulos).
3. Pericles (c. 495–429 BCE), the greatest fifth-century Athenian statesman and general.
4. Pherecrates, an Athenian writer of comic plays and prizewinner at the Lenaean dramatic competition in the late fifth century.
5. Eurybatus and Phrynondas, historical individuals, whose names had in literature become synonymous with viciousness.
6. Homer, Iliad x.224.

GORGIAS

(462a–481b)
Translated by Donald J. Zeyl.

IN THE FOLLOWING selection, Socrates examines Polus, a younger follower of Gorgias, the famous teacher of rhetoric (some fragments of whose writings are included in the Presocratics section of this anthology). The initial topic is the nature of rhetoric and its relation to politics. Very quickly, this is subsumed under a larger question about the goals of life (467a–468e). The discussion then focuses on the contribution of virtue to achieving those goals, with Socrates arguing, and Polus forced—kicking and screaming—to agree, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it.

[*462a*] SOCRATES: You say, I take it, that you know the same craft that Gorgias knows? Or don't you?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: And don't you also invite people to ask you each time whatever they like, because you believe you'll answer as one who has knowledge?

POLUS: Certainly.

[*b*] SOCRATES: So now please do whichever of these you like: either ask questions or answer them.

POLUS: Very well, I shall. Tell me, Socrates, since you think Gorgias is confused about oratory, what do you say it is?

SOCRATES: Are you asking me what craft I say it is?

POLUS: Yes, I am.

SOCRATES: To tell you the truth, Polus, I don't think it's a craft at all.

POLUS: Well then, what do you think oratory is?

[*c*] SOCRATES: In the treatise that I read recently, it's the thing that you say has produced craft.

POLUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean a knack.

POLUS: So you think oratory's a knack?

SOCRATES: Yes, I do, unless you say it's something else.

POLUS: A knack for what?

SOCRATES: For producing a certain gratification and pleasure.

POLUS: Don't you think that oratory's an admirable thing, then, to be able to give gratification to people?

SOCRATES: Really, Polus! Have you already discovered from me what I say it is, so that you go on to [*d*] ask me next whether I don't think it's admirable?

POLUS: Haven't I discovered that you say it's a knack?

SOCRATES: Since you value gratification, would you like to gratify me on a small matter?

{132} POLUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Ask me now what craft I think pastry baking is.

POLUS: All right, I will. What craft is pastry baking?

SOCRATES: It isn't one at all, Polus. Now say, "What is it then?"

POLUS: All right.

SOCRATES: It's a knack. Say, "A knack for what?"

POLUS: All right.

SOCRATES: For producing gratification and pleasure, Polus. [*e*]

POLUS: So oratory is the same thing as pastry baking?

SOCRATES: Oh no, not at all, although it is a part of the same practice.

POLUS: What practice do you mean?

SOCRATES: I'm afraid it may be rather crude to speak the truth. I hesitate to do so for Gorgias' sake, for fear that he may think I'm satirizing what he practices. I don't know whether this is the kind of oratory that Gorgias practices—in fact in our discussion a while ago we didn't get at all clear [*463a*] on just what he thinks it is. But what I call oratory is a part of some business that isn't admirable at all.

GORGIAS: Which one's that, Socrates? Say it, and don't spare my feelings.

SOCRATES: Well then, Gorgias, I think there's a practice that's not craftlike, but one that a mind given to making hunches takes to, a mind that's bold and naturally clever at dealing with people. I call it flattery, basically. I [*b*] think that this practice has many other parts as well, and pastry baking, too, is one of them. This part seems to be a craft, but in my account of it it isn't a craft but a knack and a routine. I call oratory a part of this, too, along with cosmetics and sophistry. These are four parts, and they're directed to four objects. So if Polus wants to discover them, let him do so. [*c*] He hasn't discovered yet what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is. Instead, it's

escaped him that I haven't answered that question yet, and so he goes on to ask whether I don't consider it to be admirable. And I won't answer him whether I think it's admirable or shameful until I first tell what it is. That wouldn't be right, Polus. If, however, you do want to discover this, ask me what sort of part of flattery I say oratory is.

POLUS: I shall. Tell me what sort of part it is.

SOCRATES: Would you understand my answer? By my reasoning, oratory [*d*] is an image of a part of politics.

POLUS: Well? Are you saying that it's something admirable or shameful?

SOCRATES: I'm saying that it's a shameful thing—I call bad things shameful—since I must answer you as though you already know what I mean.

GORGIAS: By Zeus, Socrates, I myself don't understand what you mean, either!

SOCRATES: Reasonably enough, Gorgias. I'm [*e*] not saying anything clear yet. This colt here is youthful and impulsive.

GORGIAS: Never mind him. Please tell me what you mean by saying that oratory is an image of a part of politics.

SOCRATES: All right, I'll try to describe my view of oratory. If this isn't [*464a*] what it actually is, Polus here will refute me. There is, I take it, something you call body and something you call soul?

GORGIAS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And do you also think that there's a state of fitness for each of these?

GORGIAS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: All right. Is there also an apparent state of fitness, one that isn't real? The sort of thing I mean is this. There are many people who appear to be physically fit, and unless one is a doctor or one of the fitness experts, one wouldn't readily notice that they're not fit.

GORGIAS: That's true.

SOCRATES: I'm saying that this sort of thing exists in the case of both the body and the soul, a thing that makes the body and the soul seem fit when [*b*] in fact they aren't any the more so.

GORGIAS: That's so.

SOCRATES: Come then, and I'll show you more clearly what I'm saying, if I can. I'm saying that of this pair of subjects there are two crafts. The one

for the soul I call politics; the one for the body, though it is one, I can't give you a name for offhand, but while the care of the body is a single craft, I'm saying it has two parts: gymnastics and medicine. And in politics, the counterpart of gymnastics is legislation, and the part that [*c*] corresponds to medicine is justice. Each member of these pairs has features in common with {133} the other, medicine with gymnastics and justice with legislation, because they're concerned with the same thing. They do, however, differ in some way from each other. These, then, are the four parts, and they always provide care, in the one case for the body, in the other for the soul, with a view to what's best. Now flattery takes notice of them, and—I won't say by knowing, but only by guessing—divides itself into four, [*d*] masks itself with each of the parts, and then pretends to be the characters of the masks. It takes no thought at all of whatever is best; with the lure of what's most pleasant at the moment, it sniffs out folly and hoodwinks it, so that it gives the impression of being most deserving. Pastry baking has put on the mask of medicine, and pretends to know the foods that are best for the body, so that if a pastry baker and a doctor had to compete in front of children, or in front of men just as foolish as children, to determine which of the two, the doctor or the pastry baker, had expert knowledge of good food and bad, the doctor would die of starvation. I [*465a*] call this flattery, and I say that such a thing is shameful, Polus—it's you I'm saying this to—because it guesses at what's pleasant with no consideration for what's best. And I say that it isn't a craft, but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it's unable to state the cause of each thing. And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft. If you have any quarrel with these claims, I'm willing to submit them for discussion.

So pastry baking, as I say, is the flattery that wears the mask of medicine. [*b*] Cosmetics is the one that wears that of gymnastics in the same way; a mischievous, deceptive, disgraceful and ill-bred thing, one that perpetrates deception by means of shaping and coloring, smoothing out and dressing up, so as to make people assume an alien beauty and neglect their own, which comes through gymnastics. So that I won't make a long-style speech, I'm willing to put it to you the way the geometers do—for perhaps you [*c*] follow me now—that what cosmetics is to gymnastics, pastry baking is to medicine; or rather, like this: what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is

to legislation, and what pastry baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice. However, as I was saying, although these activities are naturally distinct in this way, yet because they are so close, sophists and orators tend to be mixed together as people who work in the same area and concern themselves with the same things. They don't know what to do with themselves, and other people don't know what to do with them. In fact, if the soul didn't govern the body but the body governed itself, and if pastry baking [*d*] and medicine weren't kept under observation and distinguished by the soul, but the body itself made judgments about them, making its estimates by reference to the gratification it receives, then the world according to Anaxagoras would prevail, Polus my friend—you're familiar with these views—all things would be mixed together in the same place, and there would be no distinction between matters of medicine and health, and matters of pastry baking.

You've now heard what I say oratory is. It's the counterpart in the soul to pastry baking, its counterpart in the body. Perhaps I've done an absurd [*e*] thing: I wouldn't let you make long speeches, and here I've just composed a lengthy one myself. I deserve to be forgiven, though, for when I made my statements short you didn't understand and didn't know how to deal with the answers I gave you, but you needed a narration. So if I don't know how to deal with your answers either, you must spin out a speech, [*466a*] too. But if I do, just let me deal with them. That's only fair. And if you now know how to deal with my answer, please deal with it.

POLUS: What is it you're saying, then? You think oratory is flattery?

SOCRATES: I said that it was a part of flattery. Don't you remember, Polus, young as you are? What's to become of you?

POLUS: So you think that good orators are held in low regard in their cities, as flatterers?

SOCRATES: Is this a question you're asking, or some speech you're beginning? [*b*]

POLUS: I'm asking a question.

SOCRATES: I don't think they're held in any regard at all.

POLUS: What do you mean, they're not held in any regard? Don't they have the greatest power in their cities?

SOCRATES: No, if by "having power" you mean something that's good for the one who has the power.

{134} POLUS: That's just what I do mean.

SOCRATES: In that case I think that orators have the least power of any in the city.

POLUS: Really? Don't they, like tyrants, put to death anyone they want, [*c*] and confiscate the property and banish from their cities anyone they see fit?

SOCRATES: By the Dog, Polus! I can't make out one way or the other with each thing you're saying whether you're saying these things for yourself and revealing your own view, or whether you're questioning me.

POLUS: I'm questioning you.

SOCRATES: Very well, my friend. In that case, are you asking me two questions at once?

POLUS: What do you mean, two?

SOCRATES: Weren't you just now saying something like "Don't orators, [*d*] like tyrants, put to death anyone they want, don't they confiscate the property of anyone they see fit, and don't they banish them from their cities?"

POLUS: Yes, I was.

SOCRATES: In that case I say that these are two questions, and I'll answer you both of them. I say, Polus, that both orators and tyrants have the least [*e*] power in their cities, as I was saying just now. For they do just about nothing they want to, though they certainly do whatever they see most fit to do.

POLUS: Well, isn't this having great power?

SOCRATES: No; at least Polus says it isn't.

POLUS: I say it isn't? I certainly say it is!

SOCRATES: By . . . , you certainly don't! since you say that having great power is good for the one who has it.

POLUS: Yes, I do say that.

SOCRATES: Do you think it's good, then, if a person does whatever he sees most fit to do when he lacks intelligence? Do you call this "having great power" too?

POLUS: No, I do not.

SOCRATES: Will you refute me, then, and prove that orators do have [*467a*] intelligence, and that oratory is a craft, and not flattery? If you leave me unrefuted, then the orators who do what they see fit in their cities, and the tyrants, too, won't have gained any good by this. Power is a good thing, you

say, but you agree with me that doing what one sees fit without intelligence is bad. Or don't you?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: How then could it be that orators or tyrants have great power in their cities, so long as Socrates is not refuted by Polus to show that they do what they want?

POLUS: This fellow—[*b*]

SOCRATES: —denies that they do what they want. Go ahead and refute me.

POLUS: Didn't you just now agree that they do what they see fit?

SOCRATES: Yes, and I still do.

POLUS: Don't they do what they want, then?

SOCRATES: I say they don't.

POLUS: Even though they do what they see fit?

SOCRATES: That's what I say.

POLUS: What an outrageous thing to say, Socrates! Perfectly monstrous!

SOCRATES: Don't attack me, my peerless Polus, to address you in your own style. Instead, question me if you can, and prove that I'm wrong.

Otherwise you must answer me. [*c*]

POLUS: All right, I'm willing to answer, to get some idea of what you're saying.

SOCRATES: Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing they're doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they're doing? Do you think that people who take medicines prescribed by their doctors, for instance, want what they're doing, the act of taking the medicine, with all its discomfort, or do they want to be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they're taking it?

POLUS: Obviously they want their being healthy.

SOCRATES: With seafarers, too, and those who make money in other ways, [*d*] the thing they're doing at the time is not the thing they want—for who wants to make dangerous and troublesome sea voyages? What they want is their being wealthy, the thing for the sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages. It's for the sake of wealth that they make them.

POLUS: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: Isn't it just the same in all cases, in fact? If a person does anything for the sake of something, he doesn't want this thing that he's doing, but the thing for the sake of which he's doing it? [*e*]

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now is there any thing that isn't either good, or bad, or, what is between these, neither good nor bad?

{135} POLUS: There can't be, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Do you say that wisdom, health, wealth and the like are good, and their opposites bad?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: And by things which are neither good nor bad you mean things which sometimes partake of what's good, sometimes of what's bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking, running or making [*468a*] sea voyages, or stones and sticks and the like? Aren't these the ones you mean? Or are there any others that you call things neither good nor bad?

POLUS: No, these are the ones.

SOCRATES: Now whenever people do things, do they do these intermediate things for the sake of good ones, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate ones?

[*b*] POLUS: The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, surely.

SOCRATES: So it's because we pursue what's good that we walk whenever we walk; we suppose that it's better to walk. And conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what's good. Isn't that so?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And don't we also put a person to death, if we do, or banish him and confiscate his property because we suppose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?

POLUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Hence, it's for the sake of what's good that those who do all these things do them.

POLUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: Now didn't we agree that we want, not those things that we [*c*] do for the sake of something, but that thing for the sake of which we do them?

POLUS: Yes, very much so.

SOCRATES: Hence, we don't simply want to slaughter people, or exile them from their cities and confiscate their property as such; we want to do these things if they are beneficial, but if they're harmful we don't. For we want

the things that are good, as you agree, and we don't want those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad. Right? Do you think that what I'm saying is true, Polus, or don't you? Why don't you answer?

POLUS: I think it's true.

SOCRATES: Since we're in agreement about [*d*] that then, if a person who's a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death or exiles him or confiscates his property because he supposes that doing so is better for himself when actually it's worse, this person, I take it, is doing what he sees fit, isn't he?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And is he also doing what he wants, if these things are actually bad? Why don't you answer?

POLUS: All right, I don't think he's doing what he wants.

SOCRATES: Can such a man possibly have great [*e*] power in that city, if in fact having great power is, as you agree, something good?

POLUS: He cannot.

SOCRATES: So, what I was saying is true, when I said that it is possible for a man who does in his city what he sees fit not to have great power, nor to be doing what he wants.

POLUS: Really, Socrates! As if you wouldn't welcome being in a position to do what you see fit in the city, rather than not! As if you wouldn't be envious whenever you'd see anyone putting to death some person he saw fit, or confiscating his property or tying him up!

SOCRATES: Justly, you mean, or unjustly?

POLUS: Whichever way he does it, isn't he to be [*469a*] envied either way?

SOCRATES: Hush, Polus.

POLUS: What for?

SOCRATES: Because you're not supposed to envy the unenviable or the miserable. You're supposed to pity them.

POLUS: Really? Is this how you think it is with the people I'm talking about?

SOCRATES: Of course.

POLUS: So, you think that a person who puts to death anyone he sees fit, and does so justly, is miserable and to be pitied?

SOCRATES: No, I don't, but I don't think he's to be envied either.

POLUS: Weren't you just now saying that he's miserable?

SOCRATES: Yes, the one who puts someone to death unjustly is, my friend, [*b*] and he's to be pitied besides. But the one who does so justly isn't to be envied.

{136} POLUS: Surely the one who's put to death unjustly is the one who's both to be pitied and miserable.

SOCRATES: Less so than the one putting him to death, Polus, and less than the one who's justly put to death.

POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?

SOCRATES: It's because doing what's unjust is actually the worst thing there is.

POLUS: Really? Is that the worst? Isn't suffering what's unjust still worse?

SOCRATES: No, not in the least.

POLUS: So you'd rather want to suffer what's unjust than do it?

SOCRATES: For my part, I wouldn't want either, but if it had to be one [*c*] or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what's unjust.

POLUS: You wouldn't welcome being a tyrant, then?

SOCRATES: No, if by being a tyrant you mean what I do.

POLUS: I mean just what I said a while ago, to be in a position to do whatever you see fit in the city, whether it's putting people to death or exiling them, or doing any and everything just as you see fit.

SOCRATES: Well, my wonderful fellow! I'll put you a case, and you criticize [*d*] it. Imagine me in a crowded marketplace, with a dagger up my sleeve, saying to you, "Polus, I've just got myself some marvelous tyrannical power. So, if I see fit to have any one of these people you see here put to death right on the spot, to death he'll be put. And if I see fit to have one of them have his head bashed in, bashed in it will be, right away. If I see fit to have his coat ripped apart, ripped it will be. That's how great my power in this city is!" Suppose you didn't believe me and I showed you [e] the dagger. On seeing it, you'd be likely to say, "But Socrates, everybody could have great power that way. For this way any house you see fit might be burned down, and so might the dockyards and triremes of the - Athenians, and all their ships, both public and private." But then that's not what having great power is, doing what one sees fit. Or do you think it is?

POLUS: No, at least not like that.

[*470a*] SOCRATES: Can you then tell me what your reason is for objecting to this sort of power?

POLUS: Yes, I can.

SOCRATES: What is it? Tell me.

POLUS: It's that the person who acts this way is necessarily punished.

SOCRATES: And isn't being punished a bad thing?

POLUS: Yes, it really is.

SOCRATES: Well then, my surprising fellow, here again you take the view that as long as acting as one sees fit coincides with acting beneficially, it is good, and this, evidently, is having great power. Otherwise it is a bad [*b*] thing, and is having little power. Let's consider this point, too. Do we agree that sometimes it's better to do those things we were just now talking about, putting people to death and banishing them and confiscating their property, and at other times it isn't?

POLUS: Yes, we do.

SOCRATES: This point is evidently agreed upon by you and me both?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: When do you say that it's better to do these things then? Tell me where you draw the line.

POLUS: Why don't you answer that question yourself, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well then, Polus, if you find it more [*c*] pleasing to listen to me, I say that when one does these things justly, it's better, but when one does them unjustly, it's worse.

POLUS: How hard it is to refute you, Socrates! Why, even a child could refute you and show that what you're saying isn't true!

SOCRATES: In that case, I'll be very grateful to the child, and just as grateful to you if you refute me and rid me of this nonsense. Please don't falter now in doing a friend a good turn. Refute me.

POLUS: Surely, Socrates, we don't need to refer to ancient history to refute [*d*] you. Why, current events quite suffice to do that, and to prove that many people who behave unjustly are happy.

SOCRATES: What sorts of events are these?

POLUS: You can picture this man Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia, I take it?

SOCRATES: Well, if I can't picture him I do hear things about him.

POLUS: Do you think he's happy or miserable?

SOCRATES: I don't know, Polus. I haven't met the man yet.

POLUS: Really? You'd know this if you had met [*e*] him, but without that you don't know straight off that he's happy?

{137} SOCRATES: No, I certainly don't, by Zeus!

POLUS: It's obvious, Socrates, that you won't even claim to know that the Great King[1] is happy.

SOCRATES: Yes, and that would be true, for I don't know how he stands in regard to education and justice.

POLUS: Really? Is happiness determined entirely by that?

SOCRATES: Yes, Polus, so I say anyway. I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy, but that the one who's unjust and wicked is miserable.

POLUS: So on your reasoning this man Archelaus is [*471a*] miserable?

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is in fact unjust.

POLUS: Why of course he's unjust! The sovereignty which he now holds doesn't belong to him at all, given the fact that his mother was a slave of Alcetas, Perdiccas' brother. By rights he was a slave of Alcetas, and if he wanted to do what's just, he'd still be a slave to Alcetas, and on your reasoning would be happy. As it is, how marvelously "miserable" he's turned out to be, now that he's committed the most heinous crimes. First he sends for this man, his very own master and uncle, on the pretext of [*b*] restoring to him the sovereignty that Perdiccas had taken from him. He entertains him, gets him drunk, both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin and a boy about his own age. He then throws them into a wagon, drives it away at night, and slaughters and disposes of them both. And although he's committed these crimes, he remains unaware of how "miserable" he's become, and feels no remorse either. He refuses to become "happy" by justly bringing up his brother and conferring the sovereignty upon him, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven to whom [*c*] the sovereignty was by rights due to come. Instead, not long afterward, he throws him into a well and drowns him, telling the boy's mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well chasing a goose and lost his life. For this very reason now, because he's committed the most terrible of crimes of any in Macedonia, he's the most "miserable" of all Macedonians instead of the happiest, and no doubt there are some in Athens, beginning with yourself, who'd prefer being any other Macedonian at all to being Archelaus. [*d*]

SOCRATES: Already at the start of our discussions, Polus, I praised you because I thought you were well educated in oratory. But I also thought that you had neglected the practice of discussion. And now is this all there is to the argument by which even a child could refute me, and do you suppose that when I say that a person who acts unjustly is not happy, I now stand refuted by you by means of this argument? Where did you get that idea, my good man? As a matter of fact, I disagree with every single thing you say!

POLUS: You're just unwilling to admit it. You really do think it's the way [*e*] I say it is.

SOCRATES: My wonderful man, you're trying to refute me in oratorical style, the way people in law courts do when they think they're refuting some claim. There, too, one side thinks it's refuting the other when it produces many reputable witnesses on behalf of the arguments it presents, while the person who asserts the opposite produces only one witness, or none at all. This "refutation" is worthless, as far as truth is concerned, for [*472a*] it might happen sometimes that an individual is brought down by the false testimony of many reputable people. Now too, nearly every Athenian and alien will take your side on the things you're saying, if it's witnesses you want to produce against me to show that what I say isn't true. Nicias the son of Niceratus will testify for you, if you like, and his brothers along with him, the ones whose tripods are standing in a row in the precinct of [*b*] Dionysus. Aristocrates the son of Scellias will too, if you like, the one to whom that handsome votive offering in the precinct of Pythian Apollo belongs. And so will the whole house of Pericles, if you like, or any other local family you care to choose. Nevertheless, though I'm only one person, I don't agree with you. You don't compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property, the truth. For my part, if I don't produce you as a single witness to agree with what I'm saying, then I suppose I've achieved nothing worth mentioning [*c*] concerning the things we've been discussing. And I suppose you haven't either, if I don't testify on your side, {138} though I'm just one person, and you disregard all these other people.

There is, then, this style of refutation, the one you and many others accept. There's also another, one that I accept. Let's compare the one with the other and see if they'll differ in any way. It's true, after all, that the matters in dispute between us are not at all insignificant ones, but pretty nearly those

it’s most admirable to have knowledge about, and most shameful not to. For the heart of the matter is that of recognizing or failing to [*d*] recognize who is happy and who is not. To take first the immediate question our present discussion’s about: you believe that it’s possible for a man who behaves unjustly and who is unjust to be happy, since you believe Archaelaus to be both unjust and happy. Are we to understand that this is precisely your view?

POLUS: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And I say that that’s impossible. This is one point in dispute between us. Fair enough. Although he acts unjustly, he’ll be happy—that is, if he gets his due punishment?

POLUS: Oh no, certainly not! That’s how he’d be the most miserable!

[*e*] SOCRATES: But if a man who acts unjustly doesn’t get his due, then, on your reasoning, he’ll be happy?

POLUS: That’s what I say.

SOCRATES: On my view of it, Polus, a man who acts unjustly, a man who is unjust, is thoroughly miserable, the more so if he doesn’t get his due punishment for the wrongdoing he commits, the less so if he pays and receives what is due at the hands of both gods and men.

[*473a*] POLUS: What an absurd position you’re trying to maintain, Socrates!

SOCRATES: Yes, and I’ll try to get you to take the same position too, my good man, for I consider you a friend. For now, these are the points we differ on. Please look at them with me. I said earlier, didn’t I, that doing what’s unjust is worse than suffering it?

POLUS: Yes, you did.

SOCRATES: And you said that suffering it is worse.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And I said that those who do what’s unjust are miserable, and was “refuted” by you.

POLUS: You certainly were, by Zeus!

SOCRATES: So you think, Polus. [*b*]

POLUS: So I *truly* think.

SOCRATES: Perhaps. And again, you think that those who do what’s unjust are happy, so long as they don’t pay what is due.

POLUS: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: Whereas I say that they're the most miserable, while those who pay their due are less so. Would you like to refute this too?

POLUS: Why, that's even more "difficult" to refute than the other claim, Socrates!

SOCRATES: Not difficult, surely, Polus. It's impossible. What's true is never refuted.

POLUS: What do you mean? Take a man who's caught doing something unjust, say, plotting to set himself up as tyrant. Suppose that he's caught, [*c*] put on the rack, castrated, and has his eyes burned out. Suppose that he's subjected to a host of other abuses of all sorts, and then made to witness his wife and children undergo the same. In the end he's impaled or tarred. Will he be happier than if he hadn't got caught, had set himself up as tyrant, and lived out his life ruling in his city and doing whatever he liked, a person envied and counted happy by fellow citizens and aliens alike?

Is *this* [*d*] what you say is impossible to refute?

SOCRATES: This time you're spooking me, Polus, instead of refuting me. Just before, you were arguing by testimony. Still, refresh my memory on a small point: if the man plots to set himself up as tyrant *unjustly*, you said?

POLUS: Yes, I did.

SOCRATES: In that case neither of them will ever be the happier one, neither the one who gains tyrannical power unjustly, nor the one who pays what is due, for of two miserable people one could not be happier than the other. But the one who avoids getting caught and becomes a [*e*] tyrant is the more miserable one. What's this, Polus? You're laughing? Is this now some further style of refutation, to laugh when somebody makes a point, instead of refuting him?

POLUS: Don't you think you've been refuted already, Socrates, when you're saying things the likes of which no human being would maintain? Just ask any one of these people.

SOCRATES: Polus, I'm not one of the politicians. Last year I was elected to the Council by lot, and {139} when our tribe was presiding and I had to call for a vote, I came in for a laugh. I didn't know how to do it. So please [*474a*] don't tell me to call for a vote from the people present here. If you have no better "refutations" than these to offer, do as I suggested just now: let me have my turn, and you try the kind of refutation I think is called for. For I do know how to produce one witness to whatever I'm saying, and

that's the man I'm having a discussion with. The majority I disregard. And I do know how to call for a vote from one man, but I don't even [*b*] discuss things with the majority. See if you'll be willing to give me a refutation, then, by answering the questions you're asked. For I do believe that you and I and everybody else consider doing what's unjust worse than suffering it, and not paying what is due worse than paying it.

POLUS: And I do believe that I don't, and that no other person does, either. So you'd take suffering what's unjust over doing it, would you?

SOCRATES: Yes, and so would you and everyone else.

POLUS: Far from it! I wouldn't, you wouldn't, and nobody else would, either.

[*c*] SOCRATES: Won't you answer, then?

POLUS: I certainly will. I'm eager to know what you'll say, in fact.

SOCRATES: So that you'll know, answer me as though this were my first question to you. Which do you think is worse, Polus, doing what's unjust or suffering it?

POLUS: I think suffering it is.

SOCRATES: You do? Which do you think is more shameful, doing what's unjust or suffering it? Tell me.

POLUS: Doing it.

SOCRATES: Now if doing it is in fact more shameful, isn't it also worse?

POLUS: No, not in the least.

[*d*] SOCRATES: I see. Evidently you don't believe that admirable and good are the same, or that *bad* and *shameful* are.

POLUS: No, I certainly don't.

SOCRATES: Well, what about this? When you call all admirable things admirable, bodies, for example, or colors, shapes and sounds, or practices, is it with nothing in view that you do so each time? Take admirable bodies first. Don't you call them admirable either in virtue of their usefulness, relative to whatever it is that each is useful for, or else in virtue of some pleasure, if it makes the people who look at them get enjoyment from looking at them? In the case of the admirability of a body, can you mention anything other than these?

POLUS: No, I can't. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Doesn't the same hold for all the other things? Don't you call shapes and colors admirable on account of either some pleasure or benefit

or both?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Doesn't this also hold for sounds and all things musical?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And certainly things that pertain to laws and practices—the admirable ones, that is—don't fall outside the limits of being either pleasant or beneficial, or both, I take it.

POLUS: No, I don't think they do. [*475a*]

SOCRATES: Doesn't the same hold for the admirability of the fields of learning, too?

POLUS: Yes indeed. Yes, Socrates, your present definition of the admirable in terms of pleasure and good is an admirable one.

SOCRATES: And so is my definition of the shameful in terms of the opposite, pain and bad, isn't it?

POLUS: Necessarily so.

SOCRATES: Therefore, whenever one of two admirable things is more admirable than the other, it is so because it surpasses the other either in one of these, pleasure or benefit, or in both.

POLUS: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: And whenever one of two shameful things is more shameful than the other, it will be so because it surpasses the other either in pain [*b*] or in badness. Isn't that necessarily so?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well now, what were we saying a moment ago about doing what's unjust and suffering it? Weren't you saying that suffering it is worse, but doing it more shameful?

POLUS: I was.

SOCRATES: Now if doing what's unjust is in fact more shameful than suffering it, wouldn't it be so either because it is more painful and surpasses the other in pain, or because it surpasses it in badness, or both? Isn't that necessarily so, too?

{140} POLUS: Of course it is.

SOCRATES: Let's look at this first: does doing what's unjust surpass suffering [*c*] it in pain, and do people who do it hurt more than people who suffer it?

POLUS: No, Socrates, that's not the case at all!

SOCRATES: So it doesn’t surpass it in pain, anyhow.

POLUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: So, if it doesn’t surpass it in pain, it couldn’t at this point surpass it in both.

POLUS: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: This leaves it surpassing it only in the other thing.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In badness.

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: So, because it surpasses it in badness, doing what’s unjust would be worse than suffering it.

POLUS: That’s clear.

SOCRATES: Now didn’t the majority of mankind, and you earlier, agree [*d*] with us that doing what’s unjust is more shameful than suffering it?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And now, at least, it’s turned out to be worse.

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: Would you then welcome what’s worse and what’s more shameful over what is less so? Don’t shrink back from answering, Polus. You won’t get hurt in any way. Submit yourself nobly to the argument, as you would to a doctor, and answer me. Say yes or no to what I ask you.

[*e*] POLUS: No, I wouldn’t, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And would any other person?

POLUS: No, I don’t think so, not on this reasoning, anyhow.

SOCRATES: I was right, then, when I said that neither you nor I nor any other person would take doing what’s unjust over suffering it, for it really is something worse.

POLUS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: So you see, Polus, that when the one refutation is compared with the other, there is no resemblance at all. Whereas everyone but me [*476a*] agrees with you, you are all I need, although you’re just a party of one, for your agreement and testimony. It’s you alone whom I call on for a vote; the others I disregard. Let this be our verdict on this matter, then. Let’s next consider the second point in dispute between us, that is whether a wrongdoer’s paying what is due is the worst thing there is, as you were supposing, or whether his not paying it is even worse, as I was.

Let’s look at it this way. Are you saying that paying what is due and being justly disciplined for wrongdoing are the same thing?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Can you say, then, that all just [*b*] things aren’t admirable, insofar as they are just? Think carefully and tell me.

POLUS: Yes, I think they are.

SOCRATES: Consider this point, too. If somebody acts upon something, there also has to be something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it?

POLUS: Yes, I think so.

SOCRATES: And that it has done to it what the thing acting upon it does, and in the sort of way the thing acting upon it does it? I mean, for example, that if somebody hits, there has to be something that’s being hit?

POLUS: There has to be.

SOCRATES: And if the hitter hits hard or quickly, the thing being hit is [*c*] hit that way, too?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So the thing being hit gets acted upon in whatever way the hitting thing acts upon it?

POLUS: Yes, that’s right.

SOCRATES: So, too, if somebody performs surgical burning, then there has to be something that’s being burned?

POLUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And if he burns severely or painfully, the thing that’s being burned is burned in whatever way the burning thing burns it?

POLUS: That’s right.

SOCRATES: Doesn’t the same account also hold if a person makes a surgical cut? For something is being cut.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing being cut [*d*] is cut in whatever way the cutting thing cuts it?

POLUS: So it appears.

{141} SOCRATES: Summing it up, see if you agree with what I was saying just now, that in all cases, in whatever way the thing acting upon something acts upon it, the thing acted upon is acted upon in just that way.

POLUS: Yes, I do agree.

SOCRATES: Taking this as agreed, is paying what is due a case of being acted upon or of acting upon something?

POLUS: It must be a case of being acted upon, Socrates.

SOCRATES: By someone who acts?

POLUS: Of course. By the one administering discipline.

SOCRATES: Now one who disciplines correctly disciplines justly? [*e*]

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Thereby acting justly, or not?

POLUS: Yes, justly.

SOCRATES: So the one being disciplined is being acted upon justly when he pays what is due?

POLUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And it was agreed, I take it, that just things are admirable?

POLUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: So one of these men does admirable things, and the other, the one being disciplined, has admirable things done to him.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: If they're admirable, then, aren't they good? For they're either [*477a*] pleasant or beneficial.

POLUS: Necessarily so.

SOCRATES: Hence, the one paying what is due has good things being done to him?

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: Hence, he's being benefited?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Is his benefit the one I take it to be? Does his soul undergo improvement if he's justly disciplined?

POLUS: Yes, that's likely.

SOCRATES: Hence, one who pays what is due gets rid of something bad in his soul?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, is the bad thing he gets rid of the most serious one? Consider it this way: in the matter of a person's financial condition, do [*b*] you detect any bad thing other than poverty?

POLUS: No, just poverty.

SOCRATES: What about that of a person's physical condition? Would you say that what is bad here consists of weakness, disease, ugliness, and the like?

POLUS: Yes, I would.

SOCRATES: Do you believe that there's also some corrupt condition of the soul?

POLUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And don't you call this condition injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?

POLUS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Of these three things, one's finances, one's body, and one's [*c*] soul, you said there are three states of corruption, namely poverty, disease, and injustice?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Which of these states of corruption is the most shameful? Isn't it injustice, and corruption of one's soul in general?

POLUS: Very much so.

SOCRATES: And if it's the most shameful, it's also the worst?

POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I mean this: What we agreed on earlier implies that what's most shameful is so always because it's the source either of the greatest pain, or of harm, or of both.

POLUS: Very much so.

SOCRATES: And now we've agreed that injustice, and corruption of soul [*d*] as a whole, is the most shameful thing.

POLUS: So we have.

SOCRATES: So either it's most painful and is most shameful because it surpasses the others in pain, or else in harm, or in both?

POLUS: Necessarily so.

SOCRATES: Now is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly, and ignorant more painful than being poor or sick?

POLUS: No, I don't think so, Socrates, given what we've said, anyhow.

SOCRATES: So the reason that corruption of one's soul is the most shameful [*e*] of them all is that it surpasses the others by some monstrously great harm and astounding badness, since it doesn't surpass them in pain, according to your reasoning.

{142} POLUS: So it appears.

SOCRATES: But what is surpassing in greatest harm would, I take it, certainly be the worst thing there is.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Injustice, then, lack of discipline and all other forms of corruption of soul are the worst thing there is.

POLUS: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Now, what is the craft that gets rid of poverty? Isn't it that of financial management?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What's the one that gets rid of disease? Isn't it that of medicine?

[*478a*] POLUS: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: What's the one that gets rid of corruption and injustice? If you're stuck, look at it this way: where and to whom do we take people who are physically sick?

POLUS: To doctors, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Where do we take people who behave unjustly and without discipline?

POLUS: To judges, you mean?

SOCRATES: Isn't it so they'll pay what's due?

POLUS: Yes, I agree.

SOCRATES: Now don't those who administer discipline correctly employ a kind of justice in doing so?

POLUS: That's clear.

SOCRATES: It's financial management, then, that gets rid of poverty, medicine that gets rid of disease, and justice that gets rid of injustice and indiscipline. [*b*]

POLUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Which of these, now, is the most admirable?

POLUS: Of which, do you mean?

SOCRATES: Of financial management, medicine, and justice.

POLUS: Justice is by far, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Doesn't it in that case provide either the most pleasure, or benefit, or both, if it really is the most admirable?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, is getting medical treatment something pleasant? Do people who get it enjoy getting it?

POLUS: No, I don't think so.

SOCRATES: But it is beneficial, isn't it?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Because they're getting rid of something very bad, so that it's [*c*] worth their while to endure the pain and so get well.

POLUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Now, would a man be happiest, as far as his body goes, if he's under treatment, or if he weren't even sick to begin with?

POLUS: If he weren't even sick, obviously.

SOCRATES: Because happiness evidently isn't a matter of getting rid of something bad; it's rather a matter of not even contracting it to begin with.

POLUS: That's so.

SOCRATES: Very well. Of two people, each of whom has something bad [*d*] in either body or soul, which is the more miserable one, the one who is treated and gets rid of the bad thing or the one who doesn't but keeps it?

POLUS: The one who isn't treated, it seems to me.

SOCRATES: Now, wasn't paying what's due getting rid of the worst thing there is, corruption?

POLUS: It was.

SOCRATES: Yes, because such justice makes people self-controlled, I take it, and more just. It proves to be a treatment against corruption.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The happiest man, then, is the one who doesn't have any badness in his soul, now that this has been shown to be the most serious kind of badness.

POLUS: That's clear.

SOCRATES: And second, I suppose, is the man who gets rid of it. [*e*]

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: This is the man who gets lectured and lashed, the one who pays what is due.

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: The man who keeps it, then, and who doesn't get rid of it, is the one whose life is the worst.

POLUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Isn’t this actually the man who, although he commits the most [*479a*] serious crimes and uses methods that are most unjust, succeeds in avoiding being lectured and disciplined and paying his due, as Archelaus according to you, {143} and the other tyrants, orators, and potentates have put themselves in a position to do?

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: Yes, my good man, I take it that these people have managed to accomplish pretty much the same thing as a person who has contracted very serious illnesses, but, by avoiding treatment manages to avoid paying what’s due to the doctors for his bodily faults, fearing, as would a child, [*b*] cauterization or surgery because they’re painful. Don’t you think so, too?

POLUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: It’s because he evidently doesn’t know what health and bodily excellence are like. For on the basis of what we’re now agreed on, it looks as though those who avoid paying what is due also do the same sort of thing, Polus. They focus on its painfulness, but are blind to its benefit and are ignorant of how much more miserable it is to live with an unhealthy [*c*] soul than with an unhealthy body, a soul that’s rotten with injustice and impiety. This is also the reason they go to any length to avoid paying what is due and getting rid of the worst thing there is. They find themselves funds and friends, and ways to speak as persuasively as possible. Now if what we’re agreed on is true, Polus, are you aware of what things follow from our argument? Or would you like us to set them out?

POLUS: Yes, if you think we should anyhow.

SOCRATES: Does it follow that injustice, and doing what is unjust, is the worst thing there is?

[*d*] POLUS: Yes, apparently.

SOCRATES: And it has indeed been shown that paying what is due is what gets rid of this bad thing?

POLUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: And that if it isn’t paid, the bad thing is retained?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, doing what’s unjust is the second worst thing. Not paying what’s due when one has done what’s unjust is by its nature the first worst thing, the very worst of all.

POLUS: Evidently.

SOCRATES: Now wasn't this the point in dispute between us, my friend? [*e*] You considered Archelaus happy, a man who committed the gravest crimes without paying what was due, whereas I took the opposite view, that whoever avoids paying his due for his wrongdoing, whether he's Archelaus or any other man, is and deserves to be miserable beyond all other men, and that one who does what's unjust is always more miserable than the one who suffers it, and the one who avoids paying what's due always more miserable than the one who does pay it. Weren't these the things I said?

POLUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Hasn't it been proved that what was said is true?

POLUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Fair enough. If these things are true then, Polus, what is the [*480a*] great use of oratory? For on the basis of what we're agreed on now, what a man should guard himself against most of all is doing what's unjust, knowing that he will have trouble enough if he does. Isn't that so?

POLUS: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: And if he or anyone else he cares about acts unjustly, he should voluntarily go to the place where he'll pay his due as soon as possible; he should go to the judge as though he were going to a doctor, [*b*] anxious that the disease of injustice shouldn't be protracted and cause his soul to fester incurably. What else can we say, Polus, if our previous agreements really stand? Aren't these statements necessarily consistent with our earlier ones in only this way?

POLUS: Well yes, Socrates. What else are we to say?

SOCRATES: So, if oratory is used to defend injustice, Polus, one's own or that of one's relatives, companions, or children, or that of one's country when it acts unjustly, it is of no use to us at all, unless one takes it to be [*c*] useful for the opposite purpose: that he should accuse himself first and foremost, and then too his family and anyone else dear to him who happens to behave unjustly at any time; and that he should not keep his wrongdoing hidden but bring it out into the open, so that he may pay his due and get well; and compel himself and the others not to play the coward, but to grit his teeth and present himself with grace and courage as to a doctor for cauterization and surgery, pursuing what's good {144} and admirable without taking any account of the pain. And if his unjust behavior merits flogging, he should present himself to be whipped; if it merits

imprisonment, to be [*d*] imprisoned; if a fine, to pay it; if exile, to be exiled; and if execution, to be executed. He should be his own chief accuser, and the accuser of other members of his family, and use his oratory for the purpose of getting rid of the worst thing there is, injustice, as the unjust acts are being exposed. Are we to affirm or deny this, Polus?

POLUS: I think these statements are absurd, Socrates, though no doubt [*e*] you think they agree with those expressed earlier.

SOCRATES: Then either we should abandon those, or else these necessarily follow?

POLUS: Yes, that's how it is.

SOCRATES: And, on the other hand, to reverse the case, suppose a man had to harm someone, an enemy or anybody at all, provided that he didn't suffer anything unjust from this enemy himself—for this is something to be on guard against—if the enemy did something unjust against another [*481a*] person, then our man should see to it in every way, both in what he does and what he says, that his enemy does not go to the judge and pay his due. And if he does go, he should scheme to get his enemy off without paying what's due. If he's stolen a lot of gold, he should scheme to get him not to return it but to keep it and spend it in an unjust and godless way both on himself and his people. And if his crimes merit the death penalty, he should scheme to keep him from being executed, preferably never to die at all but to live forever in corruption, but failing that, to have [*b*] him live as long as possible in that condition. Yes, this is the sort of thing I think oratory is useful for, Polus, since for the person who has no intention of behaving unjustly it doesn't seem to me to have much use—if in fact it has any use at all—since its usefulness hasn't in any way become apparent so far.

1. A title referring to the king of Persia, who embodied the popular idea of supreme happiness.

MENO PHAEDO SYMPOSIUM

THESE THREE DIALOGUES are linked by the emergence and development in them of Plato's famous theory of forms. The *Meno* begins with the question, also raised in the *Protagoras*, of whether virtue can be taught. This leads to an inquiry into virtue; what is the one form shared in common by all the virtues that makes each of them a virtue (72c–d)? Various answers are proposed and rejected. Then Meno introduces a general problem for the inquiry: if neither he nor Socrates knows what virtue is, how will they recognize it when they find it (80d)? Socrates answers with the theory of recollection, which he attempts to underwrite by the examination of the slave boy (81a–86c). The dialogue ends with a return to the original topic of whether virtue can be taught. The theory of recollection presupposes that the soul is immortal. In the *Phaedo*, explicit arguments are given in favor of this presupposition, the theory of recollection is modified and enriched, and we learn more about the nature of forms and about their role not just in ethics but in science and cosmology. The *Phaedo*, which—like the *Crito*—is set in the prison where Socrates spends his last days, ends with an account of his death. In the *Symposium*, Plato gives one of his most vivid accounts of the ascent of the soul from visible, tangible particulars to intelligible, abstract forms, and we learn that it is love (*erōs*) that leads us to make that ascent.

MENO

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

{145} [*70a*] MENO:[1] Can you tell me, Socrates, is virtue something acquired by teaching? Or is it something acquired not by teaching, but by practice? Or is it something acquired neither by practice nor by learning, but something human beings possess by nature or in some other way?

SOCRATES: In the past, Meno, the inhabitants of Thessaly were well-reputed among the Greeks—admired for their horsemanship and their wealth. But now for their wisdom too, it [*b*] seems to me—especially the Larissans, your friend Aristippus' fellow citizens.[2] You have Gorgias to thank for that.[3] When he arrived in Larissa, he acquired as lovers for his wisdom the leading Aleuadae—among them your own lover Aristippus—and the other leading Thessalians as well. And he got you into this habit of answering fearlessly and high-mindedly when anyone asks you anything—as is reasonable enough if you have the knowledge. After all, he too makes [*c*] himself available to any Greek to ask him any question they want, and none of them fail to get an answer. But here in Athens, my friend, we are in the opposite situation. There has been a [*71a*] drought of wisdom, so to speak, and there is a good chance that wisdom has left these parts to go live with you. At any rate, if you wanted to question anyone who lives here in that way, there is no one who wouldn't laugh and say: "Stranger, apparently you think I am somehow divinely blessed, that I know whether virtue is something acquired by teaching or whatever the way is that human beings get it. I am so far from knowing whether it is something acquired by teaching, or not by teaching, that in fact I do not know at all what in the world virtue itself is." [*b*] Well, I am also that way myself, Meno. I share the poverty of my fellow citizens in this matter. I reproach myself for not knowing anything whatever about virtue. But if I do not know what it is, how could I know what *sort* of thing it is? Or do you think it is possible for someone, who does not know at all who Meno is, to know whether Meno is beautiful or rich or in fact of noble birth, or the opposites of these? Do you think that is possible?

MENO: No, I do not. But, Socrates, do you [*c*] really not know what virtue is? Are we to report *this* about you to the folks back home?

SOCRATES: Not only that, my friend, but also that I have never met anyone else I thought did know.

MENO: What? Didn't you meet Gorgias[4] when he was here?

SOCRATES: I did.

MENO: And you didn't think he knew?

SOCRATES: I haven't a very good memory, Meno, so I cannot tell you at present what I thought [*d*] of him then. Maybe he does know. Presumably,

you know what he said. So remind me what it was. Or if you prefer, speak for yourself. I imagine you think the same as he.

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: Well in that case, let's leave him out of it, since in fact he is not here. But as for yourself, by the gods, Meno, what do you say virtue is? Tell me, don't be begrudging. The result may be that I spoke a very lucky falsehood when I said that I had never yet met anyone who knew this, if it comes to light that you and Gorgias do know it.

MENO: I will tell you, Socrates; it is not difficult. [*e*] First, then, if you want to know a man's virtue, that is easy. This is a man's virtue: to take part in the city's affairs capably, and by doing so to benefit his friends and harm his enemies, {146} while taking care that he himself does not suffer anything like that. If you want a woman's virtue, that is not difficult to describe. She must manage the household well, look after its contents, and be obedient to the man. There is a different virtue for a child, one for a male and one for a female, and for an older man, one for a [*72a*] free man, if you want to know that, and one for a slave, if you want to know that. There are very many other virtues, too, so there is no puzzle about telling you what virtue is. You see, for each of the affairs and stages of life, and in relation to each particular function, there is a virtue for each of us—and it is the same way, I think, Socrates, for vice.

SOCRATES: I seem to be enjoying a great stroke of good luck indeed, Meno, if, while inquiring about one virtue, I have turned up something like a swarm of virtues in your possession. But, [*b*] Meno, keeping to this image of swarms, suppose I asked you about being a bee, what a bee is, and you said that bees are many and multifarious. What would you reply if I asked you: "Do you mean they are many and multifarious and different from one another in this—in each being bees? Or do they not differ at all in that, but in some other way—for example, in beauty or size or some other such way?" Tell me, how would you answer if questioned like that?

MENO: This is what I'd say: they do not differ at all one from another in being bees.

[*c*] SOCRATES: So if I went on and said: "Then tell me about that thing itself, Meno—that in which they do not differ, but are all the same. What do you say *it* is?" No doubt you would have an answer to give me.

MENO: I would.

SOCRATES: It is the same with the virtues, too. Even if they are many and multifarious, surely they all have one identical form, because of which they are all virtues. And it is right, I would suppose, for the one who is answering to look to *that* in order to make clear what virtue actually [*d*] is to the one who asked. Or don't you understand what I mean?

MENO: I think I understand. But I don't yet grasp what you are asking as firmly as I would like.

SOCRATES: Is it only about virtue that you think this way, Meno—that there is one for a man, another for a woman's, and so on for the others? Or do you think the same about health and size and strength? Do you think health is one for a man, another for a woman? Or is there the same [*e*] form everywhere, if it really is health, whether for a man or for anything else whatever?

MENO: I think health, at any rate, is the same, both for a man and for a woman.

SOCRATES: What about size and strength, then? If in fact a woman is strong, will she be strong by virtue of the same form, by the same strength? By "the same strength" I mean this: strength does not differ at all as regards being strength, whether it is in a man or in a woman. Or do you think there is some difference?

MENO: No, I don't.

SOCRATES: Then will virtue differ, as regards [*73a*] being virtue, whether it is in a child or in an old man, in a woman or in a man?

MENO: Well, I somehow think, Socrates, that this is no longer like those other cases.

SOCRATES: What? Weren't you saying that a man's virtue is to manage a city well, and a woman's a household?

MENO: Yes, I was.

SOCRATES: Well then, is it possible to manage a city well or a household or anything else whatever, while not managing it temperately and justly?

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: And if they really manage it justly [*b*] and temperately, isn't it by means of justice and temperance that they will manage it?

MENO: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: So both men and women will need the same things, if they are really going to be good—justice and temperance.

MENO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: What about a child and an old man? If they were intemperate and unjust, could they possibly be good?

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But if they were temperate and just?

MENO: Yes.

{147} [*c*] SOCRATES: So all human beings are good in the same way, since they are good if they possess the same things.

MENO: So it seems.

SOCRATES: But surely if their virtue were not the same, they would not be good in the same way.

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: So, since the virtue of them all is the same, try to tell me, try to recollect, what Gorgias says it is—and you say with him.

MENO: Well, what else than to be able to rule people? If you are really inquiring about one [*d*] thing that covers all of them.

SOCRATES: Yes indeed, I am inquiring about that. But is that same virtue the virtue of a child, Meno, and of a slave—to be able to rule over their master? Do you think that the one who rules would still be a slave?

MENO: No, I don't think so at all, Socrates.

SOCRATES: No, that wouldn't be reasonable, my very good man. And consider this further point too. Virtue, you say, is "ability to rule." Are we not to add "justly," not "unjustly"?

MENO: Yes, I think that's right. For justice, Socrates, is virtue.

[*e*] SOCRATES: Virtue, Meno? Or *a* virtue?

MENO: What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES: The same as with anything else. For example, roundness, if you like. I would say about roundness that it is *a* shape, not that it is just simply shape. My reason for speaking like that is that there are other shapes.

MENO: Yes, and you would be speaking rightly, since I also say that it is not only justice that is virtue, but that there are other virtues too.

[*74a*] SOCRATES: Which ones are? Tell me. I could mention other shapes to you, if you asked me to. So you do likewise. Mention some other virtues to me.

MENO: Well, I think courage is a virtue, and temperance and wisdom and high-mindedness, and very many others.

SOCRATES: As before, Meno, the same thing has happened to us. Again, we have found many virtues when we were inquiring about one, though in a different way than in the previous case. But the one that extends through all of them we cannot find.

MENO: No, for I cannot yet grasp, Socrates, what you are inquiring about —one virtue that [*b*] covers all of them, as in the other cases.

SOCRATES: That isn't surprising. But I am eager, if I can, to move us closer to it. For you understand, surely, that this is just how it is in all of them: if someone were to ask you, as I asked previously, "What is shape, Meno?" and you said that it was roundness, and he then asked, as I did, "Is roundness shape or *a* shape?" you would no doubt reply that it is *a* shape.

MENO: Of course.

SOCRATES: The reason being that there are [*c*] other shapes too?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And if he went on to ask you what sorts of shapes, you would tell him?

MENO: I would.

SOCRATES: Again, if he asked you in the same way what color is, and you said "white," and he went on to ask, "Is white color or *a* color?" you would say that it is *a* color, because there are other colors too?

MENO: I would.

SOCRATES: And if he asked you to mention some other colors, you would mention others that [*d*] are no less colors than white is?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then, if he pursued the argument as I did, and said, "We keep arriving at many things. Please don't answer me like that. You call these many things by a single name, and say that none of them is not a shape. And you say that even though they are opposites of one another. So tell me just what is this thing that encompasses the round no less than the straight, the one you [*e*] call shape, so that you say that the round is no more shape than is the straight?" Or don't you say that?

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: Well then, when you speak like that, do you mean that the round is no more round than straight, or that the straight is no more straight than round?

MENO: Of course not, Socrates.

{148} SOCRATES: Instead, you mean that the round is no more shape than is the straight, or the straight than the round?

MENO: True.

SOCRATES: Well then, what is this thing of which this is the name —"shape"? Try to say. If you said to the questioner who asked you in this way about shape or color, "I don't understand what you want, [*75a*] my man, nor even what you mean," he would probably be amazed and say, "You don't understand that I am inquiring about what in all these cases is the same?" Even in this case, Meno, would you be unable to answer, if someone were to ask you, "What is it that is the same in all these cases—in the case of the round and the straight and the rest—the thing that you call shape?" Try to say. By doing so you will also get practice for your answer about virtue.

[*b*] MENO: No, please, Socrates, you answer.

SOCRATES: You want me to indulge you?

MENO: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And then you will be willing to tell me about virtue?

MENO: I will.

SOCRATES: I must give it a try, since it is worth it.

MENO: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Come on then, let's try to tell you what shape is. See whether you accept that it is this: shape for us is that thing which, alone among the things that are, always goes along with color. Is that answer enough for you, or are you inquiring after some other sort? You see, I would [*c*] certainly be satisfied if you told me about virtue in just that way.

MENO: But that's silly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: How do you mean?

MENO: I mean that shape, if I am not mistaken, is according to your account what always goes along with color. All right. So if someone were to say that he didn't know color, but had the same puzzle about it as with shape, what sort of answer do you think you would have given him?

SOCRATES: I think a true one. And if my questioner were one of those eristical[5] and [*d*] contentious wise fellows, I would say to him, "I have given my answer. If what I say isn't correct, your function is to demand an account and then refute it." But if people want to engage in discussion with

one another as friends, the way you and I are doing now, they must answer more gently, as it were, and in a more dialectical manner.[6] And it is perhaps more dialectical not to answer with the truth alone, but also to do so in terms which the answerer agrees he knows. I [*e*] too, then, will try to answer you in that way. So tell me, is there something you call an end? I mean something like a limit or a boundary—I mean the same thing by all of them. Perhaps, Prodicus[7] would disagree with us, but *you* surely say there is such a thing as having limits or ends. That is the sort of thing I mean—nothing complex.

MENO: Yes I do. I think I understand what you mean, too.

SOCRATES: Well then, is there something you call a surface, and something else again you call [*76a*] a solid—for example, the ones in geometry?

MENO: Yes, there is.

SOCRATES: Then you can already understand from these what I say shape is. You see, in the case of every shape, I say that what a solid meets its limit in is shape.

MENO: And what do you say color is, Socrates?

SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno! You cause an old man trouble, commanding him to [*b*] answer, while you yourself aren't willing to recollect and tell us what Gorgias says virtue is.

MENO: You tell me this, Socrates, and I will tell you that.

SOCRATES: A man would know blindfold, Meno, just from the way you engage in discussion, that you are beautiful and still have lovers![8]

MENO: How so?

SOCRATES: Because you do nothing except give commands when you speak, the way spoiled boys do, who act like tyrants while their bloom lasts. At the same time, too, you have probably [*c*] noticed my weakness for beautiful boys. So I will indulge you and answer.

{149} MENO: By all means, indulge me!

SOCRATES: Would you like me to give an answer Gorgias-fashion, the way it would be easiest for you to follow?

MENO: Yes, of course I would.

SOCRATES: Well then, don't you both talk about certain effluences from things, the way Empedocles[9] does?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And pores into which and through which the effluences travel?

MENO: Indeed.

SOCRATES: And some of the effluences fit certain pores, whereas others are too small or too large?

[*d*] MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: And is there something you call sight?

MENO: There is.

SOCRATES: Well, from this, then, "grasp what I mean," as Pindar says.[10] Color is an effluence from shapes that is commensurate with sight, and so perceptible.

MENO: I think that is an excellent answer, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Probably because it is put in a way you are accustomed to. At the same time, I suppose, you realize that you could use the same things to say what sound is, and smell, and [*e*] many other things of that sort.

MENO: Of course.

SOCRATES: It is a "deep" answer indeed, Meno, so it pleases you more than the one about shape.

MENO: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: Yet, I am convinced it is not a better one, son of Alexidemus. On the contrary, the other is better. And I don't think you would disagree, if you did not have to leave, as you mentioned yesterday, before the celebration of the Mysteries, but could stay and be initiated.[11]

MENO: But I would stay, Socrates, if you could [*77a*] tell me many things like that.

SOCRATES: Then I certainly won't be any less than eager to tell you them—both for your sake and for my own. But I fear I won't be able to give you many answers of that sort. Come on, though, you also keep your promise to me, and try to say what virtue as a whole is. Stop making many out of one, as the jokers say each time someone breaks something, but leave virtue whole [*b*] and sound and say what it is. You got models, at least, from me.

MENO: In that case, Socrates, I think virtue, as the poets say, is "enjoying beautiful things and having power."[12] And so I say this is what virtue is, to desire beautiful things and have the power to get them.

SOCRATES: Do you mean that the one who desires beautiful things desires good ones?

MENO: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: On the assumption that there are some people who desire bad things, and others [*c*] good ones? Don't you think, my very good man, that everyone desires good things?

MENO: No, I don't.

SOCRATES: But some desire bad ones?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Thinking the bad ones are good, do you mean? Or actually recognizing they are bad and desiring them all the same?

MENO: Both, I think.

SOCRATES: Really? You think someone recognizes that the bad things are bad but desires them all the same?

MENO: Of course.

SOCRATES: What do you mean by that he desires? That he possesses them for himself?

MENO: That he possesses them for himself. What else?

{150} [*d*] SOCRATES: Thinking that the bad things benefit the one who gets them? Or knowing that the bad things harm the one who possesses them?

MENO: Some thinking that the bad things benefit; others recognizing that they harm.

SOCRATES: Do you also think that those who think that the bad things benefit recognize that the bad things are bad?

MENO: Not at all, I certainly do not think that.

SOCRATES: Then it is clear that *they*—the ones who do not know about them—don't desire bad [*e*] things; rather, they desire things that they think are good, though in fact they are bad. Hence, those who don't know about these things and think that they are good clearly do desire good things. Don't they?

MENO: It looks as though they do, anyway.

SOCRATES: What about those who desire bad things, thinking, so you claim, that bad things harm the one who gets them? They recognize, surely, that they will be harmed by them?

MENO: They must.

[*78a*] SOCRATES: But don’t they think that those who are harmed are—to the extent that they are harmed—wretched?

MENO: They must be aware of that too.

SOCRATES: And that the wretched are unhappy?

MENO: Yes, I think so.

SOCRATES: Is there anyone who wants to be wretched and unhappy?

MENO: I don’t think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then no one wants bad things, Meno, if indeed he does not want to be like that. For what is being wretched other than wanting bad things and getting them?

[*b*] MENO: It looks as though you are right, Socrates—no one wants bad things.

SOCRATES: Well, weren’t you saying just now that virtue is wanting good things and having power?

MENO: Yes, I did say that.

SOCRATES: Well, the wanting part of this statement holds of everyone, and so in this respect at least no one is better than anyone else.

MENO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: But it is clear then that if indeed someone is better than someone else, it must be as regards power that he is better.

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So this, it seems, is virtue according to your account: the power to get good things.

MENO: I think, Socrates, that the way you are [*c*] interpreting me now is entirely correct.

SOCRATES: Let’s also see, then, whether you are speaking the truth, since you may prove to have spoken correctly. You say that the power to get good things is virtue?

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: And the things you call good are things like wealth and health aren’t they?

MENO: Yes, I think getting gold and silver is good and also honors and public offices in the city.

SOCRATES: But you don’t think anything else is good besides things of that sort?

MENO: No, just all things of that sort.

SOCRATES: All right. Getting gold and silver is [*d*] virtue. So says Meno, family friend of the Great King![13] Do you add "justly and piously" to this "getting," Meno? Or does that make no difference? Even if someone gets these things *unjustly*, do you call it virtue all the same?

MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But vice?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So it seems that justice, temperance, piety, or some other part of virtue must be [*e*] added to this getting. If not, it will not be virtue, even though it is a getting of good things.

MENO: No, for how could it be virtue without them?

SOCRATES: And *not* getting gold and silver, either for oneself or for someone else, when it is not just to do so, isn't this also virtue, this not-getting?

MENO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: So getting good things won't be any more virtue than not getting them. Instead, what is done with justice is virtue, while what is done without anything like it, is vice.

MENO: I think it must be as you claim. [*79a*]

{151} SOCRATES: Now, didn't we say a moment ago that each of these is a part of virtue—justice, temperance, and everything of that sort?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Really, Meno? Are you teasing me?

MENO: Why, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Because I begged you just now not to break virtue into pieces or exchange it for smaller coins. I even gave you models of how you should answer. But you pay no attention to [*b*] that, and tell me that virtue is getting good things with justice. And justice, you say, is part of virtue.

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: It follows, then, from what you agree to, that doing whatever one does with a part of virtue is virtue. For you say that justice is a part of virtue, as well as each of the others.

MENO: So?

SOCRATES: What I mean is this. I begged you to say what virtue as a whole is. But you, far from saying what it is, claim that every action is virtue if it

is done with a part of virtue—just as [*c*] if you had said what virtue as a whole is and I already know it, and would continue to do so even if you broke it up into pieces. So it seems to me that you need to start again with the same question, my friend. What is virtue, if every action done with a part of virtue is virtue? For that is what someone is saying when he says that every action done with justice is virtue. Don't you think you need to go back to the same question? Or do you think someone knows what a part of virtue is, when he does not know what virtue itself is?

MENO: No, I don't think that.

[*d*] SOCRATES: No. Also if you remember when I was answering you just now about shape, I think we rejected that sort of answer—one that tries to answer in terms of things that are still being inquired about and have not yet been agreed to.

MENO: Yes, and we were right to reject it, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then, my good Meno, when virtue as a whole is still being inquired about, you shouldn't suppose you will make it clear to anyone by couching your answer in terms of its parts, or that you will make anything else clear by speaking the same way. Rather, you should accept [*e*] that the same question needs to be asked again. What is this virtue about which you say the things you say? Or do you think I am talking nonsense?

MENO: No, I think what you say is right.

SOCRATES: Then answer again from the beginning. What do both you and that friend of yours say virtue is? [*80a*] MENO: Socrates, I heard before I ever met you that you are never anything but puzzled yourself and that you make others puzzled too. And now, I see for myself that you are using sorcery on me, drugging me, and simply subduing me with spells, so that I am full of puzzles. Indeed, you seem to me—if I may make a little joke—to be altogether very similar, both in appearance and other respects, to the flat, saltwater stingray, since it too always numbs whoever comes near and touches it. And you, I think, have now done something like that to me. You see, [*b*] my soul and my mouth feel truly numb, and so I do not have an answer for you. Yet on countless occasions, I have talked at length about virtue, in front of lots of people—very well, too, or so *I* thought. But now I cannot say at all what sort of thing it is. And so I think your decision not to travel away from here or live abroad was a good one. For if you did things

like this as a foreigner in another city, you might well be arrested as a sorcerer.

SOCRATES: You are a tricky customer, Meno! You almost had me fooled!

MENO: How exactly, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I know why you produced that [*c*] image of me.

MENO: Why?

SOCRATES: To get a counterimage of yourself in return! I know that all beautiful boys enjoy a game of image-making. After all, it profits them. For the images of beautiful boys, I suppose, are also beautiful. But I am not going to give a counterimage of you. As for me, if the stingray is numb itself, and only for that reason numbs others too, I am like it—otherwise not. You see, it is not that *I* am puzzle-free but make others puzzled. On the contrary, I am completely puzzled myself, and that is how I make others puzzled too. And now, as far as virtue is concerned, I do [*d*] not know what it is. Perhaps, you knew before {152} you came into contact with me, but now you are like someone who does not know. All the same, I want to consider the matter with you and join you in inquiring about what it is.

MENO: And how are you going to inquire about it, Socrates, when you do not at all know what it is? For what sort of thing, from among the ones you do not know, will you take as the object of your inquiry? And even if you do happen to bump right into it, how are you going to know that *it* is the thing you did not know?

[*e*] SOCRATES: I understand what you want to say, Meno. Do you see how eristical the argument is that you are spinning? According to it, so it seems, it is not possible for a person to inquire about what he knows, or about what he does not know. After all, he wouldn't inquire about what he knows—since he knows it, and there is no need to inquire about something like that—or about what he does not know—since he does not know what he is to inquire about.

[*81a*] MENO: Well, don't you think it is a beautiful argument, Socrates?

SOCRATES: No, I do not.

MENO: Can you tell me why?

SOCRATES: Yes, I can. You see, I have heard men and women who are wise in divine matters. . . .

MENO: Saying what?

SOCRATES: Something true, I think, and beautiful.

MENO: What is it? And who are the ones who say it?

SOCRATES: The ones who say it are those priests and priestesses who have made it their [*b*] concern to be able to give an account of their practices.[14] Pindar says it, too, as well as many other poets who are godlike men. And what they say is this. See whether you think they are telling the truth. They say the human soul is immortal. At one time it comes to an end—which is what people call dying—and at another is born again. But it is never destroyed. Because of this, they say, one should live one's life as piously as possible. For from whomever Persephone accepts requital for her ancient
grief, in the ninth year, to the sun above
she returns their souls again, [*c*] and from these, stately kings,
men swift in strength, in wisdom unsurpassed,
arise. And for the rest of time, heroes holy
by men they shall be called.[15]

Since the soul is immortal, then, and has been born many times, and has seen both the things here and the ones in Hades—in fact, all things—there is nothing it has not learned. So it is in no way surprising that it can recollect about virtue and other things, since it knew them before. For, [*d*] since all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, nothing prevents someone who is recollecting one thing—which men call learning it—from discovering all the rest for himself, provided he is courageous and doesn't get tired of inquiry. For the whole of inquiry or learning, in that case, is recollection. So one should not be persuaded by that eristical argument, since it would make us idle. It is pleasant for men who are soft to hear. But the present one makes us [*e*] energetic and eager to inquire. Trusting in its truth, I am willing to inquire with you about what virtue is.

MENO: Yes, Socrates. But what do you mean we do not learn, that what we call learning is in fact recollection? Can you teach me that this is so?

SOCRATES: I said a moment ago, Meno, that you were a tricky customer! And now you ask if I [*82a*] can teach you, when I say there is no teaching but only recollection, so that I shall be immediately revealed to have contradicted myself!

{153} MENO: By Zeus, Socrates, I didn't ask you with that in mind, but from force of habit! But if you can somehow show me that it is as you say, please show me.

SOCRATES: Well, it is not easy. All the same, I am willing to try for your sake. Call over to me [*b* one of the many attendants you have here, whichever one you like, so that I can demonstrate it for you in his case.

MENO: Certainly. [*Addressing a slave boy*] Come over here.

SOCRATES: Is he a Greek? Does he speak Greek, at least?

MENO: Yes, indeed. He is homegrown.

SOCRATES: Pay attention, then, and see whether he seems to you to be recollecting or learning from me.

MENO: Yes, I will.

SOCRATES: [*Turning to the boy*] Tell me, boy, do you know that a square figure looks like this? [*He draws the square ABCD in Figure 1*.]

BOY: I do.

SOCRATES: A square figure, then, is one that has all these four lines equal [*points to AB, BC, CD, and DA*]. [*c*] [16]

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And doesn't it also have these across the middle equal [*points to EF, GH*]?

BOY: Yes.



Figure 1

SOCRATES: Now couldn't there be a larger figure of this sort [*points to ABCD*] or a smaller one [*points to AGIE or one of the other inner squares*]?

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then, if this side [*AB*] were two feet, and this one [*BC*] were two feet, how many feet would the whole be? Look at it this way. If it were two feet this way [*AB*], but only one this way [*BF*], wouldn't the figure [*ABFE*] be one times two feet?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: But since it is also two feet in this [*d*] direction [ ] [*BC*], isn't it twice two?

BOY: It is.

SOCRATES: So it is twice two feet?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: How many feet, then, is twice two? Count them and tell me?

BOY: [*Counting the interior squares*] Four, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Now, couldn't there be another figure twice the size of this one [*ABCD*], but similar to it, having all its lines [*AB, BC, CD, DA, GH, EF*] equal just like this one?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: How many feet will it be?

BOY: Eight.

SOCRATES: Come on then, try to tell me how long each side in it will be. In this one [*ABCD*], it [*e*] is two feet. What is it in the one that is twice the size?

BOY: Clearly then, Socrates, it will be twice the size.

SOCRATES: Do you see, Meno, that I am not teaching him anything, but that all I am doing is asking questions? And at this point he thinks he knows how long a side will result in a figure of eight feet. Do you not agree?

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: Well, does he know?

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But he thinks, at least, that it results from a side twice as long.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now watch him recollect in order, which is the way one should recollect. [*Turning back to the boy*] Now you tell me this. You say that a figure twice the size results from a side [*83a*] {154} twice as long? I mean one like this, not long in this way [*AB*] and short in that [*BF*], but equal in all directions, as this one [*ABCD*] is, but twice its size, or eight feet. See if you still think it will result from a side twice as long.

BOY: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Well, isn't this line [*AJ*] twice as long as this [*AB*] if we add a second line of the same length [*BJ*] from here [*B*]? [*He draws the line BJ in Figure 2*.]



Figure 2

BOY: Certainly.

[*b*] SOCRATES: And it [*AJ*], you say, will result in a figure of eight feet, if there are four like it?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then let's draw four equal sides starting from it. [*Socrates draws JK, KL, LD.*] Wouldn't it [*AJKL*] be what you say is eight feet?

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, in it there are these four figures [*ABCD, BJMC, CMKN, DCNL*], each of which is equal to this four-foot one [*ABCD*].

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then, how big is it? Isn't it four times as big?

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then is four times the same size as twice?

BOY: No, by Zeus, it isn't!

SOCRATES: Then how many times is it the same as?

BOY: Four times.

SOCRATES: So from a line twice as long, my [*c*] boy, a figure results that is not twice as big, but four times.

BOY: That's true.

SOCRATES: For a figure of four times four feet is sixteen feet. Isn't it?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: So a figure of eight feet results from what line? Didn't this one [*AJ*] result in a figure four times as big?

BOY: It did.

SOCRATES: And this quarter here [*ABCD*] results from this half here [*AB*]?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: All right. But isn't the eight-foot figure double this one [*ABCD*] and half this one [*AJKL*]?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Will it result from a line longer than this one [*AB*] but shorter than this one here [*AJ*]? Or won't it?

BOY: Yes, I think so.

SOCRATES: Good. You see, what you think is [*d*] what you should give as your answer. So tell me, isn't this one [*AB*] two feet, and this one [*AJ*] four?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the line from which the eight-foot figure results must be greater than this two-foot one [*AB*], but less than this four-foot one [*AJ*].

BOY: It must.

SOCRATES: Then try to tell me how long you [*e*] think it is.

BOY: Three feet.

SOCRATES: Well, if indeed it is to be three feet, let's take half of this line [*BJ*] as well [*he marks the point P in Figure 2*] and it [*AP*] will be three feet. For there are two here [*AB*] and one here [*BP*]. And over here [*he marks the point R*], similarly, there are two feet here [*AD*] and one here [*DR*]. And the resulting figure [*he completes the square APQR*] is the one you mention.

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then if this [*AR*] is three and this [*AP*] is three, isn't the whole figure that results three times three feet?

BOY: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: And three times three is how many feet?

BOY: Nine.

{155} SOCRATES: But the one that was twice the size had to be how many feet?

BOY: Eight.

SOCRATES: So the eight-foot figure does not at all result from the three-foot line either.

BOY: No, indeed.

SOCRATES: But from which one does it result? Try to tell us exactly. If you don't want to calculate its length, point to which one it results from.

[*84a*] BOY: But, by Zeus, Socrates, I really don't know.

SOCRATES: [*Turning to Meno*] Do you see, Meno, what point he has reached as he proceeds on the path of recollection? At first, he did not know what the side of the eight-foot figure is, just as he does not at all know at this point either. But then he at least thought he knew, answered confidently as if he knew, and didn't think he was puzzled. At this point, however, he now does [*b* believe he is puzzled, and as he does not in fact know, he does not think he does either.

MENO: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then isn't he now better off as regards the thing he did not know?

MENO: I agree with that too.

SOCRATES: By making him puzzled, then, and numbing him like a stingray, have we done him any harm?

MENO: No, I don't think so.

SOCRATES: We have certainly done something useful, it seems, as regards finding out how the matter stands. For now he might actually inquire into it with pleasure, since he does not know, whereas before he thought he could easily speak well in front of lots of people and on lots of [*c* occasions about the figure that is twice the size, and how it must have a side twice as long.

MENO: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Well, do you think he would have tried to inquire or learn about what he thought he knew, before he fell into puzzlement, came to believe that he did not know, and became anxious to know?

MENO: I don't think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So didn't numbing profit him?

MENO: I think so.

SOCRATES: Observe, then, what he will discover starting from this puzzlement, as he inquires with me—but I shall only be asking questions, not teaching. You be on your guard to see [*d*] whether you discover me teaching or expounding something to him at any point, instead of questioning him about his own beliefs. [*Socrates turns back to the slave boy, erasing everything from Figure 2 except the square ABCD.*] Now you tell me, isn't this our four-foot figure? You understand?

BOY: I do.

SOCRATES: [*Beginning to draw Figure 3*] And we can add this other one here that is equal to it [*draws BJMC*]?



Figure 3

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: And this third one that is equal to each of them [*draws MKNC*]?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then we could fill in this one in the corner [*draws NLD*]?

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then won't these four equal figures result?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then, this whole resulting one [*AJKL*] [*e*] is how many times as big as this one [*ABCD*]?

BOY: Four times.

SOCRATES: But we needed one that was twice as big. Don't you remember?

BOY: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now doesn't this line from corner to corner [*he draws BD as an example of the sort of line he means*] cut each of these figures [*the four interior squares*] in two? [*85a*]

BOY: Yes.

{156} SOCRATES: Then aren't the four resulting lines [*he draws BM, MN, ND*] equal, the ones enclosing this figure [*BMND*]?

BOY: Yes, they are.

SOCRATES: Now consider. How large is this figure?

BOY: I don't know.

SOCRATES: Has each of these lines cut off the inner half of these four figures? Or not?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then how many of this size [*BCD*] are there in this one [*BMND*]?

BOY: Four.

SOCRATES: And how many in this [*ABCD*]?

BOY: Two.

SOCRATES: And what is four to two?

BOY: It is twice it.

SOCRATES: How many feet in this [*BMND*] as a result?

BOY: Eight.

[*b*] SOCRATES: From what line?

BOY: From this one [*BD*].

SOCRATES: From the one that stretches from one corner to the other of the four-foot one?

BOY: Yes.

SOCRATES: Experts call that the diagonal.[17] Hence if "diagonal" is its name, it would be from the diagonal, you say, Meno's slave boy, that the twice-as-big figure results.

BOY: Yes, certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: [*Turning to Meno*] What do you think, Meno? Is there any belief he gave as an answer that is not his own?

[*c*] MENO: No, they are his own.

SOCRATES: And yet he did not know the answer, as we said a short while ago.

MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: But these beliefs were in him, at least, were they not?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: So the one who does not have knowledge about whatever things he does not know has true beliefs in him about the things he does not know?

MENO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And now, by contrast, these beliefs have been stirred up in him like a dream. But if someone asks him these same questions many times and in many ways, you know that in the end [*d*] he will have knowledge of them that is no less exact than anyone else's.

MENO: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Then he will have knowledge without being taught by anyone but only questioned, since *he* will have recovered the knowledge *from inside himself*.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: But recovering knowledge himself from within himself is recollection, is it not?

MENO: Of course.

SOCRATES: So didn't he either get the knowledge he now has at some time or else always have it?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, if he always had it, he would always have known. And if he got it at some time, at least he did not get it in his present life. Or did someone teach him to do geometry? For [*e*] if so, he will do the same in every part of geometry, and in all other subjects too. Is there anyone, then, who has taught him all that? You certainly ought to know, especially since he was born and brought up in your household.

MENO: No, I know no one has ever taught him.

SOCRATES: But he has these beliefs, does he not?

MENO: Apparently, he must, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, if he did not get them in his present life, isn't it clear now that he got or [*86a*] learned them at some other time?

MENO: Apparently.

SOCRATES: At that time, then, when he was not a human being?[18]

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, if for whatever time he is a human being, and for whatever time he is not one, there are true beliefs in him, which result in knowledge when awakened by questioning, won't his soul be for all time in a state of {157} learnedness? For it is clear that for all time he either is, or is not, a human being.

MENO: Apparently.

[*b*] SOCRATES: Then if the truth about the things that are is always in our soul, the soul is immortal. So you should confidently try to inquire about and to recollect what you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember.

MENO: I think you are right, Socrates, but I do not know *how*.

SOCRATES: I think I am too, Meno. And while there are other aspects of the argument on which I would not entirely insist, that we shall be better and more courageous and less idle if we think we should inquire about what we do not know than if we think that it is not possible to find [*c*] what we do not know and that we shouldn't inquire about it—that is something I would fight for to the death, if I could, both in word and deed.

MENO: Yes, I think you are right about that, at least, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Since we agree, then, that one should inquire about what one does not know, do you want us to try to inquire together about what virtue is?

MENO: I certainly do. Nevertheless, Socrates, what I would most like to consider and hear about is the very thing I asked at the beginning: should we inquire on the assumption that virtue is [*d*] something present in human beings by teaching, or by nature, or in what way?

SOCRATES: Well, Meno, if I ruled not only myself but you as well, we would not consider whether virtue is acquired by teaching or not before inquiring about what it is. However, since you are not even trying to rule yourself—in order to remain free, I suppose—but are trying to rule me and succeeding in ruling me, I shall agree. What else am I to do? So it seems we

must consider what sort of thing something is when we do not yet know what it is. If you won't do [*e*] anything else, though, at least relax your rule a little bit for my sake, and agree to investigate *from a hypothesis* whether it is acquired by teaching or whatever. By "from a hypothesis," I mean, the way geometers often conduct their investigations. When someone asks them, for example, whether this figure [*Socrates points to ABCD in Figures 2 and 3*] can be [*87a* inscribed in this circle [*Figure 4*] as a triangle, one of them might reply, "I don't know yet whether it is the sort that can, but I think I have a hypothesis, so to speak, which is useful in dealing with the question. If this figure [*ABCD*] is such that, when one applies it to the given line here [*points to AJ*], it falls short by a figure similar to the one applied [*BCMJ*], I think one thing follows, and another if it is impossible for this to happen. By adopting a hypothesis, then, I am willing to tell you whether it is possible or not to inscribe it [*b*] in the circle."[19] It is the same for us, too, where virtue is concerned. Since we do not know what it is or what sort of thing it is, let's consider by adopting a hypothesis whether it is something acquired by teaching, or not something acquired by teaching. Let's proceed as follows: Among the things belonging to the soul, what sort would virtue have to be if it is to be something not acquired by teaching, or not something acquired by teaching? First, if it is a different sort of thing than knowledge, or the same sort, is it acquired by teaching or not—or as we said just now, acquired by recollection? It makes no difference to us which name is used. [*c*] Let's say, acquired by teaching. Or isn't this, at least, clear to everyone, that a person is not taught anything except knowledge?



Figure 4

MENO: I think so.

SOCRATES: But *if* virtue is some sort of knowledge, it clearly would be acquired by teaching.

MENO: Of course.

{158} SOCRATES: So we finished with that quickly: if it is the one sort of thing, it is acquired by teaching; if the other, not.

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Next, it seems, we should consider whether virtue is knowledge or a different sort of thing than knowledge.

[*d*] MENO: Yes, I think we should consider that next.

SOCRATES: Well then, do we say that it—I mean, virtue—is something good? And does this hypothesis stay put for us, that it is a good thing?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then if there is something that is good, other than and separate from knowledge, perhaps virtue might not be some sort of knowledge. But if nothing is good that is not included in knowledge, we may correctly suspect that it is some sort of knowledge.

MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: And it is by virtue that we are good.

MENO: Yes.

[*e*] SOCRATES: And if good, beneficial. For all good things are beneficial. Aren't they?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then virtue is a beneficial thing.

MENO: That necessarily follows from the things we have agreed to.

SOCRATES: Then let's consider one by one the sorts of things that benefit us. Health does, we say, and strength and beauty and wealth. These and things like them are the ones we say are beneficial. Aren't they?

MENO: Yes.

[*88a*] SOCRATES: But these same things, we say, sometimes harm. Or do you disagree with that?

MENO: No, I agree.

SOCRATES: Consider, then, what guides each of these when they benefit us, and what when they harm. Doesn't it benefit when there is correct use, and harm when there isn't?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: In addition, then, let's also consider the ones having to do with the soul. Temperance is one, you say, and justice and courage and ease-in-learning and good memory and high-mindedness and everything of that sort?

MENO: I do.

SOCRATES: Consider, then. Don't the ones [*b*] among them that seem to you to be not knowledge, but something other than knowledge, sometimes harm and sometimes benefit? Take courage, for example. If courage is not wisdom, but a sort of boldness, then, when a person is bold without understanding, isn't he harmed, when with understanding, benefited?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Similarly, too, with temperance and ease-in-learning. When things are learned or acquired by training together with understanding, aren't they beneficial, when without understanding, harmful?

MENO: Very much so.

SOCRATES: In a word, then, all of the soul's [*c*] undertakings and acts of endurance, when guided by wisdom, end in happiness, when by folly, in the opposite.

MENO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: So if virtue is one of the things in the soul and is necessarily beneficial, it must be wisdom, since in fact all the others having to do with the soul, taken by themselves, are neither beneficial nor harmful, but become harmful or beneficial when wisdom or folly is added. According to this argument, then, [*d*] since virtue is beneficial it must be some sort of wisdom.

MENO: Yes, I think so.

SOCRATES: In fact, in the case of all the others too—wealth and the rest—that we said just now are sometimes good, sometimes harmful, isn't something similar true? When wisdom guides the rest of the soul, it makes all the other things in the soul beneficial, while foolishness makes them [*e*] harmful. Similarly, with these things too, when the soul uses and guides

them correctly, doesn't it make them beneficial, when not correctly, harmful?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And doesn't the wise one guide correctly, the foolish one incorrectly?

MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: Then, can't we say the same in the case of all of them? In human beings all the rest depend on the soul. Those of the soul itself depend on wisdom, if they are going to be good [*89a*] things. And so, by this argument, what is {159} beneficial would be wisdom. And we say that virtue is a beneficial thing?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So we say that virtue is wisdom, either the whole thing or some part of it?

MENO: I think what we are saying, Socrates, is quite right.

SOCRATES: If that is so, then, good men would not be good by nature.

MENO: No, I don't think they would.

SOCRATES: Indeed, if they were, the following would also be the case. If good men were good [*b* by nature, we would surely have people who recognized those of the young who were good by nature. And when they had pointed them out to us, we would guard them in our acropolis,[20] sealing them up much more carefully than gold, so that no one could corrupt them, but that they, when they reached maturity, might be useful to their cities.

MENO: That seems reasonable enough, Socrates.

[*c*] SOCRATES: So, since good men are not good by nature, are they so by learning?

MENO: That now seems necessary to me. And clearly, Socrates, on our hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, it is acquired by teaching.

SOCRATES: Perhaps so, by Zeus! But perhaps we weren't right to agree to that.

MENO: It certainly seemed right a moment ago.

SOCRATES: Yes, but if any of it is going to be sound, it must seem right not just a moment ago, but also now and in the future.

[*d*] MENO: Well then, what is it? What is it you are thinking that makes you uneasy about it and makes you fear that virtue is not knowledge?

SOCRATES: I shall tell you, Meno. That it is acquired by teaching, if indeed it is knowledge—*that* I do not retract as incorrect. But consider whether you think it is reasonable to fear that it is not knowledge. Tell me this: if anything whatever is acquired by teaching—not just virtue—mustn't there be teachers and learners of it?

MENO: I think so.

[*e*] SOCRATES: Then again won't the opposite hold? If there were neither teachers nor learners of something, wouldn't it be right to conjecture that it is not acquired by teaching?

MENO: That's right. But don't you think there are teachers of virtue?

SOCRATES: I have often inquired, certainly, to see if there are any teachers of it, but try as I may, I can't find any. Yet I carried out my inquiry with many people, especially those I thought most experienced in the matter. And in fact, Meno, Anytus here has sat down beside us at just [*90a*] the right time. Let's share our inquiry with him. It would be reasonable for us to share it. For, first, Anytus is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion,[21] who has become wealthy not by chance or as a result of a gift —like Ismenias of Thebes, who recently acquired the wealth of Polycrates[22] —but by his own wisdom and carefulness. Next, as regards other things too, he seems not to be a haughty, scornful, or offensive citizen, but a moderate and well-behaved man. [*b*] Finally, he brought up and educated Anytus well, as the majority of Athenians think—at any rate, they choose him for their highest offices.[23] It is right, then, to inquire with such people to see whether there are any teachers of virtue or not, and who they are. So Anytus, please inquire with us, with me and your friend Meno here, into his matter of who the teachers of virtue [*c*] might be. Consider it this way. If we wanted Meno here to become a good doctor, what teachers would we send him to? Wouldn't we send him to doctors?

ANYTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: What if we wanted him to become a good shoemaker? Wouldn't we send him to shoemakers?[24]

{160} ANYTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And similarly in all the other cases?

ANYTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then consider the same cases again and tell me this. We say that we would be right to send him to doctors if we want him to become a doctor. When we say this, are we saying that

d

we would be sensible to send him to those who claim to possess the art rather than those who don't, and who charge a fee for this very thing, and declare themselves to be teachers of anyone who wants to come to them and learn? Isn't it with these considerations in mind that we would be right to send him there?

ANYTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And doesn't the same apply to flute-playing and the rest? It would be the height of [*e*] ignorance, if we wanted to make someone a flute-player, to be unwilling to send him to those who undertake to teach the art, but to trouble other people, when they neither claim to be teachers nor have a single learner in the thing we want the one we send to learn from them. Don't you think that would be the height of irrationality?

ANYTUS: Yes, I do, by Zeus, and of lack of education besides!

SOCRATES: That's right. So now you and I can deliberate together about your guest Meno here.

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You see, he has been telling me for a long time, Anytus, that he wants the [a] wisdom and virtue by which people manage their households and cities well, look after their parents, and know how to welcome fellow citizens and foreigners and send them off, in a way worthy of a

b

good man. Consider then, to whom it would be right for us to send him to learn this virtue. Or, is it absolutely clear, according to our discussion just now, that we should send him to those who undertake to be teachers of virtue, declare themselves available to any Greek who wants to learn, and charge a set fee for it?

ANYTUS: And who do you say these people are, Socrates?

SOCRATES: You surely know as well as I do that they are the ones people call Sophists.

[*c*] ANYTUS: In the name of Heracles,[25] be quiet, Socrates! May no one belonging to me, whether family members or friends, citizens or foreigners, be seized by such madness as to go to those people, and be ruined. For they plainly pervert and corrupt those who associate with them.

SOCRATES: What are you saying, Anytus? Do they alone differ so much from others who claim to know how to do some good, that they not only don't benefit what one entrusts to them, like [*d*] the others, but do the opposite and actually corrupt it? And they openly claim to deserve payment for doing *that*? I don't know, frankly, how I am to believe you. Indeed, I know that one man, Protagoras, earned more money from this sort of wisdom than Phidias—who produced such conspicuously beautiful work—and ten other sculptors combined. Anyway, what you say is incredible. Those who repair old shoes and mend cloaks couldn't escape detection for thirty days [*e*] if they gave back the cloaks and shoes in worse condition than they got them. On the contrary, if they did that, they would soon starve to death. So how could Protagoras escape detection by the whole of Greece, if, for more than forty years, he corrupted those who associated with him and sent them off worse than when they came? He was almost seventy years old, I think, when he died and had practiced his art for forty years. And in all that time, right up to the present day, his good reputation hasn't diminished. And Protagoras is not the only one. On [*92a*] the contrary, there are many others as well, some earlier than he, some still alive. On your account, are we to say that they led the young astray and ruined them knowingly, or in a way that escaped detection even by themselves? Are we to claim they are as mad as that, those who some say are the wisest people there are?

ANYTUS: They are far from mad, Socrates. The young people who give them money are much [*b*] more so, and their relatives who allow them to do it are even madder than they. But by far the maddest of all are the cities that allow these men in when they arrive and don't expel any citizen or foreigner who attempts to do anything like that.

SOCRATES: Has one of these Sophists wronged you, Anytus? Why are you so hard on them?

{161} ANYTUS: No, by Zeus, I have never associated with any of them or allowed anyone of mine to do so.

SOCRATES: So you have absolutely no experience of these men?

ANYTUS: No, and hope to remain that way.

[*c*] SOCRATES: You are a strange fellow! How do you know whether there is anything good or bad in this undertaking of theirs, if you have absolutely no experience of it?

ANYTUS: It's easy! I *know* who these people are. Whether I lack or don't lack experience of them has nothing to do with it.

SOCRATES: Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus! For I wonder how else you could know about them, given the things you yourself say. Really though, we weren't inquiring about who the [*d*] people are that will make Meno wicked if he goes to them. Let *these* be the Sophists, if you like. But tell us, and do some good for this family friend of yours by telling him, to whom should he go in so large a city in order to become worthy of mention for the virtue I described just now.

ANYTUS: Why don't you tell him yourself?

SOCRATES: But I did say who I thought the teachers of these things are. But you said I was talking nonsense. And perhaps there is something in what you say. But now it is your turn to tell him to which of the Athenians he should go. [*e*] Name whomever you like.

ANYTUS: Why should he be told one person's name? Without exception, any fine and good Athenian he happens to meet will make him better than the Sophists, provided he is willing to believe them.

SOCRATES: Did these men become fine and good by chance? Without having learned from [*93a*] anyone, are they nevertheless able to teach others what they themselves didn't learn?

ANYTUS: I think they learned from their predecessors, who were fine and good men too. Or don't you think there have been many good men in this

city?

SOCRATES: I think, Anytus, both that there are men here who are good in political affairs, and that there have been just as many in the past. But were they also good teachers of their own virtue? You see, that is what our discussion is about, not whether there are good men here or not, or whether there have been in the past, but whether virtue really is acquired by teaching —that is [*b*] what we have been considering for a long time. But to consider that is to consider this: do good men, whether now or in the past, also know how to pass on to someone else this virtue that makes them good, or is it something a person cannot pass on or receive from someone else? That is what Meno and I have been inquiring about for a long time. On the basis of your own account, [*c*] consider it this way: Wouldn't you say that Themistocles[26] was a good man?

ANYTUS: Yes, among the best of them all.

SOCRATES: Then wouldn't you also say that he was a good teacher of his own virtue if anyone was?

ANYTUS: I suppose so—if he *wanted* to be.

SOCRATES: Do you think he wouldn't have wanted others to become fine and good men, not even his own son? Do you think he begrudged it to him and deliberately did not pass on the [*d*] virtue that made him good himself? Haven't you heard that Themistocles had his son Cleophantus taught to be a good horseman? Why, he could stay standing upright on horseback, throw the javelin from horseback while standing upright, and do many other amazing things, which Themistocles had had him educated in and made clever at, and which depend on having good teachers. Haven't you heard that from older people?

ANYTUS: I have.

SOCRATES: So no one could claim that his son's *nature* was bad.

ANYTUS: No, they probably couldn't. [*e*]

SOCRATES: What about this? Have you ever heard anyone young or old say that Themistocles' son Cleophantus was a good and wise man in the way his father was?

ANYTUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: So are we to think that he wanted to educate his son in those other things, but not {162} to make him any better than his neighbors when

it came to the wisdom he himself possessed—*if*, of course, virtue really is acquired by teaching.

ANYTUS: By Zeus, probably not!

SOCRATES: That is your sort of teacher of virtue for you, then—the one even you agree was among the best in the past. But let's consider another, [*94a*] Aristides son of Lysimachus.[27] Don't you agree that he was good?

ANYTUS: I certainly do, absolutely.

SOCRATES: Well, didn't he too do the best job of any Athenian of educating his son Lysimachus in anything that depended on teachers? But do you think he made him a better man than anyone else? You have associated with him, I assume, and see what he is like. Or take Pericles,[28] if you prefer—since he was a man of such high-minded wisdom. You know he [*b*] brought up two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus?

ANYTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: You also know, then, that he taught them to be horsemen second to none in Athens, and that he had them educated in musical and physical training and all the other things that depend on expertise, so as to be second to none. Didn't he want to make them good men, then? I think he did want to, but that it may be something that can't be acquired by teaching. And lest you think it was only a few utterly useless Athenians who were incapable of this [*c*] undertaking, consider that Thucydides also brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus.[29] He educated them well in other things, and made them the finest wrestlers in Athens. For he gave one to Xanthias to train, and the other to Eudorus—and they were thought to be the finest wrestlers of their time. Don't you remember?

ANYTUS: Yes, I have heard that.

SOCRATES: Well, isn't it clear that he would [*d*] never have taught his sons expensive things, but failed to teach them at no expense what would make them good men—*if* this were acquired by teaching? Was Thucydides a useless man, perhaps, who didn't have many friends among the Athenians and their allies? No, he belonged to a prominent family and had great power in the city and in the rest of Greece. So if it were acquired by teaching, he would have found [*e*] someone to make his sons good men, whether a fellow countryman or a foreigner, if he himself didn't have the leisure to do

it because he was taking care of the city. But I suspect, Anytus my friend, that virtue is not something acquired by teaching.

ANYTUS: It seems to me, Socrates, that you readily speak ill of people. I would advise you—if you are willing to trust me—to be careful. Perhaps, in other cities too, it is easier to do evil to [*95a*] people than good. It certainly is in this one. But then, I think you know that as well as I.

SOCRATES: I think Anytus is angry, Meno, and I am not surprised. You see, in the first place, he thinks I am disparaging these men. Second, he thinks he is one of them. But if he ever comes to know what speaking ill is really like, he will stop being angry. At present, however, he doesn't know. Tell me, though, are there also fine and good men in your country?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then are they willing to offer themselves [*b*] as teachers to the young men?

MENO: No, by Zeus, they aren't, Socrates! But sometimes you hear them say it is acquired by teaching, sometimes that it isn't.

SOCRATES: Are we to say they are teachers of this thing, then, when they do not even agree about *that*?

MENO: It seems not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: What about these Sophists, then, who alone profess to be so, do you think they are teachers of virtue?

MENO: In fact, that's what I particularly admire [*c*] about Gorgias, Socrates, that you never hear him {163} promise to teach it. He even ridicules the others when he hears them promise. It is *speaking* he thinks he should make people clever at.

SOCRATES: So you don't think the Sophists are teachers of virtue, either?

MENO: I can't tell, Socrates. Like most people, sometimes I think so, sometimes not.

SOCRATES: Do you know it isn't just you or the other politicians who sometimes think that it is [*d*] acquired by teaching, sometimes that it isn't? Do you know even the poet Theognis says the same thing?[30]

MENO: In which verses?

SOCRATES: In his elegiacs where he says—

> Drink and eat with them, and with them
> Sit, be pleasing to those with great power.

You will learn noble things, you see, from noble men.
But if with bad ones you mix, [*e*] You will lose even what
understanding you already have.

Do you see that in these lines he speaks as if virtue is acquired by teaching?

MENO: Yes, apparently so.

SOCRATES: In others, though, he makes a little change:

If understanding could be produced and put into a man,

he says roughly that

> Many and great would be the fees earned
> by those able to do it, and that
>
> Never from a good father would a bad son be born,
>
> [*96a*] If words of wisdom are trusted. But teaching
> Will never make a bad man good.

Do you see that he makes opposite claims about one and the same thing?

MENO: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Well, can you name any other thing that those who say they are teachers of it are not only not generally agreed to be teachers of it to others, but are not even agreed to know it [*b*] themselves, but instead to be useless at the very thing they claim to teach? Or that those who are generally agreed to be fine and good men themselves sometimes say that it is acquired by teaching, sometimes that it isn't? Would you say that those who are that confused about anything are teachers of it in the proper sense?

MENO: No, by Zeus, I cannot.

SOCRATES: Then if neither the Sophists nor the fine and good men themselves are teachers of the thing, is it not clear that no other people are?

MENO: No, I don't think they are.

SOCRATES: But if there [*c*] are no *teachers*, there are no learners either?

MENO: I think that's right.

SOCRATES: But didn't we agree that a thing of which there are neither teachers nor learners is not acquired by teaching?

MENO: We did agree.

SOCRATES: Now, isn't it the case that there are no teachers of virtue to be seen anywhere?

MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, there are no learners either?

MENO: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: So virtue isn't something acquired by teaching?

MENO: It seems not, if our way of considering [*d*] it is in fact correct. So I really wonder, Socrates, whether there aren't ever any good men at all—or else what could be the way those who come to be good do so?

SOCRATES: It looks, Meno, as though you and I are pretty useless men, and Gorgias has not adequately educated you or Prodicus or me. Above all, then, we ought to pay attention to [*e*] ourselves and search out someone who will make us better *one way or another*. I say this in view of our recent inquiry, because we ridiculously failed to see that it is not only under the guidance of knowledge that people conduct their affairs correctly and {164} well. And that may be why the knowledge is also escaping us of the way in which men who are good become so.

MENO: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I mean this. That good men must be beneficial is something we correctly agreed [*97a*] couldn't be otherwise. Didn't we?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that they will be beneficial if they guide us correctly in our affairs is also something we agreed to correctly, I suppose?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: But that it is not possible to guide correctly if one is not wise is something, it looks like, we agreed to *incorrectly*.

MENO: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: I shall tell you. If someone who knew the road to Larissa,[31] or anywhere else you like, were to walk there and guide others, wouldn't he guide them correctly and well?

MENO: Certainly.

[*b*] SOCRATES: But what if someone had a correct belief as to which road it was, though he had never gone on it and had no knowledge of it, wouldn't he also guide them correctly?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And as long as he has correct belief, I suppose, about what the other one has knowledge of, he will be no worse a guide than the one who is wise about it, even though he has only true belief, not wisdom.

MENO: No, no worse.

SOCRATES: So true belief is no worse a guide to the correctness of action than wisdom. And that is what we left out just now in considering what sort of thing virtue was. We said that [*c*] wisdom alone is a guide to acting correctly, whereas there was, it seems, true belief as well.

MENO: Yes, it seems so.

SOCRATES: So correct belief is no less beneficial than knowledge.

MENO: Except by this much, Socrates—the one with knowledge will always hit the mark, while the one with correct belief will sometimes hit it, sometimes not.

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Won't the one who always has correct opinion always hit it, as long as his belief is correct?

MENO: That does seem necessary to me. So, I wonder, Socrates, if that's right, why knowledge [*d*] is much more highly valued than correct belief, and what it is that makes one different from the other.

SOCRATES: Do you know, then, why you wonder about this, or shall I tell you?

MENO: By all means tell me.

SOCRATES: It is because you haven't paid attention to the statues of Daedalus.[32] But perhaps there aren't any in your country.

MENO: In reference to what do you say that?

SOCRATES: That they, too, if they aren't tied down, run away and flee, but if they are tied down, stay put.

MENO: So what? [*e*]

SOCRATES: It is not of much value to acquire one of his works that is untied, since, like a runaway slave, it won't stay put. But a tied-down one is worth a lot, since his works are very beautiful. In reference to what do I say that? In reference to true beliefs. For true beliefs—as long as they stay put—are a beautiful thing, too, and everything they bring about is good. They [*98a*] aren't willing to stay put for long, however, but flee from a person's soul. So they aren't of much value until someone ties them down by reasoning out the explanation. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection—as we agreed before. When they are tied down, they first become bits of knowledge, then they stay put. That is why knowledge is more valuable than true belief, and it is being tied down that makes knowledge different from true belief.

MENO: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it does seem to be something like that!

SOCRATES: And yet I, too, speak as someone who doesn't know, but conjectures. However, in saying [*b*] that correct belief is a different thing than knowledge—there, I think, I am not at all conjecturing. On the contrary, if there were anything else that I would say I know—and there are

few things I {165} would say it about—at any rate, I would put down this, too, as one of the things I know.

MENO: And you would be right, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well then, is it not correct to say that when correct belief guides, the outcome of each action is no worse than when knowledge does?

MENO: I think that's right too.

[*c*] SOCRATES: So correct belief is not worse than knowledge or any less beneficial when it comes to actions, nor the man who has correct belief than the one who has knowledge.

MENO: That's true.

SOCRATES: And we agreed that the good man is beneficial.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then, since it is not only through knowledge that good men—if they exist—are good and beneficial to their cities, but also through correct belief, and since neither of these is [*d*] something people possess by nature, neither knowledge nor true belief . . . or do you think either of them is possessed by nature?

MENO: No, I do not.

SOCRATES: Then, since neither is possessed by nature, good men will not have goodness by nature, either.

MENO: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Then, since they do not have it by nature, we next set out to consider whether it is something acquired by teaching.

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And didn't it seem that it would be acquired by teaching, if virtue were wisdom?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that if it were acquired by teaching, it would be wisdom?

MENO: Certainly.

[*e*] SOCRATES: And that if there were teachers, it would be acquired by teaching, but if there weren't, it wouldn't be acquired by teaching?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: But we agreed there aren't any teachers of it?

MENO: That's right.

SOCRATES: So we agreed that it is not acquired by teaching and is not wisdom?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: But we do agree that it *is* good?

MENO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And that what guides correctly is beneficial and good?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And that what alone guides correctly [*99a*] is two things, true belief and knowledge, and only if he has these does a person guide correctly. For the things that come about correctly by chance do not come about through human guidance, and in those where a man does guide toward the right thing, you find one of these two, true belief or knowledge.

MENO: I think that's right.

SOCRATES: Then, since it is not acquired by teaching, virtue is no longer knowledge, either.

MENO: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: So, of the two good and beneficial [*b*] things, one has been ruled out, and so it cannot be knowledge that is a guide in political affairs.

MENO: It seems not.

SOCRATES: Then it is not by some sort of wisdom, or by being wise, that men such as Themistocles and his associates, or those whom Anytus here just mentioned, guided their cities. For this very reason, they can't make others like themselves, seeing that they aren't what they are on account of knowledge.

MENO: It seems to be as you say, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then, if it is not by knowledge, the remaining possibility is that it is by true belief, [*c*] that it is by using *it* that political men guide their cities correctly, since they are no different as regards wisdom from soothsayers and prophets. For the latter, too, while divinely inspired, say many true things, but have no knowledge whatsoever about the things they say.

MENO: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: Then isn't it right, Meno, to call these men godlike—the ones who without understanding achieve many great successes in the things they do and say?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So wouldn't we be right to call the soothsayers and prophets we mentioned just [*d*] now godlike, as well as all the poets? And to say that

the politicians are by no means the least godlike of them, since they are inspired and possessed {166} by the god, when they achieve success in saying many great things, while knowing nothing about the things they say?

MENO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Women too, I suppose, Meno, call good men godlike; and when the Spartans praise a good man, they say, "He is a godlike man."

MENO: And apparently, Socrates, they are right in doing it. But perhaps Anytus here will be [*e*] annoyed at you for saying so.

SOCRATES: I am not concerned about that. We shall talk with him again, Meno, some other time. For the present, if we have inquired and spoken correctly throughout this entire discussion, virtue is not acquired by nature or by teaching, but comes to be present by divine dispensation, [*100a*]

without understanding, in those in whom it does come to be present—provided, of course, there is not some political man who is able to make someone else a politician. If there were, he could pretty much be said to be among the living what Homer said Tiresias was among the dead. Among those in Hades, he said, "He alone is wise, the others flit around as shadows."[33] In the same way here, such a man would be like a truly real thing in comparison to shadows as regards virtue.

MENO: I think what you said is absolutely [*b*] right, Socrates.

SOCRATES: On the basis of this reasoning, then, Meno, it appears to us that it is by divine dispensation that virtue comes to be present in those in whom it comes to be present. But we will know that with certainty when, before inquiring about the way virtue comes to be present in people, we first try to inquire about what virtue itself is by itself. Now, however, it is time for me to go be somewhere. Try to persuade your friend Anytus here, too, of the things you yourself have been persuaded of, so that he will be more gentle. You see, if you do persuade him, you will also profit the Athenians.[34]

1. A young aristocrat from Pharsalus in Thessaly.

2. Aristippus was a member of the Aleuadae, the ruling family of Larissa, the major city of Thessaly in northern Greece, not to be confused with the philosopher of the same name.
3. See *Apology* 19e and note.
4. Gorgias came to Athens in 427 BCE and perhaps on other occasions as well.
5. Someone who aims at scoring points rather than at discovering the truth. See *Republic* 537e–539c.
6. See *Republic* 454a.
7. See *Apology* 19e and note.
8. Boys had older male lovers from the arrival of puberty (probably quite late in the ancient world) until their beard became full.
9. Empedocles of Acragas in Sicily, one of the Presocratic philosophers.
10. Pindar (518–438 BCE), a lyric poet from Boeotia, was most famous for his poems celebrating the victors in the Olympian, Pythian, and other games.
11. Eleusis—one of the major demes in Athens (see *Euthyphro* 2b note)—was the center of a cult that played a prominent role in Athenian civic religion. Some of its rituals were secret mysteries, known only to initiates. Initiation began in February, so the dramatic date of the conversation is presumably just before that. Plato uses initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries as a metaphor for initiation into philosophy at *Symposium* 209e–210a.
12. Source unknown.
13. Xerxes I, king of Persia (486–465 BCE), led the unsuccessful invasion of Greece in the Persian Wars. He was regarded as the richest and most powerful ruler imaginable. Meno may have had some hereditary connection with the Persian royal house.
14. Their identity is unknown.
15. Probably a quotation from Pindar. Persephone, daughter of Demeter and Zeus, and wife of Hades, was queen of the underworld. Her grief, in this instance, was probably for her son, Dionysus, who was devoured by the Titans. Zeus blasted them with a thunderbolt, but human beings sprang from their ashes, and so are involved in their guilt and must make atonement to Persephone.
16. Strictly speaking, a rhombus is not a square, since a square must have four equal angles as well. The equality of the sides is the pertinent feature for the demonstration.
17. *Diametron:* a word also used for the diameter of a circle, the axis of a sphere, and the hypotenuse of a triangle.
18. Before his soul was embodied in a human body. See *Republic* 619e–620c.
19. The interpretation of Figure 4 is conjectural.
20. A fortified high place in a city, where public treasures were kept.
21. On Anytus, see *Apology* 18b note. About Anthemion we know pretty much only what we are told here.
22. Polycrates, a leading Athenian democrat, wrote (a lost) *Accusation of Socrates*. Xenophon's *Socrates' Defense to the Jury* is thought to be a response to it. Ismenias may have accepted money from Polycrates to help overthrow the Thirty Tyrants and restore the democracy. Ismenias is mentioned at *Republic* 336a in a context that suggests Platonic disapproval.
23. Anytus was chosen as general in 409 BCE and may have held other offices as well.
24. Anytus and his father may have been tanners.
25. See *Euthyphro* 4a and note.
26. Themistocles (c. 524–459 BCE) was an Athenian statesman and chief architect of the Greek victory in the war against the Persians. He was ostracized by Athens at the end of the 470s and was later condemned to death in his absence, on suspicion of intriguing with the Persians against Greece.
27. Lysimachus was a prominent fifth-century Athenian statesman, noted for his justice. Like his near contemporary, Themistocles, he was ostracized by Athens in 483–482 BCE on suspicion of being a -

Persian sympathizer.
28. Pericles (c. 495–429 BCE) was the most important democratic leader in Athens, from the 440s until his death. He was involved in the building program of the 440s and 430s that resulted in the Parthenon and much else.
29. Thucydides (born c. 500 BCE) was the leading conservative opponent of Pericles. He was ostracized c. 443. The great historian of the same name may have been his grandson.
30. Theognis was a sixth-century BCE elegiac poet from Megara.
31. The city of Larissa in Thessaly was close to Meno's hometown, Pharsalus.
32. See *Euthyphro* 11b–e and note.
33. Homer, *Odyssey* x.495.
34. A prophetic allusion, presumably, to Anytus' role in having Socrates executed, thereby depriving Athens of his beneficial services.

PHAEDO

Translated by G. M. A. Grube.

[*57a*] ECHECRATES:[1] Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo,[2] on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did someone else tell you about it?

PHAEDO: I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHECRATES: What are the things he said before he died? And how did he die? I should be glad to hear this. Hardly anyone from Phlius [*b*] visits Athens nowadays, nor has any stranger come from Athens for some time who could give us a clear account of what happened, except that he drank the poison and died, but nothing more.

PHAEDO: Did you not even hear how the trial [*58a*] went?

ECHECRATES: Yes, someone did tell us about that, and we wondered that he seems to have died a long time after the trial took place. Why was that, Phaedo?

PHAEDO: That was by chance, Echecrates. The day before the trial, as it happened, the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands.

ECHECRATES: What ship is that?

PHAEDO: It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking with {167} him the two lots of seven victims.[3] He saved them and was himself saved. The Athenians vowed then to Apollo, so [*b*] the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission to Delos every year. And from that time to this they send such an annual mission to the god. They have a law to keep the city pure while it lasts, and no execution may take place once the mission has begun until the ship has made its journey to Delos and returned to Athens, and this can sometimes take a long time if the winds delay it. The mission begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the prow of the ship, and this [*c*] happened, as I say, the day before Socrates' trial. That is why Socrates was in prison a long time between his trial and his execution.

ECHECRATES: What about his actual death, Phaedo? What did he say? What did he do? Who of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities not allow them to be present and he died with no friends present?

[*d*] PHAEDO: By no means. Some were present, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES: Please be good enough to tell us all that occurred as fully as possible, unless you have some pressing business.

PHAEDO: I have the time and I will try to tell you the whole story, for nothing gives me more pleasure than to call Socrates to mind, whether talking about him myself, or listening to someone else do so.

ECHECRATES: Your hearers will surely be like you in this, Phaedo. So do try to tell us every detail as exactly as you can.

PHAEDO: I certainly found being there an astonishing experience. Although I was witnessing the death of one who was my friend, I had [*e*] no feeling of pity, for the man appeared happy in both manner and words as he died nobly and without fear, Echecrates, so that it struck me that even in going down to the underworld he was going with the gods' blessing and that he would fare well when he got there, if anyone [*59a*] ever does. That is why I had no feeling of pity, such as would seem natural in my sorrow, nor indeed of pleasure, as we engaged in philosophical discussion as we were accustomed to do—for our arguments were of that sort—but I had a strange feeling, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and pain at the same time as I reflected that he was just about to die. All of us present were affected in

much the same way, sometimes laughing, then weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus[4]—you know the man and his ways.

ECHECRATES: Of course I do. [*b*]

PHAEDO: He was quite overcome; but I was myself disturbed, and so were the others.

ECHECRATES: Who, Phaedo, were those present?

PHAEDO: Among the local people there was Apollodorus, whom I mentioned, Critobulus and his father,[5] also Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes. Ctesippus of Paeania was there, Menexenus, and some others. Plato, I believe, was ill.

ECHECRATES: Were there some foreigners present?

PHAEDO: Yes, Simmias from Thebes with Cebes [*c*] and Phaedondes, and from Megara, Euclides and Terpsion.[6]

ECHECRATES: What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there?

PHAEDO: No. They were said to be in Aegina.[7]

ECHECRATES: Was there anyone else?

PHAEDO: I think these were about all.

ECHECRATES: Well then, what do you say the conversation was about?

PHAEDO: I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On [*d*] the previous days also both the others and I used to visit Socrates. We foregathered at daybreak at the court where the trial took place, for it was close to the prison, and {168} each day we used to wait around talking until the prison should open, for it did not open early. When it opened we used to go in to Socrates and spend most of the day with him. On [*e*] this day we gathered rather early, because when we left the prison on the previous evening we were informed that the ship from Delos had arrived, and so we told each other to come to the usual place as early as possible. When we arrived the gatekeeper who used to answer our knock came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us to. "The Eleven,"[8] he said, "are freeing Socrates from his bonds and telling him how his death will take place today." After a short time he came and told us to go in. We found Socrates recently released from his [*60a*] chains, and Xanthippe[9]—you know her—sitting by him, holding their baby. When she saw us, she cried out and said the sort of thing that women usually say: "Socrates, this is the last time your

friends will talk to you and you to them." Socrates looked at Crito. "Crito," he said, "let someone take her home." And some of Crito's people led her away lamenting and beating her breast. [*b* Socrates sat up on the bed, bent his leg, and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed he said: "What a strange thing that which men call pleasure seems to be, and how astonishing the relation it has with what is thought to be its opposite, namely pain! A man cannot have both at the same time. Yet if he pursues and catches the one, he is almost always bound to catch the other also, like two creatures with one head. I think that if Aesop had noted this he would have composed a fable [*c*] that a god wished to reconcile their opposition but could not do so, so he joined their two heads together, and therefore when a man has the one, the other follows later. This seems to be happening to me. My bonds caused pain in my leg, and now pleasure seems to be following."

Cebes intervened and said: "By Zeus, yes, Socrates, you did well to remind me. Evenus[10] asked me the day before yesterday, as others had done before, what induced you to write poetry after you came to prison, [*d*] you who had never composed any poetry before, putting the fables of Aesop into verse and composing the hymn to Apollo. If it is of any concern to you that I should have an answer to give to Evenus when he repeats his question, as I know he will, tell me what to say to him."

Tell him the truth, Cebes, he said, that I did not do this with the idea of rivaling him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but I tried to find out the meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my [*e*] conscience in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice. The dreams were something like this: the same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: "Socrates," it said, "practice and cultivate the arts." In the past I imagined that it was instructing and advising me to do what I was doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race, [*61a*] that the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, to practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that.

But now, after my trial took place, and the festival of the god was preventing my execution, I thought that, in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not disobey it but compose [*b*] poetry. I thought it safer not to leave here until I had satisfied my conscience by

writing poems in obedience to the dream. So I first wrote in honor of the god of the present festival. After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments. Being no teller of fables myself, I took the stories I knew and had at hand, the fables of Aesop, and I versified the first ones I came across. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, wish him well and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to follow me as soon as possible. I am leaving today, [*c*] it seems, as the Athenians so order it.

Said Simmias: "What kind of advice is this you are giving to Evenus, Socrates? I have met him many times, and from my observation he is not at all likely to follow it willingly."

How so, said he, is Evenus not a philosopher?

I think so, Simmias said.

{169} Then Evenus will be willing, like every man who partakes worthily of philosophy. Yet perhaps he will not take his own life, for that, they [*d*] say, is not lawful.[11] As he said this, Socrates put his feet on the ground and remained in this position during the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked: "How do you mean, Socrates, that it is not right to do oneself violence, and yet that the philosopher will be willing to follow one who is dying?"

Come now, Cebes, have you and Simmias, who keep company with Philolaus,[12] not heard about such things?

Nothing definite, Socrates.

Indeed, I too speak about this from hearsay, but I do not mind telling you what I have heard, for it is perhaps most appropriate for one who [*e*] is about to depart yonder to tell and examine tales about what we believe that journey to be like. What else could one do in the time we have until sunset?

But whatever is the reason, Socrates, for people to say that it is not right to kill oneself? As to your question just now, I have heard Philolaus say this when staying in Thebes and I have also heard it from others, but I have never heard anyone give a clear account of the matter.

Well, he said, we must do our best, and you may yet hear one. And [*62a*] it may well astonish you if this subject, alone of all things, is simple, and it is never, as with everything else, better at certain times and for certain people to die than to live. And if this is so, you may well find it astonishing that

those for whom it is better to die are wrong to help themselves, and that they must wait for someone else to benefit them.

And Cebes, lapsing into his own dialect,[13] laughed quietly and said: “Zeus knows it is.”

Indeed, said Socrates, it does seem unreasonable when put like that, [*b*] but perhaps there is reason to it. There is the explanation that is put in the language of the mysteries, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that one must not free oneself or run away. That seems to me an impressive doctrine and one not easy to understand fully. However, Cebes, this seems to me well expressed, that the gods are our guardians and that men are one of their possessions. Or do you not think so?

I do, said Cebes.

And would you not be angry if one of your possessions killed itself when you had not given any sign that you wished it to die, and if you [*c*] had any punishment you could inflict, you would inflict it?

Certainly, he said.

Perhaps then, put in this way, it is not unreasonable that one should not kill oneself before a god had indicated some necessity to do so, like the necessity now put upon us.

That seems likely, said Cebes. As for what you were saying, that [*d*] philosophers should be willing and ready to die, that seems strange, Socrates, if what we said just now is reasonable, namely, that a god is our protector and that we are his possessions. It is not logical that the wisest of men should not resent leaving this service in which they are governed by the best of masters, the gods, for a wise man cannot believe that he will look after himself better when he is free. A foolish man might easily think so, that he must escape from his master; he would [*e*] not reflect that one must not escape from a good master but stay with him as long as possible, because it would be foolish to escape. But the sensible man would want always to remain with one better than himself. So, Socrates, the opposite of what was said before is likely to be true; the wise would resent dying, whereas the foolish would rejoice at it.

I thought that when Socrates heard this he was pleased by Cebes’ [*63a*] argumentation. Glancing at us, he said: “Cebes is always on the track of

some arguments; he is certainly not willing to be at once convinced by what one says."

Said Simmias: "But actually, Socrates, I think myself that Cebes has a point now. Why should truly wise men want to avoid the service of masters better than themselves, and leave them easily? And I think Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are bearing leaving us so {170} lightly, and leaving those good masters, as you say yourself, the gods."

[*b*] You are both justified in what you say, and I think you mean that I must make a defense against this, as if I were in court.

You certainly must, said Simmias.

Come then, he said, let me try to make my defense to you more convincing than it was to the jury. For, Simmias and Cebes, I should be wrong not to resent dying if I did not believe that I should go first to other wise and good gods, and then to men who have died and are better than men are here. Be assured that, as it is, I expect to join the [*c*] company of good men. This last I would not altogether insist on, but if I insist on anything at all in these matters, it is that I shall come to gods who are very good masters. That is why I am not so resentful, because I have good hope that some future awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.

Well now, Socrates, said Simmias, do you intend to keep this belief [*d*] to yourself as you leave us, or would you share it with us? I certainly think it would be a blessing for us too, and at the same time it would be your defense if you convince us of what you say.

I will try, he said, but first let us see what it is that Crito here has, I think, been wanting to say for quite a while.

What else, Socrates, said Crito, but what the man who is to give you the poison has been telling me for some time, that I should warn you to talk as little as possible. People get heated when they talk, he [*e*] says, and one should not be heated when taking the poison, as those who do must sometimes drink it two or three times.

Socrates replied: "Take no notice of him; only let him be prepared to administer it twice or, if necessary, three times."

I was rather sure you would say that, Crito said, but he has been bothering me for some time.

Let him be, he said. I want to make my argument before you, my judges, as to why I think that a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is probably right to be of good cheer in the face of death and to be very hopeful that after death he will attain the greatest blessings [*64a*] yonder. I will try to tell you, Simmias and Cebes, how this may be so. I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death. Now if this is true, it would be strange indeed if they were eager for this all their lives and then resent it when what they have wanted and practiced for a long time comes upon them.

Simmias laughed and said: “By Zeus, Socrates, you made me laugh, though I was in no laughing mood just now. I think that the majority, [*b*] on hearing this, will think that it describes the philosophers very well, and our people in Thebes would thoroughly agree that philosophers are nearly dead and that the majority of men is well aware that they deserve to be.

And they would be telling the truth, Simmias, except for their being aware. They are not aware of the way true philosophers are nearly dead, nor of the way they deserve to be, nor of the sort of death they deserve. [*c*] But never mind them, he said, let us talk among ourselves. Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

Certainly, said Simmias.

Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body? Do we believe that death is this, namely, that the body comes to be separated by itself apart from the soul, and the soul comes to be separated by itself apart from the body? Is death anything else than that?

No, that is what it is, he said.

Consider then, my good sir, whether you share my belief, for this will lead us to a better knowledge of what we are investigating. Do you [*d*] think it is the part of a philosopher to be concerned with such so-called pleasures as those of food and drink?

By no means.

What about the pleasures of sex?

Not at all.

What of the other pleasures concerned with the service of the body? Do you think such a man prizes them greatly, the acquisition of distinguished

clothes and shoes and the other bodily ornaments? Do you think he values these or despises them, except insofar as one cannot do without them? [*e*]

{171} I think the true philosopher despises them.

Do you not think, he said, that in general such a man's concern is not with the body but that, as far as he can, he turns away from the body toward the soul?

I do.

[*65a*] So in the first place, such things show clearly that the philosopher more than other men frees the soul from association with the body as much as possible?

Apparently.

A man who finds no pleasure in such things and has no part in them is thought by the majority not to deserve to live and to be close to death; the man, that is, who does not care for the pleasures of the body.

What you say is certainly true.

Then what about the actual acquiring of knowledge? Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge? I [*b*] mean, for example, do men find any truth in sight or hearing, or are not even the poets forever telling us that we do not see or hear anything accurately, and surely if those two physical senses are not clear or precise, our other senses can hardly be accurate, as they are all inferior to these.[14] Do you not think so?

I certainly do, he said.

When then, he asked, does the soul grasp the truth? For whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.

[*c*] True.

Is it not in reasoning if anywhere that any reality[15] becomes clear to the soul?

Yes.

And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.

That is so.

[*d*] And it is then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself?

It appears so.

What about the following, Simmias? Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself,[16] or not?

We do say so, by Zeus.

And the Beautiful, and the Good?

Of course.

And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

In no way, he said.

Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses? I am speaking of all things such as Bigness, Health, Strength, and, in a word, the reality[17] of all other things, that which each of them essentially is. Is what is most true in them contemplated through the body, or is this [*e*] the position: Whoever of us prepares himself best and most accurately to grasp that thing itself which he is investigating will come closest to the knowledge of it?

Obviously.

Then he will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone, without associating any sight with his thought, or [*66a*] dragging in any sense perception with his reasoning, but who, using pure thought alone, tries to track down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes and ears and, in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it. Will not that man reach reality, Simmias, if anyone does?

What you say, said Simmias, is indeed true.

All these things will necessarily make the true philosophers believe [*b*] and say to each other something like this: “There is likely to be something such as a path to guide us out of our confusion, because as long as we have a body and our soul is fused with such an evil we shall never adequately attain what we desire, which we affirm to be the truth. The body keeps us busy in a thousand ways {172} because of its need for nurture. Moreover, if certain diseases befall it, they impede our search [*c*] for the truth. It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes to us

from the body. Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord, and battles, for all wars are due to the desire to acquire wealth,[18] and it is the body and the care of it, to which [*d*] we are enslaved, which compel us to acquire wealth, and all this makes us too busy to practice philosophy. Worst of all, if we do get some respite from it and turn to some investigation, everywhere in our investigations the body is present and makes for confusion and fear, so that it prevents us from seeing the truth.

"It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe things in themselves [*e*] with the soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge [*67a*] or we can do so after death. Then and not before, the soul is by itself apart from the body. While we live, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body and do not join with it more than we must, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself frees us. In this way we shall escape the contamination of the body's folly; we shall be likely to be in the company of people of the same kind, and by our own efforts we shall know all that is pure, which is presumably the [*b* truth, for it is not lawful for the impure to attain the pure."

Such are the things, Simmias, that all those who love learning in the proper manner must say to one another and believe. Or do you not think so?

I certainly do, Socrates.

And if this is true, my friend, said Socrates, there is good hope that on arriving where I am going, if anywhere, I shall acquire what has [*c* been our chief preoccupation in our past life, so that the journey that is now ordered for me is full of good hope, as it is also for any other man who believes that his mind has been prepared and, as it were, purified.

It certainly is, said Simmias.

And does purification not turn out to be what we mentioned in our argument some time ago, namely, to separate the soul as far as possible from the body and accustom it to gather itself and collect itself out of [*d*]

every part of the body and to dwell by itself as far as it can both now and in the future, freed, as it were, from the bonds of the body?

Certainly, he said.

And that freedom and separation of the soul from the body is called death?

That is altogether so.

It is only those who practice philosophy in the right way, we say, who always most want to free the soul; and this release and separation of the soul from the body is the preoccupation of the philosophers?

So it appears.

Therefore, as I said at the beginning, it would be ridiculous for a man to train himself in life to live in a state as close to death as possible, [*e*] and then to resent it when it comes?

Ridiculous, of course.

In fact, Simmias, he said, those who practice philosophy in the right way are in training for dying and they fear death least of all men. Consider it from this point of view: If they are altogether estranged from the body and desire to have their soul by itself, would it not be quite absurd for them to be afraid and resentful when this happens? If they did not gladly set out for a place, where, on arrival, they may hope to attain that for which they had yearned during their lifetime, that is, [*68a*] wisdom, and where they would be rid of the presence of that from which they are estranged?

Many men, at the death of their lovers, wives, or sons, were willing to go to the underworld, driven by the hope of seeing there those for whose company they longed, and being with them. Will then a true lover of wisdom, who has a similar hope and knows that he will never find it to any extent except in Hades, be resentful of dying and {173} not gladly undertake the journey thither? One must surely think so, my [*b*] friend, if he is a true philosopher, for he is firmly convinced that he will not find pure knowledge anywhere except there. And if this is so, then, as I said just now, would it not be highly unreasonable for such a man to fear death?

It certainly would, by Zeus, he said.

Then you have sufficient indication, he said, that any man whom you see resenting death was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body, and also a lover of wealth or of honors, either or both.[19] [*c*]

It is certainly as you say.

And, Simmias, he said, does not what is called courage belong especially to men of this disposition?

Most certainly.

And the quality of temperance which even the majority call by that name, that is, not to get swept off one's feet by one's passions, but to treat them with disdain and orderliness, is this not suited only to those [*d*] who most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy?

Necessarily so, he said.

If you are willing to reflect on the courage and temperance of other people, you will find them strange.

In what way, Socrates?

You know that they all consider death a great evil?

Definitely, he said.

And the brave among them face death, when they do, for fear of greater evils?

That is so.

Therefore, it is fear and terror that make all men brave, except the philosophers. Yet it is illogical to be brave through fear and cowardice.

[*e*] It certainly is.

What of the temperate among them? Is their experience not similar? Is it licentiousness of a kind that makes them temperate? We say this is impossible, yet their experience of this simple-minded temperance turns out to be similar: they fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so they keep away from some pleasures because they are overcome by others. Now to be mastered by pleasure is what they call [*69a*] licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it is a kind of licentiousness that has made them temperate.

That seems likely.

My good Simmias, I fear this is not the right exchange to attain virtue, to exchange pleasures for pleasures, pains for pains, and fears [*b*] for fears, the greater for the less like coins, but that the only valid currency for which all these things should be exchanged is wisdom. With this we have real courage and temperance and justice and, in a word, true virtue, with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and all such things be present or

absent. When these are exchanged for one another in separation from wisdom, such virtue is only an illusory appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves, without soundness or truth, whereas, in truth, temperance and courage and justice are a [*c*] purging away of all such things, and wisdom itself is a kind of cleansing or purification. It is likely that those who established the mystic rites for us were not inferior persons but were speaking in riddles long ago when they said that whoever arrives in the underworld uninitiated and unsanctified will wallow in the mire, whereas he who arrives there purified and initiated will dwell with the gods. There are indeed, as those concerned with the mysteries say, many who carry the thyrsus [*d*] but the Bacchants are few.[20] These latter are, in my opinion, no other than those who have practiced philosophy in the right way. I have in my life left nothing undone in order to be counted among these as far as possible, as I have been eager to be in every way. Whether my eagerness was right and we accomplished anything we shall, I think, know for certain in a short time, god willing, on arriving yonder.

This is my defense, Simmias and Cebes, that I am likely to be right [*e*] to leave you and my masters here without resentment or complaint, believing that there, as here, I shall find good {174} masters and good friends. If my defense is more convincing to you than to the Athenian jury, it will be well.

When Socrates finished, Cebes intervened: Socrates, he said, everything else you said is excellent, I think, but men find it very hard to [*70a*] believe what you said about the soul. They think that after it has left the body it no longer exists anywhere, but that it is destroyed and dissolved on the day the man dies, as soon as it leaves the body; and that, on leaving it, it is dispersed like breath or smoke, has flown away and gone and is no longer anything anywhere.[21] If indeed it gathered itself together and existed by itself and escaped those evils you were recently enumerating, there would then be much good hope, Socrates, that what you say is true; but to believe this requires a good deal of [*b*] faith and persuasive argument, to believe that the soul still exists after a man has died and that it still possesses some capability and intelligence.

What you say is true, Cebes, Socrates said, but what shall we do? Do you want to discuss whether this is likely to be true or not?

Personally, said Cebes, I should like to hear your opinion on the subject.

I do not think, said Socrates, that anyone who heard me now, not even a comic poet, could say that I am babbling and discussing things [*c*] that do not concern me,[22] so we must examine the question thoroughly, if you think we should do so. Let us examine it in some such a manner as this: whether the souls of men who have died exist in the underworld or not. We recall an ancient theory that souls arriving there come from here, and then again that they arrive here and are born here from the dead. If that is true, that the living come back from the dead, then surely our souls must exist there, for they could not come back if they [*d*] did not exist, and this is a sufficient proof that these things are so if it truly appears that the living never come from any other source than from the dead. If this is not the case we should need another argument.

Quite so, said Cebes.

Do not, he said, confine yourself to humanity if you want to understand this more readily, but take all animals and all plants into account, and, in short, for all things which come to be, let us see whether they [*e*] come to be in this way, that is, from their opposites if they have such, as the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly and the just of the unjust, and a thousand other things of the kind. Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite and from nowhere else, as, for example, when something comes to be larger it must necessarily become larger from having been smaller before.

Yes.

Then if something smaller comes to be, it will come from something larger before, which became smaller? [*71a*]

That is so, he said.

And the weaker comes to be from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?

Certainly.

Further, if something worse comes to be, does it not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?

Of course.

So we have sufficiently established that all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites?

Certainly.

There is a further point, something such as this, about these opposites: [*b*] Between each of those pairs of opposites there are two processes: from the one to the other and then again from the other to the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and decrease, and we call the one increasing and the other decreasing?

Yes, he said.

And so too there is separation and combination, cooling and heating, and all such things, even if sometimes we do not have a name for the process, but in fact it must be everywhere that they come to be from one another, and that there is a process of becoming from each into the other?

Assuredly, he said.

{175} [*c*] Well then, is there an opposite to living, as sleeping is the opposite of being awake?

Quite so, he said.

What is it?

Being dead, he said.

Therefore, if these are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two processes of generation between the two?

Of course.

I will tell you, said Socrates, one of the two pairs I was just talking about, the pair itself and the two processes, and you will tell me the other. I mean, to sleep and to be awake; to be awake comes from [*d*] sleeping, and to sleep comes from being awake. Of the two processes one is going to sleep, the other is waking up.

Do you accept that, or not?

Certainly.

You tell me in the same way about life and death. Do you not say that to be dead is the opposite of being alive? I do. And they come to be from one another?

Yes.

What comes to be from being alive?

Being dead.

And what comes to be from being dead?

One must agree that it is being alive.

Then, Cebes, living creatures and things come to be from the dead?

[*e*] So it appears, he said.

Then our souls exist in the underworld. That seems likely.

Then in this case one of the two processes of becoming is clear, for dying is clear enough, is it not?

It certainly is.

What shall we do then?

Shall we not supply the opposite process of becoming? Is nature to be lame in this case? Or must we provide a process of becoming opposite to dying?

We surely must.

And what is that?

Coming to life again.

Therefore, he said, if there is such a thing as coming to life again, [*72a*] it would be a process of coming from the dead to the living?

Quite so.

It is agreed between us then that the living come from the dead in this way no less than the dead from the living, and, if that is so, it seems to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must be somewhere whence they can come back again.

I think, Socrates, he said, that this follows from what we have agreed on.

Consider in this way, Cebes, he said, that, as I think, we were not wrong to agree. If the two processes of becoming did not always balance [*b*] each other as if they were going round in a circle, but generation proceeded from one point to its opposite in a straight line and it did not turn back again to the other opposite or take any turning, do you realize that all things would ultimately be in the same state, be affected in the same way, and cease to become?

How do you mean? he said.

It is not hard to understand what I mean. If, for example, there was such a process as going to sleep, but no corresponding process of waking up, you realize that in the end everything would show the story of [*c*] Endymion[23] to have no meaning. There would be no point to it because everything would have the same experience as he had and be asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, the saying of Anaxagoras[24] would soon be true, “that all things were mixed together.” In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were [*d*] to die and remain in

that state and not come to life again, would not everything ultimately have to be dead and nothing alive? Even if the living came from some other source, and all that lived died, how could all things avoid being absorbed in death?

It could not be, Socrates, said Cebes, and I think what you say is altogether true.

I think, Cebes, said he, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: Coming to life again [*e*] in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist.

{176} Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is [*73a*] possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal.

Cebes, Simmias interrupted, what are the proofs of this? Remind me, for I do not quite recall them at the moment.

There is one excellent argument, said Cebes, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if [*b*] one shows them a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case.[25]

If this does not convince you, Simmias, said Socrates, see whether you agree if we examine it in some such way as this, for do you doubt that what we call learning is recollection?

It is not that I doubt, said Simmias, but I want to experience the very thing we are discussing, recollection, and from what Cebes undertook to say, I am now remembering and am pretty nearly convinced. Nevertheless, I should like to hear now the way you were intending to explain it.

This way, he said. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, [*c*] he must have known it before.

Quite so, he said.

Do we not also agree that when knowledge comes to mind in this way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: When a man sees or hears or

in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?

[*d*] How do you mean?

Things such as this: To know a man is surely a different knowledge from knowing a lyre.

Of course.

Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, a garment, or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.

Thousands indeed, said Simmias.

Is this kind of thing not recollection of a kind, he said, especially so when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because [*e*] one had not seen them for some time?—Quite so.

Further, he said, can a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes?—Certainly.

Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself?—He certainly can.

In all these cases the recollection can be occasioned [*74a*] by things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar?—It can.

When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to consider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete?—One must.

Consider, he said, whether this is the case: We say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?

Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most [*b*] definitely.

And do we know what this is?—Certainly.

Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them?

Or doesn’t it seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: Do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?—Certainly they do.

{177} [*c*] But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal to you, or Equality to be Inequality?

Never, Socrates.

These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same?

I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates.

But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?

Very true, Socrates.

Whether it be like them or unlike them?

Certainly.

It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity [*d*] be recollection?

Quite so.

Well then, he said, do we experience something like this in the case of equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there not?

A considerable deficiency, he said.

Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and [*e*] cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?

Necessarily.

Well, do we also experience this about the equal objects and the Equal itself, or do we not?

Very definitely.

We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive [*75a*] to be like the Equal but are deficient in this.

That is so.

Then surely we also agree that this conception of ours derives from seeing or touching or some other sense perception, and cannot come into our mind

in any other way, for all these senses, I say, are the same.

They are the same, Socrates, at any rate in respect to that which our argument wishes to make plain.

Our sense perceptions must surely make us realize that all that we [*b*] perceive through them is striving to reach that which is Equal but falls short of it; or how do we express it?

Like that.

Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to be like it, but were inferior.

That follows from what has been said, Socrates.

But we began to see and hear and otherwise perceive right after birth?

Certainly.

We must then have acquired the knowledge of [*c*] the Equal before this.

Yes.

It seems then that we must have possessed it before birth.

It seems so.

Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and immediately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal than about the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious, and, as I say, about all those things which we mark with the seal [*d*] of "what it is," both when we are putting questions and answering them. So we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born.

That is so.

If, having acquired this knowledge in each case, we have not forgotten it, we remain knowing and have knowledge throughout our life, for to know is to acquire knowledge, keep it and not lose it. Do we not call the losing of knowledge forgetting?

Most certainly, Socrates, he said. [*e*]

But, I think, if we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at birth, and then later by the use of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we recovered the {178} knowledge we had before, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to call this recollection?

Certainly.

[*76a*] It was seen to be possible for someone to see or hear or otherwise perceive something, and by this to be put in mind of something else which he had forgotten and which is related to it by similarity or difference. One of two things follows, as I say: either we were born with the knowledge of it, and all of us know it throughout life, or those who later, we say, are learning, are only recollecting, and learning would be recollection.

That is certainly the case, Socrates.

Which alternative do you choose, Simmias? That we are born with [*b*] this knowledge or that we recollect later the things of which we had knowledge previously?

I have no means of choosing at the moment, Socrates.

Well, can you make this choice? What is your opinion about it? A man who has knowledge would be able to give an account[26] of what he knows, or would he not?

He must certainly be able to do so, Socrates, he said.

And do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were mentioning just now?

I wish they could, said Simmias, but I'm afraid it is much more likely that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do so adequately.

[*c*] So you do not think that everybody has knowledge of those things?

No indeed.

So they recollect what they once learned?

They must.

When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Certainly not since we were born as men.

Indeed no.

Before that then?

Yes.

So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they took on human form, and they had intelligence.

Unless we acquire the knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates, for that time is still left to us.

Quite so, my friend, but at what other time do we lose it? We just [*d*] now agreed that we are not born with that knowledge. Do we then lose it at the

very time we acquire it, or can you mention any other time?

I cannot, Socrates. I did not realize that I was talking nonsense.

So this is our position, Simmias? he said. If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these [*e*] things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born. If these realities do not exist, then this argument is altogether futile. Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter?

I do not think, Socrates, said Simmias, that there is any possible doubt that it is equally necessary for both to exist, and it is opportune that our argument comes to the conclusion that our soul exists before [*77a*] we are born, and equally so that reality of which you are now speaking.

Nothing is so evident to me personally as that all such things must certainly exist, the Beautiful, the Good, and all those you mentioned just now. I also think that sufficient proof of this has been given.

Then what about Cebes? said Socrates, for we must persuade Cebes also.

He is sufficiently convinced I think, said Simmias, though he is the most difficult of men to persuade by argument, but I believe him to be fully convinced that our soul existed before we were born. I do not [*b*] think myself, however, that it has been proved that the soul continues to exist after death; the opinion of the majority which Cebes mentioned still stands, that when a man dies his soul is {179} dispersed and this is the end of its existence. What is to prevent the soul coming to be and being constituted from some other source, existing before it enters a human body and then, having done so and departed from it, itself dying and being destroyed?

You are right, Simmias, said Cebes. Half of what needed proof has [*c*] been proved, namely, that our soul existed before we were born, but further proof is needed that it exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to be complete.

It has been proved even now, Simmias and Cebes, said Socrates, if you are ready to combine this argument with the one we agreed on before, that every living thing must come from the dead. If the soul [*d*] exists before, it must, as it comes to life and birth, come from nowhere else than death and being dead, so how could it avoid existing after death since it must be born

again? What you speak of has then even now been proved. However, I think you and Simmias would like to discuss the argument more fully. You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve and scatter the soul, as it leaves the [*e*] body, especially if one happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.

Cebes laughed and said: Assuming that we were afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogeyman.

You should, said Socrates, sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears.

[*78a*] Where shall we find a good charmer for these fears, Socrates, he said, now that you are leaving us?

Greece is a large country, Cebes, he said, and there are good men in it; the tribes of foreigners are also numerous. You should search for such a charmer among them all, sparing neither trouble nor expense, for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people who could do this better than yourselves.

That shall be done, said Cebes, but let us, if [*b*] it pleases you, go back to the argument where we left it.

Of course it pleases me.

Splendid, he said.

We must then ask ourselves something like this: What kind of thing is likely to be scattered? On behalf of what kind of thing should one fear this, and for what kind of thing should one not fear it? We should then examine to which class the soul belongs, and as a result either fear for the soul or be of good cheer.

What you say is true.

Is not anything that is composite and a compound [*c*] by nature liable to be split up into its component parts, and only that which is noncomposite, if anything, is not likely to be split up?

I think that is the case, said Cebes.

Are not the things that always remain the same and in the same state most likely not to be composite, whereas those that vary from one time to another and are never the same are composite?

I think that is so.

Let us then return to those same things with which we were dealing earlier,[27] to that reality of whose existence we are giving an account in [*d*] our questions and answers; are they ever the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being uniform by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any change whatever?

It must remain the same, said Cebes, and in the same state, Socrates.

What of the many beautiful particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, [*e*] or other such things, or the many equal particulars, and all those which bear the same name as those others? Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other?

The latter is the case; they are never in the same state.

{180} These latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other [*79a*] senses, but those that always remain the same can be grasped only by the reasoning power of the mind? They are not seen but are invisible?

That is altogether true, he said.

Do you then want us to assume two kinds of existences, the visible and the invisible?

Let us assume this.

And the invisible always remains the same, whereas the visible never does?

Let us assume that too.

[*b*] Now one part of ourselves is the body, another part is the soul?

Quite so.

To which class of existence do we say the body is more alike and akin?

To the visible, as anyone can see.

What about the soul? Is it visible or invisible?

It is not visible to men, Socrates, he said.

Well, we meant visible and invisible to human eyes. Or do you think we meant to some others?

To human eyes.

Then what do we say about the soul? Is it visible or not visible?

Not visible.

So it is invisible?—Yes.

[*c*] So the soul is more like the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible?—Without any doubt, Socrates.

Haven’t we also said some time ago that when the soul makes use of the body to investigate something, be it through hearing or seeing or some other sense—for to investigate something through the body is to do it through the senses—it is dragged by the body to the things that are never the same, and the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy, as if it were drunk, insofar as it is in contact with that kind of thing?

Certainly.

[*d*] But when the soul investigates by itself it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it always stays with it whenever it is by itself and can do so; it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch with things of the same kind, and its experience then is what is called wisdom?

Altogether well said and very true, Socrates, he said.

Judging from what we have said before and [*e*] what we are saying now, to which of these two kinds do you think that the soul is more alike and more akin?

I think, Socrates, he said, that on this line of argument any man, even the dullest, would agree that the soul is altogether more like that which always exists in the same state rather than like that which does not.

What of the body?

That is like the other.

Look at it also this way: When the soul and [*80a*] the body are together, nature orders the one to be subject and to be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Then again, which do you think is like the divine and which like the mortal? Do you not think that the nature of the divine is to rule and to lead, whereas it is that of the mortal to be ruled and be subject?

I do.

Which does the soul resemble?

Obviously, Socrates, the soul resembles the divine, and the body resembles the mortal.

Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been said [*b*] that the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible,[28] uniform, indissoluble, always in the same state as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the same. Have we anything else to say to show, my dear Cebes, that this is not the case?

We have not.

Well then, that being so, is it not natural for the body to dissolve easily, and for the soul to be altogether indissoluble, or nearly so?

Of course. [*c*]

You realize, he said, that when a man dies, the visible part, the body, which exists in the visible world, and which we call the corpse, whose natural lot it would be to dissolve, fall apart, and be {181} blown away, does not immediately suffer any of these things but remains for a fair time, in fact, quite a long time if the man dies with his body in a suitable condition and at a favorable season? If the body is emaciated or embalmed, as in Egypt, it remains almost whole for a remarkable length of time, and even if the body decays, some parts of it, namely bones [*d*] and sinews and the like, are nevertheless, one might say, deathless. Is that not so?—Yes.

Will the soul, the invisible part which makes its way to a region of the same kind, noble and pure and invisible, to Hades in the true sense, to the good and wise god,[29] whither, god willing, my soul must soon be going—will the soul, being of this kind and nature, be scattered and destroyed on leaving the body, as the majority of men say? Far from it, my dear Cebes and Simmias, but what happens is much more like this: If it is [*e*] pure when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it had no willing association with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than practicing philosophy in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. [*81a*] Or is this not training for death?

It surely is.

A soul in this state makes its way to the invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise, and arriving there it can be happy, having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear, violent desires, and the other human ills

and, as is said of the initiates,[30] truly spend the rest of time with the gods. Shall we say this, Cebes, or something different?

This, by Zeus, said Cebes.

But I think that if the soul is polluted and impure when it leaves [*b*] the body, having always been associated with it and served it, bewitched by physical desires and pleasures to the point at which nothing seems real[31] to it but the physical, which one can touch and see or eat and drink or make use of for sexual enjoyment, and if that soul is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is dim and invisible to the eyes but intelligible and to be grasped by philosophy—do you think such a soul will escape pure and by itself? [*c*]

Impossible, he said.

It is no doubt permeated by the physical, which constant intercourse and association with the body, as well as considerable practice, has caused to become ingrained in it?

Quite so.

We must believe, my friend, that this bodily element is heavy, ponderous, earthy, and visible. Through it, such a soul has become heavy and is dragged back to the visible region in fear of the unseen and of [*d*] Hades. It wanders, as we are told, around graves and monuments, where shadowy phantoms, images that such souls produce, have been seen, souls that have not been freed and purified but share in the visible, and are therefore seen.

That is likely, Socrates.

It is indeed, Cebes. Moreover, these are not the souls of good but of inferior men, which are forced to wander there, paying the penalty [*e*] for their previous bad upbringing. They wander until their longing for that which accompanies them, the physical, again imprisons them in a body, and they are then, as is likely, bound to such characters as they have practiced in their life.

What kind of characters do you say these are, Socrates?

Those, for example, who have carelessly practiced gluttony, violence, and drunkenness are likely to join a company of donkeys or of similar [*82a*] animals. Do you not think so?

Very likely.

Those who have esteemed injustice highly, and tyranny and plunder, will join the tribes of wolves and hawks and kites, or where else shall we say that they go?

Certainly to those, said Cebes.

And clearly, the destination of the others will conform to the way in which they have behaved?

Clearly, of course.

{182} The happiest of these, who will also have the best destination, are [*b*] those who have practiced popular and social virtue, which they call moderation and justice and which was developed by habit and practice, without philosophy or understanding?

How are they the happiest?

Because it is likely that they will again join a social and gentle group, either of bees or wasps or ants, and then again the same kind of human group, and so be temperate men.

That is likely.

No one may lawfully[32] join the company of the gods who has not practiced [*c*] philosophy and is not completely pure when he departs from life, but only the lover of learning. It is for this reason, my friends Simmias and Cebes, that those who practice philosophy in the right way keep away from all bodily passions, master them and do not surrender themselves to them; it is not at all for fear of wasting their substance and of poverty, which the majority and the money-lovers fear, nor for fear of dishonor and ill repute, like the ambitious and lovers of honors, that they keep away from them.

That would not be natural for them, Socrates, said Cebes.

By Zeus, no, he said. Those who care for their own soul and do not [*d*] live for the service of their body dismiss all these things. They do not travel the same road as those, since they are aware that they do not know where they are going. Rather, believing that nothing should be done contrary to philosophy and their deliverance and purification, they turn to this and follow wherever philosophy leads.

How so, Socrates?

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of learning know that when philosophy gets hold of their soul, it is imprisoned in and clinging to [*e*] the body, and

that it is forced to examine other things through it as through a cage and not by itself, and that it wallows in every kind of ignorance. Philosophy sees that the worst feature of this imprisonment is that it is due to desires, so that the prisoner himself is contributing to his own incarceration most of all. As I say, the lovers of learning [*83a*] know that philosophy gets hold of their soul when it is in that state, then gently encourages it and tries to free it by showing them that investigation through the eyes is full of deceit, as is that through the ears and the other senses. Philosophy then persuades the soul to withdraw from the senses insofar as it is not compelled to use them and bids the soul to gather itself together by itself, to trust only itself and whatever reality, existing by itself, the soul by itself understands, and [*b*] not to consider as real[33] whatever it examines by other means, for this is different in different circumstances and is sensible and visible, whereas what the soul itself sees is intelligible and invisible. The soul of the true philosopher thinks that this deliverance must not be opposed and so keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains as far as he can; he reflects that violent pleasure or pain or passion does not cause merely such evils as one might expect, such as one suffers when one has been [*c*] sick or extravagant through desire, but the greatest and most extreme evil, though one does not reflect on this.

What is that, Socrates? asked Cebes.

That the soul of every man, when it feels violent pleasure or pain in connection with some object, inevitably believes at the same time that what causes such feelings must be very clear and very true, which it is not. Such objects are mostly visible, are they not?

Certainly.

And doesn’t such an experience tie the soul to [*d*] the body most completely?

How so?

Because every pleasure or pain provides, as it were, another nail to rivet the soul to the body and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes real the very things the body says are so. As it shares the beliefs and pleasures of the body, I think it inevitably comes to share its ways and manner of life and is unable ever to reach Hades in a pure state; it is always full of body when it departs, so that [*e*] it soon falls back into

another body and grows with it as if it had been sewn into it. Because of this, it can {183} have no part in the company of the divine, the pure and uniform.

What you say is very true, Socrates, said Cebes.

This is why genuine lovers of learning are temperate and brave, or do you think it is for the reasons the majority says they are?

[*84a*] I certainly do not.

Indeed no. This is how the soul of a philosopher would reason: It would not think that while philosophy must free it, it should while being freed surrender itself to pleasures and pains and imprison itself again, thus laboring in vain like Penelope at her web.[34] The soul of the philosopher achieves a calm from such emotions; it follows reason and ever stays with it contemplating what is real, divine, and not an [*b*] object of belief. Nurtured by this, it considers that one should live in this manner as long as one is alive and, after death, arrive at what is akin and of the same kind, and escape from human evils. After such nurture there is no danger, Simmias and Cebes, that one should fear that, on parting from the body, the soul would be scattered and dissipated by the winds and no longer be anything anywhere.

[*c*] When Socrates finished speaking there was a long silence. He appeared to be concentrating on what had been said, and so were most of us. But Cebes and Simmias were whispering to each other. Socrates observed them and questioned them. Come, he said, do you think there is something lacking in my argument? There are still many doubtful points and many objections for anyone who wants a thorough discussion of these matters. If you are discussing some other subject, I have nothing to say, but if something is puzzling you[35] about this one, do not hesitate to speak for yourselves and expound it if you think the argument could be improved, and if you think you will better solve your puzzles with my help, take me along [*d*] with you in the discussion.

I will tell you the truth, Socrates, said Simmias. Both of us have been in difficulty for some time, and each of us has been urging the other to question you because we wanted to hear what you would say, but we hesitated to bother you, lest it be displeasing to you in your present misfortune.

When Socrates heard this he laughed quietly and said: “Really, Simmias, it would be hard for me to persuade other people that I do [*e*] not consider my present fate a misfortune if I cannot persuade even you, and you are afraid that it is more difficult to deal with me than before. You seem to think me inferior to the swans in prophecy.[36] They sing before too, but when they realize that they must die they sing most and most beautifully, as they rejoice that they are about to depart to [*85a*] join the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, tell lies about the swans and say that they lament their death and sing in sorrow. They do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffers in any other way, neither the nightingale nor the swallow nor the hoopoe,[37] though they do say that these sing laments when in pain. Nor do the swans, but I believe that as they belong to Apollo, they are prophetic, have knowledge of the future, [*b*] and sing of the blessings of the underworld, sing and rejoice on that day beyond what they did before. As I believe myself to be a fellow servant with the swans and dedicated to the same god, and have received from my master a gift of prophecy not inferior to theirs, I am no more despondent than they on leaving life. Therefore, you must speak and ask whatever you want as long as the authorities allow it.”

Well spoken, said Simmias. I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes will say why he does not accept what was said. I believe, as [*c*] perhaps you do, that precise knowledge on that subject is impossible or extremely difficult in our present life, but that it surely shows a very poor spirit not to examine[38] thoroughly what is said about {184} it, and to desist before one is exhausted by an all-around investigation. One should achieve one of these things: learn the truth about these things or find it for oneself, or, if that is impossible, adopt the best and most irrefutable [*d*] of men’s theories, and, borne upon this, sail through the dangers of life as upon a raft, unless someone should make that journey safer and less risky upon a firmer vessel of some divine doctrine. So even now, since you have said what you did, I will feel no shame at asking questions, and I will not blame myself in the future because I did not say what I think. As I examine what we said, both by myself and with Cebes, it does not seem to be adequate.

[*e*] Said Socrates: “You may well be right, my friend, but tell me how it is inadequate.”

In this way, as it seems to me, he said: “One might make the same argument about harmony, lyre and strings, that a harmony is something [*86a*] invisible, without body, beautiful and divine in the attuned lyre, whereas the lyre itself and its strings are physical, bodily, composite, earthy, and akin to what is mortal. Then if someone breaks the lyre, cuts or breaks the strings and then insists, using the same argument as you, that the harmony must still exist and is not destroyed because it would be impossible for the lyre and the strings, which are mortal, still to exist when the strings are broken, and for the harmony, which is akin and [*b*] of the same nature as the divine and immortal, to be destroyed before that which is mortal; he would say that the harmony itself still must exist and that the wood and the strings must rot before the harmony can suffer. And indeed, Socrates, I think you must have this in mind, that we really do suppose the soul to be something of this kind; as the body is stretched and held together by the hot and the cold, the dry [*c*] and the moist, and other such things, and our soul is a mixture and harmony of those things when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due measure. If then the soul is a kind of harmony or attunement, clearly, when our body is relaxed or stretched without due measure by diseases and other evils, the soul must immediately be destroyed, even if it be most divine, as are the other harmonies found in music and all the works of artists, and the remains of each body last for a long time [*d*] until they rot or are burned. Consider what we shall say in answer to one who deems the soul to be a mixture of bodily elements and to be the first to perish in the process we call death.”

Socrates looked at us keenly, as was his habit, smiled, and said: “What Simmias says is quite fair. If one of you can better address his puzzles, why did he not answer him, for he seems to have handled the argument competently. However, I think that before we answer him, [*e*] we should hear Cebes’ objection, in order that we may have time to deliberate on an answer. When we have heard him we should either agree with them, if we think them in tune with us or, if not, defend our own argument. Come then, Cebes. What is troubling you?”

I tell you, said Cebes, the argument seems to [*87a*] me to be at the same point as before and open to the same objection. I do not deny that it has been very elegantly and, if it is not offensive to say so, sufficiently proved that our soul existed before it took on this present form, but I do not believe

the same applies to its existing somewhere after our death. Not that I agree with Simmias' objection that the soul is not stronger and much more lasting than the body, for I think it is superior in all these respects. "Why then," the argument might say, "are you still unconvinced? Since you see that when the man dies, the weaker part continues to exist, do you not think that the more lasting part must [*b*] be preserved during that time?" On this point consider whether what I say makes sense.

Like Simmias, I too need an image, for I think this argument is much as if one said at the death of an old weaver that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and offered as proof the fact that the cloak the old man had woven himself and was wearing [*c*] was still sound and had not perished. If one was not convinced, he would be asked whether a man lasts longer than a cloak which is in use and being worn, and if the answer was that a man lasts much longer, this would be taken as proof that the man was definitely safe and sound, since the more temporary thing had not perished. But, Simmias, I do {185} not think that is so, for consider what I say. Anybody could see that the man who said this was talking nonsense. That weaver had woven and worn out many such cloaks. He perished after many [*d*] of them, but before the last. That does not mean that a man is inferior and weaker than a cloak. The image illustrates, I think, the relationship of the soul to the body, and anyone who says the same thing about them would appear to me to be talking sense, that the soul lasts a long time while the body is weaker and more short-lived. He might say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if it lives many years. If the body were in a state of flux and perished while the man was still alive, and the soul wove afresh the body that is worn out, yet it would [*e*] be inevitable that whenever the soul perished it would be wearing the last body it wove and perish only before this last. Then when the soul perished, the body would show the weakness of its nature by soon decaying and disappearing. So we cannot trust this argument and be confident that our soul continues to exist somewhere after our death. [*88a*] For, if one were to concede, even more than you do, to a man using that argument, if one were to grant him not only that the soul exists in the time before we are born, but that there is no reason why the soul of some should not exist and continue to exist after our death, and thus frequently be born and die in turn; if one were to grant him that the soul's nature is so strong that it can survive many bodies, but if,

having granted all this, one does not further agree that the soul is not damaged by its many births and is not, in the end, altogether destroyed [*b*] in one of those deaths, he might say that no one knows which death and dissolution of the body brings about the destruction of the soul, since not one of us can be aware of this. And in that case, any man who faces death with confidence is foolish, unless he can prove that the soul is altogether immortal. If he cannot, a man about to die must of necessity always fear for his soul, lest the present separation of the soul from the body bring about the complete destruction of the soul.

[*c*] When we heard what they said we were all depressed, as we told each other afterwards. We had been quite convinced by the previous argument, and they seemed to confuse us again, and to drive us to doubt not only what had already been said but also what was going to be said, lest we be worthless as critics or the subject itself admitted of no certainty.

ECHECRATES: By the gods, Phaedo, you have my sympathy, for as I [*d*] listen to you now I find myself saying to myself: "What argument shall we trust, now that that of Socrates, which was extremely convincing, has fallen into discredit?" The statement that the soul is some kind of harmony has a remarkable hold on me, now and always, and when it was mentioned it reminded me that I had myself previously thought so. And now I am again quite in need, as if from the beginning, of some other argument to convince me that the soul does not die along with the man. Tell me then, by Zeus, how Socrates tackled the argument. [*e*] Was he obviously distressed, as you say you people were, or was he not, but quietly came to the rescue of his argument, and did he do so satisfactorily or inadequately? Tell us everything as precisely as you can.

PHAEDO: I have certainly often admired Socrates, Echecrates, but [*89a*] never more than on this occasion. That he had a reply was perhaps not strange. What I wondered at most in him was the pleasant, kind, and admiring way he received the young men's argument, and how sharply he was aware of the effect the discussion had on us, and then how well he healed our distress and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and defeat and turned us around to join him in the examination of their argument.

ECHECRATES: How did he do this?

PHAEDO: I will tell you. I happened to be sitting on his right by the [*b*] couch on a low stool, so that he was sitting well above me. He stroked my

head and pressed the hair on the back of my neck, for he was in the habit of playing with my hair at times. “Tomorrow, Phaedo,” he said, “you will probably cut this beautiful hair.”

Likely enough, Socrates, I said.

Not if you take my advice, he said.

Why not? said I.

It is today, he said, that I shall cut my hair and you yours, if our argument dies on us, and we cannot revive it. If I were you, and the [*c*] argument {186} escaped me, I would take an oath, as the Argives did, not to let my hair grow before I fought again and defeated the argument of Simmias and Cebes.

But, I said, they say that not even Heracles could fight two people.

Then call on me as your Iolaus, as long as the daylight lasts.

I shall call on you, but in this case as Iolaus calling on Heracles.

It makes no difference, he said, but first there is a certain experience we must be careful to avoid.

What is that? I asked.

That we should not become misologues, as people become misanthropes. [*d*] There is no greater evil one can suffer than to hate reasonable discourse. Misology and misanthropy arise in the same way. Misanthropy comes when a man without knowledge or skill has placed great trust in someone and believes him to be altogether truthful, sound, and trustworthy; then, a short time afterwards he finds him to be wicked and unreliable, and then this happens in another case; when one has frequently had that experience, especially with those whom one believed [*e*] to be one’s closest friends, then, in the end, after many such blows, one comes to hate all men and to believe that no one is sound in any way at all. Have you not seen this happen?

I surely have, I said.

This is a shameful state of affairs, he said, and obviously due to an attempt to have human relations without any skill in human affairs, for such skill would lead one to believe, what is in fact true, that the very good and the very wicked are both quite rare, and that most men are [*90a*] between those extremes.

How do you mean? said I.

The same as with the very tall and the very short, he said. Do you think anything is rarer than to find an extremely tall man or an extremely short one? Or a dog or anything else whatever? Or again, one extremely swift or extremely slow, ugly or beautiful, white or black? Are you not aware that in all those cases the most extreme at either end are rare and few, but those in between are many and plentiful?

Certainly, I said.

Therefore, he said, if a contest of wickedness [*b*] were established, there too the winners, you think, would be very few?

That is likely, said I.

Likely indeed, he said, but arguments are not like men in this particular. I was merely following your lead just now. The similarity lies rather in this: It is as when one who lacks skill in arguments puts his trust in an argument as being true, then shortly afterwards believes it to be false—as sometimes it is and sometimes it is not—and so with another argument and then another. You know how those in particular [*c*] who spend their time studying contradiction in the end believe themselves to have become very wise and that they alone have understood that there is no soundness or reliability in any object or in any argument, but that all that exists simply fluctuates up and down as if it were in the Euripus[39] and does not remain in the same place for any time at all.

What you say, I said, is certainly true.

It would be pitiable, Phaedo, he said, when there is a true and reliable argument and one that can be understood, if a man who has [*d*] dealt with such arguments as appear at one time true, at another time untrue, should not blame himself or his own lack of skill but, because of his distress, in the end gladly shift the blame away from himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and reviling reasoned discussion and so be deprived of truth and knowledge of reality.

Yes, by Zeus, I said, that would be pitiable indeed.

This then is the first thing we should guard [*e*] against, he said. We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to [*91a*] attain soundness, you and the others for the sake of your whole life still to come,

and I for the sake of death itself. I am in danger at this moment of not having a philosophical attitude about this, but like those {187} who are quite uneducated, I am eager to get the better of you in argument, for the uneducated, when they engage in argument about anything, give no thought to the truth about the subject of discussion but are only eager that those present will accept the position they have set forth. I differ from them only to this extent: I shall not be eager to get the agreement of those present that what I say is true, except incidentally, but I shall be very eager that I should myself be thoroughly convinced that things are so. For I am thinking—see in how contentious a spirit—that [*b*] if what I say is true, it is a fine thing to be convinced; if, on the other hand, nothing exists after death, at least for this time before I die I shall distress those present less with lamentations, and my folly will not continue to exist along with me—that would be a bad thing—but will come to an end in a short time. Thus prepared, Simmias and Cebes, he said, I come to deal with your argument. If you will take my advice, you will give but little thought to Socrates but much more to [*c*] the truth. If you think that what I say is true, agree with me; if not, oppose it with every argument and take care that in my eagerness I do not deceive myself and you and, like a bee, leave my sting in you when I go.

We must proceed, he said, and first remind me of what you said if I do not appear to remember it. Simmias, as I believe, is in doubt and fear that the soul, though it is more divine and beautiful than the body, [*d*] yet predeceases it, being a kind of harmony. Cebes, I thought, agrees with me that the soul lasts much longer than the body, but that no one knows whether the soul often wears out many bodies and then, on leaving its last body, is now itself destroyed. This then is death, the destruction of the soul, since the body is always being destroyed. Are these the questions, Simmias and Cebes, which we must investigate?

[*e*] They both agreed that they were.

Do you then, he asked, reject all our previous statements, or some but not others?

Some, they both said, but not others.

What, he said, about the statements we made that learning is recollection and that, if this was so, our soul must of necessity exist elsewhere [*92a*] before us, before it was imprisoned in the body?

For myself, said Cebes, I was wonderfully convinced by it at the time and I stand by it now also, more than by any other statement.

That, said Simmias, is also my position, and I should be very surprised if I ever changed my opinion about this.

But you must change your opinion, my Theban friend, said Socrates, if you still believe that a harmony is a composite thing, and that the soul is a kind of harmony of the elements of the body in a state of tension, for surely you will not allow yourself to maintain that a composite harmony [*b*] existed before those elements from which it had to be composed, or would you?

Never, Socrates, he said.

Do you realize, he said, that this is what you are in fact saying when you state that the soul exists before it takes on the form and body of a man and that it is composed of elements which do not yet exist? A harmony is not like that to which you compare it; the lyre and the [*c*] strings and the notes, though still unharmonized, exist; the harmony is composed last of all, and is the first to be destroyed. How will you harmonize this statement with your former one?

In no way, said Simmias.

And surely, he said, a statement about harmony should do so more than any other.

It should, said Simmias.

So your statement is inconsistent? Consider which of your statements you prefer, that learning is recollection or that the soul is a harmony.

I much prefer the former, Socrates. I adopted [*d*] the latter without proof, because of a certain probability and plausibility, which is why it appeals to most men. I know that arguments of which the proof is based on probability are pretentious and, if one does not guard against them, they certainly deceive one, in geometry and everything else. The theory of recollection and learning, however, was based on an assumption worthy of acceptance, for our soul was said to exist also before it came into the body, just as the reality does that is of the kind that we qualify [*e*] by the words “what it is,” and I convinced myself that I was quite correct to accept it. Therefore, I cannot accept the theory that the soul is a harmony either from myself or anyone else.

{188} What of this, Simmias? Do you think it natural for a harmony, or [*93a*] any other composite, to be in a different state from that of the elements of which it is composed?

Not at all, said Simmias.

Nor, as I think, can it act or be acted upon in a different way than its elements?

He agreed.

One must therefore suppose that a harmony does not direct its components, but is directed by them.

He accepted this.

A harmony is therefore far from making a movement, or uttering a sound, or doing anything else, in a manner contrary to that of its parts.

Far from it indeed, he said.

Does not the nature of each harmony depend on the way it has been harmonized?

I do not understand, he said.

Will it not, if it is more and more fully harmonized, be more and [*b*] more fully a harmony, and if it is less and less fully harmonized, it will be less and less fully a harmony?

Certainly.

Can this be true about the soul, that one soul is more and more fully a soul than another, or is less and less fully a soul, even to the smallest extent?

Not in any way.

Come now, by Zeus, he said. One soul is said to have intelligence and virtue and to be good, another to have folly and wickedness and [*c*] to be bad. Are those things truly said?

They certainly are.

What will someone who holds the theory that the soul is a harmony say that those things are which reside in the soul, that is, virtue and wickedness? Are these some other harmony and disharmony? That the good soul is harmonized and, being a harmony, has within itself another harmony, whereas the evil soul is both itself a lack of harmony and has no other within itself?

I don’t know what to say, said Simmias, but one who holds that assumption must obviously say something of that kind.

We have previously agreed, he said, that one soul is not more and [*d*] not less a soul than another, and this means that one harmony is not more and more fully, or less and less fully, a harmony than another.

Is that not so?

Certainly.

Now that which is no more and no less a harmony is not more or less harmonized. Is that so?

It is.

Can that which is neither more nor less harmonized partake more or less of harmony, or does it do so equally?

Equally.

Then if a soul is neither more nor less a soul than another, it has [*e*] been harmonized to the same extent?

This is so.

If that is so, it would have no greater share of disharmony or of harmony?

It would not.

That being the case, could one soul have more wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is disharmony and virtue harmony?

It could not.

But rather, Simmias, according to correct reasoning, [*94a*] no soul, if it is a harmony, will have any share of wickedness, for harmony is surely altogether this very thing, harmony, and would never share in disharmony.

It certainly would not.

Nor would a soul, being altogether this very thing, a soul, share in wickedness?

How could it, in view of what has been said?

So it follows from this argument that all the souls of all living creatures will be equally good, if souls are by nature equally this very thing, souls.

I think so, Socrates.

Does our argument seem right, he said, and [*b*] does it seem that it should have come to this, if the hypothesis that the soul is a harmony was correct?

Not in any way, he said.

Further, of all the parts of a man, can you mention any other part that rules him than his soul, especially if it is a wise soul?

I cannot.

Does it do so by following the affections of the body or by opposing them? I mean, for example, that when the body is hot and thirsty the soul {189} draws him to the opposite, to not drinking; when the body is hungry, to not eating, and we see a thousand other examples of the [*c*] soul opposing the affections of the body. Is that not so?

It certainly is.

On the other hand, we previously agreed that if the soul were a harmony, it would never be out of tune with the stress and relaxation and the striking of the strings or anything else done to its composing elements, but that it would follow and never direct them?

We did so agree, of course.

Well, does it now appear to do quite the opposite, ruling over all [*d*] the elements of which one says it is composed, opposing nearly all of them throughout life, directing all their ways, inflicting harsh and painful punishment on them, at times in physical culture and medicine, at other times more gently by threats and exhortations, holding converse with desires and passions and fears as if it were one thing talking to a different one, as Homer wrote somewhere in the *Odyssey* where he says that Odysseus "struck his breast and rebuked his heart saying, 'Endure, my heart, you have endured worse than this'"?[40]

Do you think that when he composed this the poet thought that his [*e*] soul was a harmony, a thing to be directed by the affections of the body? Did he not rather regard it as ruling over them and mastering them, itself a much more divine thing than a harmony?

Yes, by Zeus, I think so, Socrates.

Therefore, my good friend, it is quite wrong for us to say that the [*95a*] soul is a harmony, and in saying so we would disagree both with the divine poet Homer and with ourselves.

That is so, he said.

Very well, said Socrates. Harmonia of Thebes seems somehow reasonably propitious to us. How and by what argument, my dear Cebes, can we propitiate Cadmus?[41]

I think, Cebes said, that you will find a way. You dealt with the argument about harmony in a manner that was quite astonishing to me. When Simmias was speaking of his difficulties I was very much [*b*] wondering

whether anyone would be able to deal with his argument, and I was quite dumbfounded when right away he could not resist your argument's first onslaught. I should not wonder, therefore, if that of Cadmus suffered the same fate.

My good sir, said Socrates, do not boast, lest some malign influence upset the argument we are about to make. However, we leave that to the care of the god, but let us come to grips with it in the Homeric fashion, to see if there is anything in what you say. The sum of your problem is this: You consider that the soul must be proved to be immortal and indestructible before a philosopher on the point of death, [*c*] who is confident that he will fare much better in the underworld than if he had led any other kind of life, can avoid being foolish and simpleminded in this confidence. To prove that the soul is strong, that it is divine, that it existed before we were born as men, all this, you say, does not show the soul to be immortal but only long-lasting. That it existed for a very long time before, that it knew much and acted much, makes it no more immortal because of that; indeed, its very entering [*d*] into a human body was the beginning of its destruction, like a disease; it would live that life in distress and would in the end be destroyed in what we call death. You say it makes no difference whether it enters a body once or many times as far as the fear of each of us is concerned, for it is natural for a man who is no fool to be afraid, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. This, I think, is what you maintain, Cebes; I deliberately repeat it often, in order that no [*e*] point may escape us, and that you may add or subtract something if you wish.

And Cebes said: "There is nothing that I want to add or subtract at the moment. That is what I say."

Socrates paused for a long time, deep in thought. He then said: [*96a*] "This is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a thorough investigation of the cause of generation {190} and destruction. I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in these matters. Then if something I say seems useful to you, make use of it to persuade us of your position."

I surely do wish that, said Cebes.

Listen then, and I will, Cebes, he said. When I was a young man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the causes of everything, why it comes [*b*] to

be, why it perishes, and why it exists. I was often changing my mind in the investigation, in the first instance, of questions such as these: Are living creatures nurtured when heat and cold produce a kind of putrefaction, as some say? Do we think with our blood, or air, or fire, or none of these, and does the brain provide our senses of hearing and sight and smell, from which come memory and opinion, and from memory and opinion which has become stable, comes knowledge? Then again, as I investigated how these things perish and what happens [*c*] to things in the sky and on the earth, finally I became convinced that I have no natural aptitude at all for that kind of investigation, and of this I will give you sufficient proof. This investigation made me quite blind even to those things which I and others thought that I clearly knew before, so that I unlearned what I thought I knew before, about many other things and specifically about how men grew. I thought before that it was obvious to anybody that men grew through eating [*d*] and drinking, for food adds flesh to flesh and bones to bones, and in the same way appropriate parts were added to all other parts of the body, so that the man grew from an earlier small bulk to a large bulk later, and so a small man became big. That is what I thought then. Do you not think it was reasonable?

I do, said Cebes.

Then further consider this: I thought my opinion was satisfactory, that when a large man stood by a small one he was taller by a head, [*e*] and so a horse was taller than a horse. Even clearer than this, I thought that ten was more than eight because two had been added, and that a two-cubit length is larger than a cubit because it surpasses it by half its length.

And what do you think now about those things?

That I am far, by Zeus, from believing that I know the cause of any of those things. I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it [*97a*] is added become two because of the addition of the one to the other. I wonder that, when each of them is separate from the other, each of them is one, nor are they then two, but that, when they come near to one another, this is the cause of their becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to one another. Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause of its becoming two, for just now the cause of

becoming two was the [*b*] opposite. At that time it was their coming close together and one was added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and separated from the other.

I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit or anything else comes to be, or perishes or exists by the old method of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I have a confused method of my own. One day I heard someone reading, as he said, from a book [*c*] of Anaxagoras,[42] and saying that it is Mind that directs and is the cause of everything. I was delighted with this cause and it seemed to me good, in a way, that Mind should be the cause of all. I thought that if this were so, the directing Mind would direct everything and arrange each thing in the way that was best. If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On [*d*] these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. The same man must inevitably also know what is worse, for that is part of the same knowledge. As I reflected on this subject I was glad to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher about the cause of things after my own heart, and that he would tell [*e*] me, first, whether {191} the earth is flat or round, and then would explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better, and that it was better to be so. If he said it was in the middle of the universe, he would go on to show that it was better for it to be in the middle, and if he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire any other kind [*98a*] of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, about their relative speed, their turnings, and whatever else happened to them, how it is best that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring in any other cause for them than that it was best for them to be as they are. [*b*] Once he had given the best for each as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he would go on to explain the common good for all, and I would not have exchanged my hopes for a fortune. I eagerly acquired his books and read them as quickly as I could in order to know the best and the worst as soon as possible.

This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the [*c*] management of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other strange things. That seemed to me much like saying that Socrates' actions are all due to his mind, and then in trying to tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason that I am sitting here is because my body consists of bones and sinews, because the bones are hard and are separated by joints, that the sinews are such as to contract and relax, that they surround the bones along with flesh [*d*] and skin which hold them together, then as the bones are hanging in their sockets, the relaxation and contraction of the sinews enable me to bend my limbs, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my limbs bent.

Again, he would mention other such causes for my talking to you: sounds and air and hearing, and a thousand other such things, but he would neglect to mention the true causes, that, after the Athenians [*e*] decided it was better to condemn me, for this reason it seemed best to me to sit here and more right to remain and to endure whatever penalty they ordered. For, by the dog, I think these sinews and bones could [*99a*] long ago have been in Megara or among the Boeotians, taken there by my belief as to the best course, if I had not thought it more right and honorable to endure whatever penalty the city ordered rather than escape and run away. To call those things causes is too absurd. If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have chosen [*b*] the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the [*c*] heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could possibly be put, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will some time discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and "binding" binds and holds them together. I would gladly become the

disciple of any man who taught the workings of that kind of cause. However, since I was deprived and could neither discover it myself nor learn it from another, do you wish [*d*] me to give you an explanation of how, as a second best, I busied myself with the search for the cause, Cebes?

I would wish it above all else, he said.

After this, he said, when I had wearied of investigating things, I thought that I must be careful to avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its reflection in water or some such material. A similar [*e*] thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of things by {192} means of words. However, perhaps this analogy is inadequate, for I certainly do not admit that one who [*100a*] investigates things by means of words is dealing with images any more than one who looks at facts. However, I started in this manner: taking as my hypothesis in each case the theory that seemed to me the most compelling, I would consider as true, about cause and everything else, whatever agreed with this, and as untrue whatever did not so agree. But I want to put my meaning more clearly, for I do not think that you understand me now.

No, by Zeus, said Cebes, not very well.

This, he said, is what I mean. It is nothing new, but what I have [*b*] never stopped talking about, both elsewhere and in the earlier part of our conversation. I am going to try to show you the kind of cause with which I have concerned myself. I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and proceed from them. I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a result, and to find the soul to be immortal.

[*c*] Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten to your conclusion.

Consider then, he said, whether you share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it shares in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything. Do you agree to this sort of cause?—I do.

[*d*] I no longer understand or recognize those other sophisticated causes, and if someone tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a bright color

or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons—for all these confuse me—but I simply, naively, and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. [*e*] That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else. And if I stick to this I think I shall never fall into error. This is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful. Or do you not think so too?—I do.

And that it is through Bigness that big things are big and the bigger are bigger, and that smaller things are made small by Smallness?—Yes.

And you would not accept the statement that one man is taller than [*101a*] another by a head and the shorter man shorter by the same, but you would bear witness that you mean nothing else than that everything that is bigger is made bigger by nothing else than by Bigness, and that is the cause of its being bigger, and the smaller is made smaller only by Smallness, and this is why it is smaller. I think you would be afraid that some opposite argument would confront you if you said that someone is bigger or smaller by a head, first, because the bigger is bigger and the smaller smaller by the same, then because the bigger is bigger by a [*b*] head which is small, and this would be strange, namely, that someone is made bigger by something small. Would you not be afraid of this?

I certainly would, said Cebes, laughing.

Then you would be afraid to say that ten is more numerous than eight by two, and that this is the cause of the excess, and not Numerousness and because of Numerousness, or that two cubits is bigger than one cubit by half and not by Bigness, for this is the same fear.—Certainly.

Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it [*c*] is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and

leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow [*d*] and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone {193} then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another. And when you must give an account of your hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable, but you will not jumble the [*e*] two as the debaters do by discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same time, if you wish to discover any truth. This they do not discuss at all nor give any thought to, but their wisdom enables them to mix everything up and yet to be pleased with themselves, but if you [*102a*] are a philosopher I think you will do as I say.

What you say is very true, said Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHECRATES: Yes, by Zeus, Phaedo, and they were right; I think he made these things wonderfully clear to anyone of even small intelligence.

PHAEDO: Yes indeed, Echecrates, and all those present thought so too.

ECHECRATES: And so do we who were not present but hear of it now. What was said after that?

PHAEDO: As I recall it, when the above had been accepted, and it was agreed that each of the Forms existed, and that other things acquired [*b*] their name by having a share in them, he followed this up by asking: If you say these things are so, when you then say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, do you not mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness?—I do.

But, he said, do you agree that the words of the statement “Simmias is taller than Socrates” do not express the truth of the matter? It is not, [*c*] surely, the nature of Simmias to be taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? Nor is he taller than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness compared with the tallness of the other?—True.

Nor is he shorter than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has tallness compared with the shortness of Simmias?—That is so.

So then Simmias is called both short and [*d*] tall, being between the two, presenting his shortness to be overcome by the tallness of one, and his

tallness to overcome the shortness of the other. He smilingly added, I seem to be going to talk like a book, but it is as I say. The other agreed.

My purpose is that you may agree with me. Now it seems to me that not only Tallness itself is never willing to be tall and short at the same time, but also that the tallness in us will never admit the short [*e*] or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the short, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. It is not willing to endure and admit shortness and be other than it was, whereas I admit and endure shortness and still remain the same person and am this short man. But Tallness, being tall, cannot venture to be small. In the same way, the short in us is unwilling to become or to be tall ever, nor does any other of the opposites become [*103a*] or be its opposite while still being what it was; either it goes away or is destroyed when that happens.—I altogether agree, said Cebes.

When he heard this, someone of those present—I have no clear memory of who it was—said: "By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion[43] to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now I think we are saying that this would never happen?"

On hearing this, Socrates inclined his head toward the speaker and said: "You have bravely reminded us, but you do not understand the [*b*] difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them [*c*] things get {194} their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another." At the same time he looked to Cebes and said: "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?"

Not at the moment, said Cebes, but I do not deny that many things do disturb me.

We are altogether agreed then, he said, that an opposite will never be opposite to itself.—Entirely agreed.

Consider then whether you will agree to this further point. There is something you call hot and something you call cold.—There is.

Are they the same as what you call snow and fire?—By Zeus, no. [*d*]

So the hot is something other than fire, and the cold is something other than snow?—Yes.

You think, I believe, that being snow it will not admit the hot, as we said before, and remain what it was and be both snow and hot, but when the hot approaches it will either retreat before it or be destroyed.—Quite so.

So fire, as the cold approaches, will either go away or be destroyed; it will never venture to admit coldness and remain what it was, fire and cold.—What you say is true. [*e*]

It is true then about some of these things that not only the Form itself deserves its own name for all time, but there is something else that is not the Form but has its character whenever it exists. Perhaps I can make my meaning clearer: the Odd must always be given this name we now mention. Is that not so?—Certainly.

Is it the only one of existing things to be called odd—this is my question—or is there something else than the Odd which one must [*104a*] nevertheless also always call odd, as well as by its own name, because it is such by nature as never to be separated from the Odd? I mean, for example, the number three and many others. Consider three: do you not think that it must always be called both by its own name and by that of the Odd, which is not the same as three? That is the nature of three, and of five, and of half of all the numbers; each of them is odd, but it is not the Odd. Then again, two and four and the whole [*b*] other column of numbers; each of them, while not being the same as the Even, is always even. Do you not agree?—Of course.

Look now. What I want to make clear is this: Not only do those opposites not admit each other, but this is also true of those things which, while not being opposite to each other yet always contain the opposites, and it seems that these do not admit that Form which is opposite to that which is in them; when it approaches them, they either perish or give way. Shall we not say that three will perish or undergo [*c*] anything before, while remaining three, becoming even?—Certainly, said Cebes.

Yet surely two is not the opposite of three?—Indeed it is not.

It is then not only opposite Forms that do not admit each other's approach, but also some other things that do not admit the onset of opposites.—Very true.

Do you then want us, if we can, to define what these are?—I surely do.

Would they be the things that compel whatever [*d*] they occupy not only to contain their Form but also always that of some opposite?—How do you mean?

As we were saying just now, you surely know that what the Form of three occupies must be not only three but also odd.—Certainly.

And we say that the opposite Form to the Form that achieves this result could never come to it.—It could not.

Now it is Oddness that has done this?—Yes.

And opposite to this is the Form of the Even?—Yes.

So then the Form of the Even will never come [*e*] to three?—Never.

Then three has no share in the Even?—Never.

So three is uneven?—Yes.

As for what I said we must define, that is, what kind of things, while not being opposites to something, yet do not admit the opposite, as, for example, the triad, though it is not the opposite of the Even, yet does [*105a*] not admit it because it always brings along the opposite of the Even, and so the dyad in relation to the Odd, fire to the Cold, and very many other things, see whether you would define it thus: Not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but that which brings along some opposite into that which it occupies; that which brings this along will not admit the {195} opposite to that which it brings along. Refresh your memory; it is no worse for being heard often. Five does not admit the form of the Even, nor will ten, its double, admit the form of the Odd. The double itself is an opposite of something else, yet it will not admit [*b*] the form of the Odd. Nor do one-and-a-half and other such fractions admit the form of the Whole, nor will one-third, and so on, if you follow me and agree to this.

I certainly agree, he said, and I follow you.

Tell me again from the beginning, he said, and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as I do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should [*c*] ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more

sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. See if you now sufficiently understand what I want.—Quite sufficiently.

Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?—A soul.

[*d*] And is that always so?—Of course.

Whatever the soul occupies, it always brings life to it?—It does.

Is there, or is there not, an opposite to life?—There is.

What is it?—Death.

So the soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said?

Most certainly, said Cebes.

Well, and what do we call that which does not admit the form of the even?—The uneven.

What do we call that which will not admit the just and that which will not admit the musical?

[*e*] The unmusical, and the other the unjust.

Very well, what do we call that which does not admit death?

The deathless, he said. Now the soul does not admit death?—No.

So the soul is deathless?—It is.

Very well, he said. Shall we say that this has been proved, do you think?

Quite adequately proved, Socrates.

Well now, Cebes, he said, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?—Of course. [*106a*]

And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true.

In the same way, if the non-cold were indestructible, then when some cold attacked the fire, it would neither be quenched nor destroyed, but retreat safely.—Necessarily.

Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is [*b*] also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. For it follows from what has been said that it will not admit

death or be dead, just as three, we said, will not be even nor will the odd; nor will fire be cold, nor the heat that is in the fire. But, someone might say, what prevents the odd, while not becoming even [*c*] as has been agreed, from being destroyed, and the even to come to be instead? We could not maintain against the man who said this that it is not destroyed, for the uneven is not indestructible. If we had agreed that it was indestructible, we could easily have maintained that at the coming of the even, the odd and the three have gone away and the same would hold for fire and the hot and the other things.—Surely.

And so now, if we are agreed that the deathless [*d*] is indestructible, the soul, besides being deathless, is indestructible. If not, we need another argument.

There is no need for one as far as that goes, for hardly anything could resist destruction if the deathless, which lasts forever, would admit destruction.

All would agree, said Socrates, that the god, and the Form of life itself, and anything that is deathless, are never destroyed.—All men would agree, by Zeus, to that, and the gods, I imagine, even more so.

If the deathless is indestructible, then the [*e*] soul, if it is deathless, would also be indestructible?—Necessarily.

{196} Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death.—So it appears.

[*107a*] Therefore the soul, Cebes, he said, is most certainly deathless and indestructible and our souls will really dwell in the underworld. I have nothing more to say against that, Socrates, said Cebes, nor can I doubt your arguments. If Simmias here or someone else has something to say, he should not remain silent, for I do not know to what further occasion other than the present he could put it off if he wants to say or to hear anything on these subjects.

Certainly, said Simmias, I myself have no remaining grounds for doubt after what has been said; nevertheless, in view of the importance [*b*] of our subject and my low opinion of human weakness, I am bound still to have some private misgivings about what we have said.

You are not only right to say this, Simmias, Socrates said, but our first hypotheses require clearer examination, even though we find them

convincing. And if you analyze them adequately, you will, I think, follow the argument as far as a man can, and if the conclusion is clear, you will look no further.—That is true.

[*c*] It is right to think then, gentlemen, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the time we call our life, but for the sake of all time, and that one is in terrible danger if one does not give it that care. If death were escape from everything, it would be a great boon to the wicked to get rid of the body and of their wickedness together with their soul. But now that the soul appears to be immortal, [*d*] there is no escape from evil or salvation for it except by becoming as good and wise as possible, for the soul goes to the underworld possessing nothing but its education and upbringing, which are said to bring the greatest benefit or harm to the dead right at the beginning of the journey yonder.

We are told that when each person dies, the guardian spirit who was allotted to him in life proceeds to lead him to a certain place, whence those who have been gathered together there must, after being [*e*] judged, proceed to the underworld with the guide who has been appointed to lead them thither from here. Having there undergone what they must and stayed there the appointed time, they are led back here by another guide after long periods of time. The journey is not as Aeschylus' Telephus[44] describes it. He says that only one single path [*108a*] leads to Hades, but I think it is neither one nor simple, for then there would be no need of guides; one could not make any mistake if there were but one path. As it is, it is likely to have many forks and crossroads; and I base this judgment on the sacred rites and customs here.

The well-ordered and wise soul follows the guide and is not without familiarity with its surroundings, but the soul that is passionately attached to the body, as I said before, hovers around it and the visible [*b*] world for a long time, struggling and suffering much until it is led away by force and with difficulty by its appointed spirit. When the impure soul which has performed some impure deed joins the others after being involved in unjust killings, or committed other crimes which are akin to these and are actions of souls of this kind, everybody shuns it and turns away, unwilling to be its fellow traveler or its guide; such a soul wanders alone completely at a loss until a certain time arrives and [*c*] it is forcibly led to its proper dwelling

place. On the other hand, the soul that has led a pure and temperate life finds fellow travelers and gods to guide it, and each of them dwells in a place suited to it.

There are many strange places upon the earth, and the earth itself is not such as those who are used to discourse upon it believe it to be in nature or size, as someone has convinced me.

Simmias said: “What do you mean, Socrates? I have myself heard [*d*] many things said about the earth, but certainly not the things that convince you. I should be glad to hear them.”

Indeed, Simmias, I do not think it requires the skill of Glaucus[45] to tell you what they are, but to prove them true requires more than that skill, and I should perhaps not be able to do so. Also, even if I had [*e*] the knowledge, my remaining {197} time would not be long enough to tell the tale. However, nothing prevents my telling you what I am convinced is the shape of the earth and what its regions are.

Even that is sufficient, said Simmias.

[*109a*] Well then, he said, the first thing of which I am convinced is that if the earth is a sphere in the middle of the heavens, it has no need of air or any other force to prevent it from falling. The homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides and the earth’s own equipoise are sufficient to hold it, for an object balanced in the middle of something homogeneous will have no tendency to incline more in any direction than any other but will remain unmoved. This, he said, is the first point of which I am persuaded.

And rightly so, said Simmias.

Further, the earth is very large, and we live around the sea in a small [*b*] portion of it between Phasis and the pillars of Heracles, like ants or frogs around a swamp; many other peoples live in many such parts of it. Everywhere about the earth there are numerous hollows of many kinds and shapes and sizes into which the water and the mist and the air have gathered. The earth itself is pure and lies in the pure sky where [*c*] the stars are situated, which the majority of those who discourse on these subjects call the ether. The water and mist and air are the sediment of the ether and they always flow into the hollows of the earth. We, who dwell in the hollows of it, are unaware of this and we think that we live above, on the surface of the earth. It is as if someone who lived deep down in the middle

of the ocean thought he was living on its surface. Seeing the sun and the other heavenly bodies through the [*d*] water, he would think the sea to be the sky; because he is slow and weak, he has never reached the surface of the sea or risen with his head above the water or come out of the sea to our region here, nor seen how much purer and more beautiful it is than his own region, nor has he ever heard of it from anyone who has seen it.

Our experience is the same: Living in a certain hollow of the earth, we believe that we live upon its surface; the air we call the heavens, as if the stars made their way through it; this too is the same: Because of our weakness and slowness we are not able to make our way to the [*e*] upper limit of the air; if anyone got to this upper limit, if anyone came to it or reached it on wings and his head rose above it, then just as fish on rising from the sea see things in our region, he would see things there and, if his nature could endure to contemplate them, he would know that there is the true heaven, the true light, and the true earth, for the earth here, these stones and the whole region, are spoiled and [*110a*] eaten away, just as things in the sea are by the salt water.

Nothing worth mentioning grows in the sea, nothing, one might say, is fully developed; there are caves and sand and endless slime and mud wherever there is earth—not comparable in any way with the beauties of our region. So those things above are in their turn far superior to the things we know. Indeed, if this is the moment to tell a tale, Simmias, it is worth hearing about the nature of things on the [*b*] surface of the earth under the heavens.

At any rate, Socrates, said Simmias, we should be glad to hear this story.

Well then, my friend, in the first place it is said that the earth, looked at from above, looks like those spherical balls made up of twelve pieces of leather; it is multicolored, and of these colors those used by our painters give us an indication; up there the whole earth has these colors, [*c*] but much brighter and purer than these; one part is sea-green and of marvelous beauty, another is golden, another is white, whiter than chalk or snow; the earth is composed also of the other colors, more numerous and beautiful than any we have seen. The very hollows of the earth, full of water and air, gleaming among the variety of other colors, present [*d*] a color of their own so that the whole is seen as a continuum of variegated colors. On the surface of the earth the plants grow with corresponding beauty, the trees and

the flowers and the fruits, and so with the hills and the stones, more beautiful in their smoothness and transparency and color. Our precious stones here are but fragments, our carnelians, jaspers, emeralds, and the rest. All stones there are of [*e*] that kind, and even more beautiful. The reason is that there they are pure, not eaten away or spoiled by decay and brine, or corroded by the {198} water and air which have flowed into the hollows here and bring ugliness and disease upon earth, stones, the other animals, and plants. The earth itself is adorned with all these things, and also with gold and silver [*111a*] and other metals. These stand out, being numerous and massive and occurring everywhere, so that the earth is a sight for the blessed. There are many other living creatures upon the earth, and also men, some living inland, others at the edge of the air, as we live on the edge of the sea, others again live on islands surrounded by air close to the [*b*] mainland. In a word, what water and the sea are to us, the air is to them, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. The climate is such that they are without disease, and they live much longer than people do here; their eyesight, hearing, and intelligence and all such are as superior to ours as air is superior to water and ether to air in purity; they have groves and temples dedicated to the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they communicate with them by speech and [*c*] prophecy and by the sight of them; they see the sun and moon and stars as they are, and in other ways their happiness is in accord with this.

This then is the nature of the earth as a whole and of its surroundings; around the whole of it there are many regions in the hollows; some are deeper and more open than that in which we live; others are deeper [*d*] and have a narrower opening than ours, and there are some that have less depth and more width. All these are connected with each other below the surface of the earth in many places by narrow and broader channels, and thus have outlets through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; huge rivers of both hot and cold water thus flow beneath the earth eternally, much fire and large rivers [*e*] of fire, and many of wet mud, both more pure and more muddy, such as those flowing in advance of the lava and the stream of lava itself in Sicily. These streams then fill up every and all regions as the flow reaches each, and all these places move up and down with the oscillating movement of the earth. The natural cause of [*112a*] the oscillation is as follows: One of the hollows of the earth, which is also the

biggest, pierces through the whole earth; it is that which Homer mentioned when he said: “Far down where is the deepest pit below the earth . . . ,”[46] and which he elsewhere, and many other poets, call Tartarus; into this chasm all the rivers flow together, and again flow out of it, and each [*b*] river is affected by the nature of the land through which it flows. The reason for their flowing into and out of Tartarus is that this water has no bottom or solid base but it oscillates up and down in waves, and the air and wind about it do the same, for they follow it when it flows to this or that part of the earth. Just as when people breathe, the flow of air goes in and out, so here the air oscillates with the water and [*c*] creates terrible winds as it goes in and out. Whenever the water retreats to what we call the lower part of the earth, it flows into those parts and fills them up as if the water were pumped in; when it leaves that part for this, it fills these parts again, and the parts filled flow through the channels and through the earth and in each case arrive at the places to which the channels lead and create seas and marshes and rivers and springs. From there the waters flow under the earth again, some flowing [*d*] around larger and more numerous regions, some around smaller and shallower ones, then flow back into Tartarus, some at a point much lower than where they issued forth, others only a little way, but all of them at a lower point, some of them at the opposite side of the chasm, some on the same side; some flow in a wide circle round the earth once or many times like snakes, then go as far down as possible, then go back into the chasm of Tartarus. From each side it is possible to [*e*] flow down as far as the center, but not beyond, for this part that faces the river flow from either side is steep.

There are many other large rivers of all kinds, and among these there are four of note; the biggest which flows on the outside (of the earth) in a circle is called Oceanus; opposite it and flowing in the opposite direction is the Acheron; it flows through many other deserted [*113a*] regions and further underground makes its way to the Acherusian lake to which the souls of the majority come after death and, after remaining there for a certain {199} appointed time, longer for some, shorter for others, they are sent back to birth as living creatures. The third river issues between the first two, and close to its source it falls into a region burning with much fire and makes a lake larger than our sea, boiling with water and mud. From there it goes in a

circle, foul and muddy, and winding [*b*] on its way it comes, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake but does not mingle with its waters; then, coiling many times underground it flows lower down into Tartarus; this is called the Pyriphlegethon, and its lava streams throw off fragments of it in various parts of the earth. Opposite this the fourth river issues forth, which is called Stygion, and it is said to flow first into a terrible and wild region, [*c*] all of it blue-gray in color, and the lake that this river forms by flowing into it is called the Styx. As its waters fall into the lake they acquire dread powers; then diving below and winding round it flows in the opposite direction from the Pyriphlegethon and into the opposite side of the Acherusian lake; its waters do not mingle with any other; it too flows in a circle and into Tartarus opposite the Pyriphlegethon. The name of that fourth river, the poets tell us, is Cocytus.[47]

[*d*] Such is the nature of these things. When the dead arrive at the place to which each has been led by his guardian spirit, they are first judged as to whether they have led a good and pious life. Those who have lived an average life make their way to the Acheron and embark upon such vessels as there are for them and proceed to the lake. There they [*e*] dwell and are purified by penalties for any wrongdoing they may have committed; they are also suitably rewarded for their good deeds as each deserves. Those who are deemed incurable because of the enormity of their crimes, having committed many great sacrileges or wicked and unlawful murders and other such wrongs—their fitting fate is to be hurled into Tartarus never to emerge from it. Those who are deemed to have committed great but curable crimes, such as doing violence to [*114a*] their father or mother in a fit of temper but who have felt remorse for the rest of their lives, or who have killed someone in a similar manner, these must of necessity be thrown into Tartarus, but a year later the current throws them out, those who are guilty of murder by way of Cocytus, and those who have done violence to their parents by way of the Pyriphlegethon. After they have been carried along to the Acherusian lake, they cry out and shout, some for those they have killed, others for those they have maltreated, and calling them they then pray to them [*b*] and beg them to allow them to step out into the lake and to receive them. If they persuade them, they do step out and their punishment comes to an end; if they do not, they are taken back into Tartarus and from

there into the rivers, and this does not stop until they have persuaded those they have wronged, for this is the punishment which the judges imposed on them.

Those who are deemed to have lived an [*c*] extremely pious life are freed and released from the regions of the earth as from a prison; they make their way up to a pure dwelling place and live on the surface of the earth. Those who have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy live in the future altogether without a body; they make their way to even more beautiful dwelling places which it is hard to describe clearly, nor do we now have the time to do so. Because of the things we have enunciated, Simmias, one must make every effort to share in virtue and wisdom in one's life, for the reward is beautiful and the hope is great.

No sensible man would insist that these things [*d*] are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places, since the soul is evidently immortal, and a man should repeat this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale. That is the reason why a man should be of good cheer about his own soul, if during life he has ignored [*e*] the pleasures of the body and its ornamentation as of no concern to him and doing him more harm than good, but has seriously concerned himself with the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul not with alien but with its own ornaments, namely, moderation, {200} righteousness, [*115a*] courage, freedom, and truth, and in that state awaits his journey to the underworld.

Now you, Simmias, Cebes, and the rest of you, Socrates continued, will each take that journey at some other time but my fated day calls me now, as a tragic character might say, and it is about time for me to have my bath, for I think it better to have it before I drink the poison and save the women the trouble of washing the corpse.

When Socrates had said this Crito spoke. Very well, Socrates, what [*b*] are your instructions to me and the others about your children or anything else? What can we do that would please you most?—Nothing new, Crito, said Socrates, but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine and yourselves by taking good care of your own selves in whatever you do, even if you do not agree with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and are unwilling to live following the tracks, as it were, of what we have

said now and on previous occasions, you will achieve nothing even if you strongly agree with me at this [*c*] moment.

We shall be eager to follow your advice, said Crito, but how shall we bury you?

In any way you like, said Socrates, if you can catch me and I do not escape you. And laughing quietly, looking at us, he said: I do not convince Crito that I am this Socrates talking to you here and ordering [*d*] all I say, but he thinks that I am the thing which he will soon be looking at as a corpse, and so he asks how he shall bury me. I have been saying for some time and at some length that after I have drunk the poison I shall no longer be with you but will leave you to go and enjoy some good fortunes of the blessed, but it seems that I have said all this to him in vain in an attempt to reassure you and myself too. Give a pledge to Crito on my behalf, he said, the opposite pledge to that he gave the jury.[48] He pledged that I would stay; you must pledge that I will not stay [*e*] after I die, but that I shall go away, so that Crito will bear it more easily when he sees my body being burned or buried and will not be angry on my behalf, as if I were suffering terribly, and so that he should not say at the funeral that he is laying out, or carrying out, or burying Socrates. For know you well, my dear Crito, that to express oneself badly is not only faulty as far as the language goes, but does some harm to the soul. You must be of good cheer, and say you are burying my [*116a*] body, and bury it in any way you like and think most customary.

After saying this he got up and went to another room to take his bath, and Crito followed him and he told us to wait for him. So we stayed, talking among ourselves, questioning what had been said, and then again talking of the great misfortune that had befallen us. We all [*b*] felt as if we had lost a father and would be orphaned for the rest of our lives. When he had washed, his children were brought to him—two of his sons were small and one was older—and the women of his household came to him. He spoke to them before Crito and gave them what instructions he wanted. Then he sent the women and children away, and he himself joined us. It was now close to sunset, for he had stayed inside for some time. He came and sat down after his bath and conversed for a short while, when the officer of the Eleven[49] came and [*c*] stood by him and said: “I shall not reproach you as I do the others, Socrates. They are angry with me and curse me when, obeying the

orders of my superiors, I tell them to drink the poison. During the time you have been here I have come to know you in other ways as the noblest, the gentlest, and the best man who has ever come here. So now too I know that you will not make trouble for me; you know who is responsible and you will direct your anger against them. You know what message I bring. Fare you well, and try to endure what you must [*d*] as easily as possible." The officer was weeping as he turned away and went out. Socrates looked up at him and said: "Fare you well also; we shall do as you bid us." And turning to us he said: "How pleasant the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has come in and conversed with me from time to time, a most agreeable man. And how genuinely he now weeps for me. Come, Crito, let us obey him. Let someone bring the poison if it is ready; if not, let the man prepare it."

{201} [*e*] But Socrates, said Crito, I think the sun still shines upon the hills and has not yet set. I know that others drink the poison quite a long time after they have received the order, eating and drinking quite a bit, and some of them enjoy intimacy with their loved ones. Do not hurry; there is still some time.

It is natural, Crito, for them to do so, said Socrates, for they think [*117a*] they derive some benefit from doing this, but it is not fitting for me. I do not expect any benefit from drinking the poison a little later, except to become ridiculous in my own eyes for clinging to life, and be sparing of it when there is none left. So do as I ask and do not refuse me.

Hearing this, Crito nodded to the slave who was standing near him; the slave went out and after a time came back with the man who was to administer the poison, carrying it made ready in a cup. When Socrates saw him he said: "Well, my good man, you are an expert in this; what must one do?"—"Just drink it and walk around until your legs feel heavy, and then lie down and it will act of itself." And he offered the [*b*] cup to Socrates, who took it quite cheerfully, Echecrates, without a tremor or any change of feature or color, but looking at the man from under his eyebrows as was his wont, asked: "What do you say about pouring a libation from this drink? It is allowed?"—"We only mix as much as we believe will suffice," said the man.

I understand, Socrates said, but one is allowed, indeed one must, [*c*] utter a prayer to the gods that the journey from here to yonder may be fortunate.

This is my prayer and may it be so.

And while he was saying this, he was holding the cup, and then drained it calmly and easily. Most of us had been able to hold back our tears reasonably well up till then, but when we saw him drinking it and after he drank it, we could hold them back no longer; my own tears came in floods against my will. So I covered my face. I was weeping for myself, not for him—for my misfortune in being deprived of such [*d*] a comrade. Even before me, Crito was unable to restrain his tears and got up. Apollodorus[50] had not ceased from weeping before, and at this moment his noisy tears and anger made everybody present break down, except Socrates. "What is this," he said, "you strange fellows. It is mainly for this reason that I sent the women away, to avoid such unseemliness, [*e*] for I am told one should die in good-omened silence. So keep quiet and control yourselves."

His words made us ashamed, and we checked our tears. He walked around, and when he said his legs were heavy he lay on his back as he had been told to do, and the man who had given him the poison touched his body, and after a while tested his feet and legs, pressed hard upon his foot, and asked him if he felt this, and Socrates said no. Then he pressed his calves, and made [*118a*] his way up his body and showed us that it was cold and stiff. He felt it himself and said that when the cold reached his heart he would be gone. As his belly was getting cold Socrates uncovered his head—he had covered it—and said—these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius;[51] make this offering to him and do not forget."—"It shall be done," said Crito, "tell us if there is anything else." But there was no answer. Shortly afterwards Socrates made a movement; the man uncovered him and his eyes were fixed. Seeing this Crito closed his mouth and his eyes.

Such was the end of our comrade, Echecrates, a man who, we would say, was of all those we have known the best, and also the wisest and the most upright.

1. Echecrates was a native of Phlius, in the northeast Peloponnese, where the conversation takes place. He was a student of the Pythagorean philosophers, Philolaus and Eurytus of Tarentum.
2. Phaedo of Elis, in the northwest Peloponnese, was a young follower of Socrates.
3. See *Crito* 43d note.
4. See *Apology* 34a and note.
5. The father of Critobulus is Crito, after whom the dialogue *Crito* is named. Several of the other friends of Socrates mentioned here also appear in other dialogues. For example, Epigenes is mentioned in the *Apology*, as is Aeschines. Simmias and Cebes are mentioned in *Crito* 45b as having come to Athens with enough money to secure Socrates' escape.
6. Euclides and Terpsion are both speakers in Plato's *Theaetetus*. Euclides is said to have founded the Megarian school of philosophy. Terpsion and Cleombrotus are otherwise unknown.
7. Island in the Saronic Gulf, quite close to Athens.
8. See *Apology* 37c and note.
9. Socrates' wife.
10. See *Apology* 20b. He is also mentioned at *Phaedrus* 267a.
11. *Themiton:* in accord with divine rather than human law, as at 67b and *Apology* 21b, 30c–d.
12. Philolaus of Croton, his book, only fragments of which survive, was probably the first by a Pythagorean.
13. That is, into Boeotian (rather than Attic) Greek.
14. See *Republic* 507c–508a.
15. That is any of *ta onta*—"any of the things that *are*."
16. A standard way of referring to the Platonic form of justice.
17. *Ousia:* participle of the verb "to be" (*einai*). An account or definition of the *ousia* (being, substance, essence) of *F* answers the question "What is *F*?" by specifying what *F* really is. See *Euthyphro* 11a–b, *Meno* 72b–e, *Republic* 534b.
18. See *Republic* 373d–e.
19. See *Republic* 436c–442d, 580d–586e.
20. That is, the true worshipers of Dionysus, as opposed to those who only carry the external symbols of his worship.
21. See Homer, *Iliad* xvi.856, xxii.362, xxiii.100–4 (cited at *Republic* 387a).
22. See *Apology* 19b–c; Aristophanes, *Clouds* 1485.
23. Endymion was granted eternal sleep by Zeus.
24. Mentioned at *Apology* 26d. Some of his views are discussed later on (97b–99d).
25. See *Meno* 81e ff.
26. That is, give the sort of account of a form—or thing that *is*—that amounts to a correct and defensible definition of what it is or of its essence. See 78d, *Republic* 534b–c.
27. At 74a–77a.
28. *Noēton:* the first occurrence of this word in Plato. What is intelligible is an object of thought, not of sense-perception, and so is contrasted with what is perceptible. See *Republic* 507a–b.
29. "It is much more likely . . . that Hades derives his name [*Haidēs*] not from what cannot be seen [*aidēs*, which means "invisible"], but from the fact that he knows [*eidenai*] everything fine and beautiful" (*Cratylus* 404b).
30. Those initiated into a religious cult promising eternal rewards.
31. *Alēthes:* also "true."
32. See 61c note.
33. *Alēthes:* see 81b and note.
34. In Homer's *Odyssey*, Penelope picked apart at night what she had woven during the day.

35. *Aporeiton:* Socrates' method of examination often results in *aporia* or puzzlement.
36. Swans are traditionally associated with Apollo. See, e.g., Sappho *fr.* 208; Aristophanes, *Birds* 769–73.
37. Tereus raped Philomela, the sister of his wife, Procne. As a result, he was transformed into a hoopoe, Procne into a nightingale, and Philomela into a swallow. Hence these birds, if any, should sing lamentations.
38. *Elengchein:* i.e., submit to the sort of examination characteristically employed by Socrates, which we call an elenchus.
39. The Euripus is the strait between the island of Euboea and Boeotia on the Greek mainland; its currents were both violent and variable.
40. *Odyssey* xx.17–18.
41. Harmonia was in legend the wife of Cadmus, the founder of Thebes. Socrates' punning joke is simply that, having dealt with Harmonia (harmony), we must now deal with Cadmus (i.e., Cebes, the other Theban).
42. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Mentioned at *Apology* 26d.
43. See 70d–71a.
44. The *Telephus* of Aeschylus is not extant.
45. A proverbial expression whose origin and specific meaning are obscure.
46. *Iliad* viii.14; cf. viii.481.
47. For these features of the underworld, see *Odyssey* x.511 ff., xi.157.
48. See *Apology* 38b.
49. See *Apology* 37c.
50. See *Apology* 34a.
51. Asclepius is the god of healing. A cock was sacrificed to him by the sick people who slept in his temples, hoping for a cure.

{202} SYMPOSIUM

Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff.

[*172a*] APOLLODORUS:[1] In fact, your question does not find me unprepared. Just the other day, as it happens, I was walking to the city from my home in Phaleron[2] when a man I know, who was making his way behind me, saw me and called from a distance: "The gentleman from Phaleron!" he yelled, trying to be funny. "Hey, Apollodorus, wait!"

So I stopped and waited.

“Apollodorus, I’ve been looking for you!” he said. “You know there once was a gathering at Agathon’s[3] when Socrates, [*b*] Alcibiades, and their friends had dinner together; I wanted to ask you about the speeches they made on Love. What were they? I heard a version from a man who had it from Phoenix,[4] Philip’s son, but it was badly garbled, and he said you were the one to ask. So please, will you tell me all about it? After all, Socrates is your friend—who has a better right than you to report his conversation? But before you begin,” he added, “tell me this: were you there yourself?”

“Your friend must have really garbled his story,” I replied, “if [*c*] you think this affair was so recent that I could have been there.”

“I did think that,” he said.

“Glaucon,[5] how could you? You know very well Agathon hasn’t lived in Athens for many years, while it’s been less than three that I’ve been Socrates’ companion and made it my job to know exactly what he says and does each day. Before that, I [*173a*] simply drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think that what I was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth—as bad as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do.”

“Stop joking, Apollodorus,” he replied. “Just tell me when the party took place.”

“When we were still children, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy. It was the day after he and his troupe held their victory celebration.”

“So it really was a long time ago,” he said. “Then who told you about it? Was it Socrates himself?”

“Oh, for god’s sake, of course not!” I replied. [*b*] “It was the very same man who told Phoenix, a fellow called Aristodemus, from Cydatheneum,[6] a real runt of a man, who always went barefoot. He went to the party because, I think, he was obsessed with Socrates—one of the worst cases at that time. Naturally, I checked part of his story with Socrates, and Socrates agreed with his account.”

“Please tell me, then,” he said. “You speak and I’ll listen, as we walk to the city. This is the perfect opportunity.”

So this is what we talked about on our way; and that's why, as I said before, I'm not unprepared. Well, if I'm to tell *you* about it too—I'll be glad to. [*c*] After all, my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation, even if I'm only a listener, whether or not I think it will be to my advantage. All other talk, especially the talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I'm sorry for you and your friends because you think your affairs are [*d*] important when really they're totally trivial. Perhaps, in your turn, you think I'm a failure, and, believe me, I think that what you think is true. But as for all of you, I don't just *think* you are failures—I know it for a fact.

{203} FRIEND: You'll never change, Apollodorus! Always nagging, even at yourself! I do believe you think everybody—yourself first of all—is totally worthless, except, of course, Socrates. I don't know exactly how you came to be called "the maniac," but you certainly talk like one, always furious with everyone, including yourself—but not with Socrates!

APOLLODORUS: Of course, my dear friend, it's perfectly obvious why I have these views about us all: it's simply because I'm a maniac, [*e*] and I'm raving!

FRIEND: It's not worth arguing about this now, Apollodorus. Please do as I asked: tell me the speeches.

APOLLODORUS: All right. . . . Well, the speeches went something like this—but I'd better tell you the whole story from the very beginning, as [*174a*] Aristodemus told it to me.

He said, then, that one day he ran into Socrates, who had just bathed and put on his fancy sandals—both very unusual events. So he asked him where he was going, and why he was looking so good.

Socrates replied, "I'm going to Agathon's for dinner. I managed to avoid yesterday's victory party—I really don't like crowds—but I promised to be there today. So, naturally, I took great pains with my appearance: I'm going to the house of a good-looking man; I had to look my best. But let me ask you this," he added, "I know you haven't been invited to the dinner; how would you like to come anyway?" [*b*]

And Aristodemus answered, "I'll do whatever you say."

"Come with me, then," Socrates said, "and we shall prove the proverb wrong; the truth is, 'Good men go uninvited to Goodman's feast.'[7] Even

Homer himself, when you think about it, did not much like this proverb; he not only disregarded it, he [*c*] violated it. Agamemnon,[8] of course, is one of his great warriors, while he describes Menelaus as a 'limp spearman.' And yet, when Agamemnon offers a sacrifice and gives a feast, Homer has the weak Menelaus arrive uninvited at his superior's table."[9]

Aristodemus replied to this, "Socrates, I am afraid Homer's description is bound to fit me better than yours. Mine is a case of an obvious inferior arriving uninvited at the table of a man of letters. I think you'd better figure out a good excuse for bringing me along, because, you know, I won't admit I've come without an invitation. I'll say I'm your guest." [*d*]

"Let's go," he said. "We'll think about what to say 'as we proceed the two of us along the way.'"[10]

With these words, they set out. But as they were walking, Socrates began to think about something, lost himself in thought, and kept lagging behind. Whenever Aristodemus stopped to wait for him, Socrates would urge him to go on [*e*] ahead. When he arrived at Agathon's he found the gate wide open, and that, Aristodemus said, caused him to find himself in a very embarrassing situation: a household slave saw him the moment he arrived and took him immediately to the dining room, where the guests were already lying down on their couches, and dinner was about to be served.

As soon as Agathon saw him, he called:

"Welcome, Aristodemus! What perfect timing! You're just in time for dinner! I hope you're not here for any other reason—if you are, forget it. I looked all over for you yesterday, so I could invite you, but I couldn't find you anywhere. But where is Socrates? How come you didn't bring him along?"

So I turned around (Aristodemus said), and Socrates was nowhere to be seen. And I said that it was actually Socrates who had brought *me* along as his guest.

"I'm delighted he did," Agathon replied. "But where is he?"

"He was directly behind me, but I have no [*175a*] idea where he is now."

{204} "Go look for Socrates," Agathon ordered a slave, "and bring him in. Aristodemus," he added, "you can share Eryximachus'[11] couch."

A slave brought water, and Aristodemus washed himself before he lay down. Then another slave entered and said: “Socrates is here, but he’s gone off to the neighbor’s porch. He’s standing there and won’t come in even though I called him several times.”

“How strange,” Agathon replied. “Go back and bring him in. Don’t leave him there.”

But Aristodemus stopped him. “No, no,” he said. “Leave him alone. It’s one of his habits: every now and then [*b*] he just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be. I’m sure he’ll come in very soon, so don’t disturb him; let him be.”

“Well, all right, if you really think so,” Agathon said, and turned to the slaves: “Go ahead and serve the rest of us. What you serve is completely up to you; pretend nobody’s supervising you—as if I ever did! Imagine that we are all your own guests, myself included. Give us good reason to praise your service.” [*c*]

So they went ahead and started eating, but there was still no sign of Socrates. Agathon wanted to send for him many times, but Aristodemus wouldn’t let him. And, in fact, Socrates came in shortly afterward, as he always did—they were hardly halfway through their meal. Agathon, who, as it happened, was all alone on the farthest couch, immediately called: “Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I touch you, I may catch a bit of [*d*] the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor’s porch. It’s clear *you’ve* seen the light. If you hadn’t, you’d still be standing there.”

Socrates sat down next to him and said, “How wonderful it would be, dear Agathon, if the foolish were filled with wisdom simply by touching the wise. If only wisdom were like water, which always flows from a full cup into an empty one when we connect them with a piece of yarn—well, then I would consider [*e*] it the greatest prize to have the chance to lie down next to you. I would soon be overflowing with your wonderful wisdom. My own wisdom is of no account—a shadow in a dream—while yours is bright and radiant and has a splendid future. Why, young as you are, you’re so brilliant I could call more than thirty thousand Greeks as witnesses.”[12]

“Now you’ve gone *too* far, Socrates,” Agathon replied. “Well, eat your dinner. Dionysus will soon enough be the judge of our claims to wisdom!”[13]

Socrates took his seat after that and had his [*176a*] meal, according to Aristodemus. When dinner was over, they poured a libation to the god, sang a hymn, and—in short—followed the whole ritual. Then they turned their attention to drinking. At that point Pausanias[14] addressed the group: “Well, gentlemen, how can we arrange to drink less tonight? To be honest, I still have a terrible hangover from yesterday, and I could really use a break. I daresay most of you could, too, since you were also part of the celebration. So let’s try not to [*b*] overdo it.”

Aristophanes[15] replied: “Good idea, Pausanias. We’ve got to make a plan for going easy on the drink tonight. I was over my head last night myself, like the others.”

After that, up spoke Eryximachus, son of Acumenus: “Well said, both of you. But I still have one question: How do *you* feel, Agathon? Are you strong enough for serious drinking?”

“Absolutely not,” replied Agathon. “I’ve no strength left for anything.”

“What a lucky stroke for us,” Eryximachus [*c*] said, “for me, for Aristodemus, for Phaedrus,[16] and the rest—that you large-capacity drinkers are already exhausted. Imagine how weak drinkers like ourselves feel after last night! Of course I don’t include Socrates in my claims: he can drink {205} or not, and will be satisfied whatever we do. But since none of us seems particularly eager to overindulge, perhaps it would not be amiss for me to provide you [*d*] with some accurate information as to the nature of intoxication. If I have learned anything from medicine, it is the following point: inebriation is harmful to everyone. Personally, therefore, I always refrain from heavy drinking; and I advise others against it—especially people who are suffering the effects of a previous night’s excesses.”

“Well,” Phaedrus interrupted him, “I always follow your advice, especially when you speak as a doctor. In this case, if the others know what’s good for them, they too will do just as you say.”

At that point they all agreed not to get drunk that evening; [*e*] they decided to drink only as much as pleased them.

“It’s settled, then,” said Eryximachus. “We are resolved to force no one to drink more than he wants. I would like now to make a further motion: let us dispense with the flute-girl who just made her entrance; let her play for herself or, if she prefers, for the women in the house. Let us instead spend

our evening in conversation. If you are so minded, I would like to propose a subject."

They all said they were quite willing, and urged him to make his proposal. So Eryximachus [*177a*] said: "Let me begin by citing Euripides' *Melanippe*: 'Not mine the tale.' What I am about to tell belongs to Phaedrus here, who is deeply indignant on this issue, and often complains to me about it: "'Eryximachus,' he says, 'isn't it an awful thing! Our poets have composed hymns in honor of just about any god you can think of; but has a single one of them given one moment's thought to the god of love, ancient and powerful as he is? As for [*b*] our fancy intellectuals, they have written volumes praising Heracles and other heroes (as did the distinguished Prodicus).[17] Well, perhaps *that's* not surprising, but I've actually read a book by an accomplished author who saw fit to extol the usefulness of salt! [*c*] How *could* people pay attention to such trifles and never, not even once, write a proper hymn to Love? How could anyone ignore so great a god?'

"Now, Phaedrus, in my judgment, is quite right. I would like, therefore, to take up a contribution, as it were, on his behalf, and gratify his wish. Besides, I think this a splendid time for all of us here to honor the god. If you agree, we can spend the whole [*d*] evening in discussion, because I propose that each of us give as good a speech in praise of Love as he is capable of giving, in proper order from left to right. And let us begin with Phaedrus, who is at the head of the table and is, in addition, the father of our subject."

"No one will vote against that, Eryximachus," said Socrates. "How could *I* vote 'No,' when the only thing I say I understand [*e*] is the art of love? Could Agathon and Pausanias? Could Aristophanes, who thinks of nothing but Dionysus and Aphrodite?[18] No one I can see here now could vote against your proposal.

"And though it's not quite fair to those of us who have to speak last, if the first speeches turn out to be good enough and to exhaust our subject, I promise we won't complain. So let Phaedrus begin, with the blessing of Fortune; let's hear his praise of Love."

They all agreed with Socrates, and pressed Phaedrus to start. Of course, Aristodemus couldn't remember exactly what everyone said, [*178a*] and I

myself don’t remember everything he told me. But I’ll tell you what he remembered best, and what I consider the most important points.

As I say, he said Phaedrus spoke first, beginning more or less like this:

> Love is a great god, wonderful in many ways to gods and men, and most marvelous of all is the way he came into being. We honor him as one of the most [*b*] ancient gods, and the proof of his great age is this: the parents of Love have no place in poetry or legend. According to Hesiod, the first to be born was Chaos, . . . but then came Earth, broad-chested, a seat for all, forever safe,
>
> And Love.[19]

{206} And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod: after Chaos came Earth and Love, these two.[20] And Parmenides tells of this beginning: The very first god [she] designed was Love.[21]

All sides agree, then, that Love is one of the most ancient [*c*] gods. As such, he gives to us the greatest goods. I cannot say what greater good there is for a young boy than a gentle lover, or for a lover than a boy to love. There is a certain guidance each person needs for his whole life, if he is to live well; and nothing imparts this guidance—not high kinship, not public honor, not [*d*] wealth—nothing imparts this guidance as well as Love. What guidance do I mean? I mean a sense of shame at acting shamefully, and a sense of pride in acting well. Without these, nothing fine or great can be accomplished, in public or in private.

What I say is this: if a man in love is found doing something shameful, or accepting shameful treatment because he is a coward and makes no defense, then nothing would give him more pain than being seen by the boy he loves —not even being seen [*e*] by his father or his comrades. We see the same thing also in the boy he loves, that he is especially ashamed before his lover when he is caught in something shameful. If only there were a way to start a city or an army made up of lovers and the boys they love! Theirs would be the best possible system of society, for they would hold back from all that is shameful, and seek honor [*179a*] in each other’s eyes. Even a few of them, in battle side by side, would conquer all the world, I’d say. For a man in love would never allow his loved one, of all people, to see him leaving

ranks or dropping weapons. He'd rather die a thousand deaths! And as for leaving the boy behind, or not coming to his aid in danger—why, no one is so base that true Love could not inspire him with [*b*] courage, and make him as brave as if he'd been born a hero. When Homer says a god 'breathes might' into some of the heroes, this is really Love's gift to every lover.[22]

Besides, no one will die for you but a lover, and a lover will do this even if she's a woman. Alcestis is proof to everyone in Greece that what I say is true.[23] Only she was willing to die in place of her husband, although his father and mother were still [*c*] alive. Because of her love, she went so far beyond his parents in family feeling that she made them look like outsiders, as if they belonged to their son in name only. And when she did this her deed struck everyone, even the gods, as nobly done. The gods were so delighted, in fact, that they gave her the prize they reserve for a handful chosen from the throngs of noble heroes—they sent her soul back from the dead. As you can see, the eager [*d*] courage of love wins highest honors from the gods.

Orpheus, however, they sent unsatisfied from Hades, after showing him only an image of the woman he came for. They did not give him the woman herself, because they thought he was soft (he was, after all, a cithara-player) and did not dare to die like Alcestis for Love's sake, but contrived to enter living into Hades. So they punished him for that, and made him die at the hands of women.[24]

The honor they gave to Achilles,[25] the son of [*e*] Thetis, is another matter. They sent him to the Isles of the Blest because he dared to stand by his lover Patroclus and avenge him, even after he had learned from his mother that he would die if he killed Hector, but that if he [*180a*] chose otherwise he'd go home and end his life as an old man. Instead he chose to die for Patroclus, and more than that, he did it for a man whose life was already over. The gods were highly delighted at this, of course, and gave him special honor, because he made {207} so much of his lover. Aeschylus talks nonsense when he claims Achilles was the lover;[26] he was more beautiful than Patroclus, more beautiful than all the heroes, and still beardless. Besides he was much younger, as Homer says.

In truth, the gods honor virtue most highly when it belongs to Love. [*b*] They are more impressed and delighted, however, and are more generous with a loved one who cherishes his lover, than with a lover who cherishes the boy he loves. A lover is more godlike than his boy, you see, since he is inspired by a god. That's why they gave a higher honor to Achilles than to Alcestis, and sent him to the Isles of the Blest.

Therefore I say Love is the most ancient of the gods, the most honored, and the most powerful in helping men gain virtue and blessedness, whether they are alive or have passed away.

That was more or less what Phaedrus said according to Aristodemus. There followed several other speeches which he couldn't [*c*] remember very well. So he skipped them and went directly to the speech of Pausanias.

Phaedrus (Pausanias began), I'm not quite sure our subject has been well defined. Our charge has been simple—to speak in praise of Love. This would have been fine if Love himself were simple, too, but as a matter of fact, there are two kinds of Love. In view of this, it might be better to begin by making clear which kind of Love we are to praise. Let [*d*] me therefore try to put our discussion back on the right track and explain which kind of Love ought to be praised. Then I shall give him the praise he deserves, as the god he is.

It is a well-known fact that Love and Aphrodite are inseparable. If, therefore, Aphrodite were a single goddess, there could also be a single Love; but, since there are actually two goddesses of that name, there also are two kinds of Love. I don't expect you'll disagree with me about the two goddesses, will you? One is an older deity, the motherless daughter of Uranus, the god of heaven: she is known as Urania, or Heavenly Aphrodite. The other goddess is younger, the daughter of Zeus and Dione: her name is Pandemos, or Common Aphrodite. It follows, therefore, [*e*] that there is a Common as well as a Heavenly Love, depending on which goddess is Love's partner. And although, of course, all the gods must be praised, we must still make an effort to keep these two gods apart.

The reason for this applies in the same way to every type of action: considered in itself, no action is either good or bad, honorable or shameful. Take, for example, our own case. We had [*181a*] a choice between drinking, singing, or having a conversation. Now, in itself none of these is better than

any other: how it comes out depends entirely on how it is performed. If it is done honorably and properly, it turns out to be honorable; if it is done improperly, it is disgraceful. And my point is that exactly this principle applies to being in love: Love is not in himself noble and worthy of praise; that depends on whether the sentiments he produces in us are themselves noble.

Now the Common Aphrodite's Love is himself [*b*] truly common. As such, he strikes wherever he gets a chance. This, of course, is the love felt by the vulgar, who are attached to women no less than to boys, to the body more than to the soul, and to the least intelligent partners, since all they care about is completing the sexual act. Whether they do it honorably or not is of no concern. That is why they do whatever comes their way, sometimes good, sometimes bad; and which one it is, is incidental to their purpose. For the Love who moves them belongs to a much younger goddess, who, through her parentage, partakes of the nature [*c*] both of the female and the male.

Contrast this with the Love of Heavenly Aphrodite. This goddess, whose descent is purely male (hence this love is for boys), is considerably older and therefore free from the lewdness of youth. That's why those who are inspired by her Love are attracted to the male: they find pleasure in what is by nature stronger and more intelligent. But, even within the group that is attracted to handsome boys, some are not moved purely by this [*d*] Heavenly Love; those who are do not fall in love with little boys; they prefer older ones whose {208} cheeks are showing the first traces of a beard —a sign that they have begun to form minds of their own. I am convinced that a man who falls in love with a young man of this age is generally prepared to share everything with the one he loves—he is eager, in fact, to spend the rest of his own life with him. He certainly does not aim to deceive him—to take advantage of him while he is still young and inexperienced and then, after exposing him to ridicule, to move quickly on to someone else.

As a matter of fact, there should be a law forbidding affairs with young boys. If nothing else, all this time and effort would not be wasted on such an uncertain pursuit—and what is more uncertain [*e*] than whether a particular boy will eventually make something of himself, physically or mentally? Good men, of course, are willing to make a law like this for

themselves, but those other lovers, the vulgar ones, need external restraint. For just this reason we have placed every possible legal obstacle to their seducing our own wives and daughters. These vulgar [*182a*] lovers are the people who have given love such a bad reputation that some have gone so far as to claim that taking *any* man as a lover is in itself disgraceful. Would anyone make this claim if he weren't thinking of how hasty vulgar lovers are, and therefore how unfair to their loved ones? For nothing done properly and in accordance with our customs would ever have provoked such righteous disapproval.

I should point out, however, that, although the customs regarding Love in most cities are simple and easy to understand, here in Athens (and in Sparta[27] as well) they are remarkably complex. In places where the people are inarticulate, like Elis or [*b*] Boeotia,[28] tradition straightforwardly approves taking a lover in every case. No one there, young or old, would ever consider it shameful. The reason, I suspect, is that, being poor speakers, they want to save themselves the trouble of having to offer reasons and arguments in support of their suits.

By contrast, in places like Ionia[29] and almost every other part of the Persian empire, taking a lover is always considered disgraceful. The Persian empire is absolute; that is why it condemns love as well as philosophy and sport. It is no good for rulers if the [*c*] people they rule cherish ambitions for themselves or form strong bonds of friendship with one another. That these are precisely the effects of philosophy, sport, and especially of Love is a lesson the tyrants of Athens learned directly from their own experience: Didn't their reign come to a dismal end because of the bonds uniting Harmodius and Aristogiton in love and affection?[30]

So you can see that plain condemnation of Love reveals lust for power in the rulers and cowardice in the ruled, while indiscriminate [*d*] approval testifies to general dullness and stupidity.

Our own customs, which, as I have already said, are much more difficult to understand, are also far superior. Recall, for example, that we consider it more honorable to declare your love rather than to keep it a secret, especially if you are in love with a youth of good family and accomplishment, even if he isn't all that beautiful. Recall also that a lover is

encouraged in every possible way; this means that what he does is not considered shameful. On the contrary, conquest is deemed noble, and failure [*e*] shameful. And as for *attempts* at conquest, our custom is to praise lovers for totally extraordinary acts—so extraordinary, in fact, [*183a*] that if they performed them for any other purpose whatever, they would reap the most profound contempt. Suppose, for example, that in order to secure money, or a public post, or any other practical benefit from another person, a man were willing to do what lovers do for the ones they love. Imagine that in pressing his suit he went to his knees in public view and begged in the most humiliating way, that he swore all sorts of vows, that he spent the night at the other man's doorstep, that he were anxious to provide {209} services even a slave would have refused—well, you can be sure that everyone, his enemies no less than his [*b*] friends, would stand in his way. His enemies would jeer at his fawning servility, while his friends, ashamed on his behalf, would try everything to bring him back to his senses. But let a lover act in any of these ways, and everyone will immediately say what a charming man he is! No blame attaches to his behavior: custom treats it as noble through and through. And what is even more remarkable is that, at least according to popular wisdom, the gods will forgive a lover even for breaking his vows—a lover's vow, our people say, is no vow at all. The freedom given to the lover by both gods and men according to our custom is immense. [*c*]

In view of all this, you might well conclude that in our city we consider the lover's desire and the willingness to satisfy it as the noblest things in the world. When, on the other hand, you recall that fathers hire attendants for their sons as soon as they're old enough to be attractive, and that an attendant's main task is to prevent any contact between his charge and his suitors; when you recall how mercilessly a boy's own friends tease him if they catch him at it, and how strongly their elders approve and even encourage such mocking—when you take all this into account, [*d*] you're bound to come to the conclusion that we Athenians consider such behavior the most shameful thing in the world.

In my opinion, however, the fact of the matter is this. As I said earlier, love is, like everything else, complex: considered simply in itself, it is neither honorable nor a disgrace—its character depends entirely on the behavior it gives rise to. To give oneself to a vile man in a vile way is truly

disgraceful behavior; by contrast, it is perfectly honorable to give oneself honorably to the right man. Now you may want to know who counts as vile in this context. I'll tell you: it is the common, vulgar lover, who [*e*] loves the body rather than the soul, the man whose love is bound to be inconstant, since what he loves is itself mutable and unstable. The moment the body is no longer in bloom, "he flies off and away,"[31] his promises and vows in tatters behind him. How different from this is a man who loves the right sort of character, and who remains its lover for life, attached as he is to something that is permanent.

We can now see the point of our customs: they are designed to separate the wheat from the chaff, the proper love from the vile. [*184a*] That's why we do everything we can to make it as easy as possible for lovers to press their suits and as difficult as possible for young men to comply; it is like a competition, a kind of test to determine to which sort each belongs. This explains two further facts: First, why we consider it shameful to yield too quickly: the passage of time in itself provides a good test in these matters. Second, why we also consider it shameful for a man to be seduced by money or political power, either because he [*b*] cringes at ill-treatment and will not endure it or because, once he has tasted the benefits of wealth and power, he will not rise above them. None of these benefits is stable or permanent, apart from the fact that no genuine affection can possibly be based upon them.

Our customs, then, provide for only one honorable way of taking a man as a lover. In addition to recognizing that the [*c*] lover's total and willing subjugation to his beloved's wishes is neither servile nor reprehensible, we allow that there is one—and only one—further reason for willingly subjecting oneself to another which is equally above reproach: that is subjection for the sake of virtue. If someone decides to put himself at another's disposal because he thinks that this will make him better in wisdom or in any other part of virtue, we approve of his voluntary subjection: we consider it neither shameful nor servile. Both these principles—that is, both the principle governing the proper attitude toward the lover of young men and the principle governing [*d*] the love of wisdom and of virtue in general—must be combined if a young man is to accept a lover in an honorable way. When an older lover and a young man come

together and each obeys the principle appropriate to him—when the lover realizes that he is justified in doing anything for a loved one who grants him favors, and when the young man understands that he is justified in performing any service for a lover who can make him [*e*] wise and virtuous—and when the lover is able to help the young man become wiser and {210} better, and the young man is eager to be taught and improved by his lover—then, and only then, when these two principles coincide absolutely, is it ever honorable for a young man to accept a lover.

Only in this case, we should notice, is it never shameful to be deceived; in every other case it is shameful, both for the deceiver [*185a*] and the person he deceives. Suppose, for example, that someone thinks his lover is rich and accepts him for his money; his action won't be any less shameful if it turns out that he was deceived and his lover was a poor man after all. For the young man has already shown himself to be the sort of person who will do anything for money—and that is far from honorable. By the same token, suppose that someone takes a lover in the mistaken belief that this lover is a good man and likely to make him better himself, while in reality the man is horrible, totally lacking in [*b*] virtue; even so, it is noble for him to have been deceived. For he too has demonstrated something about himself: that he is the sort of person who will do anything for the sake of virtue—and what could be more honorable than that? It follows, therefore, that giving in to your lover for virtue's sake is honorable, whatever the outcome. And this, of course, is the Heavenly Love of the heavenly goddess. Love's value to the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable, for he compels the lover and his loved one alike to make virtue their central concern. All other [*c*] forms of love belong to the vulgar goddess.

Phaedrus, I'm afraid this hasty improvisation will have to do as my contribution on the subject of Love.

When Pausanias finally came to a pause (I've learned this sort of fine figure from our clever rhetoricians), it was Aristophanes' turn, according to Aristodemus. But he had such a bad case of the hiccups—he'd probably stuffed himself again, though, of course, it could have been anything—that making a speech was totally out of the question. So he turned to the doctor, Eryximachus, [*d*] who was next in line, and said to him: "Eryximachus, it's up to you—as well it should be. Cure me or take my turn."

“As a matter of fact,” Eryximachus replied, “I shall do both. I shall take your turn—you can speak in my place as soon as you feel better—and I shall also cure you. While I am giving my speech, you should hold your breath for as long as you possibly can. This may well eliminate your hiccups. If it fails, the best [*e*] remedy is a thorough gargle. And if even this has no effect, then tickle your nose with a feather. A sneeze or two will cure even the most persistent case.”

“The sooner you start speaking, the better,” Aristophanes said. “I’ll follow your instructions to the letter.”

This, then, was the speech of Eryximachus:

Pausanias introduced a crucial consideration in his speech, though in my opinion he did not develop it sufficiently. Let me therefore try to carry his argument to its [*186a*] logical conclusion. His distinction between the two species of Love seems to me very useful indeed. But if I have learned a single lesson from my own field, the science of medicine, it is that Love does not occur only in the human soul; it is not simply the attraction we feel toward human beauty: it is a significantly broader phenomenon. It certainly occurs within the animal kingdom, [*b*] and even in the world of plants. In fact, it occurs everywhere in the universe. Love is a deity of the greatest importance: he directs everything that occurs, not only in the human domain, but also in that of the gods.

Let me begin with some remarks concerning medicine—I hope you will forgive my giving pride of place to my own profession. The point is that our very bodies manifest the two species of Love. Consider for a moment the marked difference, the radical dissimilarity, between healthy and diseased constitutions and the fact that dissimilar subjects desire and love objects that are themselves dissimilar. Therefore, the love manifested in health is fundamentally distinct from the love manifested in disease. And now recall that, as Pausanias claimed, it is as honorable to yield [*c*] to a good man as it is shameful to consort with the debauched. Well, my point is that the case of the human body is strictly parallel. Everything sound and healthy in the body must be encouraged and {211} gratified; that is precisely the object of medicine. Conversely, whatever is unhealthy and unsound must be frustrated and rebuffed: that’s what it is to be an expert in medicine.

In short, medicine is simply the science of the effects of Love on repletion and depletion of the body, and the hallmark of the [*d*] accomplished physician is his ability to distinguish the Love that is noble from the Love that is ugly and disgraceful. A good practitioner knows how to affect the body and how to transform its desires; he can implant the proper species of Love when it is absent and eliminate the other sort whenever it occurs. The physician's task is to effect a reconciliation and establish mutual love between the most basic bodily elements. Which are those elements? They are, of course, those that are most opposed to one another, as hot is to cold, bitter to sweet, wet to dry, cases like those. In fact, our ancestor Asclepius[32] first established medicine [*e*] as a profession when he learned how to produce concord and love between such opposites—that is what those poet fellows say, and—this time—I concur with them.

Medicine, therefore, is guided everywhere by the god of [*187a*] Love, and so are physical education and farming as well. Further, a moment's reflection suffices to show that the case of poetry and music, too, is precisely the same. Indeed, this may have been just what Heraclitus had in mind, though his mode of expression certainly leaves much to be desired. The one, he says, "being at variance with itself is in agreement with itself "like the attunement of a bow or a lyre."[33] Naturally, it is patently absurd to claim that an attunement or a harmony is in itself discordant or that its elements are still in discord with one another. Heraclitus probably meant that an expert musician creates a harmony by resolving the prior discord between high and low notes. For [*b*] surely there can be no harmony so long as high and low are still discordant; harmony, after all, is consonance, and consonance is a species of agreement. Discordant elements, as long as they are still in discord, cannot come to an agreement, and they therefore cannot produce a harmony. Rhythm, for example, is produced [*c*] only when fast and slow, though earlier discordant, are brought into agreement with each other. Music, like medicine, creates agreement by producing concord and love between these various opposites. Music is therefore simply the science of the effects of Love on rhythm and harmony.

These effects are easily discernible if you consider the constitution of rhythm and harmony in themselves; Love does not occur in both his forms in this domain. But the moment you consider, in their turn, the effects of

rhythm and harmony on their [*d*] audience—either through composition, which creates new verses and melodies, or through musical education, which teaches the correct performance of existing compositions—complications arise directly, and they require the treatment of a good practitioner. Ultimately, the identical argument applies once again: the love felt by good people or by those whom such love might improve in this regard must be encouraged and protected. This is the honorable, heavenly species of Love, produced by the melodies of [*e*] Urania, the Heavenly Muse. The other, produced by Polyhymnia, the muse of many songs, is common and vulgar.[34] Extreme caution is indicated here: we must be careful to enjoy his pleasures without slipping into debauchery—this case, I might add, is strictly parallel to a serious issue in my own field, namely, the problem of regulating the appetite so as to be able to enjoy a fine meal without unhealthy aftereffects.

In music, therefore, as well as in medicine and in all the other domains, in matters divine as well as in human affairs, we must attend with the greatest possible care to these two species of [*188a*] Love, which are, indeed, to be found everywhere. Even the seasons of the year exhibit their influence. When the elements to which I have already referred—hot and cold, wet and dry—are animated by the proper species of Love, they are in harmony with one another: their mixture {212} is temperate, and so is the climate. Harvests are plentiful; men and all other living things are in good health; no harm can come to them. But when the sort of Love that is crude and impulsive controls the seasons, he [*b*] brings death and destruction. He spreads the plague and many other diseases among plants and animals; he causes frost and hail and blights. All these are the effects of the immodest and disordered species of Love on the movements of the stars and the seasons of the year, that is, on the objects studied by the science called astronomy.

Consider further the rites of sacrifice and the whole area with which the art of divination is concerned; that is, the interaction [*c*] between men and gods. Here, too, Love is the central concern: our object is to try to maintain the proper kind of Love and to attempt to cure the kind that is diseased. For what is the origin of all impiety? Our refusal to gratify the orderly kind of Love, and our deference to the other sort, when we should have been guided

by the former sort of Love in every action in connection with our parents, living or dead, and with the gods. The task of divination is to keep watch over these two species of Love and to doctor them as necessary. Divination, therefore, is the practice that produces loving affection between gods and men; it is [*d*] simply the science of the effects of Love on justice and piety.

Such is the power of Love—so varied and great that in all cases it might be called absolute. Yet even so it is far greater when Love is directed, in temperance and justice, toward the good, whether in heaven or on earth: happiness and good fortune, the bonds of human society, concord with the gods above—all these are among his gifts.

Perhaps I, too, have omitted a great deal in this discourse on Love. If so, I assure you, it was quite inadvertent. And if in fact [*e*] I have overlooked certain points, it is now your task, Aristophanes, to complete the argument—unless, of course, you are planning on a different approach. In any case, proceed; your hiccups seem cured. [*189a*]

Then Aristophanes took over (so Aristodemus said): “The hiccups have stopped all right—but not before I applied the Sneeze Treatment to them. Makes me wonder whether the ‘orderly sort of Love’ in the body calls for the sounds and itchings that constitute a sneeze, because the hiccups stopped immediately when I applied the Sneeze Treatment.”

“You’re good, Aristophanes,” Eryximachus answered. “But watch what you’re doing. You are making jokes before your speech, and you’re forcing me to prepare for you to say something funny, and to put up my guard against you, when [*b*] otherwise you might speak at peace.”

Then Aristophanes laughed. “Good point, Eryximachus. So let me ‘unsay what I have said.’ But don’t put up your guard. I’m not worried about saying something funny in my coming oration. That would be pure profit, and it comes with the territory of my Muse. What I’m worried about is that I might say something ridiculous.”

“Aristophanes, do you really think you can take a shot at me, and then escape? Use your head! Remember, as you speak, that you will be called upon to give an account. Though perhaps, if I decide to, I’ll let you off.” [*c*]

“Eryximachus,” Aristophanes said, “indeed I do have in mind a different approach to speaking than the one the two of you used, you and Pausanias. You see, I think people have entirely missed the power of Love, because, if they had grasped it, they’d have built the greatest temples and altars to him

and made the greatest sacrifices. But as it is, none of this is done for him, though it should be, more than anything else! For he loves the human [*d*] race more than any other god, he stands by us in our troubles, and he cures those ills we humans are most happy to have mended. I shall, therefore, try to explain his power to you; and you, please pass my teaching on to everyone else."

First you must learn what Human Nature was in the beginning and what has happened to it since, because long ago our nature was not what it is now, but very different. There were three kinds of human beings, that's my first point—not two as there are now, male and female. In addition to [*e*] these, there was a third, a combination of those two; its name survives, though the kind itself has vanished. At that time, you see, the word {213} "androgynous" really meant something: a form made up of male and female elements, though now there's nothing but the word, and that's used as an insult. My second point is that the shape of each human being was completely round, with back and sides in a circle; they had four hands each, as many legs as hands, and two faces, exactly alike, on a rounded [*190a*] neck. Between the two faces, which were on opposite sides, was one head with four ears. There were two sets of sexual organs, and everything else was the way you'd imagine it from what I've told you. They walked upright, as we do now, whatever direction they wanted. And whenever they set out to run fast, they thrust out all their eight limbs, the ones they had then, and spun rapidly, the way gymnasts do cartwheels, by bringing their legs around straight.

Now here is why there were three kinds, and why they were as I described them: The male kind was originally an offspring of [*b*] the sun, the female of the earth, and the one that combined both genders was an offspring of the moon, because the moon shares in both. They were spherical, and so was their motion, because they were like their parents in the sky.

In strength and power, therefore, they were terrible, and they had great ambitions. They made an attempt on the gods, and Homer's story about Ephialtes and Otus was originally about them: how they tried to make an ascent to heaven so as to attack [*c*] the gods.[35] Then Zeus and the other gods met in council to discuss what to do, and they were sore perplexed. They couldn't wipe out the human race with thunderbolts and kill them all

off, as they had the giants, because that would wipe out the worship they receive, along with the sacrifices we humans give them. On the other hand, they couldn't let them run riot. At last, after great effort, Zeus had an idea.

"I think I have a plan," he said, "that would allow human beings to exist and stop their misbehaving: they will give up [*d*] being wicked when they lose their strength. So I shall now cut each of them in two. At one stroke they will lose their strength and also become more profitable to us, owing to the increase in their number. They shall walk upright on two legs. But if I find they still run riot and do not keep the peace," he said, "I will cut them in two again, and they'll have to make their way on one leg, hopping."

So saying, he cut those human beings in two, [*e*] the way people cut sorb-apples before they dry them or the way they cut eggs with hairs. As he cut each one, he commanded Apollo to turn its face and half its neck toward the wound, so that each person would see that he'd been cut and keep better order. Then Zeus commanded Apollo to heal the rest of the wound, and Apollo did turn the face around, and he drew skin from all sides over what is now called the stomach, and there he made one mouth, as in a pouch with a drawstring, and fastened it at the center of the stomach. This is now called the navel. Then he smoothed out [*191a*] the other wrinkles, of which there were many, and he shaped the breasts, using some such tool as shoemakers have for smoothing wrinkles out of leather on the form. But he left a few wrinkles around the stomach and the navel, to be a reminder of what happened long ago.

Now, since their natural form had been cut in two, each one longed for its own other half, and so they would throw their arms about each other, weaving themselves together, wanting to grow together. In that condition they would die from hunger and general idleness, because they would not do anything apart [*b*] from each other. Whenever one of the halves died and one was left, the one that was left still sought another and wove itself together with that. Sometimes the half he met came from a woman, as we'd call her now, sometimes it came from a man; either way, they kept on dying.

Then, however, Zeus took pity on them, and came up with another plan: he moved their genitals around to the front! Before then, you see, they used to have their genitals outside, like their faces, and they cast seed and made children, not in one another, [*c*] but in the ground, like cicadas. So Zeus

brought about this relocation of genitals, and in doing so he invented interior reproduction, *by* the man *in* the woman. The purpose of this was so that, when a man embraced a woman, {214} he would cast his seed and they would have children; but when male embraced male, they would at least have the satisfaction of intercourse, after which they could stop embracing, return to their jobs, and look after their other needs in life. This, then, is the source of our [*d*] desire to love each other. Love is born into every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human nature.

Each of us, then, is a "matching half" of a human whole, because each was sliced like a flatfish, two out of one, and each of us is always seeking the half that matches him. That's why a man who is split from the double sort (which used to be called "androgynous") runs after women. Many lecherous men have come from this class, and so do the lecherous women who run [*e*] after men. Women who are split from a woman, however, pay no attention at all to men; they are oriented more toward women, and lesbians come from this class. People who are split from a male are male-oriented. While they are boys, because they are chips off the male block, they love men and enjoy lying with men and being embraced by men; those are the best of boys and [*192a*] lads, because they are the most manly in their nature. Of course, some say such boys are shameless, but they're lying. It's not because they have no shame that such boys do this, you see, but because they are bold and brave and masculine, and they tend to cherish what is like themselves. Do you want me to prove it? Look, these are the only kind of boys who grow up to be politicians. [*b*] When they're grown men, they are lovers of young men, and they naturally pay no attention to marriage or to making babies, except insofar as they are required by local custom. They, however, are quite satisfied to live their lives with one another unmarried. In every way, then, this sort of man grows up as a lover of young men and a lover of Love, always rejoicing in his own kind.

And so, when a person meets the half that is his very own, whatever his orientation, whether it's to young men or not, then something wonderful happens: the two are struck from their [*c*] senses by love, by a sense of belonging to one another, and by desire, and they don't want to be separated from one another, not even for a moment.

These are the people who finish out their lives together and still cannot say what it is they want from one another. No one would think it is the intimacy of sex—that mere sex is the reason each lover takes so great and deep a joy in being with the other.

It's obvious that the soul of every [*d*] lover longs for something else; his soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of what it wants, and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle. Suppose two lovers are lying together and Hephaestus[36] stands over them with his mending tools, asking, "What is it you human beings really want from each other?" And suppose they're perplexed, and he asks them again: "Is this your heart's desire, then —for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, as near as can be, and never to separate, day or night? Because if that's your desire, I'd like to weld you together and join you into something that is naturally whole, so that the two of you are [*e*] made into one. Then the two of you would share one life, as long as you lived, because you would be one being, and by the same token, when you died, you would be one and not two in Hades, having died a single death. Look at your love, and see if this is what you desire: wouldn't this be all the good fortune you could want?"

Surely you can see that no one who received such an offer would turn it down; no one would find anything else that he wanted. Instead, everyone would think he'd found out at last what he had always wanted: to come together and melt together with the one he loves, so that one person emerged from two. Why should this be so? It's because, as I said, we used to be complete wholes in our original nature, and now "Love" is the name for our pursuit of wholeness, for our desire to be complete. [*193a*]

Long ago we were united, as I said; but now the god has divided us as punishment for the wrong we did him, just as the Spartans divided the Arcadians.[37] So there's a danger that if we don't {215} keep order before the gods, we'll be split in two again, and then we'll be walking around in the condition of people carved on gravestones in bas-relief, sawn apart between the nostrils, like half dice. We should encourage all men, therefore, to treat the gods with all due reverence, so that we may escape this fate and [*b*] find wholeness instead. And we will, if Love is our guide and our commander. Let no one work against him. Whoever opposes Love is hateful to the gods, but if we become friends of the god and cease to quarrel with

him, then we shall find the young men that are meant for us and win their love, as very few men do nowadays.

Now don't get ideas, Eryximachus, and turn this speech into a comedy. Don't think I'm pointing this at Pausanias and Agathon. [*c*] Probably, they both do belong to the group that are entirely masculine in nature. But I am speaking about everyone, men and women alike, and I say there's just one way for the human race to flourish: we must bring love to its perfect conclusion, and each of us must win the favors of his very own young man, so that he can recover his original nature. If that is the ideal, then, of course, the nearest approach to it is best in present circumstances, and that is to win the favor of young men who are naturally sympathetic to us.

[*d*] If we are to give due praise to the god who can give us this blessing, then, we must praise Love. Love does the best that can be done for the time being: he draws us toward what belongs to us. But for the future, Love promises the greatest hope of all: if we treat the gods with due reverence, he will restore to us our original nature, and by healing us, he will make us blessed and happy.

"That," he said, "is my speech about Love, Eryximachus. It is rather different from yours. As I begged you earlier, don't make a comedy of it. [*e*] I'd prefer to hear what all the others will say—or, rather, what each of them will say, since Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left."

"I found your speech delightful," said Eryximachus, "so I'll do as you say. Really, we've had such a rich feast of speeches on Love, that if I couldn't vouch for the fact that Socrates and Agathon are masters of the art of love, I'd be afraid that they'd have nothing left to say. But as it is, I have no fears on this score."

Then Socrates said, "That's because *you* did [*194a*] beautifully in the contest, Eryximachus. But if you ever get in my position, or rather the position I'll be in after Agathon's spoken so well, then you'll really be afraid. You'll be at your wit's end, as I am now."

"You're trying to bewitch me, Socrates," said Agathon, "by making me think the audience expects great things of my [*b*] speech, so I'll get flustered."

"Agathon!" said Socrates, "How forgetful do you think I am? I saw how brave and dignified you were when you walked right up to the theater

platform along with the actors and looked straight out at that enormous audience. You were about to put your own writing on display, and you weren't the least bit panicked. After seeing that, how could I expect you to be flustered by us, when we are so few?"

"Why, Socrates," said Agathon. "You must think I have nothing but theater audiences on my mind! So you suppose I don't realize that, if you're intelligent, you find a few sensible men much more frightening than a senseless crowd?"

"No," he said, "It wouldn't be very handsome of me to think [*c*] you crude in any way, Agathon. I'm sure that if you ever run into people you consider wise, you'll pay more attention to them than to ordinary people. But you can't suppose we're in that class; we were at the theater too, you know, part of the ordinary crowd. Still, if you did run into any wise men, other than yourself, you'd certainly be ashamed at the thought of doing anything ugly in front of them. Is that what you mean?"

"That's true," he said.

"On the other hand, you wouldn't be ashamed to do something ugly in front of ordinary people. Is that it?" [*d*]

At that point Phaedrus interrupted: "Agathon, my friend, if you answer Socrates, he'll no longer care whether we get anywhere with what we're doing here, so long as he has a partner for discussion. Especially if he's handsome. Now, like {216} you, I enjoy listening to Socrates in discussion, but it is my duty to see to the praising of Love and to exact a speech from every one of this group. When each of you two has made his offering to [*e*] the god, then you can have your discussion."

"You're doing a beautiful job, Phaedrus," said Agathon. "There's nothing to keep me from giving my speech. Socrates will have many opportunities for discussion later."

I wish first to speak of how I ought to speak, and only then to speak. In my opinion, you see, all those who have spoken before me did not so much celebrate the god as congratulate human beings on the good things that come to them from the god. But who it is who gave these gifts, what he is like—no one has spoken about that. [*195a*] Now, only one method is correct for every praise, no matter whose: you must explain what qualities in the subject of your speech enable him to give the benefits for which we

praise him. So now, in the case of Love, it is right for us to praise him first for what he is and afterward for his gifts.

I maintain, then, that while all the gods are happy, Love—if I may say so without giving offense—is the happiest of them all, for he is the most beautiful and the best. His great beauty lies in this: First, Phaedrus, he is the youngest of the gods. [*b*] He proves my point himself by fleeing old age in headlong flight, fast-moving though it is (that's obvious—it comes after us faster than it should). Love was born to hate old age and will come nowhere near it. Love always lives with young people and is one of them: the old story holds good that like is always drawn to like. And though on many other points I agree with Phaedrus, I do not agree with this: that Love is more ancient than Cronus and Iapetus.[38] No, I say that he is the youngest of the gods and stays young forever. [*c*]

Those old stories Hesiod and Parmenides tell about the gods—those things happened under Necessity, not Love, if what they say is true. For not one of all those violent deeds would have been done—no castrations, no imprisonments—if Love had been present among them. There would have been peace and brotherhood instead, as there has been now as long as Love has been king of the gods.

So he is young. And besides being young, he is delicate. [*d*] It takes a poet as good as Homer to show how delicate the god is. For Homer says that Mischief is a god and that she is delicate—well, that her feet are delicate, anyway! He says: . . . hers are delicate feet: not on the ground

Does she draw nigh; she walks instead upon the heads of men.[39]

A lovely proof, I think, to show how delicate [*e*] she is: she doesn't walk on anything hard; she walks only on what is soft. We shall use the same proof about Love, then, to show that he is delicate. For he walks not on earth, not even on people's skulls, which are not really soft at all, but in the softest of all the things that are, there he walks, there he has his home. For he makes his home in the characters, in the souls, of gods and men—and not even in every soul that comes along: when he encounters a soul with a harsh character, he turns away; but when he finds a soft and gentle character, he settles down in it. Always, then, he is touching with his feet

and with the whole of himself what is softest in the softest places. He must therefore be most delicate. [*196a*]

He is youngest, then, and most delicate; in addition he has a fluid, supple shape. For if he were hard, he would not be able to enfold a soul completely or escape notice when he first entered it or withdrew. Besides, his graceful good looks prove that he is balanced and fluid in his nature. Everyone knows that Love has extraordinary good looks, and between ugliness and Love there is unceasing war.

And the exquisite coloring of his skin! The way the god consorts with flowers shows that. For he never settles in anything, [*b*] be it a body or a soul, that cannot flower or has lost its bloom. His place is wherever it is flowery and fragrant; there he settles, there he stays.

{217} Enough for now about the beauty of the god, though much remains still to be said. After this, we should speak of Love's moral character.[40] The main point is that Love is neither the cause nor the victim of any injustice; he does no wrong to gods or men, nor they to him. If anything has an effect on him, it is [*c*] never by violence, for violence never touches Love. And the effects he has on others are not forced, for every service we give to love we give willingly. And whatever one person agrees on with another, when both are willing, that is right and just; so say "the laws that are kings of society."[41]

And besides justice, he has the biggest share of temperance. For temperance, by common agreement, is power over pleasures and passions, and no pleasure is more powerful than Love! But if they are weaker, they are under the power of Love, and *he* has the power; and because he has power over pleasures and passions, Love is exceptionally temperate.

And as for manly bravery, "Not even Ares can stand up to" [*d*] Love![42] For Ares has no hold on Love, but Love does on Ares—love of Aphrodite, so runs the tale.[43] But he who has hold is more powerful than he who is held; and so, because Love has power over the bravest of the others, he is bravest of them all.

Now I have spoken about the god's justice, temperance, and bravery; his wisdom remains.[44] I must try not to leave out anything that can be said on this. [*e*] In the first place—to honor *our* profession as Eryximachus did his

—the god is so skilled a poet that he can make others into poets: once Love touches him, *anyone* becomes a poet,

> . . . howe'er uncultured he had been before.[45]

This, we may fittingly observe, testifies that Love is a good poet, good, in sum, at every kind of artistic production. For you can't give to another what you don't have yourself, and you can't teach what you don't know. [*197a*]

And as to the production of animals—who will deny that they are all born and begotten through Love's skill?

And as for artisans and professionals—don't we know that whoever has this god for a teacher ends up in the light of fame, while a man untouched by Love ends in obscurity? Apollo, for one, invented archery, medicine, and prophecy when desire and [*b*] love showed the way. Even he, therefore, would be a pupil of Love, and so would the Muses in music, Hephaestus in bronze work, Athena in weaving, and Zeus in "the governance of gods and men."

That too is how the gods' quarrels were settled, once Love came to be among them—love of beauty, obviously, because love is not drawn to ugliness. Before that, as I said in the beginning, and as the poets say, many dreadful things happened among the gods, because Necessity was king. But once this god was born, [*c*] all goods came to gods and men alike through love of beauty.

This is how I think of Love, Phaedrus: first, he is himself the most beautiful and the best; after that, if anyone else is at all like that, Love is responsible. I am suddenly struck by a need to say something in poetic meter,[46] that it is he who—

> Gives peace to men and stillness to the sea,
>
> Lays winds to rest, and careworn men to sleep. [*d*]

Love fills us with togetherness and drains all of our divisiveness away. Love calls gatherings like these together. In feasts, in dances, and in ceremonies, he gives the lead. Love moves us to mildness, removes from us wildness. He is giver of kindness, never of meanness. Gracious, kindly—let

wise men see and gods admire! {218} Treasure to lovers, envy to others, father of elegance, luxury, delicacy, grace, yearning, desire. Love cares well for good men, cares not for bad ones. In pain, in fear, in desire, or speech, Love is our best guide and guard; he is our comrade [*e*] and our savior. Ornament of all gods and men, most beautiful leader and the best! Every man should follow Love, sing beautifully his hymns, and join with him in the song he sings that charms the mind of god or man.

This, Phaedrus, is the speech I have to offer. Let it be dedicated to the god, part of it in fun, part [*198a*] of it moderately serious, as best I could manage.

When Agathon finished, Aristodemus said, everyone there burst into applause, so becoming to himself and to the god did they think the young man's speech.

Then Socrates glanced at Eryximachus and said, "Now do you think I was foolish to feel the fear I felt before? Didn't I speak like a prophet a while ago when I said that Agathon would give an amazing speech and I would be tongue-tied?"

"You were prophetic about one thing, I think," said Eryximachus, "that Agathon would speak well. But you, tongue-tied? No, I don't believe that." [*b*]

"Bless you," said Socrates. "How am I not going to be tongue-tied, I or anyone else, after a speech delivered with such beauty and variety? The other parts may not have been so wonderful, but that at the end! Who would not be struck dumb on hearing the beauty of the words and phrases? Anyway, I was worried that I'd not be able to say anything that came close to [*c*] them in beauty, and so I would almost have run away and escaped, if there had been a place to go. And, you see, the speech reminded me of Gorgias, so that I actually experienced what Homer describes: I was afraid that Agathon would end by sending the Gorgian head,[47] awesome at speaking in a speech, against my speech, and this would turn me to stone by striking me dumb. Then I realized how ridiculous I'd been to agree to [*d*] join with you in praising Love and to say that I was a master of the art of love, when I knew nothing whatever of this business, of how anything whatever ought to be praised. In my foolishness, I thought you should tell

the truth about whatever you praise, that this should be your basis, and that from this a speaker should select the most beautiful truths and arrange them most suitably. I was quite vain, thinking that I would talk well and that I knew the truth about praising anything whatever. But now it appears that this is not what it is to praise [*e*] anything whatever; rather, it is to apply to the object the grandest and the most beautiful qualities, whether he actually has them or not. And if they are false, that is no objection; for the proposal, apparently, was that everyone here make the rest of us think he is praising Love—and not that he actually praise him. I think that is why you stir up every word and apply it to Love; [*199a*] your description of him and his gifts is designed to make him look better and more beautiful than anything else—to ignorant listeners, plainly, for of course he wouldn't look that way to those who knew. And your praise did seem beautiful and respectful. But I didn't even know the method for giving praise; and it was in ignorance that I agreed to take part in this. So "the tongue" promised, and "the mind" did not.[48] Goodbye to that! I'm not giving another eulogy using that method, not at all—I wouldn't be able to do it!—but, if you wish, I'd like to tell the truth my [*b*] way. I want to avoid any comparison with your speeches, so as not to give you a reason to laugh at me. So look, Phaedrus, would a speech like this satisfy your requirement? You will hear the truth about Love, and the words and phrasing will take care of themselves."

Then Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the others urged him to speak in the way he thought was required, whatever it was.

"Well then, Phaedrus," said Socrates, "allow me to ask Agathon a few little questions, so that, once I have his agreement, I may speak on that basis." [*c*]

{219} "You have my permission," said Phaedrus. "Ask away."

After that, said Aristodemus, Socrates began: "Indeed, Agathon, my friend, I thought you led the way beautifully into your speech when you said that one should first show the qualities of Love himself, and only then those of his deeds. I must admire that beginning. Come, then, since you have beautifully and magnificently expounded [*d*] his qualities in other ways, tell me this, too, about Love. Is Love such as to be a love of something or of nothing? I'm not asking if he is born *of* some mother or father, (for the question whether Love is love of mother or of father would

really be ridiculous), but it's as if I'm asking this about a father—whether a father is the father *of* something or not. You'd tell me, of course, if you wanted to give me a good answer, that it's *of* a son or a daughter that a father is the father. Wouldn't you?"

"Certainly," said Agathon.

"Then does the same go for the mother?"

[*e*] He agreed to that also.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "answer a little more fully, and you will understand better what I want. If I should ask, 'What about this: a brother, just insofar as he *is* a brother, is he the brother of something or not?'"

He said that he was.

"And he's of a brother or a sister, isn't he?"

He agreed.

"Now try to tell me about love," he said. "Is Love the love of nothing or of something?"

"Of something, surely!" [*200a*]

"Then keep this object of love in mind, and remember what it is. But tell me this much: does Love desire that of which it is the love, or not?"

"Certainly," he said.

"At the time he desires and loves something, does he actually have what he desires and loves at that time, or doesn't he?"

"He doesn't. At least, that wouldn't be likely," he said.

"Instead of what's *likely*," said Socrates, "ask yourself whether it's *necessary* that this be so: a thing that desires something of which it is in need; otherwise, if it were not in [*b*] need, it would not desire it. I can't tell you, Agathon, how strongly it strikes me that this is necessary. But how about you?"

"I think so too."

"Good. Now then, would someone who is tall, want to be tall? Or someone who is strong want to be strong?"

"Impossible, on the basis of what we've agreed."

"Presumably because no one is in need of those things he already has."

"True."

"But maybe a strong man could want to be strong," said Socrates, "or a fast one fast, or a healthy one healthy: in cases [*c*] like these, you might think people really do want to be things they already are and do want to

have qualities they already have—I bring them up so they won't deceive us. But in these cases, Agathon, if you stop to think about them, you will see that these people are what they are at the present time, whether they want to be or not, by a logical necessity. And who, may I ask, would ever bother to desire what's necessary in any event? But when someone says 'I am healthy, but that's just what I want to be,' or 'I am rich, but that's just what I want to be,' or 'I desire the [*d*] very things that I have,' let us say to him: 'You already have riches and health and strength in your possession, my man, what you want is to possess these things in time to come, since in the present, whether you want to or not, you have them. Whenever you say, *I desire what I already have*, ask yourself whether you don't mean this: *I want the things I have now to be mine in the future as well*.' Wouldn't he agree?"

According to Aristodemus, Agathon said that he would.

So Socrates said, "Then this is what it is to love something which is not at hand, which the lover does not have: it is to desire the preservation of what he now has in time to come, so [*e*] that he will have it then."

"Quite so," he said.

"So such a man or anyone else who has a desire desires what is not at hand and not present, what he does not have, and what he is not, and that of which he is in need; for such are the objects of desire and love."

{220} "Certainly," he said.

"Come, then," said Socrates. "Let us review the points on which we've agreed. Aren't they, first, that Love is the love of something, and, second, that he loves things of which he has a present need?" [*201a*]

"Yes," he said.

"Now, remember, in addition to these points, what you said in your speech about what it is that Love loves. If you like, I'll remind you. I think you said something like this: that the gods' quarrels were settled by love of beautiful things, for there is no love of ugly ones. Didn't you say something like that?"

"I did," said Agathon.

"And that's a suitable thing to say, my friend," said Socrates. "But if this is so, wouldn't Love have to be a desire for beauty, and never for ugliness?"

[*b*] He agreed.

"And we also agreed that he loves just what he needs and does not have."

“Yes,” he said.

“So Love needs beauty, then, and does not have it.”

“Necessarily,” he said.

“So! If something needs beauty and has got no beauty at all, would you still say that it is beautiful?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then do you still agree that Love is beautiful, if those things are so?”

Then Agathon said, “It turns out, Socrates, I didn’t know what I was talking about in that speech.” [*c*]

“It was a beautiful speech, anyway, Agathon,” said Socrates. “Now take it a little further. Don’t you think that good things are always beautiful as well?”

“I do.”

“Then if Love needs beautiful things, and if all good things are beautiful, he will need good things too.”

“As for me, Socrates,” he said, “I am unable to contradict you. Let it be as you say.”

“Then it’s the truth, my beloved Agathon, that you are unable to contradict,” he said. “It is not hard at all to contradict Socrates.”

Now I’ll let you go. I shall try to go through for [*d*] you the speech about Love I once heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima—a woman who was wise about many things besides this: once she even put off the plague for ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to make. She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I shall go through her speech as best I can on my own, using what Agathon and I have agreed to as a basis.

Following your lead, Agathon, one should first describe who Love is and what he is like, and afterward describe his works—I think it will be easiest for me to proceed the way Diotima did and tell you how she questioned me. [*e*]

You see, I had told her almost the same things Agathon told me just now: that Love is a great god and that he belongs to beautiful things.[49] And she used the very same arguments against me that I used against Agathon; she showed how, according to my very own speech, Love is neither beautiful nor good.

So I said, “What do you mean, Diotima? Is Love ugly, then, and bad?”

But she said, “Watch your tongue! Do you really think that, if [*202a*] a thing is not beautiful, it has to be ugly?”

“I certainly do.”

“And if a thing’s not wise, it’s ignorant? Or haven’t you found out yet that there’s something in between wisdom and ignorance?”

“What’s that?”

“It’s judging things correctly without being able to give a reason. Surely you see that this is not the same as knowing—for how could knowledge be unreasoning? And it’s not ignorance either—for how could what hits the truth be ignorance? Correct judgment, of course, has this character: it is *in between* understanding and ignorance.”

“True,” said I, “as you say.” [*b*]

“Then don’t force whatever is not beautiful to be ugly, or whatever is not good to be bad. It’s the {221} same with Love: when you agree he is neither good nor beautiful, you need not think he is ugly and bad; he could be something in between,” she said.

“Yet everyone agrees he’s a great god,” I said.

“Only those who don’t know?” she said. “Is that how you mean ‘everyone’? Or do you include those who do know?”

“Oh, everyone together.”

And she laughed. “Socrates, how could those who say that [*c*] he’s not a god at all agree that he’s a great god?”

“Who says that?” I asked.

“You, for one,” she said, “and I for another.”

“How can you say this!” I exclaimed.

“That’s easy,” said she. “Tell me, wouldn’t you say that all gods are beautiful and happy? Surely you’d never say a god is not beautiful or happy?”

“Zeus! Not I,” I said.

“Well, by calling anyone ‘happy,’ don’t you mean they possess good and beautiful things?”

[*d*] “Certainly.”

“What about Love? You agreed he needs good and beautiful things, and that’s why he desires them—because he needs them.”

“I certainly did.”

“Then how could he be a god if he has no share in good and beautiful things?”

“There’s no way he could, apparently.”

“Now do you see? You don’t believe Love is a god either!”

“Then, what could Love be?” I asked. “A mortal?”

“Certainly not.”

“Then, what is he?”

“He’s like what we mentioned before,” she said. “He is in between mortal and immortal.”

“What do you mean, Diotima?”

“He’s a great spirit, Socrates. Everything spiritual, you see, is [*e*] in between god and mortal.”

“What is their function?” I asked.

“They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all. Through them all divination passes, through them the art of priests in sacrifice and ritual, in [*203a*] enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery. Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead, whether we are awake or asleep. He who is wise in any of these ways is a man of the spirit, but he who is wise in any other way, in a profession or any manual work, is merely a mechanic. These spirits are many and various, then, and one of them is Love.”

“Who are his father and mother?” I asked. [*b*]

“That’s rather a long story,” she said. “I’ll tell it to you, all the same.”

“When Aphrodite was born, the gods held a celebration. Poros, the son of Metis, was there among them.[50] When they had feasted, Penia came begging, as poverty does when there’s a party, and stayed by the gates. Now Poros got drunk on nectar (there was no wine yet, you see) and, feeling drowsy, went into the garden of Zeus, where he fell asleep. Then Penia schemed up a plan to relieve [*c*] her lack of resources: she would get a child from Poros. So she lay beside him and got pregnant with Love. That is why Love was born to follow Aphrodite and serve her: because he was

conceived on the day of her birth. And that's why he is also by nature a lover of beauty, because Aphrodite herself is especially beautiful.

"As the son of Poros and Penia, his lot in life is set to be like theirs. In the first place, he is always poor, and he's far from being delicate and beautiful (as ordinary people think he is); [*d*] instead, he is tough and shriveled and shoeless and homeless, always lying on the dirt without a bed, sleeping at people's doorsteps and in roadsides under the sky, having his mother's nature, always living with Need. But on his father's side he is a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter, always weaving snares, resourceful in his pursuit of intelligence, a lover of wisdom through all his life, a genius with enchantments, potions, and clever pleadings. [*e*]

"He is by nature neither immortal nor mortal. But now he springs to life when he gets his way; {222} now he dies—all in the very same day. Because he is his father's son, however, he keeps coming back to life, but then anything he finds his way to always slips away, and for this reason Love is never completely without resources, nor is he ever rich.

"He is in between wisdom and ignorance as well. In fact, you [*204a*] see, none of the gods loves wisdom or wants to become wise—for they are wise—and no one else who is wise already loves wisdom; on the other hand, no one who is ignorant will love wisdom either or want to become wise. For what's especially difficult about being ignorant is that you are content with yourself, even though you're neither beautiful and good nor intelligent. If you don't think you need anything, of course you won't want what you don't think you need."

"In that case, Diotima, who *are* the people who love wisdom, if they are neither wise nor ignorant?" [*b*]

"That's obvious," she said. "A child could tell you. Those who love wisdom fall in between those two extremes. And Love is one of them, because he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It follows that Love *must* be a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise and being ignorant. This, too, comes to him from his parentage, from a father who is wise and resourceful and a mother who is not wise and lacks resource.

"My dear Socrates, that, then, is the nature of the Spirit called Love. Considering what you thought about Love, it's no [*c*] surprise that you were

led into thinking of Love as you did. On the basis of what you say, I conclude that you thought Love was *being loved*, rather than *being a lover*. I think that's why Love struck you as beautiful in every way: because it is what is really beautiful and graceful that deserves to be loved, and this is perfect and highly blessed; but being a lover takes a different form, which I have just described."

So I said, "All right then, my friend. What you say about Love is beautiful, but if you're right, [*d*] what use is Love to human beings?"

"I'll try to teach you that, Socrates, after I finish this. So far I've been explaining the character and the parentage of Love. Now, according to you, he is love for beautiful things. But suppose someone asks us, 'Socrates and Diotima, what is the point of loving beautiful things?'"

"It's clearer this way: 'The lover of beautiful things has a desire; what does he desire?'"

"That they become his own," I said.

"But that answer calls for still another question, that is, 'What will this man have, when the beautiful things he wants have become his own?'"

I said there was no way I could give a ready answer to that [*e*] question.

Then she said, "Suppose someone changes the question, putting 'good' in place of 'beautiful,' and asks you this: 'Tell me, Socrates, a lover of good things has a desire; what does he desire?'"

"That they become his own," I said.

"And what will he have, when the good things he wants have become his own?"

"This time it's easier to come up with the answer," I said. [*205a*] "He'll have happiness."

"That's what makes happy people happy, isn't it—possessing good things. There's no need to ask further, 'What's the point of wanting happiness?' The answer you gave seems to be final."

"True," I said.

"Now this desire for happiness, this kind of love—do you think it is common to all human beings and that everyone wants to have good things forever and ever? What would you say?"

"Just that," I said. "It is common to all."

"Then, Socrates, why don't we say that everyone is in love," [*b*] she asked, "since everyone always loves the same things? Instead, we say some

people are in love and others not; why is that?”

“I wonder about that myself,” I said.

“It’s nothing to wonder about,” she said. “It’s because we divide out a special kind of love, and we refer to it by the word that means the whole —‘love’; and for the other kinds of love we use other words.”

“What do you mean?” I asked.

“Well, you know, for example, that ‘poetry’ has a very wide range, when it is used to mean ‘creativity.’[51] After all, everything that is responsible {223} for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry; and so all the creations of every craft and profession [*c*] are themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a craft is a poet.”

“True.”

“Nevertheless,” she said, “as you also know, these craftsmen are not called poets. We have other words for them, and out of the whole of poetry we have marked off one part, the part the Muses give us with melody and rhythm, and we refer to this by the word that means the whole. For this alone is called ‘poetry,’ and those who practice this part of poetry are called poets.”

[*d*] “True.”

“That’s also how it is with love. The main point is this: every desire for good things or for happiness is ‘the supreme and treacherous love’ in everyone. But those who pursue this along any of its many other ways— through making money, or through the love of sports, or through philosophy —we don’t say that *these* people are in love, and we don’t call them lovers. It’s only when people are devoted exclusively to one special kind of love that we use these words that really belong to the whole of it: ‘love’ and ‘in love’ and ‘lovers.’”

“I am beginning to see your point,” I said.

“Now there is a certain story,” she said, “according to which lovers are those people who seek their other halves. But according to my story, a [*e*] lover does not seek the half or the whole, unless, my friend, it turns out to be good as well. I say this because people are even willing to cut off their own arms and legs if they think they are diseased. I don’t think an individual takes joy in what belongs to him personally unless by ‘belonging to me’ he means ‘good’ and by ‘belonging to another’ he means ‘bad.’

That’s because what everyone loves is really nothing other [*206a*] than the good. Do you disagree?”

“Zeus! Not I,” I said.

“Now, then,” she said. “Can we simply say that people love the good?”

“Yes,” I said.

“But shouldn’t we add that, in loving it, they want the good to be theirs?”

“We should.”

“And not only that,” she said. “They want the good to be theirs forever, don’t they?”

“We should add that too.”

“In a word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever.”

“That’s very true,” I said. [*b*]

“This, then, is the object of love,” she said. “In view of that, how do people pursue it if they are truly in love? What is the real purpose of love? Can you say?”

“If I could, Diotima,” I said, “I wouldn’t be your student, filled with admiration for your wisdom, and trying to learn these very things.”

“Well, I’ll tell you,” she said. “It is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul.”

“It would take divination to figure out what you mean. I can’t.” [*c*]

“Well, I’ll tell you more clearly,” she said. “All of us are pregnant, Socrates, both in body and in soul, and, as soon as we come to a certain age, we naturally desire to give birth. Now no one can possibly give birth in anything ugly; only in something beautiful. That’s because when a man and a woman come together in order to give birth, this is a godly affair. Pregnancy, reproduction—this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do, and it cannot occur in anything that is out of harmony, but ugliness is out of harmony with all that is godly. Beauty, however, [*d*] is in harmony with the divine. Therefore the goddess who presides at childbirth—she’s called Moira or Eilithuia—is really Beauty.[52] That’s why, whenever pregnant animals or persons draw near to beauty, they become gentle and joyfully disposed and give birth and reproduce; but near ugliness they frown and draw back in pain; they turn away and shrink back and do not reproduce, and because they hold on to what they carry inside them, the

labor is painful. This is the source of the great excitement about beauty that comes to anyone who is pregnant and already teeming with life: beauty releases them from [*e*] their great pain. You see, Socrates," she said, "what Love wants is not beauty, as you think it is."

"Well, what is it, then?"

{224} "Reproduction and birth in beauty."

"Maybe," I said.

"Certainly," she said. "Now, why reproduction? It's because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have in place of [*207a*] immortality. A lover must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier was right, that Love wants to possess the good forever. It follows from our argument that Love must desire immortality."

All this she taught me, on those occasions when she spoke on the art of love. And once she asked, "What do you think causes love and desire, Socrates? Don't you see what an awful state a wild animal is in when it wants to reproduce? Footed and [*b*] winged animals alike, all are plagued by the disease of Love. First they are sick for intercourse with each other, then for nurturing their young—for their sake the weakest animals stand ready to do battle against the strongest and even to die for them, and they may be racked with famine in order to feed their young. They would do anything for their sake. Human beings, you'd think, would do this because they understand the reason for it; [*c*] but what causes wild animals to be in such a state of love? Can you say?"

And I said again that I didn't know.

So she said, "How do you think you'll ever master the art of love, if you don't know that?"

"But that's why I came to you, Diotima, as I just said. I knew I needed a teacher. So tell me what causes this, and everything else that belongs to the art of love."

"If you really believe that Love by its nature aims at what we have often agreed it does, then don't be surprised at the answer," [*d*] she said. "For among animals the principle is the same as with us, and mortal nature seeks so far as possible to live forever and be immortal. And this is possible in one way only: by reproduction, because it always leaves behind a new young one in place of the old. Even while each living thing is said to be alive and to be the same—as a person is said to be the same from childhood

till he turns into an old man—even then he never consists of the same things, though he is called the same, but he is always being renewed and in other respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body. And it's not just in his [*e*] body, but in his soul, too, for none of his manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains the same, but some are coming to be in him while others are passing away. And what is still far stranger than that is that not only does one branch of knowledge come to be in us while another passes away and that we are never the same even in respect of [*208a*] our knowledge, but that each single piece of knowledge has the same fate. For what we call *studying* exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but [*b*] because what is departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been. By this device, Socrates," she said, "what is mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or anything else, while the immortal has another way. So don't be surprised if everything naturally values its own offspring, because it is for the sake of immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is Love."

Yet when I heard her speech I was amazed, and spoke: "Well," said I, "Most wise Diotima, is this really the way it is?" [*c*]

And in the manner of a perfect sophist she said, "Be sure of it, Socrates. Look, if you will, at how human beings seek honor. You'd be amazed at their irrationality, if you didn't have in mind what I spoke about and if you hadn't pondered the awful state of love they're in, wanting to become famous and 'to lay up glory immortal forever,' and how they're ready to brave any danger for the sake of this, much more than they are for their children; and they are prepared to spend money, suffer through all sorts of ordeals, and even die for the sake of glory. Do you really think [*d*] that Alcestis would have died for Admetus," she asked, "or that Achilles would have died after Patroclus, or that your Codrus would have died so as to preserve the throne for his sons,[53] if they {225} hadn't expected the memory of their virtue—which we still hold in honor—to be immortal? Far

from it," she said. "I believe that anyone will do anything for the sake of immortal virtue [*e*] and the glorious fame that follows; and the better the people, the more they will do, for they are all in love with immortality.

"Now, some people are pregnant in body, and for this reason turn more to women and pursue love in that way, providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and remembrance and happiness, as they think, for all time to come; [*209a*] while others are pregnant in soul—because there surely *are* those who are even more pregnant in their souls than in their bodies, and these are pregnant with what is fitting for a soul to bear and bring to birth. And what is fitting? Wisdom and the rest of virtue, which all poets beget, as well as all the craftsmen who are said to be creative. But by far the greatest and most beautiful part of wisdom deals with the proper ordering of cities and households, and that is called temperance and justice. [*b*] When someone has been pregnant with these in his soul from early youth, while he is still a virgin, and, having arrived at the proper age, desires to beget and give birth, he too will certainly go about seeking the beauty in which he would beget; for he will never beget in anything ugly. Since he is pregnant, then, he is much more drawn to bodies that are beautiful than to those that are ugly; and if he also has the luck to find a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed, he is even more drawn to this combination; such a man makes him instantly teem with ideas [*c*] and arguments about virtue—the qualities a virtuous man should have and the customary activities in which he should engage; and so he tries to educate him. In my view, you see, when he makes contact with someone beautiful and keeps company with him, he conceives and gives birth to what he has been carrying inside him for ages. And whether they are together or apart, he remembers that beauty. And in common with him he nurtures the newborn; such people, therefore, have much more to share than do the parents of human children, and have a firmer bond of friendship, because the children in whom they have a share are more beautiful and more immortal. Everyone would rather have such children than human ones, and would [*d*] look up to Homer, Hesiod, and the other good poets with envy and admiration for the offspring they have left behind—offspring, which, because they are immortal themselves, provide their parents with immortal glory and remembrance. For example," she said, "those are the sort of

children Lycurgus[54] left behind in Sparta as the saviors of Sparta and virtually all of Greece. Among you the honor goes to Solon[55] for his creation of your laws. Other men in other places everywhere, Greek or [*e*] barbarian, have brought a host of beautiful deeds into the light and begotten every kind of virtue. Already many shrines have sprung up to honor them for their immortal children, which hasn't happened yet to anyone for human offspring.

"Even you, Socrates, could probably come to be initiated into these rites of love. But as for the purpose of these rites when [*210a*] they are done correctly—that is the final and highest mystery, and I don't know if you are capable of it. I myself will tell you," she said, "and I won't stint any effort. And you must try to follow if you can.

"A lover who goes about this matter correctly must begin in his youth to devote himself to beautiful bodies. First, if the leader leads aright, he should love one body and beget beautiful ideas there; then he should realize that the beauty of any one body is brother to the beauty of any other and that if he is to [*b*] pursue beauty of form he'd be very foolish not to think that the beauty of all bodies is one and the same. When he grasps this, he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies, and he must think that this wild gaping after just one body is a small thing and despise it.

"After this he must think that the beauty of people's souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies, so that if someone is decent in his soul, even though he is scarcely blooming in his [*c*] body, our lover must be content to love and care for him and to seek to give birth to such ideas as {226} will make young men better. The result is that our lover will be forced to gaze at the beauty of activities and laws and to see that all this is akin to itself, with the result that he will think that the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance. After customs he must move on to various kinds of knowledge. The result is that he will see the beauty of [*d*] knowledge and be looking mainly not at beauty in a single example—as a servant would who favored the beauty of a little boy or a man or a single custom (being a slave, of course, he's low and small-minded)—but the lover is turned to the great sea of beauty, and, gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom,[56] [*e*] until, having grown

and been strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge, and it is the knowledge of such beauty. . . .

"Try to pay attention to me," she said, "as best you can. You see, the man who has been thus far guided in matters of Love, who has beheld beautiful things in the right order and correctly, is coming now to the goal of Loving: all of a sudden he will catch sight of something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, [*211a*] Socrates, is the reason for all his earlier labors: "First, it always *is* and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in relation to another; nor is it beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others. Nor will the beautiful appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the body. It will not appear to him as one idea or one kind of knowledge. It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything [*b*] else, but itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form; and all the other beautiful things share in that, in such a way that when those others come to be or pass away, this does not become the least bit smaller or greater nor suffer any change. So when someone rises by these stages, through loving boys correctly, and begins to see this beauty, he has almost grasped his goal. This is what it is to go aright, or be led by another, into the mystery of [*c*] Love: one goes always upward for the sake of this Beauty, starting out from beautiful things and using them like rising stairs: from one body to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, then from beautiful bodies to beautiful customs, and from customs to learning beautiful things, and from these lessons he arrives in the end at this lesson, which is learning of this very Beauty, so that in the end he comes to know just what it is to be beautiful. [*d*]

"And there in life, Socrates, my friend," said the woman from Mantinea, "there if anywhere should a person live his life, beholding that Beauty. If you once see that, it won't occur to you to measure beauty by gold or clothing or beautiful boys and youths—who, if you see them now, strike you out of your senses, and make you, you and many others, eager to be with the boys you love and look at them forever, if there were any way to do that, forgetting food and drink, everything but looking at them and being with them. But how would it be, in our view," she said, "if someone got to

see the Beautiful itself, absolute, [ ] pure, unmixed, not polluted by human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of mortality, but if he could see the divine Beauty itself in its one form? Do you think it would be a poor life [*212a*] for a human being to look there and to behold it by that which he ought, and to be with it? Or haven't you remembered," she said, "that in that life alone, when he looks at Beauty in the only way that Beauty can be seen—only then will it become possible for him to give birth not to images of virtue (because he's in touch with no images), but to true virtue (because he is in touch with the true Beauty). The love of the gods belongs to anyone who has given birth to true virtue and nourished it, and if any [*b*] human being could become immortal, it would be he."

This, Phaedrus and the rest of you, was what Diotima told me. I was persuaded. And once persuaded, I try to persuade others too that human nature can find no better workmate for acquiring this than Love. That's why I say that every man must honor Love, why I honor the rites of Love {227} myself and practice them with special diligence, and why I commend them to others. Now and always I praise the power and courage of Love so far as I am able. [*c*] Consider this speech, then, Phaedrus, if you wish, a speech in praise of Love. Or if not, call it whatever and however you please to call it.

Socrates' speech finished to loud applause. Meanwhile, Aristophanes was trying to make himself heard over their cheers in order to make a response to something Socrates had said about his own speech. Then, all of a sudden, there was even more noise. A large drunken party had arrived at the courtyard door and they were rattling it loudly, accompanied by the shrieks of some flute-girl they had brought along. Agathon at that point called to his slaves: "Go see who it is. If it's people we know, invite them in. If not, tell them the party's over, and we're about to turn in." [*d*]

A moment later they heard Alcibiades[57] shouting in the courtyard, very drunk and very loud. He wanted to know where Agathon was, he demanded to see Agathon at once. Actually, he was half-carried into the house by the flute-girl and by some other companions of his, but, at the door, he managed to stand [*e*] by himself, crowned with a beautiful wreath of violets and ivy and ribbons in his hair.

“Good evening, gentlemen. I’m plastered,” he announced. “May I join your party? Or should I crown Agathon with this wreath—which is all I came to do, anyway—and make myself scarce? I really couldn’t make it yesterday,” he continued, “but nothing could stop me tonight! See, I’m wearing the garland myself. I want this crown to come directly from my head to the head that belongs, I don’t mind saying, to the cleverest and best looking man in town. Ah, you laugh; you think I’m drunk! Fine, [*213a*] go ahead—I know I’m right anyway. Well, what do you say? May I join you on these terms? Will you have a drink with me or not?”

Naturally they all made a big fuss. They implored him to join them, they begged him to take a seat, and Agathon called him to his side. So Alcibiades, again with the help of his friends, approached Agathon. At the same time, he kept trying to take his ribbons off so that he could crown Agathon with them, but all he succeeded in doing was to push them further down his head until they finally slipped over his eyes. What with the ivy and all, he didn’t see Socrates, who had made room for him on the couch as soon as he saw him. [*b*] So Alcibiades sat down between Socrates and Agathon and, as soon as he did so, he put his arms around Agathon, kissed him, and placed the ribbons on his head.

Agathon asked his slaves to take Alcibiades’ sandals off. “We can all three fit on my couch,” he said.

“What a good idea!” Alcibiades replied. “But wait a moment! Who’s the third?”

As he said this, he turned around, and it was only then that he saw Socrates. No sooner had he seen him than he leaped up and cried: “Good lord, what’s going on here? It’s [*c*] Socrates! You’ve trapped me again! You always do this to me—all of a sudden you’ll turn up out of nowhere where I least expect you! Well, what do you want now? Why did you choose this particular couch? Why aren’t you with Aristophanes or anyone else we could tease you about? But no, you figured out a way to find a place next to the most handsome man in the room!”

“I beg you, Agathon,” Socrates said, “protect me from this [*d*] man! You can’t imagine what it’s like to be in love with him: from the very first moment he realized how I felt about him, he hasn’t allowed me to say two words to anybody {228} else—what am I saying, I can’t so much as look at an attractive man but he flies into a fit of jealous rage. He yells; he

threatens; he can hardly keep from slapping me around! Please, try to keep him under control. Could you perhaps make him forgive me? And if you can't, if he gets violent, will you defend me? The fierceness of his passion terrifies me!"

"I shall never forgive you!" Alcibiades cried. "I promise you, you'll pay for this! But for the moment," he said, turning to [*e*] Agathon, "give me some of these ribbons. I'd better make a wreath for him as well—look at that magnificent head! Otherwise, I know, he'll make a scene. He'll be grumbling that, though I crowned you for your first victory, I didn't honor him even though he has never lost an argument in his life."

So Alcibiades took the ribbons, arranged them on Socrates' head, and lay back on the couch. Immediately, however, he started up again: "Friends, you look sober to me; we can't have that! Let's have a drink! Remember our agreement? We need a master of ceremonies; who should it be? . . . Well, at least till you are all too drunk to care, I elect . . . myself! Who else? Agathon, I want the largest cup around. . . . No! Wait! You! Bring me that cooling jar over there!" [*214a*]

He'd seen the cooling jar, and he realized it could hold more than two quarts of wine. He had the slaves fill it to the brim, drained it, and ordered them to fill it up again for Socrates.

"Not that the trick will have any effect on *him*," he told the group. "Socrates will drink whatever you put in front of him, but no one yet has seen him drunk."

The slave filled the jar and, while Socrates was drinking, Eryximachus said to Alcibiades:

"This is certainly most improper. We cannot simply pour the [*b*] wine down our throats in silence: we must have some conversation, or at least a song. What we are doing now is hardly civilized."

What Alcibiades said to him was this:

"O Eryximachus, best possible son to the best possible, the most temperate father: Hi!"

"Greetings to you, too," Eryximachus replied. "Now what do you suggest we do?"

"Whatever you say. Ours to obey you, 'For a medical mind is worth a million others.'[58] Please prescribe what you think fit."

“Listen to me,” Eryximachus said. “Earlier this evening we decided to use this occasion to offer a series of encomia of Love. [*c*] We all took our turn —in good order, from left to right—and gave our speeches, each according to his ability. You are the only one not to have spoken yet, though, if I may say so, you have certainly drunk your share. It’s only proper, therefore, that you take your turn now. After you have spoken, you can decide on a topic for Socrates on your right; he can then do the same for the man to his right, and we can go around the table once again.”

“Well said, O Eryximachus,” Alcibiades replied. “But do you really think it’s fair to put my drunken ramblings next to your sober orations? And anyway, my dear fellow, I hope you didn’t [*d*] believe a single word Socrates said: the truth is just the opposite! He’s the one who will most surely beat me up if I dare praise anyone else in his presence—even a god!”

“Hold your tongue!” Socrates said.

“By god, don’t you dare deny it!” Alcibiades shouted. “I would never—*never*—praise anyone else with you around.”

“Well, why not just do that, if you want?” Eryximachus [*e*] suggested. “Why don’t you offer an encomium to Socrates?”

“What do you mean?” asked Alcibiades. “Do you really think so, Eryximachus? Should I unleash myself upon him? Should I give him his punishment in front of all of you?”

“Now, wait a minute,” Socrates said. “What do you have in mind? Are you going to praise me only in order to mock me? Is that it?”

“I’ll only tell the truth—please, let me!”

“I would certainly like to hear the truth from you. By all means, go ahead,” Socrates replied.

“Nothing can stop me now,” said Alcibiades. “But here’s what you can do: if I say anything that’s not true, you can just interrupt, if you want, and correct me; at worst, there’ll be mistakes in [*215a*] my speech, not lies. But you can’t hold it against me if I don’t get everything in the right order—I’ll say things as they come to mind. It is no easy {229} task for one in my condition to give a smooth and orderly account of your bizarreness!”

I’ll try to praise Socrates, my friends, but I’ll have to use an image. And though he may think I’m trying to make fun of him, I assure you my image is no joke: it aims at the truth. Look at him! Isn’t he just like a statue of

Silenus? You [*b*] know the kind of statue I mean; you'll find them in any shop in town. It's a Silenus sitting, his flute[59] or his pipes in his hands, and it's hollow. It's split right down the middle, and inside it's full of tiny statues of the gods. Now look at him again! Isn't he also just like the satyr Marsyas?[60]

Nobody, not even you, Socrates, can deny that you *look* like them. But the resemblance goes beyond appearance, as you're about to hear.

You are impudent, contemptuous, and vile! No? If you won't admit it, I'll bring witnesses. And you're quite a flute-player, aren't you? In fact, you're much more marvelous than [*c*] Marsyas, who needed instruments to cast his spells on people. And so does anyone who plays his tunes today—for even the tunes Olympus[61] played are Marsyas' work, since Olympus learned everything from him. Whether they are played by the greatest flautist or the meanest flute-girl, his melodies have in themselves the power to possess and so reveal those people who are ready for the god and his mysteries. That's because his melodies are themselves divine. The only difference between you and Marsyas is that you need no instruments; you do exactly [*d*] what he does, but with words alone. You know, people hardly ever take a speaker seriously, even if he's the greatest orator; but let anyone—man, woman, or child—listen to you or even to a poor account of what you say—and we are all transported, completely possessed.

If I were to describe for you what an extraordinary effect his words have always had on me (I can feel it this moment even as [*e*] I'm speaking), you might actually suspect that I'm drunk! Still, I swear to you, the moment he starts to speak, I am beside myself: my heart starts leaping in my chest, the tears come streaming down my face, even the frenzied Corybantes[62] seem sane compared to me—and, let me tell you, I am not alone. I have heard Pericles[63] and many other great orators, and I have admired their speeches. But nothing like this ever happened to me: they never upset me so deeply that my very own soul started protesting that my life—*my* life!—was no better than the most miserable slave's. And yet that is exactly how this Marsyas here at my side makes me feel all the time: he makes it seem that my life isn't worth [*216a*] living! You can't say that isn't true, Socrates. I know very well that you could make me feel that way this very moment if I

gave you half a chance. He always traps me, you see, and he makes me admit that my political career is a waste of time, while all that matters is just what I most neglect: my personal shortcomings, which cry out for the closest attention. So I refuse to listen to him; I stop my ears and tear myself away from him, for, like the Sirens,[64] he could make me stay by his side till I die. [*b*]

Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn't think I had it in me, did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed: I know perfectly well that I can't prove he's wrong when he tells me what I should do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the {230} crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I'm doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. [*c*] Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. And yet I know that if he dies I'll be even more miserable. I can't live with him, and I can't live without him! What *can* I do about him?

That's the effect of this satyr's music—on me and many others. But that's the least of it. He's like these creatures in all sorts of other ways; his powers are really extraordinary. Let me tell you about them, because, you can be sure of it, none of you really understands him. But, now I've started, I'm going to show [*d*] you what he really is.

To begin with, he's crazy about beautiful boys; he constantly follows them around in a perpetual daze. Also, he likes to say he's ignorant and knows nothing. Isn't this just like Silenus? Of course it is! And all this is just on the surface, like the outsides of those statues of Silenus. I wonder, my fellow drinkers, if you have any idea what a sober and temperate man he proves to be once you have looked inside. Believe me, it couldn't matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You can't imagine how little he [*e*] cares whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or famous in any other way that most people admire. He considers all these possessions beneath contempt, and that's exactly how he considers all of us as well. In public, I tell you, his whole life is one big game—a game of irony. I don't know if any of you have seen him when he's really serious. But I once caught him when he was open like Silenus' statues, and I had a glimpse of the figures he [*217a*]

keeps hidden within: they were so godlike—so bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing—that I no longer had a choice—I just had to do whatever he told me.

What I thought at the time was that what he really wanted was *me*, and that seemed to me the luckiest coincidence: all I had to do was to let him have his way with me, and he would teach me everything he knew—believe me, I had a lot of confidence in my looks. Naturally, up to that time we'd never been alone together; one of my attendants had always been present. But with [*b*] this in mind, I sent the attendant away, and met Socrates alone. (You see, in this company I must tell the whole truth: so pay attention. And, Socrates, if I say anything untrue, I want you to correct me.) So there I was, my friends, alone with him at last. My idea, naturally, was that he'd take advantage of the opportunity to tell me whatever it is that lovers say when they find themselves alone; I relished the moment. But no such luck! Nothing of the sort occurred. Socrates had his usual sort of conversation with [*c*] me, and at the end of the day he went off.

My next idea was to invite him to the gymnasium with me. We took exercise together, and I was sure that this would lead to something. He took exercise and wrestled with me many times when no one else was present. What can I tell you? I got nowhere. When I realized that my ploy had failed, I decided on a frontal attack. I refused to retreat from a battle I myself had begun, and I needed to know just where matters stood. So what I did was to invite him to dinner, as if *I* were his lover and he my young prey! To tell the truth, it took him quite a while to accept my invitation, but one day he finally arrived. That first time he [*d*] left right after dinner: I was too shy to try to stop him. But on my next attempt, I started some discussion just as we were finishing our meal and kept him talking late into the night. When he said he should be going, I used the lateness of the hour as an excuse and managed to persuade him to spend the night at my house. He had had his meal on the couch next to mine, so he just made himself comfortable and lay down on it. No one else was there. [*e*]

Now you must admit that my story so far has been perfectly decent; I could have told it in any company. But you'd never have heard me tell the rest of it, as you're about to do, if it weren't that, as the saying goes, "there's truth in wine when the slaves have left"—and when they're present, too. Also, would it be fair to Socrates for me to praise him and yet

to fail to reveal one of his proudest accomplishments? And, furthermore, you know what people say about snakebite—that you'll only talk about it with your fellow victims: only {231} they will understand the pain and forgive [*218a*] you for all the things it made you do. Well, something much more painful than a snake has bitten me in my most sensitive part—I mean my heart, or my soul, or whatever you want to call it, which has been struck and bitten by philosophy, whose grip on young and eager souls is much more vicious than a viper's and makes them do the most amazing things. Now, all you people here, [*b*] Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes—I need not mention Socrates himself—and all the rest, have all shared in the madness, the Bacchic frenzy of philosophy. And that's why you will hear the rest of my story; you will understand and forgive both what I did then and what I say now. As for the house slaves and for anyone else who is not an initiate, my story's not for you: block your ears!

[*c*] To get back to the story. The lights were out; the slaves had left; the time was right, I thought, to come to the point and tell him freely what I had in mind. So I shook him and whispered: "Socrates, are you asleep?"

"No, no, not at all," he replied.

"You know what I've been thinking?"

"Well, no, not really."

"I think," I said, "you're the only worthy lover I have ever had—and yet, look how shy you are with me! Well, here's how I look at it. It would be really stupid not to give you anything you [*d*] want: you can have me, my belongings, anything my friends might have. Nothing is more important to me than becoming the best man I can be, and no one can help me more than you to reach that aim. With a man like you, in fact, I'd be much more ashamed of what wise people would say if I did *not* take you as my lover, than I would of what all the others, in their foolishness, would say if I did."

He heard me out, and then he said in that absolutely inimitable ironic manner of his:

"Dear Alcibiades, if you are right in what you say about me, [*e*] you are already more accomplished than you think. If I really have in me the power to make you a better man, then you can see in me a beauty that is really beyond description and makes your own remarkable good looks pale in comparison. But, then, is this a fair exchange that you propose? You seem

to me to want more than your proper share: you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in return you want the thing itself, ‘gold [*219a*] in exchange for bronze.’[65]

“Still, my dear boy, you should think twice, because you could be wrong, and I may be of no use to you. The mind’s sight becomes sharp only when the body’s eyes go past their prime—and you are still a good long time away from that.”

When I heard this I replied:

“I really have nothing more to say. I’ve told you exactly what I think. Now it’s your turn to consider what you think best for you and me.”

“You’re right about that,” he answered. “In the [*b*] future, let’s consider things together. We’ll always do what seems the best to the two of us.”

His words made me think that my own had finally hit their mark, that he was smitten by my arrows. I didn’t give him a chance to say another word. I stood up immediately and placed my mantle over the light cloak which, though it was the middle of winter, was his only clothing. I slipped underneath the cloak and put my arms around this man—this utterly unnatural, this [*c*] truly extraordinary man—and spent the whole night next to him. Socrates, you can’t deny a word of it. But in spite of all my efforts, this hopelessly arrogant, this unbelievably insolent man—he turned me down! He spurned my beauty, of which I was so proud, members of the jury—for this is really what you are: you’re here to sit in judgment of Socrates’ amazing arrogance and pride. Be sure of it, I swear to you by all the gods and goddesses together, my night with Socrates went no further [*d*] than if I had spent it with my own father or older brother!

How do you think I felt after that? Of course, I was deeply humiliated, but also I couldn’t help admiring his natural character, his temperance, his fortitude—here was a man whose strength and wisdom went beyond my wildest dreams! How could I bring myself to hate him? I couldn’t bear to lose his friendship. But how could I possibly win him over? I knew very [*e*] well that money meant much less to him than enemy weapons {232} ever meant to Ajax,[66] and the only trap by means of which I had thought I might capture him had already proved a dismal failure. I had no idea what to do, no purpose in life; ah, no one else has ever known the real meaning of slavery!

All this had already occurred when Athens invaded Potidaea,[67] where we served together and shared the same mess. Now, first, he took the hardships of the campaign much better than I ever did—much better, in fact, than anyone in the whole army. When we were cut off from our supplies, as often happens [*220a*] in the field, no one else stood up to hunger as well as he did. And yet he was the one man who could really enjoy a feast; and though he didn't much want to drink, when he had to, he could drink the best of us under the table. Still, and most amazingly, no one ever saw him drunk (as we'll straightaway put to the test).

Add to this his amazing resistance to the cold—and, let me [*b*] tell you, the winter there is something awful. Once, I remember, it was frightfully cold; no one so much as stuck his nose outside. If we absolutely had to leave our tent, we wrapped ourselves in anything we could lay our hands on and tied extra pieces of felt or sheepskin over our boots. Well, Socrates went out in that weather wearing nothing but this same old light cloak, and even in bare feet he made better progress on the ice than the other soldiers did in their boots. You should have seen the looks they [*c*] gave him; they thought he was only doing it to spite them!

So much for that! But you should hear what else he did during that same campaign,

> The exploit our strong-hearted hero dared to do.[68]

One day, at dawn, he started thinking about some problem or other; he just stood outside, trying to figure it out. He couldn't resolve it, but he wouldn't give up. He simply stood there, glued to the same spot. By midday, many soldiers had seen him, and, quite mystified, they told everyone that Socrates had been standing there all day, thinking about something. He was still there when evening came, and after dinner some Ionians moved their [*d*] bedding outside, where it was cooler and more comfortable (all this took place in the summer), but mainly in order to watch if Socrates was going to stay out there all night. And so he did; he stood on the very same spot until dawn! He only left next morning, when the sun came out, and he made his prayers to the new day.

And if you would like to know what he was like in battle—this is a tribute he really deserves. You know that I was decorated for bravery during that

campaign: well, during that very battle, Socrates single-handedly saved my life! He absolutely did! [*e*] He just refused to leave me behind when I was wounded, and he rescued not only me but my armor as well. For my part, Socrates, I told them right then that the decoration really belonged to you, and you can blame me neither for doing so then nor for saying so now. But the generals, who seemed much more concerned with my social position, insisted on giving the decoration to me, and, I must say, you were more eager than the generals themselves for me to have it.

You should also have seen him at our horrible retreat from Delium.[69] I was there with the cavalry, while Socrates was a foot [*221a*] soldier. The army had already dispersed in all directions, and Socrates was retreating together with Laches. I happened to see them just by chance, and the moment I did I started shouting encouragements to them, telling them I was never going to leave their side, and so on. That day I had a better opportunity to watch Socrates than I ever had at Potidaea, for, being on horseback, I wasn't in very great danger. Well, it was easy to see that [*b*] he was remarkably more collected than Laches.[70] But when I looked again I couldn't get your words, {233} Aristophanes, out of my mind: in the midst of battle he was making his way exactly as he does around town,

> . . . with swagg'ring gait and roving eye.[71]

He was observing everything quite calmly, looking out for friendly troops and keeping an eye on the enemy. Even from a great distance it was obvious that this was a very brave man, who would put up a terrific fight if anyone approached him. This is what saved both of them. For, as a rule, you try to put as much distance as you can between yourself and such men in [*c*] battle; you go after the others, those who run away helter-skelter.

You could say many other marvelous things in praise of Socrates. Perhaps he shares some of his specific accomplishments with others. But, as a whole, he is unique; he is like no one else in the past and no one in the present—this is by far the most amazing thing about him. For we might be able to form an idea of what Achilles was like by comparing him to Brasidas or some other great warrior, or we might compare Pericles with

Nestor or [*d*] Antenor or one of the other great orators.[72] There is a parallel for everyone—everyone else, that is. But this man here is so bizarre, his ways and his ideas are so unusual, that, search as you might, you'll never find anyone else, alive or dead, who's even remotely like him. The best you can do is not to compare him to anything human, but to liken him, as I do, to Silenus and the satyrs, and the same goes for his ideas and arguments.

Come to think of it, I should have mentioned this much earlier: even his ideas and arguments are just like those hollow statues of [*e*] Silenus. If you were to listen to his arguments, at first they'd strike you as totally ridiculous; they're clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn by the most vulgar satyrs. He's always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he's always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words. If you are foolish, or simply unfamiliar with [*222a*] him, you'd find it impossible not to laugh at his arguments. But if you see them when they open up like the statues, if you go behind their surface, you'll realize that no other arguments make any sense. They're truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures of virtue inside. They're of great—no, of the greatest—importance for anyone who wants to become a truly good man.

Well, gentlemen, this is my praise of Socrates, though I haven't spared him my reproach, either; I told you how horribly he treated [*b*] me—and not only me but also Charmides, Euthydemus,[73] and many others. He has deceived us all: he presents himself as your lover, and, before you know it, you're in love with him yourself! I warn you, Agathon, don't let him fool you! Remember our torments; be on your guard: don't wait, like the fool in the proverb, to learn your lesson from your own misfortune.[74] [*c*]

Alcibiades' frankness provoked a lot of laughter, especially since it was obvious that he was still in love with Socrates, who immediately said to him: "You're perfectly sober after all, Alcibiades. Otherwise you could never have concealed your motive so gracefully: how casually you let it drop, almost like an afterthought, at the very end of your speech! As if the real point of all this has not been simply to [*d*] make trouble between Agathon and me! You think that I should be in love with you and no one else, while you, and no one else, should be in love with Agathon—well, we

were *not* deceived; we've seen through your little satyr play. Agathon, my friend, don't let him get away with it: let no one come between us!"

{234} Agathon said to Socrates:

[*e*] "I'm beginning to think you're right; isn't it proof of that that he literally came between us here on the couch? Why would he do this if he weren't set on separating us? But he won't get away with it; I'm coming right over to lie down next to you."

"Wonderful," Socrates said. "Come here, on my other side."

"My god!" cried Alcibiades. "How I suffer in his hands! He kicks me when I'm down; he never lets me go. Come, don't be selfish, Socrates; at least, let's compromise: let Agathon lie down between us."

"Why, that's impossible," Socrates said. "You have already delivered your praise of me, and now it's my turn to praise whoever's on my right. But if Agathon were next to you, he'd have to praise me all over again instead of having me speak in [*223a*] his honor, as I very much want to do in any case. Don't be jealous; let me praise the boy."

"Oh, marvelous," Agathon cried. "Alcibiades, nothing can make me stay next to you now. I'm moving no matter what. I simply *must* hear what Socrates has to say about me."

"There we go again," said Alcibiades. "It's the same old story: when Socrates is around, nobody else can get close to a good-looking man. Look how smoothly and plausibly he found a reason [*b*] for Agathon to lie down next to him!"

And then, all of a sudden, while Agathon was changing places, a large drunken group, finding the gates open because someone was just leaving, walked into the room and joined the party. There was noise everywhere, and everyone was made to start drinking again in no particular order.

At that point, Aristodemus said, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and some others among the original guests made their excuses and left. He himself fell asleep and slept for a long time (it was [*c*] winter, and the nights were quite long). He woke up just as dawn was about to break; the roosters were crowing already. He saw that the others had either left or were asleep on their couches and that only Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates were still awake, drinking out of a large cup which they were passing around from left to right. Socrates was talking to them. [*d*] Aristodemus couldn't remember exactly what they were saying—he'd missed the first part of their

discussion, and he was half-asleep anyway—but the main point was that Socrates was trying to prove to them that authors should be able to write both comedy and tragedy: the skillful tragic dramatist should also be a comic poet. He was about to clinch his argument, though, to tell the truth, sleepy as they were, they were hardly able to follow his reasoning. In fact, Aristophanes fell asleep in the middle of the discussion, and very soon thereafter, as day was breaking, Agathon also drifted off.

But after getting them off to sleep, Socrates got up and left, and Aristodemus followed him, as always. He said that Socrates went directly to the Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just as he always did, and only then, as evening was falling, went home to rest.

1. See *Apology* 34a.
2. A port town in Attica, southwest of Athens.
3. Agathon was a Greek tragedian.
4. Otherwise unknown.
5. Possibly the father of Charmides (mentioned at 222b), but most likely Plato's brother and Socrates' interlocutor in the *Republic*.
6. Aristodemus is also mentioned as a companion of Socrates in Xenophon, *Memorabilia* i.4, but is otherwise largely unknown. Cydatheneum was a deme (administrative unit) within the walled city of Athens.
7. Agathon's name could be translated as "Goodman." The proverb is, "Good men go uninvited to an inferior man's feast."
8. King of Mycenae. He led the Greek forces in the Trojan War. Menelaus, husband of Helen (whose abduction by Paris caused that war), was Agamemnon's brother.
9. Menelaus calls on Agamemnon at *Iliad* ii.408. Menelaus is called a limp spearman at xvii.587.
10. An allusion to *Iliad* x.224, "When two go together, one has an idea before the other."
11. Eryximachus of Athens, like his father Acumenus before him, was a doctor and friend of Phaedrus (*Phaedrus* 268a).
12. The theater of Dionysus, where Agathon's plays were staged, actually held between ten thousand and twenty thousand.
13. Dionysus was the god of wine and drunkenness.
14. Pausanias of Cerameis (a deme slightly northwest of Athens).
15. See *Apology* 19c note.
16. Socrates' interlocutor in the eponymous *Phaedrus*. He was exiled, as was Alcibiades, accused of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries.
17. See *Apology* 19e note.

18. Goddess of love.
19. *Theogony* 116–20, 118 omitted.
20. Acusilaus was an early-fifth-century writer of genealogies.
21. Parmenides of Elea (fifth-century philosopher), DK B13.
22. Cf. *Iliad* x.482, xv.262; *Odyssey* ix.381.
23. Alcestis was the self-sacrificing wife of Admetus, to whom Apollo gave a chance to live if anyone would go to Hades in his place.
24. Orpheus was a musician of legendary powers, who charmed his way into the underworld in search of his dead wife, Eurydice.
25. Champion of the Greeks in the Trojan War. Patroclus was his friend.
26. In his play, *The Myrmidons*. In Homer there is no hint of sexual attachment between Achilles and Patroclus.
27. Major city of the Peloponnese. Athens' rival in the fifth and fourth centuries.
28. Elis was a city in the northwest Peloponnese; Boeotia, an area in northern Greece.
29. Area on the central northwest coast of Asia Minor where many great settlements were located.
30. Harmodius and Aristogiton attempted to overthrow the tyrant Hippias in 514 BCE. Although their attempt failed, the tyranny fell three years later, and the lovers were celebrated as tyrannicides.
31. *Iliad* ii.71.
32. A mythical figure regarded as the first doctor.
33. Heraclitus of Ephesus, a philosopher of the early fifth century, was known for his enigmatic sayings.
34. Urania and Polyhymnia appear as Muses in Hesiod, *Theogony* 75–79. Eryximachus has made them correspond to Pausanias' Urania and Pandemos.
35. *Iliad* v.385; *Odyssey* xi.305 ff. Ephialtes and Otus were giants.
36. Armorer to the gods. Cf. *Odyssey* viii.266 ff.
37. Arcadia included the city of Mantinea, which opposed Sparta, and was rewarded for this by having its population divided and dispersed in 385 BCE. Aristophanes seems to be referring anachronistically to those events. Such anachronisms are not uncommon in Plato.
38. Cronus was the father of Zeus, who castrated, deposed, and imprisoned him. Iapetus was Cronus' brother.
39. *Iliad* xix.92–93. "Mischief" translates *Atē*.
40. "Moral character": *aretē*, i.e., virtue.
41. A proverbial expression.
42. From Sophocles: "Even Ares cannot withstand Necessity." Ares is the god of war.
43. See *Odyssey* viii.266–366. Aphrodite's husband Hephaestus made a snare that caught Ares in bed with Aphrodite.
44. "Wisdom" translates *sophia* in the first instance; afterward in this passage it is "skill" or "art."
45. Euripides, *Stheneboea*.
46. After these two lines of poetry, Agathon continues with an extremely poetical prose peroration.
47. "Gorgian head" is a pun on "Gorgon's head." In his peroration Agathon had spoken in the style of Gorgias (see *Apology* 19d–e), and this style was considered to be irresistibly powerful. The sight of a Gorgon's head would turn a man to stone.
48. The allusion is to Euripides, *Hippolytus* 612.
49. The Greek is ambiguous between "Love loves beautiful things" and "Love is one of the beautiful things." Agathon had asserted the former (197b, 201a), and this will be a premise in Diotima's argument, but Agathon asserted the latter as well (195a), and this is what Diotima proceeds to refute.

50. *Poros* means “way” or “resource.” *Aporia* (“puzzle”) means not having a way to proceed. Poros’ mother’s name, *Mētis*, means “cunning.” *Penia* means “poverty.”
51. “Poetry” translates *poiēsis*, lit. “making,” which can be used for any kind of production or creation. However, the word *poiētēs*, lit. “maker,” was used mainly for poets.
52. Moira is known mainly as a Fate, but she was also identified with the birth goddess Eilithuia.
53. Codrus was the legendary last king of Athens. He gave his life to satisfy a prophecy that promised victory to Athens if their king was killed by the invading Dorians.
54. Lycurgus was supposed to have been the founder of the oligarchic laws and stern customs of Sparta.
55. Solon (c. 640–560 BCE) was an Athenian statesman and poet and founder of the Athenian constitution.
56. I.e., philosophy.
57. Alcibiades (452–404 BCE) was a controversial Athenian statesman. He was thirty-six in 416 (the dramatic date of Agathon’s party). In 415, during the Peloponnesian War with Sparta, he was appointed joint leader of a daring, perhaps foolhardy, military expedition against Sicily—an expedition he advocated and encouraged before the Athenian Assembly. He was recalled on religious charges, alleged to have mutilated statues of the god Hermes and parodied the secret initiation rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Rather than face these charges, he helped the Spartans against the Athenians. In 407, he rejoined the Athenians. Agents of Persia, with whom the Spartans had allied themselves, assassinated him in 404.
58. *Iliad* xi.514.
59. This is the conventional translation of the word, but the *aulos* was in fact a reed instrument and not a flute. It was held by the ancients to be the instrument that most strongly arouses the emotions.
60. Satyrs had the sexual appetites and manners of wild beasts and were usually portrayed with large erections. Sometimes they had horses’ tails or ears, sometimes the traits of goats. Marsyas, in myth, was a satyr who dared to compete in music with Apollo and was skinned alive for his impudence.
61. Olympus was a legendary musician who was said to be loved by Marsyas and to have made music that drove its listeners out of their senses.
62. The Corybantes were legendary worshipers of Cybele, who brought about their own derangement through music and dance.
63. Pericles (c. 495–429 BCE) was an Athenian statesman, orator, and democratic leader. Alcibiades was his ward.
64. The Sirens were mythical women whose singing led sailors to their deaths. See Homer, *Odyssey* xii.
65. *Iliad* vi.232–36 tells the famous story of the exchange by Glaucus of golden armor for bronze.
66. Ajax, a hero of the Greek army at Troy, carried an enormous shield and so was virtually invulnerable to enemy weapons.
67. Potidaea, a city in Thrace allied to Athens, was induced by Corinth to revolt in 432 BCE. The city was besieged by the Athenians and eventually defeated in a bloody local war, 432–430 BCE.
68. *Odyssey* iv.242, 271.
69. At Delium, a town on the coast just north of Attica, a major Athenian expeditionary force was routed by a Boeotian army in 424 BCE.
70. Well-known Athenian general who died at the battle of Mantinea (418 BCE). He appears in the eponymous *Laches*, which discusses courage.
71. Cf. Aristophanes, *Clouds* 362.
72. Brasidas, among the most effective Spartan generals during the Peloponnesian War, was mortally wounded while defeating the Athenians at Amphipolis in 422 BCE (Thucydides iv.102–16). Antenor

(for the Trojans) and Nestor (for the Greeks) were the legendary wise men of the Trojan War.
73. Charmides was Plato's uncle, a member of Socrates' circle, and a supporter of the oligarchic Thirty Tyrants, who briefly controlled Athens in 404 BCE. He was killed in 303 fighting the counterrevolutionary democrats. Euthydemus (not to be confused with the Sophist of the same name) is unknown outside the various Platonic dialogues (including the *Republic*) in which he is mentioned.
74. Cf. *Iliad* xvii.32.

REPUBLIC[1]

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

BOOK I

ON HIS WAY back from the Piraeus, where he has been attending a religious festival, Socrates meets Polemarchus and goes with him to the house of his father Cephalus (327a–328b). A discussion of what justice is ensues, which begins with a lengthy examination of Polemarchus {235} in which he is forced to abandon a number of views about justice he has adopted along the way (331c–336b). Thrasymachus is irritated by the examination of Polemarchus and demands that Socrates give his own positive account of justice, instead of simply refuting other people's. Socrates claims that he cannot give such an account because he does not know what justice is, and persuades Thrasymachus to give an account in his place (336b–338a). Thrasymachus seems to be refuted but since Glaucon, Adeimantus, and even Socrates himself (345b) are all dissatisfied with the outcome of Book I (358b, 367b), we must wonder how successful Plato himself thought Socrates' refutations of Thrasymachus actually were.

SOCRATES' NARRATION BEGINS: *I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to say a prayer to the goddess, and also [327a]*

because I wanted to see how they would manage the festival, since they were holding it for the first time. I thought the procession of the local residents was beautiful, but the show put on by the Thracians was no less so, in my view. After we had said our prayer and watched the procession, we started back toward town. Then Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, saw us from a distance [b] as we were hurrying homeward, and told his slave boy to run and ask us to wait for him. The boy caught hold of my cloak from behind.

SLAVE: Polemarchus wants you to wait.

I turned around and asked where he was.

SLAVE: He is coming up behind you; please wait for him.

GLAUCON: All right, we will.

Shortly after that, Polemarchus caught up with us. Adeimantus, Glaucon's [c] brother, was with him, and so were Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and some others, all of whom were apparently on their way from the procession.

POLEMARCHUS: It looks to me, Socrates, as if you two are hurrying to get away to town.

SOCRATES: That isn't a bad guess.

POLEMARCHUS: But do you see how many we are?

SOCRATES: Certainly.

POLEMARCHUS: Well, then, either you must prove yourselves stronger than all these people or you will have to stay here.

SOCRATES: Isn't there another alternative still: that we persuade you that you should let us go?

POLEMARCHUS: But could you persuade us, if we won't listen?

GLAUCON: There is no way we could.

POLEMARCHUS: Well, we won't listen; you had [*328a*] better make up your mind to that.

ADEIMANTUS: You mean to say you don't know that there is to be a torch race on horseback for the goddess tonight?

SOCRATES: On horseback? That is something new. Are they going to race on horseback and hand the torches on in relays, or what?

POLEMARCHUS: In relays. And, besides, there will be an all-night celebration that will be worth seeing. We will get up after dinner and go to see the festivities. We will meet lots of young men there and have a discussion. So [*b*] stay and do as we ask.

GLAUCON: It looks as if we will have to stay.

SOCRATES: If you think so, we must.

So, we went to Polemarchus' house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, and what is more, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon[2] *was there too, and Charmantides of Paeania, and Clitophon, the son of Aristonymus. Polemarchus' father, Cephalus, was also inside, and I thought he looked quite old. You see, I hadn't seen him for some time. He [c] was sitting on a sort of chair with cushions and had a wreath on his head, as he had been offering a sacrifice in the courtyard. We sat down beside him, since some chairs were arranged in a circle there. As soon as he saw me, Cephalus greeted me:* Socrates, you don't often come down to the Piraeus to see us. Yet you should. If it were still easy for me to make the trip to town, you wouldn't have to come here. On the contrary, we would come to you. But as it is, [*d*] you ought to come here more often. I want you to know, you see, that in my case at least, as the other pleasures—the bodily ones—wither away, my appetites for discussions and their pleasures grow stronger. So please do as I ask: have your conversation with {236} these young men, and stay here with us, as you would with your close friends and relatives.

SOCRATES: I certainly will, Cephalus. In fact, I enjoy engaging in discussion [*e*] with the very old. I think we should learn from them—since they are like people who have traveled a road that we too will probably have to follow—what the road is like, whether rough and difficult or smooth and easy. And I would be particularly glad to find out from you what you think about it, since you have reached the point in life the poets call old age's threshold. Is it a difficult time of life? What have you to report about it?

CEPHALUS: By Zeus, Socrates, I will tell you exactly what I think. You see, [*329a*] a number of us who are more or less the same age often get together, so as to preserve the old saying.[3] When they meet, the majority of our members lament, longing for the lost pleasures of their youth and reminiscing about sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the other things that go along with them. They get irritated, as if they had been deprived of very great things, and had lived well then but are not living now. Some others, too, even moan about the abuse heaped on old people by their relatives, and

for *that* reason [*b*] recite a litany of all the evils old age has caused them. But I don't think they blame the real cause, Socrates. After all, if that were the cause, I too would have had the same experiences, at least as far as old age is concerned, and so would everyone else of my age. But as it is, I have met others in the past who don't feel that way—in particular, the poet Sophocles. I was once present when he was asked by someone, "How are you as far as sex goes, Sophocles? Can you still make love to a woman?" "Quiet, man," he replied, [*c*] "I am very glad to have escaped from all that, like a slave who has escaped from a deranged and savage master." I thought at the time what he said was sensible, and I still do. You see, old age brings peace and freedom from all such things. When the appetites cease to stress and importune us, everything Sophocles said comes to pass, and we escape from many insane masters. But in these matters, and in those concerning one's relatives, the real [*d*] cause isn't old age, Socrates, but the way people live. If they are orderly and contented, old age, too, is only moderately onerous; if they aren't, both old age, Socrates, *and* youth are hard to bear.

I admired him for saying that, and I wanted him to tell me more, so I urged him on.

I imagine when you say that, Cephalus, the masses do not accept it. On [*e*] the contrary, they think you bear old age more easily, not because of the way you live, but because you are wealthy. For the wealthy, they say, have many consolations.

CEPHALUS: That's true, they are not convinced. And there is something in their objection, though not as much as they think. Themistocles' retort is relevant here. When someone from Seriphus insulted him by saying his high reputation was due to his city, not to himself, he replied that, had he [*330a*] been a Seriphian, he would not be famous; but nor would the other, had he been an Athenian. The same account applies to those who are not rich and find old age hard to bear: a good person would not easily bear old age if it were coupled with poverty, but one who wasn't good would not be contented even if he were wealthy.

SOCRATES: Did you inherit most of your wealth, Cephalus, or did you make it yourself?

CEPHALUS: What did I make for myself, Socrates, you ask. As a moneymaker [*b*] I am in between my grandfather and my father. You see, my grandfather and namesake inherited about the same amount of wealth as

I possess and multiplied it many times. However, my father, Lysanias, diminished that amount to even less than I have now. As for me, I am satisfied to leave my sons here no less, but a little more, than I inherited.

SOCRATES: The reason I asked is that you do not seem particularly to love [*c*] money. And those who have not made it themselves are usually like that. But those who have made it themselves love it twice as much as anyone else. For just as poets love their poems and fathers their children, so those who have made money take their money seriously both as something they have made themselves and—just as other people do—because it is useful. This makes them difficult even to be with, since they are unwilling to praise anything except money.

{237} CEPHALUS: That's true.

[*d*] SOCRATES: Indeed, it is. But tell me something else. What do you think is the greatest good you have enjoyed as a result of being very wealthy?

CEPHALUS: What I have to say probably would not persuade the masses. But you are well aware, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he did not fear before. It is then that the stories told about Hades, that a person who has been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—twist [*e*] his soul this way and that for fear they are true. And whether because of the weakness of old age, or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and begins to calculate and consider whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he often even awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of evils [*331a*] to come. But someone who knows he has not been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion—a nurse to his old age, as Pindar says. For he puts it charmingly, Socrates, when he says that when someone lives a just and pious life, Sweet hope is in his heart

> Nurse and companion to his age
>
> Hope, captain of the ever-twisting
>
> Mind of mortal men.

How amazingly well he puts that. It is in this connection I would say the possession of wealth is most valuable, not for every man, but for a good and orderly one. Not cheating someone even unintentionally, not lying to him, [*b*] not owing a sacrifice to some god or money to a person, and as a result departing for that other place in fear—the possession of wealth makes no small contribution to this. It has many other uses, too, but putting one thing against the other, Socrates, I would say that for a man with any sense, that is how wealth is most useful.

SOCRATES: A fine sentiment, Cephalus. But speaking of that thing itself, justice, are we to say it is simply speaking the truth and paying whatever [*c*] debts one has incurred? Or is it sometimes just to do these things, sometimes unjust? I mean this sort of thing, for example: everyone would surely agree that if a man borrows weapons from a sane friend, and if he goes mad and asks for them back, the friend should not return them, and would not be just if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone in such a state.

CEPHALUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then the following is not the definition [*d*] of justice: to speak the truth and repay what one has borrowed. Polemarchus interrupted: It certainly is, Socrates, if indeed we are to trust Simonides at all.

CEPHALUS: Well, then, I will hand over the discussion to you, since it is time for me to look after the sacrifices.

POLEMARCHUS: Am I, Polemarchus, not heir of all your possessions?

Cephalus replied with a laugh:

Certainly.

And off he went to the sacrifice.

SOCRATES: Then tell us, heir to the discussion, just what Simonides said [*e*] about justice that you think is correct.

POLEMARCHUS: He said it is just to give to each what is owed to him. And a fine saying it is, in my view.

SOCRATES: Well, now, it is not easy to disagree with Simonides, since he is a wise and godlike man. But what exactly does he mean? Perhaps you know, Polemarchus, but I do not understand. Clearly, he does not mean what we said a moment ago—namely, giving back to someone whatever he has lent to you, even if he is out of his mind when he asks for it. And yet

[*332a*] what he has lent to you is surely something that is owed to him, isn't it?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But when he is out of his mind, it is, under no circumstances, to be given to him?

POLEMARCHUS: True.

SOCRATES: Then it seems Simonides must have meant something else when he says that to return what is owed is just.

{238} POLEMARCHUS: Something else indeed, by Zeus! He meant friends owe something good to their friends, never something bad.

SOCRATES: I understand. You mean someone does not give a lender what he is owed by giving him gold, when the giving and taking would be [*b*] harmful, and both he and the lender are friends. Isn't that what you say Simonides meant?

POLEMARCHUS: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Now what about this? Should one also give to one's enemies whatever is owed to them?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes, by all means. What is *in fact* owed to them. And what an enemy owes an enemy, in my view, is also precisely what is appropriate —something bad.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, Simonides was speaking in riddles—just like a [*c*] poet!—when he said what justice is. For what he meant, it seems, is that it is just to give to each *what is appropriate to him*, and this is what he called giving him *what he is owed*.

POLEMARCHUS: What else did you think he meant?

SOCRATES: Then what, in the name of Zeus, do you think he would answer if someone asked him: "Simonides, what owed or appropriate things does the craft we call medicine give, and to which things?"

POLEMARCHUS: Clearly, he would say it gives drugs, food, and drink to bodies.

SOCRATES: And what owed or appropriate things does the craft we call cooking give, and to which things?

[*d*] POLEMARCHUS: It gives pleasant flavors to food.

SOCRATES: Good. Now what does the craft we would call justice give, and to whom or what does it give it?

POLEMARCHUS: If we are to follow the previous answers, Socrates, it gives benefit to friends and harm to enemies.

SOCRATES: Does Simonides mean, then, that treating friends well and enemies badly is justice?

POLEMARCHUS: I believe so.

SOCRATES: And who is most capable of treating sick friends well and enemies badly in matters of disease and health?

POLEMARCHUS: A doctor.

SOCRATES: And who can do so best in a storm at sea? [*e*]

POLEMARCHUS: A ship's captain.

SOCRATES: What about the just person? In what actions and what work is he most capable of benefiting friends and harming enemies?

POLEMARCHUS: In wars and alliances, I imagine.

SOCRATES: All right. Now when people are not sick, Polemarchus, a doctor is useless to them.

POLEMARCHUS: True.

SOCRATES: And so is a ship's captain to those who are not sailing?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So to people who are not at war, a just man is useless?

POLEMARCHUS: No, I don't think that at all.

SOCRATES: So justice is also useful in peacetime?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes, it is useful. [*333a*]

SOCRATES: And so is farming, isn't it?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: For providing produce?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And shoemaking as well, of course?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: For the acquisition of shoes, I suppose you would say?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Tell me, then, what is justice useful for using or acquiring in peacetime?

POLEMARCHUS: Contracts, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And by contracts you mean partnerships, or what?

POLEMARCHUS: Partnerships, of course.

SOCRATES: So is it a just man who is a good [*b*] and useful partner in a game of checkers, or an expert checkers player?

POLEMARCHUS: An expert checkers player.

SOCRATES: And in laying bricks and stones, is a just person a better and more useful partner than a builder?

POLEMARCHUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Well, in what kind of partnership, then, is a just person a better partner than a builder or a lyre player, in the way a lyre player is better than a just person at hitting the right notes?

{239} POLEMARCHUS: In money matters, I think.

SOCRATES: Except, I presume, Polemarchus, in using money. You see, whenever one needs to buy or sell a horse jointly, I think a horse breeder is [*c*] a more useful partner. Isn't he?

POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And when it is a boat, a boat builder or a ship's captain?

POLEMARCHUS: It would seem so.

SOCRATES: In what joint use of silver or gold, then, is a just person a more useful partner than anyone else?

POLEMARCHUS: When yours must be deposited for safekeeping, Socrates.

SOCRATES: You mean whenever there is no need to use it, but only to keep it?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So when money is not being used, that is when justice is useful [*d*] for it?

POLEMARCHUS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: And when one needs to keep a pruning knife safe, justice is useful both in partnerships and for the individual. When you need to use it, however, it is the craft of vine pruning that is useful?

POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And would you also say that when one needs to keep a shield and a lyre safe and not use them, justice is a useful thing, but when you need to use them it is the soldier's craft or the musician's that is useful?

POLEMARCHUS: I would have to.

SOCRATES: And so in all other cases, too, justice is useless when they are in use, but useful when they are not?

POLEMARCHUS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: Then justice cannot be something excellent, can it, my friend, [*e*] if it is only useful for useless things. But let's consider the following point. Isn't the person who is cleverest at landing a blow, whether in boxing or any other kind of fight, also cleverest at guarding against it?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the one who is clever at guarding against disease is also cleverest at producing it unnoticed?

POLEMARCHUS: That is my view, at any rate.

SOCRATES: And the one who is a good guardian of an army is the very [*334a*] one who can steal the enemy's plans and dispositions?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So whenever someone is a clever guardian of something, he is also clever at stealing it.

POLEMARCHUS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: So if a just person is clever at guarding money, he must also be clever at stealing it.

POLEMARCHUS: So the argument suggests, at least.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that a just person has turned out to be a kind of thief. You probably got that idea from Homer. For he loves Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, whom he describes as better than everyone [*b*] at stealing and swearing false oaths.[4] According to you, Homer, and Simonides, then, justice seems to be some sort of craft of stealing—one that benefits friends and harms enemies. Isn't that what you meant?

POLEMARCHUS: No, by Zeus, it isn't. But I do not know anymore what I meant. I still believe this, however, that benefiting one's friends and harming one's enemies is justice.

SOCRATES: Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be [*c*] good and useful, or those who actually are good and useful, even if he does not believe they are, and similarly with enemies?

POLEMARCHUS: Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad.

SOCRATES: But don't people make mistakes about this, so that lots of those who seem to them to be good and useful aren't, and vice versa?

POLEMARCHUS: They do.

SOCRATES: So, for them, good people are enemies and bad ones friends?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: All the same, it is then just for them to benefit bad people and [*d*] harm good ones?

POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Yet good people are just and are not the sort to do injustice.

POLEMARCHUS: True.

{240} SOCRATES: According to your account, then, it is just to do bad things to those who do no injustice.

POLEMARCHUS: Not at all, Socrates. It is *my account* that seems to be bad.

SOCRATES: It is just, then, is it, to harm unjust people and benefit just ones?

POLEMARCHUS: That seems better than the other view.

SOCRATES: Then it follows, Polemarchus, that it is just for many people—the [*e*] ones who are mistaken in their judgment—to harm their friends, since they are bad for them, and benefit their enemies, since they are good. And so we will find ourselves claiming the very opposite of what we said Simonides meant.

POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that certainly follows. But let's change our definition. For it looks as though we did not define friends and enemies correctly.

SOCRATES: How did we define them, Polemarchus?

POLEMARCHUS: We said that a friend is someone who is believed to be good.

SOCRATES: And how are we to change that now?

POLEMARCHUS: Someone who is both believed to be good and is good is a friend; someone who is believed to be good, but is not, is believed to be a [*335a*] friend but is not. And the same goes for enemies.

SOCRATES: According to that account, then, a good person will be a friend and a bad one an enemy.

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So you want us to add something to what we said before about the just man. Then we said that it is just to treat friends well and enemies badly. Now you want us to add to this: to treat a friend well, *provided he is good*, and to harm an enemy, *provided he is bad*?

[*b*] POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that seems well put to me.

SOCRATES: Should a just man really harm anyone whatsoever?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course. He should harm those who are both bad and enemies.

SOCRATES: When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse?

POLEMARCHUS: Worse.

SOCRATES: With respect to the virtue that makes dogs good, or to the one that makes horses good?

POLEMARCHUS: With respect to the one that makes horses good.

SOCRATES: And when dogs are harmed, they become worse with respect to the virtue that makes dogs, not horses, good?

POLEMARCHUS: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: And what about human beings, comrade; shouldn't we say that, when they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue? [*c*]

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But isn't justice human virtue?

POLEMARCHUS: Yes, that's necessarily so, too.

SOCRATES: Then, my dear Polemarchus, people who have been harmed are bound to become more unjust.

POLEMARCHUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Now, can musicians use music to make people unmusical?

POLEMARCHUS: No, they can't.

SOCRATES: Or can horsemen use horsemanship to make people unhorsemanlike?

POLEMARCHUS: No.

SOCRATES: Well, then, can just people use justice to make people unjust? In a word, can good people use their virtue or goodness to make people bad? [*d*]

POLEMARCHUS: No, they can't.

SOCRATES: For it isn't the function of heat to cool things down, I imagine, but that of its opposite.

POLEMARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Nor the function of dryness to make things wet, but that of its opposite.

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So the function of a good person isn't to harm, but that of his opposite.

POLEMARCHUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And a just person is a good person?

POLEMARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So it isn't the function of a just person to harm a friend or anyone else, Polemarchus, but that of his opposite, an unjust person.

POLEMARCHUS: I think you are absolutely right, Socrates.

{241 } [*e*] SOCRATES: So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his friends, the one who says it is not wise. I mean, what he says is not true. For it has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone.

POLEMARCHUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: You and I will fight as partners, then, against anyone who tells us that Simonides, Bias, Pittacus, or any of our other wise and blessedly happy men said this.

POLEMARCHUS: I, for my part, am willing to be your partner in the battle.

[*336a*] SOCRATES: Do you know whose saying I think it is, that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies?

POLEMARCHUS: Whose?

SOCRATES: I think it is a saying of Periander, or Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Thebes, or some other wealthy man who thought he had great power.

POLEMARCHUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: All right. Since it has become apparent, then, that neither justice nor the just consists in benefiting friends and harming enemies, what else should one say it is?

Now, while we were speaking, Thrasymachus had tried many times to take [b] over the discussion but was restrained by those sitting near him, who wanted to hear our argument to the end. When we paused after what I had just said, however, he could not keep quiet any longer: crouched up like a wild beast about to spring, he hurled himself at us as if to tear us to pieces. Polemarchus and I were frightened and flustered as he roared into our midst: What nonsense you two have been talking all this time, Socrates! Why do you act like naïve people, giving way to one another? If you really want to [*c*] know what justice is, don't just ask questions and then indulge your love of honor by refuting the answers. You know very well it is easier to ask questions than to answer them. Give an answer yourself and tell us

what *you* say the just is. And don't tell me it is the right, the beneficial, the profitable, the [*d*] gainful, or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and exactly what you mean. For I won't accept such nonsense from you.

His words startled me and, looking at him, I was afraid. And I think if I had not seen him before he looked at me, I would have been dumbstruck.[5] *But as it was, I happened to look at him just as he began to be exasperated by our argument, so I was able to answer; and trembling a little, I said:* [*e*]

Do not be too hard on us, Thrasymachus. If Polemarchus and I made an error in our investigation of the accounts, you may be sure we did so involuntarily. If we were searching for gold, we would never voluntarily give way to each other, if by doing so we would destroy our chance of finding it. So do not think that in searching for justice, a thing more honorable than a large quantity of gold, we would foolishly give way to one another or be less than completely serious about finding it. You surely must not think that, my friend, but rather—as I do—that we are incapable of finding it. Hence it is surely far more appropriate for us to be pitied by you clever people than to be given rough treatment. [*337a*]

When he heard that, he gave a loud sarcastic laugh:

By Heracles! That is Socrates' usual irony for you! I knew this would happen. I even told these others earlier that you would be unwilling to answer, that you would be ironic and do anything rather than give an answer, if someone questioned *you*.

SOCRATES: That is because you are a wise fellow, Thrasymachus. You knew very well if you ask someone how much twelve is, and in putting the question you warn him, "Don't tell me, man, that twelve is twice six, or [*b*] three times four, or six times two, or four times three; for I won't accept such nonsense from you"—it was obvious to you, I imagine, that no one could respond to a person who inquired in that way. But suppose he said to you: "What do you mean, Thrasymachus; am I not to give any of the answers you mention, not even if twelve happens to be one of those things? You are amazing. Do you want me to say something other than the truth? Or do you mean {242} something else?" What answer would you give him? [*c*]

THRASYMACHUS: Well, so you think the two cases are alike?

SOCRATES: Why shouldn't I? But even if they are not alike, yet seem so to the person you asked, do you think he is any less likely to give the answer that seems right to him, whether we forbid him to do so or not?

THRASYMACHUS: Is that what you are going to do, give one of the forbidden answers?

SOCRATES: I would not be surprised—provided it is the one that seems right to me after I have investigated the matter.

THRASYMACHUS: What if I show you another answer about justice, one [*d*] that is different from all these and better than any of them? What penalty would you deserve then?

SOCRATES: The very one that is appropriate for someone who does not know—what else? And what is appropriate is to learn from the one who does know. That, therefore, is what I deserve to suffer.

THRASYMACHUS: What a pleasant fellow you are! But in addition to learning, you must pay money.

SOCRATES: I will if I ever have any.

GLAUCON: He has it already. If it is a matter of money, speak, Thrasymachus. We will all contribute for Socrates.

THRASYMACHUS: Oh yes, sure, so that Socrates can carry on as usual: he [*e*] gives no answer himself, and if someone else does, he takes up his account and refutes it.

SOCRATES: How can someone give an answer, my excellent man, when, first of all, he does not know and does not claim to know, and then, even if he does have some opinion about the matter, is forbidden by no ordinary man to express any of the things he thinks? No, it is much more appropriate [*338a*] for you to answer, since you say you do know and can tell us. Don't be obstinate. Give your answer as a favor to me and do not begrudge your teaching to Glaucon and the others.

While I was saying this, Glaucon and the others begged him to do as I asked. Thrasymachus clearly wanted to speak in order to win a good reputation, since he thought he had a very good answer. But he pretended to want to win a victory at my expense by having me do the answering. However, he agreed in the end, and then said: That is Socrates' wisdom for you: he himself [*b*] isn't willing to teach but goes around learning from others and isn't even grateful to them.

SOCRATES: When you say I learn from others, you are right, Thrasymachus; but when you say I do not give thanks, you are wrong. I give as much as I can. But I can give only praise, since I have no money. And just how enthusiastically I give it, when someone seems to me to speak well, you will know as soon as you have answered, since I think you will speak well.

THRASYMACHUS: Listen, then. I say justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger. Well, why don't you praise me? No, you are [*c*] unwilling.

SOCRATES: First, I must understand what you mean. For, as things stand, I do not. What is advantageous for the stronger, you say, is just. What on earth do you mean, Thrasymachus? Surely you do not mean something like this: Polydamas, the pancratist,[6] is stronger than we are. Beef is advantageous for his body. So, this food is also both advantageous and just for us who are weaker than he? [*d*]

THRASYMACHUS: You disgust me, Socrates. You interpret my account in the way that does it the most evil.

SOCRATES: That's not it at all, my very good man; I only want you to make your meaning clearer.

THRASYMACHUS: Don't you know, then, that some cities are ruled by a tyranny, some by a democracy, and some by an aristocracy?

SOCRATES: Of course I do.

THRASYMACHUS: And that what is stronger in each city is the ruling element?

SOCRATES: Certainly.

THRASYMACHUS: And each type of rule makes laws that are advantageous for itself: democracy makes democratic ones, tyranny tyrannical ones, and [*e*] so on with the others. And by so legislating, each declares that what is just for its subjects is what is advantageous for itself—the ruler—and it {243} punishes anyone who deviates from this as lawless and unjust. That, Socrates, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities: what is advantageous for the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who does the [*339a*] rational calculation correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere—what is advantageous for the stronger.

SOCRATES: Now I see what you mean. Whether it is true or not, I will try to find out. But you yourself have answered that what is just is what is advantageous, Thrasymachus, whereas you forbade me to answer that. True, you have added *for the stronger* to it.

THRASYMACHUS: And I suppose you think that [*b*] is an insignificant addition.

SOCRATES: It isn't clear yet whether it is significant. What *is* clear is that we must investigate whether or not it is true. I agree that what is just is something advantageous. But you add *for the stronger*. I do not know about that. We will have to look into it.

THRASYMACHUS: Go ahead and look.

SOCRATES: That is just what I am going to do. Tell me, then, you also claim, don't you, that it is just to obey the rulers?

THRASYMACHUS: I do.

[*c*] SOCRATES: And are the rulers in each city infallible, or are they liable to error?

THRASYMACHUS: No doubt, they are liable to error.

SOCRATES: So, when they attempt to make laws, they make some correctly, others incorrectly?

THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And a law is correct if it prescribes what is advantageous for the rulers themselves, and incorrect if it prescribes what is disadvantageous for them? Is that what you mean?

THRASYMACHUS: It is.

SOCRATES: And whatever laws the rulers make must be obeyed by their subjects, and that is what is just?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: According to your account, then, it isn't only just to do what [*d*] is advantageous for the stronger, but also the opposite: what is not advantageous.

THRASYMACHUS: What is that you are saying?

SOCRATES: The same as you, I think. But let's examine it more closely. Haven't we agreed that the rulers are sometimes in error as to what is best for themselves when they give orders to their subjects, and yet that it is just for their subjects to do whatever their rulers order? Wasn't that agreed?

THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: You will also have to suppose, then, that you have agreed that [*e*] it is just to do what is disadvantageous for the rulers and those who are stronger, whenever they unintentionally order what is bad for themselves. But you say, too, that it is just for the others to obey the orders the rulers gave. You are very wise, Thrasymachus, but doesn't it necessarily follow that it is just to do the opposite of what you said, since the weaker are then ordered to do what is disadvantageous for the stronger?

POLEMARCHUS: By Zeus, Socrates, that's absolutely [*340a*] clear.

And Clitophon interrupted:

Of course it is, if you are to be his witness, at any rate.

POLEMARCHUS: Who needs a witness? Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes issue orders that are bad for them, and that it is just for the others to obey them.

CLITOPHON: That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus maintained that it is just to obey the orders of the rulers.

POLEMARCHUS: Yes, Clitophon, and he also maintained that what is advantageous for the stronger is just. And having maintained both principles, [*b*] he went on to agree that the stronger sometimes order the weaker, who are subject to them, to do things that are disadvantageous for the stronger themselves. From these agreements it follows that what is advantageous for the stronger is no more just than what is not advantageous.

CLITOPHON: But what he meant by what is advantageous for the stronger is what the stronger *believes* to be advantageous for him. That is what he maintained the weaker must do, and that is what he maintained is what is just.

POLEMARCHUS: But it is not what he said.

SOCRATES: It makes no difference, Polemarchus. If Thrasymachus wants to put it {244} that way now, let's accept it. But tell me, Thrasymachus, is that [*c*] what you intended to say, that what is just is what the stronger believes to be advantageous for him, whether it is in fact advantageous for him or not? Is that what we are to say you mean?

THRASYMACHUS: Not at all. Do you think I would call someone who is in error stronger at the very moment he errs?

SOCRATES: I did think you meant that, when you agreed that the rulers are not infallible but sometimes make errors.

THRASYMACHUS: That is because you are a quibbler in arguments, Socrates. I mean, when someone makes an error in the treatment of [*d*] patients, do you call him a doctor in virtue of the fact that he made that very error? Or, when someone makes an error in calculating, do you call him an accountant in virtue of the fact that he made that very error in calculation? I think we express ourselves in words that, taken literally, do say that a doctor is in error, or an accountant, or a grammarian. But each of these, to the extent that he is what we call him, never makes errors, so that, [*e*] according to the precise account (and you are a stickler for precise accounts), no craftsman ever makes errors. It is when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and, in virtue of the fact that he made that error, he is no craftsman. No craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes an error at the moment when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a ruler makes errors. It is in this loose way that you must also take the answer I gave just now. But the most precise answer is this: a ruler, [*341a*] to the extent that he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and that is what his subject must do. Thus, as I said from the first, it is just to do what is advantageous for the stronger.

SOCRATES: Well, Thrasymachus, so you think I quibble, do you?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: And you think that I asked the questions I did in a premeditated attempt to do you evil in the argument?

THRASYMACHUS: I am certain of it. But it won't do you any good. You [*b*] will never be able to do me evil by covert means, and without them, you will never be able to overpower me by argument.

SOCRATES: Bless you, Thrasymachus; I would not so much as try! But to prevent this sort of confusion from happening to us again, would you define whether you mean the ruler and stronger in the ordinary sense or in what you were just now calling the precise sense, when you say that it is just for the weaker to do what is advantageous for him, since he is the stronger?

THRASYMACHUS: I mean the ruler in the most precise sense. Now do *that* evil, if you can, and practice your quibbling on it—I ask no favors. But you will find there is nothing you can do.

SOCRATES: Do you think that I am crazy enough to try to shave a lion[7] [*c*] and quibble with Thrasymachus?

THRASYMACHUS: Well, you certainly tried just now, although you were a good-for-nothing at it, too!

SOCRATES: That's enough of that! Tell me: is a doctor—in the precise sense, the one you mentioned before—a moneymaker or someone who treats the sick? Tell me about the one who is really a doctor.

THRASYMACHUS: Someone who treats the sick.

SOCRATES: What about a ship's captain? Is the true captain a ruler of sailors, or a sailor?

THRASYMACHUS: A ruler of sailors.

SOCRATES: In other words, we should not take any account of the fact [*d*] that he sails in a ship, and he should not be called a sailor for that reason. For it is not because he is sailing that he is called a ship's captain, but because of the craft he practices and his rule over sailors?

THRASYMACHUS: True.

SOCRATES: And is there something that is advantageous for each of these?

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And isn't it also the case that the natural aim of the craft is to consider and provide what is advantageous for each?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, that is its aim.

SOCRATES: And is anything advantageous for each of the crafts themselves besides being as complete as possible?

{245} [*e*] THRASYMACHUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: It is like this: suppose you asked me whether it is satisfactory for a body to be a body, or whether it needs something else. I would answer, "Of course it needs something. In fact, that is why the craft of medicine has been discovered—because a body is deficient and it is not satisfactory for it to be like that. To provide what is advantageous, that is what the craft was developed for." Do you think I am speaking correctly in saying this, or not?

THRASYMACHUS: Correctly.

SOCRATES: What about medicine itself? Is it deficient? Does a craft need some further virtue, as the eyes are in need of sight and the ears of hearing, [*342a*] so that another craft is needed to consider and provide what is advantageous for them? Does a craft have some similar deficiency itself, so that each craft needs another to consider what is advantageous for it? And does the craft that does the considering need still another, and so on without end? Or does each consider by itself what is advantageous for it? Does it

need neither itself nor another craft to consider what—in light of its own deficiency—is [*b*] advantageous for it? Indeed, is there no deficiency or error in any craft? And is it inappropriate for any craft to consider what is advantageous for anything besides that with which it deals? And since it is itself correct, is it without fault or impurity so long as it is wholly and precisely the craft it is? Consider this with that precision of language you mentioned. Is it so or not?

THRASYMACHUS: It appears to be so.

SOCRATES: Doesn't it follow that medicine does not consider what is advantageous for medicine, but for the body?

[*c*] THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And horse breeding does not consider what is advantageous for horse breeding, but for horses? Indeed, no other craft considers what is advantageous for itself—since it has no further needs—but what is advantageous for that with which it deals?

THRASYMACHUS: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Now surely, Thrasymachus, the various crafts rule over and are stronger than that with which they deal?

He gave in at this point as well, very reluctantly.

SOCRATES: So no kind of knowledge considers or enjoins what is advantageous for itself, but what is advantageous for the weaker, which is subject [*d*] to it.

He finally agreed to this too, although he tried to fight it. When he had agreed, however, I said: Surely then, no doctor, to the extent that he is a doctor, considers or enjoins what is advantageous for himself, but what is advantageous for his patient? For we agreed that a doctor, in the precise sense, is a ruler of bodies, not a moneymaker. Isn't that what we agreed?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So a ship's captain, in the precise sense, is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor?

THRASYMACHUS: That is what we agreed. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Doesn't it follow that a ship's captain and ruler won't consider and enjoin what is advantageous for a captain, but what is advantageous for a sailor and his subject?

He reluctantly agreed.

SOCRATES: So then, Thrasymachus, no one in any position of rule, to the extent that he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is advantageous for himself, but what is advantageous for his subject—that on which he practices his craft. It is to his subject and what is advantageous and proper for it that he looks, and everything he says and does, he says and does for it. [*343a*]

When we reached this point in the argument and it was clear to all that his account of justice had turned into its opposite, instead of answering, Thrasymachus said: Tell me, Socrates, do you still have a wet nurse?

SOCRATES: What is that? Shouldn't you be giving answers rather than asking such things?

THRASYMACHUS: Because she is letting you run around sniveling and doesn't wipe your nose when you need it, since it is her fault that you do not know the difference between sheep and shepherds.

SOCRATES: What exactly is it I do not know?

THRASYMACHUS: You think that shepherds and cowherds consider what is [*b*] good for their sheep and cattle, and fatten them and take care of them with some aim in mind other than what is good {246} for their master and themselves. Moreover, you believe that rulers in cities—true rulers, that is—think about their subjects in a different way than one does about sheep, and that what they consider night and day is something other than what is advantageous for themselves. You are so far from understanding justice and what is [*c*] just, and injustice and what is unjust, that you do not realize that justice is really the good of another, what is advantageous for the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules those simpleminded—for that is what they really are—just people, and the ones it rules do what is advantageous for the other who is stronger; and they make the one they serve happy, but they do not make themselves the least bit happy.

You must consider it as follows, Socrates, or you will be the most naïve [*d*] of all: a just man must always get less than does an unjust one. First, in their contracts with one another, when a just man is partner to an unjust, you will never find, when the partnership ends, that the just one gets more than the unjust, but less. Second, in matters relating to the city, when taxes are to be paid, a just man pays more on an equal amount of property, an unjust one less; but when the city is giving out refunds, a just man gets

nothing while an unjust one makes a large profit. Finally, when each of them holds political office, a just person—even if he is not penalized [*e*] in other ways—finds that his private affairs deteriorate more because he has to neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that he is hated by his relatives and acquaintances because he is unwilling to do them an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect. I mean, of course, the person I described before: the man of great power who does better.[8] He is the one you should consider if you want to figure out how [*344a*] much more advantageous it is for the individual to be unjust than just. You will understand this most easily if you turn your thoughts to injustice of the most complete sort, the sort that makes those who do injustice happiest, and those who suffer it—those who are unwilling to do injustice—most wretched. The sort I mean is tyranny, because it uses both covert means and force to appropriate the property of others—whether it is sacred or secular, public or private—not little by little, but all at once. If [*b*] someone commits a part of this sort of injustice and gets caught, he is punished and greatly reproached—temple robbers,[9] kidnappers, housebreakers, robbers, and thieves are what these partly unjust people are called when they commit those harms. When someone appropriates the possessions of the citizens, on the other hand, and then kidnaps and enslaves the possessors as well, instead of these shameful names he is called [*c*] happy and blessed: not only by the citizens themselves, but even by all who learn that he has committed the whole of injustice. For it is not the fear of doing injustice, but of suffering it, that elicits the reproaches of those who revile injustice.

So you see, Socrates, injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterful than justice. And, as I said from the beginning, justice is what is advantageous for the stronger, while injustice is profitable and advantageous for oneself.

Having, like a bath attendant, emptied this [d] great flood of words into our ears all at once, Thrasymachus was thinking of leaving. But those present wouldn't let him. They made him stay and give an account of what he had said. And I myself was particularly insistent: You are marvelous, Thrasymachus; after hurling such a speech at us, you surely cannot be thinking of leaving before you have adequately instructed us—or learned

yourself—whether you are right or not. Or do you think it [*e*] is a trivial matter you are trying to determine, and not rather a way of life—the one that would make living life that way most profitable for each of us?

THRASYMACHUS: Do you mean that I do not think it is a serious matter?

{247} SOCRATES: Either that, or you care nothing for us and so are not worried about whether we will live better or worse lives because of our ignorance of what you claim to know. No, be a good fellow and show some willingness to teach us—you won't do badly for yourself if you help a group as [*345a*] large as ours. For my own part, I will tell you that I am not persuaded. I do not believe that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if you should give it full scope to do what it wants. Suppose, my good fellow, that there *is* an unjust person, and suppose he *does* have the power to do injustice, whether by covert means or open warfare; nonetheless, he does not persuade me that injustice is more profitable than justice. Perhaps someone [*b*] here besides myself feels the same as I do. So, blessed though you are, you are going to have to fully persuade us that we are wrong to value justice more highly than injustice in deliberating.

THRASYMACHUS: And how am I to persuade you? If you are not persuaded by what I said just now, what more can I do? Am I to take my argument and pour it into your very soul?

SOCRATES: No, by Zeus, do not do that! But first, stick to what you have said, or, if you change your position, do it openly and do not try to deceive us. You see, Thrasymachus, having defined the true doctor—to continue examining the things you said before—you did not consider it necessary to [*c*] maintain the same level of exactness when you later turned to the true shepherd. You do not think a shepherd—to the extent that he is a shepherd—fattens sheep with the aim of doing what is best for them. But you think that, like a guest about to be entertained at a feast, his aim is to eat well or to make a future sale—as if he were a moneymaker rather than a shepherd. But of course, the only concern of the craft of shepherding is to [*d*] provide what is best for that with which it deals, since it itself is adequately provided with all it needs to be at its best, as we know, when it does not fall short in any way of being the craft of shepherding. That is why I, at any rate, thought it necessary for us to agree before[10] that every kind of rule—to the extent that it is a kind of rule—does not seek anything other than what is

best for the thing it rules and cares for, and this is true both in political and in private rule. But do you think that those who rule cities—the [*e*] ones who are truly rulers—rule willingly?

THRASYMACHUS: I do not think it, by Zeus, I know it.

SOCRATES: But, Thrasymachus, don't you realize that in other kinds of rule there is no willing ruler? On the contrary, they demand wages on the assumption that their ruling will benefit not themselves, but their subjects. For tell me, don't we say that each craft differs from every other in [*346a*] the power it has? Blessed though you are, please don't answer contrary to your belief, so that we can come to some definite conclusion.

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, that is what differentiates them.

SOCRATES: And doesn't each craft provide us with a particular benefit, different from the others? For example, medicine provides us with health, captaincy with safety at sea, and so on with the others?

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And doesn't wage-earning provide us with wages, since that is what it is capable of doing? Or would you call medicine the same craft as [*b*] captaincy? Indeed, if you want to define matters precisely, as you proposed, even if someone who is a ship's captain becomes healthy because what is advantageous for him is sailing on the sea, you would not for that reason call what he does medicine, would you?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Nor would you call wage-earning medicine, even if someone becomes healthy while earning wages?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Nor would you call medicine wage-earning, even if someone earns pay while healing?

THRASYMACHUS: No. [*c*]

SOCRATES: We are agreed then, aren't we, that each craft brings its own special benefit?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we are.

SOCRATES: So whatever benefit all craftsmen jointly receive must clearly derive from their joint practice of some additional craft that is the same for each of them.

{248} THRASYMACHUS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: And we say that the additional craft in question, which benefits the craftsmen by earning them wages, is the craft of wage-earning?

He reluctantly agreed.

SOCRATES: Then this very benefit, receiving wages, is not provided to [*d*] each of them by his own craft. On the contrary, if we are to examine the matter precisely, medicine provides health and wage-earning provides a wage; house-building provides a house, and wage-earning, which accompanies it, provides a wage; and so on with the other crafts. Each of them does its own work and benefits that with which it deals. So, wages aside, is there any benefit that craftsmen get from their craft?

THRASYMACHUS: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: But he still provides a benefit, even when he works for [*e*] nothing?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, I think he does.

SOCRATES: Then, it is clear now, Thrasymachus, that no type of craft or rule provides what is beneficial for itself; but, as we have been saying for some time, it provides and enjoins what is beneficial for its subject, and aims at what is advantageous for *it*—the weaker, not the stronger. That is why I said just now, my dear Thrasymachus, that no one chooses to rule voluntarily and take other people's troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages. You see, anyone who is going to practice his [*347a*] type of craft well never does or enjoins what is best for himself—at least not when he is acting as his craft prescribes—but what is best for his subject. It is because of this, it seems, that wages must be provided to a person if he is going to be willing to rule, whether they are in the form of money or honor or a penalty if he refuses.

GLAUCON: What do you mean, Socrates? I am familiar with the first two kinds of wages, but I do not understand what penalty you mean, or how you can call it a wage.

SOCRATES: Then you do not understand the sort of wages for which the best people rule, when they are willing to rule. Don't you know that those who love honor and those who love [*b*] money are despised, and rightly so?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is why good people won't be willing to rule for the sake of money or honor. You see, if they are paid wages openly for ruling, they will be called hirelings, and if they take them covertly as the

fruits of their rule, they will be called thieves. On the other hand, they won't rule for the sake of honor either, since they are not ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they are going to be willing to rule, some compulsion or punishment [*c*] must be brought to bear on them—that is probably why wanting to rule when one does not have to is thought to be shameful. Now, the greatest punishment for being unwilling to rule is being ruled by someone worse than oneself. And I think it is fear of that that makes good people rule when they do rule. They approach ruling, not as though they were going to do something good or as though they were going to enjoy themselves in it, but as something compulsory, since it cannot be entrusted to anyone better than —or even as good as—themselves. In a city of good men, if [*d*] it came into being, the citizens would fight in order *not to rule*, just as they now do in order to rule. There it would be quite clear that anyone who is really and truly a ruler does not naturally seek what is advantageous for himself, but what is so for his subject. As a result, anyone with any sense would prefer to be benefited by another than to go to the trouble of benefiting him. So I cannot at all agree with Thrasymachus that justice is what is advantageous for the stronger. But we will look further into that another [*e*] time. What Thrasymachus is now saying—that the life of an unjust person is better than that of a just one—seems to be of far greater importance. Which life would you choose, Glaucon? And which of our views do you think is closer to the truth?

GLAUCON: I think the life of a just person is more profitable.

SOCRATES: Did you hear all the good things Thrasymachus attributed a moment ago to the unjust man? [*348a*]

GLAUCON: I did, but I am not persuaded.

SOCRATES: Then do you want us to persuade him, if we can find a way, that what he says is not true?

{249} GLAUCON: Of course I do.

SOCRATES: Well, if we oppose him with a speech parallel to his speech enumerating in turn the many good things that come from being just, and he replies, and then we do, we will have to count and measure the good things mentioned on each side, and we will need a jury to decide the case. [*b*] But if, on the other hand, we investigate the question, as we have been doing, by seeking agreement with each other, we ourselves can be both jury and advocates at once.

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then which approach do you prefer?

GLAUCON: The second.

SOCRATES: Come on then, Thrasymachus, answer us from the beginning. You say, don't you, that complete injustice is more profitable than complete justice?

[*c*] THRASYMACHUS: I certainly have said that. And I have told you why.

SOCRATES: Well, then, what do you say about this? Do you call one of the two a virtue and the other a vice?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: That is to say, you call justice a virtue and injustice a vice?

THRASYMACHUS: Is that likely, sweetest one, when I say that injustice is profitable and justice is not?

SOCRATES: Then what exactly do you say?

THRASYMACHUS: The opposite.

SOCRATES: That justice is a vice?

THRASYMACHUS: No, just very noble naiveté.[11]

[*d*] SOCRATES: So you call injustice deviousness?

THRASYMACHUS: No, I call it being prudent.

SOCRATES: Do you also consider unjust people to be wise and good, Thrasymachus?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, if they commit complete injustice and can bring cities and whole nations under their power. Perhaps, you thought I meant pickpockets? Not that such crimes aren't also profitable, if they are not found out. But they are not worth discussing by comparison to what I described.

SOCRATES: Yes, I am not unaware of what you mean. But this did surprise [*e*] me: that you include injustice with virtue and wisdom, and justice with their opposites.

THRASYMACHUS: Nevertheless, that is where I put them.

SOCRATES: That is now a harder problem, comrade, and it is not easy to know what to say in response. If you had declared that injustice is more profitable, but agreed that it is a vice or shameful, as some others do, we could be discussing the matter on the basis of conventional norms. But now, obviously, you will say that injustice is fine and strong and apply to it all

the attributes we used to apply to justice, since you dare to include it with virtue and wisdom. [*349a*]

THRASYMACHUS: You have guessed my views exactly.

SOCRATES: All the same, we must not shrink from pursuing the argument and looking into this, just as long as I take you to be saying what you really think. You see, I believe that you really are not joking now, Thrasymachus, but saying what you believe to be the truth.

THRASYMACHUS: What difference does it make to you, whether *I* believe it or not? Isn't it *my account* you are supposed to be refuting?

SOCRATES: It makes no difference. But here is a further question I would like you to try to answer: do you think that a just person wants to do better [*b*] than another just person?

THRASYMACHUS: Not at all. Otherwise, he would not be the civilized and naïve person he actually is.

SOCRATES: What about than the just action?

THRASYMACHUS: No, not than that, either.

SOCRATES: And does he claim that he deserves to do better than an unjust person and believe that it is just for him to do so, or doesn't he believe that?

THRASYMACHUS: He would want to do better than him, and he would claim to deserve to do so, but he would not be able.

SOCRATES: That is not what I am asking, but whether a just person wants, and claims to {250} deserve, to do better than an unjust person, but not than a [*c*] just one?

THRASYMACHUS: He does.

SOCRATES: What about an unjust person? Does he claim that he deserves to do better than a just person or a just action?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course he does; he thinks he deserves to do better than everyone.

SOCRATES: Then will an unjust person also do better than an *unjust* person or an *unjust* action, and will he strive to get the most he can for himself from everyone?

THRASYMACHUS: He will.

SOCRATES: Then let's put it this way: a just person does not do better than someone like himself, but someone unlike himself, whereas an unjust person [*d*] does better than those who are like *and* those who are unlike him.

THRASYMACHUS: Very well put.

SOCRATES: Now, an unjust person is wise and good, and a just one is neither?

THRASYMACHUS: That is well put, too.

SOCRATES: So isn't an unjust person also *like* a wise and good person, while the just person is not?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course. How could he fail to be like people who have such qualities, when he has them himself? But the unjust person is not like them.

SOCRATES: Fine. Then each of them has the qualities of the people he is like?

THRASYMACHUS: What else could he have?

SOCRATES: All right, Thrasymachus. Do you call one person musical and [*e*] another non-musical?

THRASYMACHUS: I do.

SOCRATES: Which of them is wise in music and which is not?

THRASYMACHUS: The musical one is wise, presumably, and the other not wise.

SOCRATES: And in the things in which he is wise, he is good; and in the things in which he is not wise, he is bad?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Isn't the same true of a doctor?

THRASYMACHUS: It is.

SOCRATES: Do you think, then, Thrasymachus, that a man who is a musician, when he is tuning his lyre and tightening and loosening the strings, wants to do better than another musician, and does he claim that that is what he deserves?

THRASYMACHUS: I do not.

SOCRATES: But he does want to do better than a non-musician?

THRASYMACHUS: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: What about a doctor? When he is prescribing food and drink, [*350a*] does he want to do better than another doctor or than medical practice?

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But he does want to do better than a non-doctor?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: In any branch of knowledge or ignorance, do you think that a knowledgeable person would intentionally try to take more for himself than another knowledgeable person, or to do or say more, and not rather exactly what the one like himself would do in the same situation?

THRASYMACHUS: No, I imagine it must be as you say.

SOCRATES: And what about an ignorant person? Doesn't he want to do better than both a knowledgeable person and an ignorant one? [*b*]

THRASYMACHUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: A knowledgeable person is wise?

THRASYMACHUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: And a wise one is good?

THRASYMACHUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: So, a good and wise person does not want to do better than someone like himself, but someone both unlike and opposite to him.

THRASYMACHUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: But a bad and ignorant person wants to do better than both his like and his opposite.

THRASYMACHUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Well, Thrasymachus, we found that an unjust person tries to do better than those like him and those unlike him. Didn't you say that?

THRASYMACHUS: I did.

SOCRATES: And that a just person won't do better than those like him, but [*c*] those unlike him?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

{251} SOCRATES: Then a just person is like a wise and good person, and an unjust person is like an ignorant and bad one.

THRASYMACHUS: It looks that way.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we agreed that each has the qualities of the one he resembles.

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we did.

SOCRATES: A just person has turned out to be good and wise, then, and an unjust one ignorant and bad.

[*d*] *Thrasymachus agreed to all this, not easily as I am telling it, but reluctantly, with toil, trouble, and—since it was summer—a quantity of sweat that was amazing to behold. And then I saw something I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing. But in any case, after we had agreed*

that justice is virtue and wisdom and that injustice is vice and ignorance, I said: All right, let's take that as established. But we also said that injustice is a strong thing, or don't you remember that, Thrasymachus?

THRASYMACHUS: I remember. But I am not satisfied with what you are now saying. I could make a speech about it, but if I did, I know that you would say I was engaging in demagoguery. So, either allow me to say as [*e*] much as I want to say or, if you want to keep on asking questions, go ahead and ask them, and I shall say to you—as one does to old women telling stories—"All right," and nod or shake my head.

SOCRATES: No, don't do that; not contrary to your own belief.

THRASYMACHUS: Then I will answer to please you, since you won't let me make a speech. What else do you want?

SOCRATES: Nothing, by Zeus. But if that is what you are going to do, do it, and I will ask the questions.

THRASYMACHUS: Ask them, then.

SOCRATES: All right, I will ask precisely what I asked before, so that we may proceed in an orderly fashion with our argument about what sort of [*351a*] thing justice is, as opposed to injustice. For it was claimed, I believe, that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice. But now, if justice is indeed wisdom and virtue, it will be easy to show, I suppose, that it is stronger than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now be ignorant of that. However, I, at any rate, do not want to consider the matter in such simple terms, Thrasymachus, but to look into it in some such way as this: would you say that a city may be unjust and try to enslave other cities [*b*] unjustly, and succeed at enslaving them, and hold them in subjection which it enslaved in the past?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course. And that is what the best city will especially do, the one that is most completely unjust.

SOCRATES: I understand that that is your argument, but the point I want to examine is this: will the city that becomes stronger than another achieve this power without justice, or will it need the help of justice?

THRASYMACHUS: If what you said a moment ago stands, and justice is [*c*] wisdom, it will need the help of justice; but if things are as I stated, it will need the help of injustice.

SOCRATES: I am impressed, Thrasymachus, that you are not merely nodding or shaking your head, but giving these fine answers.

THRASYMACHUS: That is because I am trying to please you.

SOCRATES: You are doing well at it, too. So please me some more by answering this question: do you think that a city, an army, a band of robbers or thieves, or any other group with a common unjust purpose would be able to achieve it if its members were unjust to each other?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course not. [*d*]

SOCRATES: What if they were not unjust to one another? Would they achieve more?

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Because, Thrasymachus, injustice causes factions, hatreds, and quarrels among them, while justice brings friendship and a sense of common purpose. Isn't that so?

THRASYMACHUS: I will say it is, in order not to disagree with you.

SOCRATES: You are still doing well on that front, which is very good of you. So tell me this: if the function of injustice is to produce hatred wherever it occurs, then whenever it arises, whether among free men or slaves, won't it make them hate one another, form factions, and be unable to achieve any common purpose? [*e*]

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

{252} SOCRATES: What if it arises between two people? Won't they be at odds, hate each other, and be enemies both to one another and to just people?

THRASYMACHUS: They will.

SOCRATES: Well, then, my amazing fellow, if injustice arises within a single individual, will it lose its power or will it retain it undiminished?

THRASYMACHUS: Let's say that it retains it undiminished.

SOCRATES: Apparently, then, its power is such that whenever it comes to exist in something—whether in a city, a family, an army, or anything else whatsoever—it makes that thing, first of all, incapable of acting in concert with itself, because of the faction and difference it creates; and, second of [*352a*] all, an enemy to itself, and to what is in every way its opposite: namely, justice. Isn't that so?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And in a single individual, too, I presume, it will produce the very same effects that it is in its nature to produce. First, it will make him incapable of acting because of inner faction and not being of one mind with

himself; second, it will make him his own enemy as well as the enemy of just people. Isn't that right?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: But, my dear fellow, aren't the gods also just?

THRASYMACHUS: Let's say they are.

SOCRATES: Then an unjust person will also be an enemy of the gods, [*b*] Thrasymachus, while a just person will be their friend?

THRASYMACHUS: Feast yourself confidently on the argument! Don't worry, I won't oppose you, so as not to arouse the enmity of our friends here.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, complete the banquet for me by continuing to answer as you have been doing now. We have shown that just people are wiser and better and more capable of acting, while unjust ones are not even [*c*] able to act together. For whenever we speak of men who are unjust acting together to effectively achieve a common goal, what we say is not altogether true. They would never have been able to keep their hands off each other if they were completely unjust. But clearly there must have been some sort of justice in them that at least prevented them from doing injustice among themselves at the same time as they were doing it to others. And it was this that enabled them to achieve what they did. When they started doing unjust things, they were only halfway corrupted by their injustice. For those who are wholly bad and completely unjust are also completely incapable of acting. All this I now see to be the truth, and not [*d*] what you first maintained. However, we must now examine the question, as we proposed to do before,[12] of whether just people also live better and are happier than unjust ones. I think it is clear even now from what we have said that this is so, but we must consider it further. After all, the argument concerns no ordinary topic, but the way we ought to live.

THRASYMACHUS: Go ahead and consider.

SOCRATES: I will. Tell me, do you think there is such a thing as the function of a horse?

THRASYMACHUS: I do. [*e*]

SOCRATES: And would you take the function of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it, or best with it?

THRASYMACHUS: I don't understand.

SOCRATES: Let me put it this way: is it possible for you to see with anything except eyes?

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Or for you to hear with anything except ears?

THRASYMACHUS: No.

SOCRATES: Would it be right, then, for us to say that these things are their functions?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Again, couldn't you use a dagger, a carving knife, or lots of other things in pruning a vine? [*353a*]

THRASYMACHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: But nothing would do a better job than a pruning knife designed for the purpose?

THRASYMACHUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Shall we take pruning to be its function, then?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now I think you will understand better what I was asking earlier when I asked whether the function of each thing is what it {253} alone can do or what it can do better than anything else.

THRASYMACHUS: I do understand, and I think [*b*] that that is the function of anything.

SOCRATES: All right. Does there seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing to which some function is assigned? Let's go over the same ground again. We say that eyes have some function?

THRASYMACHUS: They do.

SOCRATES: So eyes also have a virtue?

THRASYMACHUS: They do.

SOCRATES: And ears have a function?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So they also have a virtue?

THRASYMACHUS: They have a virtue too.

SOCRATES: What about everything else? Doesn't the same hold?

THRASYMACHUS: It does.

SOCRATES: Well, then. Could eyes perform their function well if they [*c*] lacked their proper virtue but had the vice instead?

THRASYMACHUS: How could they? For don’t you mean if they had blindness instead of sight?

SOCRATES: Whatever their virtue is. You see, I am not now asking about that, but about whether it is by means of their own proper virtue that their function performs the things it performs well, and by means of vice badly?

THRASYMACHUS: What you say is true.

SOCRATES: So, if ears are deprived of their own virtue, they too perform their function badly?

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

[*d*] SOCRATES: And the same argument applies to everything else?

THRASYMACHUS: So it seems to me, at least.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and let’s next consider this: does the soul have some function that you could not perform with anything else—for example, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and all other such things? Is there anything else besides a soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they are special to it?

THRASYMACHUS: No, there is nothing else.

SOCRATES: Then what about living? Don’t we say that it is a function of a soul?

THRASYMACHUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And don’t we also say that a soul has a virtue?

THRASYMACHUS: We do.

SOCRATES: Will a soul ever perform its functions well, then, Thrasymachus, [*e*] if it is deprived of its own proper virtue, or is that impossible?

THRASYMACHUS: It is impossible.

SOCRATES: It is necessary, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things badly, and that a good soul does all these things well?

THRASYMACHUS: It is necessary.

SOCRATES: Now, didn’t we agree that justice is a soul’s virtue and injustice its vice?

THRASYMACHUS: Yes, we did agree.

SOCRATES: So a just soul and a just man will live well and an unjust one badly.

THRASYMACHUS: Apparently so, according to your argument.

SOCRATES: And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy, and anyone who does not is the opposite. [*354a*]

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Therefore, a just person is happy and an unjust one wretched.

THRASYMACHUS: Let's say so.

SOCRATES: But surely it is profitable, not to be wretched, but to be happy.

THRASYMACHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So then, blessed Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profitable than justice.

THRASYMACHUS: Let that be your banquet, Socrates, at the feast of Bendis.

SOCRATES: Given by you, Thrasymachus, after you became gentle with me and ceased to be difficult. Yet I have not had a good banquet. But that is my fault, not yours. I seem to have behaved like those gluttons who snatch [*b*] at every dish that passes and taste it before having properly savored the preceding one. Before finding the first thing we inquired about—namely, what justice is—I let that go, and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue. Then an argument came up about injustice being more profitable than justice, and I could not refrain from abandoning the previous one and following up on it. Hence the result of the discussion, so far as I am concerned, is that I know nothing. For when I do not know what justice is, I will hardly know whether it [*c*] is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a person who has it is happy or unhappy.

{254} BOOK II

GLAUCON INTRODUCES A sophisticated division of goods into three classes and asks Socrates to which class justice belongs. Socrates places it in the highest class, consisting of things valued both because of themselves and because of their consequences (357a–358a). This conflicts with the general view that justice belongs in the lowest class, consisting of things harsh in themselves and valued only for their consequences. It is this view that Glaucon, with the help of Adeimantus, challenges Socrates to defeat. He does not complete his response until the end of Book IX.

His first step is to shift the debate from individual justice to political justice. He will construct an ideal or completely good city in theory, one in which everyone is as happy as possible. He knows on the basis of the argument that concludes Book I that such a city would have to be completely virtuous and so completely just (352d–354a). Having located justice in that city, he will then look for it in the soul.

The construction of the ideal city proceeds in stages. Socrates first introduces a city of people—the so-called first city—whose souls are ruled by their necessary appetites. But this city is not, given human psychology, a real possibility. For unnecessary appetites exist in all of us by nature (571b). The second stage in the construction of the ideal city—the so-called luxurious city—seems to be introduced to make this point (see 373a, b, d).

The result of the introduction of unnecessary appetites is war both civil and intercity (373d–e). To prevent this from destroying the city, soldier-police are needed to constrain both internal and external enemies (414b). These are the guardians. And like all of the citizens of the ideal city, they must specialize in their job (see 370a–b, 374a–c, 394e, 423c–d, 433a, 443b, 453b).

The natural assets that a good guardian needs and the education he must have to develop them in the best possible way are, therefore, the next topic. The appropriate basic education for future guardians, Socrates claims, is the traditional one consisting of music and poetry, on the one hand, and physical training on the other. His discussion of it continues into Book III.

SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES: *When I had said this, I [357a] thought I had done with the discussion. But it all turned out to be only a prelude, as it were. You see, Glaucon, who is always very courageous in everything, refused on this occasion, too, to accept Thrasymachus' capitulation. Instead, he said:* Do you want to *seem* to have persuaded us, Socrates, that it is better in every way to be just rather than unjust, or do you want to *really* persuade us [*b*] of this?

SOCRATES: I want to really persuade you, if I can.

GLAUCON: Well, then, you certainly are not doing what you want. Tell me, do you think there is a sort of good we would choose to have, not because we desire its consequences, but because we would welcome it for its own sake—enjoying, for example, and all the harmless pleasures from which nothing results afterward beyond enjoying having them?

SOCRATES: Certainly, I think there is such a thing.

GLAUCON: And is there a sort of good we love for its own sake, and also [*c*] for the sake of its consequences—knowing, for example, and seeing, and being healthy? For we welcome such things, I imagine, on both counts.

SOCRATES: Yes.

GLAUCON: And do you also recognize a third kind of good, which includes physical training, medical treatment when sick, and both medicine itself and other ways of making money? We would say that these are burdensome but beneficial to {255} us, and we would not choose to have them for their own sake, but for [*d*] the sake of the wages and other things that are their consequences.

SOCRATES: Yes, certainly, there is also this third kind. But what of it?

GLAUCON: In which of them do you place justice?

[*358a*] SOCRATES: I myself put it in the finest one—the one that anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness must love both because of itself and because of its consequences.

GLAUCON: That is not what the masses think. On the contrary, they think it is of the burdensome kind: the one that must be practiced for the sake of the wages and the popularity that come from a good reputation, but that is to be avoided just because of itself.

SOCRATES: I know that is the general view. Thrasymachus has been faulting justice and praising injustice on these grounds for some time. But it seems that I am a slow learner.

GLAUCON: Come on, then, listen to what I have to say as well, and see whether you still have that problem. You see, I think Thrasymachus gave up [*b*] before he had to, as if he were a snake you had charmed. Yet, to my way of thinking, there was still no demonstration on either side. For I want to hear what justice and injustice are, and what power each has when it is just by itself in the soul. I want to leave out of account the wages and the consequences of each of them.

So, if you agree, I will renew the argument of Thrasymachus. First, I will state what sort of thing people consider justice to be, and what its origins [*c*] are. Second, I will argue that all who practice it do so unwillingly, as something compulsory, not as something good. Third, I will argue that they have good reason to act as they do. For the life of the unjust person is, they say, much better than that of the just one.

It isn't, Socrates, that I believe any of that myself. I am perplexed, indeed, and my ears are deafened listening to Thrasymachus and countless others. But I have yet to hear anyone defend justice in the way I want, as being better than injustice. I want to hear it praised just by itself, and I think [*d*] that I am most likely to learn this from you. That is why I am going to speak at length in praise of the unjust life: by doing so, I will be showing you the way I want to hear you denouncing injustice and praising justice. But see whether you want me to do what I am saying or not.

SOCRATES: I want it most of all. Indeed, what subject could a person with any sense enjoy talking and hearing about more often?

GLAUCON: Excellent sentiments. Now, listen to what I said I was going to discuss first—what justice is like and what its origins are. People say, you [*e*] see, that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad. But the badness of suffering it far exceeds the goodness of doing it. Hence, those who have done and suffered injustice and who have tasted both—the ones who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it—decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor [*359a*] to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants; and what the law commands, they call lawful and just. That, they say, is the origin and very being[13] of justice. It is in between the best and the worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two extremes. People love it, not because it is a good thing, but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power to do [*b*] it, however—someone who is truly a man—would not make an agreement with anyone, neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. For him, that would be insanity. That is the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates, and those are its natural origins.

We can see most clearly that those who practice it do so unwillingly, because they lack the power to do injustice, if we imagine the following [*c*] thought-experiment. Suppose we grant to the just and the unjust person the freedom to do whatever they like. We can then follow both of them and see where their appetites would lead. And we will catch the just person red-handed, traveling the same road as the unjust one. The reason for this is the desire to do better. This is {256} what every nature naturally pursues as good. But by law and force, it is made to deviate from this path and honor equality.

They would especially have the freedom I am talking about if they had [*d*] the power that the ancestor of Gyges of Lydia is said to have possessed. The story goes that he was a shepherd in the service of the ruler of Lydia. There was a violent thunderstorm, and an earthquake broke open the ground and created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he was filled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to many other amazing things of which we are told stories, he saw a hollow, bronze horse. There were windowlike openings in it and, peeping in, he saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing [*e*] but a gold ring on its finger. He took off the ring and came out of the chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting of shepherds that reported to the king on the state of the flocks. And as he was sitting among the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring toward himself, toward the inside of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to [*360a*] those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He was amazed at this and, fingering the ring, he turned the setting outward again and became visible. So, he experimented with the ring to test whether it indeed had this power—and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. As soon as he realized this, he arranged to become one of the messengers sent to [*b*] report to the king. On arriving there, he seduced the king’s wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him, and in this way took over the kingdom.

Let’s suppose, then, that there were two such rings, one worn by the just person, the other by the unjust. Now no one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice, or bring himself to keep away from other people’s possessions and not touch them, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go into

people's houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would [*c*] make him like a god among humans. And in so behaving, he would do no differently than the unjust person, but both would pursue the same course.

This, some would say, is strong evidence that no one is just willingly, but only when compelled. No one believes justice to be a good thing when it is kept private, since whenever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, all men believe that injustice is far more profitable to themselves than is justice. And what they believe is true, so the [*d*] exponent of this argument will say. For someone who did not want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity, and who did not touch other people's property, would be thought most wretched and most foolish by everyone aware of the situation. Though, of course, they would praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice. So much for my second topic.

As for decision itself about the life of the two we are discussing, if we [*e*] contrast the extremes of justice and injustice, we shall be able to make the decision correctly; but if we don't, we won't. What, then, is the contrast I have in mind? It is this: we will subtract nothing from the injustice of the unjust person, and nothing from the justice of the just one. On the contrary, we will take each to be perfect in his own pursuit. First, then, let the unjust person act like clever craftsmen. An eminent ship's captain or doctor, for example, knows the difference between what his craft can and cannot do. He attempts the first but lets the second go by. And if he happens to [*361a*] slip, he can put things right. In the same way, if he is to be completely unjust, let the unjust person correctly attempt unjust acts and remain undetected. The one who is caught should be thought inept. For the extreme of injustice is to be believed to be just without actually being so. And our completely unjust person must be given complete injustice—nothing must be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he does happen to slip up, he must be able to put it right, either [*b*] through his ability to speak persuasively if any of his unjust activities are discovered, or to use force if force is needed, because he is {257} courageous and strong and has provided himself with wealth and friends.

Having hypothesized such a person, let's now put the just man next to him in our argument—someone who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, [*c*] does not want to be believed to be good, but to be so.[14] We must take away his reputation. For a reputation for justice would bring him honor and rewards, so that it would not be clear whether he is being just for the sake of justice, or for the sake of those honors and rewards. We must strip him of everything except justice, and make his situation the opposite of the unjust person's. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that he may be tested with regard to justice by seeing whether or not he can withstand a bad reputation and its consequences. Let him stay like that, unchanged, until he is dead—just, but all his life [*d*] believed to be unjust. In this way, both will reach the extremes, the one of justice and the other of injustice, and we will be able to judge which of them is happier.

SOCRATES: Whew! My dear Glaucon, how vigorously you have scoured each of the men in our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for an art competition.

GLAUCON: I am doing the best I can. Since the two are as I have described, in any case, it should not be difficult to complete the account of the sort of life that awaits each of them, but it must be done. And if what I [*e*] say sounds crude, Socrates, remember that it is not *I* who speak, but those who praise injustice at the expense of justice. They will say that the just person in such circumstances will be whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded with a red-hot iron, and, at the end, when he has suffered every [*362a*] sort of bad thing, he will be impaled, and will realize then that one should not want to be just, but to be believed to be just. Indeed, Aeschylus' words are far more correctly applied to the unjust man. For people will say that it is really the unjust person who does not want to be believed to be unjust, but actually to be so, because he bases his practice on the truth about things and does not allow reputation to regulate his life. He is the one who "harvests [*b*] a deep furrow in his mind, where wise counsels propagate." First, he rules his city because of his reputation for justice. Next, he marries into any family he wishes, gives his children in marriage to anyone he wishes, has contracts and partnerships with anyone he wants, and, besides benefiting himself in all these ways, he profits because he is not disgusted

by doing injustice. In any contest, public or private, he is the winner and does better than his enemies. And by doing better than them, he becomes wealthy, [*c*] benefits his friends, and harms his enemies. He makes adequate sacrifices to the gods and sets up magnificent offerings to them, and takes much better care of the gods—and, indeed, of the human beings he favors—than the just person. So he may reasonably expect that the gods, in turn, will love him more than the just person. That is why they say, Socrates, that gods and humans provide a better life for the unjust person than for the just one.

When Glaucon had said this, I had it in mind [d] to respond, but his brother Adeimantus intervened: You surely do not think that the argument has been adequately stated?

SOCRATES: Why shouldn't I?

ADEIMANTUS: The most important point has not been mentioned.

SOCRATES: Well, then, as the saying goes, a man's brother must stand by him.[15] So if Glaucon has omitted something, you must help him. Though, for my part at any rate, what he has already said is quite enough to throw me to the canvas and make me incapable of coming to the aid of justice.

ADEIMANTUS: Nonsense. But listen to what more I have to say, as well. [*e*] You see, in order to clarify what Glaucon has in mind, we should also fully explore the arguments that are opposed to the ones he gave—those that praise justice and disparage injustice. As you know, when fathers speak to their sons to give them advice, they say that one must be just, as do all those who have others in their charge. But they do not praise justice itself, only the good reputation it brings: the [*363a*] inducement they offer is that if we are reputed {258} to be just, then, as a result of our reputation, we will get political offices, good marriages, and all the things that Glaucon recently said that the just man would get as a result of having a good reputation. But these people have even more to say about the consequences of reputation. For by throwing in being well thought of by the gods, they have plenty of good things to talk about—all the ones the gods are said to give to those who are pious. For example, the noble Hesiod and Homer say such things. For Hesiod says that the gods make the oak trees "bear acorns at the [*b*] top, bees in the middle, and fleecy sheep heavy laden with wool" for those who

are just, and tells of many other good things akin to these.[16] And Homer says pretty much the same: When a good king, in his piety,

Upholds justice, the black earth bears
Wheat and barley for him, and his trees are heavy with fruit, [*c*]
His sheep bear lambs unfailingly and the sea yields up its fish.[17]

Musaeus and his son claim that the gods give just people even more exciting goods than these. In their account, they lead the just to Hades, seat them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking—as if they thought eternal drunkenness was the finest wage of virtue. Others [*d*] stretch even further the wages that virtue receives from the gods. For they say that someone who is pious and keeps his promises leaves his children's children and a whole race behind him. In these and other similar ways, they praise justice. But the impious and unjust they bury in mud in Hades, and they compel them to carry water in a sieve. They bring them into bad repute while they are still alive. And all those penalties that Glaucon gave to just people who are thought to be [*e*] unjust, they give to the unjust ones. But they have nothing else to say.

That, then, is the praise and blame given to each. But in addition, Socrates, there is another kind of argument about justice and injustice for you to consider—one that is used both by private [*364a*] individuals and by poets.

With one voice they all chant the hymn that justice and temperance are fine things, but difficult and onerous, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are only shameful by repute and convention. They also say that unjust deeds are, for the most part, more profitable than just ones; and whereas they are perfectly willing to bestow public and private honors on bad people—provided they have wealth and other types of power—and to declare them to be happy, they dishonor and disregard those who happen to be in any way weak or poor, even though they admit that [*b*] they are better than the others.

But most amazing of all are the accounts they give of the gods and virtue, and how it is that the gods, too, assign misfortune and a bad life to many good people, and the opposite fate to their opposites. Begging priests and prophets go to the doors of rich people and persuade them that, through

sacrifices and charms, they have acquired a god-given power: if the rich [*c*] person or any of his ancestors has committed an injustice, they can fix it with pleasant rituals. And if he wishes to injure an enemy, he will be able to harm a just one or an unjust one alike at little cost, since by means of spells and enchantments they can persuade the gods to do their bidding.

And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these accounts. Some harp on the ease of vice, on the grounds that

> Vice in abundance is easy to get,
> The road is smooth and begins beside you, [*d*]
> But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue
> and a road that is long, rough, and steep.[18]

Others quote Homer to bear witness that the gods can be influenced by humans, since he too said:

> Even the gods themselves can be swayed by prayer.
> And with sacrifices and soothing promises,
> Incense and libation-drinking, human beings turn them from their purpose, [*e*]
>
> When someone has transgressed and sinned.[19]

{259} And they present a noisy throng of books by Musaeus and Orpheus —who are the offspring, they claim, of Selene and the Muses—on which they base their rituals. And they persuade not only private individuals, but whole cities, that there are in fact absolutions and purifications for unjust deeds. For the living, these consist of ritual sacrifices and pleasant games. But there are also special rites for the dead. These initiations, as they call them, free people [*365a*] from evils hereafter, while terrible things await those who have not performed the rituals.

With so many things of this sort, my dear Socrates, being said about virtue and vice, and about how human beings and gods honor them, what effect do we suppose they have on the souls of young people? I mean those who are naturally gifted and able to flit, so to speak, from one of these sayings to another and gather from them an impression of what sort of people they should be, and of how best to travel the road of life. He [*b*] would surely

ask himself Pindar's question: "Is it by justice or by crooked tricks that I will scale the higher wall," and so live out my life surrounded by secure defenses? And he will answer: "As for what people say, they say that there is no advantage in my being just if I am not also thought just, whereas the troubles and penalties of being just are apparent; but the unjust person, who has secured for himself a reputation for justice, lives the life of a god. Since, then, 'opinion forcibly overcomes truth,' and 'controls happiness,' as the wise men say, I must surely turn entirely to it.[20] I [*c*] should create an illusionist painting of virtue around me to deceive those who come near, but keep behind it the wise Archilochus' greedy and cunning fox."

"But surely," someone will object, "it is not easy for evil to remain always hidden." We will reply that nothing great is easy. And, in any case, if we are to be happy, we must go where the tracks of the arguments lead. To [*d*] remain undiscovered we will form secret societies and political clubs. And there are teachers of persuasion to make us clever in dealing with assemblies and law courts. Therefore, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we will contrive to do better than other people, without paying the penalty.

"But surely we cannot hide from the gods or overpower them by force!" Well, if the gods do not exist, or do not concern themselves with human affairs, why should we worry at all about hiding from them? On the other hand, if they do exist, and do care about us, we know nothing about them [*e*] except what we have learned from the laws and from the poets who give their genealogies. But these are the very people who tell us that the gods can be persuaded and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers, and offerings. Hence, we should believe them on both matters, or on neither. If we believe them, we should be unjust and offer sacrifices from the fruits of our [*366a*] injustice. For if we are just, our only gain is not to be punished by the gods, but we will lose the profits of our injustice. But if we are unjust, we will get those profits, and afterward we will entreat the gods and, persuading them, escape with our crimes and transgressions unpunished.

"But in Hades, won't we pay the penalty for crimes committed here, either ourselves or through our children's children?" "My friend," the young man will say as he does his rational calculation, "mystery rites and the gods of absolution have great power. The greatest cities tell us this, as do [*b*] those

children of the gods who have become the gods' poets and prophets and reveal it to be so."

On the basis of what further argument, then, should we choose justice over the greatest injustice? For if we possess such injustice with a false façade, we will do as we have a mind to among gods and humans, both while we are living and when we are dead, as both the masses and the eminent claim. So given all that has been said, Socrates, what device could get [*c*] someone with any power—whether of mind, wealth, body, or family—to be willing to honor justice, and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised?

Indeed, if anyone can show that what we have said is false, and has adequate knowledge that justice is best, what he feels for unjust people won't be anger, but a large measure of forgiveness. After all, he knows that apart from someone of godlike character who is disgusted by doing {260} injustice, or someone who has gained knowledge and avoids injustice for that reason, no [*d*] one is just willingly. Through cowardice or old age or some other weakness, people do indeed object to injustice. But it is obvious that they do so only because they lack the power to do injustice. For the first of them to gain that power is the first to do as much injustice as he can.

And all this has no other cause than the one that led to the whole of Glaucon's and my argument with you, Socrates. "Socrates, you amazing [*e*] man," we said, "of all of you who claim to praise justice, beginning from the earliest heroes of old whose accounts survive up to the men of the present day, not one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except by mentioning the reputations, honors, and rewards that are their consequences. No one has ever adequately described what each does itself, through its own power, by its presence in the soul of the person who possesses it, even if it remains hidden from gods and humans. No one, whether in poetry or in private discussions, has adequately argued that injustice is the greatest evil a soul can have in it, and justice the greatest good. If all of you had spoken in this way and had tried to persuade us [*367a*] from our earliest youth, we would not now be guarding against one another's injustice, but each would be his own best guardian, afraid that by doing injustice he would be living on intimate terms with the worst thing possible."

That, Socrates, and probably other things in addition, are what Thrasymachus (or possibly someone else) might say in discussing justice

and injustice—crudely inverting their power, in my view. But I—for I have no reason to hide anything from you—want to hear the opposite from you, [*b*] and that is why I am speaking with all the force I can muster. So do not merely demonstrate to us by argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but tell us what each one itself does, because of itself, to someone who possesses it, that makes the one bad and the other good. Follow Glaucon's advice and do not take reputations into account.[21] For if you do not deprive justice and injustice of their true reputations and attach false ones to them, we will say that it is not justice you are praising, but its reputation; nor injustice you are condemning, but its reputation; and that you are encouraging us to be unjust but keep it secret. In that case, we will say [*c*] that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one's own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker.

You agree that justice is one of the greatest goods, the ones that are worth having for the sake of their consequences, but much more so for their own sake—such as seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy, of course, and all the others that are genuine goods by nature and not simply by [*d*] repute. This is what I want you to praise about justice. How does it—because of its very self—benefit its possessor, and how does injustice harm him? Leave wages and reputations for others to praise.

I can put up with other people praising justice and blaming injustice in that way—extolling the reputations and wages of the one and denigrating those of the other. But I won't put up with that from you (unless you insist on it). For you have spent your whole life investigating this and nothing else. So do not merely demonstrate to us by argument that justice is stronger [*e*] than injustice, but show what effect each one itself has, because of itself, on the person who has it—the one for good, the other for bad—whether it remains hidden from gods and human beings or not.

Now, I had always admired the natural characters of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but I was especially pleased when I heard what they had to say on this occasion, and I replied: Sons of that man,[22] Glaucon's lover was not wrong to begin the elegy he [*368a*] wrote, when you distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara, by addressing you as "Sons of Ariston, godlike family of a famous man." That, my dear friends, was well said, in

my view. For something altogether {261} godlike must have affected you if you are not convinced that injustice is better than justice and yet can speak like that on its behalf. And I do believe that [*b*] you really are unconvinced by your own words. I infer this from your general character, since if I had only your arguments to go on, I would not trust you. The more I trust you, however, the more I am at a loss as to what to do. I do not see how I can be of help. Indeed, I believe I am incapable of it. And here is my evidence: I thought that what I said to Thrasymachus showed that justice is better than injustice, but you won't accept that from me as a proof. On the other hand, I do not see how I can refuse my help. For I fear that it may even be impious to have breath in one's body and the ability to speak, and yet stand idly by and not defend justice when it is being [*c*] prosecuted. The best thing, then, is to give justice any assistance I can.

Glaucon and the others begged me not to abandon the argument but to help in every way to track down what justice and injustice each is, and the truth about their respective benefits. So I told them what I had in mind: The investigation we are undertaking is not an easy one, in my view, but requires keen eyesight. So, since we are not clever people, I think we [*d*] should adopt the method of investigation that we would use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to identify small letters from a distance, and then noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We would consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to identify the larger ones first, and then to examine the smaller ones to see whether they are really the same.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course we would. But how is this case similar to our [*e*] investigation of justice in your view?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. We say, don't we, that there is a justice that belongs to a single man, and also one that belongs to a whole city?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And a city is larger than a single man?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is larger.

SOCRATES: Perhaps, then, there will be more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let's first find out what [*369a*] sort of thing justice is in cities, and afterward look for it in the individual, to see if the larger entity is similar in form to the smaller one.

ADEIMANTUS: I think that is a fine idea.

SOCRATES: If, in our discussion, we could look at a city coming to be, wouldn't we also see its justice coming to be, and its injustice as well?

ADEIMANTUS: We probably would.

SOCRATES: And once that process is completed, could we expect to find what we are looking for more easily?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, much more easily. [*b*]

SOCRATES: Do you think we should try to carry it out then? It is no small task, in my view. So, think it over.

ADEIMANTUS: It has been thought over. Don't do anything besides try.

SOCRATES: Well, then, a city comes to exist, I believe, because none of us is individually self-sufficient, but each has many needs he cannot satisfy. Or do you think that a city is founded on some other principle?

ADEIMANTUS: No, none.

SOCRATES: Then because we have many needs, and because one of us calls on another out of one need, and on a third out of a different need, we [*c*] gather many into a single settlement as partners and helpers. And we call such a shared settlement a city. Isn't that so?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And if they share things with one another—if they give something to one another, or take something from one another—don't they do so because each believes that this is better for himself?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, let's, in our discussion, create a city from the beginning. But its real creator, it seems, will be our need.

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, the first and greatest of our needs is to provide food in [*d*] order to sustain existence and life.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, absolutely.

SOCRATES: The second is for shelter, and the third is for clothes and things of that sort.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

{262} SOCRATES: Tell me, then, how will a city be able to provide all this? Won't one person have to be a farmer, another a builder, and another a weaver? And shouldn't we add a shoemaker to them, or someone else to take care of our bodily needs?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: A city with the barest necessities, then, would consist of four or five men?

[*e*] ADEIMANTUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: Well, then, should each of them contribute his own work for the common use of all? I mean, should a farmer, although he is only one person, provide food for four people, and spend quadruple the time and labor to provide food to be shared by them all? Or should he not be concerned about everyone else? Should he produce one quarter the food in one quarter the time for himself alone? Should he spend the other three [*370a*] quarters providing a house, a cloak, and shoes? Should he save himself the bother of sharing with other people and mind his own business on his own?

ADEIMANTUS: The first alternative, Socrates, is perhaps easier.

SOCRATES: There is nothing strange in that, by Zeus. You see, it occurred to me while you were speaking that, in the first place, we are not all born alike. On the contrary, each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, [*b*] one being suited to one job, another to another. Or don't you think so?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: Well, then, would one person do better work if he practiced many crafts or if he practiced one?

ADEIMANTUS: If he practiced one.

SOCRATES: And it is also clear, I take it, that if one misses the opportune moment in any job, the work is spoiled.

ADEIMANTUS: It is clear.

SOCRATES: That, I take it, is because the thing that has to be done won't wait until the doer has the leisure to do it. No, instead the doer must, of necessity, pay close attention to what has to be done and not leave it for his [*c*] idle moments.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, he must.

SOCRATES: The result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced, if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited and does it at the opportune moment, because his time is freed from all the others.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then, Adeimantus, we are going to need more than four citizens to provide the things we have mentioned. For a farmer won't make his own plow, it seems, if it is going to be a good one, nor his hoe, nor any of [*d*] his other farm implements. Nor will a carpenter—and he, too, needs lots of tools. And the same is true of a weaver and a shoemaker, isn't it?

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: So carpenters, metalworkers, and many other craftsmen of that sort will share our little city and make it bigger.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Yet it still would not be a great settlement, even if we added cowherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, so that the farmers would have cows to do their plowing, the builders oxen to share with the farmers [*e*] in hauling their materials, and the weavers and shoemakers hides and fleeces to use.

ADEIMANTUS: It would not be a small city either, if it had to hold all that.

SOCRATES: Moreover, it is almost impossible, at any rate, to establish the city itself in the sort of place where it will need no imports.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is impossible.

SOCRATES: Then we will need still other people who will import whatever is needed from another city.

ADEIMANTUS: We will.

SOCRATES: And if our servant goes empty-handed to another city, without any of the things needed by those from whom he is trying to get what his own people need, he will come away empty-handed, won't he? [*371a*]

ADEIMANTUS: I should think so.

SOCRATES: Our citizens, then, must produce not only enough for themselves at home, but also goods of the right quality and quantity to satisfy the needs of others.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, they must.

{263} SOCRATES: So we will need more farmers and other craftsmen in our city.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And also other servants, I imagine, who are to take care of imports and exports. These are merchants, aren't they?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: We will need merchants too, then.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And if the trade is carried on by sea, we will need a great many others who have [*b*] expert knowledge of the business of the sea.

ADEIMANTUS: A great many, indeed.

SOCRATES: Again, within the city itself, how will people share with one another the things they each produce? It was in order to *share*, after all, that we associated with one another and founded a city.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly, they must do it by buying and selling.

SOCRATES: Then we will need a marketplace and a currency for such exchange.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: So if a farmer or any other craftsman brings some of his products [*c*] to the marketplace, and he does not arrive at the same time as those who want to exchange things with him, is he to sit idly in the marketplace, neglecting his own craft?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all. On the contrary, there will be people who notice this situation and provide the requisite service—in well-organized cities, they are generally those whose bodies are weakest and who are not fit to do any other sort of work. Their job is to wait there in the marketplace and [*d*] exchange money for the goods of those who have something to sell, and then to exchange goods for the money of those who want to buy them.

SOCRATES: This need, then, causes retailers to be present in our city. Those who wait in the marketplace, and provide this service of buying and selling, are called retailers, aren’t they, whereas those who travel between cities are merchants?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that’s right.

SOCRATES: There are also other servants, I think, whose minds would not [*e*] altogether qualify them for membership in our community, but whose bodies are strong enough for hard labor. So they sell the use of their strength for a price called a wage, and that is why they are called wage-earners. Isn’t that so?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So the wage-earners too, it seems, serve to complete our city?

ADEIMANTUS: I think so.

SOCRATES: Well, then, Adeimantus, has our city now grown to completeness?

ADEIMANTUS: Maybe it has.

SOCRATES: Then where are justice and injustice to be found in it? With which of the people we considered did they come in?

ADEIMANTUS: I have no idea, Socrates, unless [*372a*] it is somewhere in some need that these people have of one another.

SOCRATES: Perhaps what you say is right. We must look into it and not back off. First, then, let's see what sort of life people will lead who have been provided for in this way. They will make food, wine, clothes, and shoes, won't they? And they will build themselves houses. In the summer, they will mostly work naked and barefoot, but in the winter they will wear adequate clothing and shoes. For nourishment, they will provide themselves [*b*] with barley meal and wheat flour, which they will knead and bake into noble cakes and loaves and serve up on a reed or on clean leaves. They will recline on couches strewn with yew and myrtles and feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They will enjoy having sex with one another, but they will produce no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war. [*c*]

At this point Glaucon interrupted and said:

It seems that you make your people feast without any relishes.[23]

SOCRATES: True enough, I was forgetting that they will also have relishes —salt, of course, and olives and cheese, and they will boil roots and vegetables the way they boil them in the country. We will give them desserts too, I imagine, consisting of figs, chickpeas, and beans. And they will roast myrtles and acorns before the fire and drink {264} in moderation. And so they will live in peace and good health, it seems, and when they die at a [*d*] ripe old age, they will pass on a similar sort of life to their children.

GLAUCON: If you were founding a city of pigs, Socrates, isn't that just what you would provide to fatten *them*?

SOCRATES: What, then, would you have me do, Glaucon?

GLAUCON: Just what is conventional. If they are not to suffer hardship, they should recline on proper couches, I suppose, dine at tables, and have the relishes and desserts that people have nowadays. [*e*]

SOCRATES: All right, I understand. It isn't merely the origins of a city that we are considering, it seems, but those of a city that is *luxurious*, too. And

that may not be a bad idea. For by examining such a city, we might perhaps see how justice and injustice grow up in cities. Yet the true city, in my view, is the one we have described: the healthy one, as it were. But if you also want to look at a feverish city, so be it. There is nothing to stop us. You see, the things I mentioned earlier, and the way of life I described, won't satisfy [*373a*] some people, it seems; but couches, tables, and other furniture will have to be added to it, and relishes, of course, and incense, perfumes, prostitutes, pastries—and the multifariousness of each of them. In particular, we cannot just provide them with the necessities[24] we mentioned at first, such as houses, clothes, and shoes; no, instead we will have to get painting and embroidery going, and procure gold and ivory and all sorts of everything of that sort. Isn't that so?

[*B*] GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then we will have to enlarge our city again: the healthy one is no longer adequate. On the contrary, we must now increase it in size and population and fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary for a city—hunters, for example, and all those imitators. Many of the latter work with shapes and colors; many with music—poets and their assistants, rhapsodes,[25] actors, choral dancers, theatrical producers. And there will have to be craftsmen of multifarious devices, including, among other things, those needed for the adornment of women. In particular, then, we [*c*] will need more servants—don't you think—such as tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, and relish cooks and meat cooks, too? Moreover, we will also need people to farm pigs. This animal did not exist in our earlier city, since there was no need for it, but we will need it in this one. And we will also need large numbers of other meat-producing animals, won't we, if someone is going to eat them?

GLAUCON: We certainly will.

SOCRATES: And if we live like that, won't we have a far greater need for [*d*] doctors than we did before?

GLAUCON: Yes, far greater.

SOCRATES: And the land, I take it, that used to be adequate to feed the population we had then will now be small and inadequate. Or don't you agree?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Won’t we have to seize some of our neighbors’ land, then, if we are to have enough for pasture and plowing? And won’t our neighbors want to seize part of ours in turn, if they too have abandoned themselves to the endless acquisition of money and overstepped the limit of their necessary desires?

GLAUCON: Yes, that is quite inevitable, Socrates. [*e*]

SOCRATES: And the next step will be war, Glaucon, don’t you agree?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Now, let’s not say yet whether the effects of war are good or bad, but only that we have now found the origin of war: it comes from those same factors, the occurrence of which is the source of the greatest evils for cities and the individuals in them.

GLAUCON: Indeed, it does.

SOCRATES: The city must be further enlarged, then, my dear Glaucon, and not just a little, but by the size of a whole army. It will do battle with the invaders in defense of the city’s wealth, and of all the other things we [*374a*] just described.

GLAUCON: Why so? Aren’t the inhabitants themselves adequate for that purpose?

{265} SOCRATES: No, not, at any rate, if the agreement that you and the rest of us made when we were founding the city was a good one. I think we agreed, if you remember, that it is impossible for a single person to practice many crafts well.

GLAUCON: True, we did say that.

SOCRATES: Well, then, don’t you think that warfare is a craft? [*b*]

GLAUCON: It is, indeed.

SOCRATES: So, should we be more concerned about the craft of shoemaking than the craft of warfare?

GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Well, now, we prevented a shoemaker from trying to be a farmer, weaver, or builder at the same time, instead of just a shoemaker, in order to ensure that the shoemaker’s job was done well. Similarly, we also assigned just the one job for which he had a natural aptitude to each of the other people, and said that he was to work at it his whole life, free from having to do any of the other jobs, so as not to miss the opportune [*c*] moments for performing it well. But isn’t it of the greatest importance that

warfare be carried out well? Or is fighting a war so easy that a farmer, a shoemaker, or any other artisan can be a soldier at the same time, even though no one can become so much as a good checkers player or dice player if he considers it only as a sideline and does not practice it from childhood? Can someone just pick up a shield, or any other weapon or instrument of war and immediately become a competent fighter in an [*d*] infantry battle or whatever other sort of battle it may be, even though no other tool makes someone who picks it up a craftsman or an athlete, or is even of any service to him unless he has acquired knowledge of it and has had sufficient practice?

GLAUCON: If tools could do that, they would be valuable indeed.

SOCRATES: Then to the degree that the guardians' job is of greatest importance, [*e*] it requires the most freedom from other things, as well as the greatest craft and practice.

GLAUCON: I should think so.

SOCRATES: And doesn't it also require a person whose nature is suited to that very practice?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then our task, it seems, is to select, if we can, which natures, which sorts of natures, suit people to guard the city.

GLAUCON: Yes, that is our task.

SOCRATES: By Zeus, it is no trivial task that we have taken on, then. All the same, we must not shrink from it, but do the best we can.

GLAUCON: No, we must not. [*375a*]

SOCRATES: Do you think that there is any difference, when it comes to the job of guarding, between the nature of a noble hound and that of a well-bred youth?

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean that both of them have to be sharp-eyed, quick to catch what they see, and strong, too, in case they have to fight what they capture.

GLAUCON: Yes, they need all these things.

SOCRATES: And they must be courageous, surely, if indeed they are to fight well.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Now, will a horse, a dog, or any other animal be courageous if it is not spirited? Or haven't you noticed just how invincible and unbeatable

[*b*] spirit is, so that its presence makes the whole soul fearless and unconquerable in any situation?

GLAUCON: I have noticed that.

SOCRATES: Then it is clear what physical qualities the guardians should have.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And as far as their souls are concerned, they must, at any rate, be spirited.

GLAUCON: That too.

SOCRATES: But with natures like that, Glaucon, how will they avoid behaving like savages to one another and to the other citizens?

GLAUCON: By Zeus, it won't be easy for them.

SOCRATES: But surely they must be gentle to [*c*] their own people and harsh to their enemies. Otherwise, they will not wait around for others to destroy them, but will do it themselves first.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Where are we to find a character that is both gentle and high-spirited at the same time? For, of course, a gentle nature is the opposite of the spirited kind.

GLAUCON: Apparently.

{266} SOCRATES: But surely if someone lacks either of these qualities, he cannot be a good guardian. Yet the combination of them seems to be impossible. And so it follows, then, that a good guardian is impossible. [*d*]

GLAUCON: I am afraid so.

I could not see a way out, and on reexamining what had gone before, I said:

We deserve to be stuck, my dear Glaucon. For we have lost track of the analogy we put forward.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: We have overlooked the fact that there *are* natures of the sort we thought impossible, ones that include these opposite qualities.

GLAUCON: Where?

SOCRATES: You can see the combination in other animals, too, but especially in the one to which we compared the guardian. For you know, of course, that noble hounds naturally have a character of that sort. They are as

[*e*] gentle as can be to those they are familiar with and know, but the opposite to those they do not know.

GLAUCON: Yes, I do know that.

SOCRATES: So the combination we want is possible, after all, and what we are seeking in a good guardian is not contrary to nature.

GLAUCON: No, I suppose not.

SOCRATES: Now, don't you think that our future guardian, besides being spirited, must also be, by nature, philosophical?

GLAUCON: How do you mean? I don't understand. [*376a*]

SOCRATES: It too is something you see in dogs, and it should make us wonder at the merit of the beast.

GLAUCON: In what way?

SOCRATES: In that when a dog sees someone it does not know, it gets angry even before anything bad happens to it. But when it knows someone, it welcomes him, even if it has never received anything good from him. Have you never wondered at that?

GLAUCON: I have never paid it any mind until now. But it is clear that a dog does do that sort of thing.

SOCRATES: Well, that seems to be a naturally refined quality, and one that is truly philosophical. [*b*]

GLAUCON: In what way?

SOCRATES: In that it judges anything it sees to be either a friend or an enemy on no other basis than that it knows the one and does not know the other. And how could it be anything besides a lover of learning if it defines what is its own and what is alien to it in terms of knowledge and ignorance?

GLAUCON: It surely could not be anything but.

SOCRATES: But surely the love of learning and philosophy are the same, aren't they?

GLAUCON: Yes, they are the same.

SOCRATES: Then can't we confidently assume that the same holds for a human being too—that if he is going to be gentle to his own and those he [*c*] knows, he must be, by nature, a lover of learning and a philosopher?

GLAUCON: We can.

SOCRATES: Philosophy, then, and spirit, speed, and strength as well, must all be combined in the nature of anyone who is going to be a really fine and good guardian of our city.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then that is what he would have to be like at the outset. But how are we to bring these people up and educate them? Will inquiring into that topic bring us any closer to the goal of our inquiry, which is to discover [*d*] the origins of justice and injustice in a city? We want our account to be adequate, but we do not want it to be any longer than necessary.

And Glaucon's brother replied:

I for one certainly expect that this inquiry will help us.

SOCRATES: By Zeus, in that case, my dear Adeimantus, we must not abandon it, even if it turns out to be a somewhat lengthy affair.

ADEIMANTUS: No, we must not.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and like people in a fable telling stories at their leisure, let's in our discussion educate these men.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, let's. [*e*]

SOCRATES: What, then, will the education be? Or is it difficult to find a better one than the one that has been discovered over a long period of time —physical training for bodies and musical training for the soul?[26]

{267} ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: Now, won't we start musical training before physical training?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And you include stories under musical training, don't you?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: But aren't there two kinds of stories, one true and the other false?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And education must make use of both, [*377a*] but first of the false ones?

ADEIMANTUS: I do not understand what you mean.

SOCRATES: Don't you understand that we first begin by telling stories to children? And surely they are false on the whole, though they have some truth in them. And we use stories on children before physical training.

ADEIMANTUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: That, then, is what I meant by saying that musical training should be taken up before physical training.

ADEIMANTUS: And you were right.

SOCRATES: Now, you know, don’t you, that the beginning of any job is of greatest importance, especially when we are dealing with anything young and tender? For that is when it is especially malleable and best takes [*b*] on whatever pattern one wishes to impress on it.

ADEIMANTUS: Precisely so.

SOCRATES: Shall we carelessly allow our children to hear any old stories made up by just anyone, then, and to take beliefs into their souls that are, for the most part, the opposite of the ones we think they should hold when they are grown up?

ADEIMANTUS: We certainly won’t allow that at all.

SOCRATES: So our first task, it seems, is to supervise the storytellers: if they make up a good story, we must accept it; if not, we must reject it. We will persuade nurses and mothers to tell the acceptable ones to their children, [*c*] and to spend far more time shaping their souls with these stories than they do shaping their bodies by handling them. Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out.

ADEIMANTUS: Which sorts?

SOCRATES: In the more significant stories, we will see the less significant ones as well. For surely the more significant ones and the less significant ones both follow the same pattern and have the same effects. Don’t you [*d*] think so?

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, I do. But I do not understand at all what more significant ones you mean.

SOCRATES: The ones Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us. After all, they surely composed false stories, which they told and are still telling to people.

ADEIMANTUS: Which stories do you mean? And what is the fault you find in them?

SOCRATES: The first and greatest fault that one ought to find, especially if the falsehood has no good features.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, but what *is* it?

SOCRATES: Using a story to create a bad image [*e*] of what the gods and heroes are like, just as a painter might paint a picture that is not at all like the things he is trying to paint.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, you are right to find fault with that. But what cases in particular, what sorts of cases, do you mean?

SOCRATES: First, the greatest falsehood about the greatest things has no good features—I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished [*378a*] by his own son.[27] But even if these stories were true, they should be passed over in silence, I would think, and not told so casually to the foolish and the young. And if, for some reason, they must be told, only a very few people should hear them—people who are pledged to secrecy and have had to sacrifice not just a pig, but something so great and scarce that the number of people who hear them is kept as small as possible.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, those stories are certainly troubling.

{268} [*b*] SOCRATES: And they should not be told in our city, Adeimantus. No young person should hear it said that if he were to commit the worst crimes, he would be doing nothing amazing, or that if he were to inflict every sort of punishment on an unjust father, he would only be doing the same as the first and greatest of the gods.

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I do not think myself that these stories are fit to be told.

SOCRATES: Indeed, we must not allow *any* stories about gods warring, fighting, or plotting against one another if we want the guardians of our city to think that it is shameful to be easily provoked into mutual hatred. After all, those stories are not true either. Still less should battles between [*c*] gods and giants, or the many other multifarious hostilities of gods and heroes toward their families and friends, occur in the stories the guardians hear or in the embroidered pictures they see. On the contrary, if we are somehow going to persuade our people that no citizen has ever hated another, and that it is impious to do so, then *those* are the things their male and female elders should tell them from childhood on. And the poets they [*d*] listen to as they grow older should be compelled to tell them the same sort of thing. Stories about Hera being chained by her son, on the other hand, or about Hephaestus being hurled from the heavens by his father when he tried to save his mother from a beating, or about the battle of the gods in Homer, should not be admitted into our city, either as allegories or non-allegories. For the young cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not. And the beliefs they absorb at that age are difficult to erase and tend to become unalterable. For these reasons, then, we should probably take the [*e*] utmost

care to ensure that the first stories they hear about virtue are the best ones for them to hear.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that makes sense. But if, at this point too, someone were once again to ask us what stories these are, how should we reply?

SOCRATES: You and I are not poets at present, Adeimantus, but we are founding a city. And it is appropriate for the founders to know the patterns [*379a*] on which the poets must base their stories, and from which they must not deviate. But they should not themselves make up any poems.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right. But what precisely are the patterns that stories about the gods must follow?

SOCRATES: Something like this: whether in epic, lyric, or tragedy, a god must always be represented as he is.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, he must.

SOCRATES: Now, gods,[28] of course, are really good, aren't they, and must be described as such? [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And surely nothing good is harmful, is it?

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose not.

SOCRATES: Well, can what is not harmful do any harm?

ADEIMANTUS: No, never.

SOCRATES: And can what does no harm do anything bad?

ADEIMANTUS: No, it can't do that either.

SOCRATES: But what does nothing bad could not be the cause of anything bad, could it?

ADEIMANTUS: No, it could not.

SOCRATES: What about what is good? Is it beneficial?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, it is the cause of doing well?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What is good is not the cause of all things, then. Instead, it is the cause of things that are good, while of bad ones it is not the cause.

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly. [*c*]

SOCRATES: So, since gods are good, they are not—as the masses claim—the cause of everything. Instead, they are a cause of only a few things that happen to human beings, while of most they are not the cause. For good

things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. Of the good things, they alone are the cause, but we must find some other cause for the bad ones, not the gods.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true in my view.

SOCRATES: Then we won't accept from Homer—or from anyone else—the [*d*] foolish mistake he makes about the gods when he says: {269} "There are two urns at the threshold of Zeus, one filled with good fates, the other with bad ones," and the person to whom Zeus gives a mixture of these "sometimes meets with a bad fate, sometimes with a good one." But the one who receives his fate entirely from the second urn, "evil famine drives over the [*e*] divine earth." Nor will we tolerate the saying that "Zeus is the dispenser of both good and bad to mortals." As for the breaking of the oaths and the truce by Pandarus, if anyone tells us that it was brought about by Athena and Zeus, or that Themis and Zeus were responsible for strife and contention among the gods, we won't praise him. Nor will we allow the young to [*380a*] hear the words of Aeschylus: "A god makes mortals guilty, when he wants to destroy a house utterly."[29] And if anyone composes a poem, such as the one those lines are from, about the sufferings of Niobe, or about the house of Pelops, or the tale of Troy, or anything else of that sort, he should be required to say that these things are not the works of a god. Or, if they are the works of a god, then the poet must look for roughly the sort of account of them we are now seeking: he must say that the actions of the gods are good and just, and that the people they punish are benefited by them. We [*b* won't allow him to say that those who are punished are made wretched, and that it was a god who made them so; but we will allow him to say that bad people are wretched because they are in need of punishment, and that in paying the penalty they are benefited by that god. But as for saying that a god, who is himself good, is the cause of evils, we will fight that in every way. We won't allow anyone to say it in his own city, if it is to be well governed, or anyone to hear it either—whether young or old, whether with meter or without meter. For these stories are impious, disadvantageous to [*c*] us, and not in concord with one another.

ADEIMANTUS: I like your law, and I will vote with you for it.

SOCRATES: This, then, will be one of the laws or patterns relating to gods that speakers and poets will have to follow: that gods are not the cause of all

things, but only of good ones.

ADEIMANTUS: And an entirely satisfactory one it is.

SOCRATES: Now, what about this second law? Do you think that gods are sorcerers who deliberately take different forms at different times, sometimes [*d*] by changing on their own and altering their own form into a large number of shapes, sometimes by deceiving us into thinking they have done so? Or are they simple beings, and least of all likely to abandon their own form?

ADEIMANTUS: I can't say offhand.

SOCRATES: Well, if something abandons its own form, mustn't it either cause the change itself or be changed by something else? [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: It must.

SOCRATES: Now, the best things are least liable to alteration or change, aren't they? For example, a body is altered by food, drink, and labors, and all plants by sun, winds, and other similar affections—but the healthiest and strongest is least altered, isn't that so?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course. [*381a*]

SOCRATES: And wouldn't a soul that is most courageous and most knowledgeable be least disturbed or altered by any outside influence?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the same account surely also applies even to manufactured items, such as implements, houses, and clothes: those that are good and well made are least altered by time or any other influences.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: So whatever is in good condition—whether due to nature or [*b*] craft or both—is least subject to change by something else.

ADEIMANTUS: It seems so.

SOCRATES: But gods, of course, as well as the things belonging to them, are best in every way.

ADEIMANTUS: They certainly are.

SOCRATES: So, on this view, gods would be least likely to have many forms.

ADEIMANTUS: Least likely, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then would they change or alter themselves?

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly so, if indeed they are altered at all.

{270} SOCRATES: Do they change themselves into something better and more beautiful, or into something worse and uglier, than themselves?

ADEIMANTUS: It would have to be into something worse, if indeed they [*c*] are altered at all. For surely we won't say that gods are deficient in either beauty or virtue.

SOCRATES: You are absolutely right. And do you think, Adeimantus, that anyone, whether god or human, would deliberately make himself worse in any way?

ADEIMANTUS: No, that is impossible.

SOCRATES: It is also impossible, then, for a god to want to alter himself. On the contrary, since each god is, it seems, as beautiful and as good as possible, he must always unqualifiedly retain his own form.

ADEIMANTUS: In my view, at least, that is absolutely necessary.

[*d*] SOCRATES: None of our poets, then, my very good man, is to say that "The gods, like strangers from foreign lands, assume many disguises when they visit our cities."[30] Nor must they tell lies about Proteus and Thetis, or present Hera, in their tragedies or other poems, disguised as a priestess collecting alms for "the life-giving sons of the Argive river Inachus,"[31] or tell us [*e*] any of the many other such lies. Nor should mothers, influenced by these stories, which terrify children, tell bad tales about gods who go wandering around at night in the guises of many strange and multifarious beings, lest they blaspheme the gods and, at the same time, make their children too cowardly.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, they should not.

SOCRATES: But, though the gods themselves are the sorts of things that cannot change, do they make us think that they appear in multifarious guises, deceiving us and using sorcery on us?

ADEIMANTUS: Perhaps they do.

SOCRATES: What? Would a god be willing to lie by presenting in word or [*382a*] deed what is only an illusion?

ADEIMANTUS: I don't know.

SOCRATES: Don't you know that all gods and humans hate a true lie, if one may call it that?

ADEIMANTUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean that no one intentionally wants to lie about the most important things to what is most important in himself. On the contrary, he fears to hold a lie there more than anything.

ADEIMANTUS: I still don't understand.

SOCRATES: That is because you think I am saying something deep. I simply mean that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are,[32] [*b*] and to be ignorant, and to have and hold a lie there, is what everyone would least of all accept; indeed, they especially hate it there.

ADEIMANTUS: They certainly do.

SOCRATES: But surely, as I was saying just now, it would be most correct to say that it is truly speaking a lie—the ignorance in the soul of the one to whom the lie was told. For a lie in words is a sort of imitation of this affection in the soul, an image of it that comes into being after it, and not an altogether pure lie. Isn't that so? [*c*]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: A real lie, then, is hated not only by the gods, but also by human beings.

ADEIMANTUS: I think it is.

SOCRATES: What about a lie in words? Aren't there times when it is useful, and so does not merit hatred? What about when we are dealing with enemies, or with so-called friends who, because of insanity or ignorance, are attempting to do something bad? Isn't it a useful drug for preventing them? And consider the case of those stories we were talking about just now—those we tell because we do not know the truth about those ancient events: [*d*] by making the lies that they contain as much like the truth as possible, don't we make them useful?

ADEIMANTUS: We most certainly do.

SOCRATES: In which of these ways, then, could a lie be useful to a god? Would he lie by making likenesses of the truth about ancient events because of his ignorance of them?

{271} ADEIMANTUS: It would be ridiculous to think that.

SOCRATES: Then there is nothing of the lying poet in a god?

ADEIMANTUS: Not in my view.

SOCRATES: Would he lie, then, through fear of his enemies?

[*e*] ADEIMANTUS: Hardly.

SOCRATES: Because of the foolishness or insanity of his family or friends, then?

ADEIMANTUS: No one who is foolish or mad is a friend of the gods.

SOCRATES: So a god has no reason to lie?

ADEIMANTUS: None.

SOCRATES: So both what is daimonic[33] and what is divine are entirely free of lies.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: A god, then, is altogether simple, true in both word and deed. He does not change himself or deceive others by means of images, by words, or by sending signs, whether they are awake or dreaming.

ADEIMANTUS: That is my view—at any rate, now that I have heard what [*383a*] you have to say.

SOCRATES: You agree, then, that this is the second pattern people must follow when speaking or composing poems about the gods: the gods are not sorcerers who change themselves, nor do they mislead us by telling lies in word or deed.

ADEIMANTUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: Even though we praise many things in Homer, then, we won't approve of Zeus' sending the dream to Agamemnon, nor of Aeschylus [*b*] when he makes Thetis say that Apollo sang, in prophecy at her wedding: About the good luck my children would have,

Free of disease throughout their long lives,
And of all the blessings the friendship of the gods would bring me.
I hoped that Phoebus' divine mouth would be free of lies,
Endowed as it is with the craft of prophecy.
But the very god who sang, the one at the feast,
The one who said all that, he himself it is
Who killed my son.[34]

Whenever anyone says such things about a god, we will be angry with him, refuse him a chorus,[35] and not allow teachers to use what he says for the [*c*] education of the young—not if our guardians are going to be as god-fearing and godlike as human beings can be.

ADEIMANTUS: I agree completely about these patterns, and I would use them as laws.

BOOK III

HAVING COMPLETED HIS discussion of the content of the stories about gods and heroes that the guardian should hear as part of their early training in music and poetry (392a), Socrates turns to the content of stories about human beings, only to postpone his discussion of it until Book X. The next topic is the selection of rulers or "complete guardians" from among the class of guardians (412b–414b). The final topic is the housing and lifestyles of the rulers, which includes the so-called Myth of the Metals (414c–417b).

The luxurious city (372e) has now been "purified" (399e). This purified city, complete with guardians and rulers, is the second stage in Plato's account of his ideal city. It contains money-loving producers and honor-loving guardians, but no full-blown Platonic philosophers. For the educational institutions needed to produce such philosophers have not yet been provided for in the city's constitution.

{272} SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES:

[*386a*] SOCRATES: Where the gods are concerned, then, it seems that those are the sorts of stories the future guardians should and should not hear from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their parents, and not treat lightly their friendship with one another.

ADEIMANTUS: I am sure we are right about that.

SOCRATES: What about if they are to be courageous? Shouldn't they be told stories that will make them least likely to fear death? Or do you think [*b*] that anyone ever becomes courageous if he has that fear in his heart?

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: What about if someone believes that Hades exists and is full of terrible things? Can anyone with that fear be unafraid of death and prefer it to defeat in battle and slavery?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Then we must also supervise those who try to tell such stories, it seems, and ask them not to disparage the life in Hades in this undiscriminating way, but to speak well of it, since what they now tell us is neither [*c*] true nor beneficial to future warriors.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, we must.

SOCRATES: We will start with the following lines, then, and expunge everything like them: "I would rather labor on earth in another man's service, a man who is landless, with little to live on, than be king over all the dead";[36] and this: "He feared that his home should be revealed to mortals [*d*] and immortals as dreadful, dank, and hated even by the gods;"[37] and: "Alas, there survives in the Halls of Hades a soul, a mere phantasm, with its wits completely gone";[38] and this: "He alone can think others to be flitting shadows";[39] and: "The soul, leaving his limbs, made its way to Hades, lamenting its fate, leaving manhood and youth behind";[40] and this: "His [*387a*] soul went below the earth like smoke, screeching as it went";[41] and:

As when bats in an awful cave
Fly around screeching if one of them falls
From the cluster on the ceiling, all clinging to one another,
so their souls went screeching.[42]

We will beg Homer and the rest of the poets not to be angry if we delete [*b*] these and all similar passages—not because they are not poetic and pleasing to the masses when they hear them, but because the more poetic they are, the more they should be kept away from the ears of children and men who are to be free and to fear slavery more than death.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then, in addition, we must also get rid of the terrible and frightening names that occur in such passages: Cocytus, Styx,[43] "those [*c*] below," "the sapless ones," and all the other names of the same pattern that supposedly make everyone who hears them shudder. Perhaps they are useful for other purposes, but our fear is that all that shuddering will make our guardians more emotional and soft than they ought to be.

ADEIMANTUS: And our fear is justified.

SOCRATES: Should we remove them, then?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And follow the opposite pattern in speech and poetry?

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Shall we also remove the lamentations and pitiful speeches of famous men? [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: If what we did before was necessary, so is that.

SOCRATES: Consider, though, whether we will be right to remove them or not. What we claim {273} is that a good man won't think that death is a terrible thing for another good one to suffer—even if the latter happens to be his friend.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, we do claim that.

SOCRATES: So, he won't mourn for him as if he had suffered a terrible fate.

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: But we also claim this: a good person is most self-sufficient when it comes to living well, and is distinguished from other people by [*e*] having the least need of anyone or anything else.

ADEIMANTUS: True.

SOCRATES: So it is less terrible for him than for anyone else to be deprived of a son, brother, possessions, or the like.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, much less.

SOCRATES: So, he will lament it the least and bear it the most calmly when some such misfortune overtakes him.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: We would be right, then, to remove the lamentations of famous men. We would leave them to women (provided they are not excellent [*388a*] women) and cowardly men, so that those we say we are training to guard our land will feel disgust at doing such things.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: In addition, then, we will have to ask Homer and the other poets not to represent Achilles, who was the son of a goddess, as: Lying now on his side, now on his back, now again

On his belly; then standing up to wander distracted

This way and that on the shore of the unharvested sea;[44]

[*b*] or to make him pick up ashes with both hands and pour them over his head, weeping and lamenting to the extent and in the manner Homer describes;[45] or to represent Priam, a close descendant of the gods, as "begging and rolling around in dung, as he calls upon each of his men by name."[46] And yet more insistently than that, we will ask them at least not to make the gods lament and say: "Woe is me, unfortunate that I am, wretched mother of a [*c*] great son."[47] But, if they do make the gods do such things, at least they must not dare to represent *the greatest of the gods* in so unlikely a fashion as to make him say: "Alas, with my own eyes I see a man who is most dear to me being chased around the city, and my heart laments";[48] or "Woe is me, that Sarpedon, who is most dear to me, should be fated to be killed by Patroclus, the son of Menoetius."[49] You see, my dear Adeimantus, if our young people listen [*d*] seriously to these stories without ridiculing them as not worth hearing, none of them is going to consider such things to be unworthy of a mere human being like himself, or rebuke himself if it occurred to him to do or say any of them. On the contrary, without shame or perseverance, he would chant many dirges and laments at the slightest sufferings.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true. [*e*]

SOCRATES: But that must not happen, as our argument has shown—and we must remain persuaded by it until someone shows us a better one.

ADEIMANTUS: No, it must not.

SOCRATES: Moreover, they must not be lovers of laughter either. For whenever anyone gives in to violent laughter, a violent reaction pretty much always follows.

ADEIMANTUS: I agree.

SOCRATES: So, if someone represents worthwhile people as overcome by laughter, we must not accept it, and we will accept it even less if they represent the gods in that way. [*389a*]

ADEIMANTUS: Much less.

SOCRATES: Then we must not accept the following sorts of sayings about the gods from Homer: "And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods as they saw Hephaestus {274} limping through the hall."[50] According to your argument, they must be rejected.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, if you want to attribute it to [*b*] me, but they must be rejected in any case.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we have to be concerned about truth as well. For if what we said just now is correct and a lie is really useless to the gods, but useful to human beings as a form of drug, it is clear that it must be assigned to doctors, whereas private individuals must have nothing to do with it.

ADEIMANTUS: It is clear.

SOCRATES: It is appropriate for the rulers, then, if anyone, to lie because of enemies or citizens for the good of the city. But no one else may have anything to do with it. On the contrary, we will say that for a private individual to lie to such rulers is as bad a mistake as for a sick person not to tell [*c*] his doctor or an athlete his trainer the truth about his physical condition, or for someone not to tell the captain the things that are true about the ship and the sailors, or about how he himself or one of his fellow sailors is faring—indeed, it is a worse mistake.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true.

[*d*] SOCRATES: So, if anyone else is caught telling lies in the city—"any of the craftsmen, whether a prophet, a doctor who heals the sick, or a carpenter who works in wood"[51]—he will be punished for introducing a practice that is as subversive and destructive of a city as of a ship.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed it is, at any rate, if what people do is influenced by what he says.

SOCRATES: What about temperance? Won't our young people also need that?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And don't the greatest parts of temperance—at any rate for the majority of people—consist in obedience to the rulers and ruling over the pleasures [*e*] of drink, sex, and food for themselves?

ADEIMANTUS: That is my view, anyway.

SOCRATES: So we will claim, I imagine, that it is fine to say the sort of thing that Diomedes says in Homer: "Sit down in silence, my friend, and be persuaded by my story";[52] and what follows it: "The Achaeans went in silently, breathing valor, afraid of their commanders";[53] and anything else of that sort.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is fine.

SOCRATES: But what about things like, “You drunkard, with the eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer,” and what follows it?[54] Are they, then, fine [*390a*] things to say? And what about all the other headstrong things that private individuals say to their rulers in works of prose or poetry?

ADEIMANTUS: No, they are not fine.

SOCRATES: That, I imagine, is because they are not suitable for inculcating temperance in the young people who hear them. But it would not be surprising if they were found pleasant in some other context. What do you think?

ADEIMANTUS: The same as you.

SOCRATES: What about making the wisest man say that the best thing of all, as it seems to him, is when “the tables are well laden with bread and meat, and the wine-bearer draws wine from the mixing bowl, brings it, and [*b*] pours it in the cups”?[55] Do you think that hearing things like that is suitable for inculcating self-mastery in young people? Or that “death by starvation is the most pitiful fate”?[56] Or about how Zeus stayed awake alone deliberating, when all the other gods and mortals were asleep, and then easily forgot all his plans because of his sexual appetite, and was so overcome by the sight [*c*] of Hera that he did not even want to go to their bedroom, but to possess her there on the ground, saying that his appetite for her was even greater than it was when they first made love to one another “without their {275} parents’ knowledge”?[57] Or what about the chaining together of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus[58] for similar reasons?

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, that does not seem suitable to me.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, if there are any words or deeds of famous men that express perseverance in the face of everything, surely they must be [*d*] seen and heard. For example, “He struck his chest and spoke to his heart: ‘Bear up, my heart, you have suffered more shameful things than this.’”[59]

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And we must not, of course, allow our men to be bribable with gifts or to be money-lovers.

[*e*] ADEIMANTUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Then they must not sing: “Gifts persuade gods, and gifts persuade revered kings.”[60] Nor must we praise Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, for being moderate, when he advises Achilles to take the gifts and defend the Achaeans, but not to lay aside his anger without gifts.[61] Nor should we agree that Achilles himself was such a money-lover as to accept the gifts of Agamemnon, or to release a corpse when he got paid for it, but otherwise to refuse.[62] [*391a*]

ADEIMANTUS: No, it certainly is not right to praise such things.

SOCRATES: It is only out of respect for Homer, indeed, that I hesitate to say that it is positively impious to accuse Achilles of such things, or to believe them when others say them. Or to believe that he said to Apollo: “You have injured me, Farshooter, most deadly of the gods; And I would punish you, if only I had the power.”[63] Or that he disobeyed the river—a [*b*] god—and was ready to fight it.[64] Or that he consecrated hair to the dead Patroclus, which he had already consecrated to the other river, Spherchеius: “To the hero, Patroclus, I give my hair to take with him.”[65] We must not believe that he did that. Nor is it true that he dragged the dead Hector around the tomb of Patroclus[66] or massacred the captives on his pyre.[67] So we will deny these things. Nor will we allow our people to believe that [*c*] Achilles—the son of a goddess and of Peleus (who was himself the most temperate of men and the grandson of Zeus), and the pupil of the most wise Cheiron—was so full of inner disorder as to have two opposite diseases within him: illiberality accompanied by the love of money on the one hand, and arrogance toward gods and humans on the other.

ADEIMANTUS: That’s right.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we will neither believe nor allow it to be said that Theseus, the son of Poseidon, and Peirithous, the son of Zeus, ever [*d*] attempted those terrible rapes,[68] nor that any other child of a god and hero dared to do any of the terrible and impious deeds that are now falsely attributed to them. We will compel the poets either to deny that they did such things, or else to deny that they were children of the gods. But they must not say both or attempt to persuade our young people that the gods produce evils, nor that heroes are no better than humans. After all, as we [*e*]

were saying earlier, these things are neither pious nor true. For we demonstrated, I take it, that it is impossible for the gods to produce evils.

ADEIMANTUS: We certainly did.

SOCRATES: And they are also positively harmful to those who hear them. You see, everyone will be ready to excuse himself when he is bad, if he has been persuaded that similar things are done and were done by "close descendants of the gods, near kin of Zeus, whose ancestral altar is in the ether on Ida's peak," and "in whom the blood of daimons has not weakened."[69] That is why we must put a stop to such stories; if we do not, they will produce in our young people a very casual attitude to evil. [*392a*]

{276} ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: What kind of stories are still left, then, about which we must determine whether or not they may be told? I mean, we have discussed how gods, heroes, daimons, and things in Hades should be portrayed.

ADEIMANTUS: We have.

SOCRATES: Then wouldn't stories about human beings be left?

ADEIMANTUS: Obviously so.

SOCRATES: But it is not possible, my friend, to discuss them here.

ADEIMANTUS: Why not?

SOCRATES: Because what we are going to say, I imagine, is that poets and prose writers get the greatest things concerning human beings wrong. They say that many unjust people are happy and many just ones wretched, [*b*] that doing injustice is profitable if it escapes detection, and that justice is another's good but one's own loss. We will forbid them to say such things, I imagine, and order them to sing and tell the opposite. Don't you think so?

ADEIMANTUS: No, I *know* so.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if you agree that what I said is correct, won't I say to you that you have conceded the point we were investigating all along?

ADEIMANTUS: And your claim would be correct.

SOCRATES: Then we won't come to an agreement about what stories should be told about human beings until we have discovered what sort of [*c*] thing justice is, and how, given its nature, it profits the one who has it, whether he is believed to be just or not.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: Our discussion of the content of stories is complete, then. Our next task, I take it, is to investigate their style. And then we will have completely investigated both what they should say and how they should say it.

ADEIMANTUS: I don't understand what you mean.

SOCRATES: Well, we must see that you do. Maybe this will help you to grasp it better: isn't everything said by poets and storytellers a narration of [*d*] past, present, or future events?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And don't they proceed by narration alone, narration through imitation, or both?

ADEIMANTUS: I need a still clearer understanding of that, too.

SOCRATES: What a ridiculously unclear teacher I seem to be! So, I will do what incompetent speakers do: I won't try to deal with the subject as a whole. Instead, I will take up a particular example and use that to explain [*e*] what I mean. Tell me, do you know the beginning of the *Iliad* where the poet tells us that Chryses begged Agamemnon to release his daughter, that Agamemnon got angry, and that Chryses, having failed to get what he [*393a*] wanted, prayed to his god[70] to punish the Achaeans?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: You know, then, that up to the lines, "He begged all the Achaeans, but especially the commanders of the army, the two sons of Atreus,"[71] the poet himself is speaking and is not trying to make us think that the speaker is anyone but himself. After that, however, he speaks as if he himself were Chryses, and tries as hard as he can to make us think that [*b*] the speaker is not Homer, but the priest himself, who is an old man. And all the rest of his narration of the events in Ilium and Ithaca, and all of the *Odyssey*, are written in pretty much the same way.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, they are.

SOCRATES: Now, each of the speeches, as well as the material between them, is narration, isn't it?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: But when he makes a speech as if he were someone else, won't [*c*] we say that he makes his own style as much like that of the person he tells us is about to speak?

ADEIMANTUS: We certainly will.

SOCRATES: Now, to make oneself like someone else in voice or appearance is to imitate the person one makes oneself like, isn't it?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then in a passage of that sort, it seems, he, and the rest of poets as well, produce their narration through imitation.

{277} ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: But if the poet never disguised himself, his entire poem would [*d*] be narration without imitation. To prevent you from saying that you still do not understand, I will tell you what that would be like. If Homer said that Chryses came with a ransom for his daughter to supplicate the Achaeans, especially the kings, and if after that Homer had gone on speaking, not as if he had become Chryses, but still as Homer, you know that it would not be imitation but narration pure and simple. It would have gone something like this—I will speak without meter since I am not a poet: the priest came and prayed that the gods would grant it to the Achaeans to capture Troy and have [*e*] a safe return home, and he entreated them to accept the ransom and free his daughter, out of reverence for the god. When he had said this, the others approved of it and consented. But Agamemnon was angry and ordered him to leave and never return, or else his priestly wand and the wreaths of the god would not protect him. He said that the priest's daughter would grow old in Argos by his side sooner than be freed. He ordered Chryses to leave and not make him angry if he wanted to get home safely. When the old man heard this, he was frightened and went off in silence. And once he had left [*394a*] the camp, he prayed at length to Apollo, invoking the cult names of the god, reminding him of his past gifts, and asking to be repaid for any that had found favor with him, whether they were temples he had built or victims he had sacrificed. He prayed that, in return for these things, the arrows of the god would make the Achaeans pay for his tears. That, comrade, is how we get pure narration [*b*] without any imitation.

ADEIMANTUS: I understand.

SOCRATES: Also understand, then, that the opposite occurs when one omits the words between the speeches and leaves the speeches on their own.

ADEIMANTUS: I understand that, too; it is what happens in tragedies, for example.

SOCRATES: You have got it absolutely right. And now I think I can make clear to you what I could not before. One sort of poetry and storytelling employs only imitation—tragedy, as you said, and comedy. Another sort, [*c*] which you find primarily in dithyrambs,[72] employs only narration by the poet himself. A third sort, which uses both, is what we find in epic poetry and many other places. Do you follow me?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, now I understand what you meant.

SOCRATES: And before that, as you remember, we said that we had already dealt with *content*, but that we had yet to investigate *style*.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES: What I meant, then, was just this: we need to come to an [*d*] agreement about whether to allow our poets to narrate as imitators, or as imitators of some things, but not others—and what sorts of things these are; or not to allow them to imitate at all.

ADEIMANTUS: I imagine that you are considering whether we will admit tragedy and comedy into our city or not.

SOCRATES: Perhaps so, but it may be an even wider question than that. I really do not know yet. But wherever the wind of argument blows us, so to speak, that is where we must go.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, well put.

SOCRATES: What I want you to consider, then, Adeimantus, is whether [*e*] our guardians should be imitators or not. Or does the answer follow from what we have said already—namely, that whereas each individual can practice one pursuit well, he cannot practice many well, and if he tried to do this and dabbled in many things, he would surely fail to achieve distinction in all of them?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course. Why wouldn’t it?

SOCRATES: Then doesn’t the same principle also apply to imitation—namely, that a single individual cannot imitate many things as well as he can imitate one?

ADEIMANTUS: No, he cannot.

SOCRATES: Then he will hardly be able to practice any pursuit worth talking [*395a*] about while at the same time imitating lots of things and being an imitator. For, as you know, even when two sorts of imitation are thought to be closely akin, the same people are not able to practice both of

them well simultaneously. The writing of tragedy {278} and comedy is an example. Didn't you just call both of these imitations?

ADEIMANTUS: I did, and you are quite right; the same people cannot do both.

SOCRATES: Nor can they be both rhapsodes and actors simultaneously.

ADEIMANTUS: True.

SOCRATES: Indeed, the same men cannot be used as both tragic and comic [*b*] actors. And all these are imitations, aren't they?

ADEIMANTUS: They are.

SOCRATES: And human nature, Adeimantus, seems to me to be minted in even smaller coins than this, so that an individual can neither imitate many things well nor perform well the actions themselves of which those imitations are likenesses.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So, if we are to preserve our first argument, that our guardians must be kept away from all other crafts so as to be the most exact craftsmen [*c*] of the city's freedom, and practice nothing at all except what contributes to this, then they must neither do nor imitate anything else. But if they imitate anything, they must imitate right from childhood what is appropriate for them—that is to say, people who are courageous, temperate, pious, free, and everything of that sort. On the other hand, they must not be clever at doing or imitating illiberal or shameful actions, so that they won't acquire a taste for the real thing from imitating it. Or haven't you noticed that imitations, if they are practiced much past youth, get established in the habits [*d*] and nature of body, tones of voice, and mind?

ADEIMANTUS: I have indeed.

SOCRATES: Since those we claim to care about are *men*, then, and men who must become good, we won't allow them to imitate a *woman*, young or old, as she abuses her husband, quarrels with the gods, brags because she thinks herself happy, or suffers misfortune and is possessed by sorrows and lamentations—and still less a woman who is ill, passionately in love, or in [*e*] labor.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely not.

SOCRATES: Nor must they imitate either male or female slaves doing servile actions.

ADEIMANTUS: No, they must not.

SOCRATES: Nor cowardly, bad men, it seems, or those whose actions are the opposite of what we described just now—men who libel and ridicule each other, and use shameful language when drunk or even when sober, or who wrong themselves and others by word or deed in the other ways that are typical of such people. And they must not get into the habit, I take it, of [*396a*] acting or talking like madmen. They must *know*, of course, about mad and evil men and women, but they must not do or imitate anything they do.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: What about metalworkers or other craftsmen, or those who row in triremes, or their coxswains, or the like—should they imitate them? [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: No, they should not, since they are not allowed even to pay any mind to those pursuits.

SOCRATES: And what about neighing horses, bellowing bulls, roaring rivers, the crashing sea, thunder, or the like—will they imitate them?

ADEIMANTUS: No, they have already been forbidden to be mad or to imitate madmen.

SOCRATES: So you are saying, if I understand you, that there is one kind of style and narration that a really good and fine person would use whenever he had to say something, and another kind, unlike that one, which his opposite by nature and education would always favor, and in which he [*c*] would narrate his story.

ADEIMANTUS: What kinds are they?

SOCRATES: In my view, when a moderate man comes upon the words or actions of a good man in the course of a narration, he will be willing to report them as if he were that man himself, and he won't be ashamed of that sort of imitation. He will be most willing to imitate the good man when he is [*d*] acting in a faultless and intelligent manner, but less willing and more reluctant to do so when he is upset by disease, passion, drunkenness, or some other misfortune. When he comes upon a character who is beneath him, however, he will be unwilling to make himself resemble this inferior character in any serious way—except perhaps for a brief period in which he is doing something good. On the contrary, he will be ashamed to do something like that, {279} both because he is unpracticed in the imitation of such people, and also because to shape and mold himself on an inferior

pattern disgusts him. In [*e*] his mind he despises that, except when it is for the sake of amusement.

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: Won't he use the sorts of narration, then, that we described in dealing with the Homeric epics a moment ago? And though his style of speaking will involve both imitation and the other sort of narration, won't imitation play a small part even in a long story? Or am I talking nonsense?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all. That must indeed be the pattern followed by that sort of speaker.

SOCRATES: As for the other sort of speaker, the more inferior he is, the [*397a*] more willing he will be to narrate anything and to consider nothing beneath him. Hence he will undertake to imitate, before a large audience and in a serious way, all the things we just mentioned: thunder and the sounds of winds, hail, axles, and pulleys; trumpets, flutes, pipes, and all the other instruments; and even the cries of dogs, sheep, and birds. And his [*b*] style will consist entirely of imitation in voice and gesture, won't it, with possibly a small bit of plain narration thrown in?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that must be so, too.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is what I meant when I said that there are two kinds of style.

ADEIMANTUS: And you were right; there are.

SOCRATES: Now, one of them involves little variation.[73] Hence if an appropriate harmony and rhythm are provided for this style, won't anyone who speaks in it correctly come close to speaking in a single harmony and, what is more, in a rhythm of pretty much the same sort, since the variations [*c*] involved in it are slight?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's precisely what he will do.

SOCRATES: What about the other kind of style? Won't it need the opposite: namely, every harmony and every rhythm, if it, too, is going to be spoken in properly, since it is multifarious in the forms of its variations?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's very much what it is like.

SOCRATES: Now, doesn't every poet and speaker adopt a style that fits one or the other of these patterns, or a mixture of both?

ADEIMANTUS: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we admit all of these into our city, or one of the pure sorts, or the mixed one? [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: If my view prevails, we will admit only the pure imitator of the good person.

SOCRATES: And yet, Adeimantus, the mixed style *is* pleasing. And the one that is most pleasing to children, their tutors, and the vast majority of people is the opposite of the one you chose.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is the most pleasing.

SOCRATES: But perhaps you would say that it does not harmonize with our constitution, because there is no twofold or manifold man among us, [*e*] since each does only one job.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, it does not harmonize with it.

SOCRATES: And isn't that the reason that it is only in a city like ours that we will find a shoemaker who is a shoemaker, not a ship's captain who also makes shoes; and a farmer who is a farmer, not a juror who also farms; and a soldier who is a soldier, not a moneymaker who also soldiers, and so on?

ADEIMANTUS: True, it is.

SOCRATES: Suppose, then, that a man whose wisdom enabled him to become multifarious and imitate everything were to arrive in person in our [*398a*] city and want to give a performance of his poems. It seems that we would bow down before him as someone holy, amazing, and pleasing. But we would tell him that there is no man like him in our city, and that it is not in accord with divine law for there to be one. Then we would anoint his head with perfumes, crown him with a woolen wreath,[74] and send him away to another city. But, for our own benefit, we would employ a more austere and less pleasant poet and storyteller ourselves—one who would imitate the [*b*] speech of a good person and make his stories fit {280} the patterns we laid down at the beginning, when we undertook to educate our soldiers.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is certainly what we would do, if it were up to us.

SOCRATES: And now, my friend, it looks to me as though we have completed our discussion of the branch of musical training that deals with speech and stories. After all, we have discussed both what is to be said and how it is to be said.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it seems that way to me, too.

SOCRATES: Wouldn’t what is left for us to discuss next, then, be lyric odes [*c*] and songs?

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And couldn’t anyone discover by now what to say about what they must be like, if indeed it is going to be concordant with what has already been said?

And Glaucon laughed and said:

I am afraid, Socrates, that “anyone” does not include me. You see, it is not sufficiently clear to me at the moment what we are to say, though I have my suspicions.

SOCRATES: Nonetheless, you are sufficiently clear about this: first, that a [*d*] song consists of three elements—speech, harmony, and rhythm.

GLAUCON: Yes, I do know that, at least.

SOCRATES: Now, as far as speech is concerned, at any rate, it is no different, is it, from speech that is not part of a song, in that it must still be spoken in conformity to the patterns we established just now?

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: Further, the harmony and rhythm must fit the speech.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But we said that there is no longer a need for dirges and lamentations in words.[75]

GLAUCON: No, there is not.

SOCRATES: What are the lamenting harmonies, then? You tell me; you are [*e*] musical.

GLAUCON: The mixo-Lydian, the syntono-Lydian, and some others of that sort.

SOCRATES: Shouldn’t we exclude them, then? After all, they are even useless for helping women to be as good as they should be, let alone men.

GLAUCON: We certainly should.

SOCRATES: Now, surely drunkenness is also entirely inappropriate for our guardians, and softness and idleness as well.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: What, then, are the soft harmonies, and the ones suitable for drinking parties?

GLAUCON: There are some Ionian ones that are called “relaxed,” and also some Lydian ones.

SOCRATES: Could you use any of them, my friend, on men who are warriors? [*399a*]

GLAUCON: No, never. So it looks as though you have got the Dorian and Phrygian left.

SOCRATES: I do not know the harmonies, so just leave me that harmony that would appropriately imitate the vocal sounds and tones[76] of a courageous person engaged in battle or in other work that he is forced to do, and who—even when he fails and faces wounds or death or some other misfortune—always grapples with what chances to occur, in a disciplined and resolute [*b*] way. And also leave me another harmony for when he is engaged in peaceful enterprises, or in those he is not forced to do but does willingly; or for when he is trying to persuade someone of something, or entreating a god though prayer, or a human being through instruction and advice; or for when he is doing the opposite—patiently listening to someone else, who is entreating or instructing him, or trying to change his mind through persuasion. Leave me the harmony that will imitate him, when he does not behave arrogantly when these things turn out as he intends; but, on the contrary, is temperate and moderate in all these enterprises, and satisfied with their outcomes. Leave me these two harmonies, then—the forced and [*c*] the willing—that will best imitate the voices of temperate and courageous men in good fortune and in bad.

GLAUCON: You are asking to be left with the very ones I just mentioned.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we will have no need for multi-stringed or polyharmonic instruments to accompany our odes and songs.

GLAUCON: No, it seems to me we won’t.

{281} SOCRATES: Then we won’t maintain craftsmen who make triangular lutes, harps, and all other such multi-stringed and polyharmonic instruments. [*d*]

GLAUCON: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: What about flute-makers and flute players? Will you allow them into the city? Or isn’t the flute the most multi-stringed of all?[77] And aren’t polyharmonic instruments all imitations of it?

GLAUCON: Clearly, they are.

SOCRATES: You have the lyre and the cithara left, then, as useful in our city; and in the countryside, by contrast, there would be a sort of pipe for the herdsman to play.

GLAUCON: That is what our argument suggests, anyway.

SOCRATES: Well we are certainly not doing anything new, my friend, in [*e*] preferring Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his.[78]

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I suppose we aren't.

SOCRATES: And, by the dog,[79] we have certainly been unwittingly repurifying the city we described as luxurious a while ago.

GLAUCON: That just shows how temperate we are.

SOCRATES: Then let's complete the purification. Now, the next topic after harmonies is the discussion of rhythms. We should not chase after complexity or multifariousness in the basic elements.[80] On the contrary, we should try to discover the rhythms of a life that is ordered and courageous, and then adapt the metrical foot and the melody to the speech characteristic of [*400a*] it, not the speech to them. What rhythms these would be is for you to say, just as you did in the case of the harmonies.

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I cannot tell you that. However, I can tell you from observation that there are three kinds of metrical feet[81] out of which the others are constructed, just as there are four, in the case of voices, from which come all the harmonies.[82] But I cannot tell you which sort imitates which sort of life.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we will also have to consult with Damon, on this [*b*] point, and ask him which metrical feet suit illiberality, arrogance, madness, and the other vices, and which their opposites. I think I have heard him using the unclear terms "warlike," "complex," "fingerlike," and "heroic" to describe one foot, which he arranged, I do not know how, to be equal up and down in the interchange of long and short.[83] And I think he called one foot an iamb and another a trochee, and assigned long and short quantities to them. In the case of some of these, I think he approved or disapproved [*c*] of the tempo of the foot as much as of the rhythm itself, or of some combination of the two—I cannot tell you which. But, as I said, we will leave these things to Damon, since to decide them would take a long discussion. Or do you think we should try it?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: But you are able to decide this, at least, aren't you: that grace goes along with good rhythm and lack of grace with bad rhythm?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, good rhythm goes along with fine speaking and [*d*] is similar to it, while bad rhythm goes along with the opposite sort, {282} and the same goes for harmony and disharmony; since, as we said just now, rhythm and harmony must conform to speech, and not vice versa.

GLAUCON: Yes, they certainly must conform to speech.

SOCRATES: And what about the style of speaking and what is said? Don't they go along with the character of the speaker's soul?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And don't all the rest go along with the style of speaking?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Fine speech, then, as well as harmony, grace, and rhythm, go along with naiveté. I do not mean the foolishness for which naiveté is a [*e*] euphemism, but the quality a mind has when it is equipped with a truly good and fine character.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And mustn't our young people try to achieve these on every occasion, if they are going to do the job that is really theirs?

GLAUCON: Yes, they must indeed.

SOCRATES: Now, surely painting and all the crafts similar to it are full of [*401a*] them, as are embroidery, architecture, and likewise the manufacture of implements generally; and so, furthermore, is the nature of bodies and that of the other things that grow. For in all these there is grace or the lack of it. And lack of grace, bad rhythm, and disharmony are akin to bad speech and bad character, while their opposites are akin to and imitate their opposite—a character that is temperate and good.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

[*b*] SOCRATES: Is it only poets we have to supervise, then, compelling them either to embody the image of a good character in their poems or else not to practice their craft among us? Or mustn't we also supervise all the other craftsmen, and forbid them to represent a character that is bad, intemperate, illiberal, and graceless, in their images of living beings, in their buildings, or in any of the other products of their craft? And mustn't the one who finds

this impossible be prevented from practicing in our city, so that our guardians [*c*] will not be brought up on images of evil as in a meadow of bad grass, where they crop and graze every day from all that surrounds them until, little by little, they unwittingly accumulate a great evil in their souls? Instead, mustn't we look for craftsmen who are naturally capable of pursuing what is fine and graceful in their work, so that our young people will live in a healthy place and be benefited on all sides as the influence exerted by those fine works affects their eyes and ears like a healthy breeze from wholesome regions, and imperceptibly guides them from earliest [*d*] childhood into being similar to, friendly toward, and concordant with the beauty of reason?

GLAUCON: Yes, that would be by far the best education for them.

SOCRATES: Then aren't these the reasons, Glaucon, that musical training is most important? First, because rhythm and harmony permeate the innermost element of the soul, affect it more powerfully than anything else, and bring it grace, such education makes one graceful if one is properly trained, [*e*] and the opposite if one is not. Second, because anyone who has been properly trained will quickly notice if something has been omitted from a thing, or if that thing has not been well crafted or well grown. And so, since he feels disgust correctly, he will praise fine things, be pleased by them, take them into his soul, and, through being nourished by them, become fine [*402a*] and good. What is ugly or shameful, on the other hand, he will correctly condemn and hate while he is still young, before he is able to grasp the reason. And, because he has been so trained, he will welcome the reason when it comes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself.

GLAUCON: Yes, it seems to me that these are the goals of musical training.

SOCRATES: It is like learning to read, then. We became adequately proficient only when the few letters that there are did not escape us in any of the different words in which they are scattered about; and when we did not disregard them, either in a small word or a great one, as if they were not worth noticing; but tried hard to distinguish them wherever they occur, knowing [*b*] that we would not be competent readers until we knew our letters.

GLAUCON: True.

{283} SOCRATES: And isn't it also true that if there are images of letters reflected in water or mirrors, we won't know them until we know the letters themselves, for both abilities are parts of the same craft and discipline?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then, by the gods, aren't I right in saying that neither we nor the guardians we claim to be educating will be musically trained until [*c*] we know the different forms of temperance, courage, generosity, high-mindedness, and all their kindred, and their opposites, too, which are carried around all over the place; and see them in the things in which they are, both themselves and their images; and do not disregard them, either in small things or in great, but accept that the knowledge of both belongs to the same craft and discipline?

GLAUCON: Yes, that necessarily follows.

SOCRATES: Then, if the fine habits in someone's soul and those in his [*d*] physical form agree and are in concord with one another, so that both share the same pattern, wouldn't that be the most beautiful sight for anyone capable of seeing it?

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And surely the most beautiful is also the most loveable, isn't it?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: A really musical person, then, would passionately love people who are most like that. But a disharmonious person, he would not passionately love.

GLAUCON: No, he would not—at least, not if the defect were in the soul. If it were only in the body, however, he would put up with it and still be willing to embrace the boy who had it. [*e*]

SOCRATES: I understand that you love or have loved such a boy yourself, and I agree with you. But tell me this: does excessive pleasure share anything in common with temperance?

GLAUCON: How can it? It surely drives one no less mad than pain does.

SOCRATES: What about with any other virtue?

[*403a*] GLAUCON: Never.

SOCRATES: Then, what about with arrogance and intemperance?

GLAUCON: Yes, with them most of all.

SOCRATES: Can you think of any pleasure that is greater or keener than sexual pleasure?

GLAUCON: No, I cannot—or of a more insane one either.

SOCRATES: But isn't the right sort of passion a naturally moderate and musically educated passion for order and beauty?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then nothing insane and nothing akin to dissoluteness can be involved in the right love?

GLAUCON: No, they cannot.

SOCRATES: Then sexual pleasure must not be [*b*] involved, must it, and the lover and the boy who passionately love and are loved in the right way must have no share in it?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, Socrates, it must not be involved.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that you will lay it down as a law in the city we are founding that a lover—if he can persuade his boyfriend to let him—may kiss him, be with him, and touch him, as a father would a son, for the sake of beautiful things. But in all other respects, his association with the [*c*] one he cares about must never seem to go any further than this. Otherwise, he will be reproached as untrained in music, and as lacking in appreciation for beautiful things.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Do you agree, then, that our account of musical training has come to an end? At any rate, it ought to end where it has ended; for surely training in the musical crafts ought to end in a passion for beauty.

GLAUCON: I agree.

SOCRATES: Now, after musical training, our young people must be given physical training.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And in this, too, they must have a careful training, which starts in childhood and continues throughout life. It would, I believe, be something [*d*] like this—but you should consider what you think, too. You see, I, for my part, do not believe that a healthy body, by means of its own virtue, makes the soul good. On the contrary, I believe that the opposite is true: a good soul, by means of its own virtue, {284} makes the body as good as possible. What do you think?

GLAUCON: I think so, too.

SOCRATES: Then if we give adequate care to the mind, entrust it with the detailed supervision of the body, and content ourselves with indicating the

general patterns to be followed rather than going on at great length, wouldn't we be proceeding in the right way? [*e*]

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Now, we said that our prospective guardians must avoid drunkenness. For surely a guardian is the last person who should get so drunk that he does not know where on earth he is.

GLAUCON: Yes, it would be ridiculous for a *guardian* to need a guardian himself!

SOCRATES: What about food? These men are athletes in the greatest contest, aren't they?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then would the regimen of ordinary, trained athletes be suitable for them? [*404a*]

GLAUCON: Maybe.

SOCRATES: But it seems to be a soporific sort of regimen and unreliable as regards health. Or haven't you noticed that these athletes sleep their lives away, and that if they deviate even a little from their orderly regimen, they become seriously and violently ill?

GLAUCON: I have noticed that.

SOCRATES: Then we need a more refined sort of training for our warrior-athletes, since they must be like sleepless hounds, as it were, who have the keenest possible sight and hearing, and whose health is not so precarious that it cannot sustain the frequent changes of water and diet generally, and the heat waves and winter storms typical of war. [*b*]

GLAUCON: I agree.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't the best physical training, then, be akin to the simple musical training we described a moment ago?

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: I mean a simple and good physical training, and one that is especially adapted to the conditions of war.

GLAUCON: In what way?

SOCRATES: You could learn *that* even from Homer. For you know that when his heroes are at war, he does not portray them banqueting on [*c*] fish[84]—even though they are by the sea in the Hellespont—or boiled meat, but roasted meat only, which is the sort most easily available to soldiers.

For it is pretty much always easier to use an open fire than to carry pots and pans around everywhere.

GLAUCON: Quite right.

SOCRATES: Nor, I believe, does Homer mention rich sauces anywhere. In fact, isn't everyone else who is in training also aware that if he is planning to stay in good physical condition, he must avoid such things altogether?

GLAUCON: Yes, and they are certainly right to be aware of it and to avoid them.

SOCRATES: If you think they are right to do that, my dear Glaucon, you [*d*] apparently do not approve of Syracusan cuisine or complex Sicilian relishes.

GLAUCON: I suppose not.

SOCRATES: Then you also object to men having a Corinthian girlfriend, [85] if they are planning to be in good physical condition.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And also to their enjoying the reputed delights of Attic pastries?

GLAUCON: I would have to.

SOCRATES: And the reason for that, I take it, is that we would be right to compare this sort of diet, and this lifestyle, to the polyharmonic songs and [*e*] lyric odes that make use of every sort of rhythm.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: There complexity engendered intemperance, didn't it, and here it engenders illness; whereas simplicity in musical training engenders temperance in the soul, and in physical training health in the body?

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And as intemperance and disease [*405a*] breed in a city, aren't many law courts and surgeries opened? And don't the legal and medical professions give themselves airs when {285} even free men in large numbers take them very seriously?

GLAUCON: How could it be otherwise?

SOCRATES: Could you find better evidence that a city's education is in a bad and shameful state than when eminent doctors and lawyers are needed, not only by inferior people and handicraftsmen, but by those who claim to have been brought up in the manner of free men? Indeed, don't you think it

is shameful and strong evidence of lack of education to be compelled to make [*b*] use of a justice imposed by others, as if they were one's masters and judges, because one lacks such qualities oneself?

GLAUCON: That is the most shameful thing of all.

SOCRATES: Do you really think so? Isn't it even more shameful not just to spend a good part of one's life in court defending oneself and prosecuting someone else, but to be so vulgar that one is persuaded to take pride in this and regard oneself as amazingly clever at doing injustice, and as so accomplished at every trick and turn that one can wiggle through any loophole, [*c*] and avoid punishment—and to do all that for the sake of little worthless things, and because one is ignorant of how much better and finer it is to arrange one's own life so that one won't need to find a judge who is asleep?

GLAUCON: Yes, that is even more shameful.

SOCRATES: What about needing the craft of medicine for something besides wounds or some seasonal illnesses? What about needing it because idleness and the regimen we described has filled one full of gasses and [*d*] phlegm, like a stagnant swamp, so that sophisticated Asclepiad doctors are compelled to come up with names like "flatulence" and "catarrh" to describe one's diseases? Don't you think that is shameful?

GLAUCON: Yes, it is; and those truly are strange new names for diseases.

SOCRATES: And of a sort that I do not imagine even existed in the time of Asclepius himself. My evidence for this is that his sons at Troy did not criticize [*e*] the woman who treated the wounded Eurypylus with Pramneian wine that had lots of barley meal and grated cheese sprinkled on it, even though such treatment is now thought to cause inflammation. Moreover, [*406a*] they did not criticize Patroclus, who prescribed the treatment.[86]

GLAUCON: Yet, surely it *was* a strange drink for someone in that condition.

SOCRATES: Not if you recall that the sort of modern medicine that coddles the disease was not used by the Asclepiads before the time of Herodicus. Herodicus was a physical trainer who became ill and, through a combination of physical training and medicine, tormented first and foremost himself, and then lots of other people as well. [*b*]

GLAUCON: How did he do that?

SOCRATES: By making his death a lengthy process. You see, although he was always tending his illness, he was not able to cure it, since it was terminal. And so he spent his life under medical treatment, with no free time for anything else whatsoever. He suffered torments if he departed even a little from his accustomed regimen; but, thanks to his wisdom, he struggled against death and reached old age.

GLAUCON: A fine reward for his craft that was!

SOCRATES: And appropriate for someone who did not know that it was [*c*] not because of ignorance or inexperience of this kind of medicine that Asclepius failed to teach it to his sons, but because he knew that everyone in a well-regulated city has his own work to do, and that no one has the time to be ill and under treatment all his life. We see how ridiculous this would be in the case of craftsmen, but we do not see it in the case of those who are supposedly happy—the rich.

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: When a carpenter is ill, he expects to get a drug from his doctor [*d*] that will make him throw up what is making him sick or evacuate it through his bowels; or to get rid of his disease through surgery or cautery. If anyone prescribes a lengthy regimen for him and tells him that he should rest with his head bandaged and so on, he quickly replies that he has no time to be ill, and that it is not profitable for him to live like that, always [*e*] minding his illness and neglecting {286} the work at hand. After that, he says goodbye to his doctor, resumes his usual regimen, lives doing his own job, and recovers his health; alternatively, if his body cannot withstand the illness, he dies and escapes his troubles.

GLAUCON: That does seem to be the correct way for someone like that to use the craft of medicine.

SOCRATES: Isn’t that because he had a job to do, and that if he could not [*407a*] do it, it would not profit him to go on living?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But a rich person, it is said, has no job assigned to him of the sort that would make his life not worth living if he had to keep away from it.

GLAUCON: So it is said, at least.

SOCRATES: What, have you not heard the saying of Phocylides that once one has the means of life, one must practice virtue?[87]

GLAUCON: And even earlier, in my view.

SOCRATES: Let's not quarrel with him about that. But let's try to find out for ourselves whether this virtue is something a rich person must practice, and if his life is not worth living if he does not practice it; or whether nursing an illness, while an obstacle to putting your mind to carpentry and [*b*] other crafts, is no obstacle whatever to taking Phocylides' advice.

GLAUCON: But, by Zeus, it is: excessive care of the body that goes beyond simple physical training is more of an obstacle than pretty much anything. For it's a nuisance in household management, in military service, and even in sedentary political office.

SOCRATES: And the greatest of all, surely, is that it makes any sort of learning, thought, or private meditation difficult, by forever causing imaginary [*c*] headaches or dizziness and accusing philosophy of causing them. Hence, wherever this sort of virtue is practiced and submitted to philosophical scrutiny, excessive care of the body hinders it. For it is constantly making you imagine that you are ill and never lets you stop agonizing about your body.

GLAUCON: Yes, probably so.

SOCRATES: Then won't we say that Asclepius knew this, too, and that he invented the craft of medicine for people whose bodies are healthy in nature and habit, but have some specific disease in them? That is the type of [*d*] person and condition for which he invented it. He rid them of their disease by means of drugs or surgery, and then prescribed their normal regimen, so that affairs of politics would not be harmed. However, he did not attempt to prescribe regimens for those whose bodies were riddled with disease, so that by drawing off a little here and pouring in a little there, he could make their life a prolonged misery and enable them to produce offspring in all probability like themselves. He did not think that he should treat someone who could not live a normal life, since such a person would profit neither himself nor his city. [*e*]

GLAUCON: Asclepius was a true man of politics, in your view.

SOCRATES: Clearly so. And it was because he was like that, don't you see, that his sons, too, turned out to be good men in the war at Troy, and

practiced [*408a*] the craft of medicine as I say they did. Don't you remember that they "sucked out the blood and applied gentle drugs" to the wound Pandarus inflicted on Menelaus? But they no more prescribed what he should eat or drink after that than they did for Eurypylus?[88] That was because they assumed that their drugs were sufficient to cure men who were healthy and living an orderly life before being wounded, even if they happened to drink wine mixed with barley and cheese right afterward. But they thought that [*b*] the lives of naturally sick and intemperate people were profitable neither to themselves nor to anyone else, that the craft of medicine shouldn't be practiced on them, and that they should not be given treatment, not even if they were richer than Midas.

GLAUCON: The sons of Asclepius were indeed very sophisticated, in your view.

SOCRATES: It is the right view to hold of them. And yet it is on just this point that Pindar and the tragedians are not persuaded by us. They say that Asclepius, even though he was the son of Apollo, {287} was bribed with gold to heal a rich man who was already dying, and that that is why he was struck [*c*] by lightning. But, in view of what we said before, we won't accept both claims from them. On the contrary, we will say that if Asclepius was the son of a god, he was not a money-grubber; and that if he was a money-grubber, he was not the son of a god.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right. But what do you say about the following, Socrates? Won't we need to have good doctors in our city? And the best, I take it, will be those who have treated the greatest number of healthy [*d*] and diseased people. In the same way, the best judges will be those who have associated with people with multifarious natures.

SOCRATES: I certainly agree that we need good ones. But do you know which ones I regard as such?

GLAUCON: I will, if you will tell me.

SOCRATES: Well, I will try. However, you ask about things that are not alike in the same question.

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Doctors, it is true, would become cleverest if, in addition to learning the craft of medicine, they associated with the greatest possible number of the most diseased bodies right from childhood, had themselves

[*e*] experienced every illness, and were not, by nature, very healthy. After all, they do not treat a body with a body. If they did, we would not allow their bodies to be or become bad. But it is with a soul that a body is treated, and it is not possible for a soul to treat anything well if it is or has become bad itself.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: But a *judge*, my friend, does rule a soul with a soul. And it is [*409a*] not possible for a soul to be nurtured among bad souls from childhood, to have associated with them, and to have itself indulged in every sort of injustice, so as to be able to draw exact inferences from itself about the injustices of others, as in the case of diseases of the body. On the contrary, it itself the craft of medicine, they associated with must have no experience of, and be uncontaminated by, bad characters while it is young, if as a fine and good soul itself, it is going to make judgments about what is just in a healthy way. That is precisely the reason, indeed, that good people are thought to be naïve when they are young and easily deceived by unjust ones: they do not have models within themselves [*b*] of the behavior of bad ones.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed, that is precisely what happens to them.

SOCRATES: That is why a good judge must not be young, but old—a late learner of what sort of thing injustice is, who has become aware of it, not as something at home in his own soul, but as an alien thing present in other people's souls. He must have trained himself over many years to discern how naturally bad it is by using his theoretical knowledge, not his own intimate experience of it. [*c*]

GLAUCON: At any rate, it would seem that *the noblest* judge would be like that.

SOCRATES: And so is the *good* one you asked about, since the one who has a good soul is good. The clever and suspicious person, on the other hand, who has committed many injustices himself and thinks of himself to be unscrupulous and wise, appears clever when he associates with those like himself, because he is on his guard and looks to the models within himself. But when he meets with good people who are older, he is seen to be stupid, distrustful at the wrong time, and ignorant of what a healthy character is, since he has no model of this within himself. But because he meets bad [*d*]

people more often than good ones, he seems more wise than foolish, both to himself and to them as well.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Then we must not look for a good judge among people like that, but among the sort we described earlier. For while a bad person could never come to know either vice or virtue, a naturally virtuous person, when educated, will in time acquire knowledge of both virtue and vice. And it is someone like that, and not a bad person, who becomes a wise judge in my view. [*e*]

GLAUCON: And I share your view.

SOCRATES: Then won't you establish by law in your city both the craft of medicine we mentioned and this craft of judging along with it? And these crafts will care for such of your citizens as {288} have naturally good bodies and souls; but those whose bodies are not like that they will allow to die, while [*410a*] those whose souls are naturally and incurably bad they will themselves put to death.

GLAUCON: Yes, we have seen that that is best both for those who receive such treatment and for the city.

SOCRATES: And so it is clear that *your* young people will be wary of coming to need a judge, since they employ that simple sort of musical training, which we said engenders temperance.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And won't a person who is musically trained hunt for a type of [*b*] physical training by following these same tracks, and catch it, if he chooses? And won't the result be that he will have no need of the craft of medicine, except when absolutely necessary?

GLAUCON: That's my view, at any rate.

SOCRATES: And he will undertake even the regimens and exertions of physical training with an eye less to strength than to arousing the spirited part of his nature, unlike all other athletes who use diets and exertions only to gain muscle power.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: Then, doesn't it follow, Glaucon, that those who established musical training and physical training did not establish them with the aim [*c*] that some people attribute to them: namely, to treat the body with the former and the soul with the latter?

GLAUCON: What was it then?

SOCRATES: It looks as though they established both chiefly for the sake of the soul.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Have you never noticed the mind-set of those who have a lifelong association with physical training but stay away from musical training? Or, again, that of those who do the opposite?

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

[*d*] SOCRATES: Savagery and toughness, in the one case; softness and over-cultivation, in the other.

GLAUCON: I have certainly noticed that people who devote themselves exclusively to physical training turn out to be more savage than they should, while those who devote themselves to musical training turn out to be softer than is good for them.

SOCRATES: And surely the savageness derives from the spirited element of their nature, which, if rightly nurtured, becomes courageous, but, if overstrained, is likely to become hard and harsh.

GLAUCON: So it seems.

SOCRATES: What about the cultivation? Wouldn't it derive from the philosophic [*e*] element of their nature, which, if relaxed too much, becomes softer than it should, but, if well nurtured, is cultivated and orderly?

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Now, we said that our guardians must have both these natures.

GLAUCON: Yes, they must.

SOCRATES: And mustn't the two be harmonized with one another?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And isn't the soul of the person thus harmonized temperate and courageous? [*411a*]

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And that of the inharmonious person, cowardly and savage?

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: So when someone gives himself over to musical training and lets the flute pour into his soul through his ears, as through a funnel, those sweet, soft, and plaintive harmonies we mentioned; and when he spends his whole life humming, entranced by song, the first result is that whatever

spirit he had, he softens the way he would iron and makes useful, rather than useless and brittle. But when he keeps at it unrelentingly and charms [*b*] his spirit, the next result is that he melts it and dissolves it completely until he has cut out, so to speak, the very sinews of his soul and makes himself "a feeble warrior."[89]

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And if he has a spiritless nature to begin with, this happens quickly. But if he has a spirited one, his spirit becomes weak and unstable, quickly inflamed by trivial things and quickly extinguished. As a result, people like that become irascible and bad-tempered, instead of [*c*] spirited, and filled with peevishness.

{289} GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, what about someone who works hard at physical training, eats very well, and never touches musical training or philosophy? At first, because his body is in good strong condition, isn't he full of pride and spirit, and more courageous than he was before?

GLAUCON: He certainly is.

SOCRATES: But what happens if he does nothing but this and never enters into partnership with a Muse? Even if there was some love of learning in his soul, because it never tastes any sort of instruction or investigation, and [*d*] never participates in any discussion or in any of the rest of musical training, doesn't it become weak, deaf, and blind, because it never receives any stimulation or nourishment, and its senses are never purified?

GLAUCON: Yes, it does.

SOCRATES: Then a person like that, I take it, becomes an unmusical hater of argument[90] who no longer uses argument to persuade people, but force [*e*] and savagery, behaves like a wild beast, and lives in awkward ignorance without rhythm or grace.

GLAUCON: That's exactly how it is.

SOCRATES: So I, for one, would claim that it is to deal with *these* two things, so it seems, that a god has given two crafts to human beings—musical training and physical training—to deal with the philosophical and spirited elements, and not, except as a byproduct, with the soul and the body; but with these two, so that they might be harmonized with one another by [*412a*] being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree.

GLAUCON: Yes, it seems so.

SOCRATES: Then it is the person who makes the best blend of musical and physical training, and applies them in the most perfect proportion to his soul, that we would be most correct to describe as completely trained in music and as most in harmony—far more so than the one who merely attunes his strings to one another.

GLAUCON: Probably so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then won't we also need this sort of person in our city, Glaucon, as a permanent overseer, if indeed its constitution is to be preserved?

GLAUCON: Yes, we will need him most of all. [*b*]

SOCRATES: Those, then, would be the patterns of their education and upbringing. For why should we enumerate their dances, hunts, chases with hounds, athletic contests, and horse races? After all, it is pretty much clear that they should be consistent with these patterns, and so there should no longer be any difficulty in discovering them.

GLAUCON: No, presumably there should not.

SOCRATES: All right. Now, what is the next question we have to settle? Isn't it which of these same people will rule and which be ruled? [*c*]

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, isn't it clear that the older ones must rule, whereas the younger ones must be ruled?

GLAUCON: Yes, it is clear.

SOCRATES: And that the rulers must be the best among them?

GLAUCON: Yes, that's clear, too.

SOCRATES: And aren't the best farmers the ones who are best at farming?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: In the present case, then, since the rulers must be the best of the guardians, mustn't they be the ones who are best at guarding the city?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then mustn't they be knowledgeable and capable in this matter, and, in addition, mustn't they care for the city?

GLAUCON: Yes, they must. [*d*]

SOCRATES: But a person would care most for what he loved.

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: And he would love something most if he thought that the same things were advantageous both for it and for himself, and if he thought that when it did well, he would do well, too; and that if it didn't, the opposite would happen.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Then we must choose from among our guardians the sort of men who seem on the basis of our observation to be most inclined, {290} throughout their entire lives, to do what they believe to be advantageous for the city, and most [*e*] unwilling to do the opposite.

GLAUCON: Yes, they would be suitable for the job.

SOCRATES: I think, then, that we will have to observe them at every stage of their lives to make sure that they are good guardians of this conviction, and that neither compulsion nor sorcery will cause them to discard or forget their belief that they must do what is best for the city.

GLAUCON: What do you mean by discarding?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. It seems to me that the departure of a belief from someone's mind is either voluntary or involuntary—voluntary when he learns that the belief is false; involuntary in the case of all true beliefs. [*413a*]

GLAUCON: I understand the voluntary sort, but I still need instruction about the involuntary.

SOCRATES: What? Don't you know that people are involuntarily deprived of good things, but voluntarily deprived of bad ones? And isn't being deceived about the truth a bad thing, whereas possessing the truth is a good one? Or don't you think that to believe things that are is to possess the truth?

GLAUCON: No, you are right. And I do think that people are involuntarily deprived of true beliefs.

SOCRATES: Then isn't it through theft, sorcery, and compulsion that this [*b*] happens?

GLAUCON: Now I do not understand again.

SOCRATES: I suppose I am making myself as clear as a tragic poet! By those who have their beliefs stolen from them, I mean those who are over-persuaded, or those who forget; because argument, in the one case, and time, in the other, takes away their beliefs without their noticing. You understand now, don't you?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well then, by those who are compelled, I mean those who are made to change their beliefs by some suffering or pain.

GLAUCON: I understand that, too, and you are right.

[*c*] SOCRATES: And the victims of sorcery, I think you would agree, are those who change their beliefs because they are charmed by pleasure or terrified by some fear.

GLAUCON: It seems to me that all deception is a form of sorcery.

SOCRATES: Well then, as I was just saying, we must discover which of them are best at safeguarding within themselves the conviction that they must always do what they believe to be best for the city. We must watch them right from childhood, and set them tasks in which a person would be most likely to forget such a conviction or be deceived out of it. And we [*d*] must select the ones who remember and are difficult to deceive, and reject the others. Do you agree?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And we must also subject them to labors, pains, and contests, and watch for the same things there.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Then we must also set up a third kind of competition for sorcery. Like those who lead colts into noise and tumult to see if they are afraid, we must subject our young people to fears and then plunge them once again into pleasures, so as to test them much more thoroughly than [*e*] people test gold in a fire. And if any of them seems to be immune to sorcery, preserves his composure throughout, is a good guardian of himself and of the musical training he has received, and proves himself to be rhythmical and harmonious in all these trials—he is the sort of person who would be most useful, both to himself and to the city. And anyone who is tested as a child, youth, and adult, and always emerges as being without impurities, should be established as a ruler of the city as well as a guardian, and should [*414a*] be honored in life and receive the most prized tombs and memorials after his death. But those who do not should be rejected. That is the sort of way, Glaucon, that I think rulers and guardians should be selected and established. Though I have provided only a pattern, not the precise details.

GLAUCON: I also think much the same.

SOCRATES: Then wouldn't it really be most correct to call these people [*b*] complete guardians—the ones who guard against external enemies and internal friends, so that the former will lack the {291} power, and the latter the desire, to do any evil; but to call the young people to whom we were referring as guardians just now, *auxiliaries* and supporters of the guardians' decrees?

GLAUCON: Yes, I think it would.

SOCRATES: How, then, could we devise one of those useful lies we were talking about a while ago,[91] a single noble lie that would, preferably, persuade [*c*] even the rulers themselves; but, failing that, the rest of the city?

GLAUCON: What sort of lie?

SOCRATES: Nothing new, but a sort of Phoenician story[92] about something that happened in lots of places prior to this—at least, that is what the poets say and have persuaded people to believe. It has not happened in our day, and I do not know if it could happen. It would take a lot of persuasion to get people to believe it.

GLAUCON: You seem hesitant to tell the story.

SOCRATES: You will realize that I have every reason to hesitate, when I do tell it.

GLAUCON: Out with it. Do not be afraid.

SOCRATES: All right, I will—though I do not know where I will get the audacity or the words to tell it. I will first be trying to persuade the rulers [*d*] and the soldiers, and then the rest of the city, that the upbringing and the education we gave them were like dreams; that they only imagined they were undergoing all the things that were happening to them, while in fact they themselves were at that time down inside the earth being formed and nurtured, and that their weapons and the rest of their equipment were also [*e*] manufactured there. When they were entirely completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up, so that now, just as if the land in which they live were their mother and nurse, they must deliberate on its behalf, defend it if anyone attacks it, and regard the other citizens as their earthborn brothers.

GLAUCON: It is not for nothing that you were ashamed to tell your lie earlier.

SOCRATES: No, it was only to be expected. But all the same, you should [*415a*] listen to the rest of the story. “Although all of you in the city are brothers,” we will say to them in telling our story, “when the god was forming you, he mixed gold into those of you who are capable of ruling, which is why they are the most honorable; silver into the auxiliaries; and iron and bronze into the farmers and other craftsmen. For the most part, you will produce children like yourselves; but, because you are all related, a silver [*b*] child will occasionally be born to a golden parent, a golden child to a silver parent, and so on. Therefore, the first and greatest command from the god to the rulers is that there is nothing they must guard better or watch more carefully than the mixture of metals in the souls of their offspring. If an offspring of theirs is born with a mixture of iron or bronze, they must not pity him in any way, but assign him an honor appropriate to [*c*] his nature and drive him out to join the craftsmen or the farmers. On the other hand, if an offspring of the latter is found to have a mixture of gold or silver, they will honor him and take him up to join the guardians or the auxiliaries. For there is an oracle that the city will be ruined if it ever has an iron or a bronze guardian.” So, have you a device that will make them believe this story?

GLAUCON: No, none that would make this group believe it themselves. [*d*] But I do have one for their sons, for later generations, and for all other people who come after them.

SOCRATES: Well, even that would have a good effect, by making them care more for the city and for each other. For I think I understand what you mean —namely, that all this will go where *tradition* leads. What *we* can do, however, when we have armed our earthborn people, is lead them forth with their rulers at their head. They must go and look for the best place in the city for a military encampment, a site from which they can [*e*] most easily control anyone in the city who is unwilling to obey the laws, or repel any outside enemy who, like a wolf, attacks the fold. And when they have established their camp and sacrificed to the appropriate gods, they must make their sleeping quarters, mustn’t they?

GLAUCON: Yes.

{292} SOCRATES: And mustn’t these provide adequate shelter against the storms of winter and the heat of summer?

GLAUCON: Yes, of course. After all, I assume you are talking about their living quarters.

SOCRATES: Yes, but ones for *soldiers*, not moneymakers.

GLAUCON: What difference do you think there [*416a*] is between the two, again?

SOCRATES: I will try to tell you. You see, it is surely the most terrible and most shameful thing in the world for shepherds to rear dogs as auxiliaries to help them with their flocks in such a way that those dogs themselves—because of intemperance, hunger, or some other bad condition—try to do evil to the sheep, acting not like sheepdogs but like wolves.

GLAUCON: Of course, that is terrible.

SOCRATES: So, mustn't we use every safeguard to prevent our auxiliaries [*b*] from treating the citizens like that—because they are stronger—and becoming savage masters rather than gentle allies?

GLAUCON: Yes, we must.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't they have been provided with the greatest safeguard possible if they have been really well educated?

GLAUCON: But surely they have been.

SOCRATES: That is not something that deserves to be asserted so confidently, my dear Glaucon. But what does deserve it is what we were saying just now, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are going to have what will do most to make them gentle to one another and [*c*] the ones they are guarding.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: But anyone with any sense will tell us that, besides this education, they must be provided with living quarters and other property of the sort that will neither prevent them from being the best guardians nor encourage them to do evil to the other citizens.

[*d*] GLAUCON: And he would be right.

SOCRATES: Consider, then, whether or not they should live and be housed in some such way as this, if they are going to be the sort of men we described. First, none of them should possess any private property that is not wholly necessary. Second, none should have living quarters or storerooms that are not open for all to enter at will. Such provisions as are required by temperate and courageous men, who are warrior-athletes, they should receive from the other citizens as wages for their guardianship, the

[*e*] amount being fixed so that there is neither a shortfall nor a surplus at the end of the year. They should have common messes to go to, and should live together like soldiers in a camp. We will tell them that they have gold and silver of a divine sort in their souls as a permanent gift from the gods, and have no need of human gold in addition. And we will add that it is impious for them to defile this divine possession by possessing an admixture of mortal gold, because many impious deeds have been done for the sake of the [*417a*] currency of the masses, whereas their sort is pure. No, they alone among the city's population are forbidden by divine law to handle or even touch gold and silver. They must not be under the same roof as these metals, wear them as jewelry, or drink from gold or silver goblets. And by behaving in that way, they would save both themselves and the city. But if they acquire private land, houses, and money themselves, they will be household managers and farmers instead of guardians—hostile masters of the other citizens, [*b*] instead of their allies. They will spend their whole lives hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, much more afraid of internal than of external enemies—already rushing, in fact, to the brink of their own destruction and that of the rest of the city as well. For all these reasons, let's declare that *that* is how the guardians must be provided with housing and the rest, and establish it as a law. Or don't you agree?

GLAUCON: Of course I do.

{293} BOOK IV

THE GOAL OF the ideal city, Socrates responds, is not to make any one group in the city outstandingly happy at the expense of others, as Thrasymachus claimed, but to make everyone as happy as his nature allows. It will be achieved, he argues, if everyone practices the craft for which his natural aptitude is highest, whether it is producing, guarding, or ruling (434a–c). Hence the guardians must above all protect their system of elementary education. For this provides the training in civic virtue without which no system of laws, no constitution, can hope to achieve anything worthwhile (423c–427a). The ideal city is pronounced established (427d). Since it is completely good (427e), it must have all the virtues of a city (see 352d–354a),

namely, wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice. Therefore the search for the justice in it is guaranteed not to be futile. By the time that search has concluded (434d), wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice have each been identified with distinct structural features of the ideal city, but those identifications will not be secure until the very same structural features are shown to be identical to those virtues in the individual soul (434d–435a). This leads to the argument for the division of the soul into three parts—appetitive, spirited, rational—corresponding to the three major classes in the ideal city—producers, guardians, rulers (435c–441c). Once this argument is complete, it remains to find the virtues in the soul and to show that they are the same structural features of it as of the ideal city (441c–444e).

The final question raised in Book IV is the central one of the *Republic*, namely, whether it is more profitable to be just or unjust (445a). Glaucon is ready to answer it at this point (445a–b) but Socrates is not (445b), for in his view the question cannot be clearly answered until much more work has been done on virtue and vice (445b–e).

SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES: *Adeimantus interrupted:* How will you defend yourself, Socrates, *he said*, if someone objects that [*419a*] you are not making these men very happy and, furthermore, that it is their own fault that they are not? I mean, the city really belongs to them, yet they derive no good from the city. Others own land, build fine, big houses, acquire furnishings to go along with them, make their own private sacrifices to the gods, entertain guests, and also, of course, possess what you were talking about just now: gold and silver and all the things that those who are going to be blessedly happy are thought to require. Instead of that, he might say, they seem simply to be paid wage-earning auxiliaries established in the city as a garrison, and nothing else. [*420a*] SOCRATES: Yes, and what is more, they do it just for upkeep and get no wages in addition to their upkeep, as other men do. So, they won't even be able to take a personal trip out of town if they want to, or give presents to their girlfriends, or spend money in whatever other ways they might wish, as people do who are considered

happy. You have omitted these and a host of other similar facts from your list of charges.

ADEIMANTUS: Well, let them too be added to the charges.

SOCRATES: How will we defend ourselves? Is that what you are asking? [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: I think we will discover what to say if we follow the same path as before. You see, our reply will be this: it would not be at all surprising if these people were happiest just as they are. However, in establishing our city, we are not looking to make any one group in it outstandingly happy, but to make the whole city so as far as possible. For we thought that we would be most likely to find justice in such a city, and injustice, by contrast, in the one that is governed worst. And we thought that by observing both cities, we would be able to decide the question we have been inquiring into for so long. At the moment, then, we take ourselves to be forming a happy [*c*] city—not separating off a few happy people and putting them in it, but making the city as a whole happy. (We will look at the opposite city {294} soon.)[93] Suppose, then, that we were painting a statue[94] and someone came up to us and started to criticize us, saying that we had not applied the most beautiful colors to the most beautiful parts of the statue; because the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, had been painted black rather than purple. We would think it reasonable to offer the following defense: "My amazing - fellow, [*d*] you must not expect us to paint the eyes so beautifully that they no longer look like eyes at all, nor the other parts either. On the contrary, you must look to see whether, by dealing with each part appropriately, we are making the whole thing beautiful. Similarly, in the present case, you must not compel us to give our guardians the sort of happiness that would make [*e*] them something other than guardians. You see, we know how to clothe the farmers in purple robes, festoon them with gold jewelry, and tell them to work the land whenever they please. We know we could have our potters recline on couches from right to left in front of the fire,[95] drinking and feasting with their wheel beside them for whenever they have a desire to make pots. And we can make all the others happy in the same way, so that the whole city is happy. But please do not urge us to do this. For if we are persuaded by you, a farmer won't be a farmer, nor a potter a potter, nor [*421a*] will any of the others from which a city is constituted remain true to

type. But for most of the others, it matters less: cobblers who become inferior and corrupt, and claim to be what they are not, do nothing terrible to the city. But if the guardians of our laws and city are not really what they seem to be, you may be sure that they will destroy the city utterly and, on the other hand, that they alone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy."

Now, if we are making genuine guardians, the sort least likely to do the [*b*] city evil, and if our critic is making pseudo-farmers—feasters happy at a festival, so to speak, not in a city—he is not talking about a city, but about something else. What we have to consider, then, is whether our aim in establishing the guardians is the greatest possible happiness for them, or whether—since our aim is to see this happiness develop for the whole [*c*] city—we should compel and persuade the auxiliaries and guardians to ensure that they, and all the others as well, are the best possible craftsmen at their own work; and then, with the whole city developing and being governed well, leave it to nature to provide each group with its share of happiness.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I think what you say is right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, will you also think me reasonable if I say something closely related?

ADEIMANTUS: What exactly?

SOCRATES: Take the rest of the craftsmen again, and consider whether these things corrupt them to such an extent that they actually become bad. [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: What things?

SOCRATES: Wealth and poverty.

ADEIMANTUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: This: do you think that a potter who has become wealthy will still be willing to devote himself to his craft?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Won't he become idler and more careless than he was?

ADEIMANTUS: Much more.

SOCRATES: Then won't he become a worse potter?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, much worse.

SOCRATES: And surely if poverty prevents him from providing himself with tools, or any of the other things he needs for his craft, he will make

poorer products himself and worse craftsmen of his sons or anyone else he teaches. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So poverty and wealth make the products and the practitioners of the crafts worse.

ADEIMANTUS: Apparently.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that we have found other things that our guardians must prevent in every way from slipping into the city undetected.

ADEIMANTUS: What things?

SOCRATES: Wealth and poverty. For the former makes for luxury, idleness, [*422a*] and revolution; and the latter for illiberality, bad work, and revolution as well.

{295} ADEIMANTUS: That's right. But consider this, Socrates: how will our city be able to fight a war if it has acquired no wealth—especially if it is compelled to fight a great and wealthy city?

SOCRATES: Obviously, it will be harder to [*b*] fight one such city, but easier to fight two.

ADEIMANTUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: First of all, if our city has to fight a city of the sort you mention, won't it be a case of warrior-athletes fighting rich men?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it will.

SOCRATES: Well, then, Adeimantus, don't you think that a single boxer who has had the best possible training could easily fight two non-boxers who are rich and fat?

ADEIMANTUS: Maybe not at the same time.

SOCRATES: Not even if he could start to run away and then turn and hit [*c*] the one who caught up with him first, and could do this often, out in the stifling heat of the sun? Couldn't a man like that overcome even more than two such enemies?

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly would not be surprising if he could.

SOCRATES: Well, don't you think that rich people have more knowledge and experience of boxing than of how to fight a war?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: In all likelihood, then, our athletes will easily be able to fight two or three times their number.

ADEIMANTUS: I will have to grant you that, [*d*] since I think what you say is right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, what if they sent an envoy to another city with the following true message: "We use no gold or silver. It is against divine law for us to do so, but not for you. So join us in this war and you can have the property of our enemy." Do you think that anyone who heard this message would choose to fight hard, lean hounds, rather than to join the hounds in fighting fat and tender sheep?

ADEIMANTUS: No, I do not. But if the wealth of all other cities were [*e*] amassed by a single one, don't you think that would endanger your non-wealthy city?

SOCRATES: You are happily innocent if you think that any city besides the one we are constructing deserves to be called a city.

ADEIMANTUS: What should we call them, then?

SOCRATES: We will have to find a "greater" title for the others because each of them is a great many cities, but not *a* city, as they say in the game.[96] They contain two, at any rate, which are at war with one another: the city [*423a*] of the poor and that of the rich. And within each of these, there are a great many more. So if you treat them as one city, you will be making a big mistake. But if you treat them as many and offer one the money, power, and the very inhabitants of another, you will always find many allies and few enemies. And as long as your own city is temperately governed in the way we just arranged, it will be the greatest one—not in reputation; I do not mean that; but the greatest in fact—even if it has only a thousand soldiers to defend it. For you won't easily find one city so great among either Greeks or barbarians, though you will find many that are reputed to be many times greater. Or do you disagree? [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: This, then, would also provide our rulers with the best limit for determining the proper size of the city, and how much land they should mark off for a city that size, letting the rest go.

ADEIMANTUS: What limit is that?

SOCRATES: I think it is this: as long as it is willing to remain one city, it may continue to grow, but not beyond that point.

ADEIMANTUS: And it is a good one. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Then we will also give our guardians this further order, that they are to guard in every possible way against the city's being either small in size or great in reputation, rather than adequate in size and one in number.

ADEIMANTUS: No doubt, *that* will be a trivial instruction for them to follow!

SOCRATES: Here is another that is even more trivial. We mentioned it earlier as well.[97] We said that if an offspring of the guardians is inferior, he must be sent off to join the other citizens, and that if the others have an excellent offspring, he must join the guardians. This was meant to make clear that [*d*] every other citizen, too, must be {296} assigned to what naturally suits him, with one person assigned to one job so that, practicing his own pursuit, each of them will become not many but one, and the entire city thereby naturally grow to be one, not many.

ADEIMANTUS: Oh, yes, that is a more minor one!

SOCRATES: Really, my good Adeimantus, the orders we are giving them are neither as numerous nor as difficult as one would think. Indeed, they are all insignificant provided, as the saying goes, they safeguard the one great thing—or rather not great but adequate. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: What's that?

SOCRATES: Their education and upbringing. For if a good education makes them moderate men, they will easily discover all this for themselves—and everything else that we are now omitting, such as the possession of women, marriages, and the procreation of children, and how all [*424a*] these must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb that friends share everything in common.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that would be best.

SOCRATES: And surely once our constitution is well started, it will, as it were, go on growing cyclically. For good education and upbringing, if they are kept up, produce good natures; and sound natures, which in turn receive such an education, grow up even better than their predecessors in every respect—but particularly with respect to their offspring, as in the case [*b*] of all the other animals.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, probably so.

SOCRATES: To put it briefly, then, what the overseers of our city must cling to, not allow to become corrupted without their noticing it, and guard against everything, is this: there must be no innovation in musical or physical training that goes against the established order. On the contrary, they must guard against that as much as they can. And they should dread to hear anyone say that "people think most of the song that floats newest from the singer's lips,"[98] in case someone happens to suppose that the poet means [*c*] not new *songs*, but a new *way of singing*, and praises that. We should not praise such a claim, however, or take it to be what the poet meant. You see, a change to a new kind of musical training is something to beware of as wholly dangerous. For one can never change the ways of training people in music without affecting the greatest political laws. That is what Damon says, and I am convinced he is right.

ADEIMANTUS: You can also count me among those who are convinced. [*d*]

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that it is in musical training that the guardhouse of our guardians must surely be built.

ADEIMANTUS: At any rate, this sort of lawlessness easily inserts itself undetected.

SOCRATES: Yes, because it is supposed to be only part of a game that, as such, can do no harm.

ADEIMANTUS: And it does not do any—except, of course, that when it has established itself there, it slowly and silently flows over into people's habits and practices. From these it travels forth with greater vigor into private contracts, and then from private contracts it advances with the utmost insolence [*e*] into the laws and constitution, Socrates, until in the end it overthrows everything public and private.

SOCRATES: Well, is that so?

ADEIMANTUS: I think it is.

SOCRATES: Then, as we were saying at the beginning, our children must take part in games that are more law-abiding right from the start, since, if their games become lawless and the children follow suit, isn't it impossible for them to grow up into excellent and law-abiding men? [*425a*]

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So whenever children play in a good way right from the start and absorb lawfulness from musical training, there is the opposite result:

lawfulness follows them in everything and fosters their growth, correcting anything in the city that may have been neglected before.

ADEIMANTUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: And so such people rediscover the seemingly insignificant conventional norms their predecessors had destroyed.

ADEIMANTUS: Which sort?

SOCRATES: Those dealing with things like this: the silence appropriate for younger people in the presence of their elders; the giving up of seats for [*b*] them and standing up in their presence; the care {297} of parents; hairstyles; clothing; shoes; the general appearance of the body; and everything else of that sort. Don't you agree?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: To legislate about such things is naïve, in my view, since verbal or written decrees will never make them come about or last.

ADEIMANTUS: How could they?

SOCRATES: At any rate, Adeimantus, it looks as though the start of someone's education determines what follows. Or doesn't like always encourage [*c*] like?

ADEIMANTUS: It does.

SOCRATES: And the final outcome of education, I imagine we would say, is a single, complete, and fresh product that is either good or the opposite.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: That is why I, for my part, would not try to legislate about such things.

ADEIMANTUS: And with good reason.

SOCRATES: Then, by the gods, what about all that marketplace business, the contracts people make with one another in the marketplace, for example, and contracts with handicraftsmen, and slanders, injuries, indictments, [*d*] establishing juries, paying or collecting whatever dues are necessary in marketplace and harbors, and, in a word, the entire regulation of marketplace, city, harbor, or what have you—dare we legislate about any of these?

ADEIMANTUS: No, it would not be appropriate to dictate to men who are fine and good. For they will easily find out for themselves whatever needs [*e*] to be legislated about such things.

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, provided that a god grants that the laws we have already described are preserved intact.

ADEIMANTUS: If not, they will spend their lives continually enacting and amending such laws in the hope of finding what is best.

SOCRATES: You mean they will live like those sick people who, because they are intemperate, are not willing to abandon their bad way of life.

[*426a*] ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Such people really do lead a charming life! Their medical treatment achieves nothing, except to make their illnesses worse and more complex, and they are always hoping that someone will recommend some new drug that will make them healthy.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's exactly what happens to invalids of this sort.

SOCRATES: And isn't it another charming feature of theirs that they think their worst enemy of all is the one who tells them the truth—that until they give up drunkenness, overeating, sexual indulgence, and idleness, then [*b*] no drug, cautery, or surgery, no charms, amulets, or anything else of that sort will do them any good?

ADEIMANTUS: It is not charming at all. Being harsh to someone who tells the truth is not charming.

SOCRATES: You do not approve of such men, apparently.

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: Then nor will you approve of an entire city that behaves in the way we were just describing. Or don't you think that such invalids behave in the very same way as cities where the following occurs? Because they are badly governed politically, the citizens are warned not to change the city's [*c*] whole political system, and the one who does is threatened with the death penalty. But the one who serves these cities most pleasantly, while they remain politically governed in that way; who indulges them, flatters them, anticipates their wishes, and is clever at fulfilling them; isn't he, on that account, honored by them as a good man who is wise in the greatest matters?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I think their behavior is the same and I do not approve of it at all.

SOCRATES: What about those who are willing and eager to provide treatment [*d*] for such cities? Don't you approve of their courage and also their lighthearted irresponsibility?

ADEIMANTUS: I do indeed—except for those who are actually deluded and suppose themselves to be true men of politics because they are praised by the masses.

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Have you no sympathy for these men? Or do you think it is possible for a man who does not know how to measure anything not to believe that he is four {298} cubits tall[99] when many others, who are similarly ignorant, tell him that he is? [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: No, I do not think that.

SOCRATES: Then do not be too hard on them. You see, such people are surely the most charming of all. They pass and amend the sorts of laws we have just been describing, and are always expecting that they will find a way to put a stop to cheating on contracts, and the other evildoings I mentioned just now, not realizing that they are really just cutting off a Hydra's head.[100]

ADEIMANTUS: Yet that is all they are really doing. [*427a*]

SOCRATES: I would have thought, then, that a true lawgiver should not bother with laws or constitutions of this kind, whether in a politically badly governed or in a politically well-governed city—in the one because it is useless and accomplishes nothing; in the other because some of them are discoverable by anyone, while the others follow automatically from the practices already described.

ADEIMANTUS: What remains for us to legislate, then? [*b*]

SOCRATES: For us, nothing; but for the Delphic Apollo, there remain the greatest, finest, and first of legislations.

ADEIMANTUS: What are they about?

SOCRATES: The establishing of temples and sacrifices, and other forms of service to gods, daimons, and heroes; the burial of the dead, and the services that ensure the favor of those who have gone to the other world. For we, of course, have no knowledge of these things and so, when we are founding a city, we won't take anyone else's advice, if we have any sense, or employ any interpreter except our ancestral one. And in fact, this god—as [*c*] he delivers his interpretations from his seat at the navel of the earth[101]—is the ancestral guide on these matters for the whole human race.

ADEIMANTUS: Well put. That is what we must do.

SOCRATES: So then, son of Ariston, your city would now seem to be [*d*] founded. As the next step, look inside it, having got hold of an adequate light somewhere. Look yourself and invite your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of us to help you, to see where justice and injustice might be in it, how they differ from one another, and which of the two must be possessed by the person who is going to be happy, whether that fact is hidden from all gods and humans or not.

And Glaucon said:

That's nonsense! You promised you would look for them yourself, because [*e*] you said it was impious for you not to defend justice in every way you could.[102]

SOCRATES: You are right to remind me, and I must do what I promised. But you will have to help.

GLAUCON: We will.

SOCRATES: I expect, then, to find justice in the following way. I think our city, if indeed it has been correctly founded, is completely good.

GLAUCON: Yes, it must be.

SOCRATES: Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, temperate, and just.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Then if we find any of these in it, what remains will be what we have not found? [*428a*]

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Therefore, as in the case of any other four things, if we were looking for one of them in something and recognized it first, that would be enough to satisfy us. But if we recognized the other three first, that itself would enable us to recognize what we were looking for, since clearly it could not be anything other than the one that remains.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: So, since there also happen to be four things we are interested in, mustn't we look for them in the same way?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

{299} SOCRATES: Now, the first thing I think I can see [*b*] clearly in the city is wisdom.

And there seems to be something odd about it.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: I think that the city we described is really wise. And that is because it is prudent,[103] isn't it?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And surely it is clear that this very thing, prudence, is some sort of knowledge. I mean, it certainly is not through *ignorance* that people do the prudent thing, but through knowledge.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But there are, of course, many multifarious sorts of knowledge in the city.

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So, is it because of the knowledge possessed by the carpenters that the city deserves to be described as wise and prudent?

GLAUCON: Not at all. It is called skilled in carpentry because of that. [*c*]

SOCRATES: So a city shouldn't be called wise because it has the knowledge that deliberates about how wooden things can be best.

GLAUCON: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: What about this, then? What about the knowledge of things made of bronze, or anything else of that sort?

GLAUCON: Not anything of that sort either.

SOCRATES: And not the knowledge of how to produce crops from the soil. On the contrary, it is skilled in farming because of that.

GLAUCON: That's my view.

SOCRATES: Then is there some knowledge in the city we have just founded, which some of its citizens have, that does not deliberate about some particular thing in the city, but about the city as a whole, and about [*d*] how its internal relations and its relations with other cities will be the best possible.

GLAUCON: There is indeed.

SOCRATES: What is it and who has it?

GLAUCON: It is the craft of guardianship. And the ones who possess it are those rulers we just now[104] called complete guardians.

SOCRATES: Because it has this knowledge, then, how do you describe the city?

GLAUCON: As prudent and really wise.

SOCRATES: Now, do you think that there will be more metalworkers in [*e*] the city, or more of these true guardians?

GLAUCON: There will be far more metalworkers.

SOCRATES: Of all those who are called by a certain name because they have some sort of knowledge, wouldn't the true guardians be the fewest in number?

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: So, it is because of the smallest group or part of itself, and the knowledge that is in it—the part that governs and rules—that a city founded according to nature would be wise as a whole. And this class—which seems to be, by nature, the smallest—is the one that inherently possesses [*429a*] a share of the knowledge that alone among all the other sorts of knowledge should be called wisdom.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So we have found—though I do not know how—this one of the four and its place in the city, too.

GLAUCON: It seems to me, at least, that it has been well and truly found.

SOCRATES: But surely courage and the part of the city it is in, and because of which the city is described as courageous, is not very difficult to spot.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Who would describe a city as cowardly [*b*] or courageous by looking at anything other than that part which defends it and wages war on its behalf?

GLAUCON: No one would look at anything else.

SOCRATES: Because, I take it, whether the others are courageous or cowardly doesn't make it one or the other.

GLAUCON: No, it doesn't.

{300} SOCRATES: So courage, too, belongs to a city because of a part of itself—because it has in that part the power to preserve through everything its belief that the things, and the sorts of things, that should inspire terror are [*c*] the very things, and sorts of things, that the lawgiver declared to be such in the course of educating it. Or don't you call that courage?

GLAUCON: I do not completely understand what you said. Would you mind repeating it?

SOCRATES: I mean that courage is a sort of preservation.

GLAUCON: What sort of preservation?

SOCRATES: The preservation of the belief, inculcated by the law through education, about what things, and what sorts of things, inspire terror. And by its preservation "through everything," I mean preserving it though pains, pleasures, appetites, and fears and not abandoning it. I will compare it to [*d*] something I think it resembles, if you like.

GLAUCON: I would like that.

SOCRATES: You know, then, that when dyers want to dye wool purple, they first select from wools of many different colors the ones that are naturally white. Then they give them an elaborate preparatory treatment, so that they will accept the color as well as possible. And only at that point do they dip them in the purple dye. When something is dyed in this way, it holds the dye fast, and no amount of washing, whether with or without detergent, [*e*] can remove the color. But you also know what happens when things are not dyed in this way, when one dyes wools of other colors, or even these white ones, without preparatory treatment.

GLAUCON: I know they look washed out and ridiculous.

SOCRATES: You should take it, then, that we too were trying as hard as we could to do something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in musical and physical training. It was contrived, you should suppose, for no purpose other than to ensure that—persuaded by us—they [*430a*] would absorb the laws in the best possible way, just like wool does a dye; that as a result, their beliefs about what things should inspire terror, and about everything else, would hold fast because they had the proper nature and rearing; so fast that the dye could not be washed out even by those detergents that are so terribly effective at scouring—pleasure, which is much more terribly effective at this than any chalestrian[105] or alkali, and pain and fear and appetite, which are worse than any detergent. This power, [*b*] then, to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated belief about what should inspire terror and what should not is what I, at any rate, call courage. And I will assume it is this, unless you object.

GLAUCON: No, I have no objection. For I presume that the sort of correct belief about these same matters that you find in animals and slaves, which is not the result of education and has nothing at all to do with law, is called something other than courage.

SOCRATES: You are absolutely right. [*c*]

GLAUCON: Well, then, I accept your account of courage.

SOCRATES: Yes, do accept it, at any rate, as my account of *political* courage, and you will be right to accept it. If you like, we will discuss that more fully some other time. You see, at the moment, our inquiry is not about courage but about justice. And for the purpose of that inquiry, I think that what we have said is sufficient.

GLAUCON: You are right.

SOCRATES: Two things, then, remain for us to find in the city: temperance [*d*] and—the goal of our entire inquiry—justice.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: How could we find justice, then, so we won't have to bother with temperance any further?

GLAUCON: Well I, for my part, do not know of any, nor would I want justice to appear first if that means that we are not going to investigate temperance any further. So if you want to please me, look for it before the other. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Of course I want to. It would be wrong not to.

GLAUCON: Go ahead and look, then.

{301} SOCRATES: I will. And seen from here, it is more like a sort of concord and harmony than the previous ones.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Temperance is surely a sort of order, the mastery of certain sorts of pleasures and appetites. People indicate as much when they use the term "self-mastery"—though I do not know in what way. This and other similar things are like tracks that temperance has left. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Isn't the term "self-mastery" ridiculous, though? For, of course, the one who is master of himself is also the one who is weaker, and the one who is weaker is also the one who masters. After all, the same person [*431a*] is referred to in all these descriptions.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: It seems to me, however, that what this term is trying to indicate is that within the same person's soul, there is a better thing and a worse one. Whenever the naturally better one masters the worse, this is called being master of oneself. At any rate, it is praised. But whenever, as a result of bad upbringing or associating with bad people, the smaller and

better one is mastered by the inferior majority, this is blamed as a disgraceful thing [*b*] and is called being weaker than oneself, or being intemperate.

GLAUCON: Yes, that seems plausible.

SOCRATES: Now, then, take a look at our new city and you will find one of these conditions present in it. For you will say that it is rightly described as master of itself, if indeed anything in which the better rules the worse is to be described as temperate and master of itself.

GLAUCON: I am looking, and what you say is true.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, pleasures, pains, and appetites that are numerous and multifarious are things one would especially find in children, women, [*c*] household slaves, and in the so-called free members of the masses—that is, the inferior people.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: But the pleasures, pains, and appetites that are simple and moderate, the ones that are led by rational calculation with the aid of understanding and correct belief, you would find in those few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: Don't you see, then, that this too is present in your city, and that the appetites of the masses—the inferior people—are mastered there by the wisdom and appetites of the few—the best people? [*d*]

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: So, if any city is said to be master of its pleasures and appetites and of itself, it is this one.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So isn't it also temperate because of all this?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And moreover, if there is any city in which rulers and subjects share the same belief about who should rule, it is this one. Or don't you [*e*] agree?

GLAUCON: Yes, I certainly do.

SOCRATES: And in which of them do you say temperance is located when they are in this condition? In the rulers or the subjects?

GLAUCON: In both, I suppose.

SOCRATES: Do you see, then, that the hunch we had just now—that temperance is like a sort of harmony—was quite plausible?

GLAUCON: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part and makes the city either courageous or wise. Temperance does not work like that, but has literally been stretched [*432a*] throughout the whole, making the weakest, the strongest, and those in between all sing the same song in unison—whether in wisdom, if you like, or in physical strength, if you prefer; or, for that matter, in numbers, wealth, or anything else. Hence we would be absolutely right to say that this unanimity is temperance—this concord between the naturally worse and the naturally better, about which of the two should rule both in the city and in each individual. [*b*]

GLAUCON: I agree completely.

SOCRATES: All right. We have now spotted three kinds of virtue in our city. What kind remains, {302} then, that would give the city yet another share of virtue? For it is clear that what remains is justice.

GLAUCON: It is clear.

SOCRATES: So then, Glaucon, we must now station ourselves like hunters surrounding a wood and concentrate our minds, so that justice does not escape us and vanish into obscurity. For it is clear that it is around here [*c*] somewhere. Keep your eyes peeled and do your best to catch sight of it, and if you happen to see it before I do, show it to me.

GLAUCON: I wish I could help. But it is rather the case that if you use me as a follower who can see only what you point out to him, you will be using me in a more reasonable way.

SOCRATES: Pray for success, then, and follow me.

GLAUCON: I will. You have only to lead.

SOCRATES: And it truly seems to be an impenetrable place and full of shadows. It is dark, at any rate, and difficult to search through. But all the same, we must go on. [*d*]

GLAUCON: Yes, we must.

And then I caught sight of something and shouted:

SOCRATES: Ah ha! Glaucon, it looks as though there is a track here, and I do not think our quarry will altogether escape us.

GLAUCON: That’s good news.

SOCRATES: Oh dear, what a stupid condition in which to find ourselves!

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: It seems, blessed though you are, that the thing has been rolling around at our feet from the very beginning, and yet, like ridiculous fools, we could not see it. For just as people who are holding something in their hands sometimes search for the very thing they are holding, we did not look in the right direction but gazed off into the distance, and perhaps [*e*] that is the very reason we did not notice it.

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: This: I think we have been talking and hearing about it all this time without understanding ourselves, or realizing that we were, in a way, talking about it.

GLAUCON: That was a long prelude! Now I want to hear what you mean!

SOCRATES: Listen, then, and see whether there is anything in what I say. You see, what we laid down at the beginning when we were founding our [*433a*] city, about what should be done throughout it—that, I think, or some form of that, is justice. And surely what we laid down and often repeated, if you remember, is that each person must practice one of the pursuits in the city, the one for which he is naturally best suited.

GLAUCON: Yes, we did say that.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we have heard many people say, and have often said ourselves, that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what is not one's own. [*b*]

GLAUCON: Yes, we have.

SOCRATES: This, then, my friend, provided it is taken in a certain way, would seem to be justice—this doing one's own work. And do you know what I take as evidence of that?

GLAUCON: No, tell me.

SOCRATES: After our consideration of temperance, courage, and wisdom, I think that what remains in the city is the power that makes it possible for all of these to arise in it, and that preserves them when they have arisen for as long as it remains there itself. And we did say that justice would be what [*c*] remained when we had found the other three.[106]

GLAUCON: Yes, that must be so.

SOCRATES: Yet, surely, if we had to decide which of these will most contribute to making our city good by being present in it, it would be difficult to decide. Is it the agreement in belief between the rulers and the subjects? The preservation among the soldiers of the law-inculcated belief about what should inspire terror and what should not? The wisdom and guardianship of the rulers? Or is what most contributes to making it good the fact [*d*] that every child, woman, slave, free person, craftsman, ruler, and subject each does his own work and does not meddle with what is not?

GLAUCON: Of course it's a difficult decision.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that this power—which consists in everyone's doing his own {303} work—rivals wisdom, temperance, and courage in its contribution to the city's virtue.

GLAUCON: It certainly does.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't you say that justice is certainly what rivals them [*e*] in contributing to the city's virtue?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Look at it this way, too, if you want to be convinced. Won't you assign to the rulers the job of judging lawsuits in the city?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And will they have any aim in judging other than this: that no citizen should have what is another's or be deprived of what is his own?

GLAUCON: No, they will have none but that.

SOCRATES: Because that is just?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So from that point of view, too, having and doing of one's [*434a*] own, of what belongs to one, would be agreed to be justice.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Now, see whether you agree with me about this: if a carpenter attempts to do the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker that of a carpenter, or they exchange their tools or honors with one another, or if the same person tries to do both jobs, and all other such exchanges are made, do you think that does any great harm to the city?

GLAUCON: Not really.

SOCRATES: But I imagine that when someone who is, by nature, a craftsman or some other sort of moneymaker is puffed up by wealth, or by having [*b*] a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other

such thing, and attempts to enter the class of soldiers; or when one of the soldiers who is unworthy to do so tries to enter that of judge and guardian, and these exchange their tools and honors; or when the same person tries to do all these things at once, then I imagine you will agree that these exchanges and this meddling destroy the city.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, meddling and exchange among these three classes is the [*c*] greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst evil one could do to it.

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't you say that the worst evil one could do to one's own city is injustice?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: That, then, is what injustice is. But let's put it in reverse: the opposite of this—when the moneymaking, auxiliary, and guardian class each do their own work in the city—is justice, isn't it, and makes the city just?

GLAUCON: That's exactly what I think too. [*d*]

SOCRATES: Let's not state it as fixedly established just yet. But if this kind of thing is agreed by us to be justice in the case of individual human beings as well, then we can assent to it. For what else will there be for us to say? But if it is not, we will have to look for something else. For the moment, however, let's complete the inquiry in which we supposed that if we first tried to observe justice in some larger thing that possessed it, that would make it easier to see what it is like in an individual human being. We agreed that this larger thing is a city, and so we founded the best city we [*e*] could, knowing well that justice would of course be present in one that was good. So, let's apply what has come to light for us there to an individual, and if it is confirmed, all will be well. But if something different is found in the case of the individual, we will go back to the city and test it there. And perhaps by examining them side by side and rubbing them together like fire-sticks, we can make justice blaze forth and, once it has come to light, *435a*] confirm it in our own case.

GLAUCON: Well, the road you describe is the right one, and we should follow it.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if you call a larger thing and a smaller thing by the same name, are they unalike in the respect in which they are called the same, or alike?

GLAUCON: Alike.

SOCRATES: So a just man won't differ at all from a just city with respect to the form of justice but will be like it. [*b*]

GLAUCON: Yes, he will be like it.

SOCRATES: But now, the city, at any rate, was thought to be just because each of the three natural classes within it did its own job; and to be temperate, courageous, and wise, in addition, {304} because of certain other conditions or states of these same classes.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we would expect an individual to have these same kinds of things in his soul, and to be correctly called by the same [*c*] names as the city because the same conditions are present in them both.

GLAUCON: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: Well, you amazing fellow, here is another trivial investigation we have stumbled into: does the soul have these three kinds of things in it or not?

GLAUCON: It does not look at all trivial to me. Perhaps, Socrates, there is some truth in the old saying that everything beautiful is difficult.

SOCRATES: Apparently so. In fact, you should be well aware, Glaucon, that it is my belief we will never ever grasp this matter precisely by methods [*d*] of inquiry of the sort we are now using in our discussions. However, there is in fact another longer and more time-consuming road that does lead there. But perhaps we can manage to come up to the standard of our previous statements and inquiries.

GLAUCON: Shouldn't we be content with that? It would be enough for me, at least for now.

SOCRATES: Well, then, it will be quite satisfactory for me, too.

GLAUCON: Then do not weary, but go on with the inquiry. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Well, isn't it absolutely necessary for us to agree to this much: that the very same kinds of things and conditions exist in each one of us as exist in the city? After all, where else would they come from? You see, it would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness did not come to be in cities from the private individuals who are reputed to have this quality,

such as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us; or that the same is not true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated [*436a*] with our part of the world; or of the love of money, which is said to be found not least among the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

GLAUCON: It certainly would.

SOCRATES: We may take that as being so, then, and it was not at all difficult to discover.

GLAUCON: No, it certainly was not.

SOCRATES: But this, now, *is* difficult. Do we do each of them with the same thing or, since there are three, do we do one with one and another with another: that is to say, do we learn with one, feel anger with another, and with yet a third have an appetite for the pleasures of food, sex, and those closely akin to them? Or do we do each of them with the whole of our soul, once we feel the impulse? *That* is what is difficult to determine in [*b*] a way that is up to the standards of our argument.

GLAUCON: I think so, too.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's try in this way to determine whether they are the same as one another or different.

GLAUCON: What way?

SOCRATES: It is clear that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things; not, at any rate, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find that happening here, we will know that we are not dealing with one and the same thing, but with many. [*c*]

GLAUCON: All right.

SOCRATES: Consider, then, what I am about to say.

GLAUCON: Say it.

SOCRATES: Is it possible for the same thing, at the same time, and in the same respect, to be standing still and moving?

GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Let's come to a more precise agreement, in order to avoid disputes later on. You see, if anyone said of a person who is standing still but moving his hands and head, that the same thing is moving and standing still, we would not consider, I imagine, that he should say that; but rather that in one respect the person is standing still, while in another he is moving. Isn't that so? [*d*]

GLAUCON: It is.

SOCRATES: Then, if the one who said this became still more charming and made the sophisticated point that spinning tops, at any rate, stand still as a whole at the same time as they are also in motion, when, with the peg fixed in the same place, they revolve, or that the same holds of anything else that moves in a circle on the same spot—we would not agree, on the {305} grounds that in such situations it is not in the same respects that these objects are both moving and standing still. On the contrary, we would say that these objects have both a straight axis and a circumference in them, and [*e*] that with respect to the straight axis they stand still—since they do not wobble to either side—whereas with respect to the circumference they move in a circle. But if their straight axis wobbles to the left or right or front or back at the same time as they are spinning, we will say that they are not standing still in any way.

GLAUCON: And we would be right.

SOCRATES: No such objection will disturb us, then, or make us any more likely to believe that the same thing can—at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing—undergo, be, or do opposite [*437a*] things.

GLAUCON: They won't have that effect on me at least.

SOCRATES: All the same, in order to avoid going through all these objections one by one and taking a long time to prove them all untrue, let's hypothesize that what we have said is correct and carry on—with the understanding that if it should ever be shown to be incorrect, all the consequences we have drawn from it will be lost.

[*b*] GLAUCON: Yes, that's what we should do.

SOCRATES: Now, wouldn't you consider assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it away, as all being pairs of mutual opposites—whether of opposite doings or of opposite undergoings does not matter?

GLAUCON: Yes, they are pairs of opposites.

SOCRATES: What about thirst, hunger, and the appetites as a whole, and also wishing and willing? Would you include all of them somewhere among [*c*] the kinds of things we just mentioned? For example, wouldn't you say that the soul of someone who has an appetite wants the thing for which it has an appetite, and draws toward itself what it wishes to have; and, in addition, that insofar as his soul wishes something to be given to it, it nods

assent to itself as if in answer to a question, and strives toward its attainment?

GLAUCON: I would.

SOCRATES: What about not-willing, not-wishing, and not-having an appetite? Wouldn't we include them among the very opposites, cases in which the soul pushes and drives things away from itself? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Since that is so, won't we say that there is a kind consisting of appetites, and that the most conspicuous examples of them are what we call hunger and thirst?

GLAUCON: We will.

SOCRATES: Isn't the one for food, the other for drink?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, insofar as it is thirst, is it an appetite in the soul for more than what we say it is for? I mean, is thirst a thirst for hot drink or cold, or much drink or little, or—in a word—for drink of a certain sort? Or isn't it rather that if heat is present in addition to thirst, it causes the appetite to be [*e*] for something cold as well, whereas the addition of cold makes it an appetite for something hot? And if there is much thirst, because of the presence of muchness, won't it cause the desire to be for much drink, and where little for little? But thirst itself will never be for anything other than the very thing that it is in its nature to be an appetite for: namely, drink itself; and, similarly, hunger is for food.

GLAUCON: That's the way it is. By itself, at any rate, each appetite is for its natural object only, while an appetite for an object of this or that sort depends on additions.

SOCRATES: No one should catch us unprepared, then, or disturb us by claiming that no one has an appetite for drink but rather for good drink, [*438a*] nor for food but rather for good food, since everyone's appetite is for good things. And so, if thirst is an appetite, it will be an appetite for good drink or good whatever, and similarly for the other appetites.

GLAUCON: Yes, there might seem to be something in that objection.

SOCRATES: But surely, whenever things are related to something, those that are of a particular sort are related to a particular sort of thing, as it seems to me, whereas those that are just themselves are related only to a [*b*] thing that is just itself.

{306} GLAUCON: I do not understand.

SOCRATES: Don't you understand that the greater is such as to be greater than something?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Than the less?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the much greater than the much less. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the once greater than the once less? And the going-to-be greater than the going-to-be less?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And doesn't the same hold of the more in relation to the fewer, the double to the half, and everything of that sort; and also of [*c*] heavier to lighter and faster to slower; and, in addition, of hot to cold, and all other similar things?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: What about the various kinds of knowledge? Aren't they the same way? Knowledge itself is of what can be learned itself (or of whatever we should take the object of knowledge to be), whereas a particular knowledge of a particular sort is of a particular thing of a particular sort. I mean something like this: when knowledge of building houses was developed, it [*d*] differed from the other kinds of knowledge, and so was called knowledge of building. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And wasn't that because it was a different sort of knowledge from all the others?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And wasn't it because it was of a particular sort of thing that it itself became a particular sort of knowledge? And isn't this true of all the crafts and sciences?

GLAUCON: It is.

SOCRATES: Well, then, you should think of that as what I wanted to get across before—if you understand it now—when I said that whenever things are related to something, those that are just themselves are related to things that are just themselves, whereas those of a particular sort are related to things of a particular sort. And I do not at all mean that the sorts in question

[*e*] have to be the same for them both—that the knowledge of health and disease is healthy and diseased, or that that of good and bad things is good and bad. On the contrary, I mean that when knowledge occurred that was not just knowledge of the thing itself that knowledge is of, but of something of a particular sort, which in this case was health and disease, the result was that it itself became a particular sort of knowledge; and this caused it to be no longer called simply knowledge but, with the addition of the particular sort, medical knowledge.

GLAUCON: I understand and I think you are right.

SOCRATES: Returning to thirst, then, wouldn't you include it among the [*439a*] things that are related to something just by being what they are? Surely thirst is related to . . .

GLAUCON: I would. It is related to drink.

SOCRATES: So a particular sort of thirst is for a particular sort of drink. Thirst itself, however, is not for much or little, good or bad, or, in a word, for drink of a particular sort; rather, thirst itself is, by nature, just for drink itself. Right?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Hence the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as it is simply thirsty, does not want anything else except to drink, and this is what it [*b*] longs for and is impelled to do.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Then if anything in it draws it back when it is thirsty, wouldn't it be something different from what thirsts and, like a beast, drives it to drink? For surely, we say, the same thing, in the same respect of itself, in relation to the same thing, and at the same time, cannot do opposite things.

GLAUCON: No, it cannot.

SOCRATES: In the same way, I imagine, it is not right to say of the archer that his hands at the same time push the bow away and draw it toward him. On the contrary, we should say that one hand pushes it away, while the other draws it toward him.

GLAUCON: Absolutely. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Now, we would say, wouldn't we, that some people are thirsty sometimes, yet unwilling to drink?

GLAUCON: Many people often are.

SOCRATES: What, then, should one say about them? Isn't it that there is an element in their {307} soul urging them to drink, and also one stopping them—something different that masters the one doing the urging?

GLAUCON: I certainly think so.

SOCRATES: Doesn't the element doing the stopping in such cases arise—when it does arise—from rational calculation, while the things that drive and drag are present because of feelings and diseases? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: It would not be unreasonable for us to claim, then, that there are two elements, different from one another; and to call the element in the soul with which it calculates, the rationally calculating element; and the one with which it feels passion, hungers, thirsts, and is stirred by other appetites, the irrational and appetitive element, friend to certain ways of being filled and certain pleasures.

GLAUCON: No, it would not. Indeed, it would [*e*] be a very natural thing for us to do.

SOCRATES: Let's assume, then, that we have distinguished these two kinds of elements in the soul. Now, is the spirited element—the one with which we feel anger—a third kind of thing, or is it the same in nature as one of these others?

GLAUCON: As the appetitive element, perhaps.

SOCRATES: But I once heard a story and I believe it. Leontius, the son of Aglaeon, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses with the public executioner nearby. He had an appetitive desire to look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned himself away. For a while he struggled and put his hand over his eyes, [*440a*] but finally, mastered by his appetite, he opened his eyes wide and rushed toward the corpses, saying: "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches; take your fill of the beautiful sight."[107]

GLAUCON: I have also heard that story myself.

SOCRATES: Yet, surely, the story suggests that anger sometimes makes war against the appetites as one thing against another.

GLAUCON: Yes, it does suggest that.

SOCRATES: And don't we often notice on other occasions that when [*b*] appetite forces someone contrary to his rational calculation, he reproaches

himself and feels anger at the thing in him that is doing the forcing; and just as if there were two warring factions, such a person's spirit becomes the ally of his reason? But spirit partnering the appetites to do what reason has decided should not be done—I do not imagine you would say that you had ever seen that, either in yourself or in anyone else.

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I would not.

SOCRATES: And what about when a person thinks he is doing some injustice? [*c*] Isn't it true that the nobler he is, the less capable he is of feeling angry if he suffers hunger, cold, or the like at the hands of someone whom he believes to be inflicting this on him justly; and won't his spirit, as I say, refuse to be aroused?

GLAUCON: It is true.

SOCRATES: But what about when a person believes he is being unjustly treated? Doesn't his spirit boil then, and grow harsh and fight as an ally of what he holds to be just? And even if it suffers hunger, cold, and every imposition of that sort, doesn't it stand firm and win out over them, not [*d*] ceasing its noble efforts until it achieves its purpose, or dies, or, like a dog being called to heel by a shepherd, is called back by the reason alongside it and becomes gentle?

GLAUCON: Your simile is perfect. And, in fact, we did put the auxiliaries in our city to be like obedient sheepdogs for the city's shepherdlike rulers.

SOCRATES: You have understood what I was trying to say very well. But have you also noticed something else about it? [*e*]

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That it is the opposite of what we recently thought about the kind of thing spirit is. You see, then we thought of it as something {308} appetitive.[108] But now, far from saying that, we say that in the faction that takes place in the soul, it is far more likely to take arms on the side of the rationally calculating element.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Is it also different from this, then, or is it some kind of rationally calculating element, so that there are not three kinds of things in the soul, but two—the rationally calculating element and the appetitive one? Or rather, just as there were three classes in the city that held it together—the moneymaking, the auxiliary, and the deliberative—is there also this

[*441a*] third element in the soul, the spirited kind, which is the natural auxiliary of the rationally calculating element, if it has not been corrupted by bad upbringing?

GLAUCON: There must be a third.

SOCRATES: Yes, provided, at any rate, that it can be shown to be as distinct from the rationally calculating element as it was shown to be from the appetitive one.

GLAUCON: But it is not difficult to show that. After all, one can see it even in small children: they are full of spirit right from birth, but as for rational calculation, some of them seem to me never to [*b*] possess it, while the masses do so quite late.

SOCRATES: Yes, by Zeus, you put that really well. Besides, one can see in animals that what you say is true. But, in addition to that, our earlier quotation from Homer also bears it out: "He struck his chest and spoke to his heart."[109] You see, in it Homer clearly presents what he has calculated about better and worse, rebuking what is irrationally angry as though it were [*c*] something different.

GLAUCON: That's exactly right.

SOCRATES: Well, we have had a difficult swim through all that, and we are pretty much agreed that the same classes as are in the city are in the soul of each individual, and an equal number of them too.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: Then doesn't it already necessarily follow that the private individual is wise in the same way and because of the same element as is the city?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And that the city is courageous in the same way and because [*d*] of the same element as is the private individual? And that in everything else that pertains to virtue, both are alike?

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: And so, Glaucon, I take it we will also say that a man is just in exactly the same way as is a city.

GLAUCON: That too follows with absolute necessity.

SOCRATES: But we surely have not forgotten that the city was just because each of the three classes in it does its own work.

GLAUCON: I do not think we have.

SOCRATES: We should also bear in mind, then, that in the case of each one of us as well, the one in whom each of the elements does its own job will [*e*] be just and do his own job.

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then isn't it appropriate for the rationally calculating element to rule, since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul; and for the spirited kind to obey it and be its ally?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Now, as we were saying, isn't it a mixture of musical and physical training that makes these elements concordant, tightening and nurturing [*442a*] the first with fine words and learning, while relaxing, soothing, and making gentle the second by means of harmony and rhythm?

GLAUCON: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: And these two elements, having been trained in this way and having truly learned their own jobs and been educated, will be put in charge of the appetitive element—the largest one in each person's soul and, by nature, the most insatiable for money. They will watch over it to see that it does not get so filled with the so-called pleasures of the body that it becomes big and strong, and no longer does its own job but attempts to [*b*] enslave and rule over the classes it is not fitted to rule, thereby overturning the whole life of anyone in whom it occurs.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't these two elements also do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies—the one by {309} deliberating, the other by fighting, following the ruler, and using its courage to carry out the things on which the former had decided?

GLAUCON: Yes, they would.

SOCRATES: I imagine, then, that we call each individual courageous because of the latter part—that is, when the element of his that is spirited in kind preserves through pains and pleasures the pronouncements of reason [*c*] about what should inspire terror and what should not.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: But we call him wise, surely, because of the small part that rules in him, makes those pronouncements, and has within it the knowledge

of what is advantageous—both for each part and for the whole, the community composed of all three.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: What about temperance? Isn't he temperate because of the friendly and concordant relations between these same things: namely, when both the ruler and its two subjects share the belief that the rationally calculating element should rule, and do not engage in faction against it? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Temperance in a city and in a private individual is certainly nothing other than that.

SOCRATES: But surely, now, a person will be just because of what we have so often described and in the way we have so often described.

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: Well, then, has our justice become in any way blurred? Does it look like anything other than the very thing we found in the city?

GLAUCON: It doesn't seem so to me, at least.

SOCRATES: We could make perfectly sure, if there is still anything in our souls that disputes [*e*] this, by applying everyday tests to it.

GLAUCON: Which ones?

SOCRATES: For example, if we had to come to an agreement about whether a man similar in nature and training to this city of ours would embezzle gold or silver he had accepted for deposit, who do you think would consider him more likely to do so than men of a different sort? [*443a*]

GLAUCON: No one.

SOCRATES: And would he have anything to do with temple robberies, thefts, or betrayals of friends in private life or of cities in public life?

GLAUCON: No, nothing.

SOCRATES: And he would be in no way untrustworthy when it came to promises or other agreements.

GLAUCON: How could he be?

SOCRATES: And surely adultery, disrespect for parents, and neglect of the gods would be more characteristic of any other sort of person than of this one.

GLAUCON: Of any other sort, indeed.

SOCRATES: And isn't the reason for all this the fact that each element [*b*] within him does its own job where ruling and being ruled are concerned?

GLAUCON: Yes, that and nothing else.

SOCRATES: Are you still looking for justice to be something besides this power that produces men and cities of the sort we have described?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I am not.

SOCRATES: The dream we had has been completely fulfilled, then—I mean the suspicion we expressed that right from the beginning, when we were founding the city, we had, with the help of some god, chanced to hit [*c*] upon the origin and pattern of justice.[110]

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, Glaucon, it really was—which is why it was so helpful—a sort of image of justice, this principle that it is right for someone who is, by nature, a shoemaker to practice shoemaking and nothing else, for a carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for all the others.

GLAUCON: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone's doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the [*d*] things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just {310} as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—lowest, highest, and middle—as well as any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from [*e*] having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the acquisition of wealth or concerning the care of his body, or even something political, or concerning private contracts. In all these areas, he considers and calls just and fine the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and wisdom the knowledge that oversees such action; and he considers and calls unjust any action that destroys this harmony, and ignorance the *belief* that oversees it. [*444a*]

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if we claim to have found the just man, the just city, and what justice really is in them, we won't, I imagine, be thought to be telling a complete lie.

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, we certainly won't.

SOCRATES: Shall we claim it, then?

GLAUCON: Yes, let's.

SOCRATES: So be it, then. I take it we must look for injustice next.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Mustn't it, in turn, be a kind of faction among those three—their [*b*] meddling and interfering with one another's jobs; the rebellion of a part of the soul against the whole in order to rule in it inappropriately, since its nature suits it to be a slave of the ruling class. We will say something like that, I imagine, and that their disorder and wandering is injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, and, in a word, the whole of vice.

GLAUCON: That is precisely what they are.

SOCRATES: Doing unjust actions, then, and being unjust; and, the opposite, [*c*] doing just ones—they all surely become clear at once, don't they, provided that both injustice and justice are also clear?

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: That they do not differ in any way from healthy actions and unhealthy ones, that what the latter are in the body, they are in the soul.

GLAUCON: In what respect?

SOCRATES: Surely, healthy actions engender health, unhealthy ones disease.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, doesn't doing just actions also engender justice, unjust ones injustice? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: But to produce health is to put the elements that are in the body in their natural relations of mastering and being mastered by one another; while to produce disease is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another that is contrary to nature.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Doesn't it follow, then, that to produce justice is to establish the elements in the soul in a natural relation of mastering and being mastered by one another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another that is contrary to nature?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Virtue, then, so it seems, is a sort of health, a fine and good [*e*] state of the soul; whereas vice seems to be a shameful disease and weakness.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: And don't fine practices lead to the possession of virtue, shameful ones to vice?

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: So it now remains, it seems, for us to consider whether it is [*445a*] more profitable to do just actions, engage in fine practices, and be just, whether one is known to be so or not; or to do injustice and be unjust, provided that one does not have to pay the penalty and become a better person as a result of being punished.

GLAUCON: But, Socrates, that question seems to me, at least, to have become ridiculous, now that the two have been shown to be as we described. Life does not seem worth living when the body's natural constitution is ruined, not even if one has food and drink of every sort, all the money in the world, and every political office imaginable. So how—even if [*b*] one could do whatever one wished, except what would liberate one from vice and injustice and make one acquire justice and virtue—could it be worth living when the natural constitution of the very thing by which we live is ruined and in turmoil?

SOCRATES: Yes, it is ridiculous. All the same, since in fact we have reached a point from which {311} we can see with the utmost clarity, as it were, that these things are so, we must not give up.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely the last thing we should do.

SOCRATES: Come up here, then, so that you can see how many kinds of [*c*] vice there are—the ones, at any rate, that are worth seeing.

GLAUCON: I am following. Just tell me.

SOCRATES: Well, from the vantage point, so to speak, that we have reached in our argument, it seems to me that there is one kind of virtue and an unlimited number of kinds of vice, four of which are worth mentioning.

GLAUCON: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: It seems likely that there are as many types of soul as there are types of political constitution of a specific kind.

GLAUCON: How many is that?

SOCRATES: Five types of constitution, and five of soul. [*d*]

GLAUCON: Tell me what they are.

SOCRATES: I will tell you that one type would be the constitution we have been describing. However, there are two ways of referring to it: if one outstanding man emerges among the rulers, it is called a kingship; if more than one, it is called an aristocracy.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is one of the kinds I had in mind. You see, whether many arise or just one, they won't change any of the laws of the city that are worth mentioning, since they will have been brought up and [*e*] educated in the way we described.

GLAUCON: No, they probably won't. [*c*]

BOOK V

BOOK V CONTINUES the discussion of virtue and vice in souls and cities that was begun at the end of Book IV. But the discussion is immediately interrupted by Polemarchus and the other interlocutors, all of whom want Socrates to explain the remark he made in passing at 423e–424a about the guardians possessing their wives and children in common. Socrates' lengthy response to their request occupies the majority of the book (451c–471c). In it he makes the revolutionary proposal that children should be brought up by the city rather than by their biological parents and that men and women with the same natural ability should receive the same education and training and do the same kind of work.

Glaucon agrees that a city of the sort Socrates has described would be the best one, but he wonders whether it could ever really come about (471c–e). After some important clarification of the nature of the task (472a–473c), Socrates undertakes to show that it could. The smallest change that would transform an already existing city into the ideal city is if its kings or rulers became philosophers or if philosophers became kings or rulers (473c–e). This proposal, Socrates thinks, is likely to produce even more outrage than those about women and children (473c), but he thinks that outrage will subside when he explains what true philosophers are really like (474b–c).

The remainder of Book V is occupied by the beginning of Socrates' portrait of these philosophers, which consists of a complex argument intended to show that only they can have access to forms and that without such access knowledge is impossible (474c–480a).

SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES: [*449a*]

SOCRATES: That, then, is the sort of city and constitution—and the sort of man—I call good and correct. And if indeed this one is correct, all the others are bad and mistaken, both as city governments and as ways of organizing the souls of private individuals. The deficient ones fall into four kinds.

GLAUCON: What are they?

I was going to describe them in the order in which I thought they developed [*b*] *out of one {312} another.*[111] *But Polemarchus, who was sitting not far from Adeimantus, extended his hand, gripped the latter's cloak by the shoulder from above, drew Adeimantus toward him, and, leaning forward himself, said some things in his ear. We overheard nothing of what he said, other than this:* Shall we let it go, then, or what?

ADEIMANTUS: (*Now speaking aloud.*) Certainly not.

SOCRATES: What is it exactly you won't let go?

[*c*] ADEIMANTUS: You!

SOCRATES: Why exactly?

ADEIMANTUS: We think you are being lazy, that you are robbing us of a whole important section of the argument in order to avoid having to explain it. You thought we would not notice when you said—as though it were something inconsequential—that, as regards women and children, anyone could see that it will be a case of friends sharing everything in common.

SOCRATES: But isn't that correct, Adeimantus?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is. But it is just like all the rest we have discussed; its correctness requires an explanation of how the sharing will be arranged, since there are many ways to bring it about. So, do not omit to tell us about [*d*] the particular one you have in mind. We have all been waiting for a long time in the expectation that you would surely discuss how procreation will be handled, how the children that are born will be reared, and the whole subject of what you mean by sharing women and children. You see, we

think that this makes a considerable difference—indeed, all the difference—to whether a constitution is correct or incorrect. So now that you are beginning to describe another constitution without having analyzed this matter adequately, we are resolved, as you overheard, not to let you go until you explain all this just as you did the rest. [*450a*]

GLAUCON: Include me, too, as having a share in this vote.

And Thrasymachus said:

In fact, you can take it as the resolution of *all* of us, Socrates.

SOCRATES: What a thing to do, attacking me like that. You have started up a huge discussion about the constitution—it will be like starting from the beginning. I was delighted to think I had already completed its description by this time and was satisfied to have what I had said earlier be accepted as is. You do not realize what a swarm of arguments you are now stirring up by making this demand. It was because I could see it that I left the topic [*b*] aside, to avoid all the trouble it would cause us.

THRASYMACHUS: What of it? Don't you think these people have come here now to listen to arguments, not to smelt ore?[112]

SOCRATES: Yes—within moderation, at least.

GLAUCON: But surely it is within moderation, Socrates, for people with any sense to listen to such arguments their whole life long. So never mind about *us*. Don't *you* get tired of explaining your views on what we asked about: namely, what the sharing of children and women will amount to for [*c*] our guardians, and how the children will be brought up while they are still small. After all, the time between birth and the beginning of formal education seems to be the most troublesome period of all. So, try to tell us in what way it should be handled.

SOCRATES: It is not easy to explain, my happy fellow. It raises even more doubts than the topics we have discussed so far. One might, in fact, doubt whether what we proposed is possible, and, even if one granted that it is entirely so, one might still have doubts about whether it would be for the best. That, then, is why I was somewhat hesitant to bring it up: I was afraid, my dear comrade, that our argument might seem to be no more than wishful thinking. [*d*]

GLAUCON: Do not hesitate at all. You see, your audience won't be inconsiderate, or incredulous, or hostile.

SOCRATES: My very good fellow, are you saying that because you want to encourage me?

GLAUCON: I am.

{313} SOCRATES: Well, you are having precisely the opposite effect. If I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, your encouragement would be all very well. When one is among knowledgeable and beloved friends, and one is speaking what one knows to be the truth about the greatest and most beloved things, one can feel both secure and [*e*] confident. But to produce arguments when one is uncertain and searching, [*451a*] as I am doing, is a frightening thing and makes one feel insecure. I am not afraid of being ridiculed—that would be childish, indeed—but I am afraid that if I fail to secure the truth, just where it is most important to do so, I will not only fall myself but drag my friends down as well. So I bow to Adrasteia, Glaucon, for what I am about to say. You see, I suspect that involuntary homicide is a lesser crime than misleading people about beautiful, good, and just norms. That is a risk it would be better to run among enemies than among friends. So you have well and truly encouraged [*b*] me.

Glaucon laughed and said:

Well, Socrates, if we suffer from any false note you strike in the argument, we will release you, as we would in a homicide case, as guiltless and no deceiver of us. So you may speak with confidence.

SOCRATES: Well, it is true; the one who is acquitted in that situation is guiltless, so the law says. And if it is true there, it is probably true here, too.

GLAUCON: On these grounds, then, tell us.

SOCRATES: I will have to go back again, then, and say now what perhaps I [*c*] should have said then in the proper place. But maybe it is all right, after having completed a male drama, to perform a female one next—especially when you demand it in this way. For people born and educated as we have described, then, there is, I believe, no correct way to acquire and employ children and women other than to follow the path on which we first set them. Surely, in our argument, we tried to establish the men as guard-dogs of their flock.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then let’s proceed by giving corresponding rules for birth and [*d*] rearing, and see whether they suit us or not.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: As follows. Do we think that the females of our guard-dogs should join in guarding precisely what the males guard, hunt with them, and share everything with them? Or do we think that they should stay indoors and look after the house,[113] on the grounds that they are incapable of doing this because they must bear and rear the puppies, while the males should work and have the entire care of the flock?

GLAUCON: They should share everything—except that we employ the females as we would weaker animals, and the males as we would stronger [*e*] ones.

SOCRATES: Is it possible, then, to employ an animal for the same tasks as another if you do not give it the same upbringing and education?

GLAUCON: No, it is not.

SOCRATES: Then if we employ women for the same tasks as men, they must also be taught the same things.

GLAUCON: Yes. [*452a*]

SOCRATES: Now, we gave the latter musical and physical training.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, we must also give these two crafts, as well as military training, to the women, and employ them in the same way.

GLAUCON: That seems reasonable, given what you say.

SOCRATES: But perhaps many of the things we are now saying, because they are contrary to custom, would seem ridiculous if they were put into practice.

GLAUCON: Indeed, they would.

SOCRATES: What do you see as the most ridiculous aspect of them? Isn't it obvious that it is the idea of the women exercising stripped in the palestras alongside the men?[114] And not just the young women, but the older ones too—like {314} the old men we see in gymnasiums who, even though their bodies [*b*] are wrinkled and not pleasant to look at, still love physical training.

GLAUCON: Yes, by Zeus, that *would* look really ridiculous, at least under present conditions.

SOCRATES: Yet, since we have started to discuss the matter, we must not be afraid of the various jokes that the wits will make both about this sort of

change in musical and physical training and—even more so—about the [*c*] change in the bearing of arms and the mounting of cavalry horses.

GLAUCON: You are right.

SOCRATES: But since we have started, we must move on to the rougher part of the law, and ask these wits *not* to do their own job, but to be serious. And we will remind them that it is not long since the *Greeks* thought it shameful and ridiculous (as many barbarians still do) for *men* to be seen stripped, and that when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians began the gymnasiums, the wits of the time had the opportunity to make a [*d*] comedy of it all. Or don't you think so?

GLAUCON: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: But when it became clear, I take it, to those who employed these practices, that it was better to strip than to cover up all such parts, the laughter in the eyes faded away because of what the arguments had proved to be best. And this showed that it is a fool who finds anything ridiculous except what is bad, or tries to raise a laugh at the sight of anything except what is stupid or bad, or—putting it the other way around—who takes [*e*] seriously any standard of what is beautiful other than what is good.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Well, then, shouldn't we first agree about whether our proposals are viable or not? And mustn't we give anyone who wishes to do so—whether it is someone who loves a joke or someone serious—the opportunity [*453a*] to dispute whether the female human does have the natural ability to share in *all* the tasks of the male sex, or in none at all, or in some but not others; and, in particular, whether this holds in the case of warfare? By making the best beginning in this way, wouldn't one also be likely to reach the best conclusion?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, would you like us to dispute with one another on their behalf, so that their side of the argument won't be attacked without defenders? [*b*]

GLAUCON: Why not?

SOCRATES: Then let's say this on their behalf: "Socrates and Glaucon, you do not need *other people* to dispute you. After all, you yourselves, when you were beginning to found your city, agreed that each one had to do the one job for which he was naturally suited."

GLAUCON: We did agree to that, I think. Of course we did.

SOCRATES: “Can it be, then, that a woman is not by nature very different from a man?”

GLAUCON: Of course she is different.

SOCRATES: “Then isn’t it also appropriate to assign a different job to each of them, the one for which they are naturally suited?”

GLAUCON: Certainly. [*c*]

SOCRATES: “How is it, then, that you are not making a mistake now and contradicting yourselves, when you say that men and women must do the same jobs, seeing that they have natures that are most distinct?” Do you have any defense, you amazing fellow, against that attack?

GLAUCON: It is not easy to think of one on the spur of the moment. On the contrary, I shall ask—indeed, I am asking—you to explain the argument on our side as well, whatever it is.

SOCRATES: That, Glaucon, and many other problems of the same sort, which I foresaw long ago, was what I was afraid of when I hesitated to [*d*] tackle the law concerning the possession and upbringing of women and children.

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, it certainly does not seem to be a simple matter.

SOCRATES: No, it is not. But the fact is that whether one falls into a small diving pool or into the middle of the greatest sea, one has to swim all the same.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then we must swim, too, and try to save ourselves from the sea of argument, hoping for a dolphin to pick us up, or for some other unlikely rescue.[115]

{315} [*e*] GLAUCON: It seems so.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, let’s see if we can find a way out. We have agreed, of course, that different natures must have different pursuits, and that the natures of a woman and a man are different. But we now say that those different natures must have the same pursuits. Isn’t that the charge against us?

GLAUCON: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: What a noble power, Glaucon, the [*454a*] craft of disputation possesses!

GLAUCON: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Because many people seem to me to fall into it even against their wills, and think they are engaging not in eristic,[116] but in discussion. This happens because they are unable to examine what has been said by dividing it up into kinds. Instead, it is on the purely verbal level that they look for the contradiction in what has been said, and employ eristic, not dialectical discussion, on one another.

GLAUCON: Yes, that certainly does happen to many people. But surely it is not pertinent to us at the moment, is it?

SOCRATES: It most certainly is. At any rate, we are in danger of unconsciously [*b*] dealing in disputation.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: We are trying to establish the principle that different natures should not be assigned the same pursuits in a bold and eristic manner, *on the verbal level*. But we did not at all investigate what kind of natural difference or sameness we had in mind, or in what regard the distinction was pertinent, when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same ones to the same.

GLAUCON: No, we did not investigate that.

SOCRATES: And because we did not, it is open to us, apparently, to ask [*c*] ourselves whether the natures of bald and long-haired men are the same or opposite. And, once we agree that they are opposite, it is open to us to forbid the long-haired ones to be shoemakers, if that is what the bald ones are to be, or *vice versa*.

GLAUCON: But that would be ridiculous.

SOCRATES: And is it ridiculous for any other reason than that we did not have in mind *every* kind of difference and sameness in nature, but were keeping our eyes only on the kind of difference and sameness that was pertinent [*d*] to the pursuits themselves? We meant, for example, that a male and female whose souls are suited for medicine have the same nature. Or don’t you think so?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: But a male doctor and a male carpenter have different ones?

GLAUCON: Of course, completely different.

SOCRATES: In the case of both the male and the female sex, then, if one of them is shown to be different from the other with regard to a particular craft or pursuit, we will say that is the one who should be assigned to it. But if it is apparent that they differ in this respect alone, that the female bears the offspring while the male mounts the female, we will say it has not yet been demonstrated that a woman is different from a man with regard to [*e*] what we are talking about, and we will continue to believe our guardians and their women should have the same pursuits.

GLAUCON: And rightly so.

SOCRATES: Next, won't we urge our opponent to tell us the precise craft or pursuit, relevant to the organization of the city, for which a woman's [*455a*] nature and a man's are not the same but different?

GLAUCON: That would be a fair question, at least.

SOCRATES: Perhaps, then, this other person might say, just as you did a moment ago,[117] that it is not easy to give an adequate answer on the spur of the moment, but that after reflection it would not be at all difficult.

GLAUCON: Yes, he might say that.

SOCRATES: Do you want us to ask the one who disputes things in this way, then, to follow us to see whether we can somehow show him that there is no pursuit relevant to the management of the city that is peculiar to [*b*] women?

GLAUCON: Of course.

{316} SOCRATES: Come on, then, we will say to him, give us an answer: "Is this what you meant by one person being naturally well suited for something and another naturally unsuited: that the one learns it easily, the other with difficulty; that the one, after a little instruction, can discover a lot for himself in the subject being studied, whereas the other, even if he gets a lot of instruction and attention, does not even retain what he was taught; that the bodily capacities of the one adequately serve his mind, while those of the other obstruct his? Are there any other factors than these, by which you [*c*] distinguish a person who is naturally well suited for each pursuit from one who is not?"

GLAUCON: No one will be able to mention any others.

SOCRATES: Do you know of anything practiced by human beings, then, at which the male sex is not superior to the female in all those ways? Or must

we make a long story of it by discussing weaving and the preparation of baked and boiled food—the very pursuits in which the female sex is thought to excel, and in which its defeat would expose it to the greatest [*d*] ridicule of all?

GLAUCON: It is true that the one sex shows greater mastery than the other in pretty much every area. Yet there are many women who are better than many men at many things. But on the whole, it is as you say.

SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is no pursuit relevant to the management of the city that belongs to a woman because she is a woman, or to a man because he is a man; but the various natural capacities are distributed in a similar way between both creatures, and women can share by nature in every pursuit, and men in every one, though for the purposes of all of them [*e*] women are weaker than men.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So shall we assign all of them to men and none to women?

GLAUCON: How could we?

SOCRATES: We could not. For we will say, I imagine, that one woman is suited for medicine, another not, and that one is naturally musical, another not.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Won’t one be suited for physical training or war, then, while [*456a*] another is unwarlike and not a lover of physical training?

GLAUCON: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And one a philosopher (lover of wisdom), another a “misosopher” (hater of wisdom)? And one spirited, another spiritless?

GLAUCON: That too.

SOCRATES: So there is also a woman who is suited to be a guardian, and one who is not. Or wasn’t that the sort of nature we selected for our male guardians, too?

GLAUCON: It certainly was.

SOCRATES: A woman and a man can have the same nature, then, relevant to guarding the city—except to the extent that she is weaker and he is stronger.

GLAUCON: Apparently so.

SOCRATES: Women of that sort, then, must be selected to live and guard with men of the same sort, since they are competent to do so and are akin [*b*] to the men by nature.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And mustn't we assign the same pursuits to the same natures?

GLAUCON: Yes, the same ones.

SOCRATES: We have come around, then, to what we said before, and we are agreed that it is not against nature to assign musical and physical training to the female guardians.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, we are not legislating impossibilities or mere fantasies, at any rate, since the law we were proposing is in accord with nature. Rather, it is the contrary laws that we have now that turn out to be more contrary [*c*] to nature, it seems.

GLAUCON: It does seem that way.

SOCRATES: Now, wasn't our inquiry about whether our proposals were both viable and best?

GLAUCON: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: And that they are in fact viable has been agreed, hasn't it?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, we must next come to an agreement about whether they are for the best?

{317} GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Now, as regards producing a woman who is equipped for guardianship, we won't have one sort of education that will produce our guardian men, will we, and another our women—especially not when it will have the same nature to work on in both cases? [*d*]

GLAUCON: No, we won't.

SOCRATES: What is your belief about this, then?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: The notion that one man is better or worse than another—or do you think they are all alike?

GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: In the city we are founding, who do you think will turn out to be better men: our guardians, who get the education we have described, or the shoemakers, who are educated in shoemaking?

[*e*] GLAUCON: What a ridiculous question!

SOCRATES: I realize that. Aren't the guardians the best of the citizens?

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And what about the female guardians? Won't they be the best of the women?

GLAUCON: Yes, they are by far the best, too.

SOCRATES: Is there anything better for a city than that the best possible men and women should come to exist in it?

GLAUCON: No, there is not.

SOCRATES: And that is what musical and physical training, employed as we [*457a*] have described, will achieve?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then the law we were proposing was not only possible, but also best for a city?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the female guardians must strip, clothing themselves in virtue instead of cloaks. They must share in warfare, and whatever else guarding the city involves, and do nothing else. But within these areas, the women must be assigned lighter tasks than the men, because of the weakness of their sex. And the man who laughs at the sight of women stripped for physical training, when their stripping is for the best, is "plucking the [*b*] unripe fruit of laughter's wisdom,"[118] and knows nothing, it seems, about what he is laughing at or what he is doing. For it is, and always will be, the finest saying that what is beneficial is beautiful; what is harmful ugly.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: May we claim, then, that we are avoiding one wave, as it were, in our discussion of the law about women, so that we are not altogether swept away when we declare that our male and female guardians must [*c*] share all their pursuits, and that our argument is somehow self-consistent when it states that this is both viable and beneficial?

GLAUCON: It is certainly no small wave that you are avoiding.

SOCRATES: You won't think it is so great when you see the next.

GLAUCON: I won't see it unless you tell me about it.

SOCRATES: The law that is consistent with that one, and with the others that preceded it, is this, I take it.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That all these women should be shared among all the men, that no individual woman and man should live together, and that the children, [*d*] too, should be shared, with no parent knowing its own offspring, and no child its parent.

GLAUCON: That wave *is* far greater and more dubitable than the other, both as regards its viability and its benefit.

SOCRATES: As far as its benefit is concerned, at least, I do not think anyone would argue that the sharing of women and children is not the greatest good, if indeed it is viable. But I imagine there would be a lot of dispute about whether or not it is viable.

GLAUCON: No, *both* could very well be disputed. [*e*]

SOCRATES: You mean I will have to face a coalition of arguments. I thought I had at least escaped one of them—namely, whether you thought the proposal was beneficial—and that {318} I would just be left with the argument about whether it is viable or not.

GLAUCON: Well, you did not escape unnoticed. So you will have to give an argument for both.

SOCRATES: I must pay the penalty. But do me this favor: let me take a holiday and act like those lazy people who make a banquet for themselves of [*458a*] their own thoughts when they are walking alone. People like that, as you know, do not bother to find out how any of their appetites might actually be fulfilled, so as to avoid the trouble of deliberating about what is possible and what is not. They assume that what they want is available, and then proceed to arrange all the rest, taking pleasure in going through everything they will do when they get it—thus making their already lazy souls even lazier. Well, I, too, am succumbing to this weakness at the moment and [*b*] want to postpone consideration of the viability of our proposals until later. I will assume now that they are viable, if you will permit me to do so, and examine how the rulers will arrange them when they come to pass. And I will try to show that, if they were put into practice, they would be the most beneficial arrangements of all, both for the city and for its guardians. These are the things I will try to examine with you first, leaving the others for later—if indeed you will permit this.

GLAUCON: You have my permission; so proceed with the examination.

SOCRATES: Well, then, I imagine that if indeed our rulers, and likewise their auxiliaries, are worthy of their names, the latter will be prepared to [*c*]

carry out orders, and the former to give orders, obeying our laws in some cases and imitating them in the others that we leave to their discretion.

GLAUCON: Probably so.

SOCRATES: Now, you are their lawgiver, and in just the way you selected these men, you will select as the women to hand over to them those who have natures as similar to theirs as possible. And because they have shared dwellings and meals, and none of them has any private property of that [*d*] sort, they will live together; and through mixing together in the gymnasia and in the rest of their daily life, they will be driven by inborn compulsion, I take it, to have sex with one another. Or don't you think I am talking about necessities here?

GLAUCON: Not *geometric* necessities, certainly, but *erotic* ones; and they probably have a sharper capacity to persuade and attract most people.

SOCRATES: They do, indeed. But the next point, Glaucon, is that for them to have unregulated sexual intercourse with one another, or to do anything else of that sort, would not be a pious thing in a city of happy [*e*] people, and the rulers won't allow it.

GLAUCON: No, it would not be just.

SOCRATES: It is clear, then, that we will next have to make marriages as sacred as possible. And sacred marriages will be those that are most beneficial.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: How, then, will the most beneficial ones come about? Tell me [*459a*] this, Glaucon. I see you have hunting dogs and quite a flock of noble birds at home.[119] Have you, by Zeus, noticed anything in particular about their "marriages" and breeding?

GLAUCON: Like what?

SOCRATES: In the first place, though they are all noble animals, aren't there some that are, or turn out to be, the very best?

GLAUCON: There are.

SOCRATES: Do you breed from them all to the same extent, then, or do you try hard to breed as far as possible from the best ones?

GLAUCON: From the best ones. [*b*]

SOCRATES: And do you breed from the youngest, the oldest, or as far as possible from those in their prime?

GLAUCON: From those in their prime.

SOCRATES: And if they were not bred in this way, do you think that your race of birds and dogs would get much worse?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: And what do you think about horses and other animals? Is the situation any different with them?

GLAUCON: It would be strange if it were.

{319} SOCRATES: Good heavens, my dear comrade! Then our need for eminent rulers is quite desperate, if indeed the same also holds for the human race.

GLAUCON: Well, it does hold of them. But so what? [*c*]

SOCRATES: It follows that our rulers will then have to employ a great many drugs. You know that when people do not need drugs for their bodies, and they are prepared to follow a regimen, we regard even an inferior doctor as adequate. But when drugs are needed, we know that a much bolder doctor is required.

GLAUCON: That's true. But what is your point?

SOCRATES: This: it looks as though our rulers will have to employ a great many lies and deceptions for the benefit of those they rule. And you remember, I suppose, we said all such things [*d*] were useful as a kind of drug.[120]

GLAUCON: And we were correct.

SOCRATES: Well, in the case of marriages and procreation, its correctness is particularly evident.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: It follows from our previous agreement that the best men should mate with the best women in as many cases as possible, while the opposite should hold of the worst men and women; and that the offspring of the former should be reared, but not that of the latter, if our flock is going to be an eminent one. And all this must occur without anyone [*e*] knowing except the rulers—if, again, our herd of guardians is to remain as free from faction as possible.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: So then, we will have to establish by law certain festivals and sacrifices at which we will bring together brides and bridegrooms, and our

poets must compose suitable hymns for the marriages that take place. We [*460a*] will leave the number of marriages for the rulers to decide. That will enable them to keep the number of males as constant as possible, taking into account war, disease, and everything of that sort; so that the city will, as far as possible, become neither too great nor too small.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: I imagine that some sophisticated lotteries will have to be created, then, so that an inferior person of that sort will blame chance rather than the rulers at each mating time.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And presumably, the young men who are good at war or at [*b*] other things must—among other prizes and awards—be given a greater opportunity to have sex with the women, in order that a pretext may also be created at the same time for having as many children as possible fathered by such men.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: And then, as offspring are born, won't they be taken by the officials appointed for this purpose, whether these are men or women or both—for surely our offices are also open to both women and men.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And I suppose they will take the offspring of good parents to [*c*] the rearing pen and hand them over to special nurses who live in a separate part of the city. But those of inferior parents, or any deformed offspring of the others, they will hide in a secret and unknown place, as is fitting.[121]

GLAUCON: Yes, if indeed the race of guardians is going to remain pure.

SOCRATES: And won't these nurses also take care of the children's feeding by bringing the mothers to the rearing pen when their breasts are full, while devising every device to ensure that no mother will recognize her [*d*] offspring? And won't they provide other women as wet nurses if the mothers themselves have insufficient milk—taking care, however, that the mothers breast-feed the children for only a moderate period of time, and assigning sleepless nights and similar burdens to the nurses and wet nurses?

GLAUCON: You are making childbearing a soft job for the guardians' women.

SOCRATES: Yes, properly so. But let's take up the next thing we proposed. We said, as you know, that offspring should be bred from parents who are in their prime.

{320} GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: Do you agree that a woman's prime lasts, on average, for a [*e*] period of twenty years and a man's for thirty?

GLAUCON: Which years are those?

SOCRATES: A woman should bear children for the city from the age of twenty to that of forty; whereas a man should beget them for the city from the time that he passes his peak as a runner until he reaches fifty-five.

GLAUCON: At any rate, that is the physical and [*461a*] mental prime for both.

SOCRATES: Then if any male who is younger or older than that engages in reproduction for the community, we will say that his offense is neither pious nor just. For the child he fathers for the city, if it escapes discovery, will be begotten and born without the benefit of sacrifices, or of the prayers that priestesses, priests, and the entire city will offer at every marriage festival, asking that from good and beneficial parents ever better and more beneficial offspring should be produced. On the contrary, it will be [*b*] born in darkness through a terrible act of lack of self-control.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: The same law will apply if a man who is still of breeding age has sex with a woman in her prime when the rulers have not mated them. We will say that he is imposing an illegitimate, unauthorized, and unholy child on the city.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: But when women and men have passed breeding age, I imagine we will leave them free to have sex with whomever they wish—except that a man may not have sex with his daughter, mother, daughters' daughters, [*c*] or mother's female ancestors, or a woman with her son and his descendants or her father and his ancestors. And we will permit all that only after telling them to be very careful not to let even a single fetus see the light of day, if one should happen to be conceived; but if one does force its way out, they must dispose of it on the understanding that no nurture is available for such a child.

GLAUCON: All that sounds reasonable. But how will they recognize one another's fathers, daughters, and the others you mentioned? [*d*]

SOCRATES: They won't. Instead, from the day a man becomes a bridegroom, he will call all offspring born in the tenth month afterward (and in the seventh, of course) his sons, if they are male, and his daughters, if they are female; and they will call him father. Similarly, he will call their children his grandchildren, and they, in turn, will call the group to which he belongs grandfathers and grandmothers. And those who were born at the same time as their mothers and fathers were breeding, they will call their brothers and [*e*] sisters. Thus, as we were saying just now, they will avoid sexual relations with each other. However, the law *will* allow brothers and sisters to have sex with one another, if the lottery works out that way and the Pythia[122] approves.

GLAUCON: You are absolutely right.

SOCRATES: That, then, Glaucon, or something like it, is how the sharing of women and children by the guardians of your city will be handled. The next point we need to have confirmed by argument, then, is that this arrangement is both consistent with the rest of the constitution and by far the best. Isn't that so? [*462a*]

GLAUCON: Yes, by Zeus, it is.

SOCRATES: As a beginning step toward reaching agreement, shouldn't we ask ourselves what we think is the greatest good for the organization of the city—the one at which the legislator should aim in making its laws—and what the greatest evil? And then examine whether what we have just described is in harmony with the tracks of the good we have found, and in disharmony with those of the bad?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Now, do we know of any greater evil for a city than what tears [*b*] it apart and makes it many instead of one? Or any greater good than what binds it together and makes it one?

GLAUCON: No, we do not.

SOCRATES: Well, doesn't sharing pleasure and pain bind it together—when, as far as possible, all the citizens feel more or less the same joy or pain at the same gains or losses?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

{321} SOCRATES: On the other hand, doesn't the privatization of these things dissolve the city—when some are overwhelmed with distress and others overjoyed [*c*] by the same things happening to the city or some of its inhabitants?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And isn't that what happens when people do not apply such phrases as "mine" and "not mine" in unison in the city? And similarly with "someone else's"?

GLAUCON: Precisely.

SOCRATES: Then isn't the city that is best governed the one in which the vast majority of people apply "mine" and "not mine" to the same things on the basis of the same principle?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And isn't it the city whose condition is most like that of a single person? I mean, when one of us somehow hurts his finger, you know the entire partnership—the one that binds body and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it—is aware of this, and all of it as a whole feels the pain in unison with the part that suffers. That is why we [*d*] say that this person has a pain in his finger. And the same principle applies, doesn't it, to any other part of a person, whether it is suffering pain or relieved by pleasure?

GLAUCON: Yes, the same one. And, to answer your question, the city that manages to come closest to this condition *is* the best-governed one.

SOCRATES: I imagine, then, that whenever one of its citizens has an experience, whether good or bad, such a city will most certainly say that the experience is its own, and all of it together will share his pleasure or pain. [*e*]

GLAUCON: That must be so, since it is well governed.

SOCRATES: It is time for us to return to our own city, then, to look there for the features we have agreed on and to see whether it, or rather some other city, possesses them to the greatest degree.

GLAUCON: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: Well, now, what about those other cities? Presumably there are rulers and people in them as well as in ours? [*463a*]

GLAUCON: There are.

SOCRATES: And won't all of them call one another "citizens"?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But besides “citizens,” what do the people in those other cities call the rulers?

GLAUCON: In most, they call them “masters,” but in democracies they are called just that—“rulers.”

SOCRATES: What about the people in our city? Besides “citizens,” what do they call the rulers? [*b*]

GLAUCON: “Preservers” and “auxiliaries.”

SOCRATES: And what do *they* call the people?

GLAUCON: “Paymasters” and “providers.”

SOCRATES: What do the rulers in other cities call the people?

GLAUCON: “Slaves.”

SOCRATES: And what do the rulers call each other?

GLAUCON: “Co-rulers.”

SOCRATES: And ours?

GLAUCON: “Co-guardians.”

SOCRATES: Now, can you tell me whether a ruler in other cities could address one of his co-rulers as his kinsman and another as an outsider?

GLAUCON: Many do, at any rate.

SOCRATES: And doesn’t he regard and speak of his kinsman as belonging [*c*] to him, while he regards the outsider as not doing so?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: What about your guardians? Could any of them regard or address a co-guardian as an outsider?

GLAUCON: Certainly not. He will regard everyone he meets as a brother or a sister, a father or a mother, a son or a daughter, or some ancestor or descendant of these.

SOCRATES: Very well put. But tell me this, too: will your laws require them simply to use these terms of kinship, or must they also do all the [*d*] things that go along with the names? In the case of fathers, for example, must they show them the customary respect, solicitude, and obedience owed to parents? Will they fare worse at the hands of gods or men, as people whose actions are neither pious nor just, if they do otherwise? Will these be the sayings that are chanted by all the citizens, and that sound in their ears right from their earliest childhood? Or will they hear {322} something else about

their fathers—or the ones they are told to regard as their fathers—or about their other relatives?

GLAUCON: They will hear those. It would be ridiculous if they only [*e*] mouthed the terms of kinship, without the actions.

SOCRATES: So, in this city more than in any other, when someone is doing well or badly, they will utter in concord the words we mentioned a moment ago, and say "*my* such-and-such is doing well" or "*my* so-and-so is doing badly."

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Well, didn't we say that this conviction and way of talking are [*464a*] accompanied by the having of pleasures and pains in common?

GLAUCON: Yes, and we were right to do so.

SOCRATES: Then won't our citizens share to the fullest, and call "mine," the very same thing? And because they share it, won't they experience to the fullest the sharing of pleasures and pains?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And—in the context of the rest of the political system—isn't the sharing of women and children by the guardians responsible for it?

GLAUCON: Yes, it is by far the most important cause.

SOCRATES: But we further agreed that this sharing is the greatest good for a city, when we compared a well-governed city to the way a human body [*b*] relates to pain and pleasure in one of its parts.

GLAUCON: And we were right to agree.

SOCRATES: Then we have shown that the cause of the greatest good for our city is the sharing of women and children by the auxiliaries.

GLAUCON: Yes, we certainly have.

SOCRATES: And what is more, it is consistent with what we said before. For we said, as you know, that if these people are going to be real guardians, they should not have private houses, land, or any other possession, but should receive their upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their [*c*] guardianship, and should all eat communally.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: So, as I say, doesn't what was said earlier, as well as what is being said now, make them into even better guardians and prevent them from tearing the city apart by applying the term "mine" not to the same thing, but to different ones—with one person dragging into his own house

whatever he, apart from the others, can get his hands on, and another into a different house to a different wife and children, who create private pleasures [*d*] and pains at things that are private? Instead of that, don't our guardians share a single conviction about what is their own, aim at the same goal, and, as far as possible, feel pleasure and pain in unison?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: What about lawsuits and accusations? Won't they pretty much disappear from among them because they have no private possessions except their own bodies and share all the rest? As a result, won't they be free from faction—at any rate, from the sort of faction that the possession of [*e*] property, children, and families causes among people?

GLAUCON: Yes, they will inevitably be entirely free of it.

SOCRATES: Moreover, neither lawsuits for violence nor for assault should justifiably occur among them. For we will declare, surely, that for people to defend themselves against others of the same age is a fine and just thing, since it will compel them to stay in good physical shape.

GLAUCON: That's right. [*465a*]

SOCRATES: This law is also correct for another reason: if a spirited person vents his anger in this way, he will be less likely to move on to more serious sorts of faction.

GLAUCON: He certainly will.

SOCRATES: As for an older person, he will be authorized to rule and punish all the younger ones.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And, unless the rulers command it, it is unlikely that a younger person will ever employ any sort of violence against an older one, or strike him. And I do not imagine he will fail to show him respect in other ways either, since two guardians—fear and shame—are sufficient to prevent it. Shame will prevent him from laying a hand on his parents, as will the fear that [*b*] the others would come to his victim's aid—some because they are his sons, some because they {323} are his brothers, and some because they are his fathers.

GLAUCON: Yes, that is what would happen.

SOCRATES: Then won't the laws induce men to live at peace with one another in all respects?

GLAUCON: Very much so.

SOCRATES: And if there is no faction among the guardians, there is no terrible danger that the rest of the city will form factions, either against them or among themselves.

GLAUCON: No, there is not.

SOCRATES: As for the pettiest of the evils the guardians would escape, they are so unseemly, I hesitate even to mention them: the flatteries of the rich [*c*] by the poor; the perplexities and sufferings involved in bringing up children; the need to make the money necessary to feed the household—the borrowings, the defaults, and all the things people are compelled to do to provide an income to hand over to their wives and slaves to spend on housekeeping. The various troubles men endure in these areas, my dear Glaucon, are obvious, quite demeaning, and not worth discussing.

[*d*] GLAUCON: They are obvious even to the blind.

SOCRATES: They will escape from all these things, then, and live a more blessedly happy life than the most blessedly happy one—that of the victors in the Olympian games.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Surely, these victors are considered happy on account of only a small part of what the guardians possess, since the latter victory is even finer, and their upkeep from public funds more complete.[123] After all, the victory they gain is the salvation of the whole city, and the crown of victory they and their children receive is their upkeep and all the necessities of life. They receive privileges from their own city during their lifetime and a [*e*] worthy burial after their death.

GLAUCON: Yes, those are very fine rewards.

SOCRATES: Now, do you remember that earlier in our discussion we were rebuked by an argument—I forget whose—to the effect that we had not made our guardians happy, that though it was possible for them to have everything that belongs to the citizens, they actually had nothing? We said, [*466a*] didn’t we, that if this happened to come up at some point, we would look into it then, but that our concern at the time was to make our guardians *guardians*, and to make the *city* the happiest possible, rather than looking to any one group within it and molding it for happiness?

GLAUCON: I remember.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if indeed the life of our auxiliaries has been shown to be much finer and better than that of Olympian victors, is there any need to compare it with the lives of shoemakers or any other craftsmen, or [*b*] with that of the farmers?

GLAUCON: I do not think there is.

SOCRATES: Nevertheless, it is surely right to repeat here what I also said on that earlier occasion: if a guardian tries to become happy in such a way that he is no longer a guardian at all, and is not satisfied with a life that is moderate, stable, and (we claim) best, but is seized by a foolish, adolescent belief about happiness, which incites him to use his power to take everything in the city for himself—he will come to realize the true wisdom of [*c*] Hesiod's saying that, in a sense, "the half is worth more than the whole."[124]

GLAUCON: If he takes my advice, he will keep to the former life.

SOCRATES: Do you agree, then, that the women should share with the men, in the way we described, in the areas of education, children, and guarding the other citizens; that whether they remain in the city or go out to war, they must guard together and hunt together, as hounds do, and [*d*] share everything to the extent possible; and that by behaving in this way, they will be doing what is best, not something contrary to the natural relationship of female to male, and the one they are most naturally fitted to share in with one another?

GLAUCON: I do agree.

SOCRATES: Then doesn't it remain for us to determine whether it is also possible among human beings, as it is among other animals, for this sort of sharing to come about, and if so, how?

{324} GLAUCON: You took the words out of my mouth.

SOCRATES: As far as war is concerned, I think it is clear how they will [*e*] wage it.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: They will go to war together. What is more, they will take the children with them to the war, when they are sturdy enough, so that, like the children of other craftsmen, they can see what they will have to do in their own craft when they are grown up. But in addition to observing, they [*467a*] should help and assist in every aspect of war, and take care of their

mothers and fathers. For haven’t you noticed in the other crafts how the children of potters, for example, assist and watch for a long time before actually putting their hands to the clay?

GLAUCON: I have, indeed.

SOCRATES: Well, should these people take more care than the guardians in training their children by appropriate experience and observation?

GLAUCON: Of course not. That would be completely ridiculous.

SOCRATES: Besides, every animal will fight better in the presence of its [*b*] young.

GLAUCON: That’s right. But there is a risk, Socrates, and not a small one either, that in the event of a disaster of the sort that is likely to happen in a war, they will lose their children’s lives as well as their own, making it impossible for the rest of the city to recover.

SOCRATES: That’s true. But, in the first place, do you think they should arrange for the avoidance of all risk?

GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if they must face some risk, shouldn’t it be one in which they will be improved by success?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But you think, do you, that it makes little difference—and so is not worth the risk—whether or not men who are going to be warriors [*c*] watch warfare when they are still boys?

GLAUCON: No, it does make a difference to what you are talking about.

SOCRATES: Starting from the assumption, then, that we are to make the children observers of war, we must further devise some way of keeping them safe. Then everything will be fine, won’t it?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, in the first place, their fathers won’t be ignorant, will they, but rather as knowledgeable as people can be, about which military campaigns are dangerous and which are not? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Presumably so.

SOCRATES: So, they will take the children on the latter, but be wary of taking them on the former.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And they will not put the worst people in charge of them, I presume, but those whose experience and age qualifies them to be leaders

and tutors.

GLAUCON: Yes, that would be proper.

SOCRATES: But we will say that the unexpected happens to many people and on many occasions.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: So, with that in mind, my friend, we must provide the young children with wings at the outset, so that, if the need arises, they can fly away and escape.

GLAUCON: What do you mean? [*e*]

SOCRATES: We must mount them on horses when they are still very young, and when they have been taught to ride, they must be taken to view the fighting, not on spirited or aggressive horses, but on the fastest and most manageable ones. In this way, they will get the best view of their own future job, and will be able to make the safest escape, if the need arises, by following their older leaders.

GLAUCON: I think you are right.

SOCRATES: What about warfare itself? How should your soldiers behave [*468a*] toward one another and the enemy? Are my views correct or not?

GLAUCON: Tell me what they are.

SOCRATES: If one of them leaves his post, throws away his shield, or does anything else of that sort out of cowardice, shouldn’t he be demoted to craftsman or farmer?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And if anyone is captured alive by the enemy, shouldn’t he be presented to his captors as a catch to use however they wish? [*b*]

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

{325} SOCRATES: But if someone distinguishes himself and earns high honors, do you or don’t you think that in the first place, while still on campaign, he should be crowned in turn by each of the adolescents and children who are with the army?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: What about shaking him by the right hand?

GLAUCON: That too.

SOCRATES: But I do not imagine you would go so far as this.

GLAUCON: As what?

SOCRATES: That he should kiss, and be kissed by, each of them.

GLAUCON: By all means. And I would add to the law that while they are still on campaign, no one he wants to kiss shall be allowed to refuse, so that [*c*] if anyone passionately loves another, whether male or female, he will try harder to win the prize for bravery.

SOCRATES: Excellent! For we have already mentioned that more opportunities for marriage will be available for a good man, and that men like him will be selected more often than others for such things, so that as many children as possible may be produced from them.

GLAUCON: Yes, we did mention that.

SOCRATES: Moreover, according to Homer too, it is just to honor in such ways those young people who are good. For Homer says that when Ajax [*d*] distinguished himself in battle, he "was rewarded with the whole backbone,"[125] since he considered that to be an appropriate honor for a courageous young man because it honored him and built up his strength at the same time.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: Then we will follow Homer in this matter, at any rate. I mean that at sacrifices and all other such occasions, we too will honor good men —insofar as they have exhibited their goodness—not only with hymns and all the other things we mentioned, but also with "seats of honor, cuts of meats, and well-filled cups of wine,"[126] so that while honoring our good men [*e*] and women, we may train them at the same time.

GLAUCON: That's an excellent idea.

SOCRATES: All right. And if any of those who died while on campaign has had a particularly distinguished death, won't we, in the first place, declare that he belongs to the golden race?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And won't we believe with Hesiod that, whenever any of that race die, they become "unsullied daimons living upon the earth, noble [*469a*] beings, protectors against evil, guardians of articulate mortals?"[127]

GLAUCON: We will certainly believe that.

SOCRATES: Won't we ask the god, then, to tell us how and with what distinction these daimons, these godlike people, should be buried, and perform their burial in whatever way he prescribes?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And for the remainder of time, won't we regard their graves as those of daimons, and take care of them and worship at them? And won't we follow these same rites whenever anyone who has been judged outstandingly [*b*] good throughout his life dies of old age, or in some other way?

GLAUCON: It would be just to do so, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Now, what about enemies? How will our soldiers behave toward them?

GLAUCON: In what respect?

SOCRATES: First, as regards enslavement, do you think it is just for Greek cities to enslave other Greeks, or should they try as hard as possible not even to allow other cities to do so, and make a habit of sparing the Greek race as a precaution against being enslaved by barbarians? [*c*]

GLAUCON: Sparing them is by far the best course.

SOCRATES: So, they should not possess any Greek slaves themselves, and should advise the other Greeks to do the same?

GLAUCON: By all means. In that way, at any rate, they would be more likely to turn against the barbarians and keep their hands off one another.

SOCRATES: What about despoiling the dead? Is it a good thing to strip the dead of anything {326} besides their armor after a victory? Doesn't it give cowards [*d*] a pretext for not facing the enemy, since when they are greedily bending over corpses, they will be performing an important duty? And haven't many armies been lost because of such plundering?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Don't you think it is illiberal and money-loving to strip a corpse? And isn't it small-minded and womanish to regard a dead body as your enemy, when the enemy himself has flitted away leaving behind only the instrument with which he fought? Do you think that people who do this are any different from dogs who get angry with the stones thrown at [*e*] them but leave the person throwing them alone?

GLAUCON: No different at all.

SOCRATES: So they should not strip corpses, should they, or refuse the enemy permission to pick up their dead?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, they certainly should not.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we surely won't take weapons to the temples as offerings, and if we care anything about the goodwill of other Greeks, we

[*470a*] especially won't do this with Greek weapons. On the contrary, we would even be afraid of polluting the temples if we brought them such things from our own race, unless, of course, the god ordains otherwise.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: What about ravaging Greek land and burning Greek houses? How will your soldiers behave toward their enemies?

GLAUCON: I would like to hear what *you* believe about that.

SOCRATES: Well, I believe they should do neither of these things, but [*b*] destroy only the year's harvest. Do you want me to tell you why?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: It seems to me that just as we have the two names "war" and "faction," so there are also two things, and the names apply to differences between the two. The two I mean are, on the one hand, what is one's own and kin, and, on the other, what is foreign and strange. "Faction" applies to hostility toward one's own, "war" to hostility toward strangers.

GLAUCON: Yes, there is nothing wrong with that claim. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Consider, then, whether this too is correct. I say that the Greek race, in relation to itself, is its own and kin, but, in relation to barbarians, is strange and foreign.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: When Greeks fight with barbarians, then, or barbarians with Greeks, we will say that that is warfare, that they are natural enemies, and that such hostilities should be called war. But when Greeks engage in such things with Greeks, we will say they are natural friends, that Greece is sick and divided into factions in such a situation, and that such hostilities should be called faction. [*d*]

GLAUCON: I, for one, agree to think that way.

SOCRATES: Now, notice that whenever something of the sort that is currently called faction occurs and a city is divided, if each side devastates the land and burns the houses of the other, the faction is thought abominable and neither party is thought to love the city—otherwise they would never have dared to ravage their own nurse and mother. But it is thought reasonable for the ones who have proved stronger to carry off the weaker ones' crops, and to have the attitude of mind of people who will one day be reconciled [*e*] and won't always be at war.

GLAUCON: That attitude of mind is far more civilized than the other.

SOCRATES: What about the city you are founding? Won't it be Greek?

GLAUCON: It will have to be.

SOCRATES: So won't its citizens be good and civilized people?

GLAUCON: Indeed, they will.

SOCRATES: Then won't they be lovers of Greeks? Won't they consider Greece as their own and share the same religious festivals as other Greeks?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then won't they regard their conflicts with Greeks—their own people—as faction, and not even use the name "war"? [*471a*]

GLAUCON: No, they won't use it.

SOCRATES: And so, they will quarrel with the aim of being reconciled, won't they?

GLAUCON: Of course.

{327} SOCRATES: They will discipline their foes in a friendly spirit, then, and not punish them with enslavement and destruction, since they are discipliners, not enemies.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: As Greeks, then, they won't devastate Greece or burn its houses, nor will they agree that *all* the inhabitants in any city—men, women, and children—are their enemies, but only those few responsible for the conflict. For all these reasons, they won't be willing to devastate [*b*] their country, since the majority of the inhabitants are their friends, nor destroy the houses, and they will pursue the conflict only to the point at which those responsible are compelled to pay the penalty by the innocent ones who are suffering painfully.

GLAUCON: I agree that this is how our citizens should treat their enemies, but they should treat barbarians the way Greeks currently treat each other.

SOCRATES: Then shall we also establish this law for the guardians, that [*c*] they should neither ravage Greek land nor burn Greek houses?

GLAUCON: Yes, let's establish it. And let's assume that this law and its predecessors are right. But, Socrates, I think that if you are allowed to go on talking about this sort of thing, you will never remember the topic you set aside in order to say all this—namely, whether it is possible for this constitution to come into existence, and how it could ever do so. I agree that *if* it came into existence, everything would be lovely for the city that had it. I will even add some advantages that you have left out: they would fight

excellently against their enemies because they would be least likely to [*d*] desert each other. After all, they recognize each other as brothers, fathers, and sons, and call each other by those names. And if the women, too, joined in their campaigns, either stationed in the same ranks or in the rear, either to strike terror in the enemy or to provide support should the need ever arise, I know that this would make them quite unbeatable. And I also see all the good things they would have at home that you have omitted. [*e*] Take it for granted that I agree that all these benefits, as well as innumerable others, would result, *if* this constitution came into existence, and say no more about it. Instead, let's now try to convince ourselves of just this: that it is possible and how it is possible, and let's leave the rest aside. [*472a*]

SOCRATES: All of a sudden, you have practically assaulted my argument and lost all sympathy for my holding back. Perhaps you do not realize that just as I have barely escaped from the first two waves of objections, you are now bringing the greatest and most difficult of the three down upon me.[128] When you see and hear it, you will have complete sympathy and recognize that I had good reason after all for hesitating and for being afraid to state and try to examine so paradoxical an argument.

GLAUCON: The more you talk like that, the less we will let you get away [*b*] without explaining how this constitution could come into existence. So explain it, and do not delay any further.

SOCRATES: The first thing to recall, then, is that it was our inquiry into the nature of justice and injustice that brought us to this point.

GLAUCON: True. But what of it?

SOCRATES: Oh, nothing. However, if we discover the nature of justice, should we also expect the just man not to differ from justice itself in any way, but, on the contrary, to have entirely the same nature it does? Or will we be satisfied if he approximates as closely as possible to it and partakes in [*c*] it far more than anyone else?

GLAUCON: Yes, we will be satisfied with that.

SOCRATES: So, it was in order to have a model that we were inquiring into the nature of justice itself and of the completely just man, supposing he could exist, and what he would be like if he did; and similarly with injustice and the most unjust man. We thought that by seeing how they seemed to us to stand with regard to happiness and its opposite, we would also be

compelled to agree about ourselves as well: that the one who was most like them would have a fate most like theirs. But we were not doing this in [*d*] order to demonstrate that it is possible for these men to exist.

GLAUCON: That's true.

{328} SOCRATES: Do you think, then, that someone would be any less good a painter if he painted a model of what the most beautiful human being would be like, and rendered everything in the picture perfectly well, but could not demonstrate that such a man could actually exist?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: What about our own case, then? Weren't we trying, as we put it, to produce a [*e*] model in our discussion of a good city?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So, do you think that our discussion will be any less satisfactory if we cannot demonstrate that it is possible to found a city that is the same as the one we described in speech?

GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Then that is the truth of the matter. But if, in order to please you, we must do our best to demonstrate how, and under what condition, this would be most possible, you must again grant me the same points for the purposes of that demonstration.

GLAUCON: Which ones?

SOCRATES: Is it possible for anything to be carried out exactly as described in speech, or is it natural for practice to have less of a grasp of truth than [*473a*] speech does, even if some people do not think so? Do you agree with this or not?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Then do not compel me to demonstrate it as coming about in practice exactly as we have described it in speech. Rather, if we are able to discover how a city that most closely approximates to what we have described could be founded, you must admit that we have discovered how [*b*] all you have prescribed could come about. Or wouldn't you be satisfied with that? *I* certainly would.

GLAUCON: Me, too.

SOCRATES: Then next, it seems, we should try to discover and show what is badly done in cities nowadays that prevents them from being managed our way, and what the smallest change would be that would enable a city to

arrive at our sort of constitution—preferably one change; otherwise, two; otherwise, the fewest in number and the [*c*] least extensive in effect.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Well, there is one change we could point to that I think would accomplish this. It certainly is not small or easy, but it *is* possible.

GLAUCON: What is it?

SOCRATES: I am now about to confront what we likened to the greatest wave. Yet, it must be stated, even if it is going to drown me in a wave of outright ridicule and contempt, as it were. So listen to what I am about to say.

GLAUCON: Say it.

SOCRATES: Until philosophers rule as kings in their cities, or those who are nowadays called kings and leading men become genuine and adequate [*d*] philosophers so that political power and philosophy become thoroughly blended together, while the numerous natures that now pursue either one exclusively are compelled not to do so, cities will have no rest from evils, my dear Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And until that happens, the same constitution we have now described in our discussion [*e*] will never be born to the extent that it can, or see the light of the sun. It is this claim that has made me hesitate to speak for so long. I saw how very unbelievable it would sound, since it is difficult to accept that there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other way.

GLAUCON: Socrates, what a speech, what an argument you have let burst with! But now that you have uttered it, you must expect that a great many people—and not undistinguished ones either—will immediately throw off [*474a*] their cloaks and, stripped for action, snatch any available weapon and make a headlong rush at you, determined to do terrible things to you. So, if you do not defend yourself by argument and escape, you really will pay the penalty of general derision.

SOCRATES: But aren't *you* the one who is responsible for this happening to me?

GLAUCON: And I was right to do it. Still, I won't desert you. On the contrary, I will defend you in any way I can. And what I can do is provide good will and encouragement, and maybe give you more careful answers to your questions than someone else. So, with the promise of this sort of

assistance, try to demonstrate to the unbelievers that things are as you claim. [*b*]

{329} SOCRATES: I will have to, especially when you agree to be so great an ally! If we are going to escape from the people you mention, I think we need to define for them who the philosophers are that we dare to say should rule; so that once that is clear, one can defend oneself by showing that some people are fitted by nature to engage in philosophy *and* to take the lead in a [*c*] city, while there are others who should not engage in it, but should follow a leader.

GLAUCON: This would be a good time to define them.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, follow me on the path I am about to take, to see if it somehow leads to an adequate explanation.

GLAUCON: Lead on.

SOCRATES: Do I have to remind you, or do you recall, that when we say someone loves something, if the description is correct, it must be clear not just that he loves some part of it but not another; but, on the contrary, that he cherishes the whole of it?

GLAUCON: You will have to remind me, it [*d*] seems. I do not recall the point at all.

SOCRATES: I did not expect you to give that response, Glaucon. A passionate man should not forget that *all* boys in the bloom of youth somehow manage to sting and arouse a passionate lover of boys, and seem to merit his attention and passionate devotion. Isn't that the way you people behave to beautiful boys? One, because he is snub-nosed, you will praise as "cute;" another who is hook-nosed you will say is "regal;" while the one in the middle you say is "well proportioned." Dark ones look "manly," and pale [*e*] ones are "children of the gods." As for the "honey-colored," do you think that this very term is anything but the euphemistic coinage of a lover who found it easy to tolerate a sallow complexion, provided it was accompanied by the bloom of youth? In a word, you people find any excuse, and use any expression, to avoid rejecting anyone whose [*475a*] flower is in full bloom.

GLAUCON: If you insist on taking *me* as your example of what passionate men do, I will go along with you . . . for the sake of argument!

SOCRATES: What about lovers of wine? Don't you observe them behaving in just the same way? Don't they find any excuse to indulge their passionate

devotion to wine of any sort?

GLAUCON: They do, indeed.

SOCRATES: And you also observe, I imagine, that if honor-lovers cannot become generals, they serve as lieutenants, and if they cannot be honored by important people and dignitaries, they are satisfied with being honored [*b*] by insignificant and inferior ones, since it is honor as a whole for which they have an appetite.

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Then do you affirm this or not? When we say that someone has an appetite for something, are we to say that he has an appetite for everything of that kind, or for one part of it but not another?

GLAUCON: Everything.

SOCRATES: Then in the case of the philosopher, too, won't we say that he has an appetite for *wisdom*—not for one part and not another, but for all of it?

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: So, if someone makes difficulties about what he learns, especially if he [*c*] is young and does not have a rational grasp of what is useful and what is not, we won't say that he is a lover of learning or a philosopher—any more than we would say that someone who is choosy about his food is famished, or has an appetite for food, or is a lover of food rather than a picky eater.

GLAUCON: And we would be right not to say it.

SOCRATES: But someone who is ready and willing to taste every kind of learning, who turns gladly to learning and is insatiable for it, *he* is the one we would be justified in calling a philosopher. Isn't that so? [*d*]

GLAUCON: In that case, many strange people will be philosophers! I mean, all the lovers of seeing are what they are, I imagine, because they take pleasure in learning things. And the lovers of listening are very strange people to include as philosophers: they would never willingly attend a serious discussion or spend their time that way; yet, just as if their ears were under contract to listen to every chorus, they run around to all the Dionysiac festivals, whether in cities or villages, and never miss one. Are we to say that these {330} people—and others who are students of similar things or of petty [*e*] crafts—are philosophers?

SOCRATES: Not at all, but they are *like* philosophers.

GLAUCON: Who do you think, then, are the true ones?

SOCRATES: The lovers of seeing the truth.

GLAUCON: That, too, is no doubt correct, but what exactly do you mean by it?

SOCRATES: It would not be easy to explain to someone else. But you, I imagine, will agree to the following.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That since beautiful is the opposite of ugly, they are two things.

[*476a*] GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And since they are two things, each of them is also one?

GLAUCON: That's true too.

SOCRATES: And the same argument applies, then, to just and unjust, good and bad, and all the forms: each of them is itself one thing, but because they appear all over the place in partnership with actions and bodies, and with one another, each of them appears to be many things.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is the basis of the distinction I draw: on one side are the lovers of seeing, the lovers of crafts, and the practical people you mentioned a moment ago; on the other, those we are arguing about, the only ones it is [*b*] correct to call philosophers.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: The lovers of listening and seeing are passionately devoted to beautiful sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of such things. But their thought is unable to see the nature of the beautiful itself or to be passionately devoted to it.

GLAUCON: That's certainly true.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, won't those who *are* able to approach the beautiful itself, and see it by itself, be rare?

[*c*] GLAUCON: Very.

SOCRATES: What about someone who believes in beautiful things but does not believe in the beautiful itself, and would not be able to follow anyone who tried to lead him to the knowledge of it? Do you think he is living in a dream, or is he awake? Just consider. Isn't it dreaming to think—whether asleep or awake—that a likeness is not a likeness, but rather the thing itself that it is like?

GLAUCON: I certainly think that someone who does that is dreaming.

SOCRATES: But what about someone who, to take the opposite case, does believe in the beautiful itself, is able to observe both it and the things that [*d*] participate in it, and does not think that the participants are it, or that it is the participants—do you think he is living in a dream or is awake?

GLAUCON: He is very much awake.

SOCRATES: So, because this person knows these things, we would be right to describe his thought as knowledge; but the other's we would be right to describe as belief, because he believes what he does?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: What if the person we describe as believing but not knowing is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we say? Will we have any [*e*] way of soothing and gently persuading him, while disguising the fact that he is not in a healthy state of mind?

GLAUCON: We certainly need one, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, consider what we will say to him. Or—once we have told him that nobody envies him any knowledge he may have—that, on the contrary, we would be delighted to discover that he knows something—do you want us to question him as follows? "Tell us this: does someone who knows know something or nothing?" You answer for him.

GLAUCON: I will answer that he knows something.

SOCRATES: Something that is or something that is not? [*477a*]

GLAUCON: That is. How could something that is not be known?

SOCRATES: We are adequately assured of this, then, and would remain so, no matter how many ways we examined it: what is completely is completely an object of knowledge and what is in no way at all is an object of complete ignorance.

GLAUCON: Most adequately.

{331} SOCRATES: Good. In that case, then, if anything is such as to be and also not to be, wouldn't it lie in between what purely is and what in no way is?

GLAUCON: Yes, in between them.

SOCRATES: Then, since knowledge deals with what is, ignorance must deal with what is not, while we must look in between knowledge and ignorance for what deals with what lies in between, if there *is* anything of [*b*] that sort.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, then, do we think there is such a thing as belief?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Is it a different power from knowledge, or the same?

GLAUCON: A different one.

SOCRATES: So, belief has been assigned to deal with one thing, then, and knowledge with another, depending on what power each has.

GLAUCON: Right.

SOCRATES: Now, doesn't knowledge naturally deal with what is, to know how what is as it is? But first I think we should go through the following.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: We think powers are a type of thing that enables us—or anything [*c*] else that has an ability—to do whatever we are able to do. Sight and hearing are examples of what I mean by powers, if you understand the kind of thing I am trying to describe.

GLAUCON: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Listen, then, to what I think about them. A power has no color for me to see, nor a shape, nor any feature of the sort that many other things have, and that I can consider in order to distinguish them for myself as different from one another. In the case of a power, I can consider only what it deals with and what it does, and it is on that basis that I come to call [*d*] each the power it is: those assigned to deal with the same things and do the same, I call the same; those that deal with different things and do different things, I call different. What about you? What do you do?

GLAUCON: The same.

SOCRATES: Going back, then, to where we left off, my very good fellow: do you think knowledge is itself a power? Or to what type would you assign it?

GLAUCON: To that one. It is the most effective power of all.

SOCRATES: What about belief? Shall we include it as a power or assign it to a different kind? [*e*]

GLAUCON: Not at all. Belief is nothing other than the power that enables us to believe.

SOCRATES: But a moment ago you agreed that knowledge and belief are not the same.

GLAUCON: How could anyone with any sense think a fallible thing is the same as an infallible one?

SOCRATES: Fine. Then clearly we agree that belief is different from knowledge. [*478a*]

GLAUCON: Yes, it is different.

SOCRATES: Each of them, then, since it has a different power, deals by nature with something different?

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: Surely knowledge deals with what is, to know what is as it is?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Whereas belief, we say, believes?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: The very same thing that knowledge knows? Can the object of knowledge and the object of belief be the same? Or is that impossible?

GLAUCON: It is impossible, given what we have agreed. If different powers by nature deal with different things, and both opinion and knowledge are [*b*] powers but, as we claim, different ones, it follows from these that the object of knowledge and the object of belief cannot be the same.

SOCRATES: Then if what is is the object of knowledge, mustn't the object of belief be something other than what is?

GLAUCON: Yes, it must be something different.

SOCRATES: Does belief, then, believe what is not? Or is it impossible even to believe what is not? Consider this: doesn't a believer take his belief to deal with something? Or is it possible to believe, yet to believe nothing?

GLAUCON: No, it is impossible.

SOCRATES: In fact, there is some single thing that a believer believes?

{332} GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: But surely what is not is most correctly characterized not as a [*c*] single thing, but as nothing?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But we had to assign ignorance to what is not and knowledge to what is?

GLAUCON: Correct.

SOCRATES: So belief neither believes what is nor what is not?

GLAUCON: No, it does not.

SOCRATES: Then belief cannot be either ignorance or knowledge?

GLAUCON: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: Well, then, does it lie beyond these two, surpassing knowledge in clarity or ignorance in opacity?

GLAUCON: No, it does neither.

SOCRATES: Then does belief seem to you to be more opaque than knowledge but clearer than ignorance?

GLAUCON: Very much so.

SOCRATES: It lies within the boundaries determined by them? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So belief will lie in between the two?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Now, didn't we say earlier that if something turned out both to be and not to be at the same time, it would lie in between what purely is and what in every way is not, and that neither knowledge nor ignorance would deal with it; but whatever it was again that turned out to lie in between ignorance and knowledge would?

GLAUCON: Correct.

SOCRATES: And now, what we are calling belief has turned out to lie in between them?

GLAUCON: It has.

SOCRATES: Apparently, then, it remains for us to find what partakes in [*e*] both being and not being, and cannot correctly be called purely one or the other, so that if we find it, we can justifiably call it the object of belief, thereby assigning extremes to extremes and in-betweens to in-betweens. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: It is.

SOCRATES: Now that all that has been established, I want him to tell me this—the excellent fellow who believes that there is no beautiful itself, no form of beauty itself that remains always the same in all respects, but who [*479a*] does believe that there are many beautiful things—I mean, that lover of seeing who cannot bear to hear anyone say that the beautiful is one thing, or the just, or any of the rest—I want him to answer this question: "My very good fellow," we will say, "of all the many beautiful things, is there one that won't also seem ugly? Or any just one that won't seem unjust? Or any pious one that won't seem impious?"

GLAUCON: There is not. On the contrary, it is inevitable that they would somehow seem both beautiful and ugly; and the same with the other things

[*b*] you asked about.

SOCRATES: What about the many things that are doubles? Do they seem to be any the less halves than doubles?

GLAUCON: No.

SOCRATES: And again, will things that we say are great, small, light, or heavy be any more what we say they are than they will be the opposite?

GLAUCON: No, each of them is always both.

SOCRATES: Then is each of the many things any more what one says it is than it is not what one says it is?

GLAUCON: No, they are like those puzzles one hears at parties, or the children's [*c*] riddle about the eunuch who threw something at a bat—the one about what he threw at it and what it was in.[129] For these things, too, are ambiguous, and one cannot understand them as fixedly being or fixedly not being, or as both, or as neither.

{333} SOCRATES: Do you know what to do with them, then, or anywhere better to put them than in between being and not being? Surely they cannot be more opaque than what is not, by not-being more than it; nor clearer [*d*] than what is, by *being* more than it.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So, we have now discovered, it seems, that the masses' many conventional norms concerning beauty and the rest are somehow rolling around between what is not and what purely is.

GLAUCON: We have.

SOCRATES: And we agreed earlier that if anything turned out to be of that sort, it would have to be called an object of belief, not an object of knowledge—a wandering, in-between object grasped by the in-between power.

GLAUCON: We did.

SOCRATES: As for those, then, who look at many beautiful things but do [*e*] not see the beautiful itself, and are incapable of following another who would lead them to it; or many just things but not the just itself, and similarly with all the rest—these people, we will say, have beliefs about all these things, but have no knowledge of what their beliefs are about.

GLAUCON: That is what we would have to say.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, what about those who in each case look at the things themselves that are always the same in every respect? Won't we say that they have knowledge, not mere belief?

GLAUCON: Once again, we would have to.

SOCRATES: Shall we say, then, that these people are passionately devoted to and love the things with which knowledge deals, as the others are devoted to and love the things with which belief deals? We have not forgotten, [*480a*] have we, that the latter love and look at beautiful sounds, colors, and things of that sort, but cannot even bear the idea that the beautiful itself is a thing that is?

GLAUCON: No, we have not.

SOCRATES: Will we be striking a false note, then, if we call such people "philodoxers" (lovers of belief) rather than "philosophers" (lovers of wisdom or knowledge)? Will they be very angry with us if we call them that?

GLAUCON: Not if they take my advice. It is not in accord with divine law to be angry with the truth.

SOCRATES: So, those who in each case are passionately devoted to the thing itself are the ones we must call, not "philodoxers," but "philosophers"?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

BOOK VI

ONLY THE PHILOSOPHERS have knowledge, and that alone is sufficient to qualify them to be the rulers, provided that they are not inferior to the nonphilosophers in virtue (484d). So Socrates tries to show that they are in fact supremely virtuous (485a–487a). Adeimantus accepts his arguments, but points out that the majority of people will simply go on believing that philosophers are unsuited to rule because they know from experience that most philosophers are vicious while the few decent ones are useless (487a–d). Socrates surprisingly agrees with the majority about this. The people the majority take to be philosophers are either vicious or useless (487d–496e), but that is because the few decent ones, who possess a true philosophical nature,

are not raised under the right sort of constitution (497a–b). If the majority ever saw a philosopher who had been raised in that way, they too would agree that he should rule their city (500e–501a).

The guardians in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers (503b), then, and they must have all the traits already mentioned, but they must also be tested to see whether they can master the most important subjects (503e). These are the subjects that enable someone to come to know the good itself, that is, the form of the good (504e–505b). Socrates cannot explain directly what the good itself is, but he describes "what seems to be an offspring of the good and most like it" (506b–e). This description is the famous Sun analogy (507a–509c). It is completed by the Line analogy, which occupies the remainder of the book (509d–511e).

{334} SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES:

SOCRATES: Who the philosophers are, then, Glaucon, and who they aren't [*484a*] has, through a somewhat lengthy argument and with much effort, somehow been made clear.

GLAUCON: That's probably because it could not easily have been done through a shorter one.

SOCRATES: I suppose not. Yet I, at least, think that the matter would have been made even clearer if we had had only that topic to discuss, and not the many others that remain for us to explore if we are to discover the difference [*b*] between the just life and the unjust one.

GLAUCON: What comes after this one, then?

SOCRATES: What else but the one that comes next? Since the philosophers are the ones who are able to grasp what is always the same in all respects, while those who cannot—those who wander among the many things that vary in every sort of way—are not philosophers, which of the two should be the leaders of a city?

GLAUCON: What would be a reasonable answer for us to give?

SOCRATES: Whichever of them seems capable of guarding a city's laws and [*c*] practices should be established as guardians.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: So, is the answer to the following question clear: should a guardian who is going to keep watch over something be blind or keen-sighted?

GLAUCON: Of course it is.

SOCRATES: Well, do you think there is any difference, then, between the blind and those who are really deprived of the knowledge of each thing that is, and have no clear model of it in their souls—those who cannot look away, like painters, to what is most true, and cannot, by making constant reference to it and by studying it as exactly as possible, establish here [*d*] on earth conventional norms concerning beautiful, just, or good things when they need to be established, or guard and preserve those that have been established?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, there is not much difference between them.

SOCRATES: Shall we appoint these blind people as our guardians, then, or those who know each thing that is, have no less experience than the others, and are not inferior to them in any other part of virtue?

GLAUCON: It would be absurd to choose anyone but philosophers, if indeed they are not inferior in these other things. For the very area in which they are superior is just about the greatest one.

SOCRATES: Shouldn't we explain, then, how the same men can have both [*485a*] sets of qualities?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then, as we were saying at the beginning of this discussion, it is first necessary to understand the nature of philosophers. And I think that if we can agree sufficiently about that, we will also agree that the same people *can* have both qualities, and that they alone should be leaders in cities.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Let's agree that philosophic natures always love the sort of learning that makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is [*b*] and does not wander around between coming-to-be and decaying.

GLAUCON: Yes, let's.

SOCRATES: And further, let's agree that they love all of it and are not willing to give up any part, whether great or small, significant or insignificant, just like the honor-lovers and passionate men we described before.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

SOCRATES: Consider next whether there is a further feature they must have in their nature if they are going to be the way we described. [*c*]

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: Truthfulness; that is to say they must never willingly tolerate falsehood in any form. On the contrary, they must hate it and have a natural affection for the truth.

GLAUCON: They probably should have that feature.

SOCRATES: But it is not only *probable*, my friend; it is entirely necessary for a naturally passionate man to love everything akin to or related to the boys he loves.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

{335} SOCRATES: Well, could you find anything that is more intimately related to wisdom than truth?

GLAUCON: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Then is it possible for the same nature to be a philosopher [*d*] (lover of wisdom) and a lover of falsehood?

GLAUCON: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: So, right from childhood, a genuine lover of learning must strive above all for truth of every kind.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: But in addition, when someone’s appetites are strongly inclined in one direction, we surely know that they become more weakly inclined in the others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then when a person’s desires flow toward learning and everything of that sort, they will be concerned, I imagine, with the pleasures that the soul experiences just by itself, and will be indifferent to those that come through the body—if indeed the person is not a counterfeit, but rather a [*e*] true, philosopher.

GLAUCON: That’s entirely inevitable.

SOCRATES: A person like that will be temperate, then, and in no way a lover of money. After all, money and the big expenditures that go along with it are sought for the sake of things that other people may take seriously, but that he does not.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And of course, there is also this to consider when you are [*486a*] going to judge whether a nature is philosophic or not.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: You should not overlook its sharing in illiberality; for surely petty-mindedness is altogether incompatible with that quality in a soul that is always reaching out to grasp all things as a whole, whether divine or human.

GLAUCON: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: And do you imagine that a thinker who is high-minded enough to look at all time and all being will consider human life to be a very great thing?

GLAUCON: He couldn’t possibly.

SOCRATES: Then he won’t consider death to be a terrible thing either, will he? [*b*]

GLAUCON: Not in the least.

SOCRATES: Then a cowardly and illiberal nature could not partake, apparently, in true philosophy.

GLAUCON: Not in my opinion.

SOCRATES: Well, then, is there any way that an orderly person, who is not money-loving, illiberal, a lying imposter, or a coward, could come to drive a hard bargain or be unjust?

GLAUCON: There is not.

SOCRATES: Moreover, when you are considering whether someone has a philosophic soul or not, you will consider whether he is just and gentle, right from the time he is young, or unsociable and savage.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And you won’t ignore this either, I imagine. [*c*]

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: Whether he is a slow learner or a fast one. Or do you expect someone to love something sufficiently well when it pains him to do it and a lot of effort brings only a small return?

GLAUCON: No, it could not happen.

SOCRATES: What if he could retain nothing of what he learned, because he was completely forgetful? Could he fail to be empty of knowledge?

GLAUCON: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Then if he is laboring in vain, don't you think that in the end he is bound to hate himself and what he is doing?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So let's never include a person with a forgetful soul among those who are sufficiently philosophical; the one we look for should be [*d*] good at remembering.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we would deny that an unmusical and graceless nature is drawn to anything besides what is disproportionate.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And do you think that truth is akin to what is disproportionate or to what is proportionate?

GLAUCON: To what is proportionate.

{336} SOCRATES: Then, in addition to those other things, let's look for a mind that has a natural sense of proportion and grace, one whose innate disposition makes it easy to lead to the form of each thing which is.

[*e*] GLAUCON: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Well, then, do you think the properties we have gone through aren't interconnected, or that any of them is in any way unnecessary to a soul that is going to have a sufficiently complete [*487a*] grasp of what is?

GLAUCON: No, they are all absolutely necessary.

SOCRATES: Is there any criticism you can find, then, of a pursuit that a person cannot practice adequately unless he is naturally good at remembering, quick to learn, high-minded, graceful, and a friend and relative of truth, justice, courage, and temperance?

GLAUCON: Not even Momus could criticize a pursuit like that.

SOCRATES: Well, then, when people of this sort are in perfect condition because of their education and their stage of life, wouldn't you entrust the city to them alone?

[*b*] *And Adeimantus replied:*

No one, Socrates, would be able to contradict these claims of yours. But all the same, here is pretty much the experience people have on any occasion on which they hear the sorts of things you are now saying: they think that because they are inexperienced in asking and answering questions, they are led astray a little bit by the argument at every question, and that when these little bits are added together at the end of the

discussion, a great false step appears that is the opposite of what they said at the outset. Like the unskilled, who are trapped by the clever checkers players in the end and [*c*] cannot make a move, they too are trapped in the end, and have nothing to say in this different kind of checkers, which is played not with pieces, but with words. Yet they are not a bit more inclined to think that what you claim is true. I say this in relation to the present case. You see, someone might well say now that he is unable to find the words to oppose you as you ask each of your questions. Yet, when it comes to facts rather than words, he sees that of all those who take up philosophy—not those who merely dabble in it while still young in order to complete their upbringing, and [*d*] then drop it, but those who continue in it for a longer time—the majority become cranks, not to say completely bad, while the ones who seem best are rendered useless to the city because of the pursuit you recommend.

When I had heard him out, I said:

Do you think that what these people say is false?

ADEIMANTUS: I do not know. But I would be glad to hear what you think.

SOCRATES: You would hear that they seem to me to be telling the truth.

ADEIMANTUS: How, then, can it be right to say that there will be no end to evils in our cities until philosophers—people we agree to be useless to [*e*] cities—rule in them?

SOCRATES: The question you ask needs to be answered by means of an image.

ADEIMANTUS: And you, of course, are not used to speaking in images!

SOCRATES: So! After landing me with a claim that is so difficult to establish, are you mocking me, too? Anyway, listen to my image, and you will [*488a*] appreciate all the more how I have to strain to make up images. What the best philosophers experience in relation to cities is so difficult to bear that there is no other single experience like it. On the contrary, one must construct one’s image and one’s defense of these philosophers from *many* sources, just as painters paint goat-stags by combining the features of different things.

Imagine, then, that the following sort of thing happens either on one ship or on many. The shipowner is taller and stronger than everyone else on board. But he is hard of hearing, he is a bit shortsighted, and his [*b*] knowledge of seafaring is correspondingly deficient. The sailors are

quarreling with one another about captaincy. Each of them thinks that he should captain the ship, even though he has not yet learned the craft and cannot name his teacher or a time when he was learning it. Indeed, they go further and claim that it cannot be taught at all, and are even ready to cut to pieces anyone who says it can. They are always crowding around the shipowner himself, {337} pleading with him, and doing everything possible to [*c*] get him to turn the rudder over to them. And sometimes, if they fail to persuade him and others succeed, they execute those others or throw them overboard. Then, having disabled their noble shipowner with mandragora[130] or drink or in some other way, they rule the ship, use up its cargo drinking and feasting, and make the sort of voyage you would expect of such people. In addition, they praise anyone who is clever at persuading or forcing the shipowner to let them rule, calling him a "sailor," a "skilled captain," and "an expert about ships" while dismissing anyone else as a [*d*] good-for-nothing. They do not understand that a true captain must pay attention to the seasons of the year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and all that pertains to his craft if he is really going to be expert at ruling a ship. As for *how* he is going to become captain of the ship, whether people want him [*e*] to or not, they do not think it possible to acquire the craft or practice of doing this at the same time as the craft of captaincy. When that is what is happening onboard ships, don't you think that a true captain would be sure [*489a*] to be called a "stargazer," a "useless babbler," and a "good-for-nothing" by those who sail in ships so governed?

ADEIMANTUS: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: I do not think you need to examine the image to see the resemblance to cities and how they're disposed toward true philosophers, but you already understand what I mean.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, I do.

SOCRATES: First teach this image, then, to the person who is surprised that philosophers are not honored in cities, and try to persuade him that it [*b*] would be far more surprising if they were honored.

ADEIMANTUS: I will.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, try to persuade him that you are speaking the truth when you say that the best among the philosophers are useless to the masses. But tell him to blame their uselessness on those who do not make

use of them, not on those good philosophers. You see, it is not natural for the captain to beg the sailors to be ruled by him, nor for the wise to knock at the doors of the rich. The man who came up with that bit of sophistry was lying.[131] What is truly natural is for the sick person, rich or poor, to go [*c*] to doctors' doors, and for anyone who needs to be ruled to go to the doors of the one who can rule him. It is not for the ruler—if he is truly any use—to beg the subjects to accept his rule. Tell him he will make no mistake if he likens our present political rulers to the sailors we mentioned a moment ago, and those who are called useless stargazers by them to the true ship's captains.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: For those reasons, then, and in these circumstances, it is not easy for the best pursuit to be highly honored by those whose pursuits are its very opposites. But by far the greatest and most serious slander is brought [*d*] on philosophy by those who claim to practice it—the ones about whom the prosecutor of philosophy declares, as you put it, that the majority of those who take it up are completely bad, while the best ones are useless. And I admitted that what you said was true, didn't I?[132]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Haven't we now explained why the good ones are useless?

ADEIMANTUS: We certainly have.

SOCRATES: Do you next want us to discuss why it is inevitable that the greater number are bad, and try to show, if we can, that philosophy is not responsible for this either? [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then let's begin our dialogue by recalling the starting point of our description of the nature that someone must have if he is to become a fine and good person. First of all, if you remember, he was led by truth,[133] [*490a*] and he had to follow it wholeheartedly and unequivocally, on pain of being a lying imposter with no share at all in true philosophy.

ADEIMANTUS: That's what we said.

{338} SOCRATES: Well, isn't that fact alone completely contrary to the belief currently held about him?

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, won't it be reasonable, then, for us to plead in his defense that a real lover of learning strive by nature for what is? He does not linger over each of the many things that are believed to be, but keeps on going, [*b*] without losing or lessening his passion, until he grasps what the nature of each thing itself is[134] with the element in his soul that is fitted to grasp a thing of that sort because of its kinship with it. Once he has drawn near to it, has intercourse with what really is, and has begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and—at that point, but not before—is relieved from his labor pains.

ADEIMANTUS: Nothing could be more reasonable.

SOCRATES: Well, then, will a person of that sort love falsehood or, in completely opposite fashion, will he hate it?

[*c*] ADEIMANTUS: He will hate it.

SOCRATES: And if truth led the way, we would never say, I imagine, that a chorus of evils could follow it.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, it is followed by a healthy and just character, and the temperance that accompanies it.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: What need is there, then, to go back to the beginning and compel the rest of the philosophic nature's chorus to line up all over again? You surely remember that courage, high-mindedness, ease in learning, and a good memory all belong to philosophers. Then you objected that anyone would be compelled to agree with what we are saying, but that if he left the [*d*] arguments aside and looked at the very people the argument is about, he would say that some of those he saw were useless, while the majority of them were thoroughly bad. Trying to discover the reason for this slander, we have arrived now at this question: why are the majority of them bad? And *that* is why we have again taken up the nature of the true philosophers and defined what it necessarily has to be. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: What we now have to do is look at the ways this nature gets corrupted; how it gets completely destroyed in the majority of cases, while a small number escape—the very ones that are called useless, rather than bad. After that, we must next look at those who imitate this nature and

[*491a*] adopt its pursuit. We must see what natures the souls have that enter into a pursuit that is too valuable and too high for them—souls that, by often striking false notes, give philosophy the reputation that you said it has with everyone everywhere.

ADEIMANTUS: What sorts of corruption do you mean?

SOCRATES: I will try to explain them to you if I can. I imagine that everyone would agree with us about this: the sort of nature that possesses all the qualities we prescribed just now for the person who is going to be a complete [*b*] philosopher, is seldom found among human beings, and there will be few who possess it. Or don't you think so?

ADEIMANTUS: I most certainly do.

SOCRATES: Consider, then, how many great sources of destruction there are for these few.

ADEIMANTUS: What are they?

SOCRATES: The most surprising thing of all to hear is that each one of the things we praised in that nature tends to corrupt the soul that has it and drag it away from philosophy. I mean courage, temperance, and the other things we mentioned.

ADEIMANTUS: That does sound strange.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, in addition to those, all so-called good things [*c*] also corrupt it and drag it away—beauty, wealth, physical strength, powerful family connections in the city, and all that goes along with these. You understand the general pattern of things I mean?

ADEIMANTUS: I do, and I would be glad to acquire a more precise understanding of it.

SOCRATES: Grasp the general principle correctly and the matter will become clear to you, and what I said about it before won't seem so strange.

{339} ADEIMANTUS: What are you telling me to grasp?

SOCRATES: In the case of every seed or growing thing, whether plant or [*d*] animal, we know that if it fails to get the food, climate, or location suitable for it, then the more vigorous it is, the more it is deficient in the qualities proper to it. For surely bad is more opposed to good than to not-good.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, I suppose it is reasonable that the best nature comes off worse than an inferior one from unsuitable nurture.

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: Well, then, Adeimantus, won't we also say that if *souls* with the [*e*] best natures get a bad education, they become exceptionally bad? Or do you think that great injustices and unalloyed evil originate in an inferior nature, rather than in a vigorous one that has been corrupted by its upbringing? Or that a weak nature is ever responsible for great good things or great bad ones?

ADEIMANTUS: No, you are right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, if the nature we proposed for the philosopher happens [*492a*] to receive the proper instruction, I imagine it will inevitably grow to attain every virtue. But if it is not sown, planted, and grown in a suitable environment, it will develop in entirely the opposite way, unless some god comes to its aid. Or do you too believe, as the masses do, that some young people are corrupted by sophists—that there are sophists, private individuals, who corrupt them to a significant extent? Isn't it, rather, the very people who say this who are the greatest sophists of all, who educate most effectively and produce young and old men and women of just the sort [*b*] they want?

ADEIMANTUS: When do they do that?

SOCRATES: When many of them sit together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or any other gathering of a mass of people in public and, with a loud uproar, object excessively to some of the things that are said or done, then approve excessively of others, shouting and clapping; and when, in addition to these people themselves, the rocks and the surrounding [*c*] space itself echo and redouble the uproar of their praise or blame. In a situation like that, how do you think—as the saying goes—a young man's heart is affected?[135] How will whatever sort of private education he received hold up for him, and not get swept away by such praise and blame, and go be carried off by the flood wherever it goes, so that he will call the same things beautiful or ugly as these people, practice what they practice, and become like them? [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: The compulsion to do so will be enormous, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet we have not mentioned the greatest compulsion of all.

ADEIMANTUS: What is that?

SOCRATES: It is what these educators and sophists impose by their actions if their words fail to persuade. Or don't you know that they punish anyone

who is not persuaded, with disenfranchisement, fines, or death?

ADEIMANTUS: They most certainly do.

SOCRATES: What other sophist, then, or what sort of private conversations do you think will oppose these and prove stronger? [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: None, I imagine.

SOCRATES: No, indeed, even to try would be very foolish. You see, there is not now, never has been, nor ever will be, a character whose view of virtue goes contrary to the education these provide. I mean a human character, comrade—the divine, as the saying goes, is an exception to the rule. You may be sure that if anything is saved and turns out well in the political [*493a*] systems that exist now, you won't be mistaken in saying that divine providence saved it.

ADEIMANTUS: That is what I think, too.

SOCRATES: Well, then, you should also agree to this.

ADEIMANTUS: What?

SOCRATES: None of those private wage-earners—the ones these people call sophists and consider to be their rivals in craft[136]—teaches anything other than the convictions the masses hold when they are assembled together, and this he calls wisdom. It is just as if someone were learning the passions and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he is rearing—how [*b*] to approach {340} and handle it, when it is most difficult to deal with or most docile and what makes it so, what sounds it utters in either condition, and what tones of voice soothe or anger it. Having learned all this through associating and spending time with the beast, he calls this wisdom, gathers his information together as if it were a craft, and starts to teach it. Knowing nothing in reality about which of these convictions or appetites is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, he uses all these terms in conformity [*c*] with the great beast's beliefs—calling the things it enjoys good and the things that anger it bad. He has no other account to give of them, but calls everything he is compelled to do just and fine, never having seen how much the natures of compulsion and goodness really differ, and being unable to explain it to anyone. Don't you think, by Zeus, that someone like that would make a strange educator?

ADEIMANTUS: I do, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then does this person seem any different from the one who believes that wisdom is understanding the passions and pleasures of the masses—multifarious people—assembled together, whether in regard to [*d*] painting, music, or politics for that matter? For if a person associates with the masses and exhibits his poetry or some other piece of craftsmanship to them or his service to the city, and gives them mastery over him to any degree beyond what is unavoidable, he will be under Diomedean compulsion,[137] as it is called, to produce the things of which they approve. But that such things are truly good and beautiful—have you ever heard anyone presenting an argument for that conclusion that was not absolutely ridiculous?

ADEIMANTUS: No, and I do not suppose I ever will. [*e*]

SOCRATES: So then, bearing all that in mind, recall our earlier question: can the majority in any way tolerate or accept that the beautiful itself (as opposed to the many beautiful things), or each thing itself (as opposed to the corresponding many), exists? [*494a*]

ADEIMANTUS: Not in the least.

SOCRATES: It is impossible, then, for the majority to be philosophic.

ADEIMANTUS: It is impossible.

SOCRATES: And so, those who practice philosophy are inevitably disparaged by them?

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: And also by those private individuals who associate with the majority and want to please them.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: On the basis of these facts, then, do you see any way to preserve a philosophic nature and ensure that it will continue to practice philosophy and reach the end? Consider the question in light of what we said [*b*] before. We agreed that ease in learning, a good memory, courage, and high-mindedness belong to the philosophic nature.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Right from the start, then, won’t someone like that be first among the children in everything, especially if his body’s nature matches that of his soul?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course he will.

SOCRATES: So as he gets older, I imagine his family and fellow citizens will want to make use of him in connection with their own affairs.

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: They will get down on their knees, begging favors from him [*c*] and honoring him, flattering ahead of time the power that is going to be his, so as to secure it for themselves.

ADEIMANTUS: That's usually what happens, at least.

SOCRATES: What do you think someone like that will do in such circumstances—especially if he happens to be from a great city where he is rich and noble, and if he is good-looking and tall as well? Won't he be filled with an impractical expectation and think himself capable of managing the affairs, not only of the Greeks, but of the barbarians, too? And won't he [*d*] exalt himself to great heights, as a result, and be brimming with pretension and empty, senseless pride?[138]

ADEIMANTUS: He certainly will.

SOCRATES: Now, suppose someone gently approaches a young man in that state of mind and tells him the truth: that he has no sense, although {341} he needs it, and that it cannot be acquired unless he works like a slave to attain it. Do you think it will be easy for him to hear that message through the evils that surround him?

ADEIMANTUS: Far from it.

SOCRATES: And suppose that, because of his noble nature and his natural affinity for such arguments, he somehow sees the point and is turned [*e*] around and drawn toward philosophy. What do we suppose those people will do if they believe that they are losing his services and companionship? Is there anything they won't do or say in his regard to prevent him from being persuaded? Or anything they won't do or say in regard to his persuader to prevent him from succeeding, whether it is in private plots or public court cases?[139]

[*495a*] ADEIMANTUS: There certainly is not.

SOCRATES: Then is there any chance that such a person will practice philosophy?

ADEIMANTUS: None at all.

SOCRATES: Do you see, then, that we weren't wrong to say that when a philosophic nature is badly brought up, its very components—together with

the other so-called goods, such as wealth and every provision of that sort—are somehow the cause of its falling away from the pursuit?

ADEIMANTUS: No, we were not. What we said was right.

SOCRATES: There you are, then, you amazing fellow! That is the extent of the sort of destruction and corruption that the nature best suited for the noblest pursuit undergoes. And such a nature is a rare occurrence anyway, [*b*] we claim. Moreover, men who possess it are the ones that do the worst things to cities and individuals, and also—if they happen to be swept that way by the current—the greatest good. For a petty nature never does anything great, either to a private individual or a city.

ADEIMANTUS: That's very true.

SOCRATES: So when these men, for whom philosophy is most appropriate, fall away from her, they leave her desolate and unwed, and themselves lead a life that is inappropriate and untrue. Then others, who are unworthy [*c*] of her, come to her as to an orphan bereft of kinsmen, and shame her. They are the ones responsible for the reproaches that you say are cast upon philosophy by her detractors—that some of her consorts are useless, while the majority deserve many evils.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is what they say.

SOCRATES: And it is a reasonable thing to say. For other worthless little men see that this position has become vacant, even though it is brimming with fine accolades and pretensions, and—like prisoners escaping from jail [*d*] who take refuge in a temple—leap gladly from their crafts to philosophy. These are the ones who are most sophisticated at their own petty craft. You see, at least in comparison to other crafts, and even in its present state, philosophy still has a grander reputation. And that is what many people are aiming at, people with defective natures, whose souls are as cramped and spoiled by their menial tasks as their bodies are warped by their crafts and [*e*] occupations. Isn't that inevitably what happens?

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Do you think that they look any different than a little, bald-headed blacksmith who has come into some money and, newly released from debtor's prison, has taken a bath, put on a new cloak, got himself up as a bridegroom, and is about to marry the master's daughter because she is poor and abandoned? [*496a*]

ADEIMANTUS: They are no different at all.

SOCRATES: What sort of offspring are they likely to beget, then? Won't their children be wretched illegitimates?

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: What about when men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and associate with her in a way unworthy of her? What kinds of thoughts and beliefs are we to say they beget? Won't they be what are truly and appropriately called sophisms, since they have nothing genuine or truly wise about them?

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then there remains, Adeimantus, only a very small group who [*b*] associate with philosophy in a way that is worthy of her: a noble and well brought-up character, perhaps, kept down by exile, who stays true to his nature and remains with philosophy because there is no one to corrupt him; or a great soul living in a {342} small city, who disdains the city's affairs and looks beyond them. A very few might perhaps come to philosophy from other crafts that they rightly despise because they have good natures. And some might be held back by the bridle that restrains our friend Theages—you see, he meets all the other conditions needed to make him fall away [*c*] from philosophy, but his physical illness keeps him out of politics and prevents it. Finally, my own case is hardly worth mentioning—my daimonic sign[140]—since I don't suppose it has happened to anyone else or to only a few before. Now, those who have become members of this little group have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is. At the same time, they have also seen the insanity of the masses and realized that there is nothing healthy, so to speak, in public affairs, and that there is no ally with [*d*] whose aid the champion of justice can survive; that instead he would perish before he could profit either his city or his friends, and be useless both to himself and to others—like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this into his calculations, he keeps quiet and does his own work, like someone who takes refuge under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind. Seeing others filled with lawlessness, the philosopher is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life pure of injustice and impious acts, and depart from it with [*e*] good hope, blameless and content.

ADEIMANTUS: Well, that is no small thing for [*497a*] him to have accomplished before departing.

SOCRATES: But no very great one either, since he did not chance upon a suitable constitution. In a suitable one, his own growth will be fuller and he will save the community, as well as himself. Anyway, it seems to me that we have now said enough about the slander brought against philosophy and why it is unjust—unless, of course, you have got something to add.

ADEIMANTUS: I have nothing further to add on that issue. But which of our present constitutions do you think is suitable for philosophy?

SOCRATES: None of them. But that is exactly my complaint. There is not [*b*] one city today with a constitution worthy of the philosophic nature. That is precisely why it is perverted and altered. It is like foreign seed sown in alien ground: it tends to be overpowered and to fade away into the native species. Similarly, the philosophic species does not maintain its own power at present, but declines into a different character. But if it were to find the best constitution, as it is itself the best, it would be clear that it is really divine [*c*] and that other natures and pursuits are merely human. Obviously, you are going to ask next what that constitution is.

ADEIMANTUS: You are wrong there. You see, I was not going to ask that, but whether it was the constitution we described when we were founding our city or a different one.

SOCRATES: In all other respects, it is that one. But we said even then[141] that there must always be some people in the city who have a rational account of the constitution, the very same one that you, the lawgiver, also had when you [*d*] made the laws.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, we did say that.

SOCRATES: But we did not explain it clearly enough, for fear of what our own objections have made clear: namely, that the demonstration of it would be long and difficult. Indeed, even what remains is not the easiest of all things to discuss.

ADEIMANTUS: What is that?

SOCRATES: How a city can engage in philosophy without being destroyed. You see, all great things are prone to fall and, as the saying goes, beautiful things are really difficult.

ADEIMANTUS: All the same, the demonstration won't be complete until [*e*] this has been cleared up.

SOCRATES: If anything prevents that, it won't be lack of willingness, but lack of ability. At any rate, you will see how passionate *I* am. Look now, in fact, at how passionately and recklessly I am going to argue that a city should practice philosophy in the opposite way to the present one.

ADEIMANTUS: How?

SOCRATES: At present, those who take it up at all do so as young men, just out of childhood, {343} who have yet to take up household management and [*498a*] moneymaking. Then, just when they reach the most difficult part they abandon it and are regarded as the most fully trained philosophers. By the most difficult part, I mean the one concerned with arguments.[142] In later life, if others are engaged in it and they are invited and deign to listen to them, they think they have done a lot, since they think this should only be a sideline. And, with a few exceptions, by the time they reach old age they are more thoroughly extinguished than the sun of Heraclitus, since they are [*b*] never rekindled.[143]

ADEIMANTUS: What should they do instead?

SOCRATES: Entirely the opposite. As young men and children, they should occupy themselves with an education and philosophy suitable to the young. Their bodies are blooming and growing into manhood at this time, and they should take very good care of them, so as to acquire a helper for philosophy. But as they grow older and their soul begins to reach maturity, they should make its exercises more rigorous. Then, when their strength begins to fail and they have retired from politics and military service, they [*c*] should graze freely in the pastures of philosophy and do nothing else, except as a sideline—I mean those who are going to live happily and, when the end comes, crown the life they have lived with a fitting providence in that other place.

ADEIMANTUS: You seem to be arguing with real passion, Socrates. But I am sure that most of your hearers will oppose you with even greater passion and won't be convinced in the least—beginning with Thrasymachus.

SOCRATES: Please do not try to raise a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus just as we have become friends—not that we were enemies before. [*d*] You see, we won't relax our efforts until we convince him and

the others—or at least do something that may benefit them in a later incarnation when, reborn, they happen upon these arguments again.

ADEIMANTUS: You are talking about the short term, I see!

SOCRATES: It is certainly nothing compared to the whole of time! However, it is no wonder that the masses are not convinced by our arguments. I mean, they have never seen a *man* that matched our *plan*—though they have more often seen words purposely chosen to rhyme with one another [*e*] than just happening to do so as in the present case. But a man who, as far as possible, matched and rhymed with virtue in word and deed, and wielded dynastic power in a city of the same type—that is something they have never seen even once. Or do you think they have? [*499a*]

ADEIMANTUS: No, definitely not.

SOCRATES: Nor, bless you, have they spent enough time listening to fine and free arguments that vigorously seek the truth in every way, so as to acquire knowledge and keep their distance from all the sophistries and eristic quibbles that—whether in public trials or private gatherings—strive for nothing except reputation and disputation.

ADEIMANTUS: No, they have not.

SOCRATES: It was for these reasons, and because we foresaw these difficulties, that we were afraid. All the same, we were compelled by the truth to [*b*] say that no city, no constitution, and, indeed, no individual man will ever become perfect until some chance event compels those few philosophers who are not vicious (the ones who are now called useless) to take care of a city, whether they want to or not, and compels the city to obey them—or until a true passion for true philosophy flows by some divine inspiration into the sons of the men now wielding dynastic power or sovereignty, or into the men themselves. Now, it cannot be reasonably maintained, in my [*c*] view, that either or both of these things is impossible. But if they were, we would be justly ridiculed for indulging in wishful thinking. Isn’t that so?

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: Then if, in the limitless past, some compulsion forced those who were foremost in philosophy to take charge of a city, or is doing so now in some barbaric place far beyond our ken, or will do so in the future, this is [*d*] something we are prepared to fight about—our argument that

{344} the constitution we have described has existed, does exist, and will exist, at any rate, whenever it is that the muse of philosophy gains mastery of a city. It is not impossible for this to happen, so we are not speaking of impossibilities—that it is *difficult*, we agree ourselves.

ADEIMANTUS: *I* certainly think so.

SOCRATES: But the masses do not—is that what you are going to say?

ADEIMANTUS: They probably don't.

SOCRATES: Bless you, you should not make such a wholesale charge against the masses! They will surely come to hold a different belief if, [*e*] instead of wanting to win a victory at their expense, you soothe them and try to remove their slanderous prejudice against the love of learning. You must show them what you mean by philosophers and define their nature [*500a*] and pursuit the way we did just now. Then they will realize you do not mean the same people they do. And if they once see it that way, even you will say that they will have a different opinion from the one you just attributed to them and will answer differently. Or do you think that anyone who is gentle and without malice is harsh to one who is not harsh, or malicious to one who is not malicious? I will anticipate you and say that I think a few people may have such a harsh character, but not the majority.

ADEIMANTUS: And I agree, of course.

SOCRATES: Then don't you also agree that the harshness of the masses [*b*] toward philosophy is caused by those outsiders who do not belong and who have burst in like a band of revelers, abusing one another, indulging their love of quarreling, and always arguing about human beings—something that is least appropriate in philosophy?

ADEIMANTUS: I do, indeed.

SOCRATES: For surely, Adeimantus, someone whose mind is truly directed toward the things that are has not the leisure to look down at human affairs and be filled with malice and hatred as a result of entering into their disputes. [*c*] Instead, as he looks at and contemplates things that are orderly and always the same, that neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it, being all in a rational order, he imitates them and tries to become as like them as he can. Or do you think there is any way to prevent someone from associating with something he admires without imitating it?

ADEIMANTUS: He can't possibly.

SOCRATES: Then the philosopher, by associating with what is orderly and divine, becomes as divine and orderly as a human being can. Though, mind [*d*] you, there are always plenty of slanders around.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And if he should come to be compelled to make a practice—in private and in public—of stamping what he sees there into the people's characters, instead of shaping only his own, do you think he will be a poor craftsman of temperance, justice, and the whole of popular virtue?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: And when the masses realize that what we are saying about him is true, will they be harsh with philosophers or mistrust us when we [*e*] say that there is no way a city can ever find happiness unless its plan is drawn by painters who use the divine model?

ADEIMANTUS: They won't be harsh, if they do realize this. But what sort of drawing do you mean? [*501a*]

SOCRATES: They would take the city and people's characters as their sketching slate, but first they would wipe it clean—which is not at all an easy thing to do. And you should be aware that this is an immediate difference between them and others—that they refuse to take either a private individual or a city in hand, or to write laws, unless they receive a clean slate or are allowed to clean it themselves.

ADEIMANTUS: And rightly so.

SOCRATES: And after that, don't you think they would draw the plan of the constitution?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And I suppose that, as they work, they would look often in each direction: on the one hand, toward what is in its nature just, beautiful, [*b*] temperate, and all the rest; and, on the other, toward what they are trying to put into human beings, mixing and blending pursuits to produce a human likeness, based on the one that Homer {345} too called divine and godly when it appeared among human beings.[144]

ADEIMANTUS: Right.

SOCRATES: They would erase one thing, I suppose, and draw in another, until they had made people's characters as dear to the gods as possible. [*c*]

ADEIMANTUS: At any rate, the drawing would be most beautiful that way.

SOCRATES: Are we at all persuading the people you said were rushing to attack us, then, that the philosopher we were praising to them is really this sort of painter of constitutions? They were angry because we were entrusting cities to him; are they any calmer at hearing it now?

ADEIMANTUS: They will be much calmer, if they have any sense.

SOCRATES: After all, how could they possibly dispute it? Will they deny [*d*] that philosophers are lovers both of what is and of the truth?

ADEIMANTUS: That would be silly.

SOCRATES: Or that their nature, as we have described it, is akin to the best?

ADEIMANTUS: They cannot deny that either.

SOCRATES: Or that such a nature, when it happens to find appropriate pursuits, will not be as completely good and philosophic as any other? Or are they going to claim that the people we excluded are more so? [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: Will they still be angry, then, when we say that until the philosopher class gains mastery of a city, there will be no respite from evils for either city or citizens, and the constitution we have been describing in our discussion will never be completed in practice?

ADEIMANTUS: They will probably be less so.

SOCRATES: If it is all right with you, then, let's not say that they will simply be less angry, but that they will become altogether gentle and persuaded; [*502a*] so that out of shame, if nothing else, they will agree.

ADEIMANTUS: All right.

SOCRATES: So let's assume that they have been convinced of this. Will anyone contend, then, that there is no chance that the offspring of kings or men in power could be natural-born philosophers?

ADEIMANTUS: No one could.

SOCRATES: Could anyone claim that if such offspring are born, they must inevitably be corrupted? We agree ourselves that it is difficult for them to be saved. But that in the whole of time not one of them could be saved—could [*b*] anyone contend that?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course not.

SOCRATES: But surely the occurrence of one such individual is enough, provided his city obeys him, to bring to completion all the things that now seem so incredible.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, one is enough.

SOCRATES: For I suppose that if a ruler established the laws and practices we have described, it is hardly impossible that the citizens would be willing to carry them out.

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Would it be either surprising or impossible, then, that others should think as we do? [*c*]

ADEIMANTUS: I don't suppose so.

SOCRATES: But I think our earlier discussion was sufficient to show that these arrangements are best, provided they are possible.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, it was.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that the conclusion we have now reached about legislation is that the one we are describing is best, provided it is possible; and that while it is difficult for it to come about, it certainly is not impossible.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is the conclusion we have reached.

SOCRATES: Now that this conclusion has, with much effort, been reached, we must next deal with the remaining issues—in what way, by means of what subjects and pursuits, the saviors of our constitution will come to exist, and at what ages they will take up each of them. [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, we must deal with that.

SOCRATES: I gained nothing by my cleverness, then, in omitting from our earlier discussion the troublesome topic of acquiring women, begetting children, and establishing rulers, because I knew the whole truth would provoke resentment and would be difficult to bring about. As it turned {346} out, the need to discuss them arose anyway. Now, the subject of women and children has already been discussed. But that of the rulers has to be taken [*e*] up again from the beginning. We said,[145] if you remember, that they must show themselves to be lovers of the city, when tested by pleasures and [*503a*] pains, by not abandoning this conviction through labors, fears, and all other adversities. Anyone who was incapable of doing so was to be rejected, while anyone who always came through pure—like gold tested in a fire—was to be made ruler and receive gifts and prizes, both while he lived and after his death. These were the sorts of things we were saying while our argument veiled its face and slipped by, for fear of stirring up the [*b*] very problems that now confront us.

ADEIMANTUS: That’s absolutely true. I do remember.

SOCRATES: I was reluctant, my friend, to say the things we have now dared to say anyway. But now, let’s also dare to say that we must establish philosophers as guardians in the most exact sense.

ADEIMANTUS: Let’s do so.

SOCRATES: Bear in mind, then, that there will probably be only a few of them. You see, they have to have the nature we described, and its parts rarely consent to grow together in one person; rather, its many parts grow split off from one another.

[*c*] ADEIMANTUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Ease of learning, good memory, astuteness, and smartness, as you know, and all the other things that go along with them, such as youthful passion and high-mindedness, are rarely willing to grow together simultaneously with a disposition to live an orderly, quiet, and completely stable life. On the contrary, those who possess the former traits are carried by their quick wits wherever chance leads them, and have no stability at all.

ADEIMANTUS: That’s true.

SOCRATES: Those with stable characters, on the other hand, who do not change easily, whom one would employ because of their greater reliability, [*d*] and who in battle are not easily moved by fears, act in the same way when it comes to their studies. They are hard to get moving and learn with difficulty, as if they are anesthetized, and are constantly falling asleep and yawning whenever they have to work hard at such things.

ADEIMANTUS: They are.

SOCRATES: Yet we say that someone must have a good and fine share of both characters, or he won’t receive the truest education or honor, or be allowed to rule.

ADEIMANTUS: That’s right.

SOCRATES: Then don’t you think this will rarely occur?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course. [*e*]

SOCRATES: He must be tested, then, in the labors, fears, and pleasures we mentioned before. He must also be exercised in many other subjects, however, which we did not mention but are adding now, to see whether his nature can endure the most important subjects or will shrink from them [*504a*] like the cowards who shrink from the other tests.

ADEIMANTUS: It is certainly important to find that out. But what do you mean by the greatest subjects?

SOCRATES: Do you remember when we distinguished three kinds of things in the soul in order to help bring out what justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom each is?

ADEIMANTUS: If I didn't, I would not deserve to hear the rest.

SOCRATES: Do you also remember what preceded it?

ADEIMANTUS: No, what? [*b*]

SOCRATES: We said, I believe, that in order to get the finest view of these matters, there is a longer road and if one travels it, they become clear, it was possible to give demonstrations that would be up to the standard of the previous discussion.[146] All of you said that was enough. The result was that our subsequent discussion, as it seemed to me, was less than exact. But whether or not it satisfied all of you is for you to say.

ADEIMANTUS: I, at any rate, thought you gave us good measure. And so, apparently, did the others.

{347} SOCRATES: No, my friend, any measure of such things that falls short in [*c*] any way of what is, is not good measure at all, since nothing incomplete is a measure of anything. Some people, however, are occasionally of the opinion that an incomplete treatment is already adequate and that there is no need for further inquiry.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, a lot of people feel like that. Laziness is the cause.

SOCRATES: Well, that is a feeling that is least appropriate in a guardian of a city and its laws.

ADEIMANTUS: No doubt.

SOCRATES: He will have to take the longer road then, comrade, and put no less effort into learning than into physical training. For otherwise, as we [*d*] were just saying, he will never pursue the greatest and most appropriate subject to the end.

ADEIMANTUS: Why, aren't these virtues the greatest things? Is there something yet greater than justice and the other virtues we discussed?

SOCRATES: Not only is it greatest, but, even in the case of the virtues themselves, it is not enough to look at a mere sketch as we are doing now, while neglecting the most finished portrait. I mean, it is ridiculous, isn't it, to strain every nerve to attain the utmost exactness and clarity about other

things of little value, while not treating the greatest things as [*e*] meriting the most exactness?

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly is. But do you think that anyone is going to let you off without asking you what you mean by this greatest subject, and what it is concerned with?

SOCRATES: No, I do not. And you may ask it, too. You have certainly heard the answer often, but now either you are not thinking or you intend to make trouble for me again by interrupting. And I suspect it is more the latter. You see, you have often heard it said that the form of the good is the [*505a*] greatest thing to learn about, and that it is by their relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial. And now you must be pretty certain that that is what I am going to say, and, in addition, that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, you know that even the fullest possible knowledge of other things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any possession without the good. Or do you think there is any benefit in possessing everything but the good? Or to [*b*] know everything without knowing the good, thereby knowing nothing fine or good?

ADEIMANTUS: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, you also know that the masses believe pleasure to be the good, while the more refined believe it to be knowledge.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And, my friend, that those who believe this cannot show us what sort of knowledge it is, but in the end are compelled to say that it is knowledge of the good.

ADEIMANTUS: Which is completely ridiculous. [*c*]

SOCRATES: How could it not be, when they blame us for not knowing the good and then turn around and talk to us as if we did know it? I mean, they say it is knowledge of the good—as if we understood what they mean when they utter the word “good.”

ADEIMANTUS: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: What about those who define the good as pleasure? Are they any less full of confusion than the others? Or aren’t even they compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures?

ADEIMANTUS: Most definitely.

SOCRATES: I suppose it follows, doesn't it, that they have to admit that the same things are both good and bad? [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly does.

SOCRATES: Isn't it clear, then, that there are lots of serious disagreements about the good?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, isn't it also clear that many people would choose things that are believed to be just or beautiful, even if they are not, and would act, acquire things, and form beliefs accordingly? Yet no one is satisfied to acquire things that are *believed* to be good. On the contrary, everyone seeks the things that *are* good. In this area, everyone disdains mere reputation.

ADEIMANTUS: Right.

SOCRATES: That, then, is what every soul pursues, and for its sake does everything. The soul has a hunch that the good is something, but it is puzzled [*e*] and cannot adequately grasp just what it is or acquire the sort of stable belief about it that it has about the other things, and so it misses the {348} benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Are we to accept that even the [*506a*] best people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, must remain thus in the dark about something of this kind and importance?

ADEIMANTUS: That's the last thing we would do.

SOCRATES: Anyway, I imagine that just and beautiful things won't have acquired much of a guardian in someone who does not even know why they are good. And I have a hunch that no one will have adequate knowledge of them until he knows this.

ADEIMANTUS: That's a good hunch.

SOCRATES: But won't our constitution be perfectly ordered if such a guardian, one who knows [*b*] these things, oversees it?

ADEIMANTUS: It is bound to be. But you yourself, Socrates, do you say the good is knowledge or pleasure, or is it something else altogether?

SOCRATES: What a man! You made it good and clear long ago that other people's opinions about these matters would not satisfy you.

ADEIMANTUS: Well, Socrates, it does not seem right to me for you to be willing to state other people's convictions but not your own, when you have spent so much time occupied with these matters. [*c*]

SOCRATES: What? Do you think it is right to speak about things you do not know as if you do know them?

ADEIMANTUS: Not as if you know them, but you ought to be willing to state what you believe as what you believe.

SOCRATES: What? Haven't you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are all shameful and ugly things, since the best of them are blind? Do you think that those who have a true belief without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?

ADEIMANTUS: They are no different.

SOCRATES: Do you want to look at shameful, blind, and crooked things, then, when you might hear fine, illuminating ones from other people? [*d*]

And Glaucon said:

By Zeus, Socrates, do not stop now, with the end in sight, so to speak! We will be satisfied if you discuss the good the way you discussed justice, temperance, and the rest.

SOCRATES: That, comrade, would well satisfy me too, but I am afraid that I won't be up to it and that I will disgrace myself and look ridiculous by trying. No, bless you, let's set aside what the good itself is for the time being. You see, even to arrive at my current beliefs about it seems beyond [*e*] the range of our present discussion. But I am willing to tell you about what seems to be an offspring of the good and most like it, if that is agreeable to you; or otherwise to let the matter drop.

GLAUCON: Tell us, then. The story about the father remains a debt you will pay another time. [*507a*]

SOCRATES: I wish I could repay it, and you recover the debt, instead of just the interest. So here, then, is this child and offspring of the good itself. But take care I do not somehow deceive you unintentionally by giving you an illegitimate account of the child.[147]

GLAUCON: We will take as much care as possible. So speak on.

SOCRATES: I will once I have come to an agreement with you and reminded you of things we have already said here as well as on many other occasions. [*b*]

GLAUCON: Which things?

SOCRATES: We say that there are many beautiful, many good, and many other such things, thereby distinguishing them in words.

GLAUCON: We do.

SOCRATES: We also say there is a beautiful itself and a good itself. And so, in the case of all the things that we then posited as many, we reverse ourselves and posit a single form belonging to each, since we suppose there is a single one, and call it what each is.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: And we say that the one class of things is visible but not intelligible, while the forms are intelligible but not visible.

GLAUCON: Absolutely. [*c*]

SOCRATES: With what of ours do we see visible things?

{349} GLAUCON: With our sight.

SOCRATES: And don't we hear audible things with hearing and perceive all other perceptible things with our other senses?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Have you ever thought about how lavish the craftsman of our senses was in making the power to see and be seen?

GLAUCON: No, not really.

SOCRATES: Well, think of it this way. Do hearing and sound need another kind of thing in order for the former to hear and the latter to be heard—a [*d*] third thing in whose absence the one won't hear or the other be heard?

GLAUCON: No.

SOCRATES: And I think there cannot be many—not to say any—others that need such a thing. Or can you think of one?

GLAUCON: No, I cannot.

SOCRATES: Aren't you aware that sight and the visible realm have such a need?

GLAUCON: In what way?

SOCRATES: Surely sight may be present in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and colors may be present in things; but unless a third kind of thing is present, which is naturally adapted for this specific purpose, you [*e*] know that sight will see nothing and the colors will remain unseen.

GLAUCON: What kind of thing do you mean?

SOCRATES: The kind you call light.

GLAUCON: You are right.

SOCRATES: So it is no insignificant form of yoke, then, that yokes the sense of sight and the power to be seen. In fact, it is more honorable than [*508a*]

any that yokes other yoked teams. Provided, of course, that light is not something without honor.

GLAUCON: And it is surely far from being without honor.

SOCRATES: Which of the gods in the heavens would you say is the controller of this—the one whose light makes our sight see best and visible things best seen?

GLAUCON: The very one you and others would name. I mean, it is clear that what you are asking about is the sun.[148]

SOCRATES: And isn't sight naturally related to that god in the following way?

GLAUCON: Which one?

SOCRATES: Neither sight itself nor that in which it comes to be—namely, the eye—is the sun. [*b*]

GLAUCON: No, it is not.

SOCRATES: But it is, I think, the most sunlike of the sense organs.

GLAUCON: By far the most.

SOCRATES: And doesn't it receive the power it has from the sun, just like an influx from an overflowing treasury?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: The sun is not sight either; yet as its cause, isn't it seen by sight itself?

GLAUCON: It is.

SOCRATES: Let's say, then, that this is what I called the offspring of the good, which the good begot as its analogue. What the latter is in the intelligible [*c*] realm in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the former is in the visible realm in relation to sight and visible things.

GLAUCON: How? Tell me more.

SOCRATES: You know that when our eyes no longer turn to things whose colors are illuminated by the light of day, but by the lights of night, they are dimmed and seem nearly blind, as if clear sight were no longer in them.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Yet I suppose that whenever they are turned to things illuminated [*d*] by the sun, they see clearly and sight is manifest in those very same eyes?

GLAUCON: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Well, think about the soul in the same way. When it focuses on something that is illuminated both by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and manifestly possesses understanding. But when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes away, it believes and is dimmed, changes its beliefs this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding.

GLAUCON: Yes, it does seem like that. [*e*]

SOCRATES: You must say, then, that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And as the cause of knowledge and truth, you must think {350} of it as an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things. But if you are to think correctly, you must think of the good as other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly thought to be sunlike, [*509a*] but wrongly thought to be the sun. So, here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike, but wrong to think that either of them is the good—for the status of the good is yet more honorable.

GLAUCON: It is an incredibly beautiful thing you are talking about, if it provides both knowledge and truth but is itself superior to them in beauty. I mean, you surely do not think that *it* could be pleasure.

SOCRATES: No words of ill omen, please! [*b*] Instead, examine our analogy in more detail.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: The sun, I think you would say, not only gives visible things the power to be seen but also provides for their coming-to-be, growth, and nourishment—although it is not itself coming to be.

GLAUCON: I would.

SOCRATES: Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their existence and being are also due to it; although the good is not being, but something yet beyond being, superior to it in rank and power.

And Glaucon quite ridiculously replied:

[*c*] By Apollo, what daimonic hyperbole!

SOCRATES: It is your own fault, you compelled me to tell my beliefs about it.

GLAUCON: And don’t you stop, either—at least, not until you have finished discussing the good’s similarity to the sun, if you are omitting anything.

SOCRATES: I am certainly omitting a lot.

GLAUCON: Well don't, not even the smallest detail.

SOCRATES: I think I will have to omit a fair amount. All the same, as far as is now possible, I won't purposely omit anything.

GLAUCON: Please don't.

SOCRATES: Then you should think, as we said, that there are these two things, one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible—I [*d*] do not say "of the heavens," so as not to seem to you to be playing the sophist with the name.[149] In any case, do you understand these two kinds, visible and intelligible?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Represent them, then, by a line divided into two unequal sections. Then divide each section—that of the visible kind and that of the intelligible—in the same proportion as the line.[150] In terms now of relative clarity and opacity, you will have as one subsection of the visible, images. By images I mean, first, shadows, then reflections in bodies of water and in [*510a*] all close-packed, smooth, and shiny materials, and everything of that sort. Do you understand?

GLAUCON: I do understand.

SOCRATES: Then, in the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images—that is, the animals around us, every plant, and the whole class of manufactured things.

GLAUCON: I will.

SOCRATES: Would you also be willing to say, then, that, as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this ratio: as what is believed is to what is known, so the likeness is to the thing it is like? [*b*]

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Next, consider how the section of the intelligible is to be divided.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: As follows: in one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is compelled to base its inquiry on hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle, but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, by contrast, it makes its way to an unhypothetical first principle, proceeding from a hypothesis, but without the images used in the

previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its methodical inquiry through them.

GLAUCON: I do not fully understand what you are saying.

{351} SOCRATES: Let's try again. You see, you will understand it more easily after [*c*] this explanation. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their methodical inquiries, regarding them as known. These they treat as hypotheses and do not think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were evident to everyone. And going from these first principles [*d*] through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement at the point they set out to reach in their investigation.

GLAUCON: I certainly know that much.

SOCRATES: Then don't you also know that they use visible forms and make their arguments about them, although they are not thinking about them, but about those other things that they are like? They make their arguments with a view to the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the [*e*] diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. The very things they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images in seeking to see those other things themselves [*511a*] that one cannot see except by means of thought.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: This, then, is the kind of thing that I said was intelligible. The soul is compelled to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not traveling up to a first principle, since it cannot escape or get above its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which images were made by the things below them, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and to be honored as such.

GLAUCON: I understand that you mean what is dealt with in geometry and [*b*] related crafts.

SOCRATES: Also understand, then, that by the other subsection of the intelligible I mean what reason itself grasps by the power of dialectical discussion, treating its hypotheses, not as first principles, but as genuine hypotheses (that is, stepping-stones and links in a chain), in order to arrive at what is unhypothetical and the first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows

from it, comes down to a conclusion, making no use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, moving on through forms to forms, and [*c*] ending in forms.

GLAUCON: I understand, though not adequately—you see, in my opinion you are speaking of an enormous task. You want to distinguish the part of what is and is intelligible, the part looked at by the science of dialectical discussion, as clearer than the part looked at by the so-called sciences—those for which hypotheses are first principles. And although those who look at the latter part are compelled to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, because they do not go back to a genuine first principle in considering it, but proceed from hypotheses, you do not think that they have true understanding of them, even though—given such a first principle—they [*d*] are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of mind of the geometers—and the others of that sort—thought but not understanding; thought being intermediate between belief and understanding.

SOCRATES: You have grasped my meaning most adequately. Join me, then, in taking these four conditions in the soul as corresponding to the four subsections of the line: understanding dealing with the highest, thought dealing with the second; assign belief to the third, and imagination to the last. [*e*] Arrange them in a proportion and consider that each shares in clarity to the degree that the subsection it deals with shares in truth.

GLAUCON: I understand, agree, and arrange them as you say.

{352} BOOK VII

BOOK VII BEGINS with another unforgettable image, the Allegory of the Cave, which fits together with the Sun and the Line (517b) analogies, and which illustrates the effects of education on the soul (514a). It leads to a brief but important discussion of education (518b–519b), in which Socrates makes it clear that the aim of education is to turn the soul around by changing its desires.

The next topic is the education of the philosopher-kings. (1) Their initial education is in music and poetry, physical training, and elementary mathematics (535a–537b). (2) This is followed by two or

three years of compulsory physical training, rather like the military service that some countries still have (537b–c). (3) Those who are most successful in these studies next receive ten years of education in mathematical science (537c–d, 522c–531d). (4) Those who are again most successful receive five years of training in dialectic (537d–540a), 531e–535a). (5) Those who are still most successful receive fifteen years of practical political training (539e–540a). Finally, (6) those who are also successful in practical politics are "compelled to lift up the radiant eye-beams of their souls" to the good itself (540a) and are equipped to be philosopher-kings.

The third city, which contains philosopher-kings and the educational institutions necessary to produce them, constitute the final stage of Plato's construction of his ideal city (535a–536d, 543c–544a).

SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES:

SOCRATES: Next, then, compare the effect of education and that of the [*514a*] lack of it on our nature to an experience like this. Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an entrance a long way up that is open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They have been there since childhood, with their necks and legs fettered, so that they are fixed in the same place, able to see only in front of them, because their fetter [*b*] prevents them from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them. Between the prisoners and the fire, there is an elevated road stretching. Imagine that along this road a low wall has been built—like the screen in front of people that is provided by puppeteers, and above which they show their puppets.

GLAUCON: I am imagining it.

SOCRATES: Also imagine, then, that there are people alongside the wall [*c*] carrying multifarious artifacts that project above it—statues of people and [*515a*] other animals, made of stone, wood, and every material. And as you would expect, some of the carriers are talking and some are silent.

GLAUCON: It is a strange image you are describing, and strange prisoners.

SOCRATES: They are like us. I mean, in the first place, do you think these prisoners have ever seen anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall of the cave in front of them?

GLAUCON: How could they, if they have to keep their heads motionless [*b*] throughout life?

SOCRATES: What about the things carried along the wall? Isn't the same true where they are concerned?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And if they could engage in discussion with one another, don't you think they would assume that the words they used applied to the things they see passing in front of them?

GLAUCON: They would have to.

SOCRATES: What if their prison also had an echo from the wall facing them? When one of the carriers passing along the wall spoke, do you think they would believe that anything other than the shadow passing in front of them was speaking?

GLAUCON: I do not, by Zeus.

SOCRATES: All in all, then, what the prisoners would take for true reality is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts. [*c*]

GLAUCON: That's entirely inevitable.

{353} SOCRATES: Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their foolishness would naturally be like, if something like this should happen to them. When one was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his neck around, walk, and look up toward the light, he would be pained by doing all these things and be unable to see the things whose shadows he had seen before, because of the flashing lights. What do you think he would say if we told him that what he had seen before was [*d*] silly nonsense, but that now—because he is a bit closer to what is, and is turned toward things that *are* more—he sees more correctly? And in particular, if we pointed to each of the things passing by and compelled him to answer what each of them is, don't you think he would be puzzled and believe that the things he saw earlier were more truly real than the ones he was being shown?

GLAUCON: Much more so.

SOCRATES: And if he were compelled to look at the light itself, wouldn't [*e*] his eyes be pained and wouldn't he turn around and flee toward the things he is able to see, and believe that they are really clearer than the ones he is being shown?

GLAUCON: He would.

SOCRATES: And if someone dragged him by force away from there, along the rough, steep, upward path, and did not let him go until he had dragged him into the light of the sun, wouldn't he be pained and angry at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, wouldn't he have his [*516a*] eyes filled with sunlight and be unable to see a single one of the things now said to be truly real?

GLAUCON: No, he would not be able to—at least not right away.

SOCRATES: He would need time to get adjusted, I suppose, if he is going to see the things in the world above. At first, he would see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. From these, it would be easier for him to go on to look at the things in the sky and the sky itself at night, gazing at the light of the stars and the moon, than during [*b*] the day, gazing at the sun and the light of the sun.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Finally, I suppose, he would be able to see the sun—not reflections of it in water or some alien place, but the sun just by itself in its own place—and be able to look at it and see what it is like.

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: After that, he would already be able to conclude about it that it provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the visible [*c*] world, and is in some way the cause of all the things that he and his fellows used to see.

GLAUCON: That would clearly be his next step.

SOCRATES: What about when he reminds himself of his first dwelling place, what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow prisoners? Don't you think he would count himself happy for the change and pity the others?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And if there had been honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by; and was best able to remember which usually came earlier, which later, and [*d*] which simultaneously; and who was thus best able to prophesize the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? Or do you think he would feel with Homer that he would much prefer to "work the earth as a serf for

another man, a man without possessions of his own,”[151] and go through any sufferings, rather than share their beliefs and live as they do? [*e*]

GLAUCON: Yes, I think he would rather suffer anything than live like that.

SOCRATES: Consider this too, then. If this man went back down into the cave and sat down in his same seat, wouldn’t his eyes be filled with darkness, coming suddenly out of the sun like that?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Now, if he had to compete once again with the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the shadows, while his sight was still dim and before [*517a*] his eyes had recovered, and if the time required for readjustment was not short, wouldn’t he provoke ridicule? Wouldn’t it be said of him that he had returned from his upward journey with his eyes ruined, and that it is not worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And as for anyone who tried to free the prisoners and lead them {354} upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn’t they kill him?

GLAUCON: They certainly would.

SOCRATES: This image, my dear Glaucon, must be fitted together as a whole with what we said before. The realm revealed through sight should [*b*] be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the sun’s power. And if you think of the upward journey and the seeing of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you won’t mistake my intention—since it is what you wanted to hear about. Only the god knows whether it is true. But this is how these phenomena seem to me: in the knowable realm, the last thing to be seen is the form of the good, and it is seen only with toil and trouble. Once one has seen it, however, one must infer that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful [*c*] in anything, that in the visible realm it produces both light and its source, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding; and that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it.

GLAUCON: I agree, so far as I am able.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and join me in this further thought: you should not be surprised that the ones who get to this point are not willing to occupy themselves with human affairs, but that, on the contrary, their souls are always eager to spend their time above. I mean, that is surely what we

would expect, if indeed the image I [*d*] described before is also accurate here.

GLAUCON: It is what we would expect.

SOCRATES: What about when someone, coming from looking at divine things, looks to the evils of human life? Do you think it is surprising that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous, if—while his sight is still dim and he has not yet become accustomed to the darkness around him—he is compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to compete about the shadows of justice, or about the statues of which they are the shadows; and to dispute the way these things are understood by people who have [*e*] never seen justice itself?

GLAUCON: It is not surprising at all.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, anyone with any sense, at any rate, would remember that eyes may be confused in two ways and from two causes: when they change from the light into the darkness, [*518a*] or from the darkness into the light. If he kept in mind that the same applies to the soul, then when he saw a soul disturbed and unable to see something, he would not laugh absurdly. Instead, he would see whether it had come from a brighter life and was dimmed through not having yet become accustomed to the dark, or from greater ignorance into greater light and was dazzled by the increased brilliance. Then he would consider the first soul happy in its [*b*] experience and life, and pity the latter. But even if he wanted to ridicule it, at least his ridiculing it would make him less ridiculous than ridiculing a soul that had come from the light above.

GLAUCON: That’s an entirely reasonable claim.

SOCRATES: Then here is how we must think about these matters, if that is true: education is not what some people boastfully profess it to be. They say that they can pretty much put knowledge into souls that lack it, [*c*] like putting sight into blind eyes.

GLAUCON: Yes, they do say that.

SOCRATES: But here is what our present account shows about this power to learn that is present in everyone’s soul, and the instrument with which each of us learns: just as an eye cannot be turned around from darkness to light except by turning the whole body, so this instrument must be turned around from what-comes-to-be together with the whole soul, until it is able to bear

to look at what is and at the brightest thing that is—the one we call [*d*] the good. Isn't that right?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Of this then—of this very turning around—there would be a craft concerned with how this instrument can be most easily and effectively turned around, not of putting sight into it. On the contrary, it takes for granted that sight is there, though not turned in the right way or looking where it should look, and contrives to redirect it appropriately.

GLAUCON: That's probably right.

SOCRATES: The other so-called virtues of the soul then, do seem to be closely akin to those of the body: they really are not present in it initially, [*e*] but are added later by habit and practice. The virtue of wisdom, on the other hand, belongs above all, so it seems, to something {355} more godlike, which never loses its power, but is either useful and beneficial or useless and [*519a*] harmful, depending on the way it is led around. Or haven't you ever noticed in people who are said to be bad, but clever, how sharp the vision of their little soul is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned toward? This shows that its sight is not inferior, but is compelled to serve vice, so that the sharper it sees, the more evils it accomplishes.

GLAUCON: I certainly have.

SOCRATES: However, if this element of this sort of nature had been hammered at right from childhood, and struck free of the leaden weights, as it were, of kinship with becoming, which have been fastened to it by eating [*b*] and other such pleasures and indulgences, which turn its soul's vision downward—if, I say, it got rid of these and turned toward truly real things, then the same element of the same people would see them most sharply, just as it now does the things it is now turned toward.

GLAUCON: That's probably right.

SOCRATES: Isn't it also probable, then—indeed, doesn't it follow necessarily from what was said before—that uneducated people who have no experience of true reality will never adequately govern a city, and neither will people who have been allowed to spend their whole lives in education. The [*c*] former fail because they do not have a single goal in life at which all their actions, public and private, inevitably aim; the latter because they

would refuse to act, thinking they had emigrated, while still alive, to the Isles of the Blessed.

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: It is our task as founders, then, to compel the best natures to learn what was said before[152] to be the most important thing: namely, to see the good; to ascend that ascent. And when they have ascended and looked sufficiently, we must not allow them to do what they are allowed to do [*d*] now.

GLAUCON: What's that, then?

SOCRATES: To stay there and refuse to go down again to the prisoners in the cave and share their labors and honors, whether the inferior ones or the more excellent ones.

GLAUCON: You mean we are to treat them unjustly, making them live a worse life when they could live a better one?

SOCRATES: You have forgotten again, my friend, that the law is not concerned with making any one class in the city do outstandingly well, but is [*e*] contriving to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing the citizens together through both persuasion and compulsion, and making them share with each other the benefit they can confer on the community. It [*520a*] produces such men in the city, not in order to allow them to turn in whatever direction each one wants, but to make use of them to bind the city together.

GLAUCON: That's true. Yes, I had forgotten.

SOCRATES: Observe, then, Glaucon, that we won't be unjustly treating those who have become philosophers in our city, but that what we will say to them, when we compel them to take care of the others and guard them, will be just. We will say: "When people like you come to be in other cities, they are justified in not sharing in the others' labors. After all, they have [*b*] grown there spontaneously, against the will of the constitution in each of them. And when something grows of its own accord and owes no debt for its upbringing, it has justice on its side when it is not keen to pay anyone for its upbringing. But both for your own sakes and for that of the rest of the city, we have bred you to be leaders and kings in the hive, so to speak. You are better and more completely educated than the others, and better [*c*] able to share in both types of life. So each of you in turn must go down to live in

the common dwelling place of the other citizens and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. For when you are used to it, you will see infinitely better than the people there and know precisely what each image is, and also what it is an image of, because you have seen the truth about fine, just, and good things. So the city will be awake, governed by us and by you; not dreaming like the majority of cities nowadays, governed by men who fight against one another over shadows and form factions in order to rule—as [*d*] if that were a great good. No, the truth of the matter is surely this: a city in which those who are going to rule are least eager to rule is necessarily best and freest {356} from faction, whereas a city with the opposite kind of rulers is governed in the opposite way."

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then do you think the people we have nurtured will disobey us when they hear these things, and be unwilling to share the labors of the city, each in turn, while living the greater part of their time with one another in the pure realm?

GLAUCON: No, they couldn't possibly. After all, we will be giving just [*e*] orders to just people. However, each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, which is exactly the opposite of what is done by those who now rule in each city.

SOCRATES: That's right, comrade. If you can find a way of life that is better [*521a*] than ruling for those who are going to rule, your well-governed city will become a possibility. You see, in it alone the truly rich will rule—those who are rich not in gold, but in the wealth the happy must have: namely, a good and rational life. But if beggars—people hungry for private goods of their own—go into public life, thinking that the good is there for the seizing, then such a city is impossible. For when ruling is something fought over, such civil and domestic war destroys these men and the rest of the city as well.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Do you know of any other sort of life that looks down on [*b*] political offices besides that of true philosophy?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES: But surely it is those who are not lovers of ruling who must go do it. Otherwise, the rivaling lovers will fight over it.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Who else, then, will you compel to go be guardians of the city if not those who know best what results in good government, and have different honors and a better life than the political?

GLAUCON: No one else.

SOCRATES: Do you want us to consider now how such people will come [*521c*] to exist, and how we will lead them up to the light, like those who are said to have gone up from Hades to the gods?

GLAUCON: Yes, of course that's what I want.

SOCRATES: It seems, then, that this is not a matter of flipping a potsherd,[153] but of turning a soul from a day that is a kind of night in comparison to the true day—that ascent to what is, which we say is true philosophy.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then mustn't we try to discover what subjects have the power to bring this about? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So what subject is it, Glaucon, that draws the soul from what is coming to be to what is? It occurs to me as I am speaking that we said, didn't we, that these people must be athletes of war when they are young? [154]

GLAUCON: Yes, we did say that.

SOCRATES: Then the subject we are looking for must also have this characteristic in addition to the former one.

GLAUCON: Which?

SOCRATES: It must not be useless to warlike men.

GLAUCON: If possible, it must not.

SOCRATES: Now, earlier they were educated by us in musical and physical training. [*e*]

GLAUCON: They were.

SOCRATES: And surely physical training is concerned with what-comes-to-be and dies, since it oversees the growth and decay of the body.

GLAUCON: Obviously.

SOCRATES: So it could not be the subject we are looking for. [*522a*]

GLAUCON: No, it could not.

SOCRATES: Is it, then, the musical training we described before?

GLAUCON: But it is just the counterpart of physical training, if you remember. It educated the guardians through habits, conveying by harmony a certain harmoniousness of temper, not knowledge; and by rhythm a certain rhythmical {357} quality. Its stories, whether fictional or nearer the truth, cultivated other habits akin to these. But as for a subject that leads to the destination you have in mind, of the sort you are looking for now, there [*b*] was nothing of that in it.

SOCRATES: Your reminder is exactly to the point. It really does not have anything of that sort. You're a marvelous fellow, Glaucon, but what is there that does? The crafts all seemed to be somehow menial.

GLAUCON: Of course. And yet, what subject is left that is separate from musical and physical training, and from the crafts?

SOCRATES: Well, if we have nothing left beyond these, let's consider one of those that touches all of them.

GLAUCON: Which?

SOCRATES: Why, for example, that common thing, the one that every [*c*] type of craft, thought, and knowledge uses, and that is among the first things everyone has to learn.

GLAUCON: Which one is that?

SOCRATES: That inconsequential matter of distinguishing the numbers one, two, and three. In short, I mean number and calculation. Or isn't it true that every type of craft and knowledge must share in them?

GLAUCON: Indeed it is.

SOCRATES: Then warfare must too.

GLAUCON: It must.

SOCRATES: In tragedies, at any rate, Palamedes is always showing up [*d*] Agamemnon as a totally ridiculous general. Haven't you noticed? He says that by inventing numbers he established how many troops there were in the army at Ilium and counted their ships and everything else. The implication is that they had not been counted before, and that Agamemnon apparently did not even know how many feet he had, since he did not know how to count. What kind of general do you think that made him?

GLAUCON: A very strange one, I'd say, if there is any truth in that.

SOCRATES: Won't we posit this subject, then, as one a warrior is compelled to learn [*e*] so he can count and calculate?

GLAUCON: It is more essential than anything else—if, that is, he is going to know anything at all about marshaling his troops—or if he is even going to be human, for that matter.

SOCRATES: Then do you notice the same thing about this subject as I do?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That in all likelihood it is one of the subjects we were looking for that naturally stimulate the understanding. But no one uses it correctly, [*523a*] as something that really is fitted in every way to draw us toward being.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: I will try to make what I believe clear, at any rate. I will distinguish for myself the things that lead in the direction we mentioned from those that do not. Then you must look at them along with me, and either agree or disagree, so that we may see more clearly whether the distinction is as I imagine.

GLAUCON: Show me the things you mean.

SOCRATES: All right, I will show you, if you can see that some sense-perceptions do not summon the understanding to look into them, because [*b*] the judgment of sense-perception is itself adequate; whereas others encourage it in every way to look into them, because sense-perception does not produce a sound result.

GLAUCON: You are obviously referring to things appearing in the distance and illusionist paintings.

SOCRATES: No, you are not quite getting what I mean.

GLAUCON: Then what do you mean?

SOCRATES: The ones that do not summon the understanding are all those that do not at the same time result in an opposite sense-perception. But the ones that do I call *summoners*. That is when sense-perception does not make [*c*] one thing any more clear than its opposite, regardless of whether what strikes the senses is close by or far away. What I mean will be clearer if you look at it this way: these, we say, are three fingers—the smallest, the second, and the middle finger.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Assume that I am talking about them as being seen from close by. Now consider this about them with me.

GLAUCON: What?

{358} SOCRATES: It is obvious, surely, that each of them is equally a finger, and it [*d*] makes no difference whether it is seen to be in the middle or at either end; whether it is dark or pale, thick or thin, or anything else of that sort. You see, in all these cases, the soul of most people is not compelled to ask the understanding what a finger is, since sight does not at any point suggest to it that a finger is at the same time the opposite of a - finger.

GLAUCON: No, it does not.

SOCRATES: It is likely, then, that a perception of that sort would not summon [*e*] or awaken the understanding.

GLAUCON: It is likely.

SOCRATES: Now, what about their greatness and smallness? Does sight perceive them adequately? Does it make no difference to it whether one of them is in the middle or at the end? And is it the same with the sense of touch, as regards thickness and thinness, hardness and softness? What about the other senses, then—do they make such things sufficiently clear? Or doesn't each of them work as follows: in the first place, the sense that deals [*524a*] with hardness must also deal with softness; and it reports to the soul that it perceives the same thing to be both hard and soft?

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: In cases of this sort then, isn't the soul inevitably puzzled as to what this sense-perception means by hardness, if it says that the same thing is also soft; and in the case of the sense-perception of lightness and heaviness, what it means lightness and heaviness are, if what [*b*] is heavy is light and what is light heavy?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed, those are strange messages for the soul to receive and do need to be examined.

SOCRATES: It is likely, then, that it is in cases of this sort that the soul, summoning calculation and understanding, first tries to determine whether each of the things reported to it is one or two.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: If there are obviously two, won't each of them be obviously one and distinct?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: If each of them is one, then, and both together are two, the soul will understand that the two are separate. I mean, it would not understand

[*c*] inseparable things as two, but as one.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: But sight, we say, saw greatness and smallness, not as separate, but as mixed up together. Right?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And to get clear about this, understanding was compelled to see greatness and smallness, too, not mixed up together, but distinguished—the opposite way from sight.

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: Isn't it in cases like this that it first occurs to us to ask what greatness is, and smallness, too?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Which is why we called one section the intelligible and the other the visible.

GLAUCON: Right. [*d*]

SOCRATES: That, then, is what I was trying to express before when I said that some things summon thought, while others do not. I define summoners as those that strike the relevant sense at the same time as do their opposites. Those that do not do this, I said, do not wake up the understanding.

GLAUCON: I understand now, and I think you are right.

SOCRATES: Well then, to which of them does number, including the number one, belong?

GLAUCON: I do not know.

SOCRATES: Use what has already been said as an analogy. If the number one is adequately *seen* just by itself, or grasped by any of the other senses, then just as we were saying in the case of fingers, it would not draw the soul [*e*] toward being. But if something opposite to it is always seen at the same time, so that it no more appears to be one than the opposite of one, then there would be a need at that point for someone to decide the matter. And he would compel the soul within him to be puzzled, to inquire, to stir up the understanding within itself, and to ask what the number one itself is. So, learning about the number one will be among the subjects that lead the soul and turn it around to look at what is. [*525a*]

{359} GLAUCON: But surely the visual perception of it has just that feature, since we do see the same thing as one and as an unlimited number at the same time.

SOCRATES: Then if this is true of the number one, won't it also be true of all numbers?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But now, calculation and arithmetic are wholly concerned with numbers.

[*b*] GLAUCON: Right.

SOCRATES: Then they obviously lead toward truth.

GLAUCON: To an unnatural degree.

SOCRATES: Then they would belong, it seems, among the subjects we are seeking. I mean, a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his troops; and a philosopher, because it is necessary to be rising up out of becoming so as to grasp being, or he will never become able to calculate.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: And our guardian is, in fact, both a warrior and a philosopher.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then it would be appropriate, Glaucon, to prescribe this subject in our legislation and to persuade those who are going to take part in [*c*] the greatest things in the city to go in for calculation and take it up, not as laymen do, but staying with it until they reach the point at which they see the nature of the numbers by means of understanding itself; not like tradesmen and retailers, caring about it for the sake of buying and selling, but for the sake of war and for ease in turning the soul itself around from becoming to truth and being.

GLAUCON: Very well put.

SOCRATES: Moreover, it occurs to me now that the subject of calculation has been mentioned, how refined it is and in how many ways it is useful for [*d*] our purposes, provided you practice it for the sake of knowledge rather than trade.

GLAUCON: Which ways?

SOCRATES: Why, in the very one we were talking about just now. It gives the soul a strong lead upward and compels it to discuss the numbers themselves, never permitting anyone to propose for discussion numbers attached to visible or tangible bodies. I mean, you surely know what people who are clever in these matters are like. If, in the course of the argument, someone [*e*] tries to divide the number one itself, they laugh and won't

permit it. If *you* divide it, they multiply it, taking care that the number one never appears to be, not one, but many parts.

GLAUCON: That's very true.

SOCRATES: Then what do you think would happen, Glaucon, if someone [*526a*] were to ask them: "What kind of numbers are you amazing fellows discussing, where the number one is as you assume it to be, wholly equal in each and every case, without the least difference, and having no internal parts?" What do you think they would answer?

GLAUCON: I think they would answer that they are talking about those that are accessible only to thought and can be grasped in no other way.

SOCRATES: Do you see then, my friend, that this subject really does seem to be necessary to us, since it apparently compels the soul to use understanding [*b*] itself on the truth itself?

GLAUCON: It does so very strongly, in fact.

SOCRATES: Now, have you ever noticed that those who are naturally good at calculation are also naturally quick in all subjects, so to speak, and that those who are slow, if they are educated and exercised in it, even if they are benefited in no other way, nonetheless improve and become generally sharper than they were?

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Moreover, I do not think you will easily find many subjects that are harder to learn or practice than it. [*c*]

GLAUCON: No indeed.

SOCRATES: For all these reasons, then, this subject is not to be neglected. On the contrary, the very best natures must be educated in it.

GLAUCON: I agree.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's require that one. Second, let's consider whether the subject that follows after it is also appropriate for our purposes.

GLAUCON: Which one? Or do you mean geometry?

SOCRATES: That's it exactly.

GLAUCON: Insofar as it pertains to war, it is clearly appropriate. You see, [*d*] when it comes to {360} setting up camp, occupying a region, gathering and ordering troops, and all the other maneuvers armies make whether in battle itself or on the march, it makes all the difference whether someone is skilled in geometry or not.

SOCRATES: But still, for things like that, even a little bit of geometry—and of calculation—would suffice. What we need to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of it tends to make it easier to see the form of the good. And that tendency, we say, is to be found in anything that compels [*e*] the soul to turn itself around toward the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are; the one the soul must do everything possible to see.

GLAUCON: You are right.

SOCRATES: Therefore, if geometry compels one to look at being, it is appropriate; but if at becoming, it is inappropriate.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's what we are saying.

SOCRATES: Now, no one with even a little experience of geometry will [*527a*] dispute with us that this science is itself entirely the opposite of what is said about it in the accounts of its practitioners.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Well, they say completely ridiculous things about it because they are so hard up. I mean, they talk as if they were practical people who make all their arguments for the sake of action. They talk of squaring, applying, adding, and the like; whereas, in fact, the entire subject is practiced [*b*] for the sake of acquiring knowledge.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Mustn't we also agree on a further point?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That it is knowledge of what always is, not of something that comes to be and passes away.

GLAUCON: That's easy to agree to, since geometry is knowledge of what always is.

SOCRATES: In that case, my noble fellow, it can draw the soul toward truth and produce philosophical thought by directing upward what we now wrongly direct downward.

[*c*] GLAUCON: More than anything else.

SOCRATES: More than anything else, then, we must require the inhabitants of your beautiful city not to neglect geometry in any way, since even its byproducts are not insignificant.

GLAUCON: What are they?

SOCRATES: The ones you mentioned that are concerned with war. And in addition, when it comes to being better able to pick up any subject, we surely know there is a world of difference between someone with a grasp of geometry and someone without one.

GLAUCON: Yes, by Zeus, a world of difference.

SOCRATES: Shall we prescribe it, then, as a second subject for the young?

GLAUCON: Let's.

SOCRATES: What about astronomy? Shall we make it the third? What do [*d*] you think?

GLAUCON: That's fine with me, at least. I mean, a better awareness of the seasons, months, and years is no less appropriate for a general than for a farmer or navigator.

SOCRATES: You are funny! You are like someone who is afraid that the masses will think he is prescribing useless subjects. It is no inconsequential task—indeed it is a very difficult one—to become persuaded that in everyone's soul there is an instrument that is purified and rekindled by such subjects [*e*] when it has been blinded and destroyed by other pursuits—an instrument that it is more important to preserve than 10,000 eyes, since only with it can the truth be seen. Those who share your belief that this is so will think you are speaking incredibly well, while those who are completely unaware of it will probably think you are talking nonsense, since they can see no other benefit worth mentioning in these subjects. So, decide right now which group you are engaging in discussion. Or is it neither of them, and are you making your arguments mostly for your own [*528a*] sake—though you do not begrudge anyone else whatever profit he can get from them?

GLAUCON: That's what I prefer—to speak, question, and answer mostly for my own sake.

SOCRATES: Let's backtrack a bit. You see, we were wrong just now about the subject that comes after geometry.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: After a plane surface, we went immediately to a solid that was revolving, without taking one just by itself. But the right way is {361} to take up [*b*] the third dimension after the second. And it, I suppose, consists of cubes and of whatever shares in depth.

GLAUCON: Yes, you are right. But Socrates, that subject has not even been investigated yet.

SOCRATES: There are two reasons for that. Because no city values it, it is not vigorously investigated, due to its difficulty. And investigators need a director if they are to discover anything. Now, in the first place, such a director is difficult to find. Second, even if he could be found, as things stand now, those who investigate it are too arrogant to obey him. But if an [*c*] entire city served as his co-director and took the lead in valuing this subject, then they would obey him, and consistent and vigorous investigation would reveal the facts about it. For even now, when it is not valued by the masses and is hampered by investigators who lack any account of its usefulness—all the same, in spite of all these handicaps, the force of its appeal has caused it to be developed. So it would not be at all surprising if the facts about it were revealed in any case.

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed, it *is* an outstandingly appealing subject. But [*d*] explain more clearly to me what you were saying just now. You took geometry, presumably, as dealing with plane surface.

SOCRATES: Yes.

GLAUCON: Then at first you put astronomy after it, but later you went back on that.

SOCRATES: Yes, the more I hurried to get through them all, the slower I went! You see, the subject dealing with the dimension of depth was next. But because of the ridiculous state of the methodical inquiry into it, I passed it by and spoke of astronomy—which deals with the motion of things having [*e*] depth—after geometry.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Let's then prescribe astronomy as the fourth subject, on the assumption that solid geometry, which we are now omitting, will be available if a city takes it up.

GLAUCON: That seems reasonable. And since you reproached me just now, Socrates, for praising astronomy in a vulgar manner, I will now praise it [*529a*] your way. You see, I think it is clear to everyone that it compels the soul to look upward and leads it from things here to things there.

SOCRATES: It is clear to everyone except me, then, since that is not how I think of it.

GLAUCON: Then how do you think of it?

SOCRATES: As it is handled today by those who teach philosophy, it makes the soul look very much downward.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: In my opinion, your conception of "higher studies" is a good deal too generous! I mean, if someone were looking at something by leaning [*b*] his head back and studying ornaments on a ceiling, it seems as though you would say that he is looking at them with his understanding, not with his eyes! Maybe you are right and I am foolish. You see, I just cannot conceive of any subject making the soul look upward except the one that is concerned with what is—and that is *invisible*. If anyone tries to learn something about perceptible things, whether by gaping upward or squinting downward, I would say that he never really learns—since there is no knowledge to be had of such things—and that his soul is not looking up but [*c*] down, whether he does his learning lying on his back on land or on sea!

GLAUCON: A fair judgment! You are right to reproach me. But what did you mean, then, when you said that astronomy must be learned in a different way than people learn it at present, if it is going to be useful with regard to what we are talking about?

SOCRATES: It is like this: these ornaments in the heavens, since they are ornaments in something visible, may certainly be regarded as having the most beautiful and most exact motions that such things can have. But these [*d*] fall far short of the true ones—those motions in which the things that are really fast or really slow, as measured in true numbers and as forming all the true geometrical figures, are moved relative to one another, and that move the things that are in them. And these, of course, must be grasped by reason and thought, not by sight. Don't you agree?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Therefore, we should use the ornaments in the heavens as models to help us study these other things. It is just as if someone chanced to find diagrams by Daedalus or some other craftsman or painter, which were [*e*] very carefully {362} drawn and worked out. I mean, anyone experienced in geometry who saw such things would consider them to be very beautifully executed, I suppose. But he would think it ridiculous to examine them seriously in order to find there the [*530a*] truth about equals, doubles, or any other ratio.

GLAUCON: How could it be anything but ridiculous?

SOCRATES: Don’t you think, then, that a real astronomer will feel the same way when he looks at the motions of the stars? He will believe that the craftsman of the heavens arranged them and all that is in them in the most beautiful way possible for such things. But as for the ratio of night to day, of these to a month, of a month to a year, or of the motions of the stars to them or to each other, don’t you think he will consider it strange to [*b*] believe that they are always the same and never deviate in the least, since they are connected to body and are visible things, or to seek by every means possible to grasp the truth about them?

GLAUCON: That’s what I think—anyway, now that I hear it from you!

SOCRATES: Just as in geometry, then, it is by making use of problems that we will pursue astronomy too. We will leave the things in the heavens alone, if we are really going to participate in astronomy and make the naturally wise [*c*] element in the soul useful instead of useless.

GLAUCON: The task you are prescribing is a lot greater than anything now attempted in astronomy.

SOCRATES: And I suppose we will prescribe other subjects in the same way, if we are to be of any benefit as lawgivers. But can you in fact suggest any other appropriate subjects?

GLAUCON: Not at the moment, anyway.

SOCRATES: But motion, it seems to me, presents itself, not just in one form, but in several. A wise person could probably list them all, but there are [*d*] two that are evident even to us.

GLAUCON: What are they?

SOCRATES: Besides the one we have discussed, there is also its counterpart.

GLAUCON: What’s that?

SOCRATES: It is probable that as the eyes fasten on astronomical motions, so the ears fasten on harmonic ones, and that these two sciences are somehow akin, as the Pythagoreans say. And we agree, Glaucon. Don’t we?

GLAUCON: We do. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Then, since the task is so huge, shouldn’t we ask them their opinion and whether they have anything to add, all the while guarding our own requirement?

GLAUCON: What’s that?

SOCRATES: That those we will be rearing should never attempt to learn anything incomplete, anything that does not always come out at the place

all things should reach—the one we mentioned just now in the case of astronomy.[155] Or don't you know that people do something similar with [*531a*] harmony, too? They measure audible concordances and sounds against one another, and so labor in vain, just like astronomers.

GLAUCON: Yes, by the gods, and pretty ridiculous they are, too. They talk about something they call a "dense interval" or quarter tone[156]—putting their ears to their instruments, like someone trying to overhear what the neighbors are saying. And some say they hear a tone in between, and that *it* is the shortest interval by which they must measure, while others argue that this tone sounds the same as a quarter tone. Both groups put ears before the [*b*] understanding.

SOCRATES: You mean those excellent fellows who vex their strings, torturing them and stretching them on pegs. I won't draw out the analogy by speaking of blows with the pick, or the charges laid against strings that are too responsive or too unresponsive. Instead, I will drop the analogy and say that I do not mean these people, but the ones we just said we were going to question about harmonics. You see, they do the same as the astronomers do. [*c*] I mean, it is in these audible concordances that they search for numbers, but they do not ascend to problems or investigate which numbers are in concord and which are not, or what the explanation is in each case.

GLAUCON: But that would be a daimonic task!

{363} SOCRATES: Yet, it is useful in the search for the beautiful and the good! Pursued for any other purpose, though, it is useless.

GLAUCON: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: Moreover, I take it that if the methodical inquiry into all the subjects we have mentioned arrives at what they share in common with one [*d*] another and what their affinities are, and draws conclusions about their kinship, it does contribute something to our goal and is not labor in vain; but that otherwise it is in vain.

GLAUCON: I have the same hunch myself. But you are still talking about a very great task, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Do you mean the prelude, or what? Or don't you know that all these subjects are merely preludes to the theme itself that must be learned? I mean, you surely do not think that people who are clever in these matters are [*e*] dialecticians.

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, I do not. Although, I have met a few exceptions.

SOCRATES: But did it ever seem to you that those who can neither give an account nor approve one know what any of the things are that we say they must know?

GLAUCON: Again, the answer is no.

SOCRATES: Then isn't this at last, Glaucon, the theme itself that dialectical [*532a*] discussion sings? It itself is intelligible. But the power of sight imitates it. We said that sight tries at last to look at the animals themselves, the stars themselves, and, in the end, at the sun itself.[157] In the same way, whenever someone tries, by means of dialectical discussion and without the aid of any sense-perceptions, to arrive through reason at the being of each thing itself, and does not give up until he grasps what good itself is with understanding itself, he reaches the end of the intelligible realm, just as the other [*b*] reached the end of the visible one.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Well, then, don't you call this journey dialectic?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Then the release from bonds and the turning around from shadows to statues and the light; and then the ascent out of the cave to the sun; and there the continuing inability to look directly at the animals, the plants, and the light of the sun, but instead at divine reflections in water and shadows of the things that are, and not, as before, merely at shadows of statues [*c*] thrown by another source of light that, when judged in relation to the sun, is as shadowy as they—all this practice of the crafts we mentioned has the power to lead the best part of the soul upward until it sees the best among the things that are, just as before the clearest thing in the body was led to the brightest thing in the bodily and visible world. [*d*]

GLAUCON: I accept that this is so. And yet, I think it is very difficult to accept; although—in another way—difficult not to accept! All the same, since the present occasion is not our only opportunity to hear these things, but we will get to return to them often in the future, let's assume that what you said about them just now is true and turn to the theme itself, and discuss it in the same way as we did the prelude. So, tell us then, in what way the power of dialectical discussion works, into what kinds it is divided, and what roads it follows. I mean, it is these, it seems, that would lead us at

last [*e*] to that place which is a rest from the road, so to speak, for the one who reaches it, and an end of his journey.

SOCRATES: You won't be able to follow me any farther, my dear Glaucon —though [*533a*] not because of any lack of eagerness on my part. You would no longer see an image of what we are describing, but the truth itself as it seems to me, at least. Whether it is really so or not—that's not something on which it is any longer worth insisting. But that there is some such thing to be seen, *that* is something on which we must insist. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And mustn't we also insist that the power of dialectical discussion could reveal it only to someone experienced in the subjects we described, and cannot do so in any other way?

GLAUCON: Yes, that is worth insisting on, too. [*b*]

{364} SOCRATES: At the very least, no one will dispute our claim by arguing that there is another road of inquiry that tries to acquire a methodical and wholly general grasp of what each thing itself is. By contrast, all the other crafts are concerned with human beliefs and appetites, with growing or construction, or with the care of growing or constructed things. As for the rest, we described them as to some extent grasping what is—I mean, geometry and the subjects that follow it. For we saw that while they do dream about what is, they cannot see it while wide awake as long as they make use of hypotheses [*c*] that they leave undisturbed, and for which they cannot give any account. After all, when the first principle is unknown, and the conclusion and the steps in between are put together out of what is unknown, what mechanism could possibly turn any agreement reached in such cases into knowledge?

GLAUCON: None.

SOCRATES: Therefore, dialectic is the only method of inquiry that, doing away [*d*] with hypotheses, journeys to the first principle itself in order to be made secure. And when the eye of the soul is really buried in a sort of barbaric bog, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it upward, using the crafts we described to help it and cooperate with it in turning the soul around. From force of habit, we have often called these branches of knowledge. But they need another name, since they are clearer than belief and darker than knowledge. We distinguished them by the term "thought"

somewhere before.[158] But I don't suppose we will dispute about names, with matters as [*e*] important as those before us to investigate.

GLAUCON: Of course not, just as long as they express the state of clarity the soul possesses.

SOCRATES: It will be satisfactory, then, to do what we did before and call the first section knowledge, the second thought, the third opinion, and the fourth imagination. The last two together we call belief, the other two, [*534a* understanding. Belief is concerned with becoming; understanding with being. And as being is to becoming, so understanding is to belief; and as understanding is to belief, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imagination. But as for the ratios between the things these deal with, and the division of either the believable or the intelligible section into two, let's pass them by, Glaucon, in case they involve us in discussions many times longer than the ones we have already gone through.

GLAUCON: I agree with you about the rest of them, anyway, insofar as I am able to follow. [*b*]

SOCRATES: So don't you, too, call someone a dialectician when he is able to grasp an account of the being of each thing? And when he cannot do so, won't you, too, say that to the extent that he cannot give an account of something either to himself or to another, to that extent he does not understand it?

GLAUCON: How could I not?

SOCRATES: Then the same applies to the good. Unless someone can give an account of the form of the good, distinguishing it from everything else, and can survive all examination as if in a battle, striving to examine things [*c*] not in accordance with belief, but in accordance with being; and can journey through all that with his account still intact, you will say that he does not know the good itself or any other good whatsoever. And if he does manage to grasp some image of it, you will say that it is through belief, not knowledge, that he grasps it; that he is dreaming and asleep throughout his present life; and that, before he wakes up here, he will arrive in Hades and [*d*] go to sleep forever.

GLAUCON: Yes, by Zeus, I will certainly say all that.

SOCRATES: Then as for those children of yours, the ones you are rearing and educating in your discussion, if you ever reared them in fact, I don't

suppose that, while they are still as irrational as the proverbial lines,[159] you would allow them to rule in your city or control the greatest things.

GLAUCON: No, of course not.

SOCRATES: Won't you prescribe in your legislation, then, that they are to give the most attention to the education that will enable them to ask and answer questions most knowledgeably? [*e*]

{365} GLAUCON: I will prescribe it—together with you.

SOCRATES: Doesn't it seem to you, then, that dialectic is just like a capstone we have placed on top of the subjects, and that no other subject can rightly be placed above it, but that our account of the subjects has now [*535a*] come to an end?

GLAUCON: It does.

SOCRATES: Then it remains for you to deal with the distribution of these subjects: to whom we will assign them and in what way.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Do you remember what sort of people we chose in our earlier selection of rulers?[160]

GLAUCON: How could I not?

SOCRATES: Well then, as regards the other requirements too, you must suppose that these same natures are to be chosen, since we have to select the most stable, the most courageous, and—as far as possible—the best-looking. In addition, we must look not only for people who have a noble [*b*] and valiant character, but for those who also have natural qualities conducive to this education of ours.

GLAUCON: Which ones in particular?

SOCRATES: They must be keen on the subjects, bless you, and learn them without difficulty. For people's souls are much more likely to give up during strenuous studies than during physical training. The pain is more their own, you see, since it is peculiar to them and not shared with the body.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: We must also look for someone who has a good memory, is persistent, and is wholeheartedly in love with hard work. How else do you [*c*] suppose he would be willing to carry out such hard physical labors and also complete so much learning and training?

GLAUCON: He would not, not unless his nature were an entirely good one.

SOCRATES: In any case, the mistake made at present—which, as we said before, explains why philosophy has fallen into dishonor—is that unworthy people take it up. For illegitimate people should not have taken it up, but genuine ones.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: In the first place, the one who takes it up must not be halfhearted in his love of hard work, with one half of him loving hard work and the other shirking it. That is what happens when someone is a lover of [*d*] physical training and a lover of hunting and a lover of all kinds of hard bodily labor; yet is not a lover of learning, a lover of listening, or a keen investigator, but hates the work involved in all such things. And someone whose love of hard work tends in the opposite direction is also defective.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Similarly with regard to truth, won't we say that a soul is maimed if it hates a voluntary lie, cannot endure to have one in itself, and is [*e*] greatly angered when others lie; but is nonetheless content to accept an involuntary lie, does not get irritated when it is caught being ignorant, and bears its ignorance easily, wallowing in it like a pig?

GLAUCON: Absolutely. [*536a*]

SOCRATES: And with regard to temperance, courage, high-mindedness, and all the other parts of virtue, too, we must be especially on our guard to distinguish the illegitimate from the genuine. You see, when private individuals or cities do not know how to investigate all these things fully, they unwittingly employ defectives and illegitimates as their friends or rulers for whatever services they happen to need.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's just what happens.

SOCRATES: So we must take good care in all these matters, since, if we bring people who are sound of limb and mind to so important a subject, [*b*] and train and educate them in it, justice itself will not find fault with us, and we will save both the city and its constitution. But if we bring people of a different sort to it, we will achieve precisely the opposite and let loose an even greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy as well.

GLAUCON: That would be a shame.

SOCRATES: It certainly would. But I seem to have made myself a little ridiculous just now.

GLAUCON: In what way? [*c*]

SOCRATES: I forgot we were playing and spoke too vehemently. You see, while I was speaking {366} I looked upon philosophy, and when I saw it undeservedly showered with abuse, I suppose I got irritated and, as if I were angry with those responsible, I said what I had to say in too serious a manner.

GLAUCON: Not too serious for me, by Zeus, as a member of the audience.

SOCRATES: But too serious for me as the speaker. In any case, let's not forget that in our earlier selection we chose older people, but here that is not [*d*] permitted. You see, we must not believe Solon when he says that as someone grows older, he is able to learn a lot. On the contrary, he is even less able to learn than to run. It is to young people that all great and frequent labors properly belong.

GLAUCON: Necessarily so.

SOCRATES: Well, then, calculation, geometry, and all the preparatory education that serves as preparation for dialectic must be offered to them in childhood—and not in the shape of compulsory instruction, either.

[*e*]GLAUCON: Why's that?

SOCRATES: Because a free person should learn nothing slavishly. For while compulsory physical labors do no harm to the body, no compulsory instruction remains in the soul.

GLAUCON: That's true.

SOCRATES: Well, then, do not use compulsion, my very good man, to train the children in these subjects; use play instead. That way you will also [*537a*] be able to see better what each of them is naturally suited for.

GLAUCON: What you say makes sense.

SOCRATES: Don't you remember that we also said that the children were to be led into war on horseback as observers, and that, wherever it is safe, they should be brought to the front and given a taste of blood, just like young dogs?

GLAUCON: I do remember.

SOCRATES: Those who always show the greatest facility in dealing with all these labors, studies, and fears must be enrolled in a unit.

[*b*] GLAUCON: At what age?

SOCRATES: After they are released from compulsory physical training. For during that period, whether it is two or three years, they are incapable of doing anything else, since weariness and sleep are enemies of learning. At

the same time, one of the important tests of each of them is how he fares in physical training.

GLAUCON: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Then, after that period, those selected from among the twenty-year-olds will receive greater honors than the others. Moreover, the subjects they learned in no particular order in their education as children, [*c*] they must now bring together into a unified vision of their kinship with one another and with the nature of what is.

GLAUCON: That, at any rate, is the only instruction that remains secure in those who receive it.

SOCRATES: It is also the greatest test of which nature is dialectical and which is not. For the person who can achieve a unified vision is dialectical, and the one who cannot isn't.

GLAUCON: I agree.

SOCRATES: Well, then, you will have to look out for those among them who most possess that quality; who are resolute in their studies and also resolute [*d*] in war and the other things conventionally expected of them. And when they have passed their thirtieth year, you will have to select them in turn from among those selected earlier and assign them yet greater honors, and test them by means of the power of dialectical discussion to see which of them can relinquish his eyes and other senses, and travel on in the company of truth to what itself is. And here, comrade, you have a task that needs a lot of safeguarding.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: Don't you realize the harm caused by dialectical discussion as [*e*] it is currently practiced?

GLAUCON: What harm?

SOCRATES: Its practitioners are filled with lawlessness.

GLAUCON: They certainly are.

SOCRATES: Do you think it is at all surprising that this happens to them? Aren't you sympathetic?

GLAUCON: Why should I be?

SOCRATES: It is like the case of a supposititious child brought up amid large wealth, a great and powerful family, and many flatterers, who finds [*538a*] out, when he has become a man, that he is not {367} the child of his professed parents and that he cannot discover his real ones. Do you have

any hunch as to what his attitude would be to the flatterers, and to his supposed parents, during the time when he did not know about the exchange, and, on the other hand, when he did know? Or would you rather hear my hunch?

GLAUCON: I would.

SOCRATES: Well, then, my hunch is that he would be more likely to [*b*] honor his father, his mother, and the rest of his supposed family than the flatterers, less likely to overlook any of their needs, less likely to treat them lawlessly in word or deed, and less likely to disobey them than the flatterers in any matters of importance, in the time when he did not know the truth.

GLAUCON: Probably so.

SOCRATES: But when he became aware of the truth, on the other hand, my hunch is that he would withdraw his honor and devotion from his family and increase them for the flatterers, whom he would obey far more than before, and he would begin to live the way they did, spend time with them [*c*] openly, and—unless he was thoroughly good by nature—care nothing for that father of his or any of the rest of his supposed family.

GLAUCON: All that would probably happen as you say. But how is it like the case of those who take up argument?

SOCRATES: As follows. I take it we hold from childhood convictions about what things are just and fine; we are brought up with them as with our parents; we obey and honor them.

[*d*] GLAUCON: Yes, we do.

SOCRATES: And there are also other practices, opposite to those, which possess pleasures that flatter our soul and attract it to themselves, but which do not persuade people who are at all moderate—who continue to honor and obey the convictions of their fathers.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

SOCRATES: What happens, then, when someone of that sort is met by the question, “What is the fine?” and, when he answers what he has heard from the traditional lawgiver, the argument refutes him; and by refuting him often and in many ways, reduces him to the belief that the fine is no more [*e*] fine than shameful, and the same with the just, the good, and the things he honored most—what do you think he will do after that about honoring and obeying his earlier convictions?

GLAUCON: It is inevitable that he won’t honor or obey them in the same way.

SOCRATES: Then when he no longer regards them as honorable or as his own kin the way he did before, and cannot discover the true ones, will he [*539a*] be likely to adopt any other sort of life than the one that flatters him?

GLAUCON: No, he won’t.

SOCRATES: And so he will be taken, I suppose, to have changed from being law-abiding to being lawless.

GLAUCON: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it likely, then, that this is what will happen to people who take up argument in that way, and, as I said just now, don’t they deserve a lot of sympathy?

GLAUCON: Yes, and pity too.

SOCRATES: Then if you do not want your thirty-year-olds to be objects of such pity, won’t you have to employ every sort of precaution when they take up argument?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And isn’t one very effective precaution not to let them taste [*b*] argument while they are young? I mean, I don’t suppose it has escaped your notice that when young people get their first taste of argument, they misuse it as if it were playing a game, always using it for disputation. They imitate those who have refuted them by refuting others themselves, and, like puppies, enjoy dragging and tearing with argument anyone within reach.

GLAUCON: Excessively so.

SOCRATES: Then, when they have refuted many themselves and been refuted by many, they quickly fall into violently disbelieving everything [*c*] they believed before. And as a result of this, they themselves and the whole of philosophy as well are discredited in the eyes of others.

GLAUCON: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: But an older person would not be willing to take part in such madness. He will imitate someone who is willing to engage {368} in dialectical discussion and look for the truth, rather than someone who plays at disputation as a game. He will be more moderate himself and will [*d*] bring honor, rather than discredit, to the practice.

GLAUCON: That’s right.

SOCRATES: And wasn't everything we said before this also said as a precaution—that those with whom one takes part in arguments are to be orderly and steady by nature, and not, as now, those, however unsuitable, who chance to come along?

GLAUCON: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: Is it enough, then, if someone devotes himself continuously and strenuously to taking part in argument, doing nothing else, but training in it just as he did in the physical training that is its counterpart, but for twice as many [*e*] years?

GLAUCON: Do you mean six years or four?

SOCRATES: It does not matter. Make it five. You see, after that, you must make them go down into the cave again, and compel them to take command in matters of war and the other offices suitable for young people, so that they won't be inferior to the others in experience. And in these offices, too, they must be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast when [*540a*] they are pulled in different directions, or give way.

GLAUCON: How much time do you assign to that?

SOCRATES: Fifteen years. Then, at the age of fifty, those who have survived the tests and are entirely best in every practical task and every science must be led at last to the end and compelled to lift up the radiant eye-beams of their souls, and to look toward what itself provides light for everything. And once they have seen the good itself, they must use it as their model and put the city, its citizens, and themselves in order throughout the remainder of [*b*] their lives, each in turn. They will spend the greater part of their time doing philosophy, but, when his turn comes, each must labor in politics and rule for the city's sake, not as something fine, but rather as something compulsory. In that way, always having educated others like themselves to take their place as guardians of the city, they will depart for the Isles of the Blessed and dwell there. And the city will publicly establish memorials and [*c*] sacrifices to them as daimons, if the Pythia agrees; but if not, as happy and divine people.

GLAUCON: Like a sculptor, Socrates, you have produced thoroughly beautiful ruling men!

SOCRATES: And ruling women, too, Glaucon. You see, you must not think that what I have said applies any more to men than it does to those women of theirs who are born with the appropriate natures.

GLAUCON: That's right, if indeed they are to share everything equally with the men, as we said.

SOCRATES: Well, then, do you agree that the things we have said about [*d*] the city and its constitution are not altogether wishful thinking; that it is difficult for them to come about, but possible in a way, and in no way except the one we described: namely, when one or more true philosophers come to power in a city—people who think little of present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, who prize what is right and the honors that come from it above everything, and who consider justice as the [*e*] greatest and most compulsory thing, serving it and fostering it as they set their city in order?

GLAUCON: How will they do that?

SOCRATES: Everyone in the city who is over ten years old they will send into the country. They will take over the children, and far removed from [*541a*] current habits, which their parents possess, they will bring them up in their own ways and laws, which are the ones we described before. And with the city and constitution we were discussing thus established in the quickest and easiest way, it will itself be happy and bring the greatest benefit to the people among whom it comes to be.

GLAUCON: That's by far the quickest and easiest way. And in my opinion, Socrates, you have well described how it would come into existence, if it ever did. [*b*]

SOCRATES: Haven't we said enough, then, about this city and the man who is like it? For surely it is clear what sort of person we will say he should be.

GLAUCON: Yes, it is clear. And as for your question, I think we have reached the end of this topic.

{369} BOOK VIII

THE DESCRIPTION OF the ideal city and of the man whose character resembles it—the philosopher-king—is now complete, and Socrates returns to the argument interrupted at the beginning of Book V. He describes four individual character types and the four types of constitutions that result when people who possess them rule in a city (544d–545d). He presents these as four stages in the increasing

corruption or decline of the ideal city, and he explains why the ideal city will decline by appeal to a mathematical myth (546a–b). However, embedded in the myth is the serious philosophical suggestion that the ideal city will decline because the philosopher-kings have to rely on sense-perception in putting their eugenics policy into practice (546b–c).

The first of the bad cities Socrates describes is a timocracy. It is ruled by people whose souls are themselves ruled by the spirited part of their soul, in which the desire for honor, victories, and good reputation are located (550b). It is the second-best city to the ideal. The third-best city is an oligarchy. It is ruled by people whose souls are ruled by their necessary appetites (544a). The fourth-best city is a democracy. It is ruled by people whose souls are ruled by unnecessary appetites (561a–b). The worst city of all is a tyranny. It is ruled by someone whose soul is ruled by its lawless unnecessary appetites (571a).

[*543a*]SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES: SOCRATES: All right. We are agreed, then, Glaucon, that if a city is going to be eminently well governed, women must be shared; children and their entire education must be shared; in both peace and war, pursuits must be shared; and their kings must be those among them who have proved best both in philosophy and where war is concerned.

[*b*] GLAUCON: We are agreed.

SOCRATES: Moreover, we also granted this: once the rulers are established, they will lead the soldiers and settle them in the kind of dwellings we described earlier, which are in no way private, but wholly shared. And surely we also came to an agreement, if you remember, about what sort of possessions they should have.

GLAUCON: Yes, I do remember. We thought that none of them should acquire any of the things that others now do; but that, as athletes of war and [*c*] guardians, they should receive their minimum yearly upkeep from the other citizens as a wage for their guardianship, and take care of themselves and the rest of the city.

SOCRATES: That's right. But since we have completed that discussion, let's recall the point at which we began the digression that brought us here, so that we can continue on the same path again.

GLAUCON: That is not difficult. You see, much the same as now, you were talking as if you had completed the description of the city. You were saying that you would class both the city you described and the man who is like it as good, even though, as it seems, you had a still finer city and man to tell [*544a*] us about. But in any case, you were saying that the others were defective, if it was correct. And you said, if I remember, that of the remaining kinds of constitution four were worth discussing, each with defects we should observe; and that we should do the same for the people like them in order to observe them all, come to an agreement about which man is best and which worst, and then determine whether the best is happiest and the worst most wretched, or whether it is otherwise. I was asking you which four constitutions you had in mind, when Polemarchus and Adeimantus [*b*] interrupted.[161] And that is when you took up the discussion that led here.

SOCRATES: That's absolutely right.

GLAUCON: Like a wrestler, then, give me the same hold again, and when I ask the same question, try to tell me what you were about to say before.

{370} SOCRATES: If I can.

GLAUCON: In any case, I really want to hear for myself what four constitutions you meant.

SOCRATES: It won't be difficult for you to hear them. You see, the ones I mean are the very ones that already have names: the one that is praised by [*c*] "the many," your Cretan or Laconian [Spartan] constitution. The second—and second in the praise it receives—is called oligarchy, a constitution filled with a host of evils. Antagonistic to it, and next in order, is democracy. And "noble" tyranny, surpassing all of them, is the fourth and most extreme disease of cities. Can you think of another form of constitution—I mean, another distinct in form from these? For, no doubt, there are dynasties and purchased kingships and other similar constitutions in between these, [*d* which one finds no less among barbarians than among Greeks.

GLAUCON: Many strange ones are certainly mentioned, at least.

SOCRATES: Are you aware, then, that there must be as many forms of human character as there are of constitutions? Or do you think constitutions arise from oak or rock[162] and not from the characters of the people in the cities, which tip the scales, so to speak, and drag the rest along with [*e*] them?

GLAUCON: No, they could not possibly arise from anything other than that.

SOCRATES: So, if there are five of cities, there must also be five ways of arranging private individual souls.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Now, we have already described the one who is like aristocracy, the one we rightly describe as good and just.

[*545a*] GLAUCON: Yes, we have described him.

SOCRATES: Mustn't we next describe the inferior ones—the victory-loving and honor-loving, which correspond to the Laconian constitution, followed by the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical—so that, having discovered the most unjust of all, we can oppose him to the most just and complete our investigation into how pure justice and pure injustice stand with regard to the happiness or wretchedness of the one who possesses them; and be persuaded either by Thrasymachus to practice injustice or by [*b*] the argument that is now coming to light to practice justice.

GLAUCON: That's exactly what we must do.

SOCRATES: Then just as we began by looking for the virtues of character in constitutions before looking for them in private individuals, thinking they would be clearer in the former, shouldn't we first examine the honor-loving constitution? I do not know another name that is commonly applied to it; it should be called either timocracy or timarchy. Then shouldn't we examine that sort of man by comparing him to it, and, after that, oligarchy [*c*] and the oligarchic man, and democracy and the democratic man? Fourth, having come to a city that is under a tyrant and having examined it, shouldn't we look into a tyrannical soul, and so try to become adequate judges of the topic we proposed for ourselves?

GLAUCON: That, at any rate, would be a reasonable way for us to go about observing and judging.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, let's try to describe how timocracy emerges from aristocracy. Or is it simply the case that, in all constitutions, change

[*d*] originates in the ruling element itself when faction breaks out within it; but that if this group remains of one mind, then—however small it is—change is impossible?

GLAUCON: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: How, then, Glaucon, will our city be changed? How will faction arise, either between the auxiliaries and the rulers or within either [*e*] group? Or do you want us to be like Homer and pray to the Muses to tell us "how faction first broke out,"[163] and have them speak in tragic tones, playing and jesting with us, as if we were children and they were speaking in earnest?

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Something like this: "It is difficult for a city constituted in this [*546a*] way to change. However, since everything that comes-to-be must decay, not even one so constituted will last forever. On the contrary, it, too, must face dissolution. And this is how it will be dissolved: {371} not only plants that grow in the earth, but also animals that grow upon it, have periods of fertility and infertility of both soul and bodies each time their cycles complete a revolution. These cycles are short for what is short-lived and the opposite for what is the opposite. However, even though they are wise, the people you have educated to be leaders in your city will, by using rational calculation combined [*b*] with sense-perception, nonetheless fail to ascertain the periods of good fertility and of infertility for your species. Instead, these will escape them, and so they will sometimes beget children when they should not.

"Now, for the birth of a divine creature[164] there is a cycle comprehended by a perfect number; while for a human being, it is the first number in which are found increases involving both roots and powers, comprehending three intervals and four terms, of factors that cause likeness and unlikeness, cause increase and decrease, and make all things mutually agreeable and rational in their relations to one another. Of these factors, the base ones—four in relation to three, together with five—give two harmonies [*c*] when thrice increased. One is a square, so many times a hundred. The other is of equal length one way, but oblong. One of its sides are 100 squares of the rational diameter of five each diminished by one, or alternatively 100 squares of the irrational diameter each diminished by two. The other side

are 100 cubes of three. This whole geometrical [*d*] number controls better and worse births.[165]

"And when, through ignorance of these, your guardians join brides and grooms at the wrong time, the children will be neither good-natured nor fortunate. The older generation will choose the best of these children, even though they do not deserve them. And when they in turn acquire their fathers' powers, the first thing they will begin to neglect as guardians will be us, by paying less attention to musical training than they should; and the second is physical training. Hence your young people will become more unmusical. And rulers chosen from among them won't be able to guard [*e*] well the testing of Hesiod's and your own races—gold, silver, bronze, and [*547a*] iron.[166] The intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with gold will engender lack of likeness and unharmonious inequality, and these always breed war and hostility wherever they arise. We must declare faction to be 'of this lineage,'[167] wherever and whenever it arises."

{372} GLAUCON: And we will declare that they have answered correctly.

SOCRATES: They must. They are Muses, after all! [*b*]

GLAUCON: What do the Muses say next?

SOCRATES: When faction arose, each of these two races, the iron and the bronze, pulled the constitution toward moneymaking and the acquisition of land, houses, gold, and silver. The other two, by contrast, the gold and silver races—since they are not poor, but naturally rich in their souls—led toward virtue and the old political system. Striving and struggling with one another, they compromised on a middle way: they distributed the land and houses among themselves as private property; enslaved and held as serfs and [*c*] servants those whom they had previously guarded as free friends and providers of upkeep; and took responsibility themselves for making war and for guarding against the ones they had enslaved.

GLAUCON: I think that is how the transformation begins.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't this constitution, then, be somehow in the middle between aristocracy and oligarchy?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Anyway, that is how the transformation occurs. But once transformed, how will it be managed? Or isn't it obvious that it will imitate [*d*] the first constitution in some respects and oligarchy in others, since it is

in the middle between them; and that it will also have some features unique to itself?

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: In honoring the rulers, then, and in the fighting class' abstention from farming, handicrafts, and other ways of making money, in providing communal meals and being devoted to physical training and training for war—in all such ways, won't the constitution be like the previous one?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: But in its fear of appointing wise people as rulers, on the [*e*] grounds that men of that sort are no longer simple and earnest but mixed; in its inclination toward spirited and simpler people, who are more naturally suited for war than peace; in its honoring the tricks and stratagems of war; and spending all its time making war—in these respects, by contrast, [*548a*] isn't it pretty much unique?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Such men will have an appetite for money just like those in oligarchies, passionately adoring gold and silver in secret, owning storehouses and private treasuries where they can deposit them and keep them hidden; and they will have walls around their houses, real private nests, where they can spend lavishly on their women or on anyone else they please. [*b*]

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: They will be stingy with money, since they honor it and do not possess it openly, but they will love to spend other people's money because of their appetites. They will enjoy their pleasures in secret, running away from the law like boys from their father, since they have not been educated by persuasion but by force. This is because they have neglected the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and honored physical training more than musical training. [*c*]

GLAUCON: The constitution you are describing is a thorough mixture of good and bad.

SOCRATES: Yes, it is mixed. But because of its mastery by the spirited element, only one thing really stands out in it—the love of victories and honors.

GLAUCON: And very noticeable it is.

SOCRATES: That, then, is how this constitution would come to exist, and that is what it would be like. It is just an outline sketch of the constitution in words, not an exact account of it, since even from a sketch we will be able to see the most just man and most unjust one. It would be an incredibly [*d*] long task to discuss every constitution and every character without omitting any detail.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: Who, then, is the man corresponding to this constitution? How does he come to exist and what sort of man is he?

ADEIMANTUS: I think he would be very like Glaucon here, at least as far as the love of victory is concerned.

{373} SOCRATES: Maybe in that respect, but in the following ones I do not think his nature would be like that. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Which ones?

SOCRATES: He would have to be more stubborn and less well trained in music; a lover of music and of listening, yet not at all skilled in speaking; the [*549a*] sort of person who is harsh to slaves instead of looking down on them, as an adequately educated person does; gentle to free people and very submissive to rulers; a lover of ruling and of honor, who does not base his claim to rule on his ability to speak or anything like that, but on his exploits in war and anything having to do with war; a lover of physical training and of hunting.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is indeed the character belonging to this constitution.

SOCRATES: As regards money, too, wouldn't someone like that look down [*b*] on it when he is young; but as he grows older, wouldn't he love it more and more because he shares in the money-lover's nature and is not pure in his attitude to virtue, since he lacks the best guardian?

ADEIMANTUS: What's that?

SOCRATES: Reason mixed with musical training. You see, only it dwells within the person who possesses it as the lifelong preserver of his virtue.

ADEIMANTUS: Well put.

SOCRATES: That, then, is what a timocratic [*c*] youth is like; he is like the corresponding city.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: And he comes to exist in some such way as this: sometimes he is the young son of a good father, who lives in a city that is not politically well governed; avoids honors, political office, lawsuits, and all such meddling in other people's affairs; and who is even willing to be put at a disadvantage so as to avoid trouble.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, but how does he become timocratic?

SOCRATES: It first happens when he listens to his mother complaining that her man is not one of the rulers and that she is at a disadvantage among the other women as a result. Next, she sees that he is not very serious about [*d*] money, either; does not fight or exchange insults in private lawsuits or in the public assembly, but takes easily everything of that sort; has a mind always absorbed in its own thoughts; and does not overvalue her or undervalue her either. As a result of all those things, she complains and tells her son that his father is unmanly and too easygoing, and makes a litany of the other sorts of things women love to recite on such occasions. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed, it is just like them to have lots of such complaints.

SOCRATES: You know, then, that the servants of such men—the ones thought to be loyal—also say similar things to the sons in private. If they see someone who owes the father money or has wronged him in some other way, whom he does not prosecute, they urge the son to punish all such people when he becomes a man, and be more of a man than his father. And when he goes out, the boy hears and sees other similar things: those who [*550a*] do their own work in the city are called fools and held to be of little account, while those who do not are honored and praised. When the young man hears and sees all this, then, and, on the other hand, also listens to what his father says, and sees his practices from close at hand and compares them with those of the others, he is pulled by both—his father nourishing the rational element in his soul and making it grow; the others [*b*] nourishing the appetitive and spirited elements. And, because he is not a bad man by nature, but has kept bad company, he compromises on a middle way when he is pulled in these two directions, and surrenders the rule within him to the middle element—the victory-loving and spirited one—and becomes a proud and honor-loving man.

ADEIMANTUS: I think you have exactly described how such a man comes to exist.

SOCRATES: So, we now have the second constitution and the second man. [*c*]

ADEIMANTUS: We have.

SOCRATES: Next then, shall we, like Aeschylus, talk of "another man ordered like another city,"[168] or follow our plan and talk about the city first?

ADEIMANTUS: The latter, of course.

{374} SOCRATES: And I suppose oligarchy would come next after such a constitution.

ADEIMANTUS: And what kind of political system do you mean by oligarchy?

SOCRATES: The constitution based on a property assessment, the one in which the rich rule [*d*] and the poor man does not participate in ruling.

ADEIMANTUS: I understand.

SOCRATES: So, mustn't we first describe how timarchy is transformed into oligarchy?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And surely the way it is transformed is clear even to the blind.

ADEIMANTUS: How?

SOCRATES: That storehouse filled with gold we mentioned,[169] which each possesses, destroys such a constitution. First, you see, the timocrats find ways of spending their money, then they alter the laws to allow them to do so, and then they and their women disobey the laws altogether.

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: Next, I suppose, through one person seeing another and envying [*e*] him, they make the majority behave like themselves.

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: After that then, they become further involved in moneymaking; and the more honorable they consider it, the less honorable they consider virtue. Or isn't virtue so opposed to wealth that if they were set on the scale of a balance, they would always incline in opposite directions?

[*551a*] ADEIMANTUS: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, when wealth and the wealthy are honored in a city, virtue and good people are honored less.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And what is honored is always practiced, and what is not honored, neglected.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, in the end, victory-loving and honor-loving men become lovers of making money and money-lovers, and they praise and admire the wealthy man and appoint him as ruler, and dishonor the poor one.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Isn't it then that they pass a law, which is a defining characteristic of an oligarchic constitution, establishing a wealth qualification—higher [*b*] where it is more oligarchic, lower where it is less so—and proclaim that anyone whose property does not reach the stated assessment cannot participate in ruling? And they either put this through by force of arms, or else, without resorting to that, they use intimidation to establish this sort of constitution. Isn't that so?

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: That, then, is, generally speaking, how it is established.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is. But what is the constitution like? What are the defects we said it had?[170] [*c*]

SOCRATES: First of all, consider its defining characteristic. I mean, what would happen if ship captains were appointed like that, on the basis of property assessments, and a poor person was turned away even if he were a better captain?

ADEIMANTUS: People would make a very bad voyage!

SOCRATES: And doesn't the same apply to any other sort of rule whatsoever?

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: Except of a city? Or does it apply to that of a city, too?

ADEIMANTUS: It applies to it most of all, since it is the most difficult and greatest kind of rule there is.

SOCRATES: That, then, is one major defect in oligarchy. [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: So it seems.

SOCRATES: And what about this one? Is it any smaller than the other?

ADEIMANTUS: Which?

SOCRATES: That a city of this sort is not one, but inevitably two—a city of the poor and one of the rich, living in the same place and always plotting

against one another.

ADEIMANTUS: By Zeus, that's no smaller a defect.

SOCRATES: And this is hardly a good quality either: the likelihood of being unable to fight a war because of being compelled to arm and use {375} the majority, or else, because of not [*e*] using them, and so having to show up as true oligarchs[171] on the battlefield; and because, at the same time, the fact that they are money-lovers makes them unwilling to pay mercenaries.

ADEIMANTUS: That is not good.

SOCRATES: And what about what we condemned long ago[172]—the fact that in this constitution there is the meddling in other people's affairs that occurs when the same people are farmers, moneymakers, and soldiers simultaneously? Or do you think it is right for things to be that way? [*552a*]

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Now, let's see whether it is the first to admit the greatest of all evils.

ADEIMANTUS: Which is?

SOCRATES: Allowing someone to sell all his possessions and someone else to buy them, and then allowing the seller to continue living in the city while not being any one of its parts—neither moneymaker nor craftsman, nor cavalryman, nor [*b*] hoplite, but a poor person without means.

ADEIMANTUS: It is the first.

SOCRATES: Anyway, this sort of thing certainly is not forbidden in oligarchies. I mean, if it were, some of their citizens would not be super rich and others totally impoverished.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Now, consider this: when a person like that was rich and spending his money, was he then of any greater use to the city in the ways we have just mentioned? Or did he merely seem to be one of the rulers, while in fact he was neither ruler nor subject of it, but only a squanderer of property?

ADEIMANTUS: That's right. He seemed to be a ruler but was nothing but a [*c*] squanderer.

SOCRATES: Do you want us to say of him, then, that as a drone existing in a cell is an affliction to the hive, so this person existing in a household is a drone and affliction to the city?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And hasn't the god, Adeimantus, made all the winged drones stingless, as well as some of the footed ones, while other footed ones have terrible stings? And don't those who end up as beggars in old age come from [*d*] among the stingless ones, while all those with stings are called evildoers?

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Clearly then, in any city where you see beggars, somewhere in the neighborhood there are thieves hidden, and pickpockets, temple robbers, and craftsmen of all such sorts of evil.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: What about oligarchic cities? Don't you see beggars in them?

ADEIMANTUS: Nearly everyone is one, apart from the rulers. [*e*]

SOCRATES: Mustn't we suppose, then, that there are also many evildoers there with stings, whom the rulers forcibly keep in check by their cautiousness?

ADEIMANTUS: We certainly must suppose it.

SOCRATES: And aren't we saying that the presence of such people is the result of lack of education, bad rearing, and a bad constitutional system?

ADEIMANTUS: We are.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is roughly what the oligarchic city would be like. It would contain all these evils and probably others as well.

ADEIMANTUS: That's pretty much it.

SOCRATES: Let's take it, then, that we have disposed of the constitution [*553a*] they call oligarchy, which gets its rulers on the basis of a property assessment. Next, let's consider how the person who is like it comes to exist, and what sort of person he is when he does.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, let's.

SOCRATES: Doesn't the transformation from timocrat to oligarch mostly occur in this way?

ADEIMANTUS: Which?

SOCRATES: It happens when a son of his is born who begins by emulating his father and following in his footsteps, and then sees him suddenly crashing against the city as against a reef, and sees him and all his possessions [*b*] spilling overboard. He had held a generalship or some other

high office, was brought to court by sycophants, and was put to death or exiled, or was disenfranchised and had all his property confiscated.

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

{376} SOCRATES: Anyway, my friend, after seeing and experiencing all that, and losing his property, the son is afraid, I imagine, and immediately throws the honor-loving and spirited element headlong from the throne in his own soul. And humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to moneymaking and, little [*c*] by little, saving and working, he amasses property. Don't you think that someone like that will then establish the appetitive and moneymaking element on that throne, and make it a great king within himself, adorned with golden tiaras and collars and Persian swords?

ADEIMANTUS: I do.

SOCRATES: And I suppose he makes the rational and spirited elements sit on the ground beneath it, one on either side, and be slaves. He won't allow [*d*] the first to calculate or consider anything except how a little money can be made into more; or the second to admire or honor anything except wealth and wealthy people, or to love being honored for anything besides the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to it.

ADEIMANTUS: There is no other way to turn an honor-loving young man into a money-loving [*e*] one that is as swift and sure as that!

SOCRATES: Isn't this, then, the oligarchic person?

ADEIMANTUS: Well, he certainly developed from the sort of man who resembled the constitution from which oligarchy came.

SOCRATES: Then let's see whether he [*554a*] resembles it.

ADEIMANTUS: Let's.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't he resemble it, primarily, by attaching the greatest importance to money?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And also by being a thrifty worker who satisfies only his necessary appetites and spends nothing on other things but enslaves his other appetites as pointless.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: A pretty squalid fellow, at any rate, who tries to make a profit from everything: a treasury-builder—the sort the majority admire. Isn't that [*b*] the sort of man who resembles this sort of constitution?

ADEIMANTUS: *I* certainly think so. At any rate, money is honored more than anything else by both the city and the one who is like it.

SOCRATES: Because I don't suppose someone like that has paid any attention to education.

ADEIMANTUS: I don't think so. I mean, if he had, he would not have chosen a blind leader for his chorus and honored him most.[173]

SOCRATES: Well put! But consider this. Wouldn't we say that though the dronish appetites exist in him because of his lack of education, some of them beggars and others evildoers, they are forcibly kept in check by his [*c*] general cautiousness?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Do you know, then, where you should look to see the evils such people do?

ADEIMANTUS: Where?

SOCRATES: Where they are guardians of orphans, or any other situation like that, where they have ample opportunity to do injustice.

ADEIMANTUS: True.

SOCRATES: So, doesn't that make it clear that in other contractual matters, where someone like that has a good reputation and is thought to be just, something good of his is forcibly holding in check the other bad appetites within; not persuading them that they had better not, nor taming them [*d*] by a word, but using compulsion and fear, because he is terrified of losing his other possessions?

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Yes, by Zeus, my friend, you will find that most of them, when they have other people's money to spend, have appetites in them akin to those of the drone.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, you certainly will!

SOCRATES: So, someone like that would not be entirely free from internal faction, and would not be a single person but somehow a twofold one, although his better appetites would generally master his worse appetites. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Because of this, I suppose someone like that would be more respectable than many {377} other people; but the true virtue of a single-minded and harmonious soul would somehow far escape him.

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, the thrifty man is a worthless individual contestant in the city for any prize of victory or any of the other fine things the love of honor craves. He is unwilling to spend money for the sake of fame [*555a*] or other such results of competition, and, fearing to arouse his appetites for spending by allying them with love of victory, he fights in true oligarchic fashion, with only a few of his resources, and is mostly defeated, but remains rich!

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Are we still in any doubt, then, that, as regards resemblance, a thrifty moneymaker [*b*] corresponds to an oligarchic city?

ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.

SOCRATES: Then democracy, it seems, must be considered next—both the way it comes to exist and what it is like when it does—so that when we know the character of this sort of man, we can present him for judgment in turn.

ADEIMANTUS: At any rate, that would be consistent with what we have been doing.

SOCRATES: Well, then, isn't the change from an oligarchy to a democracy due in some way or other to the insatiable desire for the good set before it—the need to become as rich as possible?

[*c*] ADEIMANTUS: How so?

SOCRATES: Since the rulers rule in it because they own a lot, I suppose they are not willing to enact laws to prevent young people who have become intemperate from spending and wasting their wealth, so that by buying and making loans on the property of such people, the rulers themselves can become even richer and more honored.

ADEIMANTUS: That's their primary goal, at any rate.

SOCRATES: So, isn't it clear by now that you cannot honor wealth in a city and maintain temperance in the citizens at the same time, but must inevitably [*d*] neglect one or the other?

ADEIMANTUS: That is pretty clear.

SOCRATES: The negligent encouragement of intemperance in oligarchies, then, sometimes reduces people who are not ill born to poverty.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, it does.

SOCRATES: And these people sit around in the city, I suppose, armed with stings or weapons—some of them in debt, some disenfranchised, some both—hating and plotting against those who have acquired their property, [*e*] and all the others as well; passionately longing for revolution.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: These moneymakers, with their heads down, pretending not to see them, inject the poison of their money into any of the rest who do not resist, and, carrying away a multitude of offspring in interest from their principal, [*556a*] greatly increase the size of the drone and beggar class in the city.

ADEIMANTUS: They certainly do increase it greatly.

SOCRATES: In any case, they are not willing to quench evil of this sort as it flares up, either by preventing a person from doing whatever he likes with his own property, or alternatively by passing this other law to do away with such abuses.

ADEIMANTUS: What law?

SOCRATES: The one that is next best and that compels the citizens to care about virtue. You see, if someone prescribed that most voluntary contracts [*b*] be entered into at the lender's own risk, money would be less shamelessly pursued in the city and fewer of those evils we were mentioning just now would develop in it.

ADEIMANTUS: Far fewer.

SOCRATES: But as it is, and for all these reasons, the rulers in the city treat their subjects in the way we described. And as for themselves and those belonging to them, don't they bring up the young to be fond of luxury, incapable of effort either mental or physical, too soft to endure pleasures or pains, and lazy? [*c*]

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And haven't they themselves neglected everything except making money and been no more concerned about virtue than poor people are?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, they have.

SOCRATES: And when rulers and subjects, socialized in this way, meet on journeys or some other shared undertakings, whether in an embassy or a military campaign; or as shipmates {378} or fellow soldiers; or when they watch one another in dangerous situations—in these circumstances, don't

you [*d*] think the poor are in no way despised by the rich? On the contrary, don't you think it is often the case that a poor man, lean and suntanned, is stationed in battle next to a rich one, reared in the shade and carrying a lot of excess flesh, and sees him panting and completely at a loss? And don't you think he believes that it is because of the cowardice of the poor that such people are rich and that one poor man says to another when they meet in private: "These men are ours for the taking; they [*e*] are good for nothing"?

ADEIMANTUS: I know very well they do.

SOCRATES: Well, just as a sick body needs only a slight shock from outside to become ill and sometimes, even without external influence, becomes divided into factions, itself against itself, doesn't a city in the same condition need only a small pretext—such as one side bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy—to become ill and fight with itself? And doesn't it sometimes become divided into factions even without any external influence?

[*557a*] ADEIMANTUS: Yes, violently so.

SOCRATES: Then democracy comes about, I suppose, when the poor are victorious, kill or expel the others, and give the rest an equal share in the constitution and the ruling offices, and the majority of offices in it are assigned by lot.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is how a democratic political system gets established, whether it comes to exist by force of arms or because intimidation drives its opponents into exile.

SOCRATES: In what way, then, do these people live? What sort of constitution do they have? For clearly the sort of man who is like it will turn out to [*b*] be democratic.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Well, in the first place, aren't they free? And isn't the city full of freedom and freedom of speech? And isn't there license in it to do whatever one wants?

ADEIMANTUS: That's what they say, anyway.

SOCRATES: And where there is license, clearly each person would arrange his own life in whatever way pleases him.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly. [*c*]

SOCRATES: I imagine it is in this constitution, then, that multifarious people come to exist.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: It looks, then, as though it is the most beautiful of all the constitutions. For just like an embroidered cloak embroidered with every kind of ornament, it is embroidered with every sort of character, and so would appear to be the most beautiful. And presumably, many people would behave like women and children looking at embroidered objects and actually judge it to be the most beautiful.

ADEIMANTUS: They certainly would.

SOCRATES: What is more, bless you, it is also a handy place in which to [*d*] look for a constitution!

ADEIMANTUS: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Because it contains all kinds of constitutions, as a result of its license. So whoever wants to organize a city, as we were doing just now, probably should go to a democracy and, as if he were in a supermarket of constitutions, pick out whatever pleases him and establish it.

ADEIMANTUS: He probably wouldn't be at a [*e*] loss for examples, anyway!

SOCRATES: There is no compulsion to rule in this city, even if you are qualified to rule, or to be ruled if you do not want to be; or to be at war when the others are at war, or to keep the peace when the others are keeping it, if you do not want peace; or, even if there happens to be a law preventing you from ruling or from serving on a jury, to be any the less free to [*558a*] rule or serve on a jury—isn't that a heavenly and pleasant way to pass the time, while it lasts?

ADEIMANTUS: It probably is—while it lasts.

SOCRATES: And what about the calm of some of their condemned criminals? Isn't that a sophisticated quality? Or have you never seen people who have been condemned to death or exile in a constitution of this sort staying on all the same and living right in the middle of things, without anyone giving them a thought or staring at them, while they stroll around like a hero?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I have seen it a lot.

SOCRATES: And what about the city's tolerance, its complete lack of petty-mindedness, and its utter disregard for the things we took so {379} seriously [*b*] when we were founding the city—that unless someone had

transcendent natural gifts, he would never become a good man if he did not play fine games right from early childhood and engage in practices that are all of that same sort? Isn't it magnificent how it tramples all that underfoot, gives no thought to what sort of practices someone went in for before he entered politics, and honors him if only he tells them he [*c*] wishes the majority well?

ADEIMANTUS: That's true nobility!

SOCRATES: These, then, and others akin to them are the characteristics a democracy would possess. And it would, it seems, be a pleasant constitution —lacking rulers but not complexity, and assigning a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's well known!

SOCRATES: Look and see, then, what sort of private individual resembles it. Or should we first consider, as we did in the case of the constitution, how he comes to exist?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, doesn't it happen this way? Mightn't we suppose that our thrifty oligarchic man had a son brought up by his father with his father's [*d*] traits of character?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then he too would rule by force the pleasures that exist in him —the spendthrift ones that do not make money; the ones that are called unnecessary.

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: In order not to have a discussion in the dark, would you like us first to define which appetites are necessary and which are not?

ADEIMANTUS: I would.

SOCRATES: Well, then, wouldn't those we cannot deny rightly be called necessary? And also those whose satisfaction benefits us? For we are by [*e*] nature compelled to try to satisfy them both. Isn't that so?

[*559a*]ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, we would be right to apply the term "necessary" to them?

ADEIMANTUS: We would be right.

SOCRATES: What about those someone could get rid of if he started practicing from childhood, those whose presence does no good but may

even do the opposite? If we said that all of them were unnecessary, would we be right?

ADEIMANTUS: We would be right.

SOCRATES: Let's pick an example of each, so that we have a pattern to follow.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, let's.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't the desire to eat to the point of health and well-being, [*b*] and the desire for bread and relishes be necessary ones?

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: The desire for bread is surely necessary on both counts, in that it is beneficial and that unless it is satisfied, we die.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And so is the one for relishes, insofar as it is beneficial and conduces to well-being.

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: What about an appetite that goes beyond these and seeks other sorts of foods; that, if it is restrained from childhood and educated, most people can hold in check; and that is harmful to the body or harmful to the soul's capacity for wisdom and temperance? Wouldn't it be correct to call it [*c*] unnecessary?

ADEIMANTUS: Entirely correct.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't we also say that the latter are spendthrift, then, whereas the former are moneymaking because they are useful where work is concerned?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And won't we say the same about sexual appetites and the rest?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And didn't we say that the person we just now called a drone is full of such pleasures and appetites and is ruled by the unnecessary ones, [*d*] while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is a thrifty oligarch?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course we did.

SOCRATES: Let's go back, then, and say how the democrat develops from the oligarch. It seems to me as if it mostly happens this way.

ADEIMANTUS: What way?

SOCRATES: When a young man who is reared in the uneducated and thrifty manner we described just now tastes the honey of the drones {380} and associates with wild and terrible creatures who can provide multifarious pleasures of every degree of complexity and sort, that probably marks the beginning of his transformation from having an oligarchic constitution [*e*] within him to having a democratic one.

ADEIMANTUS: It most certainly does.

SOCRATES: So, just as the city changed when one party received help from a like-minded alliance outside, doesn't the young man change in turn when external appetites of the same type and quality as it come to the aid of one of the parties within him?

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And I suppose if a counter-alliance comes to the aid of the oligarchic party within him—whether from his father or from the rest of his family, who exhort and reproach him—then there is a faction and an [*560a*] opposing faction within him, and he battles against himself.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic party yields to the oligarchic, some of its appetites are overcome while others are expelled, and a kind of shame rises in the young man's soul and order is restored.

ADEIMANTUS: That does sometimes happen.

SOCRATES: Moreover, I suppose, as some appetites are expelled, others akin to them are being nurtured undetected because of the father's ignorance of upbringing, and become numerous and strong. [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: At any rate, that's what usually happens.

SOCRATES: Then these desires draw him back to his old associates and, in secret intercourse, breed a multitude of others.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Finally, I suppose, they seize the citadel of the young man's soul, since they realize that it is empty of the fine studies and practices and the true arguments that are the best watchmen and guardians in the minds of men loved by the gods.

[*c*] ADEIMANTUS: By far the best.

SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, beliefs and arguments that are lying imposters rush up and occupy this same part of him in place of the others.

ADEIMANTUS: They do, indeed.

SOCRATES: Won't he then return to those Lotus-eaters and live with them openly? And if any help should come to the thrifty part of his soul from his relatives, don't those imposter arguments, having barred the gates of the royal wall within him, prevent the allied force itself from entering and even refusing to admit arguments of older, private individuals as ambassadors? [*d*] Proving stronger in the battle, won't they call reverence foolishness and drive it out as a dishonored fugitive? And calling temperance cowardliness, won't they shower it with abuse and banish it? As for moderate and orderly expenditure, won't they persuade him that it is boorish and illiberal, and join with a multitude of useless appetites to drive it over the border?

ADEIMANTUS: They will indeed.

SOCRATES: And when they have somehow emptied and purged these [*e*] from the soul of the one they are seizing hold of and initiating with solemn rites, they then immediately proceed to return arrogance, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness from exile in a blaze of torchlight, accompanied with a vast chorus of followers and crowned with garlands. They praise them and give them fine names, calling arrogance "good breeding," anarchy "freedom," extravagance "magnificence," and shamelessness "courage." Isn't [*561a*] it in some such way as this that a young person exchanges an upbringing among necessary appetites for the freeing and release of useless and unnecessary pleasures?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's clearly the way it happens.

SOCRATES: Then in his subsequent life, I suppose, someone like that spends no less money, effort, and time on the necessary pleasures than on the unnecessary pleasures. But if he is lucky and does not go beyond the limits in his bacchic frenzy, and if, as a result of his growing somewhat older, the great tumult within him passes, he welcomes back some of the [*b*] exiles and ceases to surrender himself completely to the newcomers. Then, putting all his pleasures on an equal footing, he lives, always surrendering rule over {381} himself to whichever desire comes along, as if it were chosen by lot,[174] until it is satisfied; and after that to another, dishonoring none but satisfying all equally.

ADEIMANTUS: He does, indeed.

SOCRATES: And he does not accept or admit true reason into the guardhouse if someone tells him that some pleasures belong to fine and

good [*c*] appetites and others to bad ones, and that he must practice and honor the former and restrain and enslave the latter. On the contrary, he denies all this and declares that they are all alike and must be honored on an equal basis.

ADEIMANTUS: That's exactly what he feels and does.

SOCRATES: And so he lives from day to day, gratifying the appetite of the moment. Sometimes he drinks heavily while listening to the flute, while at others he drinks only water and is on a diet. Sometimes he goes in for physical training, while there are others when he is idle and neglects everything. Sometimes he spends his time engaged in what he takes to be philosophy. [*d*] Often, though, he takes part in politics, leaping to his feet and saying and doing whatever happens to come into his mind. If he admires some military men, that is the direction in which he is carried; if some moneymakers, then in that different one. There is neither order nor necessity in his life, yet he calls it pleasant, free, and blessedly happy, and follows it throughout his entire life.

ADEIMANTUS: You have perfectly described the [*e*] life of a man devoted to legal equality.

SOCRATES: I certainly think he is a multifarious man and full of all sorts of characters, beautiful and complex, like the democratic city. Many men and women would envy his life because of the great number of examples of constitutions and characters it contains within it.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, will we set this man alongside democracy as the [*562a*] one who would rightly be called democratic?

ADEIMANTUS: We will.

SOCRATES: The finest constitution and the finest man remain for us to discuss: tyranny and the tyrant.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Come on, then; tell me, my dear comrade, how does tyranny come to exist? That it evolves from democracy, you see, is fairly clear.

ADEIMANTUS: It is clear.

SOCRATES: So, isn't the way democracy evolves from oligarchy much the same as that in which tyranny evolves from democracy? [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: The good they proposed for themselves, and because of which oligarchy was established, was wealth, wasn't it?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And its insatiable desire for wealth and its neglect of other things for the sake of moneymaking was what destroyed it.

ADEIMANTUS: True.

SOCRATES: So, isn't democracy's insatiable desire for what it defines as the good also what destroys it?

ADEIMANTUS: What do you think it does define as the good?

SOCRATES: Freedom. For surely, in a democratic city, that is what you [*c*] would hear described as its finest possession, and as what makes it the only place worth living in for someone who is naturally free.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, you often hear that said.

SOCRATES: As I was about to say, then, isn't it the insatiable desire for this good and the neglect of other things that changes this constitution and prepares it to need a dictatorship?

ADEIMANTUS: How does it do that?

SOCRATES: I suppose it is when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, [*d*] happens to get bad cupbearers for its leaders and gets drunk by drinking more than it should of unmixed wine. Then, if the rulers are not very gentle and do not provide plenty of freedom, it punishes them and accuses them of being filthy oligarchs.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is what it does.

SOCRATES: It showers with abuse those who obey the rulers as voluntary slaves and nonentities, but both in public and private it praises and honors rulers who are like subjects, and subjects {382} who are like rulers. And isn't it inevitable in such a city [*e*] that freedom should spread everywhere?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, and so it is bound to make its way into private households until finally it breeds anarchy among the very animals.

ADEIMANTUS: What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES: For instance, a father gets into the habit of behaving like a child and fearing his son, and the son gets into the habit of behaving like a father, feeling neither shame nor fear in front of his parents—all in order to be *free*. A resident alien feels himself equal to a citizen and a citizen to him, [*563a*] and a foreigner likewise.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, those sorts of things do happen.

SOCRATES: They do—and so do other little things of the same sort. A teacher in such circumstances is afraid of his students and flatters them, while the students belittle their teachers and do the same to their tutors, too. In general, the young are the spitting images of their elders and compete with them in words and deeds, while the old stoop to the level of the young and are full of wit and indulgence, imitating the young for [*b*] fear of being thought disagreeable and masterful.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: The ultimate freedom for the majority, my friend, comes about in such a city, when males and females bought as slaves are no less free than those who bought them. Then there is the case of women in relation to men, and men to women, and the extent of their legal equality and freedom—we almost forgot to mention that!

ADEIMANTUS: Are we not, with Aeschylus, going to "say whatever it was came to our lips just [*c*] now?"[175]

SOCRATES: Certainly. At any rate, *I am* going to say it. I mean, no one who had not experienced it would believe how much freer domestic animals are here than in any other city. Bitches follow the proverb exactly and become like their mistresses. Horses and donkeys are in the habit of proceeding with complete freedom and dignity, bumping into anyone they meet on the road who does not get out of their way. And everything else is full of freedom, too. [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: It is my own dream you are telling me. That often happens to me when I go to the country.

SOCRATES: Summing up all these things together, then, do you notice how sensitive they make the citizens' souls, so that if anyone tries to impose the least degree of slavery, they get irritated and cannot bear it? In the end, as I am sure you are aware, they take no notice of the laws—written or unwritten—in order to avoid having any master at all. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: I certainly am aware.

SOCRATES: This, my friend, is the fine and impetuous beginning from which tyranny seems to me to grow.

ADEIMANTUS: It is certainly impetuous. But what comes next?

SOCRATES: The same disease that developed in oligarchy and destroyed it also develops here—only more widespread and virulent because of the general permissiveness—and eventually enslaves democracy. In fact, excessive action in one direction usually sets up a great reaction in the opposite direction. This happens in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and particularly in constitutions. [*564a*]

ADEIMANTUS: That's probably right.

SOCRATES: For extreme freedom probably cannot lead to anything but a change to extreme slavery, whether in a private individual or a city.

ADEIMANTUS: No, it probably can't.

SOCRATES: Tyranny probably does not evolve from any constitution other than democracy, then—the most severe and cruel slavery evolving from what I suppose is the most eminent degree of freedom.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that's reasonable.

SOCRATES: But I think you were asking, not that, but rather what sort of [*b*] disease develops both in oligarchy and democracy alike, and enslaves the latter.

ADEIMANTUS: That's true.

SOCRATES: Well, then, I meant that class of idle and extravagant men, with the bravest as {383} leaders and the more cowardly as followers. We compared them to drones: the leaders to drones with stings, the followers to stingless ones.

ADEIMANTUS: Rightly so.

SOCRATES: These two cause problems in any constitution in which they arise, like phlegm and bile in the body. And it is against them that the [*c*] good doctor and lawgiver of a city must take no less advance precaution than a wise beekeeper. He should preferably prevent them from arising at all. But if they should happen to arise, he must cut them out, cells and all, as quickly as possible.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, by Zeus, and as thoroughly as possible.

SOCRATES: Then let's take up the question in this way, in order to see what we want more distinctly.

ADEIMANTUS: In what way?

SOCRATES: Let's in our discussion divide a democratic city into three parts —which is also how it is actually divided. One part is surely this class [*d*]

of drones, which, because of the general permissiveness, grows in it no less than in an oligarchy.

ADEIMANTUS: So it does.

SOCRATES: But it is much fiercer in it than in the other.

ADEIMANTUS: How so?

SOCRATES: There, because it is not honored but is excluded from the ranks of the rulers, it does not get any exercise and does not become vigorous. However, in a democracy, with few exceptions, it is surely the dominant class. Its fiercest part does all the talking and acting, while the other one settles near the speaker's platform. It buzzes and does not tolerate any dissent. As a result, this class is in charge of everything in such a constitution—with [*e*] a few exceptions.

ADEIMANTUS: That's right.

SOCRATES: Then, there is a second distinct class that is constantly emerging from the majority.

ADEIMANTUS: Which one?

SOCRATES: Surely, when everyone is trying to make money, the ones who are by nature most orderly generally become the wealthiest.

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: Then that is where the most plentiful honey for the drones exists, I take it, and the easiest for them to extract.

ADEIMANTUS: How could anyone extract it from those who have very little?

SOCRATES: I suppose, then, that these rich people, as they are called, are fodder for the drones.

ADEIMANTUS: Pretty much.

SOCRATES: The people—those who work their own land, take no part in [*565a*] politics, and own few possessions—would be the third class. This is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy when it meets in assembly.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is. But it is not willing to meet often, if it does not get a share of the honey.

SOCRATES: So, it always does get a share—one that allows the leaders, in taking the wealth of the rich and distributing it to the people, to keep the greatest share for themselves.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that is the sort of share they get. [*b*]

SOCRATES: Then I suppose that those whose wealth is taken away are compelled to defend themselves by speaking in the popular assembly and doing whatever else they can.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: At which point—even if they have no appetite for revolution at all—they get accused by the others of plotting against the people and of being oligarchs.

ADEIMANTUS: They do.

SOCRATES: Finally, when they see the people—not intentionally, but through misapprehension and being misled by the accusers—trying to do [*c*] injustice to them, then, whether they wish it or not, they really do become oligarchs—not from choice, though, but because the drone, by stinging them, engenders this evil.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then there are impeachments, judgments, and trials on both sides.

ADEIMANTUS: Right.

SOCRATES: And don't the people always tend to set up one man as their special leader, nurturing him and making him great?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes. [*d*]

{384} SOCRATES: And it is clear that when a tyrant arises, the position of popular leader is the sole root from which he springs.

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: What is the beginning, then, of the transformation from popular leader to tyrant? Isn't it clear that it happens when the popular leader begins to behave like the character in the story told about the temple of the Lycaean Zeus[176] in Arcadia?

ADEIMANTUS: What story?

SOCRATES: That whoever tastes the one piece of human innards cut up with those of all the other sacrificial victims inevitably becomes a [*e*] wolf. Haven't you heard that story?

ADEIMANTUS: I have.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the same, then, with a popular leader? Once he really takes over a docile mob, he does not restrain himself from shedding a fellow citizen's blood. But by leveling the usual false charges and bringing

people into court, he commits murder. And by blotting out a man's life, his impious tongue and lips taste kindred blood. Then he banishes and kills and [*566a*] drops hints about the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land. And after that, isn't such a man inevitably fated either to be killed by his enemies or to be a tyrant, transformed from a man into a wolf?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes. That is the inevitable outcome.

SOCRATES: He is the one, then, who stirs up faction against the rich.

ADEIMANTUS: He is.

SOCRATES: And if he happens to be exiled but, despite his enemies, manages to return, doesn't he come back as a full-fledged tyrant?

ADEIMANTUS: Obviously.

SOCRATES: And if they are unable to expel him or put him to death by [*b*] accusing him before the city, they plot a violent death for him by covert means.

ADEIMANTUS: That's what tends to happen, anyway.

SOCRATES: And everyone who has reached this stage soon discovers the famous tyrannical request—to ask the people to give him a bodyguard to keep their popular leader safe for them.

ADEIMANTUS: Right.

SOCRATES: And the people give it to him, I suppose, fearing for his safety but confident of their own.

ADEIMANTUS: Right. [*c*]

SOCRATES: So, when a wealthy man sees this and is charged with being an enemy of the people because of his wealth, then, comrade, in the words of the oracle to Croesus, he "flees without delay to the banks of the many-pebbled Hermus, and is not ashamed at all of his cowardice."[177]

ADEIMANTUS: He would certainly never get a second chance to be ashamed!

SOCRATES: If he is caught, I would imagine he is put to death.

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: As for this popular leader of ours, he clearly does not lie on the ground "mighty in his might,"[178] but, having brought down all those [*d*] others, he stands in the chariot of the city as a complete tyrant instead of a popular leader.

ADEIMANTUS: That's for sure.

SOCRATES: Shall we next describe the happiness of this man and of the city in which such a creature arises?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, let's.

SOCRATES: To start with, in the early days of his reign, won't he greet everyone he meets with a smile, deny he is a tyrant, promise all sorts of [*e*] things in private and in public, free the people from debt, redistribute the land to them and to his followers, and pretend to be gracious and gentle to all?

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: But once he has dealt with his exiled enemies by making peace with some and destroying others, and all is calm on that front, his primary concern, I imagine, is to be constantly stirring up some war or other, so that the people will need a leader.

ADEIMANTUS: Very likely. [*567a*]

SOCRATES: And also, wouldn't you say, so that impoverished by war taxes, they will be compelled {385} to concentrate on their daily needs and be less likely to plot against him?

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And in addition, I suppose, so that if there are some freethinking people he suspects of rejecting his rule, he can find pretexts for putting them at the mercy of the enemy and destroying them? For all these reasons, isn't a tyrant compelled to be always stirring up war?

ADEIMANTUS: He is.

SOCRATES: Don't all these actions tend to make him more hateful to the [*b*] citizens?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And don't some of those who helped establish his tyranny and hold positions of power within it, the ones who are bravest, speak freely to him and to each other, criticizing what is happening?

ADEIMANTUS: Probably.

SOCRATES: Then the tyrant will have to do away with all of them if he intends to rule, until he is left with no friend or enemy who is worth anything at all.

ADEIMANTUS: Obviously.

SOCRATES: He will have to keep a sharp lookout, then, for anyone who is brave, magnanimous, wise, or rich. He is so happy, you see, that he is [*c*]

compelled, whether he wants to or not, to be their enemy and plot against all of them until he has purged the city.

ADEIMANTUS: A fine purge that is!

SOCRATES: Yes. The opposite of the one doctors perform on our bodies. They draw off the worst and leave the best, whereas he does just the opposite!

ADEIMANTUS: Yet that's what he has to do, it seems, if he is to rule.

SOCRATES: It is a blessedly happy compulsion he is bound by, then, which requires him to live with inferior masses even though hated by them, or not [*d*] live at all!

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: And the more he makes the citizens hate him by doing those things, the larger and more trustworthy a bodyguard he will need, won't he?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And who will these trustworthy people be? And from where will he get them?

ADEIMANTUS: Lots of them will come swarming of their own accord, if he pays them wages.

SOCRATES: Drones again, by the dog![179] That is what I think you are talking about. Foreign, multifarious ones! [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, you are right.

SOCRATES: What about the domestic ones? Wouldn't he be willing to deprive citizens of their slaves somehow, set them free, and enlist them in his bodyguard?

ADEIMANTUS: He certainly would, since they are the ones he can trust the most.

SOCRATES: What a blessedly happy thing this tyrant business is on your view, if these are the sorts of friends and trusted men he must employ after destroying his former ones! [*568a*]

ADEIMANTUS: Nonetheless, they are the sorts he does employ.

SOCRATES: And these friends and new citizens admire and associate with him, whereas the good ones hate and avoid him?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: It is no wonder, then, that tragedy seems to be something wholly wise, or that Euripides is outstanding in it.

ADEIMANTUS: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Because, among other things, he expressed the following shrewd thought: “tyrants are wise by associating with the wise.” He meant [*b*] evidently that these associates of the tyrant are the wise ones.[180]

ADEIMANTUS: Yes. And he also praises tyranny as godlike, and lots of other things besides—and the other poets do, too.

SOCRATES: Then surely, since the tragic poets are so wise, they will forgive us and those with constitutions like ours if we do not admit them into our city, since they hymn the praises of tyranny.

{386} ADEIMANTUS: For my part, I think they will forgive us—the more refined [*c*] of them, anyway.

SOCRATES: They can go around to all the other cities instead, I suppose, drawing large crowds and hiring actors with fine, loud, persuasive voices, and lead their constitutions to become tyrannies and democracies.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: What’s more, they are paid wages and honored for it, primarily—as one might expect—by tyrants and secondly by democracy. But the higher they go on the ascending scale of constitutions, the more their honor [*d*] diminishes, as if unable to proceed for lack of breath.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: But all that is a digression. Let’s return to our tyrant’s camp—the one that is beautiful, populous, complex, and never the same—and ask how he is going to maintain it.

ADEIMANTUS: If there are sacred treasuries in the city, he will obviously use them for as long as they last, as well as the property of those he has destroyed, so the taxes he will require from the [*e*] people will be smaller.

SOCRATES: What about when these resources give out?

ADEIMANTUS: Clearly, his father’s estate will have to support him, his drinking companions, and his boyfriends and girlfriends, too.

SOCRATES: I understand. You mean the people who fathered the tyrant will have to support him and his friends.

ADEIMANTUS: They will have no choice.

SOCRATES: What if the people get irritated and say it is not just for a grown-up son to be supported by his father? On the contrary, the father should be supported by his son. They did not father him and establish

[*569a*] him in power, they say, so that, when he had become strong, they would be enslaved to their own slave and have to support him, his slaves, and other assorted rabble as well; but so that, with him as their popular leader, they would get free from the rule of the rich and the so-called fine and good people in the city. At that point, they order him and his friends to leave the city, as a father might drive a son and his troublesome drinking companions from his house. What do you think would happen then?

ADEIMANTUS: Then, by Zeus, the people will soon learn what kind of creature they have fathered, welcomed, and made strong, and that it is a case of the weaker trying to drive out the stronger. [*b*]

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Will the tyrant dare to use force against his father or hit him if he does not obey?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes—once he has taken away his weapons.

SOCRATES: A tyrant is a parricide as you describe him, then, and a harsh nurse of old age; and we do now seem to have an acknowledged tyranny. And so the people, by trying to avoid the proverbial frying pan of enslavement to free men, have fallen into the fire of having slaves as their masters; and, in exchange for the excessive and inappropriate freedom they [*c*] had before, have put upon themselves the harshest and most bitter slavery to slaves.

ADEIMANTUS: That's exactly what happens.

SOCRATES: Well, then, wouldn't we be justified in saying that we have adequately described how tyranny evolves from democracy, and what it is like once it has come to exist?

ADEIMANTUS: We would. Our description was entirely adequate.

BOOK IX

BOOK VIII ENDS with the description of tyranny. Book IX begins with a long and brilliant description of the tyrannical person himself, notable for its psychological realism and insight. When it is complete, Socrates is ready to respond to the challenge Glaucon raised in Book II.

His response consists of three complex arguments. The first appeals to the foregoing description of the five cities and the five character

types. It concludes that a philosopher-king is the {387} happiest and the most just of people, a timocrat is second in virtue and happiness, an oligarch third, a democrat fourth, and a tyrant is the most unjust and most wretched of all (580a–c).

The second argument (580d–583b) appeals to the tripartition of the soul. In it Socrates argues that a philosopher's assessment of the relative pleasantness of his life and those of money-lovers and honor-lovers is more reliable than their assessments of the relative pleasantness of this life and theirs.

The third argument (583b–588a), described by Socrates as "the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows," is also the most complex. It uses the metaphysical theory developed in Books V–VII, together with the psychological theory of Book IV, to develop a complex theory of pleasure. It concludes that a philosopher's pleasures are truer and purer than those of a money-lover or honor-lover.

The book ends with a powerful image of what the soul of an unjust man is like.

[*571a*] SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES: SOCRATES: The tyrannical man himself remains to be investigated: how he evolves from a democratic one, what he is like once he has come to exist, and whether the way he lives is wretched or blessedly happy.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, he still remains.

SOCRATES: Do you know what else I still miss?

ADEIMANTUS: What?

SOCRATES: I do not think we have adequately distinguished the nature and number of our appetites. And if that subject is not adequately dealt [*b*] with, our investigation will lack clarity.

ADEIMANTUS: Well, isn't now as fine a time as any?

SOCRATES: It certainly is. So, consider what I want to look at in them. It is this: among unnecessary pleasures and appetites, there are some that seem to me to be lawless. These are probably present in all of us, but they are held in check by the laws and by our better appetites allied with reason. In a

few people they have been gotten rid of entirely or only a few weak ones remain, [*c*] while in others they are stronger and more numerous.

ADEIMANTUS: Which ones do you mean?

SOCRATES: The ones that wake up when we are asleep, whenever the rest of the soul—the rational, gentle, and ruling element—slumbers. Then the bestial and savage element, full of food or drink, comes alive, casts off sleep, and seeks to go and gratify its own characteristic instincts. You know it will dare to do anything in such a state, released and freed from all shame and wisdom. In fantasy, it does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother or [*d*] with anyone else—man, god, or beast. It will commit any foul murder, and there is no food it refuses to eat. In a word, it does not refrain from anything, no matter how foolish or shameful.

ADEIMANTUS: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, I suppose someone who keeps himself healthy and temperate will awaken his rational element before going to sleep and feast it on fine arguments and investigations, which he has brought to an agreed conclusion within himself. As for the appetitive element, he neither starves nor overfeeds it, so it will slumber and not disturb [*e*] the best element with its pleasure or pain but will leave it alone, just by itself and pure, to investigate and reach out for the perception of something—whether [*572a*] past, present, or future—that it does not know. He soothes the spirited element in a similar way and does not get angry and fall asleep with his spirit still aroused. And when he has calmed these two elements and stimulated the third, in which wisdom resides, he takes his rest. You know this is the state in which he most readily grasps the truth and in which the visions appearing in his dreams are least lawless. [*b*]

ADEIMANTUS: I completely agree.

SOCRATES: Well, we have been led a bit astray and said a bit too much. What we want to pay attention to is this: there are appetites of a terrible, savage, and lawless kind in everyone—even in those of us who seem to be entirely moderate. This surely becomes clear in sleep. Do you think I am talking sense? Do you agree with me?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, I do agree.

SOCRATES: Now, recall what we said the democratic man is like.[181] He was the result, we presumed, {388} of a childhood upbringing by a thrifty father

who [*c*] honored only appetites that made money and despised the unnecessary ones whose objects are amusement and showing off. Isn't that right?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And by associating with more sophisticated men who are full of the appetites we just described, he starts to indulge in every kind of arrogance and adopt their kind of behavior, because of his hatred of his father's thrift. But, since he has a better nature than his corrupters, he is pulled in both directions and settles in the middle between their two ways of life. And enjoying each in what he takes to be moderation, he lives a life that is neither [*d*] illiberal nor lawless, transformed now from an oligarch to a democrat.

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, that was—and still is—our belief about someone like that.

SOCRATES: Suppose, then, that this man has now in turn become older and has a son who is also brought up in his father's way of life.

ADEIMANTUS: I will.

SOCRATES: Suppose, too, that the same things happen to him as happened to his father: he is led into all the kinds of lawlessness that those leading him call total freedom. His father and the rest of his family come to the aid of [*e*] the appetites that are in the middle, while the others help the opposite ones. And when these terrible enchanters and tyrant-makers have no hope of keeping hold of the young man in any other way, they contrive to implant a powerful passion in him as the popular leader of those idle and [*573a*] profligate appetites—a sort-of great, winged drone. Or do you think passion is ever anything else in such people?

ADEIMANTUS: I certainly do not think it is.

SOCRATES: And when the other appetites come buzzing around—filled with incense, perfumes, wreaths, wine, and all the other pleasures found in such company, they feed the drone, make it grow as large as possible, and plant the sting of longing in it. Then this popular leader of the soul adopts [*b*] madness as its bodyguard and is stung to frenzy. If it finds any beliefs or appetites in the man that are regarded as good or are still moved by shame, it destroys them and throws them out, until it has purged him of temperance and filled him with imported madness.

ADEIMANTUS: You have perfectly described how a tyrannical man comes to exist.

SOCRATES: Is that, then, why Passion has long been called a tyrant?

ADEIMANTUS: Probably so.

SOCRATES: And hasn't a drunken man, my friend, something of a tyrannical [*c*] cast of mind, too?

ADEIMANTUS: He has.

SOCRATES: And of course someone who is mad and deranged attempts to rule not only human beings, but gods as well, and expects to be able to rule them.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: A man becomes tyrannical in the precise sense, then, you marvelous fellow, when his nature or his practices or both together lead him to drunkenness, passion, and melancholia.

ADEIMANTUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, that, it seems, is how a tyrannical man comes to exist. Now, what is his life like? [*d*]

ADEIMANTUS: Why don't *you* tell *me*, as askers of riddles usually do?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. You see, I think someone in whom the tyrant of Passion dwells, and in whom it serves as captain of everything in the soul, next goes in for festivals, revelries, luxuries, girlfriends, and all that sort of thing.

ADEIMANTUS: Inevitably.

SOCRATES: And don't lots of terrible appetites sprout up each day and night beside it, creating needs for all sorts of things?

ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, they do.

SOCRATES: So, any income someone like that has is soon spent.

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the next thing, surely, is borrowing and expenditure of capital. [*e*]

ADEIMANTUS: What else?

SOCRATES: And when everything is gone, won't the violent crowd of appetites that have nested within him inevitably shout in protest? And when people of this sort are driven by the stings of these other appetites, but particularly of Passion itself, which leads all the others as if they were its

bodyguard, stung to frenzy, don’t they look to see who possesses anything that can be taken from him by deceit or force? [*574a*]

{389} ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: He must take it from every source, then, or live in great suffering and pain.

ADEIMANTUS: He must.

SOCRATES: And just as the late-coming pleasures within him do better than the older ones and steal away their satisfactions, won’t he himself, young as he is, think he deserves to do better than his father and mother? And if he has spent his own share, won’t he try to take some of his father’s wealth by converting it to his own use?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And if his parents resist him, won’t he first try to steal it and [*b*] deceive them?

ADEIMANTUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And if he cannot, won’t he next try to seize it by force?

ADEIMANTUS: I suppose so.

SOCRATES: And if, you amazing man, the old man and woman stand their ground and put up a fight, would he take care and be reluctant to act like a tyrant?

ADEIMANTUS: I am not very optimistic about the parents of someone like that!

SOCRATES: But in the name of Zeus, Adeimantus, do you really think that for the sake of his latest love, an unnecessary girlfriend, he would strike his mother, who is his oldest and necessary friend? Or that for the sake of his [*c*] latest and unnecessary boyfriend, who is in the bloom of youth, he would strike his aged and necessary father, the oldest of his friends, who is no longer in the bloom of youth? Or that he would enslave his parents to them, if he brought them into the same house?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, by Zeus, he would.

SOCRATES: It seems to be a great blessing to produce a tyrannical son!

ADEIMANTUS: It certainly does!

SOCRATES: What happens to someone like that when the possessions of [*d*] his father and mother give out and the swarm of pleasures now inside him has grown dense? Won’t he first try to break into someone’s house or snatch the cloak of someone walking late at night? Next, won’t he try to clean out

some temple? And in the course of all that, his old childhood beliefs about fine or shameful things—beliefs that are accounted just—are mastered by the new ones that have been released from slavery and, as the bodyguard of Passion, hold sway along with it. These are the ones that used to be freed in sleep as a dream, when he himself, since he was still subject to the laws and [*e*] his father, had a democratic constitution within him. But under the tyranny of Passion, what he used to become occasionally in his dreams he has now become permanently while awake, and so there is no terrible murder, no food, and no act from which he will refrain. On the contrary, Passion [*575a*] lives like a tyrant within him in complete anarchy and lawlessness, as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if he were a city, to dare anything that will provide sustenance for itself and the unruly mob around it —some of which have come in from the outside as a result of his bad associates, while others have come from within, freed and let loose by his own bad habits. Isn't this the life such a man leads?

ADEIMANTUS: It is.

SOCRATES: And if there are only a few men like that in a city, and the [*b*] majority of the others are temperate, they emigrate in order to become the bodyguard of some other tyrant or serve as paid auxiliaries if there happens to be a war somewhere. But if they chance to live in a time of peace and calm, they stay right there in the city and cause lots of little evils.

ADEIMANTUS: What sort of evils do you mean?

SOCRATES: They steal, break into houses, snatch purses, steal clothes, rob temples, and kidnap people. Sometimes, if they are capable speakers, they become sycophants and bear false witness and accept bribes.

ADEIMANTUS: You mean they are small evils—provided there are only a [*c*] few such people.

SOCRATES: Yes. After all, small evils are small by comparison to great ones. And when it comes to producing corruption and misery in a city, all these evils together do not—as the saying goes—come within a mile of a tyrant. But when you get a great number of these people and their followers in a city, and they become aware of their numbers, they are the ones who—together with the foolishness of the people—create the tyrant out of the one among them who has in his soul the greatest and strongest tyrant of all. [*d*]

{390} ADEIMANTUS: Naturally, since he would be the most tyrannical.

SOCRATES: That's if they submit willingly. But if the city doesn't put itself in his hands, then just as he once chastised his mother and father, he will now punish his fatherland in the same way, if he can, bringing in new friends and making and keeping his once beloved motherland—as the Cretans call it—or fatherland their slaves. And that is surely the end at which the appetites of a man like that aim.

[*e*] ADEIMANTUS: It most certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, isn't this what such men are like in private life, before they start to rule? In the first place, don't they associate with flatterers who are ready to do anything to serve them? Or, if they need something from someone themselves, won't they grovel and willingly engage in any sort of posturing, the way slaves do? But once they get what they need, isn't it a [*576a*] different story altogether?

ADEIMANTUS: Yes, completely different.

SOCRATES: So, those with a tyrannical nature live their entire lives without ever being friends with anyone, always masters to one man or slaves to another, but never getting a taste of freedom or true friendship.

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't we be right to call people like that untrustworthy?

ADEIMANTUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And as unjust as anyone can be—assuming we were right in our earlier conclusions [*b*] about what justice is like.

ADEIMANTUS: And we certainly were right.

SOCRATES: Let's sum up the worst type of man, then. He is surely the one who, when awake, is like the dreaming person we described earlier.[182]

ADEIMANTUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And he evolves from someone who, since he is by nature most tyrannical, achieves sole rule. And the longer he lives as tyrant, the more like that he becomes. "Inevitably," said Glaucon, taking over the argument.

SOCRATES: Well, then, won't the one who is plainly worst also be plainly [*c*] most wretched? And the one who for the longest time is most a tyrant, won't he also be most wretched for the longest time, if truth be told? Though the views of the masses [the many] on the subject are naturally also many.

GLAUCON: All that, at any rate, must be true.

SOCRATES: Doesn’t a tyrannical man correspond to and most resemble a city ruled by a tyrant, a democratic man a democratically ruled city, and similarly with the others?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And the comparison between city and city, as regards their virtue and happiness, isn’t it the same as the comparison between man and man? [*d*]

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: As regards virtue, then, how does a city ruled by a tyrant compare to a city of the sort we described first that is ruled by a king?

GLAUCON: They are absolute opposites: one is the best, and the other is the worst.

SOCRATES: I won’t ask you which is which, since it is obvious. But as regards happiness and wretchedness, is your judgment the same or different? And let’s not become dazzled by looking at the tyrant—since he is just one man—or at the few who surround him. Instead, as is necessary, let’s go in and study the city as a whole and, when we have gone down and looked [*e*] into every corner, only then present what we believe.

GLAUCON: That’s a good suggestion. And it is clear to everyone that there is no city more wretched than a tyrannical one and none happier than one ruled by a king.

SOCRATES: Would it also be right, then, to suggest the same thing about [*577a*] the men—that the only fit judge of them is someone who can, in thought, go down into a man’s character and discern it—not someone who sees it from the outside, the way a child does, and is dazzled by the façade that tyrants adopt for the outside world, but someone who discerns it adequately? And what if I were to assume that the person we must all listen to is the one who has this capacity to judge; who has lived in the same house as a tyrant and witnessed his behavior at home; who has seen how he deals with each member of his household, when he {391} can best be observed [*b*] stripped of his tragic costume; and who has also seen how he deals with public dangers? Shouldn’t we ask the one who has seen all that to tell us how the tyrant compares to the others with respect to happiness and wretchedness?

GLAUCON: That’s also a very good suggestion.

SOCRATES: Then, in order to have someone to answer our questions, do you want us to pretend that we are among the ones who can make such a judgment, and that we have met tyrannical people already?

GLAUCON: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and examine the matter like this for me. Bearing in mind the resemblance between the city and the man, examine [*c*] each in turn and describe its condition.

GLAUCON: What kinds of things do you want me to describe?

SOCRATES: Describe the city first. Would you say that a tyrannical city is free or enslaved?

GLAUCON: As enslaved as it is possible to be.

SOCRATES: Yet you can surely see masters and free people in it.

GLAUCON: I can certainly see a small group of people like that. But pretty much the whole population, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.

SOCRATES: If a man and his city are similar, then, mustn't the same structure [*d*] exist in him, too? Mustn't his soul be full of slavery and illiberality, with those same parts of it enslaved, while a small part, the most wicked and most insane, is master?

GLAUCON: It must.

SOCRATES: Will you describe such a soul as enslaved, then, or as free?

GLAUCON: Enslaved, of course.

SOCRATES: And, to go back, isn't the enslaved, tyrannical city least able to do what it wishes?

GLAUCON: By far the least.

SOCRATES: So, a tyrannical soul will also least do what it wishes—I am [*e*] talking about the soul as a whole—and will be full of disorder and regret, since it is always forcibly driven by a gadfly.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Rich or poor? Which must a tyrannical city be?

GLAUCON: Poor. [*578a*]

SOCRATES: So, a tyrannical soul, too, must always be poor and insatiable.

GLAUCON: It must.

SOCRATES: What about fear? Mustn't a city of this sort and a man of this sort be filled with it?

GLAUCON: They certainly must.

SOCRATES: And do you think you will find more wailing, groaning, lamenting, or painful suffering in any other city?

GLAUCON: No.

SOCRATES: What about in a man? Do you think such things are more common in anyone than in this tyrannical man, maddened by his appetites and passions?

GLAUCON: How could I?

SOCRATES: I imagine it is in view of all these things, then, as well as others [*b*] like them, that you judged this city to be the most wretched of cities.

GLAUCON: And wasn't I right?

SOCRATES: Yes, of course. But how, again, do you describe the tyrannical man in view of these same things?

GLAUCON: He is by far the most wretched of them all.

SOCRATES: There your description is no longer right.

GLAUCON: How so?

SOCRATES: This man, I think, is not yet the most wretched.

GLAUCON: Then who is?

SOCRATES: Presumably, you will regard this next one as even more wretched.

GLAUCON: What one?

SOCRATES: The tyrannical man who does not live out his life as a private [*c*] individual, but is unlucky, in that some misfortune gives him the opportunity of becoming an actual tyrant.

GLAUCON: On the basis of what we have already said, I infer that what you are saying is true.

SOCRATES: Yes. But it is not good enough to believe these claims; one must carefully examine someone like that by means of argument. After all, the investigation concerns the greatest thing—a good life and a bad one.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

{392} SOCRATES: So, consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say. You see, I think we should [*d*] investigate him on the basis of the following.

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: On the basis of each and every one of the wealthy private citizens in our cities who own many slaves. For they resemble a tyrant in ruling over many, although the number ruled by the tyrant is different.

GLAUCON: It is different.

SOCRATES: You know, then, that these people feel secure and do not fear their slaves.

GLAUCON: Of what have they to be afraid, after all?

SOCRATES: Nothing. But do you know why?

GLAUCON: Yes. Because the whole city is ready to defend each of its private citizens.

SOCRATES: That's right. But now, suppose some god were to lift one of these men, who has fifty or more slaves, out of the city, and put him [*e*] down—with his wife, his children, his slaves, and his other property—in a deserted place, where no free men could come to his assistance? Can you imagine the sort and amount of fear he would feel that he and his wife and children would be killed by his slaves?

GLAUCON: It would be huge, if you ask me.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't he at that point be compelled to start fawning on some of his slaves, promising them all sorts of things and setting them [*579a*] free—even though there was nothing he wanted to do less—and wouldn't he turn out to be a flatterer of slaves?

GLAUCON: He would have to be. Otherwise, he would be killed.

SOCRATES: Now, suppose the god were to settle many other neighbors around him who would not tolerate anyone claiming to be master of another, but if they caught such a person, would inflict the most extreme punishments on him?

GLAUCON: I suppose he would be in even worse trouble, since he would be surrounded by [*b*] nothing but enemies.

SOCRATES: So, isn't this, then, the kind of prison in which the tyrant is held—the one whose nature we have described, filled with multifarious fears and passions? Though his soul is really greedy, he is the only one in the city who cannot go abroad or look at the sights at which other free people yearn to look. Instead, he is mostly stuck in house, living like a woman, envying any other citizen who goes abroad and sees some good thing. [*c*]

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Isn't such a harvest of evils, then, a measure of the difference between a tyrannical man who is badly governed politically on the inside—whom you judged just now to be most wretched—and one who does not live out his life as a private individual, but is compelled by some chance to

become an actual tyrant and try to rule others, when he cannot even master himself? It is as if someone with a body that is sick and cannot master itself were compelled, not to spend his life in private pursuits, but to compete [*d*] and fight with other bodies.

GLAUCON: That's exactly what he is like. Your description is absolutely true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And so, my dear Glaucon, isn't his condition completely wretched, and isn't the life of a tyrant even harsher than the one you judged to be harshest?

GLAUCON: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: So, in truth, then, and whatever some people may think, a real tyrant is really a slave to the worst sorts of fawning and slavery, and a flatterer [*e*] of the worst kind of people. He is so far from satisfying his appetites in any way that he is in the greatest need of most things and truly poor—as is apparent if one knows how to look at a whole soul. He is full of fear throughout his life and overflowing with convulsions and pains, if in fact his condition is like that of the city he rules. And it is like it, isn't it?

GLAUCON: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And, in addition, shouldn't we also attribute to the man the [*580a*] qualities we mentioned earlier? We said that he is inevitably envious, untrustworthy, unjust, friendless, impious, and a host and nurse to every kind of vice; that ruling makes him even more so than before; and that, as a consequence, he is extremely unfortunate and goes on to make those near him so.

GLAUCON: No one with any sense could possibly contradict that.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and tell me now at last, like the judge who [*b*] makes the final {393} decision,[183] who you believe is first in happiness and who second, and judge the others similarly, making five altogether—kingly, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, tyrannical.

GLAUCON: That's an easy judgment. You see, I rank them in the order of their appearance, just as if they were choruses, both in virtue and vice and in happiness and its opposite.

SOCRATES: Shall we, then, hire a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston has given as his verdict that the best and most just is the most happy, and that he is the one who is most kingly and rules like a king

[*c*] over himself; whereas the worst and most unjust is the most wretched, and he, again, is the one who, because he is most tyrannical, is the greatest tyrant over himself and his city?

GLAUCON: You have announced it!

SOCRATES: And shall I add that it holds whether or not their characters remain hidden from all human beings and gods?

GLAUCON: Do add it.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that is one of our demonstrations. But look at this second one and see if [*d*] you think there is anything in it.

GLAUCON: What is it?

SOCRATES: In just the way a city is divided into three classes, the soul of each person is also divided in three. That is the reason I think there is another demonstration.

GLAUCON: What is it?

SOCRATES: The following. It seems to me that the three also have three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and the same holds of appetites and kinds of rule.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: One element, we say, is that with which a person learns; another, that with which he feels anger. As for the third, because it is multiform, we had no one special name for it but named it after the greatest and strongest thing it has in it. I mean we called it the appetitive element [*e*] because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex, and all the things that go along with them. We also called it the money-loving element, because such appetites are most easily satisfied by means of money. [*581a*]

GLAUCON: And we were right.

SOCRATES: So, if we said its pleasure and love are for profit, wouldn’t that best bring it together under one heading for the purposes of our argument and make clear to us what we mean when we speak of this part of the soul? And would we be right in calling it money-loving and profit-loving?

GLAUCON: I think so, anyway.

SOCRATES: What about the spirited element? Don’t we say that its whole aim is always mastery, victory, and high repute? [*b*]

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then wouldn’t it strike the right note for us to call it victory-loving and honor-loving?

GLAUCON: The absolutely right one.

SOCRATES: But surely it is clear to everyone that the element we learn with is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies, and that of the three it cares least for money and reputation.

GLAUCON: By far the least.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't it be appropriate, then, for us to call it learning-loving and philosophic?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And doesn't it rule in some people's souls, while one of the [*c*] others—whichever it happens to be—rules in other people's?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And isn't that why we say there are three primary types of people, philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: And also three kinds of pleasure, one assigned to each of them?

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: You realize, then, that if you chose to ask each of these three types of people in turn to tell you which of their lives is most pleasant, each would give the highest praise to his own? Won't the moneymaker say that, compared to that of making a profit, the pleasures of being honored or of [*d*] learning are worthless unless there is something in them that makes money?

{394} GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: What about the honor-lover? Doesn't he think the pleasure of making money is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning—except to the extent that learning brings honor—is smoke and nonsense?

GLAUCON: He does.

SOCRATES: As for the philosopher, what do you suppose he thinks of the [*e*] other pleasures in comparison to that of knowing where the truth lies and always enjoying some variety of it while he is learning? Won't he think they are far behind? And won't he call them really necessary, since he would have no need for them if they were not necessary for life?

GLAUCON: He will. We can be sure of that.

SOCRATES: Since the pleasures of each kind and the lives themselves dispute with one another—not about which life is finer or more shameful or

better or worse—but about which is more pleasant and less painful, how are we to know which of them is speaking the absolute truth? [*582a*]

GLAUCON: I have no idea how to answer that.

SOCRATES: Consider the matter this way: how should we judge things if we want to judge them well? Isn't it by experience, knowledge, and argument? Or could someone have better criteria than these?

GLAUCON: No, of course not.

SOCRATES: Consider, then. Of the three types of men, which has most experience of the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think the profit-lover learns what the truth itself is like, or has more experience of the pleasure of knowing, than the philosopher does of making a profit? [*b*]

GLAUCON: There is a great difference between them. You see, the latter has to have tasted the other kinds of pleasure beginning from childhood. But it is not necessary for the profit-lover to taste or experience how sweet is the pleasure of learning the nature of the things that are—and even if he were eager to, he could not easily do so.

SOCRATES: So, the philosopher is far superior to the profit-lover in his experience of both kinds of pleasures.

GLAUCON: Very far superior. [*c*]

SOCRATES: What about compared to the honor-lover? Is he more inexperienced in the pleasure of being honored than the latter is in the pleasure of knowing?

GLAUCON: No. Honor comes to all of them, provided they accomplish their several aims. For the rich man, too, is honored by many people, as well as are the courageous and the wise ones. So, all have experienced what the pleasure of being honored is like. But the pleasure pertaining to the sight of what is cannot be tasted by anyone except the philosopher.

SOCRATES: So, as far as experience goes, then, he is the finest judge among the three types of men. [*d*]

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And he alone will have gained his experience with the help of knowledge.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Moreover, the tool that should be used to judge is not the tool of the profit-lover or the honor-lover, but of the philosopher.

GLAUCON: What one is that?

SOCRATES: Surely we said that judgment should be made by means of arguments. Didn't we?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And arguments are, above all, his tool.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: If the things being judged were best judged by means of wealth and profit, the praise and criticism of the profit-lover would necessarily [*e*] be closest to the truth.

GLAUCON: It would indeed.

SOCRATES: And if by means of honor, victory, and courage, wouldn't it be those of the honor-lover and victory-lover?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: But since it is by means of experience, knowledge, and argument?

GLAUCON: The praise of the philosopher and argument-lover must be closest to the truth.

SOCRATES: So, of the three pleasures, then, the most pleasant would be [*583a*] that of the part of the soul with which we learn, and the one of us in whom it rules has the most pleasant life.

{395} GLAUCON: How could it be otherwise? The knowledgeable person at least praises with authority when he praises his own life.

SOCRATES: What life and pleasure does the judge say are in second place?

GLAUCON: Clearly, those of the warrior and honor-lover, since they are closer to his own than those of the moneymaker.

SOCRATES: Then those of the profit-lover come last, apparently.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, that makes two in a row. And twice the just person [*b*] has defeated the unjust one. Now comes the third, which is dedicated in Olympic fashion to our savior, Olympian Zeus.[184] Observe, then, that the other pleasures—apart from that of the knowledgeable person—are neither entirely true nor pure. On the contrary, they are like some sort of illusionist painting, as I think I have heard some wise person say. Yet, if that were true, it would be the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows.

GLAUCON: By far the greatest. But what exactly do you mean?

SOCRATES: I will find out, if you answer the [*c*] questions while I ask them.

GLAUCON: Start asking, then.

SOCRATES: Tell me, then, don’t we say that pain is the opposite of pleasure?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Isn’t there also a state of feeling neither enjoyment nor pain?

GLAUCON: There is.

SOCRATES: Isn’t it in the middle between these two, a sort of quiet state of the soul where they are concerned? Or wouldn’t you describe it that way?

GLAUCON: I would.

SOCRATES: So then do you recall the sorts of things ill people say when they are ill?

GLAUCON: Which ones?

SOCRATES: That nothing is more pleasant than being healthy, but they had not realized it was [*d*] most pleasant until they fell ill.

GLAUCON: I do remember that.

SOCRATES: Don’t you also hear people who are in great pain saying that nothing is more pleasant than the cessation of one’s suffering?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: And there are many similar circumstances, I presume, in which you see people in pain praising not enjoyment, but freedom from pain, and respite from that sort of thing, as most pleasant.

GLAUCON: Yes. For at such times, the respite presumably becomes pleasant enough to content them.

SOCRATES: And when someone ceases to enjoy something, this respite from pleasure will be painful. [*e*]

GLAUCON: Presumably.

SOCRATES: So, the quiet state we just now described as being in between the two will sometimes be both pain and pleasure.

GLAUCON: Apparently.

SOCRATES: And is it possible for what is neither to become both?

GLAUCON: Not in my view.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, when what is pleasant and what is painful arise in the soul, they are both a sort of motion, aren’t they?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And didn’t we see just now that what is neither painful nor [*584a*] pleasant is a respite and in the middle between the two?

GLAUCON: Yes, we did.

SOCRATES: How can it be right, then, to think that the absence of pain is pleasant or the absence of enjoyment painful?

GLAUCON: There's no way it can be.

SOCRATES: So, it is not right. But when the quiet state is next to what is painful, it appears pleasant; and when it is next to what is pleasant, it appears painful. And there is nothing sound in these illusions as far as the truth about pleasure is concerned. On the contrary, they are a sort of sorcery.

GLAUCON: That's what the argument suggests, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Well, then, take a look at pleasures that do not derive from [*b*] pains, so that you won't be likely to think that, *in their case*, it is the nature {396} of pleasure to be just the cessation of pain or of pain to be just the cessation of pleasure.

GLAUCON: Where am I to look? What pleasures do you mean?

SOCRATES: There are lots of others, but you might especially want to think about the pleasures of smell. You see, without being preceded by pain, they suddenly become incredibly intense. And when they cease, they leave no pain behind.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So, let's not be persuaded that pure pleasure is relief from pain, [*c*] or pure pain relief from pleasure.

GLAUCON: No, let's not.

SOCRATES: However, of the things called pleasures that reach the soul through the body, pretty much the greatest number—and the most intense ones, too—are of that kind: they are some sort of relief from pains.

GLAUCON: Yes, they are.

SOCRATES: And aren't those pleasures and pains of anticipation, which arise from the expectation of future pleasures or pains, of the same kind?

[*d*] GLAUCON: They are.

SOCRATES: Do you know what they are like and what they most resemble?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: Do you think there is such a thing in the natural world as an up, a down, and a middle?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Don't you imagine, then, that if someone were brought from down below to the middle, he would think anything other than that he was

moving upward? And if he stood at the middle and saw where he had come from, could he possibly think he was anywhere other than the upper region, since he hadn't seen the one that is truly up above?

GLAUCON: By Zeus, I do not see how he could think anything else.

SOCRATES: But if he were brought back again, wouldn't he think he was [*e*] being brought down? And wouldn't he be thinking the truth?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't all this happen to him because he is inexperienced in what is truly and really up, middle, and down?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Would it surprise you, then, if those who are inexperienced in the truth have unsound beliefs about lots of other things as well—that they are so disposed toward pleasure, pain, and the middle state that, whenever they descend to the painful, they think the truth and really are in pain; but [*585a*] that, when they ascend from the painful to the middle state, they firmly think they have reached fulfillment and pleasure? Like people who compare black to gray without having experienced white, don't they compare pain to painlessness while being inexperienced in pleasure, and so get deceived?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, it would not surprise me! In fact, I would be very surprised if it were not like that.

SOCRATES: Think of it this way, then: Aren't hunger, thirst, and the like some sort of emptiness related to the state of the body? [*b*]

GLAUCON: They are.

SOCRATES: And isn't foolishness and lack of knowledge, in turn, some sort of emptiness related to the state of the soul?

GLAUCON: It certainly is.

SOCRATES: Aren't people filled when they take in nourishment or gain understanding?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Does the truer filling belong to what *is* less or to what *is* more?

GLAUCON: Clearly, it belongs to what is more.

SOCRATES: Which of the two types, then, partakes more of pure being? The sorts belonging to bread, drink, relishes, and nourishment in general? Or the kind belonging to true belief, knowledge, understanding, and, in sum, to all of virtue? Judge it this way: what belongs to what is always the [*c*] same,

immortal, and true, is itself of that sort, and comes to be in something of that sort—it *is* more, don't you think, than what belongs to what is never the same and mortal, is itself of that kind, and comes to be in something of that kind?

GLAUCON: Far more. What belongs to what is always the same is far superior.

SOCRATES: And does the being of what is always the same partake any more of being than of knowledge?

{397} GLAUCON: Not at all.

SOCRATES: What about of truth?

GLAUCON: Not of it, either.

SOCRATES: And if less of truth, less of being, too?

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: Isn't it generally true that the types concerned with the care of [*d*] the body partake less in truth and being than do those concerned with the care of the soul?

GLAUCON: Yes, much less.

SOCRATES: Don't you think the same holds of the body in comparison to the soul?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Then isn't what is filled with things that are more, and is itself more, more really filled than what is filled with things that are less, and is itself less?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So, then, if being filled with what is appropriate to our nature is pleasant, what is more filled with things that *are* more is more really and [*e*] truly caused to enjoy a more true pleasure; whereas what partakes of things that *are* less is less truly and surely filled and partakes of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.

[*586a*] GLAUCON: That's absolutely inevitable.

SOCRATES: So, those who lack experience of knowledge or virtue, but are always occupied with feasts and the like, are brought down, apparently, and then back up to the middle state; and wander in this way throughout their lives, never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up, never looking up at it or brought up to it, never filled with what really is, and never tasting any stable or pure pleasure. On the contrary, they are always looking

downward like cattle and, with their heads bent over the earth or the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. And, in order to do better than others in these things, they kick and butt with iron horns and hooves, killing [*b*] each other, because their desires are insatiable. For they aren't using things that *are* to fill the part of themselves that *is* a thing that is, and a leak-proof vessel.

GLAUCON: You have described the life of the masses, Socrates, just like an oracle!

SOCRATES: So, isn't it necessary, then, for these people to live with pleasures that are mixed with pains, mere phantoms and illusionist paintings of true pleasures? And aren't they so colored by their juxtaposition with one another that they appear intense, beget mad passions for themselves in the [*c*] foolish, and are fought over—as Stesichorus tells us the phantom of Helen was fought over at Troy—through ignorance of the truth?[185]

GLAUCON: Something like that must be what happens.

SOCRATES: Mustn't similar things happen to someone who succeeds in satisfying the spirited element? Mustn't his love of honor be so colored by envy, his love of victory by violence, and his spiritedness by peevishness, that he pursues the satisfactions of honor, victory, and spiritedness without [*d*] rational calculation or understanding?

GLAUCON: The same sorts of things must happen with regard to that element, too.

SOCRATES: Can't we confidently assert, then, that, even where the desires of the profit-loving and honor-loving parts are concerned, those that follow knowledge and argument, and pursue with their help the pleasures that wisdom prescribes, will attain—to the degree that they can attain true pleasure at all—the truest pleasures, because they follow truth, and those that are most their own; if, indeed, what is the best for each thing is also what is [*e*] most its own?

GLAUCON: But that, of course, is what is most its own.

SOCRATES: So, when the entire soul follows the philosophic element and does not engage in faction, the result is that each element does its own work and is just; and, in particular, each enjoys its own pleasures, the best pleasures and—to the degree possible—the truest. [*587a*]

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: So, when one of the other parts gains mastery, the result is that it cannot discover {398} its own pleasure and compels the other parts to pursue an alien, and not a true pleasure.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And wouldn't what is most distant from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce that result?

GLAUCON: By far.

SOCRATES: And isn't what is most distant from reason the very thing that is most distant from law and order?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And wasn't it made evident that the passionate and tyrannical [*b*] appetites are most distant?

GLAUCON: By far the most.

SOCRATES: And the kingly and orderly ones least distant?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the tyrant, I suppose, will be most distant from a true pleasure that is his own, while the king will be least distant.

GLAUCON: It is inevitable.

SOCRATES: And so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly and the king most pleasantly.

GLAUCON: It is absolutely inevitable.

SOCRATES: Do you know, then, how much more unpleasant the tyrant's life is than the king's?

GLAUCON: Not unless you tell me.

SOCRATES: There are, it seems, three pleasures: one genuine and two illegitimate. [*c*] The tyrant is at the extreme end of the illegitimate ones, since he flees both law and reason and lives with a bodyguard of slavish pleasures. But it is not at all easy to say just how inferior he is—except perhaps as follows.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: The tyrant is somehow at a third remove from the oligarch, since the democrat was in the middle between them.[186]

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Won't he also live with a phantom of pleasure, then, that, as regards truth, is at a third remove from that other—if what we said before is

true?

GLAUCON: He will.

SOCRATES: But the oligarch, in turn, is at a third remove from the king, if we assume king and aristocrat to be the same. [*d*]

GLAUCON: Yes, third.

SOCRATES: So a tyrant is removed from true pleasure by a numerical value of three times three.

GLAUCON: Apparently.

SOCRATES: So, on the basis of the size of this numerical value, it seems the phantom of the tyrant's pleasure is a plane figure.

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: On the basis of its square and cube, in that case, it becomes clear how far removed it is.

GLAUCON: Clear to someone skilled in calculation, anyway!

SOCRATES: Turning it the other way around, then, if someone wants to say how far the king is removed from the tyrant in terms of true pleasure, [*e*] he will find, if he completes the calculation, that he lives 729 times more pleasantly, while the tyrant lives the same number of times more painfully.[187]

GLAUCON: That's an extraordinary calculation of the difference between the two men—the just one and the unjust one—in terms of their pleasure [*588a*] and pain!

SOCRATES: And yet it is a number that is both true and appropriate to human lives—if indeed days, nights, months, and years are appropriate to them.

GLAUCON: And of course they are appropriate.

SOCRATES: If the victory of the good and just person over the bad and unjust one in terms of pleasure is as great as that, won't his victory in terms of its grace, beauty, and virtue be extraordinarily greater?

GLAUCON: Extraordinarily greater, indeed, by Zeus!

SOCRATES: All right, then. Since we have reached this point in the argument, [*b*] let's return to the first things we mentioned that led us here. I think someone said that doing injustice profits {399} a completely unjust person who is believed to be just. Wasn't that the claim?[188]

GLAUCON: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: Let’s discuss it with its proponent, then, since we have now agreed on the respective effects of doing unjust and doing just things.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: By fashioning an image of the soul in words, so that the one who said that will know what he was saying. [*c*]

GLAUCON: What sort of image?

SOCRATES: One of those creatures that ancient legends say used to exist. The Chimera, Scylla, Cerberus, and the numerous other cases where many different kinds are said to have grown together into one.

GLAUCON: Yes, they do describe such things.

SOCRATES: Well, then, fashion a single species of complex, many-headed beast, with a ring of tame and savage animal heads, all of which it can grow and change from within.

GLAUCON: That’s a task for a clever fashioner of images! Still, since language [*d*] is easier to fashion than wax and the like, consider the fashioning done.

SOCRATES: Now, fashion another single species—of lion—and a single one of human being. But make the first much the greatest and the second, second in size.

GLAUCON: That’s easier—the fashioning is done.

SOCRATES: Now, join the three in one, so that they somehow grow together naturally.

GLAUCON: They are joined.

SOCRATES: Then fashion around the outside the image of one of them, that of the human being, so that to anyone who cannot see what is inside, but sees only the outer shell, it will look [*e*] like a single creature, a human being.

GLAUCON: The surrounding shell has been fashioned.

SOCRATES: When someone claims, then, that it profits this human being to do injustice, but that doing what is just brings no advantage, let’s tell him that he is saying nothing other than that it profits him to feed well and strengthen the multifarious beast, as well as the lion and everything that pertains to the lion; to starve and weaken the human being, so that he is dragged along wherever either of the other two leads; and not to accustom [*589a*] the two to one another or make them friends, but leave them to bite and fight and devour one another.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's exactly what someone who praises doing injustice is saying.

SOCRATES: On the other hand, wouldn't someone who claims that what is just is profitable be saying we should do and say what will give the inner human being the greatest mastery over the human being, to get him to take [*b*] care of the many-headed beast like a farmer, feeding and domesticating the gentle heads and preventing the savage ones from growing; to make the lion's nature his ally; and to care for all in common, bringing them up in such a way that they will be friends with each other and with himself?

GLAUCON: Yes, that's exactly what someone who praises justice is saying.

SOCRATES: From every point of view, then, the one who praises what is just speaks truly while the one who praises what is unjust speaks falsely. For whether we consider pleasure or good reputation or advantage, the one who [*c*] praises the just tells the truth while the one who condemns it has nothing sound to say and condemns with no knowledge of what he is condemning.

GLAUCON: None at all, in my opinion.

SOCRATES: Then let's persuade him gently—after all, he is not getting it wrong intentionally—by questioning him as follows: "Bless you, but shouldn't we claim that this is also the basis of the conventional norms concerning what is fine and what is shameful: what is fine is what subordinates the beastlike elements in our nature to the human one—or better, perhaps, to the divine, whereas what is shameful is what enslaves the tame element to [*d*] the savage?" Will he agree, or what?

GLAUCON: He will if he takes my advice.

SOCRATES: Is there anyone, then, in light of this argument, who profits by acquiring gold unjustly, if the result is something like this: in taking the gold, he simultaneously enslaves the {400} best element in himself to the most [*e*] wicked? If he got the gold by enslaving his son or daughter to savage and evil men, it would not profit him, no matter how much he got for doing it. So, if he ruthlessly enslaves the most divine element in himself to the most godless and polluted, how could he fail to be wretched, when he accepts golden gifts in return for a far more terrible destruction than that of Eriphyle, [*590a*] who took the necklace in return for her husband's soul?[189]

GLAUCON: A much more terrible one. I will answer for him.

SOCRATES: And don't you think intemperance has long been condemned for reasons of this sort; that it is because of vices like it that that terrible creature, the great and multiform beast, is given more freedom than it should be?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: And aren't stubbornness and peevishness condemned because they inharmoniously increase and stretch the lionlike and snakelike[190] [*b*] element?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And aren't luxury and softness condemned for slackening and loosening this same part, because that produces cowardice in it?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And aren't flattery and illiberality condemned because they subject this same spirited element to the moblike beast, allow it to be showered with abuse for the sake of money and the latter's insatiability, and habituate it from [*c*] youth to be an ape instead of a lion?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Why do you think someone is reproached for menial work or handicraft? Or shall we say that it is for no other reason than because the best element is naturally weak in him, so that it cannot rule the beasts within him, but can only serve them and learn what flatters them?

GLAUCON: Apparently.

SOCRATES: In order to ensure, then, that someone like that is also ruled by something similar to what rules the best person, we say that he should be the slave of that best person who has the divine ruler within himself. It is not to harm the slave that we say he should be ruled, as Thrasymachus supposed [*d*] was true of all subjects, but because it is better for everyone to be ruled by a divine and wise ruler—preferably one that is his own and that he has inside himself; otherwise one imposed on him from outside, so that we may all be as alike and as friendly as possible, because we are all captained by the same thing.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's right.

SOCRATES: This is clearly the aim of the law as well, which is the ally of [*e*] everyone in the city. It is also our aim in ruling our children. We do not allow them to be free until we establish a constitution in them as in a city.

That is to say, we take care of their best part with the similar one in ourselves and equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take [*591a*] our place. Only then do we set them free.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's clearly so.

SOCRATES: How, then, will we claim, Glaucon, and on the basis of what argument, that it profits someone to do injustice, or what is intemperate, or some shameful thing that will make him worse, even if it brings more money or power of some other sort?

GLAUCON: There's no way we can.

SOCRATES: Or how can we claim that it profits him to be undetected in his injustice and not pay the penalty? I mean, doesn't the one who remains undetected become even worse, while in the one who is discovered and [*b*] punished, the bestial element is calmed and tamed and the gentle one freed? Doesn't his entire soul, when it returns to its best nature and acquires temperance and justice along with wisdom, achieve a condition that is as more honorable than that of a body when it acquires strength and beauty along with health, as a soul is more honorable than a body?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

{401} SOCRATES: Won't anyone with any sense, then, give everything he has to achieve it as long as he lives? First, won't he honor the studies that produce [*c*] it and not honor the others?

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: Second, as regards the condition and nurture of his body, not only will he not give himself over to bestial and irrational pleasure, and live turned in that direction; but he won't make health his aim nor give precedence to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful, unless he is also going to become temperate as a result of them. On the contrary, it is [*d*] clear that he will always be tuning the harmony of his body for the sake of the concord of his soul.

GLAUCON: He certainly will, if indeed he is going to be truly musical.

SOCRATES: Won't he also keep order and concord in his acquisition of money? He won't be dazzled, will he, by what the masses regard as blessed happiness, and—by increasing the size of his wealth without limit—acquire an unlimited number of evils?

GLAUCON: Not in my view.

SOCRATES: On the contrary, he will keep his eye fixed on the constitution [*e*] within him and guard against disturbing anything there either with too much money or with too little. Captaining himself in that way, he will increase and spend his wealth, as far as possible by reference to it.

GLAUCON: That's exactly what he will do.

SOCRATES: Where honors are concerned, too, he will keep his eye on the [*592a*] same thing. He will willingly share in and taste those he believes will make him better. But those that might overthrow the established condition of his soul, he will avoid, both in private and in public.

GLAUCON: So, he won't be willing to take part in politics, then, if that is what he cares about.

SOCRATES: Yes, by the dog,[191] in his own city, he certainly will. But he may not be willing to do so in his fatherland, barring some stroke of divine luck.

GLAUCON: I understand. You mean in the city we have just been founding and describing; the one that exists in words, since I do not think it exists [*b*] anywhere on earth.

SOCRATES: But there may perhaps be a model of it in the heavens for anyone who wishes to look at it and to found himself on the basis of what he sees. It makes no difference at all whether it exists anywhere or ever will. You see, he would take part in the politics of it alone, and of no other.

GLAUCON: That's probably right.

BOOK X

THE MAIN ARGUMENT of the *Republic* is now complete. Hence Socrates is in a position to discuss the kind of poetry about human beings that is permitted in the ideal city, a discussion that had to be postponed in Book III (392a–c). Given the importance Socrates attributes to music and poetry and physical training (424b–425a) and the importance of Homer and Hesiod in Greek education, the return to this topic is hardly an anticlimax. It is rather the moment at which the new philosophy-based education confronts the traditional education based on poetry.

Socrates' critique of poetry is extremely subtle. The question on which it focuses is whether what one needs to know in order to be a good poet qualifies one as a teacher of virtue. Socrates argues that it does not.

Having completed his account of poetry, Socrates turns to the topic of the immortality of the soul and to the previously excluded consequences of justice and injustice (609b–612e). He argues that the good consequences of justice both in this life and the next far outweigh those of injustice. This completes his argument that justice belongs to the best of the three classes of goods that Glaucon distinguished at the beginning of Book II, since it is choiceworthy both for its own sake and for its consequences.

{402} SOCRATES' NARRATION CONTINUES:

SOCRATES: You know that there are many other things about our city that [*595a*] make me think we were entirely right in founding it as we did, but I am particularly thinking of poetry when I say that.

GLAUCON: What about it?

SOCRATES: Our refusal to admit any of it that is imitative. Indeed, the need not to admit it seems even more evident, in my view, now that we have distinguished the elements in the soul from one another. [*b*]

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Between ourselves—for *you* won't denounce me to the tragic poets or any of the other imitative ones—I think all such poetry is likely to corrupt the mind of those of its hearers who do not have the knowledge of what it is really like as a drug to counteract it.

GLAUCON: What do you have in mind in saying that?

SOCRATES: I will have to tell you, even though a sort of reverential love I have had for Homer since childhood makes me hesitate to speak. You see, he seems to have been the first teacher and leader of all these fine tragedians. [*c*] All the same, a man should not be honored more than the truth. So, as I say, I will have to tell you.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Listen, then—or rather, answer my questions.

GLAUCON: Ask away.

SOCRATES: Could you tell me what imitation in general is? You see, I do not entirely understand what it is supposed to be.

GLAUCON: So is it likely that *I* will?

SOCRATES: There would be nothing strange in that, since there are many things the shortsighted see before the sharp-eyed! [*596a*]

GLAUCON: That's right. But with you present, I could not possibly be very eager to speak out even if there were something I saw. So, you will have to do the looking yourself.

SOCRATES: Do you want us to begin our inquiry with the following point, then, in accordance with our usual method? I mean, as you know, we usually posit some one particular form in connection with each set of many things to which we apply the same name. Or don't you understand?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: Then in the present case, too, let's take any set of many things [*b*] you like. For example, there are, if you like, many couches and tables.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But the forms connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a table.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Don't we usually say, too, that the craftsman who makes each manufactured item looks toward the form when he makes the couches or the tables we use, and similarly with other things? For surely no craftsman makes the form itself— GLAUCON: How could he?

SOCRATES: Well, now, see what you would call *this* craftsman? [*c*]

GLAUCON: Which?

SOCRATES: The one who makes everything each individual handicraftsman makes.

GLAUCON: That's an amazingly clever man you are talking about!

SOCRATES: Wait a minute and you will have even more reason to say that! You see, this same handicraftsman is able to make not only every manufactured item, but he also makes all the plants that grow from the earth, and produces all the animals, including himself; and, in addition, he produces earth and sky and gods and everything in the sky, and everything in Hades beneath the earth. [*d*]

GLAUCON: You are talking about a wholly amazing sophist!

SOCRATES: You do not believe me? Tell me, do you think such a craftsman is completely impossible? Or do you think there is a way in which a maker of all these things could exist, and a way in which he could not? Don't you see there is a certain way in which even you yourself could make all of them?

GLAUCON: What way is that?

SOCRATES: It is not difficult. On the contrary, it is a sort of craftsmanship that is widely available and quick—and quickest of all, I suppose, if you are willing to take a mirror and turn it around {403} in all directions. That way you will quickly make the sun and the things in the sky; you will quickly make [*e*] the earth, yourself and the other animals, manufactured items, plants, and everything else that was mentioned just now.

GLAUCON: Yes, their appearances, but certainly not the things themselves as they truly are.

SOCRATES: Right! You attack the argument at just the right place. For I think the painter is also one of these craftsmen, isn't he?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: But you will say, I think, that he does not make the things he makes as they truly are—even though there is a certain way in which the painter also makes a couch. Isn't that right?

GLAUCON: Yes, he also makes the appearance of one.

SOCRATES: What about the couch-maker? Didn't you just say that he does not make the form—which we say is what a couch is—but only a particular [*597a*] couch?

GLAUCON: Yes, I did say that.

SOCRATES: Now, if he does not make what it is, he is not making what is, but something that is like what is, but is not. So, if someone were to say that the product of a couch-maker or any other handicraftsman completely is, he probably would not be speaking the truth?

GLAUCON: That, at any rate, is what those who occupy themselves with such arguments would think.

SOCRATES: So we should not be surprised if it also turns out to be somewhat dim in comparison to the truth.

[*b*] GLAUCON: No, we should not.

SOCRATES: Would you like us, then, to use these same examples to search for that imitator of ours and what he really is?

GLAUCON: I would, if you would.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we have these three sorts of couches. One, that is in nature, which I think we would say a god makes. Or is it someone else?

GLAUCON: No one, I suppose.

SOCRATES: One the carpenter makes.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And one the painter makes. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: It is.

SOCRATES: So painter, carpenter, and god—these three oversee three kinds of couches?

GLAUCON: Yes, three.

SOCRATES: Now, the god, either because he did not want to, or because it [*c*] was somehow necessary for him not to make more than one that is in its nature a couch, made only the one that is what a couch itself is. Two or more of these have not been naturally developed by the god and never will be naturally developed.

GLAUCON: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Because, if he were to make only two, one would again come to light whose form they in turn would both possess, and *it* would be what a couch itself is, not the two.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: The god knew this, I suppose, and, wishing to be the real [*d*] maker of the real couch and not just some particular maker of some particular couch, naturally developed the one that is in its nature unique.

GLAUCON: Probably so.

SOCRATES: Would you like us to call him its natural maker, then, or something like that?

GLAUCON: It would be right to do so, at any rate, since it is by nature that he has made it and all the others.

SOCRATES: What about the carpenter? Shouldn't we call him the craftsman who makes a couch?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And should we call a painter, too, a craftsman and maker of such a thing?

GLAUCON: Certainly not.

SOCRATES: In that case, what is it you say he is, of a couch? [*e*]

GLAUCON: In my view, the most reasonable thing to call him is this: he is an imitator of what the others are craftsmen of.

SOCRATES: All right. So the one whose product is three removed from the natural one, you call an imitator?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: So the tragedian too, if indeed he is an imitator, will be someone who is by his nature third from king and truth, and so will all the other imitators.

GLAUCON: It looks that way.

{404} SOCRATES: We are agreed about the imitator, then. Now, tell me this about the painter: in each case, do you think it is what each thing itself is in its nature that he is trying to imitate, or the [*598a*] products of the craftsmen?

GLAUCON: Those of the craftsmen.

SOCRATES: As they are, or as they appear to be? You have still to make that distinction.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: This: if you look at a couch from the side or the front or from anywhere else, does it differ in any way from itself? Or, while not differing at all, does it appear different? And similarly with the others?

GLAUCON: The latter. It appears different, but is not different at all.

SOCRATES: Then consider this very point: at what does painting aim in [*b*] each case? To imitate what is as it is? Or what appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of an illusion, or of truth?

GLAUCON: Of an illusion.

SOCRATES: So, imitation is surely far removed from the truth. And the reason that it produces everything, it seems, is that it grasps only a small part of each thing—and that is an illusion. For example, the painter, we say, can paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, even though he knows nothing about these crafts. All the same, if he is a good painter, by [*c*] painting a carpenter and displaying him at a distance, he might deceive children and foolish adults into thinking it truly is a carpenter.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: In fact, my friend, I imagine that what we must bear in mind in all these cases is this: when someone tells us he has met a human being who knows every craft as well as everything else anyone knows, and that there is

nothing of which he does not have a more exact knowledge than anyone else, we should assume we are talking to a naïve fellow. He has [*d*] been deceived, it seems, by an encounter with some sort of sorcerer or imitator, whom he therefore considers to be all-wise. But that is because of his own inability to distinguish between knowledge, lack of knowledge, and imitation.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we must next consider tragedy and its leader, Homer, since we hear from some that these men know every craft, everything [*e*] relevant to human virtue and vice, and even all about divine matters. They claim, you see, that if a good poet is to write beautiful poetry about the things he writes about, he must have knowledge of them when he writes, or else he would be unable to. We should consider, then, whether those who tell us this have been deceived by their encounters with these imitators and do not realize, when they see their works, that they are three [*599a*] removes from what is, and are easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For they produce illusions, not things that are. Or whether there is something in what they say, and good poets really do have knowledge of the things about which the masses think they speak so well.

GLAUCON: We certainly must consider that.

SOCRATES: Do you think, then, that if someone could make both what is imitated and its image, he would allow himself to take making images seriously, [*b*] and put it at the forefront of his life as the best ability he had?

GLAUCON: No, I do not.

SOCRATES: But if he truly had knowledge of what he imitates, I suppose he would take deeds much more seriously than their imitations, would try to leave behind many beautiful deeds as his own memorials, and would be much more eager to be the subject of a eulogy than the author of one.

GLAUCON: I suppose so. I mean, these things certainly are not equal either in honor or in benefit.

SOCRATES: Let's not demand an account, then, of the other things from [*c*] Homer or any other poet. Let's not ask if any of them is a doctor or only an imitator of what doctors say; or which people any of the poets, old or new, has reportedly made healthy, as Asclepius did; or which students of medicine he left behind, as Asclepius did his sons. And let's not ask them about the other crafts either, but leave them aside. When it comes, however,

to the greatest and most beautiful things of which Homer undertakes to speak—warfare, generalship, city government, and a person's education—surely, it is fair to question {405} him as follows: "My dear Homer, if you [*d*] are not third removed from the truth about virtue, and are not the sort of craftsman of an image, which is what we defined an imitator to be, but if you are even in second place and capable of knowing what practices make people better or worse in private or in public life, tell us which cities are better governed because of you, as the Lacedaemonians are because of Lycurgus, and as many others—great and small—are because of many other [*e*] men. What city gives you credit for having proved to be a good lawgiver who benefited it? Italy and Sicily give it to Charondas, and we give it to Solon. Who gives it to you?" Will he be able to name one?

GLAUCON: I suppose not. At any rate, none is mentioned even by the Homeridae[192] themselves.

SOCRATES: Then is any war in Homer's time remembered that was well fought because of his [*600a*] leadership or advice?

GLAUCON: None at all.

SOCRATES: Then as you would expect in the case of a man wise in deeds, are we told of his many ingenious inventions in the crafts or other activities, as we are about Thales of Miletus and Anacharsis the Scythian?

GLAUCON: There's nothing of that sort.

SOCRATES: Then if there is nothing of a public nature, is Homer said to have been a leader, during his own lifetime, in the education of people who loved associating with him and passed on a Homeric way of life to those who came later? Is he like Pythagoras, who was himself particularly loved [*b*] for this reason, and whose followers even today still seem to be conspicuous for a way of life they call Pythagorean?

GLAUCON: Again, we are told nothing of this kind. Indeed, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, would presumably seem even more ridiculous than his name[193] suggests as an example of such education, if the story told about Homer is true. You see, we are told that while he was alive, Creophylus completely neglected him. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Yes, we are told that. But, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate people and make them better, if he had been able, not to imitate such matters but to know about them, wouldn't he have had many

companions who honored and loved him? Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, and a great many others are able to convince anyone who associates with them in private that he wouldn't be able to manage his household or city unless they themselves supervised his education, and they are so [*d*] intensely loved because of this wisdom of theirs that their disciples do everything except carry them around on their shoulders. Are we to believe, then, that if Homer had been able to help people become virtuous, his companions would have allowed either him or Hesiod to wander around as rhapsodes, and wouldn't have clung far tighter to them than to gold and compelled them to come home and live with them? And if persuasion failed, wouldn't they have followed them wherever they went until they [*e*] had received sufficient education?

GLAUCON: I think what you say is entirely true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Are we to conclude, then, that all poets, beginning with Homer, imitate images of virtue and of all the other things they write about, and have no grasp of the truth? Although, as we were saying just now, a painter will make what seems to be a shoemaker to those who know [*601a*] as little about shoemaking as he does himself, but who look at things in terms of their colors and shapes.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: Similarly, I suppose, we will say that the poet uses words and phrases to paint colored pictures of each of the crafts, even though he knows only how to imitate them; so that others like himself, who look at things in terms of words, will think he speaks extremely well about shoemaking or generalship or anything else, provided he speaks with meter, [*b*] rhythm, and harmony. That is how great a natural spell these things cast. For if a poet's works are stripped of {406} their musical colorings and spoken just by themselves, I think you know what they look like. You have surely seen them.

GLAUCON: I certainly have.

SOCRATES: Don't they resemble the faces of those who are young but not really beautiful, after the bloom of youth has left them?

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, consider this: the maker of an image—the imitator—knows nothing, we say, about what is, but only about what [*c*] appears. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then let’s not leave the story half-told. Let’s look at the whole thing.

GLAUCON: Go on.

SOCRATES: A painter, we say, will paint reins and a bit?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: But it is the saddler and the blacksmith who make them?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Does the painter know what the reins and bit should be like, then? Or do not even their makers—the saddler and the blacksmith—know this, but only the one who knows how to use them, the horseman?

GLAUCON: That’s absolutely true.

SOCRATES: So, won’t we say that the same holds for everything?

GLAUCON: What?

SOCRATES: That for each thing there are these three crafts: one that will use, one that will make, [*d*] one that will imitate?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then aren’t the virtue, goodness, and correctness of each manufactured item, living creature, and activity related to nothing but the use for which each is made or naturally developed?

GLAUCON: They are.

SOCRATES: So it is entirely necessary, then, that the user of each thing has the most experience of it, and that he inform the maker about what the good and bad points are in the actual use of the thing he uses. For example, it is the flute player, I take it, who informs the flute-maker about which flutes respond well in actual playing, and prescribes how they should be [*e*] made, while the maker obeys him.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Doesn’t the one who knows give information, then, about good and bad flutes, whereas the other, by relying on him, makes them?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: So, as regards the same manufactured item, its maker—through associating with the one who knows and having to listen to the one who knows—has correct belief about its good and bad qualities, while its user has knowledge. [*602a*]

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: What about the imitator? Will he, on the basis of using the things he paints, have knowledge of whether they are good and correct or not? Or will he have correct belief through having to associate with the one who knows and being told how he should paint them?

GLAUCON: Neither.

SOCRATES: So an imitator has neither knowledge nor correct belief about whether the things he makes are good or bad.

GLAUCON: Apparently not.

SOCRATES: How well situated the poetic imitator is, then, in relation to wisdom about the subjects of his poems!

GLAUCON: He isn't really.

SOCRATES: And yet he will go on imitating all the same, even though he does not know in what way each thing is good or bad. On the contrary, [*b*] whatever appears good to the masses who know nothing—that, it seems, is what he will imitate.

GLAUCON: What else?

SOCRATES: Apparently, then, we are fairly well agreed on the following: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about the things he imitates, but that imitation is a kind of game, not something to be taken seriously; and that tragic poets, whether in iambic or epic verse, are as imitative as they could possibly be.

GLAUCON: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: In the name of Zeus, then, this business of imitation is concerned [*c*] with what is third removed from the truth. Isn't that right?

GLAUCON: Yes.

{407} SOCRATES: Now, then, on which of the elements in a human being does it have its effect?

GLAUCON: What sort of element do you mean?

SOCRATES: This sort: the same object, viewed from nearby, does not appear the same size, I presume, as when viewed from a distance.

GLAUCON: No, it does not.

SOCRATES: And the same things appear bent and straight when seen in water or out of it, or concave and convex because sight is misled by colors; [*d*] and every other similar sort of confusion is clearly present in our soul. It is because it exploits this weakness in our nature that illusionist painting is

nothing short of sorcery, and neither are jugglery or many other similar sorts of trickery.

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: And haven't measuring, counting, and weighing proved to be most welcome assistants in these cases, ensuring that what appears greater or smaller or more numerous or heavier does not rule within us, but rather what has calculated or measured or even weighed?

[*e*] GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: And that is the task of the soul's rational element?

GLAUCON: Yes, of it.

SOCRATES: But quite often, when it has measured and indicates that some things are greater or smaller than others, or the same size, the opposite simultaneously appears to it to hold it of these same things.

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: And didn't we say that it is impossible for the same thing to believe opposites about the same thing at the same time?[194]

GLAUCON: Yes, and we were right to say it.

SOCRATES: So, the element in the soul that believes contrary to the measurements and the one that believes in accord with the measurements [*603a*] could not be the same.

GLAUCON: No, they could not.

SOCRATES: But the one that puts its trust in measurement and calculation would be the best element in the soul.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So the one that opposes it would be one of the inferior parts in us.

GLAUCON: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: That, then, was what I wanted to get agreement about when I said that painting—and imitation as a whole—are far from the truth when they produce their work; and moreover that imitation really consorts with an element in us that is far from wisdom, and that nothing healthy or true can come from their relationship or friendship. [*b*]

GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: So, imitation is an inferior thing that consorts with another inferior thing to produce inferior offspring.

GLAUCON: So it seems.

SOCRATES: Does this apply only to the imitation that is visible, or also to the one that is audible—the one we call poetry?

GLAUCON: It probably applies to that as well.

SOCRATES: Well, let's not rely solely on a probable analogy with painting. Instead, let's also go directly again to the very element in our mind with which poetic imitation consorts and see whether it is inferior or excellent. [*c*]

GLAUCON: Yes, we should.

SOCRATES: Then let's put it as follows. Imitative poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily, who, as a result of these actions, believe they are doing either well or badly, and so experience either pain or enjoyment in all these situations. Does it imitate anything apart from these?

GLAUCON: Not a thing.

SOCRATES: So, is a human being of one mind in all these circumstances then? Or, just as in the case of visible representation, where he was split into factions and had opposite beliefs in him about the same things at the [*d*] same time, is he also split into factions and at war with himself in matters of action? But I am reminded that there is really no need now for us to reach agreement on this question. You see, in our earlier arguments, we were sufficiently agreed about all that when we said that our soul is filled with myriad opposites of that sort at the same time.[195]

{408} GLAUCON: And rightly so.

SOCRATES: Yes, it *was* right. But we omitted something then that I now [*e*] think we must discuss.

GLAUCON: What's that?

SOCRATES: When a good man suffers some stroke of bad luck, such as the loss of a son or something else he values very highly, we also said in our earlier arguments, as you know, that he will bear it more easily than others.[196]

GLAUCON: We certainly did.

SOCRATES: Now, let's consider this: will he not grieve at all? Or, since that is impossible, will he be somehow measured in the face of pain?

GLAUCON: The latter is probably closer to the truth.

SOCRATES: Now, tell me this about him: do you think he will be more [*604a*] likely to fight and resist pain when he is seen by his equals, or when he is just by himself in a solitary place?

GLAUCON: He's sure to fight it far more when he is being seen.

SOCRATES: But when he is alone, I imagine, he will venture to say many things he would be ashamed if someone else heard, and to do many things he would not want anyone else to see him doing.

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: And isn't it reason and law that tell him to resist, while what [*b*] urges him to give in to the pains is the feeling itself?

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: And when there are opposite impulses in a human being in relation to the same thing at the same time, we say that there must be two elements in him.

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Isn't one part ready to be persuaded to follow the law, wherever the law leads?

GLAUCON: Can you explain how?

SOCRATES: The law says, as you know, that it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not get irritated, since what is really good or bad in such things is not clear. There is nothing to be gained by taking them hard, nor is any aspect of human affairs worth getting very serious about. And the very thing whose aid we need as quickly as possible in such circumstances is the one our grieving hinders. [*c*]

GLAUCON: Which do you mean?

SOCRATES: The capacity to deliberate about what has happened and, as with the fall of the dice, to arrange our affairs, given what has befallen us, in whatever way reason determines would be best. Instead of acting like children who have fallen over, and who hold on to the hurt part and spend their time wailing, we should always accustom our souls to turn as quickly as possible to curing and raising up the part that has suffered a fall and is [*d*] sick, so as to banish lamentation by means of medicine.

GLAUCON: That would be the most correct way to deal with bad luck, anyway.

SOCRATES: So it is the best element, we say, that is willing to follow this rational calculation.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: As for the part that leads us to recollections of our suffering and to lamentations, and is insatiable for these things, won't we say that it is the element that lacks reason, is idle, and is a friend of cowardice?

GLAUCON: We certainly will.

SOCRATES: Now, this element—the one that gets irritated—admits of much complex imitation; whereas the wise and quiet character, which [*e*] always remains pretty much selfsame, is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand when imitated—especially not at a festival where multifarious people are gathered together in theaters. For the experience being imitated is alien to them.

GLAUCON: Absolutely. [*605a*]

SOCRATES: The imitative poet, then, clearly does not naturally relate to this best element in the soul, and his wisdom is not directed to pleasing it—not if he is going to attain a good reputation with the masses—but to the irritable and complex character, because it is easy to imitate.

GLAUCON: Clearly.

SOCRATES: So, it would at last be right to take him and place him beside the painter as his counterpart. For he is like the latter in producing things that are inferior as regards truth, and is also similar to him in associating with the other {409} element in souls, not with the best one. So, we would also at [*b*] last be justified in not admitting him into a city that is to be well governed. You see, he arouses and nourishes this element in the soul and, by making it strong, destroys the rational one—just as someone in a city who makes wicked people strong, by handing the city over to them, ruins the better ones. Similarly, we will say an imitative poet produces a bad constitution in the soul of each individual by making images that are very far removed [*c*] from the truth and by gratifying the element in it that lacks understanding and cannot distinguish greater from smaller, but believes the same things to be now large, now small.

GLAUCON: He does, indeed.

SOCRATES: But we haven't yet brought our chief charge against imitation. For its power to corrupt all but a very few *good* people is surely an altogether terrible one.

GLAUCON: It certainly is, if it really can do that.

SOCRATES: Listen and consider. When even the best of us hear Homer, or some other tragic poet, imitating one of the heroes in a state of grief and [*d*] making a long speech of lamentation, or even chanting and beating his breast, you know we enjoy it and give ourselves over to it. We suffer along with the hero and take his sufferings seriously. And we praise the one who affects us most in this way as a good poet.

GLAUCON: Of course I know.

SOCRATES: But when one of us suffers a personal loss, you also realize we do the opposite: we pride ourselves if we are able to keep quiet and endure [*e*] it, in the belief that that is what a *man* does, whereas what we praised before is what a woman does.

GLAUCON: I do realize that.

SOCRATES: Is praise of that sort rightly bestowed, then? Is it right to look at the sort of man we would be, not honored, but rather ashamed to resemble, and instead of being disgusted by what we see to enjoy and praise it?

GLAUCON: No, by Zeus, that does not seem reasonable.

SOCRATES: Yes, it does. At least, it does if you look at it in the following [*606a*] way.

GLAUCON: How?

SOCRATES: If you reflect as follows: what is forcibly kept in check in our personal misfortunes and has an insatiable hunger for weeping and lamenting—since that is what it has a natural appetite for—is the very element that gets satisfaction and enjoyment from the poets. Second, our naturally best element, since it has not been adequately educated by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over the lamenting one, since it is watching the sufferings [*b*] of somebody else and thinks there is no shame involved for it in praising and pitying another purportedly good man who grieves excessively. On the contrary, it thinks that to be a clear profit—I mean the pleasure it gets. And it would not want to be deprived of it by despising the whole poem. You see, I think only a few people are able to calculate that the enjoyment of other people's sufferings is inevitably transferred to one's own, since, when pity is nourished and strengthened by the former, it is not easily suppressed in the case of one's own sufferings.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true. [*c*]

SOCRATES: Doesn't the same argument also apply to humor? You see, if there are jokes you would be ashamed to tell yourself, but that you very

much enjoy when you hear them imitated in a comedy or even in private, and that you don't hate as something bad, aren't you doing the same as with the things you pity? For the element in you that wanted to tell the jokes, but which you held back by means of reason because you were afraid of being reputed a buffoon, you now release; and having made it strong in that way, you have been led unawares into becoming a comedian in your own life.

GLAUCON: Exactly.

SOCRATES: And in the case of sexual desires, anger, and all the appetites, [*d*] pains, and pleasures in the soul, which we say accompany every action of ours, the effect of poetic imitation on us is the same. I mean, it nurtures and waters them when they should be dried up, and establishes them as rulers in us when—if we are to be become better and happier rather than worse and more wretched—they should be ruled.

GLAUCON: I cannot disagree with you.

{410} SOCRATES: In that case, Glaucon, when you meet admirers of Homer—who [*e*] tell us that this is the poet who educated Greece, and that for the management of human affairs and education in them, one should take up his works and learn them and live guided by this poet in the arrangement of one's whole life—you should befriend and welcome them, since they are the best they are capable of being. And you should agree that Homer is the [*607a*] most poetic of the tragedians and the first among them. Nonetheless, be aware that hymns to the gods and eulogies of good people are the only poetry we can admit into our city. For if you admit the honeyed Muse, whether in lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law and the thing that has always been generally believed to be best—reason.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true.

SOCRATES: Let that, then, be our defense for our return to the topic of [*b*] poetry, which shows that, given her nature, we were right to banish her from the city earlier, since our argument compelled us. But let's also tell her —in case we are charged with some harshness and boorishness—that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. For such expressions as "the bitch yelping at its master" and "howling," and "great in the empty eloquence [*c*] of fools," and "control by a mob of the omni-wise," and "the subtle thinkers who are beggars all," and countless others are signs of this

old opposition.[197] All the same, let it be said that, if the imitative poetry that aims at pleasure has any argument to show it should have a place in a well-governed city, we would gladly welcome it back, since we are well aware of being charmed by it ourselves. Still, it is not pious to betray what one believes to be the truth. What about you, my friend; aren't you also charmed by it, especially [*d*] when it is through Homer that you look at it?

GLAUCON: Very.

SOCRATES: Isn't it just, then, for her to reenter in that way, when she has defended herself in lyric or some other meter?

GLAUCON: Yes, indeed.

SOCRATES: Then we will surely allow her defenders—the ones who are not poets themselves, but lovers of poetry—to argue without meter on her behalf, showing that she gives not only pleasure but also benefit both to constitutions and to human life. Indeed, we will listen to them graciously, since we would certainly profit if poetry were shown to be not only pleasant [*e*] but also beneficial.

GLAUCON: How could we fail to profit?

SOCRATES: But if it is not, my dear comrade, we will behave like men who have fallen in love. If they do not believe their passion is beneficial, hard though it is, they nonetheless stay away. And we too, because of the passion for this sort of poetry implanted in us by our upbringing in those [*608a*] fine constitutions, are well disposed to have her appear in the best and truest light. But as long as she is not able to produce such a defense, then whenever we listen to her, we will chant to ourselves the argument we just now put forward as a counter-charm to prevent us from slipping back into the childish passion that the masses have. For we have come to see that such poetry is not to be taken seriously, as a serious undertaking that grasps truth; but that anyone who listens to it should be careful, if he is concerned [*b*] about the constitution within him, and should believe what we have said about poetry.

GLAUCON: I completely agree.

SOCRATES: It is a great struggle, my dear Glaucon, greater than people think, to become good rather than bad. So, we must not be tempted by honor, money, or any sort of office whatever—not even by poetry!—into thinking that it is worthwhile to neglect justice and the rest of virtue.

GLAUCON: I agree with you on the basis of what we have said. And so, I think, would anyone else.

SOCRATES: And yet the greatest rewards of virtue, and the prizes proposed [*c*] for it, have not been discussed.

GLAUCON: You must have something incredibly great in mind, if it is greater than those already mentioned!

SOCRATES: In a short period of time, could anything really great come to pass? I mean, the {411} entire period from childhood to old age is surely short when compared to the whole of time.

GLAUCON: It's a mere nothing.

SOCRATES: Well, then, do you think an immortal thing should be seriously concerned with that [*d*] period rather than the whole of time?

GLAUCON: I suppose not, but what exactly do you have in mind by that?

SOCRATES: Haven't you realized that our souls are immortal and never destroyed?

He looked at me and said in amazement:

No, by Zeus, I have not. But are you really in a position to assert that?

SOCRATES: I certainly ought to be, and I think you are, too. There is nothing difficult about it.

GLAUCON: There is for me. So I would be glad to hear from you about this non-difficult topic!

SOCRATES: Listen then.

GLAUCON: All you have to do is speak!

SOCRATES: Do you think there is a good and a bad?

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: And do you think about them the [*e*] same way I do?

GLAUCON: What way?

SOCRATES: What destroys and corrupts coincides entirely with the bad, while what preserves and benefits coincides entirely with the good.

GLAUCON: I do.

SOCRATES: And do you think there is a good and a bad for each thing, such as ophthalmia for the eyes, sickness for the whole body, blight for grain, rot for wood, rust for iron and bronze, and, as I say, a natural badness [*609a*] and sickness for nearly everything?

GLAUCON: I certainly do.

SOCRATES: And when one of them attaches itself to something, doesn't it make the thing to which it attaches itself deficient? And in the end, doesn't it break it down completely and destroy it?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: So the badness natural to each thing—the deficiency peculiar to each—destroys it, but if that does not destroy it, there is nothing else left [*b*] to destroy it. For obviously the good will never destroy anything, and again what is neither good nor bad won't either.

GLAUCON: How could it?

SOCRATES: So if we discover something, the badness of which causes it to deteriorate but cannot break it down and destroy it, won't we immediately know that something with such a nature cannot be destroyed after all?

GLAUCON: That seems reasonable.

SOCRATES: Well, then, what about the soul? Isn't there something that makes it bad?

GLAUCON: Certainly. All the things we were discussing earlier: injustice, [*c*] intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance.

SOCRATES: Do any of these break it down and destroy it? Think about it, so we are not deceived into believing that when an unjust and foolish person is caught, he is destroyed by injustice, which is a deficiency in a soul. Instead, let's proceed this way: just as the body's deficiency, which is disease, wastes and destroys a body, and brings it to the point of not being a body at all, so all the things we mentioned just now reach the point of not being [*d*] when their own peculiar badness attaches itself to them, is present in them, and destroys them. Isn't that so?

GLAUCON: Yes.

SOCRATES: Come on, then, and look at the soul in the same way. When injustice and the rest of vices are present in it, does their presence in it and attachment to it corrupt and wither it until they bring it to the point of death and separate it from the body?

GLAUCON: No, they never do that.

SOCRATES: But surely it is unreasonable to suppose that a thing is destroyed by something else's deficiency and not by its own?

GLAUCON: It is unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Think about it, Glaucon. We do not even believe that a body [*e*] would be destroyed by the deficiency belonging to foods, whether it is

staleness, rottenness, or anything else. But if the foods' own deficiency induces bodily deterioration, we will say the body was destroyed *through* them *by* its own badness, which is disease. But we will never admit that the body is destroyed *by* the deficiency belonging to foods—since they and the body are different things—except when external badness induces the natural [*610a*] badness.

{412} GLAUCON: That's absolutely right.

SOCRATES: By the same argument, then, if the body's deficiency does not induce a soul's own deficiency in a soul, we will never admit that a soul is destroyed by external badness in the absence of its own peculiar deficiency—one thing by another's badness.

GLAUCON: Yes, that's reasonable.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's refute these arguments and show that what we said was not right. Or, so long as they remain unrefuted, let's never say that the soul even comes close to being destroyed by a fever or any other disease, [*b*] or by killing for that matter—not even if one were to cut the entire body up into the very smallest pieces—until someone demonstrates to us that these conditions of the body make the soul itself more unjust and more impious. But when an external badness is present, while its own particular badness is absent, let's not allow anyone to say [*c*] that a soul or anything else whatever is destroyed.

GLAUCON: But you may be sure no one will ever prove that the souls of the dying are made more unjust by death!

SOCRATES: But suppose someone dares to come to grips with our argument and—simply in order to avoid having to agree that our souls are immortal—dares to say that a dying man does become worse and more unjust. We are sure to reply that if what he says is true, injustice must be as deadly as a disease to those who have it, and that those who catch it must die because of its own deadly nature—with the worst cases dying quickly [*d*] and the less serious ones more slowly—and not as now in fact happens, where the unjust are put to death because of their injustice by others who inflict the penalty.

GLAUCON: By Zeus, injustice won't seem so altogether terrible if it will be deadly to the person who contracts it, since then it would be an *escape* from evils! But I am more inclined to think that it will be shown to be entirely the opposite—something that kills others if it can, but makes its possessor [*e*]

very lively indeed—and not just lively, but positively sleepless! That's how far it is, in my view, from being deadly.

SOCRATES: You are right. After all, if its own deficiency—its own badness—is not enough to kill and destroy the soul, an evil designed for the destruction of something else will hardly destroy the soul, or anything else except what it is designed to destroy.

GLAUCON: "Hardly" is right, it seems.

SOCRATES: Then when something is not destroyed by a single bad thing—whether [*611a*] its own or an external one—clearly it must always exist. And if it always exists, it is immortal.

GLAUCON: It must be.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's assume it to be so. And if it is so, you realize that the same ones will always exist. I mean, they surely could not become fewer in number if none is destroyed, or more numerous either. For if anything immortal is increased, you know that the increase would have to come from the mortal, and then everything would end up being immortal.

GLAUCON: True.

SOCRATES: Then we must not think such a thing—for our argument does not allow it. And we must not think, either, that the soul in its truest nature [*b*] is full of complexity and dissimilarity and conflict with itself.

GLAUCON: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: It is not easy for something to be immortal when it is composed of many elements and is not composed in the most beautiful way—which is how the soul now seemed to us.

GLAUCON: It probably isn't.

SOCRATES: Yet both our recent arguments and others as well compel us to accept that the soul *is* immortal. But what it is like in truth, seen as it should be, not maimed by its partnership with the body and other bad [*c*] things, which is how we see it now, what it is like when it has become pure—*that* we can adequately see only by means of rational calculation. And you will find it to be a much more beautiful thing than we thought and get a much clearer view of all the cases of justice and injustice and of all the other things that we have so far discussed. So far, what we have said about the soul is true of it as it appears at present. But the condition we [*d*] have seen it in is like that of all the sea god Glaucus, whose original nature cannot easily be made out by those who catch glimpses of him, because some of

the original parts of his body have been broken off, {413} others have been worn away and altogether mutilated by the waves, and other things—shells, seaweeds, and rocks—have grown into him, so that he looks more like any wild beast than what he naturally was. Such, too, is the condition of the soul when we see it beset by myriad bad things. But, Glaucon, we should be looking in another direction.

GLAUCON: Where?

SOCRATES: To its love of wisdom. We must keep in mind what it grasps and the kinds of things with which it longs to associate, because it is akin to [*e*] what is divine and immortal and what always exists, and what it would become if it followed this longing with its whole being and if that impulse lifted it out of the sea in which it now is, and struck off the rocks and shells [*612a*] that, because it now feasts on earth, have grown around it in a wild, earthy, and stony profusion as a result of those so-called happy feastings. And then you would see its true nature, whether multiform or uniform, or somehow some other way. But we have given a pretty good account now, I think, of what its condition is and what form it takes in human life.

GLAUCON: We certainly have.

SOCRATES: In the course of our discussion, then, did we respond to the other points, without having to invoke the wages and reputations of justice, as you all said Homer and Hesiod did? Instead, haven't we found [*b*] that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself, and that the soul should do what is just, whether it has Gyges' ring or not, or even the cap of Hades as well.

GLAUCON: That's absolutely true. We have.

SOCRATES: So, Glaucon, isn't it now at last unobjectionable, in addition, also to give back to justice and the rest of virtue both the kind and quantity of wages they bring to the soul, both from human beings and from gods, [*c*] both during life and after death?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then will you give *me* back what you borrowed from me in the course of the discussion?

GLAUCON: What in particular?

SOCRATES: I granted you that the just man should seem unjust and the unjust one just. For you thought that even if it would be impossible for these things to remain hidden from both gods and human beings, all the

same, it had to be granted for the sake of argument, so that justice itself could be judged in relation to injustice itself.[198] Don't you remember? [*d*]

GLAUCON: *I* would be unjust if I didn't!

SOCRATES: Well, then, since they have now been judged, I ask on behalf of justice for a return of the reputation it in fact has among gods and human beings; and that we agree that it does indeed have such a reputation, and so may carry off the prizes it gains for someone by making him seem just; since we have already seen that it does give the good things that come from being just, and does not deceive those who really possess it. [*e*]

GLAUCON: That's a just request.

SOCRATES: Then won't you first give this back, that it certainly does not remain hidden from the gods what each of the two is like?

GLAUCON: We will.

SOCRATES: But if it does not remain hidden, one would be loved by the gods and one hated, as we agreed at the beginning.[199]

GLAUCON: That's right.

SOCRATES: And won't we also agree that everything that comes to the one who is loved by gods—insofar as it comes from the gods themselves—is the [*613a*] best possible, unless it is some unavoidable bad thing due to him for an earlier mistake?

GLAUCON: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Similarly, we must suppose that if a just man falls into poverty or disease or some of the other things that seem bad, it will end well for him during his lifetime or even in death. For surely the gods at least will never neglect anyone who eagerly wishes to become just and, by practicing [*b*] virtue, to make himself as much like a god as a human being can.

GLAUCON: It is certainly reasonable to think that a man of that sort won't be neglected by one who is like him.

SOCRATES: And mustn't we think the opposite of the unjust one?

{414} GLAUCON: Definitely.

SOCRATES: Those, then, are the sorts of prizes that come from the gods to the just man.

GLAUCON: That's certainly what I believe.

SOCRATES: What about from human beings? What does a just man get from them? If we are to assert what is really the case, isn't it this? Aren't

clever but unjust men precisely like runners who run well on the first leg but not on the return one?[200] They leap away sharply at first, but in the end they become ridiculous and, heads drooping, run off the field uncrowned. True runners, on the other hand, make it to the end, collect the prizes, and [*c*] are crowned as victors. And isn't it also generally what happens to just people? Toward the end of each course of action and association and of life as a whole, don't they enjoy a good reputation and collect the prizes that come from human beings?

GLAUCON: Of course.

SOCRATES: Will you then allow me to say about them what *you* said about the unjust?[201] For I will claim that it is the just who, when they are old [*d*] enough, hold the ruling offices in their city if they choose, marry from whatever family they choose, and give their children in marriage to whomever they please. Indeed, all the things that you said about the others, I now say about these. As for the unjust, the majority of them, even if they remain hidden when they are young, are caught by the end of the race and ridiculed, and, by the time they get old, have become wretched and are showered with abuse by foreigners and citizens, beaten with whips, and made to suffer those punishments you rightly described as crude, such as racking [*e*] and burning. Imagine I have claimed that they suffer all such things. Well, as I say, see if you will stand for it.

GLAUCON: Of course I will. What you say is right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, while the just man is alive, these are the sorts of prizes, wages, and gifts he receives from gods and human beings, in addition [*614a*] to those good things that justice itself provides.

GLAUCON: Fine and secure ones they are, too!

SOCRATES: Well, they are nothing in number or size compared to those that await each man after death. We must hear about them, too, so that, by hearing them, each of these men may get back in full what he is owed by the argument.

GLAUCON: Please describe them, then, since there are not many things it would be more pleasant to hear. [*b*]

SOCRATES: Well, it is not an Alcinous-story I am going to tell you, but that of a brave man called Er, the son of Armenias, by race a Pamphylian.[202] Once upon a time, he was killed in battle. On the tenth day, when the rest of

the dead were picked up, they were already putrefying, but he was picked up still quite sound. When he had been taken home and was lying on the pyre before his funeral on the twelfth day, he revived and, after reviving, told what he had seen in the other world.

He said that when his soul had departed, it traveled together with many [*c*] others and came to a daimonic place, where there were two adjacent openings in the earth and two in the heavens above and opposite them. Judges were seated between these. And, when they had made their judgments, they told the just to go to the right up through the heavens, with signs of the judgments attached to their fronts. But the unjust they told to travel to the left and down. And they too had on their backs signs of all [*d*] their deeds. When he himself came forward, they said that he was to be a messenger to human beings to tell them about the things happening there, and they told him to listen to and look at everything in the place.

Through one of the openings in the heavens and one in the earth, he saw souls departing after judgment had been passed on them. Through the other two, they were arriving. From the one in the earth they came up parched and dusty, while from the one in the heavens they came down pure. And the [*e*] ones that had just arrived seemed to have come from a long journey, and went off gladly to the meadow, like a crowd going {415} to a festival, and set up camp there. Those that knew one another exchanged greetings and those coming up from the earth asked the others about the things up there, while those from the heavens asked about the others' experiences. They told their [*615a*] stories to one another, the former weeping and lamenting as they recollected all they had suffered and seen on their journey below the earth—which lasted a thousand years—and the ones from the heavens telling, in turn, about their happy experiences and the inconceivably beautiful sights they had seen. To tell it all, Glaucon, would take a long time. But the gist, he said, was this: for all the unjust things they had done and for all the people they had wronged, they had paid the penalty for every one in turn, ten times over for each. That is to say, they paid for each injustice once in every hundred years of their journey, so that, on the assumption that a hundred years is [*b*] roughly the length of a human life, they paid a tenfold penalty for each injustice. For example, if some of them had caused many deaths or had betrayed cities or armies and reduced them to slavery, or had taken part in other evildoing, they would receive ten times

the pain for each of them. On the other hand, if they had done good deeds and become just and pious, they received commensurate awards.

He said some other things about the stillborn and those who lived for [*c*] only a short time, but they are not worth recounting. And he told of even greater wages for impiety or piety toward gods or parents, and for murder. He said he was there, you see, when someone asked where the great Ardiaius was. This Ardiaius had been a tyrant in a city in Pamphylia just a thousand years before that, and was said to have killed his aged father and older brother and committed many other impious deeds as well. He said the one [*d*] who was asked responded: “He has not come here and never will. For in fact this, too, was one of the terrible sights we saw. When we were near the mouth, about to come up after all our sufferings were over, we suddenly saw Ardiaius together with some others, almost all of whom were tyrants—although there were also some private individuals among them who had committed great crimes. They thought that they were about to go up, but [*e*] the mouth would not let them through. Instead, it roared whenever one of these incurably bad people, or anyone else who had not paid a sufficient penalty, tried to go up. At that location, there were savage men, all fiery to look at, standing by, paying attention to the sound, who grabbed some of these people and led them away. But in the case of Ardiaius and others, they bound their feet, hands, and neck and threw them down and flayed them. [*616a*] They dragged them along the road outside, lacerating them on thorn bushes. They explained to those who were passing by at the time why they were being dragged away, and said that they were to be thrown into Tartarus. He said that of the many and multifarious fears they experienced there, the greatest each of them had was that the sound would be heard as he came up, and that each was very pleased when it was silent as he went up. Such then were the penalties and punishments, and the rewards that were their counterparts. [*b*]

When each group had spent seven days in the meadow, on the eighth they had to move on from there and continue their journey. In four days, they came to a place where they could see stretching from above, through the whole heavens and earth, a straight beam of light, like a column, very closely resembling a rainbow, but brighter and more pure. They reached the beam after traveling another day’s journey. And there, in the middle of the light, they saw stretching from the heavens the ends of its bonds—for [*c*]

this light is what binds the heavens, like the cables underneath a trireme, thus holding the entire revolving thing together. From those ends hangs the spindle of Necessity, by means of which all the revolving things are turned. Its shaft and hook were adamant, while its whorl[203] was adamant mixed with materials of other kinds. The nature of the whorl was as follows. Its shape was like the ones here on Earth, but from Er's description, we must think [*d*] of it as being like this: in one great whorl, hollow and scooped out, lay another just like it, only smaller, that fitted into it exactly, the way nested bowls fit together; and similarly a third and a fourth, and four others. For there were eight whorls altogether, lying inside one {416} another, with their rims appearing as circles from above, while from the back they formed one [*e*] continuous whorl around the shaft, which is driven right through the center of the eighth.

Now, the first or outermost whorl had the broadest circular rim, that of the sixth was second, third was that of the fourth, fourth that of the eighth, fifth that of the seventh, sixth that of the fifth, seventh that of the third, and eighth that of the second. That of the greatest was spangled; that of the seventh was brightest; that of the eighth took its color from the seventh's shining [*617a*] on it; that of the second and fifth were very similar to one another, being yellower than the rest; the third was the whitest in color; the fourth was reddish; and the sixth was second in whiteness.

The spindle as a whole revolved at the same speed, but within the revolving whole the seven inner circles gently revolved in the opposite direction to the whole. Of these, the eighth moved fastest; second, and at [*b*] the same speed as one another, were the seventh, sixth, and fifth; third, it seemed to them, in the speed of its counter-revolution, was the fourth; fourth was the third; and fifth the second.[204]

The spindle revolved on the lap of Necessity. On top of each of its circles stood a Siren, who was carried around by its rotation, emitting a single sound, one single note. And from all eight in concord, a single harmony was produced. And there were three other women seated around it equidistant [*c*] from one another, each on a throne. They were the daughters of Necessity, the Fates, dressed in white with garlands on their heads—Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos—and they sang to the accompaniment of the Sirens' harmony, Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, and

Atropos of the future. Clotho, using her right hand, touched the outer circumference of the spindle and helped it turn, pausing from time to time; Atropos, with her left, did the same to the inner ones; and Lachesis used each hand in turn to touch both. [*d*]

When the souls arrived, they had to go straight to Lachesis. A sort of spokesman first arranged them in ranks; then, taking lots and models of lives from the lap of Lachesis, he mounted a high platform, and said: “The word of Lachesis, maiden daughter of Necessity! Ephemeral souls. The beginning of another death-bringing cycle for mortal-kind! Your daimon will not be assigned to you by lot; you will choose him. The one who has the [*e*] first lot will be the first to choose a life to which he will be bound by necessity. Virtue has no master: as he honors or dishonors it, so shall each of you have more or less of it. Responsibility lies with the chooser; the god is blameless.”

After saying that, the spokesman threw the lots out among them all, and each picked up the one that fell next to him—except for Er, who was not allowed. And to the one who picked it up, it was clear what number he had drawn. After that again the spokesman placed the models of lives on the [*618a*] ground before them—many more of them than those who were present. They were multifarious: all animal lives were there, as well as all human lives. There were tyrannies among them, some life-long, others ending halfway through in poverty, exile, and beggary. {417} There were lives of famous men—some famous for the beauty of their appearance or for their other strengths or athletic prowess, others for their nobility and the virtues of their ancestors, and also some infamous in these respects—and similarly for [*b*] women. But the structure of the soul was not included, because with the choice of a different life it would inevitably become different. But all the other qualities were mixed with each other and with wealth or poverty, sickness or health, or the states in between.

Here, it seems, my dear Glaucon, a human being faces the greatest danger of all, and because of that each must, to the neglect of all other subjects, take care above all else to be a seeker and student of that subject which will [*c*] enable him to learn and discover who will give him the ability and the knowledge to distinguish a good life from a bad, so that he will always and in any circumstances choose the better one from among those that are possible. He must calculate the effect of all the things we have mentioned

just now, both jointly and severally, on the virtue of a life, so as to know what the good and bad things are that beauty does when it is mixed with wealth or poverty and this or that state of the soul; what high and [*d*] low birth, private lives and ruling offices, physical strength and weaknesses, ease and difficulties in learning, and all the things that are either naturally part of the soul or can be acquired by it do, when they are mixed with one another. On the basis of all that he will be able, by considering the nature of the soul, to reason out which life is better and which worse and choose [*e*] accordingly, calling worse the one that will lead the soul to become more unjust, and better the one that leads it to become more just. Everything else he will ignore. For we have seen that this is the best way to choose, whether in life or death.

Holding this belief with adamantine determination, he must go down to [*619a*] Hades, so that even there he won't be dazzled[205] by wealth and other such evils, and won't rush into tyrannies or other similar practices and so commit irreparable evils, and suffer even greater ones; but instead will know to choose the middle life in such circumstances, and avoid either of the extremes, both in this life, so far as is possible, and in the whole of the life [*b*] to come. For this is how a human being becomes happiest.

At that point our messenger from the other world also reported that the spokesman said this: "Even for the one who comes last, if he chooses wisely and lives earnestly, there is a satisfactory life available, not a bad one. Let not the first to choose be careless, nor the last discouraged."

When the spokesman had told them that, Er said, the one who drew the first lot came up and immediately chose the greatest tyranny. In his foolishness and greed, you see, he chose it without adequately examining everything, and did not notice that it involved being fated to eat his own [*c*] children, among other evils. When he examined the life at leisure, however, he beat his breast and bemoaned his choice, ignoring the warning of the spokesman. For he did not blame himself for these evils, but chance, daimons, and everything except himself. He was one of those who had come down from the heavens, having lived his previous life in an orderly constitution, sharing in virtue through habit but without philosophy. [*d*]

Generally speaking, not the least number of the people caught out in this way were souls who came from the heavens, and so were untrained in

sufferings. The majority of those from the earth, on the other hand, because they had suffered themselves and had seen others doing so, were in no rush to make their choices. Because of that, and also because of the chance of the lottery, there was an exchange of evils and goods for most of the souls. Yet, if a person, whenever he came to the life that is here, always practiced philosophy in a sound manner, and if the fall of the lot did not put his [*e*] choice of life among the last, it is likely, from what was reported by Er about the next world, that not only will he be happy here, but also that his journey from here to there and back again will not be underground and rough, but smooth and through the heavens.

He said it was a sight worth seeing how the various souls chose their lives, since seeing it caused pity, ridicule, and surprise. For the {418} most part, [*620a*] their choice reflected the character of their former life. He saw the soul that had once belonged to Orpheus, he said, choosing a swan's life: he hated the female sex because of his death at their hands, and so was unwilling to be conceived in a woman and born.[206] He saw the soul of Thamyris choosing a nightingale's life, a swan changing to the choice of a human life, and other musical animals doing the same. The [*b*] twentieth soul chose the life of a lion.

It was that of Ajax, son of Telamon, who avoided human life because he remembered the judgment about the armor.[207] The next was that of Agamemnon, which also hated the human race on account of what it suffered, and so changed to the life of an eagle. Allotted a place in the middle, the soul of Atalanta, when it saw the great honors of a male athlete, unable to pass them by, chose his life. After her, he saw the soul of Epeius, son of Panopeus, taking on the nature of a craftswoman. Further on, among the [*c*] last, he saw the soul of the ridiculous Thersites clothing itself as an ape.

Now it chanced that Odysseus' soul drew the last lot of all, and came to make its choice. Remembering its former sufferings, it rejected love of honor, and went around for a long time looking for the life of a private individual who did his own work, and with difficulty it found one lying off somewhere neglected by the others. When it saw it, it said that it would have done the same even if it had drawn the first-place lot, and chose it [*d*] gladly. Similarly, souls went from the other animals into human beings, or

into one another; the unjust changing into savage animals, the just into tame ones; and every sort of mixture occurred.

When all the souls had chosen lives, in the same allotted order they went forward to Lachesis. She assigned to each the daimon it had chosen, as guardian of its life and fulfiller of its choices. This daimon first led the soul [*e*] under the hand of Clotho as it turned the revolving spindle, thus ratifying the allotted fate it had chosen. After receiving her touch, he led the soul to the spinning of Atropos, to make the spun fate irreversible. Then, without turning around, it went under the throne of Necessity. When it had passed through that, and when the others had also passed through, they all traveled [*621a*] to the plain of Lethe, through burning and choking and terrible heat, for it was empty of trees and earthly vegetation. They camped, since evening was coming on, beside the river of forgetfulness, whose water no vessel can hold. All of them had to drink a certain measure of this water. But those not saved by wisdom drank more than the measure. And as each of them drank, he forgot everything. When they were asleep and midnight came, [*b*] there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake, and they were suddenly carried away from there, this way and that, up to their births, like shooting stars. But Er himself was prevented from drinking the water. Yet how or where he had come back to his body, he did not know, but suddenly recovering his sight he now saw himself lying on the pyre at dawn.

And so, Glaucon, his story was saved and not lost; and it would save us, too, [*c*] if we were persuaded by it, since we would safely cross the river Lethe with our souls undefiled. But if we are persuaded by me, we will believe that the soul is immortal and able to endure every evil and also every good, and always hold to the upward path, practicing justice with wisdom every way we can, so that we will be friends to ourselves and to the gods, both while we remain here on Earth and when we receive the rewards of justice, and go around like victors in the games collecting prizes; and so both in this life and on the thousand-year journey we have described, we will fare well.

1. Note on the translation: The *Republic* is largely in reported speech. Socrates is relating a conversation he had in the past. Here, for ease of reading, his report is cast as an explicit dialogue in direct speech with identified speakers.
2. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (fl. c. 430–400 BCE) was a Sophist and rhetorician of note.
3. "God ever draws together like to like."
4. *Odyssey* xix.392–98.
5. It was a Greek superstition that anyone seen by a wolf before he saw it was struck dumb.
6. *Pancration* was a mixture of boxing and wrestling combined with kicking and strangling.
7. Proverbial characterization of an almost impossible task.
8. Do better (*pleonektein*): an important notion in the *Republic*, connected to *pleonexia*, wanting to get and have more and more. *Pleonexia* is the chief cause of injustice (359c), since it leads one to try to get what belongs to other people, what isn't *one's own*. This concept is contrasted with *doing or having one's own*, which is, or is the cause of, justice (434a, 441e).
9. The temples served as public treasuries, so a temple robber is the equivalent of a present-day bank robber.
10. 341e–342e above.
11. *Euētheia, kakoētheia:* Thrasymachus uses *euētheia* in the bad sense, to mean stupidity. Socrates takes him to mean it in the good sense of being straightforward, and so contrasts it with *kakoētheia*—deviousness. See 400e.
12. 347e.
13. *Ousia* ("being" or "substance") is an abstract noun derived from the verb *einai* ("to be"). The being of justice is what justice really or essentially is.
14. In Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 592–94, it is said of Amphiaraus, "he did not wish to be believed to be the best but to be it." The passage continues with the words Glaucon quotes below at 362a–b.
15. See Homer, *Odyssey* xvi.97–98.
16. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 332–33.
17. Homer, *Odyssey* xix.109.
18. *Works and Days* 287–89, with minor alterations.
19. *Iliad* ix.497–501, with minor alterations.
20. The quotation is attributed to Simonides, who is cited by Polemarchus in Book I.
21. At 361b–c.
22. Sometimes taken to be a facetious, indexical reference to Thrasymachus, whose heirs (sons) in the argument Glaucon and Adeimantus self-confessedly are. It is more likely, however, that it is an honorific expression equivalent in meaning to "that well-known man."
23. Anything eaten with such staples as barley and wheat breads.
24. See 558d–559d.
25. People who memorized epic poems and gave dramatic recitations of them.
26. Musical training included poetry and stories, as well as music proper.
27. Uranus prevented his wife, Gaia, from giving birth to his children by blocking them up inside her. Gaia gave a sickle to one of these children, Cronus, which he used to castrate his father when Uranus next had intercourse with her. Cronus ate the children he had by his wife, Rhea, until, by deceiving him with a stone, she was able to save Zeus from suffering this fate. Zeus then overthrew his father.
28. *Ho theos:* literally, "the god." But the definite article is almost certainly functioning as a universal quantifier, as in "The swallow is a migratory bird."

29. The first three quotations are from *Iliad* xxiv.527–32. The sources for the fourth, and for the quotation from Aeschylus, are unknown. The story of Athena urging Pandarus to break the truce is told at *Iliad* iv.73–126.
30. *Odyssey* xvii.485–86.
31. Inachus was the father of Io, who was persecuted by Hera because Zeus was in love with her. The source for the part of the story Plato quotes is unknown.
32. Because of the ambiguity of the verb *einai* ("to be"), a thing that is could be: (1) a thing that exists (existential "is"); (2) a thing that is beautiful (say) (predicative "is"); (3) a thing that is true or something that is (veridical "is").
33. See *Apology* 27c–d.
34. At *Iliad* ii.1–34, Zeus sends a dream to Agamemnon to promise success if he attacks Troy immediately. The promise is false. The source for the quotation from Aeschylus is unknown.
35. I.e., deny him the funding necessary to hire a chorus of actors and produce his play.
36. *Odyssey* xi.489–91. Odysseus is being addressed by Achilles in Hades.
37. *Iliad* xx.64–65. Hades is afraid that the earth will split open and reveal what his home is like.
38. *Iliad* xxiii.103–4. Achilles speaks these lines as the soul of the dead Patroclus leaves for Hades.
39. *Odyssey* x.493–95. Circe speaking to Odysseus about the prophet Tiresias.
40. *Iliad* xvi.856–57. The words refer to Patroclus, who has just been mortally wounded by Hector.
41. *Iliad* xxiii.100. The soul referred to is that of Patroclus.
42. *Odyssey* xiv.6–9. The souls are those of Penelope's suitors, whom Odysseus has killed.
43. "Cocytus" means river of wailing or lamenting; "Styx," river of hatred.
44. *Iliad* xxiv.3–12.
45. *Iliad* xviii.23–24.
46. *Iliad* xxii.414–15.
47. *Iliad* xviii.54. Thetis, the mother of Achilles, is mourning his fate among the Nereids.
48. *Iliad* xxii.168–69. Zeus is watching Hector being pursued by Achilles.
49. *Iliad* xvi.433–34.
50. *Iliad* i.599–600.
51. *Odyssey* xvii.384.
52. *Iliad* iv.412. Agamemnon has unfairly rebuked Diomedes for cowardice. Diomedes' squire protests, but Diomedes quiets him with these words. By obeying, the squire exhibits the kind of moderation that most people can come to possess.
53. A mix of *Iliad* iii.8 and iv.431.
54. *Iliad* i.225. Achilles is insulting his commander, Agamemnon.
55. *Odyssey* ix.8–10.
56. *Odyssey* xii.342. Eurylochus urges the men to slay the cattle of Helios in Odysseus' absence.
57. *Iliad* xiv.294–341.
58. *Odyssey* viii.266 ff.
59. *Odyssey* xx.17–18. The speaker is Odysseus.
60. The source of the passage is unknown.
61. *Iliad* ix.602–3.
62. *Iliad* xix.278 ff., xxiv.594.
63. *Iliad* xxii.15, 20.
64. *Iliad* xxi.232 ff.
65. *Iliad* xxiii.151–52.
66. *Iliad* xiv.14–18.
67. *Iliad* xxiii.175.

68. According to some legends, Theseus and Peirithous abducted Helen and tried to abduct Persephone from Hades.
69. Thought to be from Aeschylus' lost play *Niobe*.
70. Apollo.
71. *Iliad* i.15 ff.
72. Choral song to the god Dionysus.
73. *Metabolē*: variation in general, but also a technical term in music for the transition from one harmony to another.
74. As was traditionally done to statues of the gods.
75. 387d–388e.
76. *Phthongos, prosōdia: phthongos* is a human voice, an animal cry, or more generally a sound of some sort; *prosōdia* is the tone or accent of a syllable, or a song accompanied by music.
77. The flute is characterized as multi-stringed because of the number of different notes it is capable of producing.
78. After Athena had invented the flute, she discarded it because playing it distorted her features. It was picked up by the satyr Marsyas, who was foolish enough to challenge Apollo (inventor of the lyre) to a musical contest. He was defeated, and Apollo flayed him alive. Satyrs were bestial in their behavior and desires—especially their sexual desires.
79. Probably the dog-headed Egyptian god Anubis.
80. Rhythm is poetic meter, and the elements are the metrical feet.
81. Probably those in which the foot is divided in the ratio of: (1) 2:2—e.g., the dactyl (¯ ˘ ˘) or the spondee (¯ ¯); (2) 3:2—e.g., the paeon (˘ ˘ ˘ ¯); (3) 1:2 or 2:1—e.g., the iamb (˘ ¯) or the trochee (¯ ˘).
82. The precise reference is unclear.
83. The foot being described is probably the dactyl (¯ ˘ ˘): it is warlike and heroic, because Greek heroic poetry was written in dactylic hexameter; complex, because it consists of a long syllable and two short ones; equal up and down in the interchange of long and short, because a long syllable is equal in length to two short ones; and fingerlike, because the first joint on a finger is roughly equal in length to the other two.
84. Fish was a luxury item in Plato's Athens.
85. Corinthian prostitutes enjoyed an international reputation in the Classical period.
86. At *Iliad* xi.580 ff. Eurypylus is wounded, but not treated in this way (see xi.828–36). However, Machaon, the son of Asclepius, does receive this treatment at xi.624–50.
87. Phocylides of Miletus was a mid-sixth-century elegiac and hexameter poet best known for his epigrams.
88. *Iliad* iv.218–19. In the extant text, Machaon is acting alone.
89. *Iliad* xvii.588.
90. *Misologos:* the opposite of a philosopher, who is a *philologos*, a lover of argument. See *Phaedo* 89d–91b.
91. 382a–d.
92. Apparently a reference, first, to the legend of the Phoenician hero Cadmus, who sowed the earth with dragon's teeth from which giants grew; and, second, to the *Odyssey*, and the tales Odysseus tells to the Phaeacians.
93. This discussion begins at 445c, but is interrupted and does not resume again until Book VIII.
94. Ancient Greek statues were painted and gilded.
95. At formal drinking parties (*sumposia*), the toastmaster sat at the head of the table. The others sat in order of their importance, from his right counterclockwise around the table to his left.

96. The reference is obscure; it may be to a saying or proverb, or to a game like checkers.
97. 415a–c.
98. *Odyssey* i.351–52. Our text of Homer is slightly different.
99. Roughly seven feet. A cubit is between seventeen and twenty-two inches long.
100. The Hydra was a mythical monster. When one of its heads was cut off, two or three new heads grew in its place. Heracles (or Hercules) had to slay the Hydra as one of his labors.
101. The oracle of the god is Apollo. His seat is Delphi. A stone there marked the supposed center of the earth.
102. 368b–c.
103. *Euboulos:* in Greek cities, the *boulē* was the council that had day-to-day responsibility for public affairs.
104. 414b.
105. Carbonate of soda from Chalestra, a town and lake in Macedonia.
106. 428a.
107. A fragment of the comedy *Kapēlides* by Theopompus (410–370 BCE) tells us that a certain Leotrophides (emended to Leontius because of Plato's reference here) was known for his love of boys as pale as corpses. So Leontius' desire is probably sexual in origin, and for that reason appetitive. The North and South Walls enclosed an area connecting Athens to Piraeus.
108. 439e.
109. *Odyssey* xx.17. See 390d.
110. 432d–433b.
111. See Book VIII.
112. A proverbial expression applied to those who neglect the task at hand for an uncertain profit. Thrasymachus is reminding Socrates of his own words at 336e.
113. Respectable, well-to-do women lived secluded lives in most Greek states: they were confined to the household (see 579b) and to domestic work and were largely excluded from the public spheres of culture, politics, and warfare.
114. A palestra was a wrestling school and training ground.
115. The story of Arion's rescue by the dolphin is told in Herodotus, *Histories* 1.23–24.
116. See *Meno* 75d.
117. 453c.
118. Plato is adapting a phrase of Pindar.
119. Both hunting dogs and aviaries were common in rich Greek households.
120. 382c–d.
121. Infanticide by exposure was commonly used in ancient Greece as a method of family planning.
122. See *Apology* 21a.
123. See *Apology* 36d.
124. *Works and Days* 40.
125. *Iliad* vii.321.
126. *Iliad* viii.162.
127. *Works and Days* 122.
128. The third wave was proverbially the greatest.
129. The riddle seems to have been this: a man who is not a man saw and did not see a bird that was not a bird in a tree (*xulon*) that was not a tree; he hit (*ballein*) and did not hit it with a stone that was not a stone. The answer is that a eunuch with bad eyesight saw a bat on a rafter, threw a pumice stone at it, and missed. "He saw a bird" is ambiguous between "he saw what was actually a bird" and "he

saw what he took to be a bird," *xulon* means both "tree" and "rafter" or "roof tree," and *ballein* means both "to throw" and "to hit." The rest is obvious.

130. An intoxicant.

131. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1391a, says that when Simonides was asked whether it was better to be rich or wise, he replied: "Rich—because the wise spend their time at the doors of the rich."

132. 487d.

133. 485c.

134. Literally, "the what it is of the nature of each thing itself."

135. See Homer, *Iliad* xxiv.367.

136. I.e., rivals in the craft of teaching virtue.

137. An inescapable compulsion. The origin of the phrase is uncertain.

138. Plato seems to have had Alcibiades in mind here and in what follows. See *Symposium* 215d–216d.

139. The trial of Socrates in 399 BCE is the obvious case in point.

140. See *Apology* 31c–32a.

141. 412a–b.

142. I.e., dialectic.

143. Heraclitus' sun was extinguished at night but rekindled the next morning.

144. See, e.g., *Iliad* i.131.

145. At 412b–414a.

146. 435d.

147. Throughout, Socrates is punning on the word *tokos*, which means either a child or the interest on capital.

148. Helios—the sun—was considered a god.

149. The play seems to be on the similarity of sound between *orano* ("the heavens") and *orato* ("visible").

150.



151. *Odyssey* xi.489–90. The shade of Achilles speaks these words to Odysseus, who is visiting Hades.

152. 505a–b.

153. A proverbial expression, referring to a children's game. The players were divided into two groups. A shell or potsherd—white on one side, black on the other—was thrown into space between them to the cry of "night or day?" Note the reference to night and day in what follows. According to whether white or black fell uppermost, one group ran away pursued by the other.

154. 404a, 412b–417b.

155. 528d.

156. A dense interval is evidently the smallest difference in pitch that was recognized in ancient music.

157. See 516a–b.

158. 511d–511e.

159. A pun made possible by the fact that *alogon* can mean "irrational" (as applied to people) and "incommensurable" (as applied to lines in geometry).

160. 412b–417b.

161. 449b.

162. Homer, *Odyssey* xix.163.
163. Apparently an adaptation of *Iliad* xvi.112–13.
164. The divine creature seems to be the world or universe. See *Timaeus* 30b–d, 32d, 34a–b. Plato does not specify its number.
165. The human geometrical number is the product of 3, 4, and 5 "thrice increased": if $(3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) = (3 \times 4 \times 5)^2$ is one increase, $(3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) = (3 \times 4 \times 5)^4$ is three. This formula included "increases involving both roots and powers": $(3 \times 4 \times 5)$ is a root; its indices are powers. It "comprehends" three "intervals," symbolized by ×, and four "terms"—namely, the roots. The resulting number, 12,960,000, can be represented geometrically as: (1) a square whose sides are 3,600, or (2) an "oblong" or rectangle whose sides are 4,800 and 2,700. (1) is "so many times 100": 36 times. (2) is obtained as follows. The "rational diameter" of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square whose sides are 5. This diameter = $\sqrt{52 + 52} = \sqrt{50} = 7$. Since the square of 7 is 49, we get the longer side of the rectangle by diminishing 49 by 1 and multiplying the result by 100. This gives 4,800. The "irrational diameter" of 5 is $\sqrt{50}$. When squared (= 50), diminished by 2 (= 48), and multiplied by 100, this, too, is 4,800. The short side, "100 cubes of three," = 2,700. The significance of the number is more controversial. The factors "that cause likeness and unlikeness, cause increase and decrease, and make all things mutually agreeable and rational in their relations to one another" are probably the numbers, since odd numbers were thought to cause likeness and even ones unlikeness. Of the numbers significant in human life, one is surely the 100 years of its maximum span (615a–b). Another might be the number of days in the year (roughly 360), and a third might be the divisions of those days into smaller units determined by the sun's place in the sky, since it is the sun that provides for the "coming-to-be, growth, and nourishment" of all visible things (509b). Assuming that those units are the 360 degrees of the sun's path around the earth, the number of moments in a human life that have a potential effect on its coming-to-be, growth, and nourishment would be $100 \times 360 \times 360$, or 12,960,000—Plato's human geometrical number.
166. 414d–415c; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 109–202.
167. Homer, *Iliad* vi.211.
168. The line does not occur in the extant plays, but it may be an adaptation of *Seven against Thebes* 451.
169. 548a.
170. 544c.
171. I.e., as being few in number; *oligos* means few.
172. 374b–c.
173. I.e., Plutus, the god of wealth, who is often represented as being blind.
174. Many public officials in democratic Athens were elected by lot.
175. We no longer possess the play from which this fragment comes.
176. Zeus the wolf-god.
177. The story of the Delphic oracle to Croesus is found in Herodotus, *Histories* i.55.
178. See *Iliad* xvi.776.
179. See 399e note.
180. The fragment is from an unknown play. Euripides meant that tyrants gain wisdom from the wise people who, as Simonides said, "knock at the doors of the rich" (489b). Plato twists his words to mean that the drones and slaves, who are the tyrant's last resort, are wise, since they associate with him.
181. 558c–562a.

182. See 571c–d.
183. The reference is to the way plays were judged at dramatic festivals in Athens. A herald announced the results.
184. The first toast at a banquet was to the Olympian Zeus, the third to our savior, Zeus. By combining both in a single form of address, Plato seems to be emphasizing the importance of this final proof.
185. According to the story, Stesichorus wrote a poem defaming Helen and was punished by being struck with blindness. His sight was restored when he added a verse to the poem in which he claimed that it was a phantom of Helen and not Helen herself who was at Troy.
186. Third because the Greeks always counted the first as well as the last member of a series. The day after tomorrow was the third day.
187. Socrates' mathematics is difficult to follow.
188. See 348b, 360c–361d, 392c.
189. Eriphyle was bribed by Polynices to persuade her husband, Amphiaraus, to take part in an attack on Thebes. Amphiaraus was killed, and Eriphyle was murdered by her son in revenge. See *Odyssey* xi.326–27.
190. The snakelike element hasn't been previously mentioned, although it may be included in "everything that pertains to" the lion (588e).
191. See 399e note.
192. The rhapsodes and poets who recited and expounded Homer throughout the Greek world.
193. It derives from two words, *kreas* (meat) and *phylon* (race or kind). A modern equivalent might be "meathead."
194. 436b–c.
195. 439c–441c.
196. 387d–e.
197. The sources of these quotations are unknown.
198. See 360e–361d, 367b–e.
199. 352a–b, 363a–e.
200. The race is a sprint from one end of the stadium to the other and back.
201. 361d–362c.
202. Books ix–xi of the *Odyssey* were traditionally referred to as *Alkinou apologoi*, the tales of Alcinous. Included among them is the story of Odysseus' descent into Hades.
203. The circular weight that twirls a spindle in weaving.
204. Plato's description of the beam of light and the spindle is difficult. He compares the light to the ropes that bind a trireme together. These ropes seem to have girded the trireme from stem to stern and to have entered it at both places. Within the trireme, they were connected to some sort of twisting device that allowed them to be tightened when the water caused them to stretch and become slack. The spindle of Necessity seems to be just such a twisting device. Hence, the extremities of the light's bonds must enter into the universe just as the ropes enter the trireme, and the spindle must be attached to these extremities, so that its spinning tightens the light and holds the universe together. The light is thus like two rainbows around the universe (or the whorl of the spindle), whose ends enter the universe and are attached to the spindle. The upper half of the whorl of the spindle consists of concentric hemispheres that fit into one another, with their lips or rims fitting together in a single plane. The outer hemisphere is that of the fixed stars; the second is the orbit of Saturn; the third of Jupiter; the fourth of Mars; the fifth of Mercury; the sixth of Venus; the seventh of the sun; and the eighth of the moon. The earth is in the center. The hemispheres are transparent and the width of their rims is the distance of the heavenly bodies from one another.

205. See 364d, 576d.
206. According to one myth, Orpheus was killed and dismembered by Thracian women, or Maenads.
207. Ajax thought that he deserved to be awarded the armor of the dead Achilles, but instead it was awarded to Odysseus. Ajax was maddened by this injustice and later killed himself because of the terrible things he had done while mad.

{419} PARMENIDES

(127a–135d)
Translated by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan.

THE FOLLOWING BRIEF selection shows the young Socrates in the company of Parmenides and Zeno, talking not about ethics but about profound and very abstract metaphysical issues. Are things many or—as Plato takes Parmenides to have argued in his poem—only one? Socrates introduces the theory of forms (128e–130a) as a response to Zeno. Parmenides counters with a series of powerful criticisms of that theory. Since Plato wrote Parmenides' lines, this dialogue is a good example of Plato's willingness to submit even his own cherished views to critical scrutiny.

[*127a*] Antiphon said that Pythodorus said that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was already quite venerable, [*b*] very gray but of distinguished appearance, about sixty-five years old. Zeno was at that time close to forty, a tall, handsome man who had been, as rumor had it, the object of Parmenides' affections when he was a boy. Antiphon said that the two of them were staying with Pythodorus, outside [*c*] the city wall in the Potters' Quarter, and that Socrates had come there, along with a number of others, because they were eager to hear Zeno read his book, which he and Parmenides had just brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then quite young.

Zeno was reading to them in person; Parmenides happened to be out. Very little remained to be read when Pythodorus, as he related it, came [*d*] in, and

with him Parmenides and Aristotle—the man who later became one of the Thirty. They listened to a little of the book at the very end. But not Pythodorus himself; he had heard Zeno read it before.

Then Socrates, after he had heard it, asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again; and when he had read it, Socrates said, [*e*] "Zeno, what do you mean by this: if things are many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible, because unlike things can't be like or like things unlike? That's what you say, isn't it?"

"It is," said Zeno.

"If it's impossible for unlike things to be like and like things unlike, isn't it then also impossible for them to be many? Because, if they were many, they would have incompatible properties. Is this the point of your arguments—simply to maintain, in opposition to everything that is commonly said, that things are not many? And do you suppose that each of your arguments is proof for this position, so that you think you give as many proofs that things are not many as your book has arguments? Is [*128a*] that what you're saying—or do I misunderstand?"

"No," Zeno replied. "On the contrary, you grasp the general point of the book splendidly."

"Parmenides," Socrates said, "I understand that Zeno wants to be on intimate terms with you not only in friendship but also in his book. He has, in a way, written the same thing as you, but by changing it round he tries to fool us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in [*b*] your poem that the all is one, and you give splendid and excellent proofs for that; he, for his part, says that it is not many and gives a vast array of very grand proofs of his own. So, with one of you saying 'one,' and the other 'not many,' and with each of you speaking in a way that suggests that you've said nothing the same—although you mean practically the same thing—what you've said you appear to have said over the heads of the rest of us."

"Yes, Socrates," said Zeno. "Still, you haven't completely discerned the truth about my book, even though you chase down its arguments and [*c*] follow their spoor as keenly as a young Spartan hound. First of all, you have missed this point: the book doesn't at all preen itself on having been written with the intent you described, while disguising it from people, as if that were some great accomplishment. You have mentioned {420} something that happened accidentally. The truth is that the book comes to

the defense of Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by [*d*] claiming that, if it is one, many absurdities and self-contradictions result from that argument. Accordingly, my book speaks against those who assert the many and pays them back in kind with something for good measure, since it aims to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many, would, if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more absurd than those suffered by the hypothesis of its being one. In that competitive spirit, then, I wrote the book when I was a young man. Someone made an unauthorized copy, so I didn't even have a chance to decide [*e*] for myself whether or not it should see the light. So in this respect you missed the point, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's competitiveness, but out of a mature man's vainglory. Still, as I said, your portrayal was not bad."

"I take your point," Socrates said, "and I believe it was as you say. But [*129a*] tell me this: don't you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of likeness, and another form, opposite to this, which is what unlike is? Don't you and I and the other things we call 'many' get a share of those two entities? And don't things that get a share of likeness come to be like in that way and to the extent that they get a share, whereas things that get a share of unlikeness come to be unlike, and things that get a share of both come to be both? And even if all things get a share of both, though they are opposites, and by partaking of them are both like and unlike themselves, what's astonishing about that?

"If someone showed that the likes themselves come to be unlike or the [*b*] unlikes like—that, I think, would be a marvel; but if he shows that things that partake of both of these have both properties, there seems to me nothing strange about that, Zeno—not even if someone shows that all things are one by partaking of oneness, and that these same things are many by partaking also of multitude.[1] But if he should demonstrate this thing itself, what one is, to be many, or, conversely, the many to be one—at this I'll be astonished.

"And it's the same with all the others: if he could show that the kinds [*c*] and forms[2] themselves have in themselves these opposite properties, that would call for astonishment. But if someone should demonstrate that I am one thing and many, what's astonishing about that? He will say, when he

wants to show that I'm many, that my right side is different from my left, and my front from my back, and likewise with my upper and lower parts—since I take it I do partake of multitude. But when he wants to show that I'm one, he will say I'm one person among the seven of us, [*d*] because I also partake of oneness. Thus he shows that both are true.

"So if—in the case of stones and sticks and such things—someone tries to show that the same thing is many and one, we'll say that he is demonstrating something to be many and one, not the one to be many or the many one—and we'll say that he is saying nothing astonishing, but just what all of us would agree to. But if someone first distinguishes as separate the forms, themselves by themselves, of the things I was talking about a moment ago—for example, likeness and unlikeness, multitude and oneness, rest and motion, and everything of that sort—and then shows [*e*] that in themselves they can mix together and separate, I for my part," he said, "would be utterly amazed, Zeno. I think these issues have been handled with great vigor in your book; but I would, as I say, be much more impressed if someone were able to display this same difficulty, which you and Parmenides went through in the case of visible things, also [*130a*] similarly entwined in {421} multifarious ways in the forms themselves—in things that are grasped by reasoning."

Pythodorus said that, while Socrates was saying all this, he himself kept from moment to moment expecting Parmenides and Zeno to get annoyed; but they both paid close attention to Socrates and often glanced at each other and smiled, as though they admired him. In fact, what Parmenides said when Socrates had finished confirmed this impression. "Socrates," he [*b*] said, "you are much to be admired for your keenness for argument! Tell me. Have you yourself distinguished as separate, in the way you mention, certain forms themselves, and also as separate the things that partake of them? And do you think that likeness itself is something, separate from the likeness we have? And one and many and all the things you heard Zeno read about a while ago?"

"I do indeed," Socrates answered.

"And what about these?" asked Parmenides. "Is there a form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?"

"Yes," he said.

[*c*] “What about a form of human being, separate from us and all those like us? Is there a form itself of human being, or fire, or water?”

Socrates said, “Parmenides, I’ve often found myself in doubt whether I should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently.”

“And what about these, Socrates? Things that might seem absurd, like hair and mud and dirt, or anything else totally undignified and worthless? Are [*d*] you doubtful whether or not you should say that a form is separate for each of these, too, which in turn is other than anything we touch with our hands?”

“Not at all,” Socrates answered. “On the contrary, these things are in fact just what we see. Surely it’s too outlandish to think there is a form for them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasn’t troubled me from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there and occupy myself with them.”

“That’s because you are still young, Socrates,” [*e*] said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet gripped you as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you begin to consider none of the cases beneath your notice. Now, though, you still care about what people think, because of your youth.

“But tell me this: is it your view that, as you say, there are certain forms from which these other things, by getting a share of them, derive their [*131a*] names—as, for instance, they come to be like by getting a share of likeness, large by getting a share of largeness, and just and beautiful by getting a share of justice and beauty?”

“It certainly is,” Socrates replied.

“So does each thing that gets a share get as its share the form as a whole or a part of it? Or could there be some other means of getting a share apart from these two?”

“How could there be?” he said.

“Do you think, then, that the form as a whole—one thing—is in each of the many? Or what do you think?”

“What’s to prevent its being one, Parmenides?” said Socrates.

“So, being one and the same, it will be at the same time, as a whole, in [*b*] things that are many and separate; and thus it would be separate from itself.”

“No it wouldn’t,” Socrates said. “Not if it’s like one and the same day. That is in many places at the same time and is none the less not separate from itself. If it’s like that, each of the forms might be, at the same time, one and the same in all.”

“Socrates,” he said, “how neatly you make one and the same thing be in many places at the same time! It’s as if you were to cover many people with a sail, and then say that one thing as a whole is over many. Or isn’t that the sort of thing you mean to say?”

“Perhaps,” he replied. [*c*]

“In that case would the sail be, as a whole, over each person, or would a part of it be over one person and another part over another?”

“A part.”

“So the forms themselves are divisible, Socrates,” he said, “and things that partake of {422} them would partake of a part; no longer would a whole form, but only a part of it, be in each thing.”

“It does appear that way.”

“Then are you willing to say, Socrates, that our one form is really divided? Will it still be one?”

“Not at all,” he replied.

“No,” said Parmenides. “For suppose you are going to divide largeness itself. If each of the many large things is to be large by a part of largeness [*d*] smaller than largeness itself, won’t that appear unreasonable?”

“It certainly will,” he replied.

“What about this? Will each thing that has received a small part of the equal have something by which to be equal to anything, when its portion is less than the equal itself?”

“That’s impossible.”

“Well, suppose one of us is going to have a part of the small. The small will be larger than that part of it, since the part is a part of it: so the small itself will be larger! And that to which the part subtracted is added will [*e*] be smaller, not larger, than it was before.”

“That surely couldn’t happen,” he said.

“Socrates, in what way, then, will the other things get a share of your forms, if they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?”

“By Zeus!” Socrates exclaimed. “It strikes me that’s not at all easy to determine!”

“And what do you think about the following?”

“What’s that?”

[*132a*] “I suppose you think each form is one on the following ground: whenever some number of things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as you look at them all, and from that you conclude that the large is one.”

“That’s true,” he said.

“What about the large itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in the same way with the mind’s eye, again won’t some one thing appear large, by which all these appear large?”[3]

“It seems so.”

“So another form of largeness will make its appearance, which has emerged alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and [*b*] in turn another over all these, by which all of them will be large. Each of your forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude.”

“But, Parmenides, maybe each of these forms is a thought,”[4] Socrates said, “and properly occurs only in minds. In this way each of them might be one and no longer face the difficulties mentioned just now.”

“What do you mean?” he asked. “Is each of the thoughts one, but a thought of nothing?”

“No, that’s impossible,” he said.

“Of something, rather?”

“Yes.”

“Of something that is, or of something that is not?” [*c*]

“Of something that is.”

“Isn’t it of some one thing, which that thought thinks is over all the instances, being some one character?”

“Yes.”

“Then won’t this thing that is thought to be one, being always the same over all the instances, be a form?”

“That, too, appears necessary.”

“And what about this?” said Parmenides. “Given your claim that other things partake of forms, won’t you necessarily think either that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?”[5]

“That isn’t reasonable either, Parmenides,” he said. “No, what appears [*d*] most likely to me is this: these forms are like patterns set in nature, and other things resemble them and are likenesses; and this partaking of the forms is, for the other things, simply being modeled on them.”

“If something resembles the form,” he said, “can that form not be like what has been modeled on it, to the extent that the thing has been made like it? Or is there any way for something like to be like what is not like it?”

“There is not.”

{423} “And isn’t there a compelling necessity for that which is like to partake of the same one form [*e*] as what is like it?”

“There is.”

“But if like things are like by partaking of something, won’t that be the form itself?”

“Undoubtedly.”

“Therefore nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise, alongside the form another form will always make its appearance, and if that form is like anything, yet another; and if the form [*133a*] proves to be like what partakes of it, a fresh form will never cease emerging.”

“That’s very true.”

“So other things don’t get a share of the forms by likeness; we must seek some other means by which they get a share.”

“So it seems.”

“Then do you see, Socrates,” he said, “how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by themselves?”

“Quite clearly.”

“I assure you,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit one form [*b*] in each case every time you make a distinction among things.”

“How so?” he asked.

“There are many other reasons,” Parmenides said, “but the main one is this: suppose someone were to say that if the forms are such as we claim they must be, they cannot even be known. If anyone should raise that objection, you wouldn’t be able to show him that he is wrong, unless the objector happened to be widely experienced and not ungifted, and consented to pay attention while in your effort to show him you dealt with

many distant considerations. Otherwise, the person who insists that they are necessarily unknowable [*c*] would remain unconvinced."

"Why is that, Parmenides?" Socrates asked.

"Because I think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself, would agree, to begin with, that none of those beings is in us."

"Yes—how could it still be itself by itself?" replied Socrates.

"Very good," said Parmenides. "And so all the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. And whether one posits the [*d*] latter as likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by their various names. These things that belong to us, although they have the same names as the forms, are in their turn what they are in relation to themselves but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in this way are of themselves but not of the forms."

"What do you mean?" Socrates asked.

"Take an example," said Parmenides. "If one of us is somebody's master or somebody's slave, he is surely not a slave of master itself—of what a [*e*] master is—nor is the master a master of slave itself—of what a slave is. On the contrary, being a human being, he is a master or slave of a human being. Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and, in the same way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and in relation [*134a*] to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what they are in relation to themselves. You do understand what I mean?"

"Certainly," Socrates said, "I understand."

"So too," he said, "knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth itself, which is what truth is?"

"Certainly."

"Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing is. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"But wouldn't knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth that belongs to our world? And wouldn't it follow that each particular knowledge that [*b*] belongs to us is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world?"

“Necessarily.”

“But, as you agree, we neither have the forms themselves nor can they belong to us.”

“Yes, you’re quite right.”

{424} “And surely the kinds themselves, what each of them is, are known by the form of knowledge itself?”

“Yes.”

“The very thing that we don’t have.”

“No, we don’t.”

“So none of the forms is known by us, because we don’t partake of knowledge itself.”

“It seems not.”

“Then the beautiful itself, what it is, cannot be known by us, nor can the [*c*] good, nor, indeed, can any of the things we take to be characters themselves.”

“It looks that way.”

“Here’s something even more shocking than that.”

“What’s that?”

“Surely you would say that if in fact there is knowledge—a kind itself—it is much more precise than is knowledge that belongs to us. And the same goes for beauty and all the others.”

“Yes.”

“Well, whatever else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn’t you say that god more than anyone else has this most precise knowledge?”

“Necessarily.”

“Tell me, will god, having knowledge itself, then be able to know things [*d*] that belong to our world?”

“Yes, why not?”

“Because we have agreed, Socrates,” Parmenides said, “that those forms do not have their power in relation to things in our world, and things in our world do not have theirs in relation to forms, but that things in each group have their power in relation to themselves.”

“Yes, we did agree on that.”

“Well then, if this most precise mastery and this most precise knowledge belong to the divine, the gods’ mastery could never master us, nor could their knowledge know us or anything that belongs to us. No, just as we [*e*]

do not govern them by our governance and know nothing of the divine by our knowledge, so they in their turn are, for the same reason, neither our masters nor, being gods, do they know human affairs."

"If god is to be stripped of knowing," he said, "our argument may be getting too bizarre."

"And yet, Socrates," said Parmenides, "the forms inevitably involve these objections and a host of others besides—if there are those characters [*135a*] for things, and a person is to mark off each form as 'something itself.' As a result, whoever hears about them is doubtful and objects that they do not exist, and that, even if they do, they must by strict necessity be unknowable to human nature; and in saying this he seems to have a point; and, as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by [*b*] itself; but only a prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else who has sifted all these difficulties thoroughly and critically for himself."

"I agree with you, Parmenides," Socrates said. "That's very much what I think too."

"Yet on the other hand, Socrates," said Parmenides, "if someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just brought up and others of the same sort, won't allow that there are forms for things and won't mark off a form for each one, he won't have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesn't allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the [*c*] same. In this way he will destroy the power of dialectic[6] entirely. But I think you are only too well aware of that."

"What you say is true," Socrates said.

"What then will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?"

"I don't think I have anything clearly in view, at least not at present."

"Socrates, that's because you are trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon," he said, "before [*d*] you have been properly trained. I noticed that the other day too, as I listened to you conversing with Aristotle here. The impulse you bring to argument is noble and divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still young, put your back into it and get more training through something

people think useless—what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you."

1. Like *to hen* ("the one," "oneness") the expression *plēthos* ("multitude") is also ambiguous. It can refer to a form, to any group of many things (whether concrete particulars or forms), or the character things have if they are many. Corresponding to the ambiguity in the meaning of "one," between "single" and "unified," there is an ambiguity in the meaning of "multitude." It can specify a plurality of definite individuals or some mass that lacks unity and definiteness.
2. In this dialogue Plato uses three different abstract expressions to specify forms, two of which occur here: *genos*, which we render as "kind," and *eidos*, which we render as "form." Later he will use a third term, *idea*, which we render as "character."
3. Alternatively: "If you look at them all in the same way with the mind's eye, won't some one large again appear, by which all these appear large?"
4. Alternatively: "But, Parmenides, maybe each of the forms is a thought of these things."
5. Alternatively: "or that, although they are thoughts, they are not thought?"
6. The Greek word is *dialegesthai*, which could instead be translated as "discourse," or untechnically as "conversation."

{425} TIMAEUS

(27e–58c)
Translated by Donald J. Zeyl.

THE FOLLOWING SELECTION deals with the creation of the universe. It makes use of the theory of forms, not now in an ethical or metaphysical context, but to deal with the kind of cosmological and scientific issues familiar from the writings of the Presocratics.

TIMAEUS: As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is *that which always is* and has no becoming, and what is *that which* [*28a*] *becomes* but never is? The former is grasped by

understanding, which involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but never really is. Now everything that comes to be[1] must of necessity come to be by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be without a cause. So whenever the craftsman looks at what is always changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so [*b*] completes is beautiful. But were he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that has been begotten, his work will lack beauty.

Now as to the whole universe [*ouranos*] or world order [*kosmos*]—let's just call it by whatever name is most acceptable in a given context—there is a question we need to consider first. This is the sort of question one should begin with in inquiring into any subject. Has it always existed? Was there no origin from which it came to be? Or did it come to be and take its start from some origin? It has come to be. For it is both visible and tangible and it has a body—and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we [*c*] have shown, perceptible things are grasped by opinion, which involves sense perception. As such, they are things that come to be, things that are begotten. Further, we maintain that, necessarily, that which comes to be must come to be by the agency of some cause. Now to find the maker and father of this universe [*to pan*] is hard enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare him to everyone is impossible. And so we must go back and raise this question about the universe: Which of the two models did the maker use when he fashioned it? Was it the one that does not change and stays [*29a*] the same, or the one that has come to be? Well, if this world of ours is beautiful and its craftsman good, then clearly he looked at the eternal model. But if what it's blasphemous to even say is the case, then he looked at one that has come to be. Now surely it's clear to all that it was the eternal model he looked at, for, of all the things that have come to be, our universe is the most beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.

Since these things are so, it follows by unquestionable necessity that this [*b*] world is an image of something. Now in every subject it is of utmost importance to begin at the natural beginning, and so, on the subject of an image and its model, we must make the following specification: the accounts we give of things have the same character as the subjects they set forth. So accounts of what is stable and fixed and transparent to understanding are themselves stable and unshifting. We must do our very best to make these accounts as irrefutable and invincible as any account may be. On the other hand, accounts we give of that which has been formed to be [*c*] like that reality, since they are accounts of what is a likeness, are themselves likely, and stand in proportion to the previous accounts, i.e., what being is to becoming, truth is to convincingness. Don't {426} be surprised then, Socrates, if it turns out repeatedly that we won't be able to produce accounts on a great many subjects—on gods or the coming to be of the universe—that are completely and perfectly consistent and accurate. Instead, if we can come up with accounts no less likely than any, we ought to be content, keeping in mind that both I, the speaker, and you, the judges, are only [*d*] human. So we should accept the likely tale on these matters. It behooves us not to look for anything beyond this.

SOCATES: Bravo, Timaeus! By all means! We must accept it as you say we should. This overture of yours was marvelous. Go on now and let us have the work itself.

TIMAEUS: Very well then. Now why did he who framed this whole [*e*] universe of becoming frame it? Let us state the reason why: he was good, and one who is good can never become jealous of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible. In fact, men of wisdom will tell you (and you couldn't do [*30a* better than to accept their claim) that this, more than anything else, was the most preeminent reason for the origin of the world's coming to be. The god wanted everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all that was visible—not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion—and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than disorder. Now it wasn't permitted (nor is it now) that one who is [*b*] supremely good should do anything but what is best. Accordingly, the god reasoned and concluded that in the realm of things naturally visible no

unintelligent thing could as a whole be better than anything which does possess intelligence as a whole, and he further concluded that it is impossible for anything to come to possess intelligence apart from soul. Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so he constructed the universe. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine [*c*] providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence.

This being so, we have to go on to speak about what comes next. When the maker made our world, what living thing did he make it resemble? Let us not stoop to think that it was any of those that have the natural character of a part, for nothing that is a likeness of anything incomplete could ever turn out beautiful. Rather, let us lay it down that the universe resembles more closely than anything else that Living Thing of which all other living things are parts, both individually and by kinds. For that Living Thing comprehends within itself all intelligible living things, just [*d*] as our world is made up of us and all the other visible creatures. Since the god wanted nothing more than to make the world like the best of the intelligible things, complete in every way, he made it a single visible living [*31a*] thing, which contains within itself all the living things whose nature it is to share its kind.

Have we been correct in speaking of one universe, or would it have been more correct to say that there are many, in fact infinitely many universes? There is but one universe, if it is to have been crafted after its model. For that which contains all of the intelligible living things couldn’t ever be one of a pair, since that would require there to be yet another Living Thing, the one that contained those two, of which they then would be parts, and then it would be more correct to speak of our universe as made in the likeness, now not of those two, but of that other, the one that contains them. So, in order that this living thing should be like the complete Living [*b*] Thing in respect of uniqueness, the Maker made neither two, nor yet an infinite number of worlds. On the contrary, our universe came to be as the one and only thing of its kind, is so now and will continue to be so in the future.

Now that which comes to be must have bodily form, and be both visible and tangible, but nothing could ever become visible apart from fire, nor tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. That is why, as he

began to put the body of the universe together, the god came to make it out of fire and earth. But it isn't possible to combine two things well all by themselves, {427} without a third; there has to be some bond between the [*c*] two that unites them. Now the best bond is one that really and truly makes a unity of itself together with the things bonded by it, and this in the nature of things is best accomplished by proportion. For whenever of three numbers which are either solids or squares the middle term between any [*32a*] two of them is such that what the first term is to it, it is to the last, and, conversely, what the last term is to the middle, it is to the first, then, since the middle term turns out to be both first and last, and the last and the first likewise both turn out to be middle terms, they will all of necessity turn out to have the same relationship to each other, and, given this, will all be unified.

So if the body of the universe were to have come to be as a two-dimensional plane, a single middle term would have sufficed to bind together [*b*] its conjoining terms with itself. As it was, however, the universe was to be a solid, and solids are never joined together by just one middle term but always by two. Hence the god set water and air between fire and earth, and made them as proportionate to one another as was possible, so that what fire is to air, air is to water, and what air is to water, water is to earth. He then bound them together and thus he constructed the visible and tangible universe. This is the reason why these four particular constituents [*c*] were used to beget the body of the world, making it a symphony of proportion.[2] They bestowed friendship upon it, so that, having come together into a unity with itself, it could not be undone by anyone but the one who had bound it together.

Now each one of the four constituents was entirely used up in the process of building the world. The builder built it from all the fire, water, air, and earth there was, and left no part or power of any of them out. His [*d*] intentions in so doing were these: First, that as a living thing it should be [*33a*] as whole and complete as possible and made up of complete parts. Second, that it should be just one universe, in that nothing would be left over from which another one just like it could be made. Third, that it should not get old and diseased. He realized that when heat or cold or anything else that possesses strong powers surrounds a composite body from outside and

attacks it, it destroys that body prematurely, brings disease and old age upon it and so causes it to waste away. That is why he concluded that he should fashion the world as a single whole, composed of all wholes, complete and free of old age and disease, and why he fashioned it that [*b*] way. And he gave it a shape appropriate to the kind of thing it was. The appropriate shape for that living thing that is to contain within itself all the living things would be the one which embraces within itself all the shapes there are. Hence he gave it a round shape, the form of a sphere, with its center equidistant from its extremes in all directions. This of all shapes is the most complete and most like itself, which he gave to it because he believed that likeness is incalculably more excellent than unlikeness. [*c*] And he gave it a smooth round finish all over on the outside, for many reasons. It needed no eyes, since there was nothing visible left outside it; nor did it need ears, since there was nothing audible there, either. There was no air enveloping it that it might need for breathing, nor did it need any organ by which to take in food or, again, expel it when it had been digested. For since there wasn't anything else, there would be nothing to leave it or come to it from anywhere. It supplied its own waste for its food. Anything that it did or experienced it was designed to do or experience [*d*] within itself and by itself. For the builder thought that if it were self-sufficient, it would be a better thing than if it required other things.

And since it had no need to catch hold of or fend off anything, the god thought that it would be pointless to attach hands to it. Nor would it need [*34a*] feet or any support to stand on. In fact, he {428} awarded it the movement suited to its body—that one of the seven motions which is especially associated with understanding and intelligence. And so he set it turning continuously in the same place, spinning around upon itself. All the other six motions he took away, and made its movement free of their wanderings. And since it didn't need feet to follow this circular path, he begat it without legs or feet.

[*b*] Applying this entire train of reasoning to the god that was yet to be, the eternal god made it smooth and even all over, equal from the center, a whole and complete body itself, but also made up of complete bodies. In its center he set a soul, which he extended throughout the whole body, and with which he then covered the body outside. And he set it to turn in a circle, a single solitary universe, whose very excellence enables it to keep

its own company without requiring anything else. For its knowledge of and friendship with itself is enough. All this, then, explains why this world which he begat for himself is a blessed god.

As for the world's soul, even though we are now embarking on an account of it *after* we've already given an account of its body, it isn't the case that the god devised it to be younger than the body. For the god [*c*] would not have united them and then allow the elder to be ruled by the younger. We have a tendency to be casual and random in our speech, reflecting, no doubt, the whole realm of the casual and random of which we are a part. The god, however, gave priority and seniority to the soul, both in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the body's mistress and to rule over it as her subject.

The components from which he made the soul and the way in which [*35a*] he made it were as follows: In between the *Being* that is indivisible and always changeless, and the one that is divisible and comes to be in the corporeal realm, he mixed a third, intermediate form of being, derived from the other two. Similarly, he made a mixture of the *Same*, and then one of the *Different*, in between their indivisible and their corporeal, divisible counterparts. And he took the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same. Now when he had mixed these two together [*b*] with Being, and from the three had made a single mixture, he redivided the whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different, and of Being. This is how he began the division: first he took one portion away from the whole, and then he took another, twice as large, followed by a third, one and a half times as large as the second and three times as large as the first. The fourth portion he took was twice as large as the second, the fifth three times as large as the third, the sixth eight times that of the first, and the seventh twenty-seven times that of the first.

After this he went on to fill the double and triple intervals by cutting [*36a*] off still more portions from the mixture and placing these between them, in such a way that in each interval there were two middle terms, one exceeding the first extreme by the same fraction of the extremes by which it was exceeded by the second, and the other exceeding the first extreme by a number equal to that by which it was exceeded by the second. These

connections produced intervals of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 within the previous intervals. He then proceeded to fill all the 4/3 intervals with the 9/8 [*b*] interval, leaving a small portion over every time. The terms of this interval of the portion left over made a numerical ratio of 256/243. And so it was that the mixture, from which he had cut off these portions, was eventually completely used up.[3]

{429} Next, he sliced this entire compound in two along its length, joined the [*c*] two halves together center to center like an X, and bent them back in a circle, attaching each half to itself end to end and to the ends of the other half at the point opposite to the one where they had been joined together. He then included them in that motion which revolves in the same place without variation, and began to make the one the outer, and the other the inner circle. And he decreed that the outer movement should be the movement of *the Same*, while the inner one should be that of *the Different*. He made the movement of the Same revolve toward the right by way of the side, and that of the Different toward the left by way of the diagonal, [*d*] and he made the revolution of the Same, i.e., the uniform, the dominant one in that he left this one alone undivided, while he divided the inner one six times, to make seven unequal circles. His divisions corresponded to the several double and triple intervals, of which there were three each. He set the circles to go in contrary directions: three to go at the same speed, and the other four to go at speeds different from both each other's and that of the other three. Their speeds, however, were all proportionate to each other.[4]

{430} Once the whole soul had acquired a form that pleased him, he who [*e*] formed it went on to fashion inside it all that is corporeal, and, joining center to center, he fitted the two together. The soul was woven together with the body from the center on out in every direction to the outermost limit of the universe, and covered it all around on the outside. And, revolving within itself, it initiated a divine beginning of unceasing, intelligent life for all time. Now while the body of the universe had come to be as a visible thing, the soul was invisible. But even so, because it shares in [*37a*] reason and harmony, the soul came to be as the most excellent of all the things begotten by him who is himself most excellent of all that is intelligible and eternal.

Because the soul is a mixture of the Same, the Different and Being (the three components we've described), because it was divided up and bound together in various proportions, and because it circles round upon itself, then, whenever it comes into contact with something whose being is scatterable or else with something whose being is indivisible, it is stirred throughout its whole self. It then declares what exactly that thing is the same as, [*b*] or what it is different from, and in what respect and in what manner, as well as when, it turns out that they are the same or different and are characterized as such.[5] This applies both to the things that come to be, and to those that are always changeless. And when this contact gives rise to an account that is equally true whether it is about what is different or about what is the same, and is borne along without utterance or sound within the self-moved thing, then, whenever the account concerns anything that is perceptible, the circle of the Different goes straight and proclaims it throughout its whole soul. This is how firm and true opinions and convictions come about. Whenever, on the other hand, the account concerns [*c*] any object of reasoning, and the circle of the Same runs well and reveals it, the necessary result is understanding and knowledge. And if anyone should ever call that in which these two arise, not soul but something else, what he says will be anything but true.

Now when the Father who had begotten the universe observed it set in motion and alive, a thing that had come to be as a shrine for the everlasting gods, he was well pleased, and in his delight he thought of making it more like its model still. So, as the model was itself an everlasting Living Thing, [*d*] he set himself to bringing this universe to completion in such a way that it, too, would have that character to the extent that was possible. Now it was the Living Thing's nature to be eternal, but it isn't possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that is begotten. And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought order to the universe, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This number, of course, is what we now call "time."

For before the heavens came to be, there were no days or nights, no [*e*] months or years. But now, at the same time as he framed the heavens, he devised their coming to be. These all are parts of time, and *was* and *will be*

are forms of time that {431} have come to be. Such notions we unthinkingly but incorrectly apply to everlasting being. For we say that it *was* and *is* and *will be*, but according to the true account only *is* is appropriately said [*38a*] of it. *Was* and *will be* are properly said about the becoming that passes in time, for these two are motions. But that which is always changeless and motionless cannot become either older or younger in the course of time—it neither ever became so, nor is it now such that it has become so, nor will it ever be so in the future. And all in all, none of the characteristics that becoming has bestowed upon the things that are borne about in the realm of perception are appropriate to it. These, rather, are forms of time that have come to be—time that imitates eternity and circles according to number. And what is more, we also say things like these: that what has [*b*] come to be is what has come to be, that what is coming to be *is* what is coming to be, and also that what will come to be *is* what will come to be, and that what is not *is* what is not. None of these expressions of ours is accurate. But I don't suppose this is a good time right now to be too meticulous about these matters.

Time, then, came to be together with the universe so that just as they were begotten together, they might also be undone together, should there ever be an undoing of them. And it came to be after the model of that [*c*] which is sempiternal, so that it might be as much like its model as possible. For the model is something that has being for all eternity, while it, on the other hand, has been, is, and shall be for all time, forevermore. Such was the reason, then, such the god's design for the coming to be of time, that he brought into being the Sun, the Moon and five other stars, for the begetting of time. These are called "wanderers," and they came to be in order to set limits to and stand guard over the numbers of time. When the god had finished making a body for each of them, he placed them into [*d*] the orbits traced by the period of the Different—seven bodies in seven orbits. He set the Moon in the first circle, around the earth, and the Sun in the second, above it. The Dawnbearer (the Morning Star, or Venus) and the star said to be sacred to Hermes (Mercury) he set to run in circles that equal the Sun's in speed, though they received the power contrary to its power. As a result, the Sun, the star of Hermes and the Dawnbearer alike overtake and are overtaken by one another. As for the other bodies, if I were to spell out where he situated them, and all his reasons for doing so, my account,

already a digression, would make more work than its purpose calls for. Perhaps later on we could at our leisure give this subject the exposition it deserves.

Now when each of the bodies that were to cooperate in producing time had come into the movement prepared for carrying it and when, bound by bonds of soul, these bodies had been begotten with life and learned their assigned tasks, they began to revolve along the movement of the [*39a*] Different, which is oblique and which goes through the movement of the Same, by which it is also dominated. Some bodies would move in a larger circle, others in a smaller one, the latter moving more quickly and the former more slowly. Indeed, because of the movement of the Same, the ones that go around most quickly appeared to be overtaken by those going more slowly, even though in fact they were overtaking them. For as it revolves, this movement gives to all these circles a spiral twist, because [*b*] they are moving forward in two contrary directions at once. As a result, it makes that body which departs most slowly from it—and it is the fastest of the movements—appear closest to it.

And so that there might be a conspicuous measure of their relative slowness and quickness with which they move along in their eight revolutions, the god kindled a light in the orbit second from the earth, the light that we now call the Sun. Its chief work would be to shine upon the whole universe and to bestow upon all those living things appropriately endowed and taught by the revolution of the Same and the uniform, a share in [*c*] number. In this way and for these reasons night-and-day, the period of a single circling, the wisest one, came to be. A month has passed when the Moon has completed its own cycle and overtaken the Sun; a year when the Sun has completed its own cycle.

As for the periods of the other bodies, all but a scattered few have failed to take any note of them. Nobody has given them names or investigated {432} their numerical measurements relative to each other. And so people are all but ignorant of the fact that time really is the wanderings of these [*d*] bodies, bewilderingly numerous as they are and astonishingly variegated. It is none the less possible, however, to discern that the perfect number of time brings to completion the perfect year at that moment when the relative speeds of all eight periods have been completed together and, measured by the circle of the Same that moves uniformly, have achieved their

consummation. This, then, is how as well as why those stars were begotten which, on their way through the universe, would have turnings. The purpose was to make this living thing as like as possible to that perfect [*e*] and intelligible Living Thing, by way of imitating its sempiternity.

Prior to the coming to be of time, the universe had already been made to resemble in various respects the model in whose likeness the god was making it, but the resemblance still fell short in that it didn't yet contain all the living things that were to have come to be within it. This remaining task he went on to perform, casting the world into the nature of its model. And so he determined that the living thing he was making should possess the same kinds and numbers of living things as those which, according to the discernment of Intellect, are contained within the real Living Thing. Now there are four of these kinds: first, the heavenly race of gods; next, the kind that has wings and travels through the air; third, the kind that [*40a*] lives in water; and fourth, the kind that has feet and lives on land. The gods he made mostly out of fire, to be the brightest and fairest to the eye.[6] He made them well-rounded, to resemble the universe, and placed them in the wisdom of the dominant circle [i.e., of the Same], to follow the course of the universe. He spread the gods throughout the whole heaven to be a true adornment [*kosmos*] for it, an intricately wrought whole. And he bestowed two movements upon each of them. The first was rotation, an unvarying movement in the same place, by which the god would always think the same thoughts about the same things. The other was revolution, [*b*] a forward motion under the dominance of the circular carrying movement of the Same and uniform. With respect to the other five motions, the gods are immobile and stationary, in order that each of them may come as close as possible to attaining perfection.

This, then, was the reason why all those everlasting and unwandering stars —divine living things which stay fixed by revolving without variation in the same place—came to be. Those that have turnings and thus wander in that sort of way came to be as previously described.

The Earth he devised to be our nurturer, and, because it winds around [*c*] the axis that stretches throughout the universe, also to be the maker and guardian of day and night. Of the gods that have come to be within the universe, Earth ranks as the foremost, the one with greatest seniority.

To describe the dancing movements of these gods, their juxtapositions and the back-circlings and advances of their circular courses on themselves; to tell which of the gods come into line with one another at their conjunctions and how many of them are in opposition, and in what order and at which times they pass in front of or behind one another, so that some are occluded from our view to reappear once again, thereby bringing terrors [*d*] and portents of things to come to those who cannot reason—to tell all this without the use of visible models would be labor spent in vain. We will make do with this account, and so let this be the conclusion of our discussion of the nature of the visible and generated gods.

As for the other spiritual beings [*daimones*], it is beyond our task to know and speak of how they came to be. We should accept on faith the assertions of those figures of the past who claimed to be the offspring of gods. They must surely have been well informed about their own ancestors. So we [*e*] cannot avoid believing the children of gods, even though their accounts lack plausible or compelling proofs. Rather, we should follow custom and believe them, on the ground that what they claim to be reporting are matters of their own concern. Accordingly, let us accept {433} their account of how these gods came to be and state what it is.

Earth and Heaven gave birth to Ocean and Tethys, who in turn gave birth to Phorcys, Cronus, and Rhea and all the gods in that generation. [*41a*] Cronus and Rhea gave birth to Zeus and Hera, as well as all those siblings who are called by names we know. These in turn gave birth to yet another generation. In any case, when all the gods had come to be, both the ones who make their rounds conspicuously and the ones who present themselves only to the extent that they are willing, the begetter of this universe spoke to them. This is what he said: “O gods, works divine whose maker and father I am, whatever has come to be by my hands cannot be undone but by my consent. Now [*b*] while it is true that anything that is bound is liable to being undone, still, only one who is evil would consent to the undoing of what has been well fitted together and is in fine condition. This is the reason why you, as creatures that have come to be, are neither completely immortal nor exempt from being undone. Still, you will not be undone nor will death be your portion, since you have received the guarantee of my will —a greater, more sovereign bond than those with which you were bound when you came to be. Learn now, therefore, what I declare to you. There

remain still three kinds of mortal beings that have not yet been begotten; and as long as they have not come to be, the universe will be incomplete, for it will still [*c*] lack within it all the kinds of living things it must have if it is to be sufficiently complete. But if these creatures came to be and came to share in life by my hand, they would rival the gods. It is you, then, who must turn yourselves to the task of fashioning these living things, as your nature allows. This will assure their mortality, and this whole universe will really be a completed whole. Imitate the power I used in causing you to be. And to the extent that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares our name of 'immortal,' something described as divine and ruling within those of them who always consent to follow after justice and after you, I shall begin by sowing that seed, and then hand it over to you. The rest of [*d*] the task is yours. Weave what is mortal to what is immortal, fashion and beget living things. Give them food, cause them to grow, and when they perish, receive them back again."

When he had finished this speech, he turned again to the mixing bowl he had used before, the one in which he had blended and mixed the soul of the universe. He began to pour into it what remained of the previous ingredients and to mix them in somewhat the same way, though these were no longer invariably and constantly pure, but of a second and third grade of purity. And when he had compounded it all, he divided the mixture into a number of souls equal to the number of the stars and assigned each soul to a star. He mounted each soul in a carriage, as it [*e*] were, and showed it the nature of the universe. He described to them the laws that had been foreordained: They would all be assigned one and the same initial birth, so that none would be less well treated by him than any other. Then he would sow each of the souls into that instrument of time suitable to it, where they were to acquire the nature of being the most [*42a*] god-fearing of living things, and, since humans have a twofold nature, the superior kind should be such as would from then on be called "man." So, once the souls were of necessity implanted in bodies, and these bodies had things coming to them and leaving them, the first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they all would have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as [*b*] well as all their natural

opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust. And if a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character. But if he failed in this, he would be born a second time, now as a woman. [*c*] And if even then he still could not refrain from wickedness, he would be changed once again, this time into some wild animal that resembled the wicked character he had acquired. And he would have no rest from these toilsome {434} transformations until he had dragged that massive accretion of fire-water-air-earth into conformity with the revolution of the Same and uniform within him, and so subdued that turbulent, irrational mass by means of [*d*] reason. This would return him to his original condition of excellence.

Having set out all these ordinances to them—which he did to exempt himself from responsibility for any evil they might afterwards do—the god proceeded to sow some of them into the Earth, some into the Moon, and others into the various other instruments of time. After the sowing, he handed over to the young gods the task of weaving mortal bodies. He had them make whatever else remained that the human soul still needed [*e*] to have, plus whatever goes with those things. He gave them the task of ruling over these mortal living things and of giving them the finest, the best possible guidance they could give, without being responsible for any evils these creatures might bring upon themselves.

When he had finished assigning all these tasks, he proceeded to abide at rest in his own customary nature. His children immediately began to attend to and obey their father’s assignment. Now that they had received the immortal principle of the mortal living thing, they began to imitate the craftsman who had made them. They borrowed parts of fire, earth, [*43a*] water, and air from the world, intending to pay them back again, and bonded together into a unity the parts they had taken, but not with those indissoluble bonds by which they themselves were held together. Instead, they proceeded to fuse them together with copious rivets so small as to be invisible, thereby making each body a unit made up of all the components. And they went on to invest this body—into and out of which things were to flow—with the orbits of the immortal soul. These orbits, now bound within a mighty river, neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but

tossed it violently and were violently tossed by it. Consequently [*b*] the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it would proceed in a disorderly, random, and irrational way that involved all six of the motions.[7] It would go forwards and backwards, then back and forth to the right and the left, and upwards and downwards, wandering every which way in these six directions. For mighty as the nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck against the living things. [*c*] Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and collided with external fire (i.e., fire other than the body's own) or for that matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or when it was caught up by a surge of air-driven winds. The motions produced by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, and strike against it. (That is no doubt why these motions as a group came afterwards to be called "sensations," as they are still called today.) It was just then, at that very instant, that they produced a very long and [*d*] intense commotion. They cooperated with the continually flowing channel to stir and violently shake the orbits of the soul. They completely bound that of the Same by flowing against it in the opposite direction, and held it fast just as it was beginning to go its way. And they further shook the orbit of the Different right through, with the result that they twisted every which way the three intervals of the double and the three of the triple, as well as the middle terms of the ratios of 3/2, 4/3, and 9/8 that connect them. [These agitations did not undo them, however,] because they cannot be completely undone except by the one who had bound them together. They mutilated and disfigured the circles in every possible way so that [*e*] the circles barely held together and though they remained in motion, they moved without rhyme or reason, sometimes in the opposite direction, sometimes sideways and sometimes upside down—like a man upside down, head propped against the ground and holding his feet up against something. In that position his right side will present itself both to him and to those looking at him as left, and his left side as right. It is this very thing—and others like it—that had such a dramatic effect upon the revolutions of the soul. Whenever they encounter something outside of [*44a*] them characterizable as *same* {435} or *different*, they will speak of it as "the same as" something,

or as “different from” something else when the truth is just the opposite, so proving themselves to be misled and unintelligent. Also, at this stage souls do not have a ruling orbit taking the lead. And so when certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul’s entire vessel along with them. It is then that these revolutions, however much in control they seem to be, are actually under their control. All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence. But as the stream that brings growth [*b*] and nourishment diminishes and the soul’s orbits regain their composure, resume their proper courses and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time, their revolutions are set straight, to conform to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course. They then correctly identify what is the same and what is different, and render intelligent the person who possesses them. And to be sure, if such a person also gets proper nurture to supplement his education, he’ll turn out perfectly [*c*] whole and healthy, and will have escaped the most grievous of illnesses. But if he neglects this, he’ll limp his way through life and return to Hades uninitiated and unintelligent.

But this doesn’t happen until later. Our present subject, on the other hand, needs a more detailed treatment. We must move on to treat the prior questions—the ones that deal with how bodies came to be, part by part, as well as the soul. What were the gods’ reasons, what was their plan when they caused these to be? In discussing these questions we shall hold fast to what is most likely, and proceed accordingly.

Copying the revolving shape of the universe, the gods bound the two divine orbits into a ball-shaped body, the part that we now call our head. This is the most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts. They then assembled the rest of the body and handed the whole of it to the head, to be in its service. They intended it to share in all the motions there [*d*] were to be. To keep the head from rolling around on the ground without any way of getting up over its various high spots and out of the low, they gave it the body as a vehicle to make its way easy. This is the reason why the body came to have length and grow four limbs that could flex and extend themselves, divinely devised for the purpose of getting about. Holding on and supporting itself with these limbs, it would be capable of [*45a*] making

its way through all regions, while carrying at the top the dwelling place of that most divine, most sacred part of ourselves. This is how as well as why we have all grown arms and legs. And considering the front side to be more honorable and more commanding than the back, the gods gave us the ability to travel for the most part in this direction. Human beings no doubt ought to have the front sides of their bodies distinguishable from and dissimilar to their backs, and so the gods began by setting the [*b*] face on that side of the head, the soul's vessel. They bound organs inside it to provide completely for the soul, and they assigned this side, the natural front, to be the part that takes the lead.

The eyes were the first of the organs to be fashioned by the gods, to conduct light. The reason why they fastened them within the head is this. They contrived that such fire as was not for burning but for providing a gentle light should become a body, proper to each day. Now the pure fire inside us, cousin to that fire, they made to flow through the eyes: so they made the eyes—the eye as a whole but its middle in particular—close-textured, [*c*] smooth, and dense, to enable them to keep out all the other, coarser stuff, and let that kind of fire pass through pure by itself. Now whenever daylight surrounds the visual stream, like makes contact with like and coalesces with it to make up a single homogeneous body aligned with the direction of the eyes. This happens wherever the internal fire strikes and presses against an external object it has connected with. And because this body of fire has become uniform throughout and thus uniformly [*d*] affected, it transmits the motions of whatever it comes in contact with as well as of whatever comes in contact with it, to and through the whole body until they reach the soul. This brings about the sensation we call "seeing." At night, however, the kindred fire has {436} departed and so the visual stream is cut off. For now it exits only to encounter something unlike itself. No longer able to bond with the surrounding air, which now has lost its fire, it undergoes changes and dies out. So it not only stops seeing, but even begins to induce sleep. For when the eyelids—which the gods [*e*] devised to keep eyesight safe—are closed, they shut in the power of the internal fire, which then disperses and evens out the internal motions, and when these have been evened out, a state of quietness ensues. And if this quietness is deep, one falls into an all but dreamless sleep. But if some fairly strong motions remain, they produce images similar in kind and in [*46a*] number

to the kind of motions they are, and the kind of regions in which they remain—images which, though formed within, are recalled upon waking as external objects.

And so there is no longer any difficulty in understanding how images are produced in mirrors or in any other smooth reflecting surfaces. On such occasions the internal fire joins forces with the external fire, to form on the smooth surface a single fire which is reshaped in a multitude of ways. So once the fire from the face comes to coalesce with the fire from [*b*] sight on the smooth and bright surface, you have the inevitable appearance of all images of this sort. What is left will appear as right, because the parts of the fire from sight connect with the opposite parts of the fire from the face, contrary to the usual manner of encounter. But, on the other hand, what is right does appear as right, and what is left as left whenever light switches sides in the process of coalescing with the light with which it coalesces. And this happens whenever the mirror's smooth surface is [*c*] curled upwards on both sides, thereby bending the right part of the fire from sight toward the left, and the left part toward the right. And when this same smooth surface is turned along the length of the face [i.e., vertically], it makes the whole object appear upside down, because it bends the lower part of the ray toward the top, and the upper part toward the bottom.[8]

Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes employed in the service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character of what is most excellent. But because they make things cold or hot, compact [*d*] or disperse them, and produce all sorts of similar effects, most people regard them not as auxiliary causes, but as the actual causes of all things. Things like these, however, are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about anything. We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that properly possesses understanding. The soul is an invisible thing, whereas fire, water, earth, and air have all come to be as visible bodies. So anyone who is a lover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes those that belong to intelligent nature, and as secondary all those belonging to things that are moved by [*e*] others and that set still others in motion by necessity. We too, surely, must do likewise: we must describe both types of causes, distinguishing those which possess understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and good,

from those which, when deserted by intelligence, produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time.

Let us conclude, then, our discussion of the accompanying auxiliary causes that gave our eyes the power which they now possess. We must next speak of that supremely beneficial function for which the god gave [*47a*] them to us. As my account has it, our sight has indeed proved to be a source of supreme benefit to us, in that none of our present statements about the universe could ever have been made if we had never seen any stars, sun or heaven. As it is, however, our ability to see the periods of day-and-night, of months and of years, of equinoxes and solstices, has led to the {437} invention of number, and has given us the idea of time and opened [*b*] the path to inquiry into the nature of the universe. These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed. I'm quite prepared to declare this to be the supreme good our eyesight offers us. Why then should we exalt all the lesser good things, which a non-philosopher struck blind would "lament and bewail in vain"? Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good is this: the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the orbits of intelligence in the universe [*c*] and apply them to the revolutions of our own understanding. For there is a kinship between them, even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal orbits are undisturbed. So once we have come to know them and to share in the ability to make correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions of the god.

Likewise, the same account goes for sound and hearing—these too are the gods' gifts, given for the same purpose and intended to achieve the same result. Speech was designed for this very purpose—it plays the [*d*] greatest part in its achievement. And all such composition as lends itself to making audible musical sound is given in order to express harmony, and so serves this purpose as well. And harmony, whose movements are akin to the orbits within our souls, is a gift of the Muses, if our dealings with them are guided by understanding, not for irrational pleasure, for which people nowadays seem to make use of it, but to serve as an ally in the fight to bring order to any orbit in our souls that has become unharmonized, and make it concordant with itself. Rhythm, too, has likewise been [*e*] given us by the

Muses for the same purpose, to assist us. For with most of us our condition is such that we have lost all sense of measure, and are lacking in grace.

Now in all but a brief part of the discourse I have just completed I have presented what has been crafted by Intellect. But I need to match this account by providing a comparable one concerning the things that have [*48a*] come about by Necessity. For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be toward what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe. So if I'm to tell the story of how it really came to be in this way, I'd also have to introduce the character of the Straying Cause—how it is its nature to set things adrift. [*b*] I shall have to retrace my steps, then, and, armed with a second starting point that also applies to these same things, I must go back once again to the beginning and start my present inquiry from there, just as I did with my earlier one.

We shall of course have to study the intrinsic nature of fire, water, air, and earth prior to the heaven's coming to be, as well as the properties they had then. So far no one has as yet revealed how these four came to be. We tend to posit them as the elemental "letters" of the universe and tell people they are its "principles" on the assumption that they know what fire and the other three are. In fact, however, they shouldn't even be compared to syllables.[9] Only a very unenlightened person might be [*c*] expected to make such a comparison. So let me now proceed with my treatment in the following way: for the present I cannot state "the principle" or "principles" of all things, or however else I think about them, for the simple reason that it is difficult to show clearly what my view is if I follow my present manner of exposition. Please do not expect me to do so then. I couldn't convince even myself that I could be right to commit myself to [*d*] undertaking a task of such magnitude. I shall keep to what I stated at the beginning, the virtue of likely accounts, and so shall try right from the start to say about things, both individually and collectively, what is no less likely than any—more {438} likely, in fact, than what I have said before. Let us therefore at the outset of this discourse call upon the god to be our savior this time, too, to give us

safe passage through a strange and unusual exposition, and lead us to a view of what is likely. And so let me begin [*e*] my speech again.

The new starting point in my account of the universe needs to be more complex than the earlier one. Then we distinguished two kinds, but now we must specify a third, one of a different sort. The earlier two sufficed for our previous account: one was proposed as a model, intelligible and always changeless, a second as an imitation of the model, something that [*49a*] possesses becoming and is visible. We did not distinguish a third kind at the time, because we thought that we could make do with the two of them. Now, however, it appears that our account compels us to attempt to illuminate in words a kind that is difficult and vague. What must we suppose it to do and to be? This above all: it is a *receptacle* of all becoming —its wetnurse, as it were.

However true that statement may be, we must nevertheless describe it more clearly. This is a difficult task, particularly because it requires us to [*b*] raise a preliminary problem about fire and the other three: It is difficult to say of each of them—in a way that employs a reliable and stable account—which one is the sort of thing one should really call *water* rather than *fire*, or which one one should call some one of these rather than just any and every one of them. What problem, then, do they present for us to work through in likely fashion? And then how and in what manner are we to go on to speak about this third kind?[10]

First, we see (or think we see) the thing that we have just now been [*c*] calling *water* condensing and turning to stones and earth. Next, we see this same thing dissolving and dispersing, turning to wind and air, and air, when ignited, turning to fire. And then we see fire being condensed and extinguished and turning back to the form of air, and air coalescing and thickening and turning back into cloud and mist. When these are compressed still more we see them turning into flowing water, which we see turning to earth and stones once again. In this way, then, they transmit their coming to be one to the other in a cycle, or so it seems. Now then, [*d*] since none of these appears ever to remain the same, which one of them can one categorically assert, without embarrassment, to be some particular thing, *this* one, and not something else? One can’t. Rather, the safest course by far is to propose that we speak about these things in the following way:

what we invariably observe becoming different at different times—fire for example—to characterize that, i.e., fire, not as “this,” but each time as “what is such,” and speak of water not as “this,” but always as “what is such.” And never to speak of anything else as “this,” as though it has [*e*] some stability, of all the things at which we point and use the expressions “that” and “this” and so think we are designating something. For it gets away without abiding the charge of “that” and “this,” or any other expression that indicts them of being stable. It is in fact safest not to refer to it by any of these expressions. Rather, “what is such”—coming around like what it was, again and again—*that’s* the thing to call it in each and every case. So fire—and generally everything that has becoming—it is safest to call “what is altogether such.” But that in which they each appear to keep coming into being and *from* which they subsequently pass out of being, [*50a*] *that’s* the only thing to refer to by means of the expressions “that” and “this.” A thing that is some “such” or other, however—hot or white, say, or any one of the opposites, and all things constituted by these—should be called none of these things [i.e., “this” or “that”].

I must make one more effort to describe it, more clearly still. Suppose you were molding gold into every shape there is, going on non-stop remolding one shape into the next. If someone then were to point at one of them and ask you, “What is it?” your safest answer by far, with respect [*b*] to truth, would be to say, “gold,” but never “triangle” or any of the other shapes that come to be in the gold, as though it is these, {439} because they change even while you’re making the statement. However, that answer, too, should be satisfactory, as long as the shapes are willing to accept “what is such” as someone’s designation. This has a degree of safety.

Now the same account, in fact, holds also for that nature which receives all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on any characteristic [*c*] similar to any of the things that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make its impression upon, and it is modified, shaped, and reshaped by the things that enter it. These are the things that make it appear different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are imitations of those things that always are, imprinted after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe. This is something we shall pursue at another

time. For the moment, we need to keep in mind three types of things: that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and [*d*] that after which the thing coming to be is modeled, and which is the source of its coming to be. It is in fact appropriate to compare the receiving thing to a mother, the source to a father, and the nature between them to their offspring. We also must understand that if the imprints are to be varied, with all the varieties there to see, this thing upon which the imprints are to be formed could not be well prepared for that role if it were not itself devoid of any of those characters that it is to receive from elsewhere. For [*e*] if it resembled any of the things that enter it, it could not successfully copy their opposites or things of a totally different nature whenever it were to receive them. It would be showing its own face as well. This is why the thing that is to receive in itself all the elemental kinds must be totally devoid of any characteristics. Think of people who make fragrant ointments. They expend skill and ingenuity to come up with something just like this [i.e., a neutral base], to have on hand to start with. The liquids that are to receive the fragrances they make as odorless as possible. Or think of people who work at impressing shapes upon soft materials. They emphatically refuse to allow any such material to already have some definite shape. Instead, they'll even it out and make it as smooth as it can be. In the same [*51a*] way, then, if the thing that is to receive repeatedly throughout its whole self the likenesses of the intelligible objects, the things which always are—if it is to do so successfully, then it ought to be devoid of any inherent characteristics of its own. This, of course, is the reason why we shouldn't call the mother or receptacle of what has come to be, of what is visible or perceivable in every other way, either earth or air, fire or water, or any of their compounds or their constituents. But if we speak of it as an invisible [*b*] and characterless sort of thing, one that receives all things and shares in a most perplexing way in what is intelligible, a thing extremely difficult to comprehend, we shall not be misled. And in so far as it is possible to arrive at its nature on the basis of what we've said so far, the most correct way to speak of it may well be this: the part of it that gets ignited appears on each occasion as fire, the dampened part as water, and parts as earth or air in so far as it receives the imitations of these.

But we must prefer to conduct our inquiry by means of rational argument. Hence we should make a distinction like the following: Is there such a thing

as a Fire *by itself*? Do all these things of which we always say that [*c*] each of them is something "by itself" really exist? Or are the things we see, and whatever else we perceive through the body, the only things that possess this kind of actuality, so that there is absolutely nothing else besides them at all? Is our perpetual claim that there exists an intelligible Form for each thing a vacuous gesture, in the end nothing but mere talk? Now we certainly will not do justice to the question before us if we dismiss it, leaving it undecided and unadjudicated, and just insist that such things [*d*] exist, but neither must we append a further lengthy digression to a discourse already quite long. If, however, a significant distinction formulated in few words were to present itself, that would suit our present needs best of all. So here's how I cast my own vote: If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these "by themselves" things definitely exist—these Forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if—as some {440} people think—true opinion does not differ in any way from understanding, then all the things we perceive through our [*e*] bodily senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion. And of true belief, it must be said, all men have a share, but of understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do.

[*52a*] Since these things are so, we must agree that that which keeps its own form unchangingly, which has not been brought into being and is not destroyed, which neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible—it cannot be perceived by the senses at all—and it is the role of understanding to study it. The second thing is that which shares the other's name and resembles it. This thing can be perceived by the senses, and it has been begotten. It is constantly borne along, now coming to be in a certain place and then perishing out of it. It is apprehended by opinion, which involves sense perception. And the third type is space, which exists always and cannot be destroyed. It provides a fixed state for all things [*b*] that come

to be. It is itself apprehended by a kind of bastard reasoning that does not involve sense perception, and it is hardly even an object of conviction. We look at it as in a dream when we say that everything that exists must of necessity be somewhere, in some place and occupying some space, and that that which doesn't exist somewhere, whether on earth or in heaven, doesn't exist at all.

We prove unable to draw all these distinctions and others related to them —even in the case of that unsleeping, truly existing reality—because our dreaming state renders us incapable of waking up and stating the [*c*] truth, which is this: Since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the image, which is invariably borne along to picture something else, it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in something else, somehow clinging to being, or else be nothing at all. But that which really is receives support from the accurate, true account—that as long as the one is distinct from the other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at the same time [*d*] become one and the same, and also two.[11]

Let this, then, be a summary of the account I would offer, as computed by my "vote." There are being, space, and becoming, three distinct things which existed even before the universe came to be.

Now as the wetnurse of becoming turns watery and fiery and receives the character of earth and air, and as it acquires all the properties that [*e*] come with these characters, it takes on a variety of visible aspects, but because it is filled with powers that are neither similar nor evenly balanced, no part of it is in balance. It sways irregularly in every direction as it is shaken by those things, and being set in motion it in turn shakes them. And as they are moved, they drift continually, some in one direction and others in others, separating from one another. They are winnowed out, as it were, like grain that is sifted by winnowing sieves or other such implements. They are carried off and settle down, the dense and heavy ones in [*53a*] one direction, and the rare and light ones to another place.

That is how at that time the four kinds were being shaken by the receiver, which was itself {441} agitating like a shaking machine, separating the kinds most unlike each other furthest apart and pushing those most like each other closest together into the same region. This, of course, explains

how these different kinds came to occupy different regions of space, even before the universe was set in order and constituted from them at its coming to be. Indeed, it is a fact that before this took place the four kinds all lacked [*b*] proportion and measure, and at the time the ordering of the universe was undertaken, fire, water, earth and air initially possessed certain traces of what they are now. They were indeed in the condition one would expect thoroughly god-forsaken things to be in. So, finding them in this natural condition, the first thing the god then did was to give them their distinctive shapes, using forms and numbers.

Here is a proposition we shall always affirm above all else: The god fashioned these four kinds to be as perfect and excellent as possible, when they were not so before. It will now be my task to explain to you what [*c*] structure each of them acquired, and how each came to be. My account will be an unusual one, but since you are well schooled in the fields of learning in terms of which I must of necessity proceed with my exposition, I'm sure you'll follow me.

First of all, everyone knows, I'm sure, that fire, earth, water, and air are bodies. Now everything that has bodily form also has depth. Depth, moreover, is of necessity comprehended within surface, and any surface bounded by straight lines is composed of triangles. Every triangle, moreover, [*d*] derives from two triangles, each of which has one right angle and two acute angles. Of these two triangles, one [the isosceles right-angled triangle] has at each of the other two vertices an equal part of a right angle, determined by its division by equal sides; while the other [the scalene right-angled triangle] has unequal parts of a right angle at its other two vertices, determined by the division of the right angle by unequal sides. This, then, we presume to be the originating principle of fire and of the other bodies, as we pursue our likely account in terms of Necessity. Principles yet more ultimate than these are known only to the god, and to any man he may hold dear.

We should now say which are the most excellent [*e*] four bodies that can come to be. They are quite unlike each other, though some of them are capable of breaking up and turning into others and vice-versa. If our account is on the mark, we shall have the truth about how earth and fire and their proportionate intermediates [water and air] came to be. For we shall never concede to anyone that there are any visible bodies more excellent

than these, each conforming to a single kind. So we must whole-heartedly proceed to fit together the four kinds of bodies of surpassing excellence, and to declare that we have come to grasp their natures well enough.

Of the two [right-angled] triangles, the isosceles [*54a*] has but one nature, while the scalene has infinitely many. Now we have to select the most excellent one from among the infinitely many, if we are to get a proper start. So if anyone can say that he has picked out another one that is more excellent for the construction of these bodies, his victory will be that of a friend, not an enemy. Of the many [scalene right-angled] triangles, then, we posit as the one most excellent, surpassing the others, that one from [a pair of] which the equilateral triangle is constructed as a third figure. Why this is so is too long a story to tell now. But if anyone puts this [*b*] claim to the test and discovers that it isn't so, his be the prize, with our congratulations. So much, then, for the selection of the two triangles out of which the bodies of fire and the other bodies are constructed—the [right-angled] isosceles, and [the right-angled] scalene whose longer side squared is always triple its shorter side squared [i.e., the half-equilateral].[12]

{442} At this point we need to formulate more precisely something that was not stated clearly earlier. For then it appeared that all four kinds of bodies could turn into one another by successive stages. But the appearance is wrong. While there are indeed four kinds of bodies that come to be from [*c*] the [right-angled] triangles we have selected, three of them come from triangles that have unequal sides, whereas the fourth alone is fashioned out of isosceles triangles. Thus not all of them have the capacity of breaking up and turning into one another, with a large number of small bodies turning into a small number of large ones and vice versa. There are three that can do this. For all three are made up of a single type of triangle, so that when once the larger bodies are broken up, the same triangles can go to make up a large number of small bodies, assuming shapes appropriate to them. And likewise, when numerous small bodies are fragmented into [*d*] their triangles, these triangles may well combine to make up some single massive body belonging to another kind.

So much, then, for our account of how these bodies turn into one another. Let us next discuss the form that each of them has come to have, and the various numbers that have combined to make them up.

Leading the way will be the primary form [the tetrahedron], the tiniest structure,[13] whose elementary triangle is the one whose hypotenuse is twice the length of its shorter side. Now when a pair of such triangles are juxtaposed along the diagonal [i.e., their hypotenuses] and this is done three times, and their diagonals and short sides converge upon a single [*e*] point as center, the result is a single equilateral triangle, composed of six such triangles.[14] When four of these equilateral triangles are combined, a single solid angle is produced at the junction of three plane angles. This, [*55a*] it turns out, is the angle which comes right after the most obtuse of the plane angles.[15] And once four such solid angles have been completed, we get the primary solid form, which is one that divides the entire circumference [sc. of the sphere in which it is inscribed] into equal and similar parts.

The second solid form [the octahedron][16] is constructed out of the same triangles which, however, are now arranged in eight equilateral triangles and produce a single solid angle out of four plane angles. And when six such solid angles have been produced, the second body has reached its completion.

Now the third body [the icosahedron][17] is made up of a combination of one hundred and twenty of the elementary triangles, and of twelve solid [*b*] angles, each enclosed by five plane equilateral triangles. This body turns out to have twenty equilateral triangular faces. And let us take our leave of this one of the elementary triangles, the one that has begotten the above three kinds of bodies and turn to the other one, the isosceles [right-angled] triangle, which has begotten the fourth [the cube].[18] Arranged in sets of four whose right angles come together at the center, the isosceles triangle produced a single equilateral quadrangle [i.e., a square]. And when six of [*c*] these quadrangles were combined together, they produced eight solid angles, each of which was constituted by three plane right angles. The shape of the resulting body so constructed is a cube, and it has six quadrangular equilateral faces.

{443} One other construction, a fifth, still remained, and this one the god used for the whole universe, embroidering figures on it.[19]

Anyone following this whole line of reasoning might very well be puzzled about whether we should say that there are infinitely many worlds [*d*] or a finite number of them. If so, he would have to conclude that to answer, "infinitely many," is to take the view of one who is really "unfinished" in things he ought to be "finished" in. He would do better to stop with the question whether we should say that there's really just one world or five and be puzzled about that. Well, our "probable account" answer declares there to be but one world, a god—though someone else, taking other things into consideration, will come to a different opinion. We must set him aside, however.

Let us now assign to fire, earth, water, and air the structures which have just been given their formations in our speech. To earth let us give the [*e*] cube, because of the four kinds of bodies earth is the most immobile and the most pliable—which is what the solid whose faces are the most secure must of necessity turn out to be, more so than the others. Now of the [right-angled] triangles we originally postulated, the face belonging to those that have equal sides has a greater natural stability than that belonging to triangles that have unequal sides, and the surface that is composed of the two triangles, the equilateral quadrangle [the square], holds its position with greater stability than does the equilateral triangle, both in [*56a*] their parts and as wholes. Hence, if we assign this solid figure to earth, we are preserving our "likely account." And of the solid figures that are left, we shall next assign the least mobile of them to water, to fire the most mobile, and to air the one in between. This means that the tiniest body belongs to fire, the largest to water, and the intermediate one to air—and also that the body with the sharpest edges belongs to fire, the next sharpest to air, and the third sharpest to water. Now in all these cases the body that has the fewest faces is of necessity the most mobile, in that it, more [*b*] than any other, has edges that are the sharpest and best fit for cutting in every direction. It is also the lightest, in that it is made up of the least number of identical parts. The second body ranks second in having these same properties, and the third ranks third. So let us follow our account, which is not only likely but also correct, and take the solid form of the pyramid that we saw constructed as the element or the seed of fire. And let us say that the second form in order of generation is that of air, and the third that of water.

Now we must think of all these bodies as being so small that due to their small size none of them, whatever their kind, is visible to us individually. [*c*] When, however, a large number of them are clustered together, we do see them in bulk. And in particular, as to the proportions among their numbers, their motions and their other properties, we must think that when the god had brought them to complete and exact perfection (to the degree that Necessity was willing to comply obediently), he arranged them together proportionately.

Given all we have said so far about the kinds of elemental bodies, the following account [of their transformations] is the most likely: When earth [*d*] encounters fire and is broken up by fire's sharpness, it will drift about—whether the breaking up occurred within fire itself, or within a mass of air or water—until its parts meet again somewhere, refit themselves together and become earth again. The reason is that the parts of earth will never pass into another form. But when water is broken up into parts by fire or even by air, it could happen that the parts recombine to form one corpuscle of fire and two of air. And the fragments of air could produce, [*e*] from any single particle that is broken up, two fire corpuscles. And conversely, whenever a small amount of fire is enveloped by a large quantity of air or water or perhaps earth and is agitated inside them as they move, and in spite of its resistance is beaten and shattered to bits, then any two fire corpuscles may combine to constitute a single form of air. And when air is overpowered and broken down, then two and one half entire forms of air will {444} be consolidated into a single, entire form of water.[20]

Let us recapitulate and formulate our account of these transformations as follows: Whenever one of the other kinds is caught inside fire and gets [*57a*] cut up by the sharpness of fire's angles and edges, then if it is reconstituted as fire, it will stop getting cut. The reason is that a thing of any kind that is alike and uniform is incapable of effecting any change in, or being affected by, anything that is similar to it. But as long as something involved in a transformation has something stronger than it to contend with, the process of its dissolution will continue non-stop. And likewise, when a few of the smaller corpuscles are surrounded by a greater number of bigger [*b*] ones, they will be shattered and quenched. The quenching will stop when these smaller bodies are willing to be reconstituted into the form of

the kind that prevailed over them, and so from fire will come air, and from air, water. But if these smaller corpuscles are in process of turning into these and one of the other kinds encounters them and engages them in battle, their dissolution will go on non-stop until they are either completely squeezed and broken apart and escape to their own likes, or else are defeated, and, melding from many into one, they are assimilated to the kind that prevailed over them, and come to share its abode from then on. [*c*] And, what is more, as they undergo these processes, they all exchange their territories: for as a result of the Receptacle's agitation the masses of each of the kinds are separated from one another, with each occupying its own region, but because some parts of a particular kind do from time to time become unlike their former selves and like the other kinds, they are carried by the shaking toward the region occupied by whatever masses they are becoming like to.

These, then, are the sorts of causes by which the unalloyed primary bodies have come to be. Now the fact that different varieties are found within their respective forms is to be attributed to the constructions of [*d*] each of the elementary triangles. Each of these two constructions did not originally yield a triangle that had just one size, but triangles that were both smaller and larger, numerically as many as there are varieties within a given form. That is why when they are mixed with themselves and with each other they display an infinite variety, which those who are to employ a likely account in their study of nature ought to take note of.

Now as for motion and rest, unless there is agreement on the manner and the conditions in which these two come to be, we will have many [*e*] obstacles to face in our subsequent course of reasoning. Although we have already said something about them, we need to say this as well: there will be no motion in a state of uniformity. For it is difficult, or rather impossible, for something to be moved without something to set it in motion, or something to set a thing in motion without something to be moved by it. When either is absent, there is no motion, but [when they are present] it is quite impossible for them to be uniform. And so let us always presume that rest is found in a state of uniformity and to attribute motion to non-uniformity. [*58a*] The latter, moreover, is caused by inequality, the origin of which we have already discussed.[21]

We have not explained, however, how it is that the various corpuscles have not reached the {445} point of being thoroughly separated from each other kind by kind, so that their transformations into each other and their movement [toward their own regions] would have come to a halt. So let us return to say this about it: Once the circumference of the universe has comprehended the [four] kinds, then, because it is round and has a natural tendency to gather in upon itself, it constricts them all and allows no empty [*b*] space to be left over. This is why fire, more than the other three, has come to infiltrate all of the others, with air in second place, since it is second in degree of subtlety, and so on for the rest. For the bodies that are generated from the largest parts will have the largest gaps left over in their construction, whereas the smallest bodies will have the tiniest. Now this gathering, contracting process squeezes the small parts into the gaps inside the big ones. So now, as the small parts are placed among the large ones and the smaller ones tend to break up the larger ones while the larger tend to cause the smaller to coalesce, they all shift, up and down, into their own respective regions. For as each changes in quantity, it also changes the [*c*] position of its region. This, then, is how and why the occurrence of non-uniformity is perpetually preserved, and so sets these bodies in perpetual motion, both now and in the future without interruption.

1. *Becoming* and *coming to be* here as elsewhere translate the same Greek word, *genesis*, and its cognates.
2. A simple example of a proportionate progression that satisfies Plato's requirements in 32a might be that of 2, 4, 8. So: 2:4::4:8 (the first term is to the middle what the middle is to the last, the last term is to the middle what the middle is to the first); 4:2::8:4 or 4:8::2:4 (the middle term turns out to be first and last and the first and last terms turn out to be middles). Since, however, the body of the world is three-dimensional, its components must be represented by "solid" numbers, i.e., numbers that are the products of three numbers. This will require two middle terms.
3. The construction of the world's soul follows three stages: (1) *The creation of the mixture*: Three preliminary mixtures are created. The first is a mixture of indivisible, changeless Being with divisible Being. The second and third are likewise mixtures of indivisible with divisible Sameness and Difference, respectively. These three preliminary mixtures are themselves mixed to create the final mixture.

(2) *The division of the mixture*: Seven "portions" of the mixture are now marked off, possessing the following numerical values: First portion: 1
Second portion: 2
Third portion: 3
Fourth portion: 4
Fifth portion: 9
Sixth portion: 8
Seventh portion: 27
(3) *The filling of the intervals*: The values of the first, second, fourth, and sixth portions form a series such that each successive portion is twice that of its predecessor. The values of the first, third, fifth, and seventh portions form a series such that each successive portion is three times that of its predecessor. Thus intervals between successive portions of the first series are called "double intervals" and those between successive portions of the second series are called "triple intervals." Within each interval there are two "middle terms." The first of these is such that its value is that of the first extreme plus 1/x of the first extreme, which is equal to the value of the second extreme minus 1/x of the second extreme. This is the "harmonic middle." The second middle term is such that its value is the median between the extremes. This is the "arithmetical middle." Inserting the two middle terms within the original intervals in the first series, we get:
1 – 4/3 – 3/2 – 2 – 8/3 – 3 – 4 – 16/3 – 6 – 8;
and doing the same with the second series produces:

1 – 3/2 – 2 – 3 – 9/2 – 6 – 9 – 27/2 – 18 – 27.

Combining the two series in ascending order and omitting duplication we get:

1 – 4/3 – 3/2 – 2 – 8/3 – 3 – 4 – 9/2 – 16/3 – 6 – 8 – 9 – 27/2 – 18 – 27.

In this series the value of each term but the first is either 4/3 or 3/2 or 9/8 the value of its predecessor. Finally, the intervals of 4/3 (e.g., between 1 and 4/3, or between 3/2 and 2, or 3 and 4) are now themselves "filled" by intervals of 9/8. In the interval between 1 and 4/3, for example, we can insert new intervals each of which multiplies its predecessor by 9/8, but we can do so no more than twice (1 – 9/8 – 81/64 . . . 4/3), since a third attempt (729/512) would exceed 4/3. The interval between 81/64 can only be filled up with a "leftover," a number by which 81/64 can be multiplied to equal 4/3. This number turns out to be 256/243.

4. By speaking of "circles" instead of spheres, Plato seems to have in mind the model of the armillary sphere, a skeleton structure which, by representing whole spheres as rings, enables a viewer to examine the axial positions of spheres within the outer sphere. The circle of *the Same* is a ring of one half of the just described soul compound which in its motion represents the entire sphere, from the center of the earth to the outer limit, the realm of the fixed stars. This sphere moves "toward the right," i.e., from east to west along its axis between the poles along the plane of the equator. The observation point is presumably that of an observer in a northern latitude looking toward the south. The circle of *the Different* is a ring of the remaining half of the soul compound, which is subsequently subdivided into seven smaller rings (spheres), the orbits of the moon, the sun, and the five planets. Their movements are "toward the left," i.e., in the opposite direction of the movement of the sphere that embraces them, that of *the Same*. The planes of these seven rings are parallel to "the diagonal," i.e., the plane of the ecliptic, and presumably all seven rings move within the limits of the

Zodiac, that band of constellations which parallels, and is bisected along its length by, the ecliptic. The relation of the plane of the equator to that of the ecliptic, following Plato's suggestion that the latter is "diagonal" to the former, may be illustrated as follows:



5. Plato relies on a principle, common to some fifth-century natural philosophers (e.g., Empedocles), that "like is known by like": In order for a knowing subject to be able to know a given object, the subject must possess some of the same or similar characteristics as the object. Thus because the soul is itself composed of sameness and difference it can recognize A as being the same as or different from B, and the respects, manners, and times when this is so.

6. These are the fixed stars, that is, those other than the planets, which have already been created (cf. below, 40b).

7. Timaeus is here describing the uncontrolled movements of a newborn animal. He goes on to describe the confusion produced in its soul by its first sensations.

8. According to 46b–c, direct vision of an object in daylight occurs when fire exiting from the eyes coalesces with fire (daylight) traveling from the object to make a uniform, linear column of fire. In the case of seeing an object reflected in a mirror, the left side of the object will appear as its right side would appear if the object were directly seen, and vice versa, as the following diagram illustrates:



direct vision



reflected vision

9. Plato is criticizing Empedocles and his followers, who made the familiar four elements the ultimate material constituents (the "roots") of things. As he argues later (53b–56c), the elements are composites made up of things that are themselves composite: They are composed of solid geometrical figures which are themselves composed of triangles. It is the solid figures and not the four elements themselves that rank as "syllables" to the triangles (the "letters").

10. Lit. "this thing itself," a reference to the receptacle. The "preliminary problem" concerning fire and the others is raised in b7–d3 and a solution is proposed at d3–e7. The solution then provides the correct way of thinking and speaking of the receptacle (d7–50a6).

11. Plato's argument in this terse paragraph seems to be the following: A's being an image of B is a relation which supervenes upon A's intrinsic properties, and thus is not itself among A's intrinsic properties. Such a relation requires a subject with a certain set of intrinsic properties to sustain it. For example, if a certain lump of bronze formed in a particular way or a certain canvas covered with oil

pigments in a particular configuration are *images* of JFK, they must be, respectively, an image "in bronze" or "on canvas." Images that aren't "in" or "on" anything are "nothing at all." The final sentence reasserts the absence of the "being in" relation (and perhaps by extension the "being of" relation) between the model (Forms) and the subject (receptacle): whereas the image is "in" the latter (and "of" the former), they neither are "of" nor "in" each other.

12. Plato's arguments in 53c–54b can be summarized and interpreted as follows: 1. All bodies are three-dimensional and hence bounded by surfaces.

2. All surfaces bounded by straight lines are divisible into triangles.

3. All triangles are or are divisible into right-angled triangles (by drawing from an appropriately selected angle a line that is perpendicular to the opposite side).

4. All right-angled triangles are either isosceles (with all angles of fixed size) or scalene (with two angles of varying size).

5. The most perfect of the scalene right-angled triangles is the half-equilateral, whose right angle is bounded by lines the lengths of which are in the ratio of n^2 to $3n^2$ (or, as Plato says later (54d6, 7), whose hypotenuse is twice the length of the shorter side).

13. The pyramid.

14. Juxtaposing AOD and AOE along their common side AO, and similarly BOD and BOF along BO, and COE and COF along CO, and then joining the resulting trapezia at O.

15. I.e., the conjunction of three 60º plane angles, totaling 180º. All obtuse angles are < 180°.

16. The octahedron, produced by joining four equilateral triangles to form a solid angle, will require eight such triangles to be joined at six solid angles for its completion.

17. The icosahedron, produced by joining five equilateral triangles to form a solid angle. It requires one hundred twenty elemental "perfect" scalene right-angled triangles, arranged in twenty equilateral triangles, joined at twelve solid angles for its completion.

18. The cube, made up of squares, produced by juxtaposing AOB, BOC, COD, and AOD at O.

19. The dodecahedron, the remaining one of the regular solids. It has twelve faces, each of which is a regular pentagon. It cannot be constructed out of either of the two elemental right-angled triangles.

20. A corpuscle (*sōma*) of water is an icosahedron, consisting of twenty equilateral triangles or one hundred twenty elementary triangles, sufficient to constitute one pyramid (four equilateral or twenty-four elementary triangles) and two octahedra (eight equilateral or forty-eight elementary triangles each). A corpuscle of air is an octahedron, and so sufficient to constitute two pyramids. Conversely, two fire corpuscles have the required constituent triangles to make up one of air, and two and a half air corpuscles can make up a water corpuscle (or perhaps better: five air corpuscles can make up two of water). Plato seems to use "corpuscle" and "form" (*eidos*) interchangeably in this passage.

21. The reference of the discussion of "the origin of inequality" is unclear. Perhaps Plato is thinking of the discussion of the "powers that are neither similar nor evenly balanced" (52e) in the primal chaos. Or perhaps, more specifically, he has in mind the origin of the differences among the elemental structures. These differences are due to the dissimilarity of the two primal triangles, their different sizes, and the different possible combinations and recombinations of the scalene right-angled triangles.

{446} ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was born of a well-to-do family in the Macedonian town of Stagira in 384 BCE. His father, Nicomachus, was a physician who died when Aristotle was young. In 367, when Aristotle was seventeen, his uncle Proxenus sent him to Athens to study at Plato's Academy. There he remained, first as a pupil, later as an associate, for the next twenty years.

When Plato died in 347, the Academy came under the control of his nephew Speusippus, who favored mathematical aspects of Platonism that Aristotle, who was more interested in biology, found uncongenial. Perhaps for this reason—but more likely because of growing anti-Macedonian sentiment in Athens—Aristotle decided to leave. He accepted the invitation of Hermeias, his friend and a former fellow student in the Academy, to join his philosophical circle on the coast of Asia Minor in Assos, where Hermeias (a former slave) had become ruler. Aristotle remained there for three years. During this period he married Hermeias' niece Pythias, with whom he had a daughter, also named Pythias.

In 345, Aristotle moved to Mytilene, on the nearby island of Lesbos, where he joined another former Academic, Theophrastus, who was a native of the island. Theophrastus, at first Aristotle's pupil and then his closest colleague, remained associated with him until Aristotle's death. While they were on Lesbos the biological research of Aristotle and Theophrastus flourished. In 343, Philip of Macedon invited Aristotle to his court to serve as tutor to his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. What instruction Aristotle gave the young man who was to become Alexander the Great is not known, but it seems likely that Aristotle's own interest in politics increased during his stay at the Macedonian court. In 340 Alexander was appointed regent for his father, and his studies with Aristotle ended.

The events of the next five years are uncertain. Perhaps Aristotle stayed at the court; perhaps he went back to Stagira. But in 335, after the death of Philip, he returned to Athens for his second long sojourn. Just outside the city he rented some buildings and established his own school, the Lyceum, where he lectured, wrote, and discussed philosophy with his pupils and associates. Under his direction, they carried out research on biological and other philosophical and scientific topics. Theophrastus worked on botany, Aristoxenus on music; Eudemus wrote a history of mathematics and astronomy, Meno of medicine, and Theophrastus of physics, cosmology, and psychology. In addition, Aristotle and his group produced a monumental account of the constitutions of 158 Greek city-states—an account Aristotle draws on in his own *Politics*.

While he was in Athens, Aristotle's wife Pythias died. He subsequently began a union with a woman named Herpyllis, like Aristotle a native of Stagira. Although they apparently never married, they had a son, whom they named Nicomachus, after Aristotle's father.

Aristotle's work during his twelve or thirteen years at the Lyceum was prodigious. Most of his surviving works were probably written during this period. But when Alexander died in 323, Athens once again became a hostile environment for a Macedonian, and Aristotle was accused of impiety (the same charge that had been leveled against both Anaxagoras and Socrates). Leaving the Lyceum in the hands of Theophrastus, Aristotle fled northward to the Macedonian stronghold of Chalcis (his mother's birthplace); he is said to have remarked that he would "not allow the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy." Removed from the cultural center of Athens, he lamented his isolation and died in 322 at the age of sixty-two.

Of Aristotle's writings, only about one fifth to one quarter have survived. Still, the great variety of subjects that they cover provides a good indication of the range and depth of his interests. The notorious difficulty these writings pose for the contemporary reader is in part {447} explained by the nature of the works themselves. Far from being polished pieces of prose intended for publication, they are for the most part working papers and lecture notes, terse and compressed

often to the point of unintelligibility. (Ancient sources tell us that in his published works—now lost—Aristotle displayed an exemplary literary style, and there are occasional glimpses of it in his surviving works.) Aristotle was above all driven by a desire for knowledge and understanding in every possible realm. His works are teeming with detailed observation about the natural world as well as abstract speculations of the most general sort. As both a scientist and a philosopher, Aristotle could easily make the transition from describing the feeding behavior of eels and limpets to theorizing about the divine intellect that is the uncaused cause of everything in the universe. But his philosophical and scientific interests are rooted in the natural world—about one quarter of the surviving works deal with topics in biology. This he combined with an unshakeable confidence in the ability of the human mind, aided by the system of deductive logic he invented and by close and detailed observation of natural phenomena, to comprehend the fundamental nature of objective reality.

Aristotle did not suppose that he was the first person to attempt this task. He was a keen student of the writings of his scientific and philosophical predecessors. The influence of Plato's thought is apparent throughout Aristotle's works, even where he disagrees most with his teacher. He pays a great deal of attention to the Presocratics, seldom agreeing with them, but often crediting them with important (albeit usually partial) insights. His typical approach to a subject is to review its history and then, making what use he can of the received opinions, to set out his own account. Often his position is a kind of compromise that incorporates the best features while avoiding the excesses of rival schemes that are too extreme.

All of the sciences (*epistēmai*, literally "knowledges") can be divided into three branches: theoretical, practical, and productive. Whereas practical sciences, such as ethics and politics, are concerned with human action, and productive sciences with making things, theoretical sciences, such as theology, mathematics, and the natural sciences, aim at truth and are pursued for their own sakes. Aristotle was unique in pursuing all three. His *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, which provide the foundation for the study of speech and literary theory, are

his contributions to the productive sciences. The *Ethics* and *Politics* are devoted to the practical sciences. In the remainder of his works, Aristotle directs his attention to the theoretical sciences.

A science, according to Aristotle, can be set out as an axiomatic system in which necessary first principles lead by inexorable deductive inferences to all of the truths about the subject matter of the science (*Posterior Analytics* I.6). Some of these first principles are peculiar to the science in question, as the definition of a straight line is to geometry. Some—such as the principle of noncontradiction—are so general that they are common to all the sciences (*Metaphysics* IV.3). Scientific knowledge is therefore demonstrative; what we know scientifically is what we can derive, directly or indirectly, from first principles that do not themselves require proof.

What, then, is the status of the first principles? They clearly cannot be known in the same way as the consequences derived from them, that is, demonstratively, yet Aristotle is confident that they must be known—for how could knowledge be derived from what is not knowledge? They are, Aristotle tells us, grasped by the mind (Aristotle's term is *nous*, usually translated as *intuition* or *understanding*). This way of putting the matter makes it seem as if an Aristotelian science is an entirely *a priori* enterprise in which reason alone grasps first principles and logic takes over from there to arrive at all of the truths of science. And Aristotle does say that it is dialectic—a process of deductive reasoning—that provides a path to first principles (*Topics* I.2).

{448} It is clear, however, that Aristotle does not think that this alone is the way a scientist goes about acquiring knowledge, for in his own scientific treatises, he does not begin by announcing the first principles and deducing their consequences. Rather he sets out the puzzles the science is trying to solve and the observations that have been made and the opinions that have been held about them. Perhaps he thinks of the axiomatic presentation as a kind of ideal that is possible only for a completed science and is appropriate for teaching it rather than for making discoveries in it. As for the acquisition of first principles, Aristotle appeals to what sounds somewhat like an inductive procedure. Beginning with the perception of particulars,

which are “better known to us,” and moving through memory and experience, we arrive at knowledge of universals, which are “better known in themselves” (*Posterior Analytics* II.19, *Metaphysics* I.1). Aristotle’s approach thus seems to combine features of both rationalism and empiricism.

Each of the special sciences studies some particular realm of being, some part of what there is. But there is also, Aristotle maintains (*Metaphysics* IV.1), a more general study of what there is, a study of being qua being. (‘Qua’ translates a technical expression Aristotle uses to indicate an aspect under which something is to be considered). The study of being qua being concerns the most general class of things, namely, everything that exists. And it studies them under their most general aspect, namely, as things that exist. It thus raises the question of what it is for something to exist.

Now, on Aristotle’s view what it is for a horse to exist is different in kind from what it is for whiteness or courage to exist. “Something is said to be,” he tells us, “in many ways” (*Metaphysics* IV.2, VII.1). So it might seem that there could not be a unified answer to the question of what it is for something in general to exist. But he also thinks that there is a connection among these modes of being (or senses of ‘exist’) which is deep enough to make a unified answer possible. The existence of whiteness is derivative; there is such a thing as whiteness because something, for example some horse, is white. Whiteness is not an independent entity, capable of existing on its own. Horses and other biological specimens, on the other hand, are independent entities. Such independently existing entities Aristotle calls “substances.” (The Greek word traditionally translated as ‘substance’ may with equal plausibility be rendered ‘basic reality’.) The existence of everything else is somehow dependent on its relation to substances. Hence Aristotle tells us that the ancient and perennial question “What is being?” really comes down to the question “What is substance?” (*Metaphysics* VII.1).

Substances, then, are the most fundamental realities. But not all of Aristotle’s predecessors would have agreed with him about what the substances are. Empedocles would have said that the four elements are the only substances. Democritus would call atoms substances; for

Plato, the substances are his independently existing and immaterial Forms. Much of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is spent trying to steer a middle course between the materialism of these Presocratics, on the one hand, and Platonism, on the other. How successful he is in this effort—and indeed, even the precise details of his solution—are matters of dispute.

In his earliest ontological writings, Aristotle maintains that individual biological specimens—this man or that tree—are the primary substances (*Categories* 5). The species to which they belong, man and tree, are substances in a secondary sense. But he subsequently (*Metaphysics* VII–VIII) begins to raise the question of what it is that makes this man or that tree a substance—what the substance of these things is, as he puts it. He intimates that the answer to this question will tell us what primary substance is. His convoluted and difficult investigation of this question leads him to the conclusion that it is form or essence that is primary substance. This suggests a tilt in the direction of Plato, but Aristotle insists that his answer is different from Plato's, for in his view Platonic Forms are separate from and independent of their material {449} instantiations, whereas Aristotelian essences in some sense are not. Still, much remains unclear about Aristotle's answer. For example, there is no consensus among scholars about whether Aristotle thought of essences as being particular (so that each individual horse has its own unique essence) or specific (in which case the essence of all horses will be the same).

Aristotle's universe is finite, eternal, and geocentric: a stationary earth surrounded by concentric spheres that carry the sun, moon, planets, and stars in their circular orbits about the earth. Everything below the sphere of the moon is made of four fundamental elements —earth, water, air, and fire—that interact and are capable of transforming into one another. Each element is characterized by a pair of properties from among the contraries hot, cold, wet, and dry. Earth is cold and dry; water, cold and wet; air, hot and wet; fire, hot and dry. The heavenly bodies are made of a different kind of matter altogether, a fifth element ("quintessence"). Each element has a natural place and a natural movement. The four sublunary elements tend to move in a straight line, earth downward toward the center of the universe, fire

up toward the extreme reaches of the universe, and air and water toward intermediate places. Once in its natural place, each of these four remains at rest unless something else causes it to move. The natural movement of the fifth element in the heavens is circular and eternal. All of this movement and change is ultimately explained in terms of an "unmoved mover"—a cause of change that is itself uncaused and outside of the universe (*On the Heavens* I–III, *On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be* II.4, *Physics* VIII.6, *Metaphysics* XII.6–9).

It is the job of natural science to study things whose nature it is to undergo change. In the face of influential Parmenidean arguments against the possibility of change, Aristotle attempted to set out a framework that would make change intelligible. Every change involves three essential ingredients: a pair of opposed characteristics or states (from which and to which, respectively, the change occurs) and a subject which underlies the change and persists through it. Schematically, every change, every case of "coming-to-be," can be described in this way: something, *x*, goes from being *F* to not being *F*, or vice versa. A musician comes to be because a man goes from being unmusical to being musical; a statue comes to be because some shapeless bronze takes on a definite form. Contrary to what Parmenides argued, coming-to-be does not involve getting *something from nothing*; it involves getting something which is *F* from something which is (among other things) not *F* (*Physics* I.7–9).

These are the necessary preconditions for change. But what is change? Aristotle defines it in terms of his concepts of *actuality* and *potentiality*. Change, he tells us, is "the actuality of that which potentially is, qua potentially" (*Physics* III.1). The process of building a house, for example, is the actuality of the buildable materials, qua buildable. The materials that are potentially a house are already actual even before the building begins—they are bricks and boards, and so on. So the actuality with which Aristotle identifies change is that of the bricks and boards, not qua bricks and boards, but qua buildable. It is precisely when the house is in the process of being built that this potentiality of the material actually (and not merely potentially) exists qua potentiality. Once the process is completed, that potentiality has

been replaced by a corresponding actuality, that of the completed house. The precise meaning of Aristotle's definition of change is a subject of scholarly debate. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that, in undergoing change, a thing is actualizing a potentiality that it already has even before it changes. It is thus already part of its nature to be able to undergo change of that sort.

It is the job of a theoretical science to explain things, and that means that it must answer "why?" questions. To answer such a question is to give a *cause*. (Aristotle's word is *aition*; 'explanation' is an equally appropriate translation.) But 'cause' is "said in many ways" (*Physics* II.3). In one sense, the cause of something is the material out of which it comes to be (material {450} cause). In another sense, it is the form or essence stated in the definition of the thing (formal cause). In a third, it is the source of change or stability (efficient cause). In a fourth, it is the end (*telos*), what the thing is for (final cause). Note that it is not just events that have causes, in Aristotle's view; houses and tigers have causes just as much as eclipses and explosions do. Note also that there can be more than one cause of the same thing (e.g., bronze is the material cause of a statue, whereas a certain shape is its formal cause). Indeed, two things may be causes of each other, as exercise is the (efficient) cause of health and health is the (final) cause of exercise.

A complete account of something will mention all of the causes that are appropriate to it. Artifacts clearly have causes in all four senses: a house is made of wood, by a builder, with a form and structure suitable to provide a shelter for human beings and their possessions. Mathematical objects, since they do not undergo change, have no efficient or final causes. Natural objects, such as plants and animals clearly have the first three kinds of cause, for they come into being, are composed of matter (ultimately of the four elements), and have essential natures. But are there final causes in nature? Aristotle maintains, notoriously, that there are (*Physics* II.8, *Parts of Animals* I.1). His teleological account of nature is central to his entire philosophical system.

His position here may strike us as an aberration if we identify final causes with conscious intentions. The final cause of an artifact is

found in the mind of the artisan who made it; the final cause is in that sense external to the artifact itself. (It is for this reason that artifacts do not count for Aristotle as genuine substances. Lacking final causes that are internal to them, they do not engage in activity of their own, and hence they have no essence, strictly speaking.) But final causes in nature are not like this at all. Rather, Aristotle's idea is that the final causes of natural objects are internal to those objects. Consider the living creatures that populate the natural world. They behave in certain characteristic ways: their being is defined by these functions and these characteristic activities. The parts of which they are composed enable them to fulfill these functions more or less successfully. It is not by accident that animals have teeth or eyes; their organs clearly have functions—they are *for* something. And what they are for is typically beneficial for the organism; they enable it to survive and to engage in the activities that define its being. It is function and activity, not purpose, that Aristotle claims to discern in nature.

This understanding of Aristotle's teleology helps to explain why he believes that final, formal, and efficient causes often coincide (*Physics* II.7). Just as the various parts and organs of an animal contribute to its well-being and survival, the *telos* of the animal itself is to be a good (i.e., successful) specimen of its kind. So the final cause of a tiger is just to be a tiger, as specified in its formal cause (i.e., its definition). The coincidence of the efficient cause with the final and the formal can be seen most easily in the case of reproduction and development. The efficient cause of a tiger cub is a tiger (in Aristotle's view, its father). As the cub grows, its process of development tends almost invariably (in the normal case—occasionally things go awry) toward the same outcome: a mature individual that, like its parents, satisfies the definition of a tiger.

The being of a living thing is thus inextricably bound up in its being alive and living the life that a thing of its kind lives. What is it that differentiates the living from the nonliving? Aristotle's answer is: the presence of the soul (*psuchē*). We notice immediately an important difference between this and later conceptions of soul: *psuchē* for Aristotle is linked with life in general, rather than with mind, thought,

or personality in particular. All living things have souls. But there are different degrees or levels of soul, associated with different capacities or functions. At the most fundamental level is the nutritive soul, the kind of soul common to all living things, for all plants and animals have the capacity to take in nourishment. Higher {451} levels would account for the appetitive, locomotive, and perceptive capacities of humans and other animals. At the highest level is the rational soul, peculiar to humans.

But what is the soul? Aristotle defines it to be the *form* of the body. More precisely, it is the "first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially" (*De Anima* II.1). The term 'first actuality' needs some explanation. As Aristotle uses the expression, a first actuality is not itself an activity or bit of behavior (a 'second actuality'), but a capacity or ability to act or to behave. It is thus a kind of potentiality (a 'second potentiality'), an organizing principle that enables a living thing to go about the business of living. To have a soul, then, is to have a capacity to engage in certain characteristic activities. In the most general case, it is the capacity to metabolize. For higher levels of soul, it is the capacity to move about, to have desires and to fulfill them, to perceive, to contemplate.

The soul is therefore neither a material part of an animal, nor some immaterial thing capable of existing in separation from the body. For the soul is a set of capacities that a living thing has, and these capacities are incapable of existing on their own—they are the capacities of a living thing. Aristotle thus resists both a materialist conception of the soul as some kind of bodily part and a Platonic conception which holds the soul to be independent of and, indeed, impeded by the body.

Much of Aristotle's discussion of the soul concerns the topic of sense-perception (*De Anima* II.5–12). He discusses the physiology of each of the five senses in detail and defines perception in general as the reception in the soul of the perceptible form of an external object. His account of thought to some extent mirrors what he says about perception. In thinking, the mind takes on the intelligible form of its object and in so doing becomes, in a sense, identical with it. Aristotle thereby avoids the problem of having somehow to relate a mental

representation to an object external to the mind. But thought differs from perception in an important respect: whereas there are sense organs, there is, for Aristotle, no organ of thought (*De Anima* III.4). For this reason he holds that thought, unlike other psychic functions, is somehow separable from the body. It is not clear how well this aspect of Aristotle's theory can be made to harmonize with his otherwise hylomorphic conception of the soul.

Thus far we have looked at some of Aristotle's answers to the questions of the theoretical sciences. As we shall see, his approach to the practical sciences builds on those answers. The central question of ethics is how to live, that is, what the good life is, and Aristotle's answer is basically naturalistic. He takes it to be uncontroversial that all of our actions are aimed at some good. So the good, he reasons is "that which all seek" (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.1). And what is this good? It must be something that is chosen for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else. Aristotle's answer is that it is happiness (*eudaimonia*) in the sense of well-being or flourishing. (It would be a mistake to think of happiness here in the narrow sense of a kind of mental or emotional state.) The well-being of a thing consists in its fulfilling its basic function and performing its characteristic activities. Human happiness or well-being, then, consists in fulfilling the function and performing the activities that define life for human beings. All animals nourish themselves, and grow, and perceive. What is distinctively human is the rational faculty, and that is what determines our well-being. *Eudaimonia* is therefore an "activity of the soul in accord with reason" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7). We flourish, then when we do well the things that are distinctively human.

The remainder of Aristotle's *Ethics* consists of an unpacking of this basic conception of *eudaimonia*. He distinguishes virtues of character from intellectual virtues, and discusses all of them in detail (*Nicomachean Ethics* II–VI). Intellectual virtues are excellences of the rational element in the soul. But the irrational element also has an aspect that is rational, in that it is capable of being persuaded by reason, and the excellences of this part of the soul are virtues of {452} character, or moral virtues (*Nicomachean Ethics* I.13). Such a virtue is a disposition to choose actions that are intermediate between

the extremes of excess and deficiency. (For example, courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness.) These choices must be made in accordance with reason, as would be determined by a person of practical wisdom. So possession of the moral virtues implies the possession of the intellectual virtues, as well, since practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue. Of the intellectual virtues, the highest is that of theoretical contemplation. This, finally, is the activity of the soul with which Aristotle identifies the highest form of *eudaimonia* (*Nicomachean Ethics* X.7).

In Aristotle's view, politics is continuous with ethics, for just as it is part of human nature to seek happiness, it is also part of human nature to live in communities. We are, Aristotle asserts, social animals (*Politics* I.2). The state is the highest form of community; it is a natural entity, and does not exist merely by convention. (The kind of state Aristotle has in mind is the relatively small city-state of fourth-century Greece.) Plato had argued that the structure of the soul was like that of the state, with different psychic functions corresponding to different classes of citizens. For Aristotle, the analogy works the other way around. The state has a proper function and a nature in the same way that an individual organism does. Hence, to say what a state is we must determine what its proper function is.

Aristotle believes that a state exists for the sake of the good or happy life, so that the best form of government will be one which promotes the well-being of all of its citizens, and he goes on, after considering a variety of alternatives, to describe such a state in considerable detail (*Politics* VII). In his emphasis on the rule of law and the role of a constitution in defining a state, Aristotle's ideas are still timely today. There are other aspects of his thought, however, such as his belief that there are natural rulers and natural slaves, that the contemporary reader will no doubt find repugnant.

Aristotle has had a profound influence on the history of philosophy. From late antiquity though the Middle Ages, it was standard procedure for philosophers to couch their own writing in the form of commentaries on his works. His logic was so thoroughly accepted that the subject remained virtually unchanged for the next two millennia. His concepts of subject and predicate, matter and form,

essence and accident, species and genus, among others, have become a standard part of the philosophical vernacular. Although many of his ideas have been discredited or superseded, much of what he has to say remains relevant to issues of vital contemporary interest. In terms of the breadth of his intellectual curiosity and the vastness of his influence, Aristotle is without equal in the history of human thought.

CATEGORIES

Translated by S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews.

IN THIS BRIEF but important work, Aristotle gives an account of predication, that is, of the application of the terms of a language to things in the world. (The Greek word *katēgoriai*, from which the English "categories" is derived, comes from the verb meaning "to predicate.") On the basis of this account he develops a theory of classification of "the things that there are." In the excerpt presented here he introduces the notion of a substance (*ousia*), his term for an independently existing entity, a fundamental ingredient of reality. Everything else, he argues, depends for its existence on the existence of substances.

{453} 1

Things [*1a*] are called *homonymous* when they have only a name in common but a different definition[1] corresponding to the name. For example, both a human and a drawing are animals.[2] But while the name of these two things is common to them both, the definition corresponding to the name is different. For if [*5*] one gives an account of what it is for each of them to be an animal, one will give a distinctive definition for each.

Things are called *synonymous* when they have a name in common and also the same definition corresponding to the name. Thus, for example, both

a human and an ox are animals. Each of them is called by the same name, ‘animal’; moreover, the definition [*10*] of what they are is the same. For if one gives a definition of what it is for each of these to be what it is, an animal, one will give the same definition.

Things are called *paronymous* in case one gets its name from another with some difference in grammatical form. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the [*15*] brave man from bravery.

2

Among things that are said, some are said in combination, some without combination. Examples of things said in combination are ‘man runs’, ‘man wins’. Examples of things said without combination are ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs, ‘wins’.

[*20*] Among the things that there are: (a) Some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject.

(b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (I call ‘in a subject’ what is in something, not as a part, [*25*] and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, this bit of grammar is in a subject, the soul, but it is not said of any subject; and this individual white is in a subject, the body, for all color is in body, but it is not said of any subject.

(c) Some are both said of a subject [*1b*] and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is said of a subject, grammar.

(d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example the individual man or the individual [*5*] horse. Nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject.

Without exception, things that are individual and one in number are not said of any subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject. This bit of grammar is among the things in a subject.

3

Whenever one thing is predicated of another as [*10*] of a subject, everything said of what is predicated will also be said of the subject. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal is predicated of man; therefore animal will also be predicated of the individual man. [*15*]

For the individual man is both a man and an animal.

Differentiae of genera that are different and not subordinate to one another are also different in kind—for example, differentiae of animal and of knowledge. For the differentiae of animal are *footed*, *winged*, *aquatic*, and *two-footed*, but none of these is a differentia of knowledge—one sort of knowledge does not [*20*] differ from another by being two-footed. Yet if one genus is subordinate to another, nothing prevents their differentiae from being the same. For the higher genera are predicated of those beneath them, so that all differentiae of what is predicated will be differentiae of the subject as well.

4

Each of the things said without any combination [*25*] signifies either a substance, or how much [quantity], or of what sort [quality], or related to what [relative], or where, or when, or being arranged, or having on, or doing, or being affected. To give a general indication of what these things are, here are some examples:

Substance	man, horse
Quantity	two cubits, three cubits
{454} Quality	white, grammatical
[*2a*] Relative	double, half, larger
Where	in the Lyceum, in the marketplace
When	yesterday, last year
Being arranged	lying, sitting
Having on	wearing shoes, being armed
Doing	cutting, burning
Being affected	being cut, being burned

[*5*] Said by itself, each of the things mentioned above is no assertion, but, in combination with others of these, it becomes an assertion. For it seems that every assertion is either true or false; but none of the things said without combination—such [*10*] as ‘man’, ‘white’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’—is either true or false.

5

Substance in the most proper sense of the word, that which is *primarily* and most of all called substance, is neither said of any subject, nor is it in any subject—for example, the individual man and the individual horse. What are called *secondary* substances are both the [*15*] species which the things primarily called substances fall under and the genera of these species. For example, the individual man falls under the species, man, and the genus of the species is animal. So these things, for example man and animal, are called secondary substances.

It is evident from what has been said that both the name and the definition of a thing [*20*] *said of a subject* must be predicable of the subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and so the name is predicated—for you will be predicating ‘man’ of the individual man; and also the definition of man will be predicated of the [*25*] individual man—for the individual man is also a man. Thus, both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject.

But, for the most part, neither the name nor the definition of what is *in a subject* is predicated of the subject. Sometimes, however, nothing prevents the name [*30*] from being predicated of the subject, but the definition cannot be predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (body) is predicated of the subject—for the body is called white—but the definition of white will never be predicated of body.

All other things are either said of [*35*] primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. This is evident from a consideration of cases. For - example, animal is predicated of man, and therefore of the individual man (for if it were predicated of no individual [*2b*] man, it would not be predicated of man at all). Again, color is in body, and therefore in an individual body (for if it were not in any individual, it would not be in body at all). Thus, all other things are either said of primary substances as subjects [*5*] or in them as subjects. Therefore, if there were no primary substances, there could not be anything else.

Among secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus; for it is closer to the primary substance. If one were to give an account of what some primary substance is, it would be more informative and [*10*] more appropriate to give the species than to give the genus. For example, we would give a more informative account of an individual man if we give ‘man’ rather than ‘animal’; for the former is more distinctive of an

individual man, while the latter is more general. And in giving an account of an individual tree it is more informative to give ‘tree’ in our account than to give ‘plant’.

[*15*] Further, primary substances are subjects for all other things, and all other things are predicated of them or are in them, and it is for this reason that they are called substances most of all. But as primary substances are to other things, so species is to genus—for a species is a subject [*20*] for its genus. And while genera are predicated of their species, the converse does not hold—that is, species are not predicated of their genera. Thus for this reason, too, the species is more a substance than is the genus.

Among species that are not themselves genera, none is more a substance than another. For it is no more appropriate to give ‘man’ [*25*] in an account of an individual man than it is to give ‘horse’ in an account of an individual horse. Similarly, among primary substances none is more a substance than another, for an individual man is no more a substance than is an individual ox.

{455} It is reasonable that, after primary substances, species and genera alone among everything else should [*30*] be called secondary substances. For they alone among things predicated reveal primary substance. If we were to give an account of what an individual man is we should properly give the species or the genus—and we should do this more informatively by giving ‘man’ than by giving ‘animal’. But to give any of the other things will [*35*] be out of place—for example, to give ‘white’ or ‘runs’ or anything whatsoever like that. So it is reasonable that only these among the other things are called substances.

Moreover, it is because they are subjects for everything else that primary substances are most properly called substances. [*3a*]

But as primary substances are to everything else, so species and genera of primary substances are to all the rest; for all the rest are predicated of these. Thus if you call an individual man grammatical [*5*] you will be calling both a man and an animal grammatical—and likewise for the rest.

Not being in a subject is something common to all substances. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor is it in a subject. It is [*10*] also quite clear that secondary substances are not in a subject either. For man is said of a subject, the individual man; but it is not in a subject, for man is not in the individual man. In similar fashion animal is also said of a

subject, the individual man; but animal is not in the [*15*] individual man. Moreover, although nothing prevents the name of a thing that is in a subject from sometimes being predicated of the subject, the definition of such a thing cannot be predicated of it. In the case of secondary substances, however, the definition as well as the name can be predicated of the subject. For you will predicate of the individual man both the definition of man [*20*] and the definition of animal. Therefore no substance is among the things in a subject.

This, however, is not peculiar to substance; their differentiae are not in a subject either. For *footed* and *two-footed* are said of a subject, man, but they are not in a subject—neither [*25*] *two-footed* nor *footed* is in man. Moreover, the definition of a differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia would be said. For example, if *footed* is said of man, the definition of *footed* will also be predicated of man, since man is footed.

We shouldn't be afraid that we might have to say that the parts of a substance [*30*] are not themselves substances since they are in a subject, namely, the whole substance. For 'things in a subject' was not being used to mean things belonging to something as parts.

It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that they are said synonymously of everything they are said of. For every [*35*] such predicate is predicated either of individuals or of species. (While a primary substance yields no predicate—for a primary substance is not said of any subject—among secondary substances the species is predicated of the individual and the genus is predicated both of the species and of the individual [*3b*]. Similarly, differentiae are predicated both of species and of individuals.) Moreover, primary substances are given the definition of both their species and their genera, and a species is given that of its genus. (For whatever is said of the predica [*5*] te is also said of the subject.) Similarly, both species and individuals are given the definition of their differentiae. But we saw that synonymous things are those that have both a name in common and the same definition. Therefore substances and differentiae are said synonymously of everything they are said of. [*10*] Each substance seems to signify a particular *this*. As far as primary substances are concerned, it is indisputably true that each signifies a particular *this*, for what is indicated is individual and one in number. As far as secondary substances are concerned, it seems from the appearance of the name when one [*15*] says

'man' or 'animal' that they, too, signify a particular *this*. But it is not really so. Rather, each signifies a particular sort.[3] For the subject is not one, as is primary substance, but man and animal are said of many things. Yet a secondary substance does not signify simply a particular sort, as white does. White signifies nothing but a sort, wh [*20*] ereas species and genus distinguish {456} a sort with respect to substance; for each of them signifies a particular sort of substance. (With a genus one encompasses more than with a species. For saying 'animal' embraces more than saying 'man'.) It is also a characteristic of substances not to have a con [*25*] trary. For what would be the contrary of a primary substance? For example, nothing is the contrary of an individual man, nor is anything the contrary of man or of animal. But this is not peculiar to substance—it holds also of many other things, such as quantity. For nothing is the contrary of two [*30*] cubits, or of ten, or of any other such thing—although someone might say that many is the contrary of few, or large the contrary of small. But nothing is the contrary of any definite quantity.

It appears that substance does not admit of more or less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substa [*35*] nce than another—indeed, I said that it is—rather, I mean that no substance is said to be more or less just what it is. For example, if this substance is a man, he will not be more or less a man than himself or than another man. One man is not more a man than an [*4a*] other, as one white thing is whiter than another or one thing is more beautiful than another. And yet something may be said to be more or less than itself, as when a white body is said to be whiter now than before, and what is hot is said [*5*] to be more or less hot. But no substance is spoken of in this way. A man is not said to be more a man now than before, nor is any other substance. Therefore, substance does not admit of more or less. [*10*] Most characteristic of substance seems to be the fact that something one and the same in number can receive contraries. In no other case can one cite something one in number that is able to receive contraries. For example, a color that is one and the same in number will not be white [*15*] and black; nor will the same action, one in number, be both bad and good; and similarly for other things that are not substance. But a substance, one and the same in number, can receive contraries. An individual man, for example, being one and the same, becomes now pale and now dark, [*20*]

now hot and now cold, now bad and now good. This sort of thing is to be seen in no other case.

Someone might object by saying that statements and beliefs are things of this sort, for the same statement seems to be both true and false. For example, if the statement that [*25*] someone is sitting is true, when the person stands the same statement will be false. It is the same with beliefs, also. If one holds the true belief that someone is sitting, when the person stands—if one holds the same belief about him—the belief will be false. But even if we agree to this, there is still a difference in how this happens. In the case of [*30*] substances it is because *they* change that they are able to receive contraries. For what turns from hot to cold, or from dark to pale, or from good to bad, has changed (because it has altered). Similarly in other cases, each thing is able to receive contraries by itself admitting the change. Statements and [*35*] beliefs, however, remain themselves entirely unchanged; it is because the facts change that the contrary comes to hold of a statement or belief. For the statement that someone is sitting remains the same, [*4b*] but it becomes now true and now false because the facts change. It is the same with beliefs, also. Thus even if one were to allow that [*5*] statements and beliefs can receive contraries, it would still be characteristic of a substance that it can receive contraries in this way—by a change in *itself*.

Yet this is not true. For statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries not because they receive anything themselves, but because something else has been affected. It is because of what the facts are, [*10*] or are not, that a statement is said to be either true or false, not by its being able to receive contraries. For no statement or belief is changed by anything at all. So, since nothing comes about in them, they are not able to receive contraries. But a substance itself receives contraries, and this is the reason it is said to be able to receive contraries. For it receives illness and health, [*15*] or paleness and darkness, and it is said to be able to receive contraries because it itself receives each thing of this sort. Thus it is distinctive of substance that what is one and the same in number can receive contraries. Let this much, then, be said about substance.

{457} De Interpretatione

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

The second in a series of works on logic, *De Interpretatione* (literally, "On Interpretation") presents an analysis of the structure of statement-making sentences. It is thus one of the first attempts to answer the questions of what is today called philosophy of language. In Chapter 9 Aristotle raises a famous puzzle about the present truth of statements concerning events in the future.

1

[*16a*] First, we should set down what a name is and what a verb is, then what a denial, an affirmation, a statement, and a sentence (*logos*) are.

Now, voiced sounds are symbols of affections in the soul. And just as written marks are not the same for everyone, voiced sounds [*5*] are not the same either. But the primary things that these signify (namely, affections in the soul) are the same for everyone. And what these affections are likenesses of (namely, things) are also the same for everyone. We have spoken about these things in *On the Soul*,[4] since they belong to another work.

Just as some intelligible objects in the soul are neither true nor false, whereas others are already necessarily one or the [*10*] other, so it is with voiced sounds too. For falsity and truth have to do with combination and division. Thus names and verbs by themselves—for example, 'human' or 'pale' when nothing further is added—are like the intelligible objects that are without combination and division, since so far they are neither false nor true. [*15*] An indication of this is that even 'goat-stag'[5] signifies something but not, as yet, anything true or false—unless 'is' or 'is not' is added, either simply or with reference to time.

2

A name is a voiced sound that is significant by convention, without [a reference to] time, no part of which is significant in separation. [*20*] For in

‘Mansfield’, the ‘field’ does not signify anything by itself, as it does in the phrase (*logos*) ‘a man’s field’. But neither is it the same in the case of complex names as it is in the case of simple ones. For in the latter the part is in no way significant, whereas in the former it has some meaning but does not signify anything in separation—for example, the ‘life’ in ‘lifeboat’. I say ‘by [*25*] convention’, because no name is a name by nature, but only when it has become a symbol. For even inarticulate sounds (of beasts, for example) make at least something clear, yet none of them is a name.

‘Not-man’, though, is not a name, nor is there any established name that one should [*30*] call it by, nor is it a sentence (*logos*) or a denial. Let us call it an indefinite name.

‘Of Philo’ (*Philōnos*) and ‘to Philo’ (*Philōni*) [genitive and dative cases of the name *Philōn*], and things of that sort are not names but inflections of names. But the same account (*logos*) applies to them as to names, except that an [*16b*] inflection together with ‘is’, ‘was’, or ‘will be’ is not true or false, whereas a name with them added always is true or false—for example, in ‘Of Philo is’ and ‘Of Philo is not’ nothing so far is [*5*] true or false.

3

A verb is what additionally signifies time, but no part of it is significant in separation. It is a sign of things that are said of something else. I mean by ‘additionally signifies time’ that, for example, ‘recovery’ is a name, whereas ‘recovers’ is a verb, since it additionally signifies that something belongs *now*. And it is always [*10*] a sign of something’s belonging—that is, something’s belonging to an underlying subject.

{458} I do not call ‘does not recover’ and ‘does not ail’ verbs. For, though they additionally signify time and always belong to something, there is a difference for which there is no established name. Let us call them indefinite verbs, [*15*] since they likewise belong both to what is and what is not.[6]

Similarly, ‘recovered’ and ‘will recover’ are not verbs, but inflections of verbs. They differ from verbs because verbs additionally signify the present time, whereas inflections of verbs, signify times outside the present.

Verbs said just by themselves are names and signify something. For the speaker stops his thought, [*20*] and the hearer pauses. But so far it does not signify whether something is or is not. For not even* ‘is’ or ‘is not’ is a sign of a thing, and neither is ‘that which is’, when it is said bare of any additions—for by itself it is nothing, but it additionally signifies some combination, which cannot be [*25*] understood without the components.

4

A sentence is a significant voiced sound some part of which is significant in separation—as an annunciation,[7] but not as an affirmation. I mean, for example, that ‘human’ signifies something, but not that the thing is or is not (though it will be an affirmation or denial if something is added); the single syllables of human, [*30*] by contrast, signify nothing. Nor is the ‘ice’ in ‘mice’ significant—here it is only a voiced sound. In double [or complex] names, as we said, a part does signify, but not by itself.

Every sentence is significant, not as a [naturally appropriate] instrument, but, as we said, by convention. Not every sentence [*17a*] is a statement, however, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. But there is not truth or falsity in every sentence—for example, a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false. Let us set aside these other cases, though, since the investigation of them more properly belongs to rhetoric or poetics, whereas our present branch of theoretical knowledge concerns statements.

7

Now, some things are universals, while others are [*17a38*] particulars. And I mean by ‘universal’ what is by nature predicated of more than one thing, and by ‘particular’ what is not—for example, human [*40*] is a universal, whereas Callias is a particular.

Necessarily, then, [*17b*] when one states that something does or does not belong to something, sometimes it is of a universal that one states this, sometimes of a particular. Now if one states universally of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, there will be contrary statements. (By ‘stating universally of a universal’ I mean, [*5*] for example, ‘Every human is pale’, ‘No human is pale’.) But when one states something of a universal, but not universally, the statements are not contrary, though

contrary things may be made clear. By ‘stating of a universal but not universally’ I mean, for example, ‘A human is pale’, ‘A human is not pale’, since, though human is a universal, [*10*] it is not used universally in the statement. For ‘every’ does not signify the universal, but rather that it is used universally.

In the case of what is predicated, on the other hand, it is not true that it can be predicated universally, since there will be no [true] affirmation in which the universal is predicated universally of what is predicated—as, for example, in ‘Every human is every animal’. [*15*]

I call an affirmation and a denial *contradictory* opposites when what one of them signifies universally the other signifies not universally—for example, ‘Every human is pale’ and ‘Not every human is pale’, ‘No human is pale’ and ‘Some human is pale’. But the universal affirmation and the universal denial are *contrary* [*20*] opposites—for example, ‘Every human is just’ and ‘No human is just’. That is why they cannot both be true at the same time, whereas their [contradictory] opposites may both be true with respect to the same {459} thing—for example, ‘Not every man is pale’ and ‘Some man is pale’. [*25*]

Of contradictory universal statements about a universal, though, it is necessary for one or the other to be true or false, and similarly if they are about particulars—for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ and ‘Socrates is not pale’. But if they are about universals, but are not universal, it is not always the case that one is true and the other false. For it is true to say at the same time [*30*] that a human is pale and that a human is not pale, and that a human is noble and that a human is not noble. For, if he is base, then he is not noble, and if something is becoming something, it is also not that thing. This might seem strange at first sight, because ‘A human is not pale’ might appear to signify at the same time that [*35*] no human is pale. But it does not signify the same [as the latter], nor does it necessarily hold at the same time.

It is evident that a single affirmation has a single denial. For the denial must deny the very same thing that the affirmation affirms, and deny it of the same thing, whether a particular or a [*40*] universal, whether universally or not universally. [*18a*] I mean, for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ and ‘Socrates is not pale’. But if something else is denied, or the same thing is denied of something else, that will not be the opposite statement, but a different one. The opposite of ‘Every human is pale’ is ‘Not every human is

pale’; of ‘Some human is pale’, [*5*] ‘No human is pale’; of ‘A human is pale’, ‘A human is not pale’.

We have said, then, that a single affirmation has a single denial as its contradictory opposite, and which these are; that contrary statements are a distinct group, and which these are; and that not all [*10*] contradictory pairs are true or false,[8] why this is, and when they are true or false.

9

[*18a28*] In the case of what is and what has been, then, it is necessary for the affirmation or the denial to be true or false. And in the case of universal statements about universals, it is always necessary for one to be true and the other false—also [*30*] in the case of particulars, as we have said. But in the case of universals that are not said of things universally, this is not necessary—we have also discussed this. But in the case of particulars that are going to be it is not likewise.

For if every affirmation or denial is either true or false, it is also necessary for everything either to be the case or not to be the case. So if* a person [*35*] says that something will be and another person denies this same thing, it is clearly necessary for one of them to be speaking truly, if every affirmation is true or false, since both will not be the case at the same time in such circumstances. For if it is true to say that something is pale or not pale, it is necessary for it to be pale or not pale;[9] and if it [*18b*] is pale or not pale, it was true to affirm or deny this. Also, if it is not the case, one speaks falsely; and if one speaks falsely, it is not the case. So it is necessary for the affirmation or the denial to be true. Nothing, therefore, either is or happens, or will be or will not be, by luck or [*5*] as luck would have it, but rather everything is by necessity and not as luck would have it, since either the affirmer or the denier speaks truly. For otherwise it might equally well happen or not happen, since what happens as luck would have it is no more thus-and-so than it is not thus-and-so, nor will it be.

Further, if something is pale now, it is true to say earlier that it would be pale, so that it is always [*10*] true to say of anything that has happened {460} that it would be so. But if it was always true to say that it was or would be so, it couldn’t not be so, or not be going to be so. But if something cannot not happen, it is impossible for it not to happen. And if it is

impossible for something not to happen, it is necessary for it to happen. Everything that will be, then, will be by necessity. Therefore, nothing will be as luck would have it [*15*] or by luck, since if it is by luck it is not by necessity.

Nor, however, can we say that *neither* is true—for example, that it neither will be so or will not be so. For, first, though the affirmation is false, the denial is not true, and, though the negation is false, the affirmation is not true. And, in addition to this, [*20*] if it is true to say that it is pale and dark, both must be the case, and if both will be the case tomorrow, both must be the case tomorrow. But if neither will be the case nor will not be the case tomorrow, even so, nothing such as a sea-battle will happen as luck would have it, [*25*] since the sea-battle would have neither to happen nor not happen.

These, then, and others of the same sort, are the absurd consequences that follow if indeed for every affirmation and denial, whether said universally about universals or about particulars, it is necessary for one of the opposites to be true and the other false, and nothing happens as chance would have it, but everything [*30*] is or happens by necessity. So there would be no need to deliberate or to busy ourselves about anything, on the supposition that if we do this, that will be the case, and that if we do not do this, it will not be. For there is nothing to prevent someone's having said ten thousand years ago that this thing would be so and another's having denied it, [*35*] so that whichever of the two it was true to say then, will be so of necessity.

Nor, of course, does it make any difference whether anyone said the contradictory things or did not say them. For it is clear that this is the way the things are, even if someone did not affirm it and another deny it, since it is not because of the affirming or the denying that it will be or will not be the case, nor is it a matter of ten thousand years rather than any other time whatsoever. So if in the entire course [*19a*] of time things were such that one or the other was true, it was necessary for this to happen, and each thing that happens was always such as to happen by necessity. For what someone has truly said will happen cannot not happen; and of what happens it was always true to say that it will [*5*] happen.

But surely this is impossible. For we see that what will be so has a starting-point both in deliberation and in action, and that, in general, in things that are not always in activity there is the possibility of being and of

not being. And in these cases, both being and [*10*] not being, and so both happening and not happening, are possible. And it is clear to us that many things are like this. For example, it is possible for this cloak to be cut up, although it will not be cut up but will wear out first. But similarly its not being cut up is also possible, since its wearing out first would not have been the case [*15*] unless its not being cut up were in fact possible. And so it is the same in the case of other things that happen, since they are said to be possible in the same way.

It is evident, therefore, that not everything is or happens by necessity, but that some things happen as luck would have it, and the affirmation is no more true than the denial. In other cases, it is one rather than [*20*] the other for the most part, but it is still possible for the other to happen and for the first not to happen.

Now, for what is, whenever it is, to be, and for what is not, whenever it is not, not to be, is necessary. But surely not everything that is, by necessity is, and not everything that is not, by necessity is not. For it is not the same thing for everything that is to be by [*25*] necessity *whenever it is* as for it to be by necessity *unconditionally*; and the same is true of what is not. And in the case of contradictories the same account applies. It is necessary, surely, that everything either is or is not, and will be or will not be. But one cannot divide and say that one or the other is necessary. I mean, for example, that it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea-battle tomorrow, [*30*] but it is surely not necessary for a sea-battle to happen tomorrow nor necessary for it not to happen—although it is necessary for one to happen or not to happen.[10]

{461} So, since the truth of statements corresponds to how things are, it is clear that those things that are as luck would have it are such as to admit of contraries, and the same necessarily holds for the contradictories as well. This is just what happens in the case of [*35*] things that neither always are nor always are not. For in these cases it is necessary for one of the contradictories to be true and the other false—not, however, this one or that one, but as luck would have it—and for one to be true *rather* than the other, yet not *already* true or false.

So it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation or denial of opposites, [*19b*] one is true and the other false.[11] For what holds of things

that are does not hold of things that are not, but that may possibly be or may not be—in these cases it is as we said.

1. ‘Definition’, here and elsewhere in this chapter, translates *logos tēs ousias*, literally, ‘account of the essence’.
2. The Greek word *zōov* can mean either an animal or a figure in a picture; the latter need not be the figure of an animal.
3. ‘Sort’ here translates *poion*, usually rendered ‘quality’.
4. See DA III.3–7.
5. See Plato, Rep. 488a.
6. The meaning is unclear, but may be this. ‘What is’ = (1) ‘what is recovered’ or ‘what recovery belongs to’; ‘what is not’ = (2) ‘what is not recovered’ or ‘what recovery does not belong to’. Both ‘does not recover’ and ‘does not ail’ apply to (1) and likewise to (2). For if someone is (already) recovered at time t, he does not recover (he is not in the process of recovery) at t, but nor does he ail (nor is he in the process of ailing) at t.
7. As when we announce the arrival of a guest by stating his name.
8. That is, not every contradictory pair is such that one is true and the other false. Aristotle has said above (18a5) that ‘a human is pale’ and ‘a human is not pale’ count as a contradictory pair, but both are true (17b30).
9. There is a key ambiguity lurking here. ‘If it is true that p, it is necessary that p’ might mean (1) ‘Necessarily, if it is true that p, then p’ (the conditional ‘If it is true that p, then p’ is necessary) or (2) ‘If it is true that p, then it is necessary that p’ (if it is true that p, then it is a necessary truth that p). (1) ascribes necessary truth to the conditional (necessitas consequentiae); (2) ascribes necessary truth to the consequent of the conditional (necessitas consequentis). (1) is a truism, while (2) is a substantive but implausible claim; confusing them is a well-known modal fallacy. If Aristotle means (1), then the conclusion he draws at 18b4–5 is fallacious, and he is exposing a flaw in the fatalist’s argument. If he means (2), then that conclusion follows. Whether the argument, so interpreted, is one he offers on his own behalf is a matter of dispute.
10. Here Aristotle seems to be saying that from ‘It is necessary that either p or not-p’ it does not follow that ‘Either it is necessary that p or it is necessary that not-p’, which supports interpretation (1) of 18a37.
11. Here Aristotle seems to be saying it is not necessary that either p is true or p is false, and that although this principle of bivalence holds for statements about the present or past, it does not hold for future contingencies. This supports interpretation (2) of 18a37.

TOPICS

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

THIS EARLY WORK is a manual of argumentation. In the brief excerpt presented here, Aristotle discusses the role of dialectic in obtaining first principles (Chapters 1 and 2). He also defines some concepts central to his thought (Chapters 4 and 5).

Book I

I.1

[*100a18*] The purpose of this work is to find a method of inquiry by means of which we shall be able to construct deductions, proceeding from reputable beliefs (*endoxa*), on any problem that is proposed, and to avoid saying anything contradictory when submitting to argument ourselves. [*20*] First, then, we must say what a deduction is, and what its different varieties are, in order to grasp what a dialectical deduction is. For this is what we are inquiring about in the work before us.

A deduction, then, is an argument in which, certain things being posited, [*25*] something distinct from the things laid down results of necessity because of them. It is a demonstration when the deduction proceeds from things that are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has a [*30*] starting-point in things that are true and primary. A dialectical deduction, by contrast, proceeds from reputable beliefs.

The things that are true and primary are those that are convincing not because of other things but because of themselves—for [*100b18*] in the case of scientific starting-points one should not further inquire after *why* they are so; instead, each of the starting-points should be intrinsically [*20*] convincing. Reputable beliefs, by contrast, are things that are believed by everyone, by the majority, or by the wise—either by all of them, or by most, or by the most well known and most reputable.

A contentious deduction is one that proceeds from what appear to be, but are not, [*25*] reputable beliefs, or an apparent deduction from what are, or what appear to be, reputable beliefs. In fact, not everything that appears to be a reputable belief actually is one, since none of the things said to be reputable beliefs wears this appearance entirely on its face—which is what actually does happen in the case of the starting-points of eristic arguments. For in their case the nature of their falsity is for the most part clear on the spot to those with even a little comprehension. [*30*] {462} Let us say, then, that the first sort of contentious deduction we mentioned [*101a*] is a genuine deduction, whereas the other sort is a contentious deduction, but not a genuine deduction, since it appears to deduce, but does not deduce.

Further, beyond all the sorts of deductions just mentioned, [*5*] there are the fallacious arguments that proceed from things that properly belong to a given science, as happens in the case of geometry and other sciences of this kind. For this mode of argument would seem to be different from the sorts of deductions we mentioned. After all, someone who draws false diagrams does not deduce from true and primary things, nor from reputable beliefs either, since [*10*] they do not fall within the definition. For he does not take [as his starting-points] things that are believed by all, by most, or by the wise (whether all of them or most or the most reputable), rather he produces his deduction from premises that properly belong to the science but are not true. For example, he produces his fallacious argument either by defining the semicircles [*15*] in a way that he shouldn't, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they should not be drawn.[1]

The aforementioned, then, may be taken as an outline of the kinds (*eidos*) of deductions there are. And as a universal remark both about all the things we have mentioned and about those we shall discuss later, we may say that this will be the extent of our [*20*] determinations. This is because our deliberate choice is not to give an exact account of any of these things; rather our wish is to give an outline of them, since we consider it fully adequate, for the purposes of the method of inquiry before us, to be able to know each of them in some way or other.

I.2

Our next task, after what we have said, is to say how many areas, [*25*] and also of what sorts, our work is useful in. It is useful, then, in three—in training, in argumentative encounters, and in the philosophical sciences.

Now, it is immediately evident that it is useful in training, since if we have a method of inquiry we shall more easily be able to attack whatever is proposed. It is useful in argumentative encounters, [*30*] because once we have catalogued the beliefs of the many we shall do battle with them, not by proceeding from the beliefs of others, but from their own, changing the course of any argument that they appear to us to be stating incorrectly. And it is useful in the philosophical sciences because the capacity to go though the puzzles on both sides of a question will make it easier to discern [*35*] what is true and what is false in each.

Furthermore, dialectic is useful as regards the primary [starting-points] in each science. For it is impossible to say anything about these based on the starting points properly belonging to the science in question, since these starting-points are prior to everything else; rather, these have to be discussed though reputable beliefs about each [*101b*] of them. And this is a task that is special to, or most characteristic of, dialectic, which, because of its ability to examine, provides a route toward the starting-points of all methods of inquiry.

I.4

. . . The sources of arguments are equal in number to, and the same as, the things that deductions are concerned with. For arguments come from premises, [*15*] while deductions are concerned with problems. And every premise, as well as every problem, exhibits either a special property (*idion*) or a genus or a coincident (for the differentia, since it is connected to the genus, should actually be classified together with the genus).

But since one sort of special property signifies the essence and another sort does not, let us divide special properties into [*20*] the two parts just stated, and let us call the sort that signifies the essence a definition, whereas the remaining sort, in keeping with the name commonly given to it, may be called a special property. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that according to the present division [*25*] it turns out that there are four things in all: definition, special property, genus, and coincident.

A problem is different from a premise in its mode. For said in this way ‘Is two-footed terrestrial animal the definition [*30*] of human?’ or ‘Is animal the genus of what is human?’ it is a premise; {463} whereas, said in this way ‘Whether two-footed terrestrial animal is the definition of human or not’ it becomes a problem. And similarly in the case of the others. So it makes perfect sense that problems and premises are equal in number, since [*35*] you make a problem out of any premise by changing its mode.

I.5

We must say, then, what a definition, a special property, a genus, and a coincident are.

A definition is an account that signifies an essence. It is given either as an account to replace a name or as an account to replace an account, since it is

also possible [*102a*] to define some of the things that are signified by an account. Those who merely give a name, whatever it is, clearly do not give the definition of the thing, since every definition is an account. Nonetheless, this sort of thing—for [*5*] example, 'the noble is the fitting'—should also be counted as definitional. Likewise, the problem of whether perception and scientific knowledge are the same or distinct. For in fact, where definitions are concerned, most of our time is taken up with whether things are the same or distinct. Putting it simply, though, let us call everything definitional that falls to the same method of inquiry as definitions. And it is immediately clear that all the cases just mentioned [*10*] are of this sort. For if we are able to argue dialectically that things are the same and that they are distinct, then we shall also be well equipped to attack definitions in the same way, since by showing that the two things are not the same we will have done away with the definition. The *converse* of what we have just said, however, does not hold, since to establish a definition [*15*] it is not enough to show that two things are the same, although to disestablish one it is sufficient to show that they are not the same.

A special attribute is one that does not reveal the essence of a thing yet belongs to that thing alone and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is a special attribute of a human to be receptive of grammar, since if someone is human [*20*] he is receptive of grammar, and if he is receptive of grammar he is human. For no one would say that something is a special property if it admitted of belonging to something else. For example, no one would say that sleep is a property special to a human, even if it at some time it happened to belong only to him. Therefore, if something of this sort were said to be a special property, it would be said to be such not unconditionally, but rather special at a time, or [*25*] in relation to something. Being on the right, for example, is a property special to something at a time, and two-footed is said to be a property that is special in relation to something—for example, special to a human in relation to a horse or a dog. It is clear, though, that nothing that admits of belonging to something else is predicated convertibly—for example, it is not [*30*] necessary if something is asleep for it to be human.

A genus is what is predicated in the what-it-is of many things that differ in species. And we should say that what are predicated in the what-it-is are the sorts of things that it would be fitting to mention if we were asked what a

given thing is—just as it is fitting in the case of a human, when asked what it is, to say ‘an animal’. [*35*] The problem of whether one thing is in the same genus as another, or in a distinct one, is also connected to the genus, since this sort of problem also falls to the same method of inquiry as the genus. For if we argue dialectically that animal is the genus of the human, and likewise of the ox, we will have argued dialectically that they are in the same genus, whereas if we show that it is the genus of one [*102b*] and that it is not the genus of the other, we shall have argued dialectically that they are not in the same genus.

A coincident is something that is none of these (neither a definition, a special property, nor a genus), yet does belong to the thing. [*5*] Also, it is what admits of both belonging and not belonging to the same thing—for example, being seated admits of belonging and not belonging to the same thing, and so likewise does being pale, since nothing prevents the same thing from being now pale, now not pale. The second of these two definitions of coincident, though, is better. [*10*] For if the first is stated, anyone who is going to comprehend it must already know what a definition is, and a special property, and a genus. The second definition, by contrast, is sufficient by itself for knowing what is meant.

{464} We may also add to the coincident class the comparisons between one thing and another [*15*] that are stated in some way that derives from the coincident class—for example, whether the noble or the advantageous is more choiceworthy, or whether a life in accordance with virtue or a life of indulgence is more pleasant, or anything else that might be stated in a way that is close to these. For in all such cases, the inquiry arises as to whether the coincident that is predicated belongs to a [*20*] higher degree to one or to the other.

It is immediately clear that nothing prevents a coincident from becoming a special property of something at a time or in relation to something—for example, sitting down, which is a coincident, will be a special property at a time when only one person is sitting down, and when he is not the only one sitting down it will be a special property of his in relation to those who are not sitting down. So nothing prevents a [*25*] coincident from becoming a special property either in relation to something or at a time. Unconditionally, however, it will not be a special property.

1. Aristotle is probably thinking of attempts to square the circle.

Posterior Analytics

Translated by Richard McKirahan.

The Posterior Analytics contains Aristotle's epistemology and philosophy of science. His approach is broadly speaking foundational. Some of what we know can be justified by being shown to follow logically from other things that we know, but some of what we know does not need to be justified in this way. Such items of foundational knowledge are the first principles (archai; literally "starting-points") of the various sciences. In the excerpts below, Aristotle sets out the axiomatic structure of a science and presents his theory of explanation. The final chapter provides a tantalizing but obscure presentation of his ideas on the acquisition of first principles.

Book I

I.1

[*71a*] All teaching and all learning that involves reasoning is based on pre-existing knowledge.[1] This is evident to anyone who considers all such cases. For this is how the mathematical sciences come to be present in us, and all the other arts as well. Similarly [*5*] too for arguments, both deductive and inductive; both kinds produce their teaching through things previously known, the former taking premises as if from people who understand them, the latter proving the universal by virtue of the fact that the particular case is clear. Rhetorical arguments persuade in the same ways {465} too, for they persuade either [*10*] through examples, which is induction, or through enthymemes, which is deduction.

There are two kinds of prior knowledge that is necessary to have. For some things it is necessary to assume in advance that they are,[2] for others it is necessary to understand what the thing being said is, and for some both. For example, for the principle that everything may be truly affirmed or denied, it is necessary to assume in advance that it is. For triangle, [*15*] it is necessary to assume in advance that this is what it signifies. And for the unit, both—both what it signifies and that it is. For each of these is not clear to us in the same way.

It is possible to recognize things one has previously come to know and also to recognize things simultaneously with acquiring knowledge of them, for example, everything that falls under a universal of which we have knowledge. For we had prior knowledge that every triangle [*20*] has angles equal to two right angles. But that this figure in the semicircle is a triangle —we recognized [that it has angles equal to two right angles] at the same time as we performed the induction. For the learning of some things—everything that is in fact particular and not predicated of any subject—occurs in this way and the last term does not come to be known through the middle. But perhaps it should be said that before performing the induction [*25*] or grasping a deduction we have scientific knowledge in one way, but not in another. For if we did not have unqualified scientific knowledge if something is, how did we know unqualifiedly that it has angles equal to two

right angles? It is clear that we have scientific knowledge in the sense that we have scientific knowledge universally, but we do not have unqualified scientific knowledge. Otherwise the paradox in the *Meno* will arise, [*30*] for either we will learn nothing or we will learn what we already know.

We must not speak like some who attempt to solve the problem: "Do you know that every pair is even or not?" And when the person they ask says yes, they produce some pair which he did not think exists, so that he did not think that it is even. They solve this puzzle by saying that they do not know that every pair is even—only the pairs that they know. But [*71b*] what they know is what they have a demonstration of and what they have assumed to have a given attribute, and they did not assume it to hold of everything that they know is a triangle or a number, but unqualifiedly of every number or triangle. For no premise is assumed of the form 'whatever number you know' or 'whatever rectilinear figure you know', but rather premises are assumed to [*5*] hold in every case.

But nothing, I think, prevents a person from knowing scientifically what he learns in one way and being ignorant of it in another. For what is absurd is not if in some way he knows what he is learning, but if he knows it in *that* way, namely, in the same respect and in the same way in which he is learning it.

I.2

We think we have unqualified scientific knowledge of each thing and not in the [*10*] sophistical way, which is accidental, when we think we know the cause through which the thing is as being its cause, and also that this cannot be other than it is. Now it is clear that having scientific knowledge is something of this sort. For both those who do not know scientifically and those who do—the former think that they are in this condition, while those who do know scientifically [*15*] actually are in this condition; and so that of which there is unqualified scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is.

We will discuss later whether there is also another way of knowing scientifically. But we assert that we do know through demonstration. I call a demonstration a scientific deduction, and I call scientific a deduction which by virtue of possessing it we know its conclusion scientifically. Now if knowing scientifically is [*20*] as we have posited, demonstrative scientific knowledge must be {466} based on things that are true, primary and

immediate, and better known than, prior to and causes of the conclusion, for thus the starting-points[3] will be appropriate to what is proved. There can be a deduction even without these conditions being satisfied, but there cannot be a demonstration, for it will not [*25*] produce scientific knowledge.

They must be true, because it is not possible to have scientific knowledge of what is not—for example, that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with its side.

They must be based on things that are primary and indemonstrable because we will not know them scientifically unless we have a demonstration of them. For to have scientific knowledge not accidentally of things of which there is demonstration is to have a demonstration of them.

They must be causes and better known [*30*] and prior: causes because we know something scientifically only when we know its cause; they must be prior if they are causes; and they must be previously known not only in that we understand them but also in that we know that they are.

Things are prior and better known in two ways. For the same thing is not prior in nature and prior to us [*72a*] or better known and also better known to us. I call prior and better known to us things that are closer to perception, and unqualifiedly prior and better known things that are more remote. The most universal things are the most remote, while particulars are [*5*] closest, and these are opposite of one another.

'Based on things that are primary' means based on appropriate starting-points, for I say that the same thing is primary and a starting-point. A starting-point of a demonstration is an immediate premise. An immediate premise is one to which no other premise is prior. A premise is either part of a proposition, one thing predicated of one thing. A dialectical premise [*10*] is one that assumes either part indifferently, while a demonstrative premise is one that assumes that one of them, definitely, is true. A proposition is either part of a contradiction. A contradiction is an opposition in which there is intrinsically no intermediate. The part of a contradiction that predicates one thing of another is an affirmation, and the part that denies one thing of another is a negation.

Among immediate [*15*] deductive starting-points I call a thesis one that cannot be proved and that a person does not need if he is going to learn anything no matter what. One that a person does need if he is going to learn

anything at all I call an axiom. There are some things of this kind, for it is especially to these things that we are accustomed to apply the name. A hypothesis is a thesis that assumes either part of a contradiction, [*20*] for example that something is or that something is not. One that does not do this is a definition. For a definition is a thesis: an arithmetician posits that a unit is that which is indivisible in quantity. But it is not a hypothesis: what a unit is and that there is a unit are not the same.

But since it is necessary to be convinced of [*25*] and know a thing by having the kind of deduction we call a demonstration, and since this deduction occurs because the premises on which the deduction is based are *these*, we must not only have prior knowledge of the primary things—either all or some of them—but we must also know them better, for it is always the case that when an attribute belongs to one thing by virtue of another, it belongs to that other thing more. [*30*] For example, that because of which we love something is dearer to us than the thing itself. And so if in fact we know and are convinced because of the primary things, we also know them better and are more convinced of them, since it is because of them that we know and are convinced of the things that are posterior.

But it is impossible to be more convinced of anything that one does not know or is a better condition than if he knew it, than of what one knows. But this is what will happen [*35*] unless someone who is convinced through demonstration has previous knowledge, for it is necessary to be more convinced of the starting-points—either all or some of them—than of the conclusion. But anyone who is going to have the scientific knowledge that comes through demonstration must not {467} only know the starting-points better and be more convinced of them than of what is being proved, [*72b*] but also nothing else must be more convincing or better known to him than the opposites of the starting-points on which the deduction of the contrary error will be based, since anyone who has scientific knowledge must be absolutely unable to be persuaded to the contrary.

I.3

[*5*] Some think that there is no scientific knowledge because the primary things must be known scientifically, while others think that there is, but that there is demonstration of everything.

Neither of these views is either true or necessary. For those who hypothesize that there is no scientific knowledge at all maintain that there is an infinite regress, supposing that people cannot have scientific knowledge of what is posterior via what is [*10*] prior when there is nothing primary. And they are right. For it is impossible to get through an infinite number of things. Or alternatively, if the regress stops and there are starting-points, these must be unknown since there is no demonstration of them, which is the only thing these people say is to have scientific knowledge. But if it is not possible to know the primary things, neither is it possible unqualifiedly or strictly to have scientific knowledge of what is based on them, but only [*15*] on the hypothesis that the other things [the starting-points] are the case.

The other group agrees about knowing scientifically, for they hold that it exists only through demonstration, but that nothing prevents there being demonstration of everything, since circular demonstration can occur and things can be demonstrated from one another.

But we say that not all scientific knowledge is demonstrative, but that scientific knowledge of the immediates is [*20*] indemonstrable. That this is necessary is evident. For if it is necessary to have scientific knowledge of the things that are prior and on which the demonstration depends, but these stop at some point,* these immediates must be indemonstrable. This is our position on these matters, and we declare that there is not only scientific knowledge but also a starting-point of scientific knowledge by which we recognize the definitions.

[*25*] That it is impossible to demonstrate unqualifiedly by circular proof is clear, since in fact demonstration must be based on things that are prior and better known. For it is impossible for the same things to be simultaneously prior and posterior to the same things unless they are so in different ways, as some things are prior in relation to us, while others are unqualifiedly prior—which is how induction makes something known. [*30*] But if that were the case, unqualified knowing would not have been defined well, but there would be two kinds of it. Or rather, the other kind of demonstration, since it comes to be from what is better known to us, is not unqualified demonstration.

A consequence for those who say that there is circular demonstration is not only what has just been said, but also that they are saying nothing else than that this is the case if this is the case. But this way it is easy [*35*] to

prove everything. It is clear that this occurs when three terms are posited. For it makes no difference whether we say that it returns through many terms or few, or through few terms or two. For when, given that *A* is the case, of necessity *B* is the case, and given that this is the case, *C*, then given that *A* is the case, C will be the case. If, then, given that *A* is the case it is necessary that *B* is the case, and that if this is the case it is necessary that *A* is [*73a*] the case (for this is what being circular is), let it be supposed that *A* is *C*. So to say that given that B is the case, *A* is the case is to say that *C* is the case. But this is to say that given that *A* is the case, *C* is the case. But *C* is the same as *A*, and so it follows that those who maintain that there is circular [*5*] demonstration are saying nothing else than that if *A* is the case then *A* is the case. But in this way it is easy to prove everything.

But in fact this is not possible either, except in cases where things follow from one another, as distinctive properties do. Now it has been proved that when one thing is posited it is never necessary for anything else to be the case. I say ‘one’ because neither if one term nor if one thesis is posited [is it ever necessary for anything else to be the case]. [*10*] But it is possible from two theses first and fewest, if indeed it is possible to deduce something from them. Now if *A* follows from *B* and *C*, and these follow from one another and {468} from *A* as well, in these circumstances it is possible to prove one from another in the first figure all the things that have been postulated, as is proved in the work on deduction.

[*15*] But it has also been proved that in the other figures either there is no deduction or there is a deduction but not about what has been assumed. Things that are not reciprocally predicated can in no way be proved circularly, and so since there are few such things in demonstrations, it is evident that the claim that there is demonstration of things from one other and that for this reason [*20*] there can be demonstration of all things is both idle and impossible.

I.4

Since that of which there is unqualified scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is, what is known scientifically by demonstrative scientific knowledge must be necessary. Demonstrative scientific knowledge is scientific knowledge we have by having a demonstration. Therefore a demonstration is a deduction based on things that are necessary. Therefore

we must grasp [*25*] from what things and of what sorts of things demonstrations are. But let us first define what we mean by ‘in every case’, by ‘intrinsically’, and by ‘universally’.

Whatever is not such as to apply in some cases but not in others, or at some times but not at others, I say belongs ‘in every case’. For example, if animal holds of every man, then if it is true to [*30*] say that this is a man, it is true to say that this is also an animal. And if it is now true to say the one, it is now true to say the other too. And likewise, if there is a point in every line. An indication of this is that when we are asked about something holding ‘in every case’, this is in fact how we bring objections, if it does not hold either in some case or at some time.

All the things that belong to something in ‘what it is’ I say belong intrinsically, [*35*] as line belongs intrinsically to triangle and point to line. For their essence depends on these and these are predicated in the account that states what those things are. Also all of the things predicated of *them*, to which they are predicated in the account indicating ‘what it is’ [belong to them intrinsically], as straight and curved belong to line, and odd and [*40*] even do to number, as well as prime and composite, and equilateral [*73b*] and oblong. And line or number is predicated in the account stating ‘what it is’ for each of these. Likewise in other cases too I say that these kinds of things belong intrinsically to each thing, while all that belong in neither way I call accidents, [*5*] as musical and white are accidents of animal.

Also I call intrinsic that which is not said of any other subject, as the walking thing is something else that is walking, and similarly for the white thing.* But a substance, and everything that signifies a particular, are what they are without being something else. So I call intrinsic those things that are not said of a subject, and accidents those that are said of a subject.

In yet another way I call intrinsic what belongs [*10*] to something because of itself, and what does not belong because of itself I call an accident. For example, if there was lightning while someone was walking, it was an accident, since it is not because of his walking that there was lightning, but we say that this just happened. But if it occurs because of itself, I call it intrinsic. For example, if something died while its throat was being cut and died because of the [*15*] cut we say that it died because its throat was being cut and did not just happen to die while its throat was being cut.

Therefore the things called intrinsic in the case of the objects of unqualified scientific knowledge are such as either to be predicated in the account of the predicates or to have the others predicated in their account both because of themselves and of necessity. For it is not possible for them not to belong either unqualifiedly or as the opposites do, the way [*20*] straight or bent belongs to line and odd or even to number. For the contrary of something is either its privation or a contradiction in the same kind, as even is what is not odd *among numbers*, since it follows that any number that is not odd is even. And so if it is necessary to either affirm or deny that any attribute belongs to a given subject, it is necessary also for intrinsic attributes to belong. [*25*] Let ‘in every case’ and ‘intrinsically’ be defined in this way.

I say that whatever belongs in every case and intrinsically and qua itself belongs ‘universally’. Thus it is evident that everything that belongs universally belongs to its subjects of necessity. {469} Intrinsically and qua itself are the same, as point belongs to line intrinsically [*30*] and so does straight (for it belongs to line qua line), and two right angles belong to triangle qua triangle (for triangle is intrinsically equal to two right angles). It belongs ‘universally’ precisely when it is proved to belong to what is chance and primary. For example, having two right angles does not hold universally of figure even though it is possible to prove [*35*] of a figure that it has two right angles—but not of any chance figure, nor does a person who proves this make use of any chance figure (for a quadrilateral is a figure, but it does not have angles equal to two right angles), whereas any chance isosceles triangle has angles equal to two right angles, but it is not the primary subject that does, but triangle is prior. Now that which is shown to be the chance [*40*] and primary thing that has two right angles or whatever else—it is to this primary subject that [*74a*] it belongs universally, and the demonstration is intrinsically of this universally. And it is a demonstration of the others in some way but not intrinsically; nor is it of isosceles universally, but it extends more widely.

I.5

[*74a*] But it must not escape our notice that it often happens that we commit errors [*5*] and that what is proved does not belong primarily and universally in the way it seems to be proved universally and primarily. We are mistaken

in this way either when there is nothing to grasp higher over and above the particular, or when there is but it is has no name and applies to things that are different in kind, or when that of which it holds is a whole of which that of which it is proved is a part. [*10*] For the demonstration will hold of the parts and will hold in every case, but nevertheless the demonstration will not hold of this universally as the primary subject. But I say that a demonstration is of this as its primary subject, qua this, when it is of this universally as its primary subject.

So if someone were to prove that lines at right angles to the same line do not meet, the demonstration of this might seem to be due to the fact that it holds [*15*] of all lines at right angles. But it is not, since this does not occur because they are equal in that particular way, but because they are equal in any way. And if there were no other triangle than isosceles, having angles equal to two right angles might seem to belong to it qua isosceles. And that proportionals alternate was once proved separately to hold of things qua numbers, qua lines, qua solids, and qua times, though it can [*20*] be proved by a single demonstration to hold of them all. But because all these things —numbers, lengths, times, and solids—are not a single named thing and differ in kind from one another, they used to be taken separately. But now it is proved universally. For it does not belong qua lines or qua numbers, but qua this thing which they hypothesize to hold universally.

This is why even if someone proves for each [*25*] kind of triangle either by one demonstration or by a different one that each kind has two right angles, the equilateral separately, and the scalene and the isosceles as well, he does not yet know that *the triangle* has two right angles, except in the sophistical way, nor does he know that this attribute belongs to triangle universally,* not even if there is [*30*] no other triangle besides these. For he does not know that the attribute belongs to the subject qua triangle or even that *every* triangle has it, except numerically, but not that every one has it in virtue of its kind, even if there is no triangle that he does not know.

So when do we not know universally and when do we know unqualifiedly? Indeed it is clear that we would know it if the essence of triangle were the same as the essence either of equilateral or of each kind of triangle or of all kinds of triangles together. But if it is not the same but different, and the attribute belongs qua triangle, we do [*35*] not know it.

Does it belong qua triangle or qua isosceles? And when does it belong in respect of this as primary? And of what does the demonstration hold universally? Clearly, whenever things are being removed and it belongs to something as its primary subject. For example, two right angles will belong to an isosceles bronze triangle, but will belong also when being bronze and being isosceles are removed, [*74b*] but not when figure or limit are. But they are not the first things to which it fails to belong when they are removed. What, then, is the first? If then, triangle is the first, the attribute {470} also belongs to the others in virtue of this and the demonstration holds of this universally.

I.6

[*5*] If, then, demonstrative scientific knowledge is based on necessary principles (for what we know scientifically cannot be other than it is) and the things that belong intrinsically are necessary to the things they belong to (for some belong in the 'what it is' and the others are predicated of the subjects that themselves belong in their 'what it is', to which one or the other of the opposites must [*10*] belong), it is evident that demonstrative deduction will be based on things of this kind. For everything belongs either this way or accidentally, and accidents are not necessary.

Either, then, we should state it this way, or else, taking as a starting-point that demonstration is of things that are necessary, and if something has been demonstrated it cannot be other than it is; [*15*] therefore the deduction must depend on necessary premises. For it is possible to deduce from true premises without demonstrating, but from necessary premises it is not possible to deduce without demonstrating, since precisely this is a characteristic of demonstration.

An indication that demonstration is based on things that are necessary is that this is how we bring objections against people who think they are demonstrating—on [*20*] the grounds that a premise is not necessary—if we think that it can be other than it is, either generally or at least for the sake of argument. From this it is also clear that people who think they do well to assume starting-points on the grounds that a premise is reputable and true are foolish, as the sophists are in assuming that to know scientifically is to possess scientific knowledge. For us, a starting-point is not just a reputable

view, [*25*] but a primary fact in the genus which the proof concerns; and not everything that is true is appropriate.

That the deduction must be based on things that are necessary is evident from the following too. If a person who does not have an account of the 'why', when there is a demonstration, is not scientifically knowledgeable (it could result that *A* belongs of necessity to *C*, but *B*, the middle through [*30*] which it was demonstrated, does not belong of necessity), then he does not know why, because this is not a demonstration through the middle. For it can fail to be, but the conclusion is necessary. Further, if someone does not know something now, even though he has his account of it and is still alive and the thing still exists, and he has not forgotten it, then he did not know it before either. But the middle might cease to be if it is not [*35*] necessary, and so he will have his account and he will still be alive and the thing will still exist, but he does not know it. Therefore he did not know it before either. But if the middle has not ceased to be but can cease to be, the result will be possible and can occur; but in such circumstances it is impossible for anyone to know.

Now when the conclusion is of necessity, [*75a*] nothing prevents the middle through which it was proved from being non-necessary. For it is possible to deduce something necessary from premises that are not necessary, just as it is possible to deduce something true from premises that are not true. But when the middle is of necessity, [*5*] the conclusion is of necessity too, just as from true premises the conclusion is always true. (Let *A* hold of *B* of necessity, and this of *C*. Thus it is necessary that *A* belong to *C*.) But when the conclusion is not necessary, neither can the middle be necessary. (For let A belong to C not of necessity, [*10*] and let *A* belong to *B* and *B* to *C* of necessity; therefore *A* will belong to *C* of necessity too; but it was posited that it does not.) Since if someone has scientific knowledge demonstratively the conclusion must hold of necessity, it is clear that he must have the demonstration through a middle that is necessary too, or else he will not know scientifically either why or that it is necessary for it to hold, [*15*] but either he will think he knows even though he does not, if he supposes what is not necessary to be necessary, or he will not even think that he does. This is equally true in cases where he knows the fact through middle terms and where he knows the 'why' and knows it through immediates.

But there is no demonstrative scientific knowledge of accidents that are not intrinsic according to the way things that are intrinsic were defined. For it is not [*20*] possible to prove that the conclusion holds of necessity. For it is possible that the accident may not belong—this is the kind of accident I mean.

{471} But someone might wonder why [in examining a pretended demonstration of this kind] we need to ask for premises about these things, if the conclusion is not necessary. For it makes no difference if someone were asked any random questions and then asserted the [*25*] conclusion. But we need to ask the interlocutor to grant non-necessary premises not on the grounds that the conclusion is necessary on account of the premises he has been asked to grant, but because it is necessary for a person who asserts them to assert the conclusion and to assert the conclusion truly, if they truly belong.

Since in each genus everything that belongs intrinsically and qua itself belongs of necessity, it is evident that [*30*] scientific demonstrations are concerned with things that belong intrinsically and that they are based on things of this kind. For accidents are not necessary, so that [in treating them] it is not necessary to know why the conclusion holds or if it always does but not incidentally, as happens in deductions through signs. For neither will he have scientific knowledge intrinsically of something that holds intrinsically, nor will he know the ‘why’ scientifically. [*35*] To know the ‘why’ scientifically is to have scientific knowledge through the cause. Therefore the middle term must belong to the third because of itself, and also the first to the middle.

I.10

[*76a31*] I call principles in each genus those which it is not possible to prove that they are.[4] Now what both the primary things and the things that depend on them signify is assumed, but it is necessary to assume that the principles are and to prove that the others are. For example, it is necessary to assume what unit signifies [*35*] and what straight and triangle signify, and that the unit and magnitude exist, but is necessary to prove that the rest exist.

Of the principles they use in demonstrative sciences some are proper to each science and some are common [to more than one science], but common by analogy, since a principle is useful insofar as it is in the genus that falls under the science. [*40*] Examples of proper principles are that a line is such and such, and that straight is such and such. An example of a common principle is that if equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal. Each of these is sufficient insofar as it is in the genus. For it will do the same for the geometer [*76b*] even if he assumes it to hold not for all things but only for magnitudes, and for the arithmetician if he assumes it to hold only for numbers.

Proper to a science are also (1) those things that are assumed to exist, concerning which the science investigates the attributes that belong to them intrinsically. For example, arithmetic assumes units, [*5*] while geometry assumes points and lines. For these sciences assume that these things exist and that this is what they are. (2) Concerning the intrinsic attributes of these, they assume what each one signifies—for example, arithmetic assumes what odd, even, square, and cube signify, and geometry what irrational or to inflect and to verge signify, but that [*10*] these things exist, they prove through the common principles and from the things that have been demonstrated. And similarly in astronomy.

For every demonstrative science is concerned with three things: all the things posited to exist (these are the genus whose intrinsic attributes it investigates); the common principles, called axioms, from which as primary it forms its demonstrations; [*15*] and thirdly the attributes, concerning which it assumes what each signifies. However, nothing keeps some sciences from overlooking some of these (for example, from hypothesizing that the genus exists), if it is evident that they exist (for it is not equally clear that number exists and that cold and hot do), and from not assuming what the attributes signify if they are clear, [*20*] just as in the case of the common principles one does not assume what subtracting equals from equals signifies, because it is familiar. But nonetheless, these things are by nature three: that concerning which the science forms its proofs, what it proves, and the things from which it proves.

What must be because of itself and must be thought to be because of itself is not a hypothesis or a postulate, for the demonstration is not addressed to external discourse [*25*] but to the discourse in the soul, since deduction is

not so addressed either. For it is always possible to {472} object to external discourse, but not always to internal discourse.

Whatever someone assumes without having proved them himself even though they can be proved—if what he is assuming seems true to the learner, he is hypothesizing them, and it is not unqualifiedly a hypothesis, but [*30*] only in relation to the learner. But if he is assuming the same thing when the learner has either no opinion or even the contrary opinion, he is postulating it. And a hypothesis and a postulate differ in this, for what is contrary to the learner's opinion is a postulate—anything that can be demonstrated and that a person assumes and employs without having proved.

[*35*] Definitions are not hypotheses, for nothing is said to be or not be, whereas hypotheses are among the premises, while it is necessary only to understand the definitions. But this is not a hypothesis (unless someone is going to say that even hearing is a hypothesis). Hypotheses are, rather, among things that are the case, such that by their being the case the conclusion comes about.

Nor does the geometer hypothesize falsehoods, [*40*] as some have declared, saying that we must not make use of what is false and that the geometer speaks falsely when he says that a line he has drawn is a foot long when it is not a foot long or straight when it is not straight. [*77a*] But the geometer does not base any conclusion on the grounds that the line that he himself has spoken of is this one which he drew, but on the things indicated by these figures. Further, every postulate and hypothesis is either universal or particular, whereas definitions are neither of these.

Book II

II.8

[*93a*] We must in turn consider which of these arguments are well stated and which are not, what definition is, and whether or not there is in any way demonstration and definition of ‘what it is’.

Since as we said, knowing ‘what it is’ and knowing the cause of ‘if it exists’ are the same thing—the [*5*] reason for this being that the cause is something and this is either the same or different; if it is different, it is either demonstrable or indemonstrable; now if it is different and can be demonstrated, the cause must be the middle and it must be proved in the first figure, for what is proved is universal and affirmative.

One [*10*] way would be the one just reviewed: proving ‘what it is’ through something else. For the middle term in a proof of ‘what it is’ must be ‘what it is’ and the middle term in proofs of distinctive properties must be a distinctive property. And so we will prove one ‘what it is to be’ of something and we will not prove another ‘what it is to be’ of the same thing. Now it has been said earlier that this way will not be a demonstration. [*15*] But there is a logical deduction of ‘what it is’.

Let us state in what way it is possible, speaking again from the beginning. For just as we investigate ‘the why’ when we know ‘the that’ (and sometimes they become clear simultaneously, but it is not at all possible to come to know ‘the why’ before ‘the that’), similarly it is clear that it is impossible to know ‘what it is to be’ something without knowing [*20*] ‘that it exists’. For it is impossible to know ‘what it is’ if we do not know ‘if it exists’.

However, we know ‘if it exists’ accidentally in some cases, but in other cases by knowing something of the thing itself—for example knowing that thunder is a certain noise of clouds, and that an eclipse is a certain loss of light, that a human being is a certain animal and that a soul is something that moves itself. Now in all cases where [*25*] we know ‘that it exists’ accidentally, we necessarily have no relation to ‘what it is’, since we do not even know ‘that it exists’, and investigating ‘what it is’ without knowing ‘that it exists’ is to investigate nothing. In cases where we know something

of the thing itself, it is easier. And so, the way we know ‘that it exists’ corresponds to the way we stand in relation to ‘what it is’.

In cases where we know something of ‘what it is’ let it first, on the one hand, [*30*] be like this: *A* stands for eclipse, *C* for moon, *B* for the earth’s screening. Now to investigate whether it is being eclipsed or not is to investigate whether *B* is or is not, and this is no different from investigating whether the account of *A* holds. And if the latter does we say that the former is too. Or, we investigate which member of the contradictory pair the {473} account covers: of having [*35*] or of not having two right angles.

But when we get the answer, we know ‘the that’ and ‘the why’ simultaneously if it is through immediates. But if it is not through immediates, we know ‘the that’ but not ‘the why’. Let the moon be *C*, eclipse be *A*, and not being able to cast [*93b*] a shadow at the time of full moon when there is nothing evident between us and the moon be *B*. Now if *B* (not being able to cast a shadow when there is nothing between us and the moon) belongs to *C* and *A* (being eclipsed) belongs to *B*, it is clear that it is being eclipsed, but not yet why, and we know that there is an eclipse but we do not know what it is. When it is clear that *A* belongs to *C*, to investigate why it belongs is to investigate [*5*] what *B* is—screening or the moon’s turning or being extinguished. This is the account of the other extreme—in this case, *A*. For eclipse is in fact the earth’s screening. What is thunder? The extinguishing of fire in a cloud. Why does it thunder? Because the fire in a cloud is extinguished. Let cloud be *C*, thunder be *A*, [*10*] and the extinguishing of fire be *B*. Now *B* belongs to *C* (cloud) because fire is extinguished in it, and *A* (noise) belongs to *B*. And *B* is the account of *A*, the first extreme. If in turn there is another middle for this, it will be one of the accounts that have been left aside.

[*15*] Accordingly it has been stated how the ‘what it is’ is grasped and becomes known, so that there proves to be neither a deduction nor a demonstration of ‘what it is’. However, it becomes clear through a deduction and through a demonstration. And so, in cases where the cause is different from it, it is not possible to know ‘what it is’ without demonstration, but there is no demonstration of it, as [*20*] we stated in discussing the puzzles.

[*93b21*] Of some things the cause is different from the things, and of others it is not. And so it is clear that in some cases ‘what it is’ is immediate too, and is a starting-point, and for these we need to hypothesize both that they are and what they are, or to make this evident in another way. This is what the arithmetician does, since [*25*] he hypothesizes what a unit is and that it exists. But for things that have a middle and the cause of whose essence is something different, it is possible to reveal this through a demonstration, as we said, although we do not demonstrate ‘what it is’.

II.10

Since a definition is said to be an account of [*93b29*] ‘what it is’, it is evident [*30*] that one kind will be an account of what the name or other name-like formula signifies, for example what triangle signifies. When we know that this exists, we investigate ‘why’ it exists. But it is hard to grasp in this way things which we do not know that they exist. The cause of the difficulty has been stated above: we do not [*35*] know ‘if it exists’ or not except accidentally. (There are two ways in which a formula may be one: either by conjunction, like the *Iliad*, or because the formula indicates one thing predicated of another not accidentally.) Now one definition of definition is what has been stated; another definition is an account that shows why it exists. And so the former definition indicates [*94a*] but does not prove, while it is evident that the latter will be like a demonstration of ‘what it is’ that differs in arrangement from a demonstration. For to say why it thunders and what thunder is are different. In the one case we say “because fire in clouds is extinguished.” [*5*] But what is thunder? The noise of fire in clouds being extinguished. And so the same account is stated in a different way, and in one way it is a continuous demonstration, while the other way it is a definition. (Yet another definition of thunder is noise in clouds; this is the conclusion of the demonstration of ‘what it is’.) The definition through immediates is an indemonstrable positing of ‘what it is’. [*10*] Therefore one definition is an indemonstrable account of ‘what it is’; one is a deduction of ‘what it is’ that differs in arrangement from a demonstration; a third kind is the conclusion of a demonstration of ‘what it is’.

Therefore it is evident from what has been said in what way there is [*15*] demonstration of ‘what it is’ and in what way there is not, and of what

things there is such a demonstration and of what things there is not, and further in how many ways definition is said and in what way a definition proves ‘what it is’ and in what way it does not, and of what things there is a definition and of what there is not, and how definition is related to {474} demonstration and in what way it is possible for there to be definition and demonstration of the same thing and in what way it is not.

II.19

[*99b15*] As for deduction and demonstration it is evident what each of them is and how each comes about, as it is for demonstrative science too—for it is the same thing. But about the starting-points, how they come to be known and what state recognizes them will be clear from what follows, after we have first discussed some puzzles.

[*20*] That it is not possible to know scientifically through demonstration if you do not know the primary starting-points—the immediate ones—has been said earlier. But we should discuss some puzzles about knowledge of the immediates and whether it is the same or not the same, and whether there is scientific knowledge of both, or scientific knowledge of the one and some other kind of knowledge of the other [*25*], and whether the states [of scientific knowledge] are not present in us [from birth] but come about in us, or are present but we are unaware of them.

Now if we possess them it is absurd. For it follows that we have knowledge more precise than demonstration but are unaware of it. But if we acquire them without possessing them earlier, how can we come to know them and learn them if not from pre-existing knowledge? For this is impossible [*30*] as we also said in connection with demonstration.

Now it is evident that we cannot possess them and that they cannot come to be in us if we are ignorant and possess no such state. Therefore we must possess some capacity, but not one that will be more valuable than these states in respect of precision. And this is evidently something that belongs to all animals, [*35*] for they possess a congenital capacity of discerning which we call perception.

Granted that perception is present, in some animals there occurs a persistence of the percept and in others there does not. In animals where it does not occur (whether it does not occur at all or concerning the things for which it does not occur) there is no knowledge apart from perceiving. In

other animals it is possible that after perceiving they preserve something [*100a*] in their soul. When many occurrences of this kind take place, a certain difference then occurs, with the result that for some from the persistence of such things there comes to be an account and for others there does not.

So from perception memory comes about, as we say, and from memory of the same thing occurring many times comes [*5*] experience, for memories many in number constitute a single experience. From experience, or when the entire universal has come to be at rest in the soul—the one beside the many, whatever is one and the same in them all—the starting-point of art and science comes about: the starting-point of art if it is concerned with coming to be, but the starting-point of science if it is concerned with what is. [*10*] So the states [of scientific knowledge] are not present in us as determinate states, nor do they arise from still other, higher cognitive states, but from perception—as in a battle after a rout has occurred when one man comes to a stand, another does too and then another—until it reaches a starting-point. And in fact the soul is such that it can be affected in this way.

But let us say again what was said just now [*15*] but not clearly. When one of the undifferentiated things comes to a stand, the first universal in the soul —for in fact it perceives the particular, but the perception is of the universal [*100b*] (for example, of human being, not of Callias the human being)— once more it comes to a stand in these, until whenever the things that have no parts and are universals come to a stand (for example, such and such a kind of animal, and then animal, and then likewise in this). So it is clear that it is necessary for us to come to know the primary things by induction. For [*5*] this is the way perception produces the universal in us.

Since some of the cognitive states by which we grasp truth are always true, but others admit falsehood (for example, opinion and reasoning), whereas scientific knowledge and *nous*[5] are {475} always true, and no other kind than *nous* is more accurate than scientific knowledge—and since the starting-points of demonstrations are more intelligible [than what is demonstrated from them], [*10*] and all scientific knowledge involves an account, there cannot be scientific knowledge of the starting-points; and since nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge except *nous*, there will be *nous* of the starting-points—if we consider on the basis of these points

and also consider that demonstration is not the starting-point of demonstration, so that neither is scientific knowledge the starting-point of scientific knowledge, then if we have no other kind of knowledge that is true aside from scientific knowledge, [*15*] *nous* will be the starting-point of scientific knowledge, and it will be the starting-point of the starting-point, and scientific knowledge as a whole will be similarly related to its entire object.

1. The *Posterior Analytics* uses three ordinary words that can be translated ‘know’ (*gignōskein*, *eidenai*, and *epistasthai*) and two nouns that can be translated ‘knowledge’ (*gnōsis* and *epistēmē*). In this work Aristotle introduces and elaborates a new application of *epistasthai* and *epistēmē*, which this translation renders as ‘have scientific knowledge’ (sometimes ‘know scientifically’) and ‘scientific knowledge’ (sometimes ‘science’), respectively, to mark this new semi-technical sense. It retains ‘know’ for the other verbs and ‘knowledge’ for the other noun. Related words receive similar treatment: the adjectives *epistēmonikos* and *epistēmōn* become ‘scientific’ and ‘scientifically knowledgeable’, while words related to *ginōskein* and *eidenai* are usually rendered with ‘know’ (for example, *proginōskein* becomes ‘know previously’). In my judgment the occasional clumsiness of the resulting English is a small price to pay for the disambiguation that is gained.
2. The Greek verb *einai* (to be) is ambiguous; Aristotle uses it in the sense of ‘exist’ in connection with things (especially the subjects of a science), and in the sense of ‘be the case’ or ‘be true’ in connection with facts, propositions, and premises. When it has only one of these meanings I translate it accordingly, but the context here and occasionally elsewhere requires the ‘undifferentiated’ translation.
3. ‘Starting-point’ is used as a translation of *archē* for most of its occurrences in this work, for the sake of consistency with the translations of Aristotle’s other works; but the alternative translation ‘principle’ will be used in cases where it seems more appropriate.
4. See note at 71a12.
5. Aristotle uses the term *nous* (often translated ‘intuition’ or ‘understanding’) here in a specialized sense, for the cognitive grasp of principles or starting-points (*archai*). Although *nous* is a kind of knowledge (*gnōsis*), it is not scientific knowledge (*epistēmē*), for that requires demonstration, and *archai* are indemonstrable.

PHYSICS

Translated by S. Marc Cohen.

THE GREEK TITLE of this work, *ta phusika*, comes from the word for nature (*phusis*). It thus refers to the study of natural phenomena in general, and not just to physics in the narrow sense. In Books I and III Aristotle defends and defines the concept of change. In Book II he presents his doctrine of the four causes, discusses the topics of chance and necessity, and argues for the existence of ends (or "final causes") in nature. In parts of the book not included in this anthology, he discusses place, time, the void, the infinite, continuity, and the eternity of change. Finally, in Book VIII he argues for the eternal existence of an "unmoved mover"—an uncaused cause of change.

Book I

I.1

[*184a10*] Knowledge, i.e., scientific knowledge, in any methodological inquiry, results from a knowledge of its starting-points or causes or elements. For we think we know each thing when we know its primary causes and first principles (*prōtai archai*)[1] all the way to its elements. It is clear, therefore, that in [*15*] natural science, too, our first task must be to try to determine its principles.

The natural path to take is to begin with things that are less perspicuous by nature but more perspicuous to us, and proceed to things that are more perspicuous by nature and more knowable. For what is better known to us is not the same as what is better known without qualification (*haplōs*). That is precisely why we must proceed in this way from what is more obscure [*20*] by nature but clearer to us, until we reach what is clearer and better known by nature.

The things that are clear and plain to us at first are rather confused; but later their elements and principles will become better known when they have been extracted from those things. That is why one should proceed from the universal to the particular; for the whole is [*25*] better known by perception, and the universal is a kind of whole, since the universal embraces many things as parts.[2]

{476} The same thing happens, [*184b*] in a way, with names in relation to their definitions (*logoi*). For a name, for example ‘circle’, signifies some whole in an undivided way, but its definition (*horismos*) divides it into its particular [elements].[3] And children at first call all men ‘father’ and all women ‘mother’, and only later make distinctions among them.

I.5

[*188a19*] Absolutely all [previous theorists] make contraries their starting-points, both those who say that [*20*] the universe is one and not subject to change (*mē kinoumenon*)—for even Parmenides makes hot and cold starting-points, although he calls them fire and earth—and those who [propose] rare and dense, as well as Democritus, with his ‘full’ and ‘void’,

of which he says that the first is being and that the second is not-being. Moreover, [Democritus speaks of differences] in position, shape, and order, but these are genera of contraries: up and down, [*25*] in front of and behind [are species] of position, angular and without angles, straight and curved [are species] of shape.

It is clear, then, that they all, in one way or another, make contraries their starting-points; and it was reasonable for them to do so. For the starting-points should not be [derived] from one another or from other things, and everything [else should be derived] from them. But primary contraries have these [features]: because they're primary they're [*30*] not [derived] from other things, and because they're contraries they're not [derived] from one another.

But we should also examine this logically, to see how it follows. To begin with, we must accept that it is not in the nature of even one of all the things there are either to act or be acted on in a random way, one chance thing by another chance thing, nor does anything come-to-be from just anything whatsoever, unless one takes this to happen coincidentally. [*35*] For how could pale come-to-be from musical, if musical were not a coincidental attribute (*sumbebēkos*) of something that is not pale or that is dark? No, pale comes-to-be from not-pale, and not from every such thing, [*188b*] but from something dark or intermediate between [dark and pale], and musical from not-musical,* except not from every such thing, but from unmusical or some intermediate between them, if there is one.

Nor does [anything] cease-to-be into the first random thing; for example pale does not cease-to-be into musical, except sometimes coincidentally, [*5*] but into not pale, and not into any chance thing but into dark or some intermediate. In the same way also musical [ceases-to-be] into not musical, and this not into any chance thing but into unmusical or an intermediate, if there is one.

It is the same, too, in the case of other things, since the same account also applies to things that are not simple, but [*10*] compound. But because the opposed condition has not been named this consequence escapes our notice. For necessarily everything that is in tune comes-to-be from something out of tune, and what is out of tune from what is in tune, and what is in tune ceases-to-be into discord, and not into any chance [discord] but into one that is [*15*] opposed. It makes no difference whether we talk about harmony

or arrangement or composition; for it is obvious that the same account [applies to them all]. Now surely a house or a statue or anything else whatsoever comes-to-be in the same way. For a house comes-to-be from [things] not put together but dispersed in these particular ways, and a statue, or anything that has a shape, [comes-to-be] [*20*] from shapelessness—in each of these cases there is a certain organization or composition.

Accordingly, if this is true, everything that comes-to-be or ceases-to-be would come-to-be from, or cease-to-be into, a contrary or an intermediate [between contraries]. But the intermediates are [derived] from the contraries; for example, colors from pale and dark, [*25*] so that all things that come-to-be in nature are either contraries or are [derived] from contraries.

{477} Now with this much the majority of other [theorists] are pretty much in agreement, as we mentioned earlier. For they all posit elements and what they call ‘starting-points’, although they do so without argument. Nonetheless, they say that these are contraries, just as if [*30*] they had been compelled to by the truth itself. They differ from one another in that some posit [contraries that are] prior and others [contraries that are] posterior, and some [ones that are] better known by definition (*logos*) and some [ones better known] by perception. For some posit hot and cold, some wet and dry, and others odd and even or strife and love as causes [*35*] of coming-to-be. And these differ from one another in the aforementioned way.

Therefore, in a way [the starting-points] they mention are the same, and [in a way] different. Certainly it would seem to most people that they are different, but they are the same [*189a*] in that they are analogous. For they take contraries from the same column,[4] some of them wider in extent and some narrower. So in this way their accounts are both the same and different, some better and some worse, and some [posit contraries] better known by definition, as we mentioned [*5*] before, and others [posit contraries] better known by perception. For the universal is known by definition, while the particular by perception; for definition is of the universal, and perception is of a part [of it]. For example, large and small are known by definition, while rare and dense are known by perception. But it is obvious that, as I was saying, [*10*] the starting-points have got to be contraries.

I.6

The next thing we must do is to say whether there are two or three or more starting-points. It is not possible, of course, that there should be only one, because there cannot be just *one* contrary. Nor can there be infinitely many, for then being would be unknowable. . . .

Granted that they are finite in number, it is reasonable not to limit them to only two. For one might raise a puzzle as to how either density should be of such a nature as to act in any way on rarity, or rarity on density. The same is true of any other pair of contraries. For love does not battle with strife [*25*] or make something out of it; rather, both act on some different, third, thing. Some people even assume more things than that from which to construct the natural world.[5]

In addition to the objections raised so far, one might well face a further puzzle if one does not place something of a different nature underneath the contraries. For we see that the contraries are not the substance of anything that exists, [*30*] and a starting-point should not be said of anything as an underlying subject—if it were, there would be [some further] starting-point for that starting-point. For a subject is a starting-point and seems to be prior to what is predicated of it. Moreover, no substance is the contrary of another substance. How, then, could a substance be [derived] from non-substances? And how could a non-substance be prior to a substance?

This is precisely why anyone who thinks that [*35*] the previous argument and this one are sound must, [*189b*] if he is going to preserve them both, assume some third thing, just as is claimed by those who assert the universe to be of a single nature, for example, water or fire or something intermediate between them. An intermediate seems preferable, as fire and earth and air and water are already [*5*] bound up with contrarieties. . . .

It is now evident that there is not just one element, nor are there more than two or three. But whether there are two or three is, as we have said, a matter of great puzzlement.

I.7

Let us now give our own account. [*30*] We'll first discuss coming-to-be in the broadest sense, since it is in accordance with nature to speak first of the

common characteristics, and then get a theoretical grasp on the special features of each type of case.

When we say that one thing comes-to-be from another, or that something comes-to-be from something different, we are talking about either simple things or compounds. Here is what I mean. A man may become [*35*] musical, or something not-musical may become musical, or [*190a*] a not-musical man may become musical. By 'simple thing that becomes' I mean the man and the not-musical, {478} and by 'simple thing that it becomes' I mean the musical. But when we say that the not-musical man becomes a musical man, [*5*] both the thing that becomes and what it becomes are compounds.[6]

In some of these cases we not only say 'becomes this' but also 'from this'—for example, 'from not-musical [it becomes] musical'—but we don't say this in all cases. We don't say 'from a man he became musical', but rather 'a man became musical'. Among what we are calling 'simple things that become', one [kind] [*10*] remains after it becomes and one does not remain. The man remains and is still a man after having become musical, but the not-musical, i.e., the unmusical, does not remain, either simply or as a component.

Now that we have made these distinctions, if we look at all these cases of coming-to-be in the way we have described, we can derive from them the following: there must [*15*] always be some underlying subject that is the thing that becomes, and even if it is one in number, it is not one in form. (By 'in form' I mean the same as 'in account'.) For the essence of man[7] and the essence of unmusical are not the same. One remains, and the other does not; the one that is not opposed remains (for the man remains), while the not-musical, i.e., the [*20*] unmusical, does not remain, nor does the compound of the two, for example, the unmusical man.

We speak of 'becoming something *from* something', and not of '*this* becoming something', more in the case of things that do not remain; for example, 'becoming musical from unmusical' and not '[becoming musical] from a man'. However, we sometimes speak in this way about things that do remain; [*25*] for we say 'becomes a statue from bronze', not 'the bronze becomes a statue'. But from what is opposed and does not remain we do speak in both ways, and say both 'becomes this from that' and 'that

becomes this'. For [we say both] 'becomes musical from unmusical' and 'the unmusical becomes musical'. And hence it is also the same with the compound; for we say [*30*] 'becomes musical from an unmusical man' as well as 'an unmusical man becomes musical'.

'Comes-to-be' [or 'becomes'] is said in many ways, and some things are said, not to come-to-be [simply], but to become something, while only substances are said to come-to-be simply (*haplōs*). In the other cases it is obvious that there must be some underlying subject that becomes (for when [something] becomes of some quantity or quality or [*35*] in some relation or somewhere, there is an underlying subject, since only a substance is not said of any underlying subject, [*190b*] but other things are all said of substances).

But that substances, i.e., the things* that simply *are*, come-to-be from some underlying subject, will appear on examination. For we find in every case some underlying thing from which that which becomes proceeds; for example, animals and plants from [*5*] seed. When things come-to-be simply, they come-to-be in different ways: by change of shape, as a statue; by addition, as things which grow; by taking away, as Hermes from the stone; by putting together, as a house; by alteration, as things which alter in respect of their matter. It is obvious that all things [*10*] that come-to-be in this way come-to-be from some underlying subject.

Thus, it is clear from what has been said that whatever comes-to-be is always compound. There is, on the one hand, something which comes-to-be and, on the other, the thing which {479} comes to be that[8]—the latter in two senses, either the underlying subject or the opposite. By the opposite I mean the unmusical, by the underlying subject, the man; and similarly I call the [*15*] absence of shape or form or arrangement the opposite, and the bronze or stone or gold the underlying subject.

It is evident, then, that if natural things have causes and starting-points from which they primarily are and have come-to-be in a non-coincidental way, but each thing [has come-to-be] what it is called in accordance with its essence (*ousia*), then [*20*] everything comes-to-be from an underlying subject and a form. For a musical man is in a way compounded out of man and musical—he will be analyzed into the accounts of those two.* Thus it is clear that things that come-to-be would come-to-be from them. But the

underlying subject, although one in number, is two in form. On the one hand, there is the [*25*] man, and the gold, and in general the countable matter—which is more of a *this something*, and what comes-to-be from it comes-to-be not coincidentally. On the other hand, the privation or contrariety is a coincident. As for the form, it is one—for example, an arrangement, or musicality, or anything else that is predicated in that way.

And this is why, from one perspective it should be said that there are two [*30*] starting-points, and from another, that there are three—on the one hand, that they are the contraries, for example musical and unmusical, or hot and cold, or in tune and out of tune; on the other hand, that they are not [merely two], since contraries cannot be acted on by one another. But this, too, is solved by the fact that the underlying subject is another thing, since it is not [*35*] a contrary. Therefore, in a way the starting-points are not more numerous than the contraries, but are, one might say, two in number; but since [*191a*] a different being belongs to them, they are not two in every way, but three. For being a man is different from being unmusical, and being shapeless from being bronze.

We have now said how many starting-points there are for the coming-to-be of natural things, and in what ways there are that many. And it is clear that there are two contraries and that something must be their [*5*] underlying subject. But in another way this is not necessary. For one or the other of the contraries would, by its presence or absence, be sufficient to bring about a change.

The nature that is an underlying subject can be known by analogy. For as the bronze is in relation to the statue, the wood in relation to the bed, or the matter and the formless [*10*] before receiving form in relation to any of the things that have form, so is this underlying nature in relation to a substance, i.e., a ‘this something’ or a being.

This starting-point is therefore one, although it is not one, or a being, in the way that a *this something* is. Another [starting-point that is] one is what is given in an account, and also its contrary, the privation. In what way these things are two, and in what way [*15*] more than two, we have stated above. The first theory was that only contraries were the starting-points; later, we said that something else had to be their underlying subject, and that there are three starting-points. And from what we have now said it is apparent what the difference between the contraries is, how they are related

to one another, and what the underlying subject is. But whether the form [*20*] or the underlying subject is substance is not at all clear. What is clear is that the starting-points are three, and how they are three, and what they are like. With this, then, we conclude our discussion of what the starting-points are, and how many there are.

I.8

The next thing we will do is to show that this is the only way to resolve the puzzle of the early theorists. For those who were the first to seek the truth [*25*] and discover the nature of things philosophically went off the track, as it were, diverted by their own inexperience. They say that nothing at all either comes-to-be or ceases-to-be, because what comes-to-be would have to come-to-be either from what is or from what is not, and {480} both of these are [*30*] impossible. For what is does not come-to-be (since it already is), and nothing comes-to-be from nothing—there has got to be an underlying subject. This conclusion then kept getting inflated to the point where they say that there are not many things, but just being itself.

They accepted this doctrine for the reasons we have given. But we, on the other hand, say that for something to come-to-be from what is [*35*] or from what is not, or for what is or what is not either to do something or have something done to it, or for something to come-to-be anything whatsoever, in a way is no different [*191b*] than for a doctor to do something or have something done to him, or to come-to-be something from his being a doctor. Therefore since this [‘from being a doctor’] is said in two ways, it is clear that so, too, is ‘from what is’ and ‘what is does something’ or ‘has something done to it’.

Now a doctor builds a house not qua doctor, but qua [*5*] housebuilder, and becomes pale not qua doctor but qua dark. But he doctors or becomes a failure at doctoring qua doctor. Since we say that strictly speaking a doctor most of all does something or has something done to him or becomes something from [being] a doctor only if it is qua doctor that he does it or has it done to him or becomes this, it is clear that ‘coming-to-be from what is not’ also means [*10*] qua what is not.

Having missed this distinction, the early theorists gave up, and because of their ignorance made the further mistake of thinking that nothing else either is or comes-to-be [other than what already is]; instead, they abolished

coming-to-be altogether. Although we agree with them that nothing comes-to-be simply from what is not, we still think that in a way there is coming-to-be from what is not, for example, [*15*] coincidentally. For a thing comes-to-be from a privation, which is intrinsically not [what it will become], and does not belong [to what eventually comes-to-be]. But this is a source of wonder, and it seems impossible that anything comes-to-be in this way from what is not.

Similarly, neither does what is come-to-be from what is, except coincidentally. But in a way this, too, happens, just as an animal might come-to-be from an animal, [*20*] or an animal of a particular [kind] from an animal of a particular [kind]. For example, suppose a dog should come-to-be from a horse;* the dog would come-to-be not only from a particular [kind of] animal, but from an animal—although not qua animal; since it was already that [before the becoming]. But if a particular [kind of animal] is going to come-to-be non-coincidentally, it will not be from an animal, and if a particular [kind of] thing that is [is going to come-to-be], it will not be from [*25*] what is, nor from what is not. For we have already explained what 'from what is not' means, namely, qua what is not. Furthermore, we have not violated [the principle] that everything either is or is not.

This is one way [to solve the puzzle]; another is [to point out] that the same things can be spoken of in terms of potentiality and actuality—but we have drawn this distinction with more precision elsewhere. [*30*] Therefore, as we said, we have solved the puzzles that compel people to deny some of the claims we have made; for this is why our predecessors strayed from the path that would have led them to coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and change in general. If they had gotten sight of this nature,[9] that would have dispelled all their ignorance.

I.9

There are, to be sure, others who have touched [*35*] on this nature, although not adequately. For at first they agree that a thing simply comes-to-be from what is not, [*192a*] and hold that to that extent Parmenides was right. Then it seems to them that if something is one in number, there is also only one thing that it is in potentiality. But that is a very different thing.

For we say that matter and privation are different, and that one of them—matter—is [*5*] coincidentally what is not, while the privation is intrinsically what is not, and that while matter is very nearly (and in a way, *is*) substance, the privation is not substance in any way. But they, on the other hand, think that the great and the small alike, either both together or each {481} separately, are what is not. So their kind of triad is completely different from ours. They reached the point [*10*] of seeing that some nature must be the underlying subject, yet they make it one—even if one of them makes it a dyad, calling it the great and the small, nonetheless the effect is the same, since he overlooked the other [nature]. For along with the form, the thing that persists is a contributing cause of what comes-to-be—a mother, you might say. But the other part of the contrariety [*15*] often seems, to one who concentrates on its aspect as an agent of evil, not to exist at all. For when something is divine, good, and desirable, we say that there is not only something that is its contrary, but also a third thing which naturally desires and strives for the first in accordance with its own nature. But it is a consequence of their view that the contrary strives for [*20*] its own extinction (*phthora*). And yet it is not possible for the form to desire itself, since it does not lack [itself]; nor can the contrary [desire the form], since contraries are destructive of one another. Rather, it is the matter that [desires the form], just as if the female [desires to be] male or the ugly [to be] beautiful[10]—except that [the matter] is coincidentally, but not intrinsically, ugly or female [*25*].

In one way [the matter] comes-to-be and ceases-to-be, but in another way it does not. As that which contains [the privation], it does cease-to-be intrinsically (since the thing that ceases-to-be, the privation, is in it), but as that which is potentially [the formed thing], it does not [cease-to-be] intrinsically, but is necessarily incapable of ceasing-to-be or coming-to-be. For if it did come-to-be, it would have had to come from something primary that was already in existence [*30*] as its underlying subject. But that is its own nature, and so [if it came-to-be] it would [already] be prior to coming-to-be. For my definition of matter is just this—the primary subject underlying each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists non-coincidentally in the result. And if it ceased-to-be, it would come to an end

in that [i.e., matter], and therefore will have ceased-to-be before it ceases-to-be.

As for the starting-point with respect to form, whether it is [*35*] one or many and what sort (or sorts) of thing it is, a detailed examination is a task for first philosophy, and so we will reserve that for a [*192b*] later occasion.[11] But concerning natural forms that are capable of ceasing-to-be, we will discuss those later in our exposition. But that there are starting-points, and what they are like, and how many there are, we have established. Let us now continue by making a fresh start.

Book II

II.1

[*192b8*] Some things exist by nature, and others as a result of other causes. Those that exist by nature include animals and their parts, and [*10*] plants, and the simple [parts] of bodies, i.e., earth, air, fire, and water—for we say that these and the like exist by nature.

But all of these are evidently different from things that are not naturally constituted. For each of them has within itself a starting-point of change and rest (with respect to place, or [*15*] to growth and withering, or to qualitative change). But a bed or a cloak or anything else of that kind, insofar as each one falls under its respective predicate—i.e., to the extent that it results from art—has no innate impulse to undergo change; whereas insofar as they happen to be made of stone or [*20*] earth or a mixture of the two, and to that extent, they do. And that is because a nature is a certain starting-point and cause of changing and resting in that to which it belongs primarily and as such, i.e., not coincidentally. (By 'not coincidentally' I mean this: someone who is a doctor may be the cause of health in himself, but it is [*25*] nevertheless not in respect of being cured that he possesses the art of medicine; rather, the same person happens to be both a doctor and the one who is cured. And that is why they are sometimes separated from one another.) {482} It is the same with any other things that are produced: none of them has within itself the starting-point of its production. Some have it in other things that are external, for example, a house [*30*] or any of the things that is made by hand. Some, which are coincidentally their own causes, have it within themselves but not intrinsically.

A nature, then, is what we have said, and things which have such a starting-point have a nature. And all of them are substances. For [a substance] is a subject, and a nature is always in a subject. [*35*] These things are [said to be] in accordance with nature, as are those that belong to them intrinsically, for example, fire's tendency to move upward. For this is not a nature nor [*193a*] does it have a nature, but it exists naturally and in accordance with nature.

So we have said what a nature is, and what [is meant by] 'naturally' and 'in accordance with nature'. Now to try to prove that there is [such a thing

as] nature would be ludicrous. For it is obvious that there are many things of this sort. And to prove what is [*5*] obvious by what is obscure is [the mark] of a person who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not. It is clear that this condition is possible: a person blind from birth might make inferences about colors. Such persons must therefore be talking about words, without having any understanding.

It seems to some people that the nature or [*10*] substance of a natural object is a primary constituent of it, which is in itself without arrangement. For example, [they say that] wood is the nature of a bed, and bronze of a statue. An indication of this, Antiphon says, is that if you planted a bed and the rotting wood had the power to send up a shoot, it is not a bed that would come up, but wood, [thinking] that [the bed] is something that [*15*] belongs [to the wood] coincidentally, as the arrangement [of its parts] in accord with the law and the craft, whereas its substance is that which persists continuously while undergoing [this process].

But if each of these [kinds of material] itself stands in the same relation to something else, for example, bronze and gold to water, bones and wood to earth and similarly for [*20*] the rest, then [on this view] *that* would be its nature and substance. For this reason some people say it is earth, others fire, or air, or water, or several or all of these, that is the nature of everything that exists. For whatever [kind of material] one of them supposes to be of this sort—whether one thing or many—this or these many he declares to be all the [*25*] substance there is, [maintaining that] all other things are affections, states, or dispositions of these. And whichever [one he chooses, he says that] it is eternal, for it cannot change from itself, whereas other things can come-to-be and cease-to-be an indefinite number of times.

This, then, is one way in which a nature is spoken of: it is the primary matter that is the underlying subject of those things that have in themselves a starting [*30*] point of movement and change. In another way it is the shape, i.e., the form [of a thing] according to its account. For just as what is according to craft and what is crafted are called craft, so too what is according to nature and what is natural are [called] nature.

But we would not say of anything that it is according to craft, or that it is [an example of] craft, if it is a bed only potentially and does not [*35*] yet have the form of a bed. Nor would we [make the corresponding claim] about naturally constituted objects. What is potentially flesh or bone does

not [*193b*] yet have its own nature, and does not by nature exist, until it gets the form that is in accordance with the account, by virtue of which definition we say what flesh or bone is. Therefore, in another way a nature would be the shape, i.e., the form, of things which have in themselves a starting-point of movement; and this [form] is not separable [*5*] except in account. (The combination of these [i.e., form and matter], for example, a man, is not a nature, but is natural.) Now the form is a nature rather than the matter; for each thing is said to be [what it is] when it exists in actuality rather than when it exists potentially. Again, a man comes-to-be from a man, but not a bed from a bed. That is why people say that the shape is not [*10*] the nature of a bed, but the wood is, since if the bed sprouted, it is not a bed but wood that would come-to-be. But even if this [i.e., the shape] is [an example of] craft,* still shape [in some cases] is also a nature. For a man comes-to-be from a man.

{483} Moreover, nature in the sense of coming-to-be is a route toward nature. For it is not like healing, which is called a route, not toward the healing art, but toward health. [*15*] For healing must [go] from the healing art, not toward it. But this is not the way that nature is related to nature. Rather, the growing thing, insofar as it grows, goes out of something into something. What, then, is it that grows? Not what it is growing out of, but what it is growing into. Therefore shape is a nature.

Shape and nature are spoken of in two ways; for privation is also [*20*] in a way a form. But whether there is a privation, i.e., a contrary, in simple coming-to-be we must consider later.

II.2

We have now distinguished the various ways in which nature [is spoken of]. We must next consider how the mathematician differs from the student of nature; for natural bodies contain surfaces, volumes, lines, [*25*] and points, and these are what the mathematician investigates.

Again, is astronomy different from the study of nature or a part of it? It is absurd [to suppose] that the student of nature should know the essence of the sun or moon, but not know any of their intrinsic coincidents, especially since those who write about nature evidently also discuss the shape of the moon and sun, [*30*] and whether the earth and the cosmos are spherical or not.

Now the mathematician also deals with these things, but not insofar as each is a limit of a natural body; nor does he study these coincidents insofar as they belong to such bodies. That is why he separates them; for in thought they are separable from movement, and it makes no difference, [*35*] nor does anything false result, if they are separated [in this way]. Not even those who speak of Ideas notice that they do this [i.e., separate things that are separable only in thought]; for they separate natural objects, [*194a*] which are less separable than the objects of mathematics. This becomes clear if one tries, in each of the two cases, to state the definitions of the things and of their coincidents. For with odd and even, straight and curved, and, again, number, [*5*] line, and figure, it is possible to do this without [reference to] movement. But this is not the case with flesh and bone and man; these are spoken of like snub nose, not like curved.[12]

This is also made clear by the more physical branches of mathematics, such as optics, harmonics, and astronomy, which are in a way the reverse of geometry. For [*10*] geometry investigates physical lines, but not qua physical, whereas optics investigates mathematical lines, but qua physical, not qua mathematical.

Since nature is [spoken of] in two ways, form and matter, we must consider it in the same way we would investigate what snubness is, hence neither without matter nor with respect to [*15*] matter [only]. And once again one might raise a puzzle about this too. Since there are two natures, which is the concern of the student of nature? Or should he be concerned with the combination of the two? But if with the combination of the two, then also with each of them singly. Then does it belong to the same [science] to know both of them, or to different ones to know each singly?

It would seem to one who looks at the ancients that [the study of nature is concerned] with matter. [*20*] (For Empedocles and Democritus touched on form and essence only to a very small extent.) But if art imitates nature, and it belongs to the same science to know both form and matter up to a point, it would belong to the study of nature also to know both sorts of nature (for example, the doctor has [knowledge] of health, and also of bile and phlegm, in which health [resides]; and the builder [knows] both the form of the house and the [*25*] matter—that it is bricks and beams; and similarly for the rest).

Again, it belongs to the same [science to know both] what something is for, i.e., the end, and whatever is for the sake of that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for. For when there is some end toward which a continuous process of movement [is directed], [*30*] that last thing* is also what the process is for. (That is why it was ludicrous for the poet to say 'he has [reached] the end for which he was born'[13]—of course, we don't {484} mean that everything that comes last is an end, but only that which is best.) And indeed the arts make their material—some make it from scratch, others make it good to work with—and we use things as if they were all [*35*] there for us. (For in a way we too are an end; what something is for [is spoken of] in two ways, as we said in our work *On Philosophy*.[14]) There are two [*194b*] arts that control matter and have knowledge—the art that uses [the product] and the art that directs its production. That is why the using art also directs in a way, but with the difference that it knows the form, whereas the art that directs by being productive,* knows the [*5*] matter. For a helmsman knows and prescribes what sort of form a rudder should have, whereas [a carpenter knows] from what sort of wood and by what sort of processes it should be [made]. In the case of artifacts, then, we make the matter for the sake of a function, whereas with natural objects [the matter] is there all along. Further, matter is a relative—a different form has different matter.

To what [*10*] extent, then, must the student of nature know the form and the what-it-is? Perhaps up to the point of knowing what each thing is for (as the doctor knows sinew or the smith bronze) and concerning [only] things that are separable in form but are found in matter. For a man and the sun give rise to a man. But what is separable and what the separable is like is the task of first philosophy [*15*] to determine.

II.3

Now that we have drawn these distinctions, we must look into how many and what sorts of causes there are. Since the aim of our enterprise is knowledge, and we do not think we know a thing until we have grasped the why of it (which is to grasp its primary cause) [*20*], it is clear that we too must do this with respect to coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and every [kind

of] natural change, in order that by having knowledge of their starting-points we might try to bring under them each of the things we are seeking.

(1) In one way that out of which a thing comes-to-be and which persists is said to be a cause, for example, the [*25*] bronze is a cause of a statue, the silver is a cause of a bowl, and the genera of these [is also a cause].

(2) In another way, it is the form or paradigm, and this is the formula of the essence, and its genera (for example, the ratio 2:1, and in general number, [is a cause] of the octave), and the parts that are in the formula.

(3) Next, the primary starting-point from which change [*30*] or rest originates [is said to be a cause]; for example, someone who has given advice is a cause, the father is [a cause] of a child, and in general what does [is a cause] of what is done and what alters something [is a cause] of what is altered.

(4) Finally, [something may be called a cause] in the sense of an end, namely, what something is for; for example, health [is a cause] of walking. (As evidence, [when we ask] 'Why is he walking?' we say: 'To be healthy', and in so saying we think that [*35*] we have given the cause.) Likewise for anything that is intermediate between the initiation of the movement and the end—for example, slimming, purging, [*195a*] drugs, or [medical] instruments. All these things are for some end, although they differ from one another in that some are activities while others are instruments.

That is about how many ways there are in which we speak of causes.[15] And since causes are spoken of in many ways, it follows that there are in fact [*5*] several causes of the same thing, and not merely coincidentally. For example, both the art of sculpting and the bronze are causes of a statue, not with respect to anything else [that the statue may be] but qua statue. But [they are] not [causes] in the same way. Rather, one [is a cause] in the sense of matter, the other in the sense of [the starting-point] from which the movement [originates].

Now some things are causes of one another. For example, hard work [is a cause of] fitness and fitness of [*10*] hard work. But [they are] not [causes] in the same way; rather, one [is a cause] in the {485} sense of end, the other in the sense of the starting-point of movement. Further the same thing [can be a cause] of contraries. For what by its presence is the cause of something we count also by its absence as the cause of the contrary of that thing in

some cases. For example, [we consider] the absence of the helmsman [to be a cause] of the capsize of a ship if his presence would have been a cause of its safety.

[*15*] All the causes we have mentioned so far fall into four quite evident groups. Letters are the cause of syllables in the sense of (1) that from which, as is the matter of artifacts, fire and the like of bodies, the parts of the whole, and premises of a conclusion. The first member of each pair is a cause in the sense of [*20*] underlying subject, for example, the parts, while the second member—the whole, i.e., the combination, and the form—[is a cause] in the sense of (2) essence. Now a seed and a doctor and one who has given advice—in general the maker—are all [causes in the sense of] (3) the starting-point from which change or rest originates. Finally, some things are causes in the sense of (4) the end, i.e., the good, of the others; what something is for, i.e., the end of other things, [*25*] tends to be what is best. (It makes no difference whether we call it good or apparent good.) These, then, are the causes, and this is how many kinds of cause there are. But although there are many ways of being a cause, they can be brought under a few general headings. For causes are spoken of in many ways, and even among causes of the same kind some are [*30*] prior and some posterior to one another. For example, both a doctor and an artisan are causes of health; both double and number are causes of the octave; and the inclusive [causes] are always [posterior] to the particular ones.

Further, there are coincidental causes and their genera. For example, the cause of a statue is in one way Polyclitus, and in another way a sculptor, because being Polyclitus is coincidental to [*35*] the sculptor. The [genera] comprising that which coincides are also [causes], for example, if a man or [*195b*] more generally an animal were [considered to be a cause] of the statue. And some of the things that coincide can be more remote or more proximate than others. For example, if a pale [man] or a musical [man] were said to be a cause of the statue, [this would be more remote than Polyclitus or a man].

All causes, whether properly so-called or coincidental, may be spoken of either as potential [*5*] or as actual. For example, the cause of a house being built is either a housebuilder or a housebuilder’s building. A similar point can be made about the things of which the aforementioned causes are causes. For example, [we may speak of a cause] of this statue or of a statue

or, more generally, of an image, of this bronze or of bronze or, more generally, of matter. So too with their coincidents. [*10*] Further, causes and the things of which they are causes may both be spoken of as combinations. For example, [we may speak] not of Polyclitus or a sculptor, but of Polyclitus the sculptor.

All these add up to six, each of which is spoken of in two ways. [We may speak of the cause] (1) as a particular, or (2) as a genus, or (3) as a coincident, or (4) as the genus of [*15*] a coincident, or (5) as a combination, or (6) simply. And each of these is either actual or potential.

They differ in this way: actual particular causes exist or do not exist simultaneously with the things they are causes of. For example, this person's giving medical care [is simultaneous] with that one's being healed, and this person's housebuilding with that [*20*] house's being built. But this is not always true of potential causes. The house and the housebuilder do not cease-to-exist simultaneously.

We must always seek the most precise cause of each thing, just as we also do in other cases. For example, a man builds because he is a builder, and [he is a] builder in virtue of [the art of] building. This last cause then is prior; [*25*] and so it is in all cases.

Further, [we must seek] genera [as causes] of genera, and particulars [as causes] of particulars. For example, a sculptor [is the cause] of a statue, but this [sculptor is the cause] of this [statue]. And [we must seek] potentialities [as causes] of things that are potential, but [seek] actualities in relation to things that are actual.

Let this, then, be a sufficient determination [*30*] for our purposes of the number of causes and the ways in which they are causes.

{486} II.4

Luck and chance are also said to be causes, and many things are said to be and to come-to-be by luck and by chance. So we must ask in what way luck and chance are included among the causes we have mentioned, and whether luck and [*35*] chance are the same or different, and generally what luck and chance are.

Some people raise puzzles about whether or not they even exist. [*196a*] They say that nothing results from luck, but that everything we claim to result from chance or luck has some definite cause. For example, if you go

to the market and there by luck you find someone you wanted but did not expect to meet, [they say that] the cause of your going is your [*5*] desire to go shopping. Similarly also in the rest of the cases that are said to be the result of luck, it is always possible, [they say], to find some cause other than luck. For if luck actually did exist, it would seem truly strange, and one might well wonder why on earth none of the wise men of old said anything about luck in their accounts of the causes of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. [*10*] Rather, it would seem that they too did not believe that anything is a result of luck. But even this is surprising. For many things both come-to-be and are as a result of luck and as a result of chance, and although they are not unaware that everything that comes-to-be can be referred back to some cause, just as the old argument obliterating [*15*] luck has it, nevertheless they all talk about some of these things resulting from luck and others not. That is why they ought at least to have made mention of this in some way or other.

But they certainly did not think that luck was one of the causes, such as love, strife, mind, fire, or anything else of that sort. Now this is strange, whether they supposed that there is no such thing as luck or thought that there is but left it out. It is especially strange considering that they sometimes use it, [*20*] as Empedocles does when he says that air is not always separated out on top, but as luck would have it. At any rate he says in his cosmogony that ‘it sometimes happened to run this way, but often otherwise’.[16] He also says that most of the parts of animals came to be as a result of luck.

There are even some who say [*25*] that chance is the cause of the heavens and of all the worlds. They say that the vortex, i.e., the movement that separated and arranged everything in its present order, came to be by chance. And this is certainly amazing. For on the one hand they say that it is not as a result of luck that animals and plants [*30*] exist and come-to-be; rather, nature or mind or something else of that kind is the cause of them (for it is not any random thing that comes-to-be from a given seed, but an olive-tree comes from this one and a man from that one). And yet on the other hand they say that the heavens and the most divine of visible things came to be by chance and have no cause [*35*] of the sort that animals and plants do.

Yet if this is so, it is worthy of attention, and something might well have been [*196b*] said about it. For in addition to the other strange aspects of what they say, it is even stranger for them to say this when they see in the heavens nothing coming to be by chance, but among the things that are not the result of luck they see that many things occur as a result of luck. Surely we should have expected [*5*] exactly the opposite.

There are others who think that luck is a cause, but that it is obscure to the human mind, since it is something divine and miraculous. Therefore we must investigate chance and luck to see what each of them is, and whether they are the same or different, and how they fit into the causes we have distinguished.

II.5

First of all, then, since we observe that some [*10*] things always come about in the same way, and others do so for the most part, it is obvious that neither luck nor anything that is the result of luck is said to be the cause of either of these, either of what comes about of necessity, i.e., always, or of what comes about for the most part. But since there are things that happen in addition to these, and everybody says they are the result of [*15*] luck, it is obvious that luck and chance really do exist. For we know that things of this sort are the result of luck, and things that are the result of luck are of this sort.

{487} Now some of the things that happen are *for* something, while others are not. Some of the former are in accordance with choice, and some are not, but both are *for* something. Therefore it is clear that in addition [*20*] to what is necessary and what is usual, there are things that are capable of being *for* something. (Things that are *for* something include whatever might be done as a result of thought or as a result of nature.) Whenever such things come about coincidentally, then, we say that they are the result of luck. For just as a thing may be something either intrinsically or [*25*] coincidentally, so too may it be a cause. For instance, the intrinsic cause of a house is the housebuilder, whereas the pale or the musical are coincidental causes. So the intrinsic cause is determinate, but the coincidental causes are indeterminate, since indefinitely many things might coincide in one thing.

As we have said, then, whenever this occurs in the case of an event that is [*30*] *for* something, it is said to be the result of chance or of luck. (The

distinction between these will have to be drawn later; but for now it should be obvious that both are among the things that are *for* something.) For example: if he had known, he might have come for the purpose of getting back the money [owed him], when [his debtor was] collecting subscriptions for a feast. In fact he did not come for [*35*] that purpose, but it was a coincidence that he came and as a result collected [the money owed him]—he did not go to that [*197a*] place usually or of necessity. The end, the collecting, was not a cause in him, but it is the sort of thing that can be chosen and be the result of thought. So in this case he is said to have come as a result of luck, but if he had chosen to and either always or usually went there for this purpose, it would [*5*] not have been the result of luck. Thus it is clear that luck is a coincidental cause of things done for something and in accordance with deliberate choice. That is why thought and luck concern the same things; for there is no choice without thought.

Now the causes from which a lucky outcome might result are necessarily indeterminate. That is why luck seems to be something indeterminate [*10*] and obscure to human beings, and also why it might, in a way, seem that nothing occurs as a result of luck. For, as we might expect, all these statements are correct. Things do, in a way, occur as a result of luck; for they occur coincidentally, and luck is a coincidental cause. But it is not the unqualified (*haplōs*) cause of anything. For example, a housebuilder is the cause of a [*15*] house; but a flute player may be a coincidental cause. And there are indefinitely many causes of a man’s coming and collecting money when he did not come for that purpose. He may have wanted to see someone; he may have been prosecuting or defending a case in court; he may have been going to the theater.

It is also correct to say that luck is something contrary to reasonable expectation. For there is reasonable expectation of things that are always or usually the case, whereas [*20*] luck is found in occurrences over and above these. Therefore since causes of this sort are indeterminate, luck is also indeterminate. Still, in some cases one might be puzzled about whether just any chance thing might be a cause of a lucky outcome—whether, for example, wind or the warmth of the sun, but not a haircut, may be the cause of health. [No.] For some coincidental causes are closer than others [to what they cause].

Luck is called good when something good results [*25*], and bad when something bad results; it is called good fortune and bad fortune when the results are large. That is why someone who just misses a very bad (or good) outcome is fortunate (or unfortunate)—in our minds we say that the person has gotten the result, since the near [*30*] miss seems to us as if it were no miss at all. Further, it is reasonable that good fortune is unstable; for luck is unstable, as no result of luck can come about always or usually.

As we have said, then, in the case of events that occur neither without exception (*haplōs*) [*35*] nor usually, both luck and chance are coincidental causes of the ones that might occur for the sake of something.

II.6

Luck and chance are different, however, in that the latter extends more widely; every result of luck is also the result of chance, but not every [*197b*] result of chance is the result of luck. For luck and the results of luck belong to things that are capable of {488} being fortunate and in general capable of action, and that is why luck has got to involve action. A sign of this is that good luck seems to be the same as happiness, or very close to it, [*5*] and happiness is a kind of action, since it is acting well. Therefore what is not capable of acting cannot do anything by luck either. And it is for this reason that neither inanimate things nor beasts nor children do anything as a result of luck, because they are not capable of choice. They have neither fortune nor misfortune, except by similarity—in the way that [*10*] Protarchus said that the stones from which altars are made are fortunate, because they are honored, while their fellows are trodden underfoot. But in a way, even these things have things happen to them as a result of luck, when an agent does something to them as a result of luck; but otherwise they do not.

Chance, on the other hand, applies both to the other animals and to many inanimate [*15*] things. For example, we say that the horse came by chance, because although by coming it was saved, it did not come in order to be saved. And the tripod fell by chance, for it was left standing in order to be sat on, but it did not fall in order to be sat on.

Hence it is evident that among those things that generally happen for the sake of something, when one of them happens, not for the sake of what actually results [*20*] but due to an external cause, we say that it results from chance. A thing is the result of luck when it results from chance and, in

addition, has been chosen by an agent who is capable of choice. A sign of this is the fact that something is said to have been done in vain when that for the sake of which it was done does not occur.* If, for instance, walking is for evacuating the bowels, but when he walked, he did not succeed in doing this, [*25*] we say that he walked in vain and that his walking was in vain. This implies that when something is done in vain there is something else for whose sake it is natural for it to be done, but it does not succeed in achieving the result for whose sake it is natural for it to be done. Thus someone who claimed to have taken a bath in vain because the sun was not eclipsed would be ludicrous, since that was not what he took a bath *for*. So also, then, an event happens by chance (as the name suggests[17]) [*30*] when it is done in vain. And so the stone did not fall in order to hit someone; it fell by chance, because it might have fallen by someone's agency and in order to hit someone.

The separation of chance from luck is clearest in the case of natural events. For when an event is contrary to nature, we regard it as a result of chance, not of luck. [*35*] But even this [sc. what is contrary to nature] is different [from other cases of chance]; the latter have an external cause, the former have an internal cause.

We have stated, then, what chance is and [*198a*] what luck is, and what the difference between them is. But as for the type of cause, both of them are among the starting-points from which movement originates. For they are always among the causes of things that occur either naturally or as the result of thought. And the [*5*] number of these is indeterminate.

Chance and luck are causes of events that have some coincidental cause, but that mind or nature might have caused; and since nothing coincidental is prior to anything intrinsic, it is clear that no coincidental cause is prior to any intrinsic cause. Chance and luck are therefore posterior [*10*] to mind and nature. And so however much chance might be the cause of the heavens, it is still necessary for mind and nature to be prior causes of this universe and of many other things.

II.7

It is clear that there are causes, and that there are as many as [*15*] we say there are; for that is the number of things that are included under [the

heading of] the reason why. For the reason why ultimately comes either to the what-it-is, in the case of unmoved things (for example, in mathematics, where it comes ultimately to the definition of straight or commensurate or something else); or to what first initiated the movement (for example, why did they go to war?—because they were [*20*] raided), or to what something is for (for example, so that they might rule); or, in the case of things that come-to-be, to the matter.

It is evident, then, that these are the causes and that this is their number. Since there are {489} four causes, the student of nature should know about all of them; and when he gives the reason why in the study of nature, he should refer to all the causes—the matter, the form, what initiated the movement, and what something is for. The last three [*25*] often amount to one; for what-it-is and what it is *for* are one, and what first initiated the movement is the same in species as these—for a human being generates a human being. And the same is true generally when the things that initiate movement are themselves movable.

Things that initiate movement but are not themselves movable are outside the scope of the study of nature. For they initiate movement without having within themselves either movement or the starting-point of movement; rather, they are unmoved. That is why there are three [*30*] inquiries: one about what is unmoved, one about what is movable but eternal (*aphthartōn*), and one about what can cease-to-be.

Thus the reason why is given by referring to the matter, and to the what-it-is, and to what first initiated the movement. Especially in the case of coming-to-be people look at causes in this way—what comes after what? and what [*35*] first acted or was acted on?—always one thing after another.

There are two kinds of starting-points that initiate movement naturally. One of these is not itself natural, since it does not [*198b*] have a starting-point of movement within itself. A thing is of this kind if it initiates movement without itself being moved—for instance, what is entirely unmoved (i.e., the first of all [the things that initiate movement])[18] and also the what-it-is (i.e., the form), since this is the end and what something is for. Therefore, since nature is *for* something, this [starting-point], too, must [*5*] be known.

The reason why should be given in all these ways. For example, (1) that this necessarily comes from that (*from that* either without exception or for the most part); (2) if this is going to be [it is from that] (as the conclusion from the premises); (3) that this is the essence; and (4) because it is better thus—not simply better, but better in relation to the substance of a given thing.

II.8

The first thing that must be accounted for is why [*10*] nature is among the causes that are *for* something, and then how things stand with respect to necessity in the case of natural things. For everyone brings things back to this cause, saying that since the hot is of such-and-such a nature, and so is the cold, and each one of the elements, certain other things are and come-to-be of necessity. For even if [*15*] they mention any cause other than necessity, as one thinker does with love and strife, and another with mind, they just touch on it, and then kiss it goodbye.

A puzzle now arises: what keeps us from supposing that nature acts not *for* something or because it is better, but of necessity, in the way that Zeus makes it rain—not in order to make the grain grow. For what has been drawn up must be cooled, and what has been cooled and [*20*] turned into water must come down; it just so happens that when this occurs, the grain grows. Similarly, if the grain is spoiled on the threshing floor, it does not rain so that the grain will be spoiled; that is coincidental.

So why shouldn't we suppose that this is the way it is with the parts of natural organisms? For example, that the teeth grow as they do by necessity —the [*25*] front ones sharp and well suited for biting, the back ones broad and useful for chewing food—not coming to be *for* this, but coincidentally? And similarly for all the other parts that seem to be *for* something. So wherever all the parts happened to come together just as if they had been *for* something, [*30*] those [animals] survived, since their constitution was, by chance, suitable [for survival]. The ones that were not so constituted, on the other hand, were destroyed and are still being destroyed, as Empedocles says of the man-headed calves.

Now one might well be perplexed by this argument, or another one of the same sort. But in fact it is impossible for things to happen in this way. For these [teeth and other parts] [*35*] and all natural things come-to-be as they

do either always or for the most part, whereas nothing that happens by luck or chance [comes-to-be in this way]. (For it does not [*199a*] strike us as a matter of luck or coincidence when it rains frequently in the winter, but only in the summer; nor does a {490} summer heat wave [so strike us], whereas one in the winter does.) So if these things seem to be either a result of coincidence or *for* something, and they cannot be the result of coincidence [*5*] or chance, then they are *for* something. Surely all such things are natural, as even those who give these arguments would admit. Therefore, the *for something* is found among things that come-to-be and are by nature.

Further, whenever there is an end, the successive steps that precede it are done for the sake of that end. Surely, then, as actions are done, [*10*] so, too, do things occur in nature, and as things occur in nature, so, too, is each action done, unless something impedes it. But actions are done for the sake of something; therefore, things occur in nature, too, for the sake of something. For example, if a house were something that came to be naturally, it would come-to-be just as it actually does as a result of art, and if natural things came to be not only naturally but also through art, they would come-to-be just as they do [*15*] in nature. One thing, then, is for the sake of the other. In general, art either completes the work that nature is unable to complete or imitates nature. If, then, the products of art are for something, clearly the products of nature are also for something; for later stages are related to earlier ones in the same way in the case of products of art as they are in the case of products of nature.

[*20*] This is most evident in the case of the other animals, since they use neither art nor inquiry nor deliberation in producing things—indeed this is why some people are puzzled about whether spiders, ants, and other such things operate by intelligence or in some other way. To one who advances little by little along the same lines, it is evident that even in plants things [*25*] come-to-be that promote the end—leaves, for instance, grow for the protection of the fruit. Therefore if it is both by nature and for some end that a swallow makes its nest and a spider makes its web, and if plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit, and send roots down rather than up for the sake of nourishment, it is evident that this sort of cause exists [*30*] among things that come-to-be and are by nature. And since nature is of two sorts, on the one hand as matter and on the other as form, and the form is the end,

and since everything else is for the end, the [final] cause that things are for must be the form.

Now errors occur even in products of art. Grammarians, for example, have written things incorrectly, and doctors have given the wrong [*35*] medicine. So errors are clearly possible in the products of [*199b*] nature, too.

If in some cases involving the products of art what is done correctly is *for* something, and in cases of error an attempt is made for something but misses the mark, the same will also hold of natural products, and freaks will be errors that fail to achieve what they are for. [*5*] Hence in the original constitution of things, the [man-headed] calves, if they were unable to reach a certain limit and end, would also have been brought into being by a defective starting-point—just as, in the actual state of things, [freaks are brought into being] by a [defective] seed. Further, the seed must come into being first, and not the animal straightaway; in fact the 'whole-natured first'[19] was seed.

Further, in [*10*] plants as well as in animals things happen for something, though in a less articulate way. Then does it also happen with plants that, for example, olive-headed vines keep coming into being, as he says [man-headed] calves did, or not? That is absurd—but surely it would have happened that way, if it did with animals.

Further, [on Empedocles' view] seeds, too, would have had to come-to-be as a matter of chance. But whoever says this [*15*] does away entirely with nature and natural things. For things are natural when, having been moved continuously by some starting-point within themselves, they arrive at some end. From each starting-point comes, neither the same thing in each case, nor just any chance thing, but in every case it proceeds toward the same [end, and achieves it], if nothing impedes.

Now certainly both the end that a thing is for and the thing that is for this end might also result from [*20*] luck. For example, we say that a friend came by luck, paid the ransom, and then went away, when he did the action as though he had come in order to do it, although it was not on that account that he came. This end is achieved {491} coincidentally, since luck is one of the coincidental causes, as we said before. But whenever the end results always or for the most part, [*25*] it is neither coincidental nor a result of

luck. In the case of natural things it is always like that, unless something impedes.

Anyway, it is crazy to think an occurrence is not for the sake of something unless you see the initiator of the movement deliberating. Even art does not deliberate. Moreover, if the shipbuilding art were in the wood, it would still produce a ship in the same way, although by nature. And so [*30*] if what something is *for* is present in art, it is also present in nature. This is clearest when a doctor applies medical treatment to himself—nature is like that.

It is evident, then, that nature is a cause, indeed a cause in the sense of being *for* something.

II.9

Is the necessity present [in nature] conditional, [*35*] or is it also unqualified (*haplōs*)? At present people suppose that the necessity that obtains [*200a*] among things that come-to-be is the sort there would be if one thought that a wall came into being of necessity. On this view, heavy things naturally move downwards, and light things upwards, and that is why the stones and the foundations are below, while the earth is above because of its lightness, and the [*5*] wooden logs, since they are lightest of all, are on the very top.

Nevertheless, although the wall would not have come into being without these things, it did not come-to-be because of them (except in the sense that they are its material cause), but in order to shelter and protect certain things.

It is the same, too, with all other things that are *for* something: although they would not [have come into being] without things that have the necessary nature, they do not come-to-be because of these things (except in the sense that they are the [*10*] material cause), but for some end. For example, why does a saw have such and such features? So it can do this, i.e., for this end. But this end cannot come about unless the saw is made of iron; therefore it is necessary for it to be made of iron if there is to be a saw that performs its function. The necessity, then, is conditional, but not in the sense of an end; for necessity is in the matter, whereas the end is in the form.

Necessity is found both among mathematical [*15*] objects and among things that come-to-be naturally, and in a way the two cases are similar. For it is because the straight is such and such that it is necessary for a triangle to have angles equal to two right angles, and not the other way around. Still, if

the triangle did not have angles equal to two right angles, the straight would not be what it is [or: would not exist] either.

In the case of things that come-to-be for an end, it is just the opposite: [*20*] if the end exists or will exist, then the things that precede it exist or will exist too. If they do not, then just as in that [mathematical] case, if the conclusion is not true, the starting-point [from which it follows] will not be true either, so also in this [natural] one, the end, i.e., what the process is for, will not come about either [if the materials do not exist]. For the end is also a starting-point, not of action, but of reasoning. (In mathematics too the starting-point is of the reasoning, since there are no actions there.) And so, if there is to be a house, it is necessary for [*25*] these things to come-to-be or to obtain; and in general, the matter that is *for* something must exist (for example, bricks and stones if there is to be a house). The end, however, does not exist because of these things, except in the sense that they are the material cause, nor will it come about because of them. Nevertheless, in general, if these things—the stones in one case, or the iron in the other—did not exist, neither would the house or the saw. Nor in the mathematical case would the [*30*] starting-points exist if the triangle did not equal two right angles.

Evidently, then, necessity in natural things belongs to the material cause and to the movements of matter. The student of nature should mention both causes, but more especially what something is for, since this is the cause of the matter, whereas the matter is not the cause of the end. The end is what something is for, and the starting-point [*35*] comes from the definition, i.e., from the account [of the form].

The same is true in productions of [*200b*] craft. For instance, since a house is this sort of thing, these things {492} must come-to-be and be present of necessity; and since health is this, these things must come-to-be and be present of necessity. In the same way, if a man is this, these things must come-to-be and be present of necessity; and if these, then these.

But presumably necessity is present in the form as well [as in the matter]. [*5*] Suppose, for instance, that we define the function of sawing as a certain sort of cutting; this sort of cutting requires a saw with teeth of a certain sort, which it will not have unless it is made of iron. For even the form contains parts that are, in a way, the matter of the form.

Book III

III.1

[*200b12*] Since nature is a starting-point of movement and change, and our inquiry concerns nature, we must not fail to consider the question of what movement is. For if we don't understand that, we can't possibly [*15*] understand nature, either. Once we have defined movement, we will have to turn to the topics that come next in order and try to do the same thing there.

Now movement seems to be one of the things that are continuous, and it is in the continuous that the infinite makes its first appearance. That is why those who define the continuous often end up making use of the infinite in their accounts, [*20*] in that what is continuous is infinitely divisible. In addition to this, [they say], movement would be impossible without place, void, and time.

It is clear, then, for these reasons and because these [features] are universal and common to all things, that in our investigation we should look into each of them, since theoretical knowledge of general topics precedes that of [*25*] special ones. And first, as we said, should be the topic of - movement.

Some things are only in actuality, others both in potentiality and in actuality—such a thing is either a *this something*, or a quantity, or a quality, or any of the other categories of being. Relatives, on the other hand, are spoken of either with respect to excess and deficiency or [*30*] with respect to acting and being acted on, and in general as capable of initiating movement and of being moved. For a mover moves what is moved, and what is moved is moved by a mover.

There is no movement over and above the things [that are moved]. For what undergoes change always changes either in substance, or in quantity, or in quality, or in place, and it is our contention that there is nothing that applies in common to all of these, [*35*] i.e., nothing that is neither a this nor a quantity [*201a*] nor a quality nor a predicate in any of the other categories. Therefore there will be neither movement nor change of anything over and above the things we have mentioned, since, of course, there *is* nothing over and above the things we have mentioned.

There are two ways in which each of these belongs to anything: in the case of a this, one is its form, the other its [*5*] privation; in the case of a quality, such things as pale and dark; in the case of quantity, complete and incomplete. Similarly, too, in the case of spatial movement, upwards and downwards, or [in other words] light and heavy. Therefore there are as many kinds of movement and change as there are of being.

With respect to each kind of thing [*10*] we distinguish between those that are potentially and those that are actually. Movement is the actuality of that which potentially is, qua potentially. For example, alteration is the actuality of the alterable, qua alterable; growth or (its opposite) decay (for there is no name that applies to both in common) is the actuality of what is capable of growing or decaying, [qua such]; coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be [is the actuality] of what is generable or [*15*] perishable [qua such]; and spatial movement [is the actuality] of what is capable of being moved locally [qua such].

The following considerations make it clear that this is what movement is. Whenever what is buildable, insofar as we speak of it as such, actually exists, it is being built, and this is what building is. It is the same with learning, doctoring, rolling, leaping, ripening, and aging.

In some cases the [*20*] same thing is both in potentiality and in actuality—not at the same time or in the same respect, but, for example, actually hot but potentially cold. Hence it is also the case that many things will both act on and be acted on by one another. For they will all be capable at the same time of both acting and being acted on. Therefore what naturally initiates movement is also capable of being moved, for in initiating {493} movement everything of this sort is [*25*] also moved itself. So it seems to some people that everything that initiates movement is moved, but this is not really so, as will be made clear from other considerations[20]—for there is an unmoved mover.

But movement is the actuality of that which potentially is, the whole time it is actually being realized,[21] not qua itself but qua movable. By ‘qua’ I mean this: bronze [*30*] is potentially a statue, but nevertheless the actuality of the bronze, qua bronze, is not movement. For being bronze is not the same as being something potentially, since if they were simply the same, i.e., in definition (*logos*), movement would be the actuality of the bronze

qua bronze. But they are not the same, as we have said. (This is clear [*35*] in the case of contraries: for being potentially healthy is different from being potentially [*201b*] ill. If they were the same, then being ill and being healthy would be the same; rather, what is one and the same is the subject—whether it is moisture or blood—that is [at one time] healthy and [at another time] ill.) And since they are not the same, just as color and the visible are not the same, it is evident that [*5*] movement is the actuality of what is potential qua potential.

It is clear, then, that this is what movement is, and that it occurs precisely when this actuality exists, and not before or after it exists. For it is possible for something—for example, the buildable—to be actual at one time and not at another, and the actuality of the buildable, qua buildable, is [*10*] housebuilding. For the actuality of the buildable is either housebuilding or a house. But when there is a house, the buildable no longer exists—rather the buildable is what is *being* built. Therefore the actuality [of the buildable] must be the housebuilding. And housebuilding is a kind of movement.[22] But now the same account will apply to other kinds of movement as well.

III.2

That the account of movement we have given is [*201b16*] correct is clear both from what others have said about it and from the fact that it is not easy to define it in any other way. For movement and change cannot be put into any other genus, as is clear to anyone who considers where [*20*] others have tried to put it, when they say that movement is [a kind of] difference, or inequality, or not-being. For things that are different, or that are unequal, or that are not—none of these is necessarily moving; and change is no more into these or out of these than it is into or out of their opposites.

The reason that movement seems to belong [*25*] to one of these [kinds] is that it is something indefinite, and the principles (*archai*) of the second column[23] are indefinite because they are privative. For movement is neither a this, nor a such, nor does it belong to any of the other categories. The reason that movement seems to be indefinite is that it can’t be classified either as a potentiality or as an actuality of things. For [*30*] neither a potential quantity nor a quantity in actuality is necessarily moving. And movement seems to be a kind of actuality, although an incomplete one; this

is because the potentiality of which it is the actuality is incomplete, and this is why it is difficult to understand what it is. It has to be classified as a privation, or as a potentiality, or as a simple [*35*] actuality, and yet none of these seems to be possible.

Well then, there remains [*202a*] the aforementioned alternative,[24] that movement is a certain actuality, but of the sort we proposed—hard to comprehend, but still possible.

Every mover that has the potential to be moved, i.e., is at rest when it is not moving, is also moved, as we have said. (For when a thing [*5*] that can move is not moving it is at rest.) And to {494} act (*energein*) on this [movable thing], qua such, is just what it is to move it. [The mover] does this by contact [with the moved], and therefore it is itself acted upon at the same time. That is why movement is the actuality of the movable, qua movable, and it occurs when the movable is in contact with the thing that initiates the movement (*tou kinētikou*), so that the latter is acted on at the same time. The mover will always bring some form, either [*10*] a this or a quality or a quantity, that will be the starting-point and cause of the movement, whenever it initiates the movement, for example when an actual man makes a man out of what is potentially a man.

III.3

The solution to the puzzle[25] is obvious—movement is in the thing that is moved. For movement is the actuality of the thing moved, and is due to the agency of the thing that initiates the movement. [*15*] The actuality of the thing that initiates the movement is not different; for it must be the actuality of both of them. It is capable of initiating movement (*kinētikon*) by being able to do it (*tō(i) dunasthai*), but it is a mover (*kinoun*) by actually doing it (*tō(i) energein*). Still, what the mover is capable of acting on (*energētikon*) is the movable. Therefore, there is just one actuality of both of them, in the same way that the interval between one and two is the same as that between two and one, and the road up is the same as the [*20*] road down. For they are one [in number], although they are not one in account. It is the same, too, with the mover and the moved.

But there is a logical puzzle here. For presumably there must be some actuality of what is active and of what is passive. And yet the actuality of

the former is acting, and of the latter is being affected; the outcome (*ergon*) and end of the former is an action, and of the latter an affection. [*25*] Now both of these actualities are movements, so if they are different, what are they *in*?

Either both are in what is affected and moved, or the acting is in the agent and the being affected is in the patient. (If the latter, too, is called 'acting', the term would be homonymous.) On the second alternative (*touto*), the movement will be in the mover (for the same account applies to the mover [*30*] and the thing moved),[26] and therefore either every mover will be moved or, a mover that has movement will not be moved.

On the other hand, if both acting and being affected are in what is moved and affected, and both teaching and learning, although they are two [different processes], are in what learns, then (1) the actuality of a particular thing will not be in that thing, and (2) something will be moved with two movements [*35*] at the same time. But this is strange, for how could there be two alterations [proceeding] from one thing to one form? No, that is impossible—rather, the actuality will be one.

But [*202b*] it is unreasonable for there to be one and the same actuality of two things that are different in form. And if teaching and learning are the same, and acting and being affected [are the same], then teaching will be the same as learning, and acting will be the same as being affected. It follows, therefore, that the teacher [*5*] will be learning everything [he teaches] and the agent will have [everything he does] done to him.

Or maybe it's not so strange for the actuality of one thing to be in another thing? After all, teaching—the actuality of the art of instruction—is in something; it is not cut off, but is [the actuality] of this [teacher] in that [learner]. And nothing prevents two things from having one and the same actuality (not as the same in being, but as [*10*] the potential is related to the actual). Nor is it necessary for the teacher to learn, even if acting and being acted on are the same, so long as there is not just one account that states the essence of both, as with 'mantle' and 'cloak', but they are related as the road from Thebes to Athens is related to the road from Athens to Thebes, as we stated earlier.[27] For not all of the same [properties] belong to all {495} things whatsoever that are the same, [*15*] but only to those whose being is the same.

Furthermore, even if teaching is the same as learning, it does not follow that to teach is the same as to learn, just as from the fact that there is a single distance separating one point from another it does not follow that being here at a distance from there is the same as being there at a distance from here. To put it in general terms, teaching is not [*20*] strictly the same as learning, or acting as being acted on; rather, it is the process [*kinēsis*] to which both [‘teaching’ and ‘learning’] apply that is the same. For being the actuality of one thing in another is different in account from being the actuality of the second by means of the agency of the first.

We have thus stated what movement is, both in general and in particular, for it is not hard to see how to define any of its [*25*] species. Alteration is the actuality of the alterable, qua alterable—more perspicuously, [movement is] the actuality of what potentially acts or is acted on, qua such. This is true generally (*haplōs*) and again in particular cases, whether it is housebuilding or doctoring. The same account will be given for each of the other types of movement.

Book VIII

VIII.5

[*256a2*] Everything that moves is moved by something. There are two ways in which this occurs. What moves may be moved not by the mover [alone], but by [*5*] something else which moves the mover, or it may be moved by the mover itself. In this second case, the mover either directly moves the thing that is moved,[28] or it does so through a number of intermediaries. For example, the stick that moves the stone is moved by the hand that is in turn moved by the man; but he does this without having been moved by something else. Now, we describe both the last and the first[29] of these initiators of [*10*] movement as movers, but especially the first. For it moves the last, but that does not move the first, and without the first the last would not initiate movement, although the first can do so without the last; for example, the stick would not initiate movement if it were not moved by the man.

So everything that is moved must be moved by something, and that thing in turn is either (1) moved by [*15*] something else or (2) not [moved by anything else]. Now (1) if it is moved by something else,* there must be some first mover that is not moved by anything else; on the other hand, (2) if [it is not moved by anything else], it is already a first mover, and there does not have to be another [mover]—for it is impossible for the sequence of mover and moved to go on to infinity, since there is no first member of an infinite sequence. Therefore, if everything that is moved is moved by something, [*20*] and the first mover is also moved, but is not moved by anything else, then it must be moved by itself. . . .

VIII.6

Since movement must always exist and not cease [*258b10*], it is necessary that there be something eternal—either one thing or more than one—that is the primary initiator of movement. And the prime mover [must be] unmoved. There is a question whether each of the unmoved movers[30] is eternal, but that is irrelevant to the issue at hand. But the following considerations will make clear that there must be something unmoved and

exempt from all change, [*15*] both absolute (*haplōs*) and coincidental, that initiates movement in other things.

Let us suppose, if you will, that it is possible for some things to exist at one time but not exist at another without coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be; indeed, it may be necessary for everything, if it lacks parts but exists at one time and does not exist at another, to do this [*20*] without any process of change (*metaballein*). And let us also suppose that it is possible for some of the unmoved movers that are starting-points to exist at one time but not exist at another. Still, it is not possible that {496} they are all like this. For it is clear that something must cause the things that move themselves to exist at one time but not at another. For everything that moves itself [*25*] must have some magnitude, since nothing without parts can be moved (although it does not follow from what we have said that everything that initiates movement must have parts). So the fact that some things come-to-be and others cease-to-be, and that this occurs continuously, cannot be caused by an unmoved thing that does not always exist, nor can some [of these occurrences] be caused by one [non-eternal unmoved] thing* and others by another. Neither individually nor collectively can [*30*] the [non-eternal unmoved movers] cause [the process to occur] continuously and forever. For it goes on eternally and of necessity, and even though there are infinitely many [non-eternal movers], they do not all exist at the same time.

It is clear, then, that even though innumerably many [*259a*] of these unmoved and self-moved movers may cease-to-be and then be followed by others that come-to-be, with one unmoved mover moving one thing, and another one moving another thing, there is nonetheless something that encompasses all of them, over and above any one of them, that is the cause of the fact that some of these exist [*5*] and others do not, and of the continuity of change. This [eternal unmoved mover] is the cause of their movement, and they are the causes of the movement of the rest.

Since movement is eternal, the first mover, if there is just one, will also be eternal. If there is more than one, there will be many eternal movers. But we should suppose that there is one rather than many, and a finite rather than an infinite number. For where either assumption leads to the same [*10*] consequences, we should always make the more limited assumption; in the case of natural phenomena, what is finite and better should obtain, if possible, rather [than its opposite]. And one mover is sufficient; it will be

the first of the unmoved movers, eternal, and the starting-point of the movement of everything else. . . .

1. A*rchai*, normally translated as ‘starting-points’, is here rendered as ‘principles’. This is especially appropriate where the *archai* are propositional, but not all of them are.
2. The main claim of this paragraph appears to contradict the doctrine of *APo*. I.2 71b33–72a6, according to which particulars are better known to us than universals, and the order of procedure is the opposite of the one recommended here. But the appearance is misleading, since in *APo*. he is describing the inductive procedure of deriving universal truths from particular instances, whereas here (as 184b12 makes clear) he is alluding to the fact that general characteristics are more readily apparent to the senses than more specific ones—one might perceive something as an animal before noticing that it is a dog, let alone a spaniel.
3. The particulars (*kath’ hekasta*) here are not individual circles, but properties by means of which ‘circle’ is defined.
4. See note on *GC* I.3 319a15.
5. *Tēn tōn ontōn phusin*, lit. ‘the nature of beings’.
6. Aristotle is discussing the formula ‘*x* becomes *y*’, and the things that go into the ‘*x*’ and ‘*y*’ slots in this formula. The ‘*x*’ slot refers to the thing that is there at the start, and undergoes the change (the so-called *terminus a quo*). The ‘*y*’ slot refers to the thing that is there at the end, the result of the change (the so-called *terminus ad quem*). Unfortunately, the expressions he uses for these things are ambiguous. *To gignomenon* (lit., ‘the coming-to-be thing’) can mean either ‘the thing that becomes [*F*]’, and go into the ‘*x*’ slot, or ‘the thing that comes-into-being’, and go into the ‘*y*’ slot. Similarly, *ho gignetai* (lit. ‘what becomes’) can mean either ‘what becomes [*F*]’, and go into the ‘*x*’ slot, or ‘what [it] becomes’, and go into the ‘*y*’ slot. Most frequently, as in this passage, he uses *to gignomenon* (‘the thing that becomes’) for the ‘*x*’ slot and *ho gignetai* (‘what it becomes’) for the ‘*y*’ slot. But cf. 190b11, where he does the reverse.
7. *To anthrōpō(i) einai*, lit. ‘the being for a man’. See ESSENCE in Glossary.
8. Here Aristotle has reversed his use of the expressions *ti gignomenon* and *ho touto gignetai*, using the first to refer to the *terminus ad quem*—the result of the change—and the latter to refer to the *terminus a quo*—the thing that was there at the start, before the change began. ‘Whatever comes-to-be’ (*to gignomenon*) in line 11 seems to cover both termini. See note on 190a1–5.
9. The ‘nature’ of which Aristotle speaks is that of the underlying subject (*hupokeimenon*), which he regards as his most important contribution to an adequate understanding of the topic.
10. Our translation follows the suggestion of Pacius that the desire here is not that of a woman for a man, or of the ugly for the beautiful, but a female’s desire to *be* male, or an ugly thing’s desire to *be* beautiful. A literal rendering of the terse Greek would be: ‘just as if female of male and ugly of beautiful’.
11. See *Met*. VII–IX, XII.
12. ‘Snub nose’, Aristotle claims, unlike ‘curved’, cannot be defined without reference to matter (cf. *Met*. VII.5 esp. 1030b29–32 and VII.11 1037a29–32).

13. The quotation is from a fragment of a lost play. Philoponus (*in Ph. II*, 236,7) identifies the author as Euripides, but it is more likely to have been written by an unknown comic poet.
14. This work is largely lost; only fragments of it exist.
15. In the traditional jargon, the four causes are: (1) material, (2) formal, (3) efficient, and (4) final.
16. DK 31B53.
17. 'By chance', *automaton*; 'it is in vain', *auto matēn*. Aristotle appeals to (alleged, but dubious) etymology.
18. A reference to the first mover (*ho prōton kinei*), which will be discussed below (*Ph.* VIII.6).
19. Empedocles DK 31B62.
20. In *Ph.* VIII.5.
21. *Hotan entelecheia(i) on energjē(i)* ("the whole time it is actually being realized") is difficult to render lucidly. A literal translation would be "when being in actuality it is active." The verb *energein* (to be active) is cognate with the noun *energeia*, which is normally synonymous with *entelecheia* (actuality). The point is that a movement exists for precisely the period of time during which the potentiality, as such, is actual.
22. It useful here to remember that *kinēsis* applies to changes and processes in general, and not just what we commonly think of as 'movements'.
23. On the 'columns' of predication, see *GC* I.3 319a17 and *Met.* I.5 986a23ff and 1004b27ff.
24. 201a27.
25. Aristotle here alludes to a puzzle ("Does movement reside in the mover, or in the thing moved?") that he has not explicitly mentioned in the *Physics*.
26. Aristotle's point is not that the mover has the same account as the moved, but the case of mover-and-moved is a special case of agent-and-patient, and that therefore the account of the latter pair will also apply to the former.
27. At 202a18–20.
28. Literally, the mover is "the first thing before the last thing" (*prōton meta to eschaton*) that is moved, i.e., there are no intermediates between the mover and the moved.
29. In Aristotle's example, the last mover is the stick, and the first mover is the man.
30. These 'unmoved movers' are presumably individual souls.

On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be[1]

Translated by S. Marc Cohen.

In this work on the topic of coming into (and going out of) existence, Aristotle opposes the Atomists' contention that these phenomena involve the association (and dissociation) of atoms. There are no atoms (i.e., indivisible bodies) in Aristotle's view. Rather, every body

has the potential to be divided at any point, although no body can be actually divided into an infinite number of parts.

In the excerpts presented here, Aristotle distinguishes coming into being from alteration (Book I) and discusses the reciprocal transformation of the four elements (Book II).

{497} Book I

I.1

[*314a*] We must distinguish the causes and accounts of the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be that are common to all things in nature that come-to-be and cease-to-be; and we must also ask what growth and alteration are, and whether we ought to regard alteration and coming-to-be as having the same [*5*] nature, or whether they have separate ones, as their distinct names suggest.

Some of the early [theorists] say that [even] so-called simple[2] coming-to-be is [merely] alteration, whereas others say that alteration and coming-to-be are different. On the one hand, those who declare that all is one, and that there is one thing from which everything comes-to-be, are bound [*10*] to say that coming-to-be is [merely] alteration, and that [even] what comes-to-be strictly speaking is [merely] altered. On the other hand, those, such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras and Leucippus, who posit more than one kind of matter, are bound to say that coming-to-be and alteration are different.

And yet Anaxagoras did not understand what he was saying, at least when he says that coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are the same [*15*] as alteration, even though, like the rest of them, he says that there are many elements. Empedocles says that there are four bodily ones (although his elements total six if the sources of movement are included), whereas Anaxagoras says that the elements are infinite in number, as do Leucippus and Democritus. For Anaxagoras posits uniform[3] things (*homoiomerē*) as elements, for example, bone, flesh, [*20*] marrow, and all the rest of the things each of whose parts has the same name as the whole. Democritus and Leucippus, on the other hand, say that everything else is compounded out of indivisible bodies that are infinite both in number and shape, the compounds differing from one another [only] in which bodies they are composed of and in the order and

arrangement [of those bodies]. But the doctrine of Anaxagoras and his followers is evidently opposed [*25*] to that of Empedocles and his followers. For Empedocles says that fire, water, air, and earth, rather than flesh, bone, and such uniform things, are the four elements, and that they are simple; Anaxagoras, on the other hand, says that it is these [uniform things] that are simple and elemental, whereas earth, fire, water, and air are compounds, for [*314b*] each of [these four] is a "mixture of all the seeds" (*panspermia*).

Well, as I was saying, those who construct everything out of one thing are bound to say that coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are [merely] alteration. For the underlying subject (*hupokeimenon*) always remains one and the same, and that is the sort of case we call alteration. But those who make [*5*] the [elemental] kinds more than one are bound to distinguish alteration from coming-to-be. For coming-to-be occurs when these [elemental kinds] come together, and ceasing-to-be when they break apart. That is why Empedocles speaks this way, saying "There is no birth (*phusis*) of anything,[4] . . . but only mixing and separating of things mixed."[5]

It is clear, then, that this account fits their own fundamental assumption, [*10*] and that they do, in fact, speak in this way. But they also must concede that alteration is something over and above coming-to-be, and yet it is impossible for them to do so consistently with what they say. It is easy to see that we are right in saying this. For just as we see change in size (which is [*15*] called growth or decay) in something that is substantially unchanged, so too we see alteration. Nevertheless, the claims of those who posit more than one starting-point[6] make alteration impossible. For the properties with respect to which we say that alteration occurs—I mean, for example, hot and cold, pale and dark, wet and dry, hard and soft, {498} and [*20*] all the rest—are differentiae of elements, just as Empedocles says: "the sun, brilliant to see, and hot everywhere . . . and rain, in all things dark and cold."[7] And he differentiates the rest [of the elements] in the same way. Therefore, if it is not possible for water to come-to-be from fire, or earth from water, neither will there be anything [becoming] dark from [having been] pale, or [*25*] hard from soft; and the same argument applies to all the others. But that is just what alteration is.

So, too, it is obvious that a single matter must always be assumed for the contraries, whether the change involves place, or growth and decay, or alteration. Moreover, this is just as necessary [for alteration] as alteration is [for it]. For if there is alteration, [*315a*] there must be one underlying element, i.e., one matter for all those things that undergo change into one another, and if there is such a single underlying element, there is alteration. . . .

I.3

[*317a32*] Now that these distinctions have been drawn, we must first theorize about whether anything simply comes-to-be or ceases-to-be, or whether, strictly speaking, nothing ever does, but everything always becomes something from something; I mean, for example, becoming healthy from being ill, [*35*] or becoming ill from being healthy, or small from large or [*317b*] large from small, and in this way for all the others. For if there is to be simple coming-to-be, something would have to simply come-to-be from not-being, so that it would be true to say that not-being belongs to some things. For becoming something is from what was not that thing, for example, from not-pale or [*5*] not-beautiful, but simple coming-to-be is from what simply was not.

Now 'simply' means either (1) what is primary in each category of being or (2) what is universal, i.e., all-encompassing. And if it means (1) what is primary, then there will be coming-to-be of a substance from a non-substance.[8] But it is clear that none of the other predicates [*10*] (for example, quality or quantity or place) can belong to what is not a substance and a 'this'—for in that case properties would exist separate from substances. On the other hand, if it [sc. 'what simply is not'] means (2) what wholly[9] is not, then it will be the universal negation of all things, so that what comes-to-be would necessarily come-to-be from nothing.

We have puzzled over these matters and discussed them at greater length elsewhere,[10] but we should address them concisely [*15*] here as well. [Our solution is] that in one way a thing simply comes-to-be from what is not, but in another way it always comes-to-be from what is. For something must previously exist that is potentially [something or other], but is not actually

[that thing], and this is spoken of in both ways [both as what is and as what is not].

Still, even after these distinctions have been drawn, there remains a puzzle of remarkable difficulty, which we must take up once again, namely, how is simple coming-to-be possible, whether [*20*] it is from a potential being in or in some other way? For one might well raise a puzzle about whether there is coming-to-be of a substance and a 'this', rather than of a 'such' or a 'so much' or a 'where'; and the same issue arises for ceasing-to-be, as well. For if something [sc. a substance] comes-to-be [or ceases-to-be], it is clear that there will be a potential, but not actual, substance from which its coming-to-be will proceed or into which [*25*] it must change if it ceases-to-be. Well, will any other [predicates] actually belong to it (I mean, for example, will it be of such-and-such quantity or quality or location?) if it is only potentially a this and a being, but is simply neither a this nor a being? For if it is [actually] nothing, but everything potentially, the result will be that a not-being of this sort is separable, and, {499} further, the principal and [*30*] perpetual fear of the early philosophers will be realized, namely, the coming-to-be of something from nothing previously existing. But if it is not a this or a substance, and yet some of the other [predicates] we mentioned belong to it, then properties (*pathē*), as we said, will be separable from substances.

We must work as hard as we can on these puzzles, and also ask what the cause [*35*] is of the fact that there is always coming-to-be, of both the simple and partial[11] varieties. [*318a*] Now one sort of cause is the starting-point from which we say that a movement originates, and another is the matter.[12] The latter is the one we should discuss, since we covered the former earlier in our writings on movement,[13] where we said that there is something that is unmoved throughout all of time, and that [*5*] there is something that is always moving. One of these—the unmoved starting-point [of movement]—is the business of another and prior branch of philosophy. As for the one whose continuous movement moves the others, we shall have to explain later[14] which among the particular things we have mentioned is that cause. But let us talk here about the cause that is placed under the heading of 'material', the one on account of which [*10*] ceasing-

to-be and coming-to-be in the natural world will never fail. For once this is clear we will at the same time have a solution to our present puzzle and also to the question of what we should say about simple ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be.

It is especially puzzling to consider what the cause of the continuity of coming-to-be is, if ceasing-to-be is disappearing [*15*] into not-being, and not-being is nothing. For a not-being is neither something nor of any quality, or quantity, or location. So if indeed at every time some existing thing is disappearing, why hasn't the universe been entirely used up and vanished long ago, if, that is, there was only a limited quantity of that from which each of the things that come-to-be has come-to-be? The reason the universe has not come to an end is certainly not because that from which coming-to-be occurs is [*20*] infinite. For that is impossible: nothing is actually infinite, and the potential [infinity] that comes from divisibility would make the only coming-to-be that does not fail be that of things that are getting ever smaller. But that is not in fact what we see. So must change be unceasing, then, because the ceasing-to-be of *A* is the coming-to-be of *B*, and the coming-to-be of *A* [*25*] the ceasing-to-be of *B*?

Well, we have to assume that this explanation is sufficient to handle all cases of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be in the same way for any being whatsoever. But if the coming-to-be of *A* is, indeed, one and the same as the ceasing-to-be of *B*, and the ceasing-to-be of *A* is one and the same as the coming-to-be of *B*, then we must reconsider [*30*] why it is said that some things simply come-to-be or cease-to-be and others not simply, for some account of this is required. The fact is that we do say that a thing simply ceases-to-be (and not just that it stops being *this*) and that this is a case of simply coming-to-be, and that of ceasing-to-be. Likewise, when we say that a thing becomes *this* we are not saying that it simply comes-to-be, as when we say that one who learns is becoming [*35*] knowledgeable we are not saying that he is simply coming-to-be.

We often [*318b*] distinguish between terms that signify a *this something* [*tode ti*] and those that do not, and that is what will yield the result we are looking for. For it makes a difference what the changing thing changes into; for example, perhaps turning into fire is a simple coming-to-be [sc. of fire], but also the [qualified] ceasing-to-be of something [else], say earth, whereas the coming-to-be of earth is a case of becoming *something* (and not

of simply coming-to-be), but a simple [*5*] ceasing-to-be, for example, of fire. This is just what Parmenides asserted: he says that the two, being and not-being, are fire and earth, respectively. It makes no difference whether we postulate these or something else, for what we are trying to get at is the mode [*tropos*] of change, not what underlies it. Therefore, simple ceasing-to-be is turning into what [*10*] simply is not, and simple coming-to-be is turning into what simply is. And {500} so one of the pair by which we mark this distinction (whether they are fire and earth, or some other pair) will be what is, and the other will be what is not.

This, then, is one way to distinguish between simply and not simply coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be. Another depends on what the matter [underlying the change] might be. For the more [*15*] its differentiae signify a *this something*, the more of a substance it is, and the more [they signify] a privation, the more a not-being. For example, heat is a [positive] predicate, i.e., a specific form (*eidos*), whereas cold is a privation, and it is by these differentiae[15] that fire and earth are distinguished. It certainly seems to most people that the distinction turns on what is perceptible or not perceptible: when [*20*] the change is to perceptible matter, they say that coming-to-be occurs, and when it is to matter that is not apparent, ceasing-to-be. They distinguish what is and what is not by their perceiving or not perceiving it, just as they think that what is known is what is, and what is unknown is what is not—[for them] perception has the force of knowledge. For just as they think that they [*25*] live and exist in virtue of perceiving or having the capacity to perceive, so too they think that things [exist in virtue of being perceived or perceptible]. (In a way, they are pursuing the truth, but what they actually say is not true.) The result is that the truth about simply coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be is different from the common opinion. For according to perception, wind and air count as beings less [than earth does], which is why [*30*] people say that when things cease-to-be by changing into one of them they ‘simply cease-to-be’, but that when they change into something tangible, i.e., into earth, they [simply] come-to-be. In truth, however, [wind and air] are more a *this something*, i.e., a form (*eidos*), than earth is.

We have now explained why there is simple coming-to-be that is also the ceasing-to-be of something, and simple ceasing-to-be that is also the

coming-to-be of something. [*35*] It is because there is a difference in the matter out of which or into which [the change occurs]—whether or not it is a substance, [*319a*] and whether it is more or less [substantial], and whether it is more or less perceptible.

But some things are said to simply come-to-be, and others are said only to become something, in cases that do not involve the kind of coming-to-be from one another that we have just now been [*5*] discussing. And all that we have so far determined is why, when every instance of ceasing-to-be is the coming-to-be of something else, we do not attribute 'coming-to-be' and 'ceasing-to-be' impartially to both of the things which change into one another. But the point we just made above raises a different puzzle: why is it that one who learns is not [*10*] said to simply come-to-be, but to become knowledgeable, whereas one who is born *is* said to come-to-be?

These cases are distinguished by the predicates involved. For some terms signify a *this something* (*tode ti*), some a quality, some a quantity. So those which do not signify substance (*ousia*) are not said to simply come-to-be, but to become *something*.[16] Nevertheless, in all cases we speak of coming-to-be in [only] one [*15*] of the two columns[17] [of predicates], for example in the case of substance, if it's fire but not if it's earth, and in the case of quality, if it's *knowledgeable* but not if it's *ignorant*.

Well, then, we have explained why some things undergo simple coming-to-be and others {501} do not, both in general and in the case where they are substances, and we have said that the reason why coming-to-be is unceasing is that the material cause (*aitia hōs hulē*) is an underlying subject (*hupokeimenon*) that [*20*] is capable of change between contraries, and because, in the case of substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always the ceasing-to-be of another and the ceasing-to-be of one thing is always the coming-to-be of another.

But there should be no puzzle about why there is coming-to-be even though things are always being destroyed; for just as people say that there is simple ceasing-to-be when something turns into what is imperceptible, i.e., into what is not, so, too, they say there is coming-to-be from [*25*] what is not when that is imperceptible. So whether or not the underlying subject is 'something that is', a thing comes-to-be from what is not. Therefore, just as it comes-to-be from what is not, so too it passes away into what is not. And

for the same reason, things do not come to an end; for coming-to-be is the ceasing-to-be of what is not, while ceasing-to-be is the coming-to-be of what is not.

But one might still be puzzled about whether 'what simply is not' [*30*] is one of a pair of contraries. For example, is earth (i.e., the heavy) what is not, and fire (i.e., the light) what is? Or is this not the case, and earth is also something that is, while the common matter of both earth and fire is what is not? And is the matter of each of these different? Or [is it the same, since] otherwise they would not [*319b*] come-to-be from one another or from their contraries? For contraries belong to these things—to fire, earth, water, and air. In a way, it's the same, but in a way it's different. For the underlying subject, whatever it is, is the same, but its being is not the same.[18] So much, then, for these topics.

I.4

Let us now say what distinguishes coming-to-be from alteration; [*5*] for we do say that these kinds of change are different from one another. Well, then, since the underlying subject is one thing and the attribute (*pathos*) whose nature it is to be said of the subject is another, and there is change in [*10*] each of these, alteration occurs when the subject is perceptible and remains the same but changes in its attributes, which are either contraries or something intermediate between them—for example, when a body is first healthy and then ill while remaining the same [body], or when the same piece of bronze is first spherical and then angular.

When, however, the whole thing changes [*15*] without anything perceptible remaining as the same underlying subject,[19] but the way blood comes-to-be from an entire seed, air from water, or water from the whole of the air, then it is a case of coming-to-be of one thing and the ceasing-to-be of something else. This is so especially when the change occurs from something imperceptible into something perceptible, whether to touch or to all the senses, for example, when [*20*] water comes-to-be [from] or passes away into air (since air is pretty nearly imperceptible).

But in those cases in which an attribute (one of a pair of contraries) of the thing that ceases-to-be persists in the thing that comes-to-be—for example, when water comes-to-be from air, if both are transparent or cold—the thing

into which there is change must not be an attribute of this [persisting thing]. If it is, we have a case of alteration. [*25*] Suppose, for example, that a musical man ceases-to-be, and an unmusical man {502} comes-to-be, and the man remains the same. If *musical* and *unmusical* had not been intrinsically[20] attributes of the man, we would have had a case of the coming-to-be of one [of these attributes] and the ceasing-to-be of the other. And that is why, [given that] they are attributes of the man, the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are [only] of *the musical man* and *the unmusical man*. [*30*] In fact, of course, each of them is an attribute of the persisting thing [i.e., the man]. And that is why such cases are alterations.

Now when the change between contraries is with respect to quantity, we have growth and decay; when it is with respect to place, we have spatial movement; and when it is with respect to attribute or quality, we have alteration. But when nothing [*320a*] remains of which either of the contraries is an attribute or an accident (*sumbebēkos*) in any way, then we have coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.

Strictly speaking, it is the underlying subject that is receptive of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be that is matter most of all, but in a way the subjects of the other kinds of change [are matter] also, because all underlying [*5*] subjects are receptive of certain contrarieties. Let this serve, then, as our treatment of coming-to-be, and of whether or not and how it occurs, and of alteration. . . .

Book II

II.1

[*329a24*] . . . Our view is that there is some matter of perceptible bodies, but that it is not separable but rather is always accompanied by one or the other of a pair of contraries, from which[21] the so-called elements come-to-be. A more precise account of them[22] has been given elsewhere. Nevertheless, since it is in just this way that the primary bodies come-to-be from matter, we must also give an account [*30*] of these,[23] in which we take as a starting-point the matter that is inseparable from the contraries and yet is their underlying subject. For the hot is not matter for the cold, nor it for the hot, but an underlying subject [is matter] for both of them. Therefore the starting-point is: first, the potentially perceptible body; second, the pairs of contraries (I mean, e.g., hot and cold); [*35*] and then, third, fire and water and the like. [*329b*] For although the latter change into one another (and not the way that Empedocles and others say they do—for [on their account] there would be no alteration),[24] the contraries do not change. Nonetheless we must discuss how many and what kinds [of contraries] are the starting-points of body. For other [*5*] people postulate and use them, and say nothing about why these or why this many.

II.2

Now, since we are seeking the starting-points of perceptible body, that is to say, of the tangible, and the tangible is that which is perceived by the sense of touch, it is obvious that not all of the contrarieties constitute forms and starting-points of body, but only those that pertain to the sense of touch. For the contrarieties by which [bodies] are [*10*] differentiated are tangible contrarieties. That is why neither *pale* and *dark*, nor *sweet* and *bitter*, nor any other such perceptible contrariety constitutes an element. Admittedly, sight is prior to touch, and therefore its object (*hupokeimenon*) is prior. But the latter is an attribute of a tangible body not qua tangible, but qua [*15*] something else, even if it happens to be naturally prior.

Among those that are tangible, we must first determine which ones are the primary differentiae and contrarieties. The contrarieties that {503} pertain

to touch are these: *hot–cold*, *dry–wet*, *heavy–light*, *hard–soft*, *viscous–brittle*, *rough–smooth*, *coarse–fine*. Of these, [*20*] *heavy* and *light* are neither active nor passive; for a thing is not said to be either heavy or light because it either acts on or is acted on by another thing. But the elements must be reciprocally active and passive, since they interact and change into one another.

A thing is said to be hot or cold, however, and wet or dry, by either acting or [*25*] being acted on. For hot is what brings together things of the same kind—the separating that people say that fire does is actually a bringing together of things of the same type, which results from the removal of foreign things. Cold, on the other hand, is what unites and brings together both things of the same kind and those not of the same type alike. Wet is what lacks boundaries of its own, [*30*] but is easily bounded; while dry is what is easily bounded by its own boundaries, but is difficult [for other things] to bound....

[*330a24*] It is clear, then, that all the other differentiae are reducible [*25*] to these four primary ones [hot, cold, wet, dry], whereas these cannot further be reduced to any smaller number. . . .

II.3

[*330a30*] Since there are four elements,[25] there are six possible ways in which they can combine [in pairs]. But it is not in the nature of contraries to combine, for it is impossible for one and the same thing to be both hot and cold, or, again, wet and dry, and so it is evident that there will be four combinations among elementary attributes—hot and dry, hot and wet, and [*330b*] again, cold and wet, cold and dry. And it stands to reason that these have attached themselves to the four apparently simple bodies, to fire and air and water and earth. For fire is hot and dry, air is hot and wet (air being a kind of moist vapor), [*5*] water is cold and wet, and earth cold and dry. So the differentiae are distributed among the primary bodies in a reasonable way, and their number accords with reason. . . .

Fire, air, and each of the others[26] we have [*330b22*] mentioned are not simple, but mixed. There are such simples, but not these. So if there is one that is similar to fire, it is fiery, but not fire; and if there is one similar to air, it is airy; and likewise for the others. [*25*] Fire is an excess of heat, just as

ice is an excess of cold. Freezing and boiling are excesses, of cold and heat, respectively. So if ice is a freezing of what is wet and cold, then fire, too, will be a boiling of what is dry and hot. And that is why nothing [*30*] comes-to-be from ice or fire. . . .

II.4

We have previously[27] determined that there is [*331a7*] reciprocal coming-to-be among the simple bodies, and, in addition, these cases of becoming are evident to the senses. Otherwise there would be no alteration, for alteration involves [*10*] the attributes of the tangible. For this reason we must describe the way they change into one another, and whether each of them can come-to-be from all of the others, or whether some can and some cannot.

Well, it is obvious that they are all naturally disposed to change into one another; for coming-to-be is into contraries and from contraries, and every element [*15*] has contrariety with every other element on account of their having contrary differentiae.[28] In some cases, both attributes are contraries; for example, fire and water (for one is dry and hot, the other wet and cold). In other cases, only one pair are contraries; for example, air and water (for one is wet and hot, the other wet and [*20*] cold).

Therefore it is evident that, universally, every element is naturally disposed to change into any of the others, and when we turn to particular cases, it will not be difficult to see how this happens. Any one of them will be [generable] from any of the others, although there may be a difference in whether the process is faster and easier, or slower and more difficult. In cases in which {504} they share a corresponding [attribute] between them, the transition will be faster, [*25*] and where they do not it will be slower, because it is easier for one [attribute] to change than for many. An example of the faster transition is when air comes-to-be from fire; one is hot and dry, the other hot and wet, so that once the dry is overcome by the wet, there will be air. And again, in the case in which water comes-to-be from air, when the hot is [*30*] overcome by the cold (one being hot and wet, the other cold and wet) the change from the hot will result in water. It’s the same way when earth comes from water or fire from earth; for in both cases they share a corresponding [attribute]. . . .

[*331b2*] It is therefore evident that the coming-to-be of the simple bodies will be cyclical, and that the way the change occurs is made easy by the fact the consecutive [elements] have corresponding attributes.[29] On the other hand from fire to water and [*5*] from air to earth, and again from water and earth to fire and air, respectively, is made more difficult by the fact that there is a change of more [attributes]. For if fire is to come from water, both the cold and the wet must cease-to-be, and again if earth is to come from air, both the cold and the dry must cease-to-be. Similarly, [*10*] if water and earth are to come-to-be from fire and air, respectively, both [attributes] must change. . . .

II.5

Well, then, we have stated that each element [*332a*] comes-to-be out of each of the others, and in what way this change from one to another occurs. But let us proceed to some further speculations about them. If the matter of natural bodies is, as some people [*5*] think, water and air and the like, it must be either one or two or more of them. But they can't all be one—for example, all of them air, or water, or fire, or earth, if change is really into contraries. For if they all were air, assuming that to be what persists, there would be alteration, but not [simple] coming-to-be. It certainly does not seem that way, i.e., that [*10*] water is at the same time also air or anything else. There will be some contrariety that provides a differentia, and [water] will have one member and [another element] will have the other, as for example fire has heat. But then [if air persists when it changes into fire] won't fire just be hot air? That would be alteration [of air], and that's not what seems to happen. And again, if air is going to come from fire, there will be a change from hot to its [*15*] contrary.[30] But then this will belong to air, and air will be something cold. So it is impossible for fire to be hot air, for [if it were] the same thing would be both hot and cold at the same time.

Both [air and fire], then, will be something else that is the same for both of them—some other common matter.[31] The same argument applies to all [the elements], which means that no one of them will be what everything is made of.

1. The usual English translation of the title of this work—*On Generation and Corruption*—is a direct rendering of its Latin translation *De Generatione et Corruptione*. But this is misleading in several ways: (1) it misses the connection between the noun *genesis* (‘generation’) and the cognate verb *gignetai* (‘comes-to-be’); (2) it obscures the fact that Aristotle uses this verb to cover both coming-into-existence and becoming such-and-such (e.g., becoming hot or becoming tired); (3) it wrongly suggests that *genesis* is something that only a living thing can undergo (whereas for Aristotle the building of a house is just as much a *genesis* as the birth of a kitten). So we have translated the noun *genesis* as ‘coming-to-be’ and the verb *gignetai* as ‘comes-to-be’ or ‘becomes’, as the context dictates. For similar reasons, ‘corruption’ and ‘perishing’ are equally misleading for *phthora*, which we have rendered as ‘ceasing-to-be’.
2. Aristotle contrasts simple coming-to-be (*haplē genesis*, sometimes translated ‘unqualified coming-to-be’) with ‘becoming something’ (*gignesthai ti*, sometimes translated ‘qualified coming-to-be’); alteration (*alloiōsis*), or change of quality, is the most common case of becoming something.
3. On ‘uniform things’ (or ‘homoiomeries’) see note on *Mete.* IV.12 389b24.
4. Alternatively, *phusis oudenos estin* might be translated ‘nothing has a nature’.
5. DK 31B8.
6. *Archē* (‘starting-point’) is often translated ‘principle’.
7. DK 31B21.
8. What is primary, in a given category, is its broadest genus, i.e., the category itself. So ‘what simply is not’ in the category of substance would mean ‘what is not a substance’, in which case a substance that comes-to-be from what-simply-is-not would come-to-be from a non-substance.
9. “What wholly is not” (*to mē on holōs*) would be something that is not anything at all, i.e., a thing devoid of all properties. Aristotle here assumes that there is no such thing, and concludes that if anything were to come from what wholly is not it would come from nothing.
10. *Ph.* I.8.
11. ‘Partial’ (*kata meros*) here means ‘qualified’ coming-to-be, i.e., becoming such-and-such.
12. These are the so-called ‘efficient’ and ‘material’ causes, respectively. See *Ph.* II.3.
13. *Ph.* VIII.6.
14. Aristotle gives his explanation in *GC* II.10: it is the continuous circular movement of the sun.
15. On Aristotle’s theory of the elements (derived from Empedocles), the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) are differentiated by the two pairs of contraries hot–cold and wet–dry. Thus, fire is hot and dry, while earth is cold and dry. So the difference between fire and earth is that the former is hot and the latter cold. For the details, see *GC* II, below.
16. More precisely: when what comes-to-be is a cat, or a daffodil, we have the simple coming-to-be of a substance; but when what comes-to-be is a pale thing, or a knowledgeable one, we do not have a have a simple coming-to-be, but rather a qualified coming-to-be—a case in which a substance (e.g., a human being) becomes something (e.g., pale, or knowledgeable).
17. Aristotle is thinking of properties and their contraries arranged in two columns: one positive, the other negative. (Cf. *Met.* 986a23ff and 1004b27ff.) It is the ones in the positive column, he says, to which we ascribe coming-to-be.
18. Aristotle’s point here is obscure. Perhaps he means that in the case of reciprocal change between contraries, such as between earth and air, the underlying subject, whatever it is, is the same in both directions, but ‘different in being’ in that the subject of the change from earth to air is actually cold and potentially hot, whereas the subject of the change from air to earth is actually hot and potentially cold.

19. ‘Without anything perceptible remaining as the same underlying subject’ does not strictly speaking assert that something imperceptible *does* persist as the subject. But the alternative possibility—that nothing at all persists as the subject—is not likely to have been what Aristotle had in mind. If it were, he would have had no reason to characterize alteration as a change in which a *perceptible* subject persists—it would have been simpler to say that in alteration a subject persists, and in coming-to-be it does not. Moreover, the rejection of a persisting subject would conflict with his account of coming-to-be in *Ph.* I.9.
20. ‘Intrinsically’ (*kath’ hauto*) is here being used in the second of the two senses distinguished at *APo.* I.4 73a34–b24.
21. The reference of ‘which’ here is unclear. It might refer to the ‘pair of contrary properties’ that immediately precedes, but more likely to the ‘matter’ at the beginning of the sentence.
22. Again, the reference of ‘them’ is unclear. It might refer to (a) matter and contrary properties, but more likely to (b) the elements. On option (a), the reference would be to *Ph.* I.6–9; on (b), to *Cael.* III–IV.
23. ‘These’ clearly refers to something different from ‘them’ in the previous sentence (see previous note). On option (a), ‘these’ refers to the primary bodies, i.e., the elements; on the preferable option (b), it refers to the pairs of contrary properties, which are discussed in the next chapter.
24. On Empedocles’ account, the elements are immutable, and so cannot change at all. On Aristotle’s account, by contrast, they are capable of reciprocal change.
25. Although Aristotle uses the term ‘elements’ (*stoicheiai*), it is clear that he has in mind the four elementary attributes (hot, cold, wet, dry), rather than the four things he usually calls elements (earth, air, fire, and water).
26. The others are water and earth.
27. In *Cael.* III.6.
28. That is: for any pair of elements, at least one attribute of the one is the contrary of some attribute of the other.



29. The cycle of elements looks like this:
Fire and air are ‘consecutive’ (*ephexēs*), as are fire and earth; water and air are consecutive, as are water and earth. Consecutive elements have an attribute in common (e.g., fire and air are both hot); the non-consecutive pairs (fire and water, air and earth) do not. Aristotle therefore describes them as ‘contrary’ elements.
30. Aristotle seems to be ignoring the fact that on his theory, both air and fire are essentially hot; the difference between them is that fire is dry, while air is wet (330b2–5). As Philoponus noted (*in GC*, 240,25–31), Aristotle’s argument at the end of this paragraph would be better served by a different choice of contraries: when fire changes into air, there will be a change from dry to its contrary,

because air is something wet. So if fire were hot air, the same thing would be dry and wet at the same time.

31. This is usually thought to be a reference to ‘prime’ matter, which underlies the four elements and is what persists in the transmutation of elements into one another. Prime matter always has some property or other (it is hot, or cold, or wet, etc.), and is capable of taking on any property, but has none of them essentially.

{505} On the Heavens

Translated by S. Marc Cohen.

This work contains Aristotle’s account of the physical universe—the earth, moon, sun, planets, and stars. In parts not included in this anthology, he argues that the universe is unique and eternal, that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe, and that the other heavenly bodies revolve around it in circular orbits. In the chapters excerpted here he discusses the elements of which everything on the earth is composed. He argues that they are four in number and that they cannot be reduced to a smaller number. They are not eternal but are capable of being generated out of one another.

Book I

I.2

[*268b11*] As for the nature of the universe, whether it is infinite in magnitude or limited in size, that is something to be looked into later. Here we will discuss its specific parts, taking that as our starting-point.

We assert that all natural bodies [*15*] and magnitudes are intrinsically capable of change (*kinēta*) of place; nature, we say, is the starting-point of their movement.[1] Every change of place (which we call spatial movement), no matter how large or small, is either straight or circular or some combination thereof. For these two [types of spatial movement] are the only simple ones. The reason for this is that there are only two simple lengths: [*20*] straight and curved. Now when [spatial movement] goes around the center it is circular, while when it is upward or downward it is straight. (By 'upward' I mean away from the center, and by 'downward' toward the center.) Necessarily, therefore, every simple spatial movement is either away from the center, or toward the center, or around the center. And this seems to agree, [*25*] reasonably enough, with what we said at the start;[2] for a body is completed in three [dimensions], and so is its movement.

Some bodies are simple and some are mixtures of simple ones (by 'simple' I mean ones such as fire and earth and their species, and things of the same kind—those that have a starting-point of movement in their nature). So necessarily [*30*] some movements are simple and others are somehow mixed; [*269a*] simple bodies have simple movements, while mixtures have mixed ones, moving as determined by their predominant [element].

Now if we assume that (1) there is simple movement, and (2) circular movement is simple, and (3) the movement of a simple body is simple, and (4) what has a simple movement is a simple body (for if it were [5] a compound body it would move as determined by its predominant [element]), then it follows that there is a simple body that is disposed to move in a circular movement in accordance with its own nature. It is possible, of course, for it to be moved by the force of something else, but that could not be natural, since each simple body has [just] one natural

movement. Moreover, if ‘unnatural’ is the contrary of [*10*] ‘natural’ and a single thing has a single contrary, then necessarily, since circular movement is simple, if it is not the natural movement of the body that is moved, it will be its unnatural movement. Now if it is fire or something else of that sort whose [unnatural] movement is circular, its natural movement would be the contrary of circular. But each movement has a single contrary, and upward and downward are [*15*] contraries of one another. If, on the other hand, something other [than one of the elements] is the body whose unnatural movement is circular, it will have some other movement as its natural movement. But that is impossible. For if its natural {506} movement is upward it will be fire or air; and if it is downward, it will be water or earth.

Furthermore, such [circular] spatial movement must also be primary. For the complete is naturally prior [*20*] to the incomplete, and a circle is one of things that are complete, whereas a straight line is not. That is because neither an infinite nor a finite straight line could be complete; the former because it lacks a limit or an end, and the latter because it has something outside of it—anything of this sort can be extended. Therefore since (1) the movement of a naturally prior body is prior, and (2) [*25*] circular movement is prior to straight movement, and (3) movement in a straight line belongs to the simple bodies (fire moves in a straight line upward and earthy things downward toward the center), it follows necessarily that there is also some simple body whose movement is circular. For we have already said that the movement of mixed bodies is determined by the predominant element in the mixture [*30*] of simples.

From this it is evident that there exists in nature (*pephukē*) some other bodily substance beyond the ones we meet with (*sustaseis*) in the sublunary realm,[3] more divine than and prior to all of them. [One can reach this same conclusion] also if one assumes that every movement is either natural or unnatural, and that what is unnatural for one thing is natural for another, as happens, for example, with upward and downward movements—the [*35*] former being natural to fire but unnatural to earth, and the latter the other way around. [*269b*] It necessarily follows that circular movement, since it is unnatural for these [elements], is natural to some other one.

Furthermore, if circular movement is natural for anything, it is clear that it would be natural for some simple and primary body whose nature it is [to

move in a circle], and that just as [*5*] fire moves naturally upward and earth downward, this [body] moves naturally in a circle. But if [all] the bodies that rotate around a center were moving unnaturally, the result would be remarkable and utterly contrary to reason—that the only movement that is continuous and eternal is unnatural. For it is obvious that in all other cases the movements that are quickest to [*10*] cease are the unnatural ones. Therefore if fire is what gets moved [in a circle], as some people say, this movement is no less unnatural for it than downward movement is; for we see the [natural] movement of fire to be in a straight line upward from the center.

This is why, reasoning from all of these considerations, we are confident that there is something beyond the bodies [*15*] here[4] around us that is different and separate, whose nature is worthier the more removed it is from the sublunary realm.

Book III

III.3

[*302a10*] It remains to say of which bodies there is coming-to-be, and why. Now since in every domain knowledge is derived from primary things, and the elements are the primary constituents of actually existing things (*enuparchontōn*), we must investigate which of these bodies are elements, and why they are, and then after that consider how many there are and what they are like.

This will be evident [*15*] once we have explained what the nature of an element is. Let an element of bodies be (1) that into which other bodies are divisible, (2) present (*enuparchon*) in them potentially or actually (which of the two is a matter of dispute), and (3) something that is itself indivisible into things of another kind. Something like this is what everybody in any context means by ‘element’.

Now if [*20*] an element is what we have said it is, there must be such bodies. For fire and earth are present (*enesti*) potentially in flesh and wood and each thing of that sort, since they are observably separated out from them. But neither flesh nor wood is present in fire, either potentially or actually, since [if they were] they would be separated out from [*25*] it. Similarly, even if there were only one such [element], they would still not be present in it; for if [the element] will be flesh or bone or anything else like that, we would not even then {507} have to say that they were potentially present in it. Rather, the manner of their coming-to-be has to be considered.

Anaxagoras’s theory of the elements is opposed to that of Empedocles. The latter says that fire and earth and the others in that group [*30*] are the elements of bodies and that everything else is compounded out of them. But Anaxagoras says the contrary—for him the elements are uniform[5] things (I mean, for example, flesh and bone and all [*302b*] such things). Air and fire, on the other hand, are mixtures of these and of all the rest of the [things he calls] ‘seeds’—each of them is an aggregate of all the uniform things that are invisible [in the aggregate]. For that reason [he holds that] everything comes-to-be from them (he calls fire and ether [*5*] the same thing).

Since every natural body has its own proper movement, and some movements are simple and some are mixed, and mixed movements are of mixed bodies, and simple movements are of simple bodies, it is obvious that there will be some simple bodies, since there are also simple movements. Therefore it is clear both that there are elements and why there are.

III.4

[*10*] The next issue we have to look into is whether [the elements] are finite or infinite in number, and if they are finite, what their number is. First, we must realize that they are not infinite, as some have thought. We will begin with the view of those who, like Anaxagoras, make all of the uniform things elements. No one who holds this opinion [*15*] has a correct grasp of what an element is. For we observe many mixed bodies being divided into uniform things, I mean, such things as flesh, bone, wood, and stone. So since a compound cannot be an element, not every uniform thing will be an element, but only those that are indivisible into things of another kind, as we said [*20*] earlier.[6]

Further, it was not necessary for those who understood elements in this way to make them infinite. For all the same results follow if their number were taken to be finite—even if there were only two or three of them, as Empedocles proposed. And even granting their assumption [that there are infinitely many elements] not everything would be made [*25*] out of uniform parts. After all, they don't try to make a face out of faces, or any other such naturally configured thing [out of uniform parts that are like the whole]. And so it is obvious that it would be much better to make the starting-points limited, indeed as few as possible as long all the same results can be established. This is just what mathematicians deem to be appropriate; the starting-points [*30*] they assume are always limited either in kind or in number.

Furthermore, if bodies are said to be distinguished from one another by their own proper differentiae, and the differentiae of bodies are finite (they differ [*303a*] in their perceptible properties, which are finite—although this needs to be proved), it is obvious that the elements must also be finite.

But the alternative theory of people like Leucippus and Democritus of Abdera does not have reasonable [*5*] consequences either. For they say that the primary magnitudes[7] are infinite in number and indivisible in magnitude, and that coming-to-be is neither 'many out of one' nor 'one out of many', but rather that everything is produced by the combination and collision of these [primary bodies]. In a way they treat all beings as numbers, or as made out of numbers; even if [*10*] they do not set their view forth clearly, this is nevertheless what they mean.

In addition, since they say that the bodies differ in shape, and that there are infinitely many shapes, there will also be infinitely many simple bodies. But they never give any further delineation of what the various shapes of the elements are, or what these shapes are like. All they do is to assign the sphere to fire; they distinguish air and [*15*] water and the rest by their largeness or smallness, {508} as if it were their nature to be the 'seed-mixture' (*panspermia*) of all of the elements.

First of all, they fall into the same error that the others do of not grasping that the starting-points are finite in number, even though that would have left the rest of what they say intact. Further, if the differentiae of the shapes are not infinite, it is clear that [*20*] there will not be infinitely many elements.[8]

In addition to this, the 'indivisible bodies' (*atoma sōmata*) that they propose cannot help but conflict with mathematics, and do away with many of the reputable beliefs and observations of sense-perception, as we have discussed earlier in our treatment of time and movement.[9] And at the same time they are forced to contradict [*25*] themselves, since if the elements are indivisible, fire and air and water cannot be differentiated by largeness and smallness. Nor can they come-to-be from one another, since the large bodies that are always involved in the process of being separated out, on their account of the way water and air and earth come-to-be from one another, would eventually be used up.

Further, not even on their own [*30*] assumptions does it appear that the elements would have to be infinite, since bodies differ in shape, and the shapes are all constructed out of pyramids, rectilinear things out of rectilinear [pyramids], and [*303b*] spherical ones out of eight [pyramid-shaped] parts. For there have to be starting-points of the shapes, and

therefore whether those are one, or two, or more, the simple bodies will be the same in number.

And finally, since each of the elements has its own proper movement, [*5*] and the movement of the simple bodies is simple, and there are not infinitely many simple movements (because the simple movements are not more than two and the places are not infinite), there are not infinitely many elements.

III.5

Since the elements must be finite in number, it remains for us to investigate [*10*] whether there are many of them or only one. Among those who have thought that there is only one, some think it is water, some that it is air, some that it is fire, some that it is finer-grained than water but denser than air, and they say that, being infinite, it surrounds all the heavens.

As for those who make this one thing their element—whether it is water, or air, or something finer-grained than water but [*15*] denser than air—and say that everything else comes-to-be from this by rarefaction and condensation, they fail to see that they are making something else prior to their element. For coming-to-be, they say, is a combining of elements or a dissolution into elements, so whatever is composed of finer particles must be naturally prior. Well, since [*20*] they say that fire is the finest-grained of all bodies, fire would have to be naturally prior. It makes no difference [if it is not fire]; for then it would have to be one of the others that is primary, and not some intermediate.

Moreover, density and rarity are no different from fineness and coarseness as explanations of generation (*gennan*). For by ‘rare’ they mean fine-grained, and by [*25*] ‘dense’ they mean coarse. But fineness and coarseness really amount to largeness and smallness; for what is composed of small parts is fine-grained, and what is composed of large parts is coarse. What is spread out over a large area is fine-grained, and what is composed of small parts is spread out in that way, so it follows that the substance of other things is determined by the largeness or smallness [*30*] of their parts. So those who differentiate them in this way end up speaking of them in relative terms, and one thing will not be simply fire and another air, but the same thing will be [*304a*] fire relative to one thing and air relative to another. Exactly the same consequence confronts those who say that the elements

are many, but that they differ in largeness and smallness. Each [element] will be distinguished from the others quantitatively, so there will be some ratio (*logos*) of its size in relation to the sizes of the others. Therefore it follows that whatever things stand in such [*5*] a ratio in relation to one another will be air, fire, earth, and water, {509} since the ratios of the smaller ones are present in the larger ones.

Those who postulate fire as the [only] element escape this difficulty, but must still entangle themselves in illogical consequences. Some of them attach a certain shape [*10*] to fire, as in the case of those who make it a pyramid.[10] (Of these, some give a rather simplistic account: the pyramid is the most piercing of shapes, as fire is the most piercing of bodies. Others offer a more sophisticated line of reasoning, proposing that all bodies are composed of very fine particles, and the solid [*15*] shapes are composed of pyramids; and since fire is the finest-grained of bodies, and the pyramid the finest grained and primary of shapes—the primary shape of the primary body—fire would therefore be a pyramid.) On the other hand, some of them attach no particular shape [to fire], but only make it the body with the finest parts, [*20*] since they say that everything else comes-to-be from a combination of [those parts], rather like the blowing together of dust.

Both of these views run into the same difficulty: if they make the primary body indivisible, the aforementioned arguments will once again undermine that assumption. Further, this line of reasoning will not be offered [*25*] by anyone who wants to speculate naturalistically (*phusikōs*). For if every body is comparable in size to every other body, and the size of one uniform body relative to another is proportional to the relative sizes of their elements (for example, the size of all the water relative to that of all the air is proportional to the size of the element of air relative to that of the element of water, and similarly for the rest), [*30*] and if there is more air than water, and in general more of what has fine particles than there is of what has coarse ones, it is obvious that the element of water will be smaller than that of air. Well, then, if the smaller magnitude is contained in the larger one, then the element of air would be [*304b*] divisible. Similarly with the element of fire and in general with the ones made of finer particles.

On the other hand, if the primary body is divisible, then (1) those who give fire a certain shape will end up with the consequence that (a) there is a

part of fire that is not fire, since a pyramid is not composed of pyramids, and (b) it will no longer be the case that [*5*] every body is either an element or made out of elements, since there will be a part of fire that is neither fire nor any other element. On the other hand, (2) those who make size the differentiating factor will find that there is some element that is prior to *their* element, and that this will go on *ad infinitum*, assuming that every body is divisible and that whatever has the finest parts is the element. And these people will also have to [*10*] say that the same thing is both fire in relation to one thing and air in relation to another, and likewise for water and earth.

The common mistake made by all of those who postulate a single element is to provide only one natural movement, the same one for all things. For we observe that every natural body has a source (*archē*) of movement, and so if all bodies [*15*] are some one thing, then there would be just one movement for all of them. And necessarily the more there is of this [source], the more movement there will be, as is the case with fire—the more there is of it, the faster it moves upward with its own proper movement. But in fact many things move swiftly downward. For these reasons, therefore, and because of our earlier [*20*] determination that there are many natural movements, it is clear that there cannot be only one element. So since the elements are neither one nor infinite in number, there must necessarily be a finite plurality of them.

III.6

The first thing we must consider is whether the elements are eternal, or whether they come-to-be and cease-to-be. Once this has been established, it will be evident both [*25*] how many there are and what they are like.

It is impossible for them to be eternal. For we observe fire and water and each of the simple bodies being destroyed. But this destruction must either come to an end or go on *ad infinitum*. If it goes on *ad infinitum*, the time this destruction takes will also be infinite, and so will that of its being put together again—for [*30*] each thing that is {510} destroyed at a given time is subsequently recombined from its constituents. It would therefore follow that there is another infinite time beyond the first infinite time, since the time of recombination is infinite and is preceded by an earlier [infinite] time

of destruction. And therefore there would be an infinity beyond infinity, [*305a*] and that is impossible.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the destruction stops somewhere. Either there will be an indivisible body at which the process of destruction comes to an end, or it will end in a body that is divisible but never divided, as Empedocles seems to have meant. Well, it will not be indivisible, for the reasons we gave [*5*] earlier; but neither will it be divisible but never divided. For a smaller body is more easily destroyed than a larger one. And thus if a larger body is destroyed by this kind of process and dissolved into smaller parts, it is even more likely for this to happen to a smaller one.

There are two ways in which we observe fire [*10*] ceasing-to-be: it may cease-to-be either by being quenched by a contrary, or by dying out on its own. A smaller amount is acted on by a greater, and the smaller it is, the faster it happens. The elements of bodies must therefore be capable of being destroyed and of being generated.

Since they are capable of being generated, their coming-to-be will be either from something incorporeal or from a [*15*] body, and if from a body either from some body other [than an element] or from one another. Now an account of generation from something incorporeal involves a void that has been separated [from body]. For everything that comes-to-be comes-to-be *in* something, and the thing in which the coming-to-be occurs will either be incorporeal or will have a body. If it has a body, there will be two bodies in the same place simultaneously—the one [*20*] that has come-to-be, and the one that was pre-existent. If it is incorporeal, there must be a separate void —and that is impossible, as was proved earlier.[11] But neither is there any body from which the elements could possibly come-to-be. For in that case it would follow that there is another body that is prior to the elements. If this body has weight or lightness, [*25*] it will be one of the elements; but if it has no tendency to move it will be immovable, i.e., mathematical. But as such it will not be in a place. If it rests in a place, it will still be possible for it to move in that place. If it is forced, [it will move] naturally, and if not forced, unnaturally. So if it is in a place, somewhere, it will be one of the elements. But if it is not in a place, nothing [*30*] will be [generable] from it, for what comes-to-be and what it comes-to-be from must be together. So since [the elements] cannot come-to-be either from something incorporeal or from

some body other [than an element], the only remaining possibility is that they come-to-be from one another.

1. See *Ph.* II.1 192b20.
2. In *Cael.* I.1.
3. Literally, ‘hereabouts’ (*entautha*). Aristotle commonly uses this term to refer to that part of the natural world that is on or near the surface of the earth, the so-called ‘sublunary realm’.
4. Aristotle typically uses ‘here’ (*deuro*) to refer to the sensible objects in the sublunary realm.
5. On ‘uniform things’ (*homoiomerē*) see *GC* I.1 314a24–b1 and *Mete*. IV.12 389b25.
6. 302a18.
7. Although Aristotle here calls them ‘magnitudes’ (*megethē*), it is clear that he has in mind what he describes below at 303a12 as ‘simple bodies’ (*hapla sōmata*) and at a21 as ‘indivisible bodies’ (*atoma sōmata*). It is the bodies (atoms), and not their sizes, that Democritus held to be infinite in number.
8. Aristotle means that there will not be infinitely many *kinds* or *shapes* of atoms; he has given no reason to think that there cannot be infinitely many individual atoms of only a finite number of shapes.
9. *Ph.* VI.1–2.
10. It is unclear which monist identified fire with the pyramidal shape. But Plato (who was not a monist) did say that particles of fire were pyramids (*Tim*. 55d).
11. In *Cael.* I.9.

METEOROLOGICA

Translated by S. Marc Cohen.

AS ITS NAME implies, this work is devoted primarily to a study of meteorological phenomena, such as wind, rain, lightning, and thunder, along with certain astronomical phenomena, such as comets, that Aristotle mistakenly considers to be meteorological. Book IV discusses the way in which the four elements combine in composite bodies such as metals and tissues; in the final chapter, presented here,

Aristotle brings out the role of function in the accounts of even the four elements.

{511} Book IV

IV.12

[*389b23*] Let us now discuss in particular what flesh is, and bone, and the rest of the uniform[1] [*25*] parts. For it is by attending to the coming-to-be of the uniform parts that we grasp the elements of which they are naturally constituted, the genera under which they fall, and the particular genus of each one. Uniform parts are made up of the elements, and themselves serve as the matter for all the products of nature.

The aforementioned elements are the matter of which all these parts are composed, but their essence is in their form. That this is so is always [*30*] clearer in the more developed products and in general in those things that are like instruments, i.e., are *for* something. It is clearer, for example, that a corpse is a human being only homonymously. So, too, a hand of a dead person [*390a*] is called a hand only homonymously, in just the way that stone flutes might still be called flutes; for these also seem to be instruments of a kind. But that this is so is less clear in the case of flesh and bone, and less clear still in the case of fire and water. The reason is that being *for* something is least clear where [*5*] matter dominates. It's like this: if you take the extremes, matter is nothing other than matter, and essence nothing other than form, but each intermediate thing is proportional to the nearer extreme. Every one of these is *for* something, and is not water or fire or flesh or viscera in every condition in which it may occur. This is even [*10*] more so with a face or a hand. They are all defined by their function. The capacity to perform its function constitutes what each of them truly is. For example, an eye is an eye if it can see, but when it is incapable of doing this it is an eye only homonymously, like one that is dead or made of stone. Nor is a wooden saw really a saw any more than one in a picture. It is the same, moreover, with flesh as well, but [*15*] its function is less clear than that of the tongue. It is similar with fire, too, although its function is perhaps even less clear in nature than that of flesh. It is similar, too, with the parts of plants and with inanimate things, like bronze and silver. They are all what they are in virtue of some capacity to act or to be acted upon, just like flesh

and sinew. But their [*20*] definitions cannot be given exactly, so that it is not easy to discern when they are present and when they are not unless their capacities are so thoroughly weakened that only their shapes remain. For example, the bodies of ancient corpses suddenly become ashes in their graves, and extremely old fruit retains only its [*390b*] shape but not its perceptible qualities. So, too, with solids formed from milk.

Parts such as these—I mean such uniform parts as flesh, bone, hair, sinew, and the like—can be generated by heat and cold and the motions they produce [*5*] as the parts are solidified by the hot and the cold. They are all differentiated by the differentiae mentioned above—tension, attraction, pulverization, hardness, softness, and the rest—all of which are produced by the hot and the cold and the [*10*] combination of their motions. But no one would suppose this to be true of the non-uniform parts that are composed of these, like a head or a hand or a foot. In just the same way, although cold and heat and their motion cause the coming-to-be of bronze and silver, they do not cause the coming-to-be of a saw or a bowl or a box. In these cases the cause is a craft, while in the case of the non-uniform parts it is nature or some other cause.

Now that we grasp which genus each of the [*15*] uniform parts falls under, we must take on the question of what each of them is, for example, what blood is, or flesh or semen or any of the others. For we know what each thing is and why it is when we grasp either the matter or the form involved in its coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, but especially when we have both, and also know what the source of its [*20*] movement is. After the uniform parts have been clarified we must similarly study the non-uniform ones, and finally the compounds made up of the latter, such as humans, plants, and other such things.

1. In Aristotle's terminology, flesh and bone are 'uniform parts' (or 'homoiomeries', *homoiomerē*, lit. 'like-parted') in the sense that flesh can be divided into parts that are themselves flesh. A face, on the other hand, is a non-uniform part, since no part of a face is itself a face. See also *GC* I.1 314a19.

{512} De Anima

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

THE SUBJECT MATTER of this work is psychology, the study of the soul. (The title means “On the Soul.”) For Aristotle this study is a part of biology; he identifies the soul with the form of a living thing. In the excerpts presented here, he sets out the problems he wishes to solve and indicates why the subject is so difficult (I.1), and considers whether the soul is susceptible to change (I.4). He goes on to propose his own definition of the soul (II.1–2) and to describe a hierarchy of souls (II.3–4). The remainder of Book II contains his theory of perception; Book III considers the characteristic activity of the highest level of soul: thinking.

Book I

I.1

[*402a*] We take knowing to be a noble and an estimable thing, and one sort more so than another, either in virtue of its exactness or by being about better and more wondrous things. On both these grounds we may quite reasonably place the study of soul in the first rank. It would seem, too, that to truth as a whole, knowledge of the soul makes a great contribution, [*5*] especially with respect to nature, since the soul is as it were the starting-point of living things. And we are inquiring to get a theoretical grasp on and to know both the nature of the soul and its substance, and then on all the coincidents belonging to it—some of which seem to be special attributes of the soul, whereas others seem to belong because of it to living things as well. But in every way and altogether [*10*] it is most difficult to attain any plausible belief concerning it. For, since the inquiry is also common to many other things, I mean the one about the substance and the what-it-is, it might perhaps seem that a single method of inquiry is appropriate where all the things whose substance we wish to know are concerned, just as there is in fact demonstration of the coincidental special attributes, so that we should inquire [using] this [*15*] method of inquiry. If, however, there is no single and common method of inquiry concerning the what-it-is, our undertaking will be yet more difficult, since it will be necessary in each case to find out what the way [to inquire] is. But even if it is evident that it is demonstration or division or some other method of inquiry, there will still be much [*20*] puzzlement and much variability as to what to base our inquiry on. For different things—for example, numbers and planes—have different starting-points.

[P1] First of all, presumably, it is necessary to determine in which of the genera the soul belongs and what it is—I mean whether it is a this something and a substance or a quality, or a quantity or in some other of the categories that have been distinguished. [P2] Further, whether [*25*] it is one of those potential beings or whether it is rather a sort of actuality. For this makes no small difference. [P3] Also, we must investigate whether it has parts or is partless, and [P4] whether [*402b*] all souls are of the same form, and [P5] if not, whether they differ in species or in genus. For, as things

stand, people who speak and inquire about the soul would seem to investigate the human soul alone. [P6] And we must be careful not to neglect to consider whether there is one account of the soul, as of animal, or whether there is a different account [*5*] of each (for example, of horse, dog, human, god)—animal, the universal, being either nothing or posterior. And similarly if there is any other common thing predicated.

[P7] Further, if there are not many [sorts of] souls but rather [one sort of soul with] many parts, should we inquire into the whole soul or its parts? Again, it is difficult [*10*] to determine which of these parts are naturally distinct from each other, and whether we should inquire into the parts first {513} or their functions—for example, understanding or *the* understanding, perceiving or the perceptual part, and similarly in the other cases. [P8] And if the functions come first, again a puzzle might be raised about whether we should inquire into the corresponding objects before these—for example, [*15*] the perceptible object before the part that can perceive, and the intelligible object before the understanding [part].

It seems, though, that the knowledge of the what-it-is is not only useful for getting a theoretical grasp on the causes of the coincidents connected to the substances (as in mathematics knowing what the straight is and what the curved is, or what a line is and what a plane is, is useful for seeing how many right angles the angles [*20*] are equal to), but also, conversely, knowing these coincidents contributes in great part to knowing the what-it-is. For when we can give an account of the way either all or most of these coincidents appear to be, we will then be able to speak best about the substance. For the starting-point of all demonstration is [*25*] what-it-is, so that insofar as definitions [of it] do not lead us to know the coincidents, or fail even to facilitate a likely conjecture about [how to demonstrate] them, [*403a*] it is clear that they have all been stated in a dialectical and empty way.

[P9] There is a puzzle too about the attributes of the soul, as to whether they are all also shared by what has the soul or whether there is also some attribute that is special to the soul itself. For it is necessary to attain [a resolution of] this, but it is not easy. It appears that [*5*] in most cases, though, the soul is neither affected nor does it act without the body—for example, being angry, being confident, having an appetite for things, perceiving in general—whereas understanding seems to be most of all

special to the soul. Yet if it too is a sort of imagination, or does not exist without imagination, it would not be possible even for it to exist without a body.

If, then, some function or [*10*] affection of the soul is special to it, it will be possible for it to be separated. On the other hand, if there is nothing special to it, it will not be separable, but will be like the straight, to which, insofar as it is straight, many coincidents belong—for example, it will touch a bronze sphere at a point, although, if separated, the straight will not touch it in this way. In fact, it is inseparable, since it always involves some body. [*15*]

So, too, the attributes of the soul—spiritedness, mild-manneredness, fear, pity, confidence, and, further, joy, loving, and hating—would all seem to involve the body, since at the same time as these the body is affected in a certain way. This is evidenced by the fact that sometimes, though strong and vivid affections take place in us, we are not provoked or [*20*] frightened, whereas at other times we are moved by small and faint ones, as when the body is aroused (*orga[i]*) and its condition is like when someone is angry (*orgizatai*). It is yet more evident that this is so. For sometimes, though nothing frightening is occurring, people may come to have the affections of a frightened person.

If this is so, however, it is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts.[1] So their definitions [*25*] will be of this sort, for example: ‘Being angry is a sort of movement of such-and-such a sort of body, or of a part or a capacity, as a result of something for the sake of something’. And this is why it already belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp on the soul, either all soul or this sort of soul.

But a natural scientist and a dialectician would define each of these differently—for example, what anger is. For a dialectician it is a desire for retaliation [*30*] or something like that, whereas for a natural scientist it is a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart. Of these, the scientist gives the matter, whereas the dialectician gives the [*403b*] form and the account. For this is the account of the thing, although it must be in matter of such-and-such a sort if it is to exist. And so of a house the account is this, that it is a shelter to prevent destruction by winds, rain, and heat. But one person will say that it is stones, [*5*] bricks, and timbers, and another that it is

the form in them for the sake of these other things. Which of these people, then, is the natural scientist? Is it the one concerned with the matter but ignorant of the account, or the one concerned with the account alone? Or is it rather the one concerned with {514} what is composed of both? Who, then, is each of the others? Or isn't it that there is no one who is concerned with the attributes of the matter that are not separable and insofar as they are they are not separable? And [*10*] isn't it, rather, the natural scientist who is concerned with everything that is a function or attribute of this sort of body and this sort of matter? And isn't anything not of this sort the concern of someone else, in some cases a craftsman, if there happens to be one, such as a builder or a doctor? And aren't those things that are not actually separable, but are considered insofar as they are not attributes of this sort of body and in abstraction from it, the concern of the mathematician? And insofar as they are actually separable, [*15*] that of the primary philosopher?[2]

But let us return to where our account began. We were saying that the attributes of the soul are—at any rate, insofar as they are like spiritedness and fear—inseparable in this way from the natural matter of the living things to which they belong, and not [separable] in the way that line and plane are.

I.2

In our investigation concerning the soul it is necessary to go though the puzzles [*20*] from which we must become free as we proceed and at the same time to collect the beliefs of those of our predecessors who had declared any views on the subject, so that we may take what is correct in what they say, and, if anything is incorrect, guard against it. The starting-point of our inquiry is to set out the attributes that seem most of all to belong by nature to the soul. What is animate, [*25*] then, seems to differ from what is inanimate most of all in two regards—movement and also perception. And these are pretty much the two characteristics of soul that are handed down to us by our predecessors. For some say that that most of all and primarily the soul is a mover. And thinking that what was not itself in movement could not possibly move something else, [*30*] they took the soul to be a thing that is in movement.

I.4

[*408a34*] . . . We might more reasonably raise a puzzle about whether the soul is in movement, though, by looking to the following considerations. For we say that the soul [*408b*] is pained, enjoying, feeling confident, feeling afraid, and, further, feeling angry and also perceiving and thinking. And all of these seem to be movements. Hence we might think that the soul itself is being moved. But this is not necessarily so. For even if we grant that being pained [*5*] or enjoying or thinking are in the highest degree movements, and that each is a case of something's being moved, but that its being moved is due to the soul, as being angry or being afraid is the heart being moved in this way, and as thinking is presumably this or something else being moved, and these come about in some cases by the movement of certain things with respect to place and in others [*10*] by their alteration (which ones and in what way is another story)—still, even then, to say that the soul is feeling angry is like saying that the soul is weaving a web or building a house. For presumably it is better not say that the soul is feeling pity or learning or thinking, but rather that the human being is doing so by means of his soul. And this not because the movement is in the soul, [*15*] but because sometimes it reaches as far as the soul, and sometimes begins from it—for example, perception begins from particular things, while recollection begins from the soul and extends to the movements or the traces in the perceptual organs.

The understanding, on the other hand, seems to be born in us as a sort of substance, and not to pass away. For if it could pass away it would most of all be due to the feebleness of old age, whereas, as things stand, it is like what happens in the case of [*20*] the perceptual organs. For if an old man could get such-and-such a sort of eye, he would see as well as even a young one. So old age is not due to the soul's being affected in a certain way but, rather, what the soul is in, as in the case of drunkenness and disease. And in particular understanding and contemplating are extinguished because something else within passes away, but the understanding itself is unaffectable. But thinking [*25*] and loving or hating are not affections of the understanding but of what has it, insofar as it has it. That is why when that passes away it neither remembers nor loves. For they were not affections of it, but of what is {515} common, which has passed away. But the understanding is presumably something divine and is unaffectable.

Book II

II.1

[*412a3*] So much, then, for the views handed down by our predecessors concerning the soul. Let us go back again and start afresh, as it were, and try [*5*] to determine what the soul is and what would be the most comprehensive account of it.

We say, then, that one kind (*genos*) among the beings is the substance, and of this, one sort is as matter, which is intrinsically not a this something, and another is shape and form, on the basis of which something is already said to be a this something, and a third, the compound of these. And matter is potentiality, whereas form is actuality—and this in two ways, as scientific knowledge is [*10*] and as contemplating is.

It is bodies that most of all seem to be substances, and among these, the natural ones. For these are starting-points for the others. Of natural bodies, some have life, while some do not have it. And by life we mean self-nourishment, growth, and decay. So every natural body that participates in life will be a substance, [*15*] but a substance as a composite is. But since it is also a body of such-and-such a sort, for it has life, it will not be a body. For the body is not among the things that are predicated of an underlying subject, but is rather as an underlying subject is and matter.

It is necessary, then, for the soul to be substance, as form, of a natural body that has life potentially. [*20*] But substance is actuality. Therefore, it is the actuality of such a body. But something is said to be actual in two ways, either as scientific knowledge is or as contemplating is. And it is evident that it is as scientific knowledge is. For both sleep and waking depend on the presence of the soul; waking is analogous to contemplating, and sleep to [*25*] having but not exercising [scientific-knowledge]; and in the same individual scientific knowledge is prior in coming-to-be. That is why the soul is the first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially.

One that is instrumental will be a body of this sort. For even the parts of plants are instruments, although extremely [*412b*] simple ones—for example, the leaf is a covering for the pod and the pod for the fruit, and the roots are an analog of the mouth, since both take in nourishment.

If, then, we must state something that is common to every soul, [*5*] it must be that it is the first actuality of a natural instrumental body. That is why there is no need to inquire whether the soul and the body are one, any more than the wax and the shape, or, in general, the matter of a given thing and that of which it is the matter. For, since the one and being are said in many ways, the most controlling is actuality.

It has now been said in universal terms what the soul is. For in accord with its account it is substance. [*10*] And this is the essence of such-and-such a sort of body. It is exactly like this: if an instrument—for example, an axe—were a natural body, its substance would be the being for the axe, and this would be its soul. And if this were separated from it, it would not still be an axe, except homonymously. As things stand, though, it is an axe. For it is not of this sort of body that the [*15*] essence and the account is the soul, but of a certain sort of natural body that has a starting-point of movement and rest within it.

We must get a theoretical grasp on how what has been said applies also in the case of the parts [of the body]. For if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. For that is the substance of an eye, the one in accord with the account. And the eye is matter for sight, and if this fails, [*20*] it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, like an eye in stone or in a picture. We must now apply what holds in the case of the part to the whole living body. For as the part is in relation to the part, so analogously is the whole of perception to the whole perceptive body, insofar as it is such. For it is not what has lost [*25*] its soul that is potentially such as to live, but what has it. The seed and the fruit are potentially bodies of this sort.

As, then, are cutting and seeing, so too is being awake an actuality, and as are sight and the capacity of the instrument, so is the soul, [*413a*] whereas the body is what is potentially [alive]. But just as the eye-jelly and sight are an eye, so in this case the soul and the body are an animal.

Hence that the soul is not separable from the body—or that certain parts of it are not, if it is {516} by nature divisible—is quite clear. For of some parts [*5*] the actuality is of the parts themselves. But nothing prevents some of them, at any rate, from being separable, because of being the actualities of no body. Further, it is unclear whether the soul is the actuality of the body in this way or in the way that the sailor is of the ship.

So much, then, by way of making determinations in outline and [*10*] giving a sketch of the soul.

II.2

Since it is from what is imperspicuous but more evident that what is perspicuous and what is in accord with its account more knowable come about, we must in this way try again to approach the soul. For the defining account must not only make clear 'the that,' which is what most definitions state, but must also include the cause and make it evident. [*15*] As things stand, though, definitional accounts are like conclusions. For example, What is squaring? Making an equilateral rectangle equal to one that is not equilateral. But such a definition is an account of the conclusion, whereas the one that says that squaring is the finding of the mean proportional states the cause of the thing.[3]

We say, then, to make a start [*20*] to the inquiry, that what has soul is distinguished from what lacks soul by life. But things are said to be living in many ways, and we say that a thing is alive if any one of these alone is present, for example, understanding, perception, movement and rest with respect to place, further the movement involved in nourishment, and also both withering and growth. That is why all plants, too, [*25*] seem to be alive. For they evidently have within themselves a capacity and starting-point of this sort, because of which they come to grow and decay in contrary directions. For they do not grow upward without growing downward, but grow in both directions alike, indeed in all directions, if they are constantly nourished, and so they continue to live for as long as they are capable of taking [*30*] nourishment. This [sort of life] can be separated from the others, but the others cannot be separated from it, in the case of the mortal ones. This is evident in the case of plants, since they have no other capacity of soul.

It is due of this starting-point, then, that life belongs to [*413b*] living things, whereas being an animal is due primarily to perception. For even what does not move or change its place, but which does have perception, is said to be an animal and not just a living thing. Now the primary sort of perception that belongs to all animals is touch. And just as the nutritive can

be separated [*5*] from touch and all perception, in the same way touch can be separated from the other perceptual capacities.

The nutritive, we say, is that part of the soul in which even plants share, whereas all animals evidently have the perceptual capacity of touch. The cause due to which each of these circumstances obtains, we shall state later. [*10*] For now, though, let this much alone be stated: the soul is the starting-point of the things we mentioned and is defined by these, namely, by nutrition, perception, thought, and movement.

But is each of these a soul or a part of a soul, and if a part, is it separable only in account or also in place? Where some of them are concerned the answer is not difficult [*15*] to see, whereas others involve puzzlement. For, just as in the case of plants some evidently live when divided and [the parts] are separated from each other, as if the soul in them were actually one in each plant, but potentially many, in the same way we see this happening, where other differentiae of the soul are concerned, in the case of insects when they are [*20*] cut in two. For not only does each part have perception and movement with respect {517} to place—and if perception, then imagination and desire as well. For where there is perception, there is also both pain and pleasure—and where these, of necessity appetite too. Where the understanding is concerned, on the other hand, and the contemplative capacity, nothing is yet evident, but it seems [*25*] to be a different kind (*genos*) of soul, and it alone admits of being separated, as what is eternal does from what is capable of passing away.

It is evident from the foregoing considerations, however, that the remaining parts of the soul are not separable, as some people claim. But that they are distinct in account is evident. For the perceptual part and the believing part are distinct, if indeed perceiving [*30*] and believing are, and similarly for each of the other parts we mentioned.

Further, in some animals all of these belong, in some, some of them, and in others one only, and this will produce differentiation among the animals. What the cause is, we must investigate later. [*414a*] The situation is somewhat similar with the [different sorts of] perception. For some animals have them all, others some, others only the one that is most necessary, namely, touch.

But whereas something is said to be that by which we live or that by which we perceive in two ways, as is that by which we know scientifically

(for in one way this is scientific knowledge, [*5*] in another it is the soul, since we say that we know scientifically by each of these), and similarly we are healthy on the one hand by health and on the other by a part or even by the whole of the body, and whereas of these scientific knowledge and health are shape and a sort of form or account, and as it were activity of the recipient, in the one case of what is receptive of scientific knowledge or receptive of health [*10*] (for the activity of those things that are capable of acting on something seem to occur in that which is affected and suitably disposed), and since the soul is that by which we primarily live, perceive, and think, the result is that it will be an account and a form, and not matter and the underlying subject. For something is said to be a substance, as we mentioned, in three ways, as form, [*15*] as matter, and as the compound of both. And of these, the matter is potentiality, the form is actuality. And since the compound of the two is an animate thing, the body is not the actuality of the soul, but rather the soul is the actuality of a certain sort of body.

And that is why those people take things correctly who believe that the soul neither exists without a body nor is a body of some sort. For it is not a body, [*20*] but it belongs to a body, and for this reason is present in a body, and in a body of such-and-such a sort, rather than as our predecessors supposed, whey they inserted it into a body without first determining in which and in what sort, even though it appears that not just any random thing is receptive of any random thing. In our way of looking at it, by contrast, it comes about quite reasonably. For the actuality of each thing [*25*] naturally comes about in what it already belongs to potentially, that is, the appropriate matter.

That the soul, then, is a certain sort of actuality and account of what has the potentiality to be of this sort.

II.3

Of the capacities of the soul we mentioned, some living things have all of them, as we said, others some of them, [*30*] and some only one. The capacities we mentioned were for nutrition, perception, desiring, movement with respect to place, and thought. To plants only the nutritive part belongs, whereas to others it belongs together with the perceptual part. But if the perceptual belongs, then so does the desiring one. [*414b*] For desire comprises appetite, spirit, and wish; all animals have at least one sort of

perception, namely, touch; but for what has perception there is also pleasure and pain and the pleasant as well as the painful; and where there are these, there is also appetite, [*5*] since it is a desire for the pleasant.

Further, animals have a perception of what is nourishing, since touch is a perception of what is nourishing. For all animals are nourished by dry, hot, wet, and cold things, the perception of which is touch, and of other perceptible objects coincidentally. For neither sound nor color [*10*] nor odor contribute anything to nourishment, whereas flavor is one of the objects of touch. Hunger and thirst are appetite, hunger being for dry and hot, {518} thirst for moist and cold. Flavor is a sort of seasoning of these. We must speak perspicuously about these matters later on. For now, though, let us state this much: those living things that have touch also have desire. [*15*] But where imagination is concerned, it is unclear, and must be investigated later on.

Some have in addition to these the part capable of causing movement with respect to place, while others also have the thinking part and also understanding (*nous*)—for example, human beings and anything else there may be that is similar or more estimable.

It is clear, then, that there will be a single account of soul in the same way as there is of [*20*] figure. For in the latter case there is no figure beyond the triangle and the others that are next in order, and in the former there is no soul beyond the ones we mentioned. Even in the case of the figures, though, we could produce a common account, which would fit them all and be special to no figure. Likewise too in the case of the souls we mentioned. That is why it is ridiculous to inquire after a common account both [*25*] in these cases and in others, when it is an account that will not be special to any being, and will not accord with its proper indivisible species, to the neglect of the one that is of this sort.

For the situation as regards the soul is quite similar to the one where the figures are concerned. For what is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order, both in the case of the figures and in the case of the animate things—for [*30*] example, the triangle in the quadrilateral, and the nutritive part in the perceptual one. So we must inquire as regards each given case what the soul of each given one is—for example, what that of a plant is and that of a human or a beast.

And what the cause is due to which they have this order must be investigated. For without the nutritive part [*415a*] there is no perceptual one, though the nutritive is separated from the perceptual one in the case of plants. Again, without touch none of the other sorts of perception is present, but touch is present without the others. For many animals have neither sight nor hearing [*5*] nor perception of odor. And of the ones that can perceive, some have the part capable of causing movement with respect to place, whereas others do not. Finally, and most rarely, they have rational calculation and thought. For among the ones capable of passing away, those that have rational calculation also have all the rest, whereas of those that have each of the others not all have rational calculation, on the contrary, some [*10*] do not even have imagination, whereas others live by this alone. And concerning the theoretical understanding a distinct account is required.

It is clear, then, that the account concerned with each of these parts is the most appropriate where a soul too is concerned.

II.4

Anyone who is going to make an investigation into these parts must grasp what each of them is, and thus must inquire about the things that follow, [*15*] and about the others.[4] But if we have to say what each of them is—for example, what the understanding part is, or the perceptual, or the nutritive, we must further first say what understanding is and what perceiving is. For activities and actions are prior in account to capacities. And if that is so, and further, if prior to them, we must get a theoretical grasp on the corresponding objects, [*20*] then we must, due to same cause, make some determinations about these—for example, about nourishment and perceptible and intelligible objects.

And so we must first speak about nourishment and generation. For the nutritive soul belongs to the others as well [as to plants], and it is the first and most common capacity of soul, in virtue of which life belongs to every one. Its [*25*] functions are generation and the making use of nourishment. For it is the most natural function in those living things that are complete and not disabled or spontaneously generated, to produce another like itself —an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant—in order that they may partake in the eternal and divine insofar as they can. For all desire that, and

it is for the sake of it that they do [*415b*] {519} whatever they do by nature. (The for-the-sake-of-which, though, is twofold—the purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom.) Since, then, they cannot share in what is eternal and divine by continuous existence, because nothing that admits of passing away can persist as the same and numerically one, they share in them insofar as each can, [*5*] some more and some less. And what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in form.

The soul of the living body is its cause and starting-point. But things are said to be these in many ways, and the soul is likewise a cause in three of the ways distinguished. For the soul is a cause as that from which the movement comes, as that-for-the-sake-of-which, [*10*] and as the substance of animate bodies.*

That it is so as substance is clear. For the cause of its being for everything is its substance; living is the being for living things; and the soul is cause and starting-point of this. Further, the actuality is the account of what is potentially.

It is evident that the soul is also cause as that-for-the-sake-of-which. [*15*] For just as the understanding acts for the sake of something, in the same way so does nature, and this something is its end. And the soul is naturally such in animals. For all natural bodies—those of plants just like those of animals—are instruments of the soul, since they are for the sake of the soul.* But there are two ways in which something is said to be [*20*] the for-the-sake-of-which—the purpose for which and the beneficiary for whom.

But then a soul is also that from which movement with respect to place first derives—although not all living things have this capacity. And alteration and growth also depend on the soul. For perception seems to be a sort of alteration, and nothing perceives that does not partake of soul. Similarly where growth [*25*] and withering are concerned. For nothing either decays or grows naturally without being nourished, and nothing is nourished that does not have a share in life.

Empedocles did not speak correctly, however, when he added that growth comes about for plants in a downward direction when they root themselves because earth naturally moves in that way, and in an upward direction because [*416a*] fire does likewise. For he does not grasp up and down correctly. For up and down are not the same for all things as they are for the All, but as the head is of animals, so the roots are of plants—if we are to

speak of instrumental parts as different or the same by appeal to their functions. [*5*] Besides, what is it that holds together the fire and the earth since they are moving in contrary directions? For they will be pulled apart, if there will be nothing to prevent it. But if there will be something, it is the soul—that is, the cause of growth and nourishment.

But some people think that it is the nature of fire to be the unconditional cause of nourishment and growth. For [*10*] this alone among the bodies is evidently nourished and grows. That is why we might suppose that in both plants and animals it is this that performs the function. But, though it is in a way a contributing cause, it is certainly not an unconditional cause. On the contrary, it is rather the soul that is this. For the growth of fire is unlimited, [*15*] as long as there is fuel, but there is a limit and an account of size and growth for things that are put together by nature; and these are characteristic of soul but not of fire, and of the account rather than of the matter.

Since the same capacity of the soul is nutritive and generative, we must first determine the facts about nutrition. For it is distinguished [*20*] from the other capacities by this function.

Now, nourishment seems to be of contrary by contrary—not every one by every one, however, but wherever contraries not only come-to-be from each other but also grow. For many things come-to-be from each other, but not all are quantities—for example, the healthy comes-to-be from the sick. And not even those that do grow from each other appear [*25*] to nourish each other in the same way—for example, water is nourishment for fire, whereas fire does not nourish water. It seems, then, that it is especially among the simple bodies that one nourishes and the other is nourished.

But a puzzle arises. For while some people say that like is nourished by like, just as with growth, [*30*] others, think the reverse, as we said, that it is contrary by contrary—the supposition being that like is unaffectable by like, whereas nourishment changes and gets concocted, and in every case change is into the opposite or into the intermediate. Further, the nourishment is affected by the {520} thing being nourished, but not it by the nourishment, [*35*] just as the carpenter is not affected by his material, but it by him. [*416b*] The carpenter, though, merely changes from inactivity to activity.

But whether the nourishment is the final state of the thing added or the first makes a difference here. For if both are nourishment, but one is unconcocted and the other concocted, it would be possible to speak of it as nourishment in both ways. [*5*] For insofar as the nourishment is unconcocted, contrary is nourished by contrary, whereas insofar as it is concocted, like is nourished by like. So it is evident that in a way both speak correctly and in a way incorrectly.

But since nothing is nourished that does not partake in soul, what is nourished will be the ensouled body, insofar as it is ensouled, so that nourishment is also [*10*] relative to an ensouled being—and not coincidentally so. The being for nourishment, however, is distinct from the being for a growth-producer. For it is insofar as the ensouled thing has some quantity that a growth-producer exists for it, whereas it is insofar as it is a this something and a substance that nourishment does. For the ensouled thing preserves its substance, which lasts just as long as it is nourished, and it is generative not of what is being nourished, but [*15*] of something of the same sort as what is being nourished. For its own substance already exists, and nothing generates itself, but rather preserves itself. So this sort of starting-point of the soul is a capacity of the sort that preserves what has it, insofar as it has it, whereas nourishment equips it to be active. That is why, if deprived of food it cannot exist. [*416b20a*] {But since the end is what determines [*416a23b*] what it is right to call everything, and the end is to generate something of the same sort as itself, the primary soul will be one that can generate something of the same sort as itself. [*416b25a*]}*

Seeing that there are three things, what is nourished, [*416b20b*] what it is nourished by, and what nourishes, what nourishes is the primary soul, what is nourished is the body that has it, and what it is nourished by is the nourishment. [*416b23a*] But what it is nourished by [*416b25b*] is twofold, just like what it is steered by, namely, the hand and the rudder—the one moving and being moved, the other being moved only. For all nourishment must be capable of being concocted, and what effects the concoction is heat, which is why every ensouled thing has heat.

What nourishment is has now been stated in outline. . . . [*30*]

Now that these matters have been determined, [*33*] let us speak about what is common to all perception.

Perception comes about in being moved and affected, as has been said, since it seems to be a sort of alteration. And some people say indeed that like is affected by like. [*35*] In what way this is possible or impossible, we have said in our universal [*417a*] accounts concerning affecting and being affected. A puzzle arises, though, as to why perception of the perceptual capacities themselves does not also take place, and why they do not produce perception without external objects, when present in them are fire, earth, and the other elements, of which there is perception either intrinsically or of their [*5*] coincidents.

It is clear, then, that the perceptual part is not [intrinsically] active, but only potentially so. That is why it does not perceive [without an external object], just as what is burnable does not burn all by itself without something to ignite it. For otherwise it would ignite itself, with no need of actual fire. But since we speak of perceiving in two ways (for we say of what is capable of hearing or seeing that it sees or hears, even if it happens to be asleep, and [*10*] we also say it of what is actively doing so at the time), perception, too, will be spoken of in two ways—as potential, on the one hand, and as active, on the other. Similarly, too, the perceptible object is both the potential one and the active one.

First, then, let us speak as if being affected, being moved, and being active were the same. [*15*] For, in fact, movement is a sort of activity, although an incomplete one, as has been said elsewhere. Now, everything is affected and moved [in way *F*] by an agent that is actively [*F*]. That is why in one way like is affected by like and in another by unlike, as we said. For it is the unlike that is affected, but when it has been affected it is like.

{521} [*20*] Distinctions, however, must also be drawn concerning potentiality and actuality. For now we are speaking about them in a simple way. [1] For one way that something can be a scientific knower is the way in which we would say that a human is a scientific knower because the human [species] is among the scientific knowers and the ones that have scientific knowledge. [2] Another way, is that in which we say that the person who already has grammatical knowledge is a scientific knower. [*25*] Each of these is capable, but not in the same way—the first because his genus, and his matter, is of the requisite sort, the other because he is capable

of contemplating if he so wishes, and if nothing external prevents him. [3] In a third way, there is a person who is already actively contemplating, the one who is actually and in the full sense scientifically knowing this letter A. Both of the first two, then, [*30*] are potential scientific knowers, but the one because of having been altered through learning, that is, by frequent changes from the contrary state, whereas the other, [because of having been altered] in another way [changes] from the state of having scientific knowledge of arithmetic or grammar, but not activating it, to activating it.

[*417b*] And being affected is not simple, either. On the contrary, it is [1] on the one hand a sort of destruction of something by its contrary, while [2] on the other it is rather the preservation of what is potentially [*F*] by what is actually [*F*], and which is like it in the way that a potentiality may be like an actuality. For what possesses scientific knowledge becomes an actual contemplator, [*5*] and this is not an alteration, since the progress of the thing is into itself or into actuality, or else is a distinct kind (*genos*) of alteration. That is why it is not correct to say that what exercises wisdom, when it exercises wisdom, is altered, just as it is not correct to say that the builder is altered when he builds. The bringing, then, of what understands and [*10*] exercises wisdom from doing so potentially to doing so actually should rightly be called not teaching but some other name. And a person who learns and acquires scientific knowledge, proceeding from being [a scientific knower] potentially by the agency of one who is actually [a scientific knower], should not be said to be affected,* or else we should say that there are two ways of being affected, one a change [*15*] to conditions of lack, the other to the states and the nature [of the thing].

The first change in a perceiver is brought about by the parent, and when it has been born it already has—just like scientific knowledge—perception. But something is said to be actively perceiving in the same way as something is said to be contemplating. There is the difference, though, that in perception the things productive of the activity are external, namely, what is visible, [*20*] what is audible, and similarly for the rest of the perceptible objects. The cause of this is that active perception is of particulars, whereas scientific knowledge is of universals, and these are in a way in the soul itself. That is why it is up to us to understand—but not up to us to perceive—whenever we wish, since the perceptible object must be present. [*25*] The

same holds of the sciences that deal with perceptible objects, and due to the same cause, namely, that perceptible objects are particular and external.

But about these matters there will be an opportunity to speak perspicuously later on as well. For now, though, let it be enough to have determined this much, namely, what is said to be potential is not simple, [*30*] but rather while there is what is so in the way we would say that a boy is capable of being a general, there is also what is so in the way that a man of the right age is capable of being one, and it is the same way with the perceptual part. But since there is no name for the difference between these, although it has been determined [*418a*] about them that they are distinct and in what way they are distinct, we must go on using "being affected" and "being altered" as if these terms had their standard meaning.

What can perceive is potentially such as the perceptible object already is actually, as has been said. It is affected, then, as being not like the object, but when it has been affected it is made like it, [*5*] and is such as it is.

II.6

Let us speak first about the perceptible objects of each given perceptual capacity. Things, though, are said to be perceptible objects in three ways. Of these, we say that we perceive two intrinsically, and one coincidentally. And of the two, {522} one is special to a given perceptual capacity, the other common [*10*] to all.

By a special object I mean whatever cannot be perceived by another perceptual capacity, and about which we cannot be deceived—for example, sight is of color, hearing of sound, taste of flavor, whereas touch has several different ones. At any rate, a given perceptual capacity is discerning about these, and does not make errors about whether there is color or whether there is sound, [*15*] but rather about what the colored thing is or where it is, or what the thing making the sound is or where it is.

Things like these, then, are said to be special objects of a given perceptual capacity, whereas those that are said to be common are movement, rest, number, shape, and size, since things like these are special to no perceptual capacity but common to all. For indeed movement is perceived by touch and by sight.

A thing is said to be coincidentally perceptible—for [*20*] example, if the pale were the son of Diares. For you perceive the son of Diares

coincidentally, because it is coincident with the pale, which you perceive [intrinsically]. And that is why you are not affected at all by the perceptible object insofar as it is the son of Diares.

Of the intrinsically perceptible things, it is the special objects that are perceptible in the full sense, and it is to these that the substance of each [*25*]given perceptual capacity is by nature related.

II.11

[*423b27*] . . . It is the differentiae of body insofar as it is body that are objects of touch. I mean the differentiae that determine the elements, namely, hot, cold, dry, and wet, of which we have spoken earlier in our account of the elements. The perceptual organ for these, in which the perceptual capacity called [*30*] "touch" primarily belongs, is the part that is potentially such as they are. For perceiving is a sort of being affected, and so what does the affecting [*424a*] makes that part such as it is actually, the part being such potentially. That is why we do not perceive what is equally as hot, cold, hard, or soft [as the part], but only the excesses, the perceptual capacity being a sort of mean between the pairs of contraries in the perceptible objects. And that is why it discerns the perceptible objects. [*5*] For the mean is capable of discerning, since in relation to each extreme it becomes the other. And just as what is to perceive white and black must be neither of them actively, although both potentially (and similarly too in the case of the other perceptual capacities), so in the case of touch it must be neither hot nor cold.

Further, just as sight is of the visible [*10*] and in a way of the invisible, and just as the rest of the perceptual capacities too were similarly of opposites, so touch is of the tangible and the intangible—where the intangible consists of what has to a very minor degree the differentiae of tangible objects, as is the case with air, and of the excessive tangible things, such as those that are destructive [of the perceptual capacity].

We have now spoken about each of the perceptual capacities [*15*] in outline.

II.12

Speaking universally about every perceptual capacity, though, we must take it that the perceptual capacity is what can receive the perceptible forms

without the matter, as wax receives the seal of the signet-ring without the iron or the gold—it takes on a golden or [*20*] brazen seal, but not insofar as it is gold or bronze. Similarly too the perceptual capacity for each [sort of object] is affected by what has color, flavor, or sound, but by these not insofar as it is what is said to be each of these things, but insofar as they are of such-and-such a sort, and in accord with the ratio. The primary perceptual organ is that in which a capacity of this sort exists. It is the same [as the capacity], but the being [for it] is distinct. [*25*] For what perceives must be a spatial magnitude, but surely neither the being for what can perceive nor the perceptual capacity is a spatial magnitude, but rather a sort of ratio and capacity of the former thing.

It is evident from this why it is that excesses in perceptible objects destroy the perceptual organs (for if the movement is too strong for the perceptual organ, [*30*] the ratio is dissolved—and this, as we saw, is the perceptual capacity—just as the consonance and pitch [of a lyre] are if the strings are struck forcefully). And also why it is that plants do not perceive, although they have a {523} part of soul, and are affected by tangible objects (for in fact they are cooled and heated). For the cause of this is their not having a mean, nor a starting-point of a sort [*424b*] that can receive the forms of perceptible objects, on the contrary, they are affected [by the form] along with the matter.

But someone might raise a puzzle as to whether what is incapable of smelling can be affected in any way by odor, or what is incapable of seeing by color, and similarly in the other cases. If, though, [*5*] the object of smell is odor, then, if it produces anything, it is smelling that odor produces. So none of those things that are incapable of smelling can be affected by smell (and the same account applies in the other cases), nor can any of the ones that are capable except insofar as each is capable of perceiving [the relevant thing]. At the same time, this is also clear from the following. It is not light and dark or sound or odor that produces any effect on [*10*] bodies, but rather it is the things in which these perceptible objects are present—for example, it is the air that accompanies the thunder that splits the wood. Tangible objects and flavors, on the other hand, do affect bodies. For otherwise by what would inanimate things be affected and altered? Will these other objects, then, produce some effect? Or is it the case that not every body is affected by smell and sound, and are those that are affected

indeterminate and such as not to remain where they are—for example, [*15*] air (for air gives off an odor as if it had been affected)? What then is smelling beyond being affected? Or is smelling also perceiving, whereas the air when affected quickly becomes perceptible?

Book III

III.3

[*428a*] . . . If, then, imagination is that in virtue of which we say that some appearance comes about in us, and if it is not what we say it is metaphorically, is it one of those capacities or states in virtue of which we discern and grasp truth or falsity?—these being perception, belief, scientific knowledge, and understanding.

Now, that it is not perception is clear from [*5*] the following. For while perception is either a capacity or an activity, such as sight and seeing, things can appear to us when neither of these is present—for example, the ones in dreams. Next, perception is always present but not imagination. But if they were the same in activity, it would be possible for all beasts to have imagination, whereas it seems not to be so—for example, [*10*] ants and bees do, but grubs do not.* Next, perceptions are always true, whereas most appearances are false. Next, we do not say, when we are activating [our perceptible capacities] in an exact way regarding a perceptible object, that it *appears* to us to be a human, but rather when we do not perceive it clearly, and then it may be true or false. *And*, just as [*15*] we were saying before, things appear to us even when we have our eyes closed.

But then again neither will imagination be any of those things that always grasp the truth—for example, scientific knowledge or understanding. For imagination can also be false. It remains, then, to see whether it is belief. For belief, too, may be true or false. But belief follows upon conviction (for it is not possible to believe the things we believe [*20*] without being convinced of them), and while none of the beasts has conviction, many have imagination. Further, every belief follows upon conviction, conviction upon being persuaded, persuasion upon reason, and while some beasts have imagination, none has reason.*

It is evident, therefore, that imagination will be neither belief together with perception, nor belief due to perception, nor a combination [*25*] of belief and perception, both because of the foregoing considerations and because it is clear that belief will be about nothing other than that object, if indeed it exists, which is also the object of perception.* I mean that the combination of a belief about the pale and a perception of the pale will

constitute imagination, since it will surely not be constituted from a belief whose object is the good and a perception of the [*30*] pale. To be appeared to [in imagination], then, will be to believe non-coincidentally just what appears. [*428b*] In fact, though, something can appear *falsely* to us, about which we have at the same time a true supposition. For example, the sun appears to us to be a foot across, although we are convinced that it is bigger than the inhabited world. It follows [on {524} the view we are considering], then, either that we have jettisoned the true belief that we had, [*5*] even though the thing has remained the same, and we have neither stopped noticing nor been persuaded to change, or else, if we still have the belief, it will be necessary for the same one to be true and false. But it could have become false only if the object changed without our noticing. Therefore imagination is not one of these things nor is it constituted from them.

But since, when something is moved another thing can be moved by [*10*] it, and since imagination seems to be a sort of movement and not to take place without perception but rather in things that perceive and only about things of which there is perception, and since it is possible for movement to come about as a result of the activity of perception and must be like the perception—this [sort of] movement can neither come about without perception nor [*15*] belong to non-perceiving things, and in accord with it the one who has it does and is affected by many things, and it can also be either true or false.

This happens because of the following things: Perception of the special perceptibles is true or has the least possible degree of falsity. Second, though, [there is the perception] of the coinciding of these, [*20*] the things that coincide with the perceptibles,* and here it is now possible to be in error. For about the fact that something is pale, perception cannot be false, but about whether this or something else is the pale thing, it can be false. Third, [there is perception] of the common perceptibles, that is, ones that follow along with the coincidental perceptibles to which the special ones belong (I mean, for example, movement and magnitude). And about these now it is most of all possible to be in error in accord with perception.

But the movement [*25*] that comes about as a result of the activity of perception will be different, insofar as it results from these three sorts of perception. In fact, the first is true as long as the perception is present,

whereas the others may be false whether it is present or absent, and especially when the perceptible object is far away.

If then imagination has no characteristics other than the aforementioned ones, but it is what has been described, then imagination will be a movement [*429a*] that comes about as a result of the activity of perception. And since sight is sense perception to the highest degree, imagination (*phantasia*) derives its name from light (*phaos*), because without light it is not possible to see. And because its objects persist and are similar to perceptions, animals do many things in accord with them, [*5*] some because they lack understanding (for example, beasts) and others because their understanding is sometimes obscured by feeling, disease, or sleep (for example, human beings). About imagination, then, what it is and why it is, let this much be said.

III.4

Concerning the part of the soul by which the soul both knows and [*10*] thinks wise thoughts (whether this is separable or not separable as a spatial magnitude but only in account), we must investigate what differentia it has, and how on earth understanding comes about.

Now, if understanding is like perceiving, it would be either a sort of being affected by the intelligible object or something else of that sort. It must be unaffectable, therefore, but receptive of the form, [*15*] and potentially such as it is, although not the same as it, and as what is capable of perceiving is in relation to the perceptible objects, so the understanding must be in relation to the intelligible ones.

It must, therefore, since it understands all things, be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may master them—that is, in order that it may know them.[5] For something foreign intruding into it impedes and obstructs it. [*20*] So, too, it must have no other nature than this, that it is potentially something. That part of the soul, therefore, that is called the understanding (and I mean by the understanding that by which the soul thinks and grasps things) is actively none of the beings before it [actively] understands them. That is why it is reasonable that it should not be mixed with the body, since it would then come to be of a certain sort, either cold [*25*] or hot, or it would have some instrument as the perceptual part does,

{525} whereas, as things stand, it has none. Those who say, then, that the soul is a place of forms speak well, except that it is not the whole soul, but the one capable of understanding, and it is not actually but potentially the forms.

That the ways in which the perceptual part and the understanding part are affected are not the same is evident from the case of the perceptual organs [*30*] and the perceptual capacity. For the perceptual capacity is not capable of perceiving after the perceptual object has been too intense—for example, it cannot perceive sound after hearing very loud [*429b*] sounds, nor see or smell after very strong colors or odors. But when the understanding understands something intensely intelligible, it [afterwards] understands inferior ones not less, but even more. For the perceptual part does not exist without a body, whereas the understanding is separable. And when [*5*] the understanding becomes each of the [intelligible] things in the way it does when someone is said to have active scientific knowledge (and this comes about when he is capable of activating it by himself), even then it exists potentially in a way, although not in the same way as before it learned or discovered [these]—and then it is capable of understanding by itself.

Since, though, magnitude is distinct from the being for magnitude, and [*10*] water from the being for water (and so also for many other things, although not for all, since in some cases they are the same), we discern the being for flesh and flesh [itself] by distinct things or by the same thing in distinct states. For flesh does not exist without matter, but, like the snub, is a *this in this*. It is by means of the perceptual part, then, that we discern the hot and the cold, and those things of which [*15*] flesh is a certain ratio. But it is by something else, either something separable or the way the state of a bent line is in relation to itself when straightened out, that we discern the being for flesh.

Further, in the case of abstract beings the straight is like the snub, since it involves extension. But its essence, if the being for straight is distinct from the straight, is something else—let it be, two.[6] It is by means of a distinct thing, [*20*] therefore, that we discern it, or by means of the same thing in a distinct state. In general, therefore, the way the things are separable from matter is the way it is too with what concerns the understanding.

But a puzzle arises: If the understanding is something simple and unaffectable, and if it has nothing in common with anything, as Anaxagoras says, how will it understand, if to understand is to be affected in some way (for it is insofar as two things have something in common, that the [*25*] one seems to affect and the other to be affected)? Further, is it itself even intelligible? For either everything else will have understanding, if it is not by reference to something else that it itself is intelligible, and if the intelligible is something that is one in form, or it will have something mixed with it that makes it intelligible in just the way other things are.

On the other hand, being affected in virtue of something common has been discussed before, [showing] that the understanding is in a way the intelligible objects potentially, [*30*] although it is none actually before it understands [them]—and it is potentially [these] in the same way as there is writing on a wax tablet on which there is nothing actually written. [*430a*] That is just how it is in the case of the understanding. And it is an intelligible object in just the way its intelligible objects are, since, in the case of those things that have no matter, that which understands and that which is understood are the same, since theoretical scientific knowledge and what is known in that way are the same. In those that have matter each of the intelligible objects is present potentially. (The cause of the understanding's not always [actively] understanding [*5*] must be investigated later.[7]) In those that have matter each of the intelligible objects is present potentially. So in these understanding will not be present (for the understanding is a capacity to be such things without the matter), but what is intelligible will be present in *it*.

III.5

But since in the whole of nature there is something that is matter [*10*] for each genus (and this is {526} what is potentially all those things [that are in the genus]), while there is something else that is causal and productive, by which they are all produced (which, for example, is the role of a craft in relation to its matter), so in the soul too there must be these differences. And in fact there is one sort of understanding that is such by becoming all things, [*15*] while there is another that is such by producing all things in the way

that a sort of state, like light, does. For in a way light too makes potential colors into active colors.

And this [productive] understanding is separable, impassive, and unmixed, being in substance an activity (for the producer is always more estimable than the thing affected and the starting-point than the matter), . . . * not now understanding and at other times not. And when separated, though, this alone is it just what it is. And it alone is immortal and eternal (but we do not remember because this is unaffectable, whereas the passive understanding is capable of passing away), [*25*] and without this nothing understands.[8]

III.6

The grasp by understanding of indivisible things is found in those cases concerning which there is no falsehood, whereas in those in which there is both falsehood and truth, there is already some sort of combination of intelligible objects as into one—as Empedocles[9] said "as many heads sprouted without necks" and were then combined by love—so too these things that were separate are combined [*30*] (for example, the incommensurable and the diagonal), and if it is of things that have been or that will be, it understands and combines time in addition. For [*430b*] falsehood always involves combination, since even if [it understands] the pale thing not to be pale,* it combines not-pale [with it]. (It is possible, though, to say that all these are also cases of division.) But at any rate it is not only false or true that Cleon is pale but also that he was or will be so. [*5*] And what produces the one thing is in each case the understanding.

But since what is indivisible is twofold, either potentially so or actively so, nothing prevents someone from grasping what is indivisible when his understanding grasps a length (for this is actively indivisible), nor from doing so in an indivisible time, since the time is divisible and indivisible in a similar way to the length. It is not possible, then, to say what he was grasping in each half of the time. [*10*] For [the part] does not exist before [the whole] gets divided, except potentially. But if he grasps each of the halves separately, then he also divides the time at the same time, and then it is as if they were lengths themselves. But if he grasps the length as composed of both halves, then he does so in the time composed of both halves—things that are indivisible, though, not with respect to quantity, but

in form, he understands in an indivisible time and with an indivisible part of the soul. [*15*] But coincidentally, and not in the way that those things are, the thing by which he understands and the time in which he understands are divisible, but in the way that those things are, indivisible.* For there is in these too something that is indivisible, although {527} presumably not separable, which makes the time and the length one. And this in a similar way is in everything that is continuous, as it is in time and length. [*20*]

A point, on the other hand, and every division, and whatever is in this way indivisible, is made clear in the way a lack is. And the same account applies to the other cases (for example, how we know what is bad or what is black), since we know them in a way by their contrary. But what knows must be potentially [the contrary] and in it [the contraries] must be one. And if to something there is not a contrary of its causes, it knows itself and is an activity [*25*] and separable.

An affirmation, however, is something [predicated] of something, as too is a denial, and each one is either true or false. By contrast, not all understanding is such, but that of the what-it-is in the sense of the essence is true, and is not something [predicated] of something. However, just as the seeing of a special object is true, but seeing that the pale is a human or not is not always true, so it is also with [understanding] what is without matter. [*30*]

III.7

Active scientific knowledge, however, is the same as its object, whereas [*431a*] potential scientific knowledge is prior in time in the individual, but in general it is not even prior in time.[10] For all things that come-to-be do so from what is actual.

It is evident, however, that the perceptible object simply causes the perceptual part to move from potentially [perceiving] to actively doing so, [*5*] since the part is not affected or altered. That is why this is a different form (*eidos*) from movement. For movement is the activity of what is incomplete, whereas what is activity in the unconditional sense is something else, namely, the activity of what is complete.[11] Perceiving, then, is like bare announcing and understanding, but when [the perceived object] is pleasant or painful, [the soul], as if asserting or denying, pursues or

avoids. In fact, to feel pleasure or pain is to be active [*10*] with regard to the perceptual mean in relation to what is good or bad, as such. Both aversion and desire are the same, as active, and the desiring part and the aversive part are not different either from one another or from the perceptual one, although the being for them is different.

To the understanding soul, however, appearances are like perceptions. And when it asserts or denies good [*15*] or bad, it avoids or pursues, because the soul never understands without an appearance. But just as the air made the eye-jelly be such-and-such, however, and it in turn something else, and hearing likewise, the last thing is one, and a single mean, but the being for it is manifold. (What the thing is by which it discerns that sweet and hot differ [*20*] has been stated before, but we should also say the following. It is indeed one thing, but in the way a defining mark is, and, since they are one by analogy and in number, it is with respect to each of them as they are with respect to each other. What then is the difference between puzzling over how it discerns things that are not the same in genus and how it discerns contrary ones—for example, white and black? Accordingly, let A (white) be to [*25*] B (black) as C is to D, as those are to each other, so that, the alternation [namely, A : C : : B : D] also holds.*[12] If, then, CA belong to one thing, it will be the case, as for CB too, they will be one and the same—but the being for them will not be the same, and similarly for those others. And the same [*431b*] account would apply if A were sweet and B white.) The part that understands, then, understands the forms in the appearances, and, as in the previous cases, what is to be pursued or avoided is distinguished for it, and so, even outside of {528} perception, when it is dealing with appearances, it is moved to pursuit or avoidance. For example, perceiving the beacon that is a fire, by the common [perception], [*5*] seeing it moving, it recognizes that it is the enemy, but sometimes, by means of the appearances or intelligible objects that are in the soul, it calculates and deliberates about future things on the basis of present ones. And when it [the soul] says, as there, pleasant or painful, here it pursues or avoids—and so in cases of action generally. What are unrelated to action too, namely, the true and [*10*] the false, are in the same genus as the good and the bad, but they differ in that the first is unconditional, the second relative to someone.

As for things said to exist in abstraction, it is as if [the understanding] actively understood the snub not insofar as it is snub, but separately insofar as it is concave, [namely,] without the flesh in which it understood the concavity to be—that is the way it is with mathematical objects, [*15*] which are not separable, but which it understands as separable, when it understands them.*

In general, though, the active understanding is its objects. But whether or not it is possible for the understanding to understand any separated things when it is itself not separated from a spatial magnitude must be investigated later.[13]

III.10

[*433a9*] But apparently, at any rate, these two things, either desire or understanding, do cause movement—if we posit the imagination as a sort of understanding. For many people [*10*] follow their imaginations against their scientific knowledge, and in the other animals understanding and rational calculation do not exist, although imagination does.

Both of these, therefore, are capable of causing movement with respect to place, namely, understanding and desire—understanding, however, that is of the practical sort, which rationally calculates for the sake of something, and differs from the theoretical sort in respect of the end. And every desire, too, is for the sake of something.

[*15*] For the object of desire is the starting-point of practical understanding, and the last thing is the starting-point of the action.[14] So it is reasonable to regard these two things—desire and practical thought—as causing movement. For the object of desire moves us, and, because of this, thought causes movement, because its starting-point is the object of desire. Also, when the imagination causes movement it does not cause movement in the absence of desire. [*20*] There is, then, one thing that causes movement, namely, the desiring part. For if there were two things that caused movement, understanding and desire, they would cause movement in virtue of some common form. But as things stand the understanding evidently does not cause movement without desire (for wish is a desire, and when movement is in accord with rational calculation, it is in accord with

wish), and desire causes movement even contrary to rational calculation, since appetite [*25*] is a sort of desire.

Now understanding is always correct, whereas desire and imagination are both correct and incorrect. That is why what causes movement in every case is the object of desire, which is either the good or the apparent good—not every good, however, but the good that is doable in action. And what is doable in action is what admits of being otherwise. [*30*]

Evidently, then, it is a capacity of the soul of this sort—the one called desire—that causes movement. For those, on the other hand, who divide the soul into parts, [*433b*] and divide and separate them in accord with their capacities, the parts turn out to be very many—the nutritive part, perceptual part, understanding part, deliberative part, and further the desiring part. For these differ more from each other than do the appetitive and the spirited parts.

Since, however, desires come about that are contrary to each other, but this happens [*5*] when reason and appetites are contraries, and occurs in beings that have a perception of time (for the understanding urges us to hold back because of the future, whereas appetite [urges us on] {529} because of the pleasant, since the immediate pleasure appears both unconditionally pleasant and unconditionally good, because we do not see the future), what moves us will yet be one in form, [*10*] namely, the desiring part insofar as it is desiring (but the primary [mover] of all is the object of desire, since it moves things without being moved, by being understood or imagined), although in number there will be more than one mover.

Movement, on the other hand, involves three things, the mover, second, that by means of which it moves things, and third the thing moved. But the mover is twofold, [*15*] the unmoved one, and the one that moves and is moved. The one that is unmoved is the good doable in action, and the one that moves and is moved is the desiring part (for the cause of movement is caused to move insofar as it desires, and active desiring is a sort of movement), while the thing moved is the animal. The instrument by which desire moves it, this now is something bodily—which is why we must get a theoretical grasp on it as included among the functions common to body and soul. [*20*] But to speak for now in summary fashion—what moves in an instrumental way is found where a starting-point and an end are the same, as, for example, in a hinge or ball-and-socket joint, since there the convex

and concave are respectively the end and the starting-point of movement (that is why the one [the concave socket] remains at rest while the other [the convex ball] moves), the two being different in account, but not spatially separate. For everything is moved by pushing and pulling. [*25*] That is why, just as in the case of a circle [or sphere], so here there must be a point that remains fixed, and the movement must have it as starting-point.

In general, then, as we have said, insofar as an animal has a desiring part, so far is it capable of moving itself. A desiring part, however, cannot exist without an imagination, and all imagination is either rationally calculative or perceptual. Hence [*30*] in the latter the other animals also have a share.

III.11

. . . Now, perceptual imagination, as we said, also [*434a5*] belongs to the other animals, but the deliberative sort exists [only] in the rationally calculative ones (for whether to do this or that is already a work of rational calculation; and we must measure by one [standard], since we are pursuing the greater [good]; and so we must be able to make one appearance that results from many). And this is the cause of these animals seeming not to have belief, [*10*] namely, that they do not have the [imagination] that results from a syllogism, but this has that.*

That is why desire does not have the deliberative capacity, but sometimes defeats and moves wish, whereas sometimes wish does this to it, just like a ball, one desire does it to the other desire, as when lack of self-control occurs, but by nature the higher is more ruling and causes movement.*[15] So there are already three spatial movements to be caused.

[*15*] But the scientific part is not moved, but remains at rest. And since the one supposition and premise is universal and the other is particular (for the first says that any man of such-and-such a sort should do an action of such-and-such a sort, and the second that this is an action of such-and-such a sort, and I am a man of such-and-such a sort), it is the latter belief that produces movement, not the universal one—or, rather, it is both, but the one remains entirely at rest, while the other does not.

1. Or “enmattered *ratios*” in the way that perceptual capacities are (III.2 426a27–b7).
2. See *Met.* VI.1.
3. Euclid II.14 shows how to construct a square (or equilateral rectangle) equal in area to a given non-equilateral rectangle. The figure below is the crucial one in the construction:



Here AB and BC are the sides of the given rectangle X. The square on BD is equal in area to X. Euclid VI.13 shows that AB : BD :: BD : BC, making BD the mean proportional, which explains why the square on BD is equal in area to X.
4. “The things that follow” are the special attributes (or intrinsic coincidents) of a part of the soul that are not constituents of its essence but are demonstrable from it. “The others” are attributes that belong to a living thing due to the fact that its soul has the relevant part (I.1 402a9–10).
5. Anaxagoras DK 59B12.
6. See *Met.* VII.11 1036b12–13.
7. No discussion, advertised as such, of what causes its inactivity is to be found in Aristotle’s extant works.
8. *Toutou outhen noei*. This might mean [1] ‘without this nothing understands’ or [2] ‘without this it understands nothing’. In turn, [2] could mean: [2a] without passive understanding, productive understanding understands nothing, or [2b] without productive understanding passive understanding understands nothing. Initially, [2a] seems to conflict with the fact that active understanding, as in essence an activity, can be actively understanding—and so understanding some intelligible object—when separated from memory wax, mortal passive understanding, and the body, making [2b] seem the more attractive option, since it has already been stated at the opening of the chapter (430a10–17). Nonetheless, if [2a] refers to a productive understanding that is not separated from a passive one, it too seems to state something that Aristotle believes, namely, when we, as matter-form compounds, understand anything, ‘we must at the same time understand an appearance’ deriving from perception and memory (III.8 432a8–9). However, [2b] seems to fit better with the rest of the chapter. So if we favor [2] over [1], we should also favor [2b] over [2a].
9. DK 31B57.
10. This sentence also occurs in the mss. at III.6 430a19–21.
11. See *Met.* IX.6 1048b18–35.
12. A and B are contraries in the same genus, C and D are in different genera, but—as in the case of hot and sweet—C occupies a similar position in its spectrum (whatever it is) to the one A occupies in the white—black spectrum, and similarly for B and D—in other words, C and D are contraries too. Hence, by the argument used earlier in the case of hot and sweet, a single mean must stand to A and C (and to B and D) as they stand to each other. But A and C, and B and D, belong to different genera.
13. This problem is not further discussed in Aristotle’s extant works.
14. The last thing is the last thing found in deliberation or practical reasoning (*NE* III.3 1112b12–24).
15. Aristotle is returning to the simile of the hinge or ball-and-socket joint (III.10 433b22–27). Wish in being for the ultimate end of action (the good), grasped by scientific knowledge or understanding, is by nature fixed, like the concave socket. The desire it moves (as in cases of self-control) is thus

described as like a ball or sphere, since it now joins wish in producing the action dictated by the ball-like minor premise of the agent's deliberative syllogism, which will be explicitly referred to in a moment (434a16–21). In cases of lack of self-control, wish is moved, against deliberation, by appetite. The movement is against nature in just the way that a socket's being moved by an arm held fixed is an unnatural movement. These are the three spatial movements referred to in the next sentence.

{530} PARTS OF ANIMALS

Translated by S. Marc Cohen.

EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY, according to Aristotle, are fundamentally teleological in character: parts and systems are explained in terms of what they do and what they are for. In this study of the physiology of animals, he provides a number of such explanations. In the two chapters excerpted here, he defends both the study of biology in general and the teleological approach in particular.

Book I

I.1

[*639a*] In every branch of theoretical knowledge and every methodological inquiry, from the humbler to the more estimable alike, there seem to be two levels of proficiency. One is well-described as scientific knowledge of the subject matter, the other as a kind of general education (*paideia*). For it is a mark of an educated [*5*] person to be able to accurately distinguish a good account from a bad one. Indeed, this is what we generally think being educated amounts to, and we take an educated person to be one who is capable of doing what we have said. However, it is only a person who has this critical ability in nearly all fields that we think of as generally educated, [*10*] rather than someone [who can do this merely] in one determinate area (*phusis*). For someone might have this same competence in a restricted area.

So it is clear that in the inquiry into nature, too, there must be standards (*horoi*) with reference to which one can evaluate the manner in which conclusions are arrived at, quite apart from the question of whether those conclusions are [*15*] true or not.

I mean, for example: of the substances to be demarcated,[1] should we take each one by itself—for example, the nature of man, or of lion, or ox, or any other [species]—and examine it in particular? Or should we start out with their common attributes (*sumbebēkota*), insofar as they all have something in common? For many of the same attributes belong [*20*] to many different kinds (*genē*) [of animals]—for example, sleep, breathing, growth, decay, death, and the remaining affections and conditions of this sort.

It is unclear and indeterminate at this point what to say about these matters. But it is obvious that if we take up these topics one species[2] at a time we will end up saying the same thing many times over. [*25*] For each of the attributes we have mentioned belongs to horses, dogs, and humans; therefore, if we discuss these attributes one species at a time, we will be compelled to say the same things many times over, in that the same attributes belong to animals of different species, even though the attributes do not differ [from one species to another]. On the other hand, there are presumably [*30*] different attributes from the same category that are [*639b*]

specifically different, such as the movement of animals; for these are not all of the same kind, since flying, swimming, walking, and creeping are all different.

That is why we should consider how to examine [such questions], I mean whether we should first look at what the entire genus has in common, and only then [*5*] look into its specific parts, or begin with the individual species. At this point, this has not been determined.

Nor have we yet agreed whether the student of nature should emulate the mathematicians who prove things about astronomy. If so, he should {531} begin with observations of each of the species of animals and their parts,[3] [*10*] and then talk about the why, i.e., the cause (*to dia ti kai tas aitias*). Or should he proceed differently?

In addition to this, since we see that there are many causes of natural coming-to-be—for example, that for the sake of which, and the starting-point from which movement arises—we must determine which of these is naturally primary and which secondary. Now the one we call *for the sake of something* is evidently primary; for this is the [*15*] definition (*logos*), and the definition is the starting-point in both the products of craft and naturally constituted things alike. For the doctor and the builder both begin with definitions, whether in thought, as the doctor does with health, or in perception, as the builder does with a house; they then go on to give their accounts and their reasons for each of the things they do, and why it should be done in that way. In any case, *that for the sake of which*, i.e., a good outcome, [*20*] is even more [prevalent] in the works of nature than it is in those of craft. Necessity, on the other hand, is not present in all natural phenomena in the same way, although it is what nearly everybody tries to appeal to in giving their accounts—without having distinguished in how many ways necessity is spoken of.

On the one hand, there is unconditional necessity, which belongs to eternal things; on the other, there is hypothetical necessity, which is found both in everything that [*25*] comes-to-be and in everything made by craft—for example, in a house or any other such thing. It is necessary that there be such-and-such matter if there is to be a house or any other end. First this must come-to-be and be moved, and then that, and so on in this way

successively until the end, i.e., what each of them is *for*, comes-to-be and [*30*] exists. And it happens in the same way in nature, as well.

But the [*640a*] method of proof and of necessity in the natural sciences is different from that of the theoretical sciences. (We have spoken about this elsewhere.[4]) In the theoretical sciences the starting-point is what *is*; in the natural sciences, the starting-point is what *will be*. In other words: since health, or a man, is thus-and-so, *this* [*5*] must be or come-to-be; rather than: since this is or has come-to-be, that of necessity exists or will exist. Nor is it possible to string such demonstrations of necessity together and say since this is, that is, and so on, endlessly. We have determined these matters elsewhere,[5] as well as which things are necessary, and in which cases necessities are reciprocal, and for what reason.

We should also not fail to consider whether to [*10*] do as the earlier theorists did and describe how each [kind of animal] naturally comes-to-be, or just describe how they are. For the latter is significantly different from the former. But it seems at this point that in the case of coming-to-be, as well, we should do what we stated earlier, and start out with the observable facts (*phainomena*) about a given kind first, [*15*] and then discuss their causes. For in the case of housebuilding, too, we have: these things happen because the form of a house is like *this*, rather than: a house is like this because *this* is how it comes-to-be. Coming-to-be is for the sake of being[6] (*ousia*), but being is not for the sake of coming-to-be.[7]

That is why Empedocles was wrong in saying [*20*] that many of an animal's characteristics are accidental consequences of its birth (*genesis*)—for example, that its backbone is thus[8] because {532} it happened to break by being twisted. He was wrong, first because the seed that gives rise* to it has to have the right sort of potentiality, and second because what brings about the result is prior not only in formula but [*25*] also in time. For man begets man, and so the coming-to-be of this [offspring] happens as it does because that [parent] was thus-and-so.

It is the same even in the case of things that are thought to be spontaneously generated[9] (*automatōs ginesthai*), and likewise with products of craft. For some things, such as health, for example, are the same whether they come-to-be spontaneously or by craft. Now in some cases [*30*] there

pre-exists a creative element that resembles [the product], for example in sculpting.[10] For here there is no spontaneous generation—the craft is the form (*logos*) of the product (*tou ergou*) without its matter. And it is the same with things that result from luck as it is with those that result from craft: they come-to-be as the craft has it.

That is why most of all we should say that since *this* is the essence of man, that is why he has these parts—for he [*35*] cannot exist without them. Alternatively, we should get as close as we can, and [say] that it is this way in general (since it would be impossible otherwise) or at least that it is done well [*640b*] this way. And these [results] follow: since he is thus, his coming-to-be must also happen in this way; that is why this is the first of his parts to come-to-be, and then that. And it is this way similarly with all things that are naturally constituted.

Now the ancients who were the first to investigate nature [*5*] scientifically were looking for the material starting-point, i.e., that sort of cause, [asking] what it is, and what it is like, and how the whole comes-to-be from it, and from what source of movement—for example, strife or love or mind or spontaneity. [They assumed] that the underlying matter necessarily has some particular nature—for example, that the nature of fire is [*10*] heat, that of earth is cold, that of the former is lightness and that of the latter heaviness—and that is how the cosmos came-to-be. They describe the coming-to-be of animals and plants in the same way; for example, that the stomach and every cavity for food or residue came-to-be as a result of water flowing through the body, and that [*15*] the nostrils broke open as a result of breath passing through. But air and water are the matter of bodies; for all these theorists construct nature out of such bodies.

But if men and animals and their parts exist naturally, we will have to discuss flesh and bone and blood and all the [*20*] uniform parts, and similarly the non-uniform parts such as face, hand, and foot, and state in virtue of what and in respect of what sort of capacity each of them is such. For it is not enough to say what they are made of, for example, of fire or earth. If we were talking about a bed or something like that, we would try to determine its form [*25*] rather than its matter, such as metal or wood; or if not [the form] at least the matter of the composite. For a bed is a *this* in a *this*, or a *this such*, and therefore we need to talk about its shape and what it

is like in respect of its form (*idean*). For its nature in respect of its form (*morphē*) is more in control than its material nature is.

But now if each of the animals and its parts is [what it is] by virtue of [*30*] its shape and color, what Democritus says would be right, for that is what he appears to have supposed. At any rate he says that it is clear to everyone what sort of a thing a man is in shape, and that we recognize him by his shape and by his color. However even a corpse has the same shape in its outward appearance,[11] [*35*] but all the same it is not a man. Moreover, a thing cannot be a hand in just any condition (for example, if it is made of metal or wood), except {533} homonymously, [*641a*] like a doctor in a picture.[12] For it will not be able to perform its proper function, just as stone flutes and a doctor in a picture are unable to perform theirs. Similarly, none of the parts of a corpse is really that part—I mean, [*5*] for example, an eye or a hand.

So Democritus' account is an over-simplification, as if he were a carpenter speaking about a wooden hand. In fact that is just how natural scientists (*phusiologoi*) talk when they describe the coming-to-be and the causes of form in terms of the powers by which it was fabricated. But probably the carpenter would mention an axe or a drill, [*10*] whereas they would cite air and earth. So the carpenter's account is better. For it will not be enough for him to say that after the tool sank into it, this became hollow and that became flat; rather, he will say why the blow was struck in a certain way, i.e., what it was *for*, stating the reason (*aitian*): so that this or that shape might come-to-be.

It is clear, [*15*] then, that their account is wrong, and that we ought to say that an animal is such, and to talk about it—what it is, and what it is like—and about each of its parts, as well, just as we do about the form of a bed.

Now this [form] is either the soul, or a part of the soul, or does not exist without the soul. (At any rate once the soul has departed there is no longer an animal, nor does any of its parts [*20*] remain the same, except in outward appearance only, like a thing turned to stone in a fable.) And since this is so, it is the job of the student of nature to discuss and to know about the soul (if not all of it, at least about that part in virtue of which it is that sort of animal). And he must say what the soul is, or what this part of it is, and discuss the attributes the animal has in virtue of [*25*] having such-and-such

an essence (*ousia*). This is especially so in light of the fact that a nature is spoken of in two ways, both as matter and as essence. The latter is also a nature both as that which initiates movement and as an end. And such a thing is either an animal's entire soul or some part of it. Therefore, in this way the student of nature will have to talk about [*30*] the soul more than about matter, insofar as it is more due to soul that matter is nature than it is the other way round. For wood is both a bed and a table, because it is potentially these things.

Someone paying close attention to what we have just said, however, might be puzzled as to whether it is in the purview of natural science to discuss the entire soul or just a part of it. For [*35*] if it is the entire soul, then there is no philosophy remaining over and above natural science. For the intellect deals with intelligible things. Therefore knowledge of [*641b*] anything whatsoever would be natural science. For both the intellect and the intelligible are studied by the same science, since they are correlatives, and correlatives are always studied by the same science, as is the case with perception and perceptible objects.

An alternative is that the starting-point of change (*kinēsis*) [*5*] is neither the entire soul nor all of its parts; rather, the starting-point of growth [in animals] is the same as in plants, that of alteration is the perceptive [part of the soul], and that of spatial movement is a different part (but not the intelligible part). For spatial movement is a characteristic of animals other [than humans], although none of them are capable of thought (*dianoia*). Hence it is clear that we should not be discussing the entire soul; for nature is not the entire soul, [*10*] but one or more of its parts.

Furthermore, no abstract object can be studied by natural science, since everything nature does is *for* something. For just as a craft is evident in its artifacts, so too in things themselves some other such starting-point and cause is evident, which we [*15*] grasp—just as we do heat and cold—from the entire universe. That is why it is more likely that the heavens came-to-be from such a cause (if they did come-to-be) and exist by means of such a cause, than it is that the mortal animals did. At any rate, order and precision is much more evident in the heavenly bodies than it is with us, while inconstancy [*20*] and randomness are found among mortals. Still, some people say that each of the animals exists and comes-to-be naturally, while

the heavens (in which there is no evidence whatsoever of luck and disorder) were put together by chance and luck.

{534} Now we say 'this is for the sake of that' in every case in which it is evident that there is some end [*25*] that a movement accomplishes as long as nothing impedes it. Hence there obviously is such a thing, and it is what we call a nature. For certainly it is not just any random thing that comes-to-be from a given seed, but *this* comes-to-be from *this*; nor does a random seed come from a random body. The seed, then, is the starting-point and productive agent of the things that come-to-be from it. For [*30*] they do so naturally; at any rate, they grow from it.

But still prior to this is that of which it is the seed; for while the seed is [involved in the process of] coming-to-be, its end is the substance [that comes-to-be]. And prior even to both of these is that from which the seed comes. For it is a seed in two ways: of that *out of* which it is, and of that *of* which it is.[13] It is the seed both of that from which it came, for example a horse, and of that [*35*] which will come to be from it, for example a mule, although not in the same way, but of each in the manner we have stated. Furthermore, the seed is something in potentiality, [*642a*] and we know how potentiality is related to actuality.

There are, then, two causes: that *for the sake of which*, and that which is *of necessity*. (For many things come-to-be because of necessity.) But perhaps one might be puzzled about what kind of necessity those who say 'of necessity' mean. For neither of the [*5*] two kinds we distinguished in our writings[14] on philosophy can apply here. However, there is a third kind that applies to things that are susceptible of coming-to-be. For we call food something that is necessary in neither of these two ways, but rather as something without which it is not possible to exist. This is, in effect, conditional necessity. For since an axe is needed in order to cut, it is necessary for it be [*10*] hard, and in order to be hard, to be made of bronze or steel; in just this way, since the body is also an instrument (for each of its parts is *for* something, and so, too, is the body as a whole), it is therefore necessary for it to be such-and-such, and to be made of such-and-such, if that end is going to be.

It is clear,* then, that there are two kinds of cause, and in our discussions we should certainly [*15*] arrive at both of them (or at least try make it clear

if we cannot) and that all those who fail to discuss this say virtually nothing about nature. For nature is the starting-point more than matter is. Even Empedocles sometimes stumbles onto it, led on by the truth itself, and is [*20*] forced to say that the formula (*logos*) [of a thing] is [its] substance and nature, as for example when he gives his account of what bone is.[15] For he says that it is not one, or two, or three, or even all of the elements, but the formula[16] of their mixture. Moreover, it is clear that he would also give the same kind of account of flesh, and each of the other parts of that sort, as well.

The reason why our predecessors did not arrive [*25*] at this approach is that there was no notion of essence, i.e., defining a substance. Democritus was the first to touch on this, not because he found it necessary for his investigation into nature, but because he was swept away by the facts themselves. In the time of Socrates, this interest grew, but inquiries into nature came to an end; instead, [*30*] philosophers turned their attention toward the practical topic of virtue and toward political science.

This is how our demonstrations should proceed: breathing, for example, exists for the sake of *this*, and *this* comes-to-be of necessity because of *those* things. 'Necessity' sometimes means that if what a thing is *for* is going to exist, then it is necessary for these things to obtain; but sometimes it means that they are this way by their very [*35*] nature. For example, [in breathing] it is necessary for warm air to go out and then come back in again when it meets resistance, and for [cold outside] air to stream in (this is immediately necessary); [*642b*] but then the warm air inside resists, and, in the process of cooling it, there is an influx of outside air.*[17]

{535} This, then, is the kind of investigation we are engaged in, and these are the sorts of things that we have to come up with explanations for.

I.5

[*644b22*] Among naturally constituted substances, some are ungenerated and imperishable for the whole of eternity, while others admit of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. But it turns out that the former, although [*25*] worthy of study—divine, even—are less accessible for us to investigate; for there is extremely little perceptual evidence on the basis of which we could conduct an examination into what we long to know about them. On the other hand,

concerning perishable plants and animals we have a great abundance of evidence that can lead to knowledge, since we live among them. [*30*] For someone who is willing to work hard enough can discover many of the facts (*huparchontōn*) about each kind (*genos*).[18]

Each of these [subject-matters] has its own delights. Even though we grasp ever so little about the eternal things, nevertheless, because it is so worthwhile, knowledge of them is more pleasurable than it is of all the things around us, just as catching by chance even a tiny glimpse of those we love [*35*] is more pleasurable than having a detailed view of many other and important things. [*645a*] Still, because we know more about perishable things, and know them better, our scientific knowledge of them is superior. Furthermore, the fact that they are nearer to us and conform more closely to our own nature provides some compensation as compared to the [branch of] philosophy that deals with things that are divine.

But since we have [*5*] gone through these [divine things] in detail,[19] stating how they appear to us, it remains for us to talk about animal nature, whether more or less estimable, leaving nothing aside to the extent that we are able. For even in the study of animals that are disagreeable to the senses, nevertheless the nature that crafted them yields extraordinary pleasures to [*10*] those who are philosophical by nature and are able to recognize their causes. Indeed, since we enjoy looking at representations of them on the grounds that we are at the same time studying the craft (such as painting or sculpting) that crafted them, it would be unreasonable and absurd not to show even more affection for the study of the things themselves, that are constituted by nature, [*15*] at any rate when we are able to discern their causes.

That is why we should not be childishly disgusted by the examination of the less estimable animals, for in all things natural there is something marvelous. The story goes that when some strangers wanted to meet Heraclitus, they stopped when they saw him warming himself [*20*] by the oven; but he urged them to come in: ‘fear not’, [he said,] ‘there are gods here, too’. So, too, in undertaking to investigate each [species] of animals we should not feel ashamed, because in all of them there is something natural and noble (*kalon*).

For what is goal-directed and non-random is found most of all in the works of nature, [*25*] and the end for the sake of which they have been composed or have come-to-be occupies a position of honor. But if you have regarded an investigation concerning other animals as unworthy, you really ought to think the same thing about one concerning yourself. For it is not possible to look at the stuff human kind[20] is made of—such as blood, flesh, bones, [*30*] veins, and parts like that—without considerable disgust. Just as we should think that one who is discussing any of a thing's parts or equipment does not pay attention to matter for its own sake, but rather to the entire form (for example, to a house, rather than to the bricks and clay and boards), so in the same way one who is discussing nature [*35*] should pay attention to the combination of parts, i.e., the entire substance, rather than to those things that never exist independently of the substance in which they are found.

1. Or 'to be defined' (*diorizein*). The substances here are clearly the secondary substances of *Catg.* 2a11ff, such as the species *man* and *horse*, rather than primary substances such as a particular man or horse.
2. Literally, 'if we speak of many things in part (*kata meros*)'. The next sentence makes clear that the 'parts' Aristotle has in mind here are the individual species.
3. Literally, 'the student of nature should first observe the appearances concerning animals and their parts with respect to each' (*dei kai ton phusikon ta phainomena prōton ta peri ta zō(i)a theōrēsanta kai ta merē ta peri hekaston*).
4. It is not clear which work Aristotle is referring to. He normally (e.g., *Met.* VI.1 1025bff) classifies natural science as one of the theoretical sciences (along with mathematics and metaphysics). In contrasting them here, he seems to be thinking of nature as more like a productive science (such as housebuilding), whose aim is to make something—i.e., bring about a certain end—rather than to deduce conclusions from underlying principles.
5. In *GC* II, esp. ch. 11.
6. *Ousia* is used here in the general sense of being (as opposed to becoming), rather than in its (usual) more specific sense of primary and independent being (as opposed to quantity, quality, etc.).
7. Cf. Plato, *Philebus* 54A–C.
8. Aristotle is suggesting that Empedocles tried to account for vertebrae as the result of a fetus' backbone breaking by being twisted *in utero*.
9. *Automatōs ginesthai* might also be translated 'come-to-be by chance', as it is in *Ph.* II.6. But here Aristotle seems to be concerned that the spontaneous generation (as he thought) of such things as

fleas might be thought to be a counter-example to his claim about the necessity of a parent in animal generation. Cf. Platt, "Two Passages in Aristotle," *Classical Quarterly* 9 (1915), 7–9, and *Met.* VII.7.
10. There must be an idea or conception in the mind of the sculptor of what the completed statue will be like, and that conception is the creative element (*poiētikon*) that preexists. Cf. *Met.* VII.7 1032a32–b1: 'from craft come to be the things whose form is in the soul'.
11. 'Same shape in its outward appearance': *tēn autēn tou schēmatos morphēn*.
12. The picture of a doctor does not contain a real doctor, but an image that is a 'doctor' in name only (*homōnumōs*). Similarly, something that looks like a hand but is made of wood is a 'hand' in name only.
13. That is, it is the seed both of the parent that produces it, and of the offspring that grows from it. Cf. *Met.* XII.7 1072b35–1073a3.
14. It is not clear which works Aristotle is referring to.
15. DK 31B96.
16. *Logos* ('formula') here could also be translated as 'ratio'.
17. At *Resp.* 480a16–b12, Aristotle gives a different account of the mechanics of breathing, according to which heat in the heart causes the chest to expand like a bellows, thereby drawing in cool air from the outside, which then causes the chest to contract.
18. Alternatively: 'can discover a great deal about each existing (*huparchontōn*) kind'. *Genos* ('kind') is normally translated as 'genus', but here it is clear that Aristotle has species in mind.
19. The 'divine things' are the heavenly bodies, which are discussed in *Cael*.
20. As at 644b30, *genos* ('kind') is used in the sense of 'species', rather than 'genus'.

{536} METAPHYSICS

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

ALTHOUGH EVERYTHING IN the Metaphysics was written by Aristotle, it was probably not written as a single work but was put into its present form and probably given its present title by a later editor (Andronicus of Rhodes, first century CE). The meaning of the title is unclear. It may mean "Beyond natural things," indicating that this work goes beyond the study of nature. Or it may mean simply "After the Physics," referring to its place in the Aristotelian curriculum. Aristotle's own term for its subject matter is "first philosophy." The Metaphysics is generally regarded as the most difficult work in the Aristotelian corpus.

In the excerpts presented here, Book I discusses the history of the notion of causes, and contains a detailed criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms; Book IV examines the nature of the study of being qua being; Book VI presents the division of the sciences into the theoretical, the practical, and the productive; Books VII and VIII take up the question 'What is substance?' and the ideas of matter, form, essence, and universals; Book IX discusses the topics of activity (or actuality) and potentiality; Book XII argues for the existence of an unmoved mover; and Book XIII returns to the question of whether the fundamental substances and starting-points are universal or particular.

Book I

I.1

All humans by nature desire to know. An indication of this [*980a21*] is our liking for the perceptual capacities. For even apart from their utility, these are liked because of themselves—and most of all the one because of the eyes. For it is not only in order to do an action, but even when we are not going to do anything whatsoever, that we choose sight over (one might almost say) all [*25*] the others. The cause of this is that of all perceptual capacities it enables us to know most fully and makes clear many differences.

By nature, animals are born possessed of perception. In some of them, memory does not come about from this, but in others it does come about. And because it does, they are more practically-wise and better at learning [*980b21*] than those incapable of remembering. Practically-wise, but outside the reach of teaching, are the ones that cannot hear sounds (for example, bees and whatever other kind (*genos*) of animal may be like them), whereas those that in addition to memory have this perceptual capacity can be taught. [*25*]

Now, the other animals live by appearances and memories, and have but a small share in experience, whereas humankind lives also by craft knowledge and rational calculations. From memories experience comes about in humans, since many memories of the same thing finally bring about the capacity of one experience. Indeed, experience seems pretty much similar to [*981a*] scientific knowledge and craft knowledge. But scientific knowledge and craft knowledge come to humans *through* experience. For "experience made craft," as Polus[1] says, "and lack of experience, luck."

Craft knowledge comes about when, from many [*5*] intelligible objects belonging to experience, one universal supposition about similar things comes about. For to have a supposition that when Callias was sick with this disease this treatment benefited him, and similarly with Socrates and many other particular cases, is a matter of experience. But to suppose that it benefited *everyone* of a certain sort, marked off by a single form, [*10*] suffering from a certain disease (for {537} example, phlegm-filled or bilious people when burning with a fever), is a matter of craft.

With a view to action, then, experience seems no different from craft knowledge—on the contrary, we even see experienced people being more successful than those who have an account but are without experience. The cause of this is that experience [*15*] is knowledge of particulars, whereas craft knowledge is of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with particulars. For the doctor does not cure a *human*, except coincidentally, but Callias or Socrates or someone else spoken of in that way, who happens coincidentally to be a human. If, then, [*20*] someone without experience has the account and knows the universal, but does not know the particular included under it, he will often make an error in treatment, since it is the particular that admits of treatment.

Nevertheless, we regard *knowledge* and *comprehension* as characteristic of craft rather than of experience, and [*25*] take it that craftsmen are wiser than experienced people, on the supposition that in every case wisdom follows along rather with knowledge than with experience. This is because craftsmen know the cause, whereas experienced people do not. For experienced people know the that but do not know the why, whereas craftsmen know the why, that is, the cause.

It is also because of this that we consider the architectonic practitioners [*30*] in each craft to be more estimable, to know in a yet more full sense, and to be wiser than the handicraftsmen, because they know the causes of the things they produce. [*981b*] The handicraftsmen, by contrast, we consider to be like some sort of inanimate things that produce without knowing what they produce, in the way, for example, that fire burns. But whereas inanimate things produce each result by a sort of nature, the handicraftsmen do so by habit—the supposition being that architectonic craftsmen are wiser not in terms of being practically efficient, [*5*] but in terms of having the account themselves and knowing the causes. On the whole too an indication of the person who knows, as opposed to the person who does not know, is his capacity to teach. That is why we think craft knowledge to be more like scientific knowledge than experience is, since craftsmen can teach, while experienced people cannot.

Furthermore, we do not think that any perceptual capacities whatsoever constitute wisdom, [*10*] even though they are most in control, at any rate of the knowledge of particulars. Still, they do not tell us the why of anything (for example, why fire is hot), but only that it is hot.

At first, then, anyone who discovered any sort of craft that went beyond the common perceptual capacities was quite likely wondered at by people not only because there was something useful [*15*] in his discoveries, but also because he was thought wise and superior to others. But as more crafts were discovered, some of which were related to necessities, others to passing the time, it is quite likely that the discoverers of the latter were always thought to be wiser, because their sciences did not aim at utility. Hence when all [*20*] such crafts were already developed, the sciences that aim neither at pleasure nor at necessities were discovered, first in the places where people had leisure. That is why the mathematical crafts first arose in Egypt, since there the priestly class were allowed to be at leisure.

We have said in the *Ethics* [*25*] what the difference is between craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, and other things of the same kind (*genos*). What our present account is for the sake of, however, is this: Everyone takes what is called "wisdom" to be concerned with the primary causes and the starting-points. And so, as we said earlier, the person of experience seems wiser than those who have any perceptual capacity whatsoever, a craftsman than [*30*] experienced people, an architectonic craftsman than a handicraftsman, and theoretical sciences than productive ones. [*982a*] So it is clear that theoretical wisdom is scientific knowledge of certain sorts of starting-points and causes.

I.2

Since this is the science we are inquiring into, this is what we should investigate, namely, what sorts of causes and what sorts of starting-points [*5*] are the concern of the science that is theoretical wisdom. Well, if we were to get hold of the suppositions we have about the theoretically-wise person, perhaps the answer will thereby become more evident.

{538} First, then, we take it that [1] what a wise person has scientific knowledge about is *all things*, insofar as they admit of it, without his having particular scientific knowledge of them. Next, we take it that [2] the person who has the capacity to know difficult things, that is, [*10*] things that are not easy for humans to know—*he* is wise. For perception is common to all, which is why it is easy and involves no wisdom. Further, we take it that someone is wiser in any science if [3] he is a more exact knower of it and [4] a better teacher of the causes. Also, we take it that among the sciences

[5] the one choiceworthy for the sake of itself, and for the knowing of it, is [*15*] more theoretical wisdom than one choiceworthy for the sake of its results. Also, we take [6] a more ruling science to be wisdom more than a subordinate one. For a wise person should prescribe, not be prescribed to, and should be obeyed by the less wise, not obey someone else. Such, then, are the sort and number of suppositions we hold about theoretical wisdom [*20*] and theoretically-wise people.

Of these, [Response 1] scientific knowledge of all things necessarily belongs to the person who most of all has universal scientific knowledge, since he in a way knows all the things that fall under it. [R2] The most universal things of all, however, are pretty much the most difficult for humans to know, since they are furthest from perception. [R3] And the most exact [*25*] of the sciences are the ones concerned most of all with the primary things, since the sciences which proceed from fewer things (for example, arithmetic) are more exact than those that proceed from an addition (for example, geometry). [R4] But then, too, the one that provides theoretical scientific knowledge of the causes is more teachable, since teaching is what those people do, that is, those who state the causes of each thing. [R5] And knowing or knowing scientifically [*30*] for its own sake most of all belongs to the science of what is most scientifically knowable of all. For the person who chooses to know scientifically because of itself will most of all choose to have what is most of all scientific knowledge, and this is the science of what is most [*982b*] scientifically knowable of all. And what is most scientifically knowable of all are the primary things and causes, since it is through these and proceeding from these that we know the other things, not these because of the ones that fall under them. [R6] But the most ruling of the sciences—that is, the one that is ruling rather than subordinate—is the one that knows that for-the-sake-of-which [*5*] each thing is to be done, and this is the good of each of them, and in general the best good in all of nature.

So based on all that has been said, the name we are inquiring into applies to the same science [as has all these features]. For this must be the one that gets a theoretical grasp on the primary starting-points and causes, and the good or the for-the-sake-of-which is one of these causes. [*10*]

That it is not a productive science is clear too from those who first turned to philosophy, since it is because of wondering at things that humans, both

now and at first, began to do philosophy. At the start, they wondered at those of the puzzles that were close to hand, then, advancing little by little, they puzzled over greater issues, for example, about the [*15*] attributes of the moon and about issues concerning the sun and stars, and how the All comes-to-be.* Someone who puzzles or wonders, however, thinks himself ignorant (it is because of this, indeed, that the philosopher is in a way a myth-lover, since myth is composed of wonders).* So if indeed it was because of [a desire] to avoid ignorance that they engaged in philosophy, it is evident that it was because of [a desire] [*20*] to know that they pursued scientific knowledge, and not for the sake of some sort of utility.

What in fact happened is witness to this. For it was when pretty much all the necessities of life, as well as those related to ease and passing the time, had been supplied that such wisdom began to be sought. So clearly we do not inquire into it because of its having another use, but just as a human [*25*] being is free, we say, when he is for his own sake and not for someone else, in the same way we pursue this as the only free science, since it alone is for its own sake.

It is because of this indeed that the possession of this science might be justly regarded as not for humans, since in many ways the nature of humans is enslaved, so that, according to Simonides,[2] "a {539} god alone can have this [*30*] privilege," and it is not fitting that a human should not be content to inquire into the science that is in accord with himself. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine, it would probably occur in this case most of all, [*983a*] and all those who went too far [in this science] would be unlucky. The divine, however, cannot be jealous—but, as the proverb says, "Bards often do speak falsely." Moreover, no science should be regarded as more estimable than this. For the most divine science is also the most estimable. And a science would be most divine in only two ways: if the [primary] god most of all would have it, or if it were a science of divine things. And this science [*5*] alone is divine in both these ways. For the [primary] god seems to be among the causes of all things and to be a sort of starting-point, and this is the sort of science that the [primary] god alone, or that he most of all, would have. All the sciences are more necessary than this one, then, [*10*] but none is better.

The acquisition of it, however, must in a way leave us in a condition contrary to the one in which we started our search. For everyone, as we said, starts by wondering at something's being the way it is, just as people do at those wondrous automata,[3] when they do not have a theoretical grasp on their cause,* or at the turnings of the sun, or at [*15*] the incommensurability of the diagonal (for it seems a wonder to everyone that a more-than-minimal magnitude is not measurable*). It is in the contrary and proverbially the better condition, however, that we must end up, as happens in those other cases too when people learn [the cause]. For nothing would make a man who knows geometry wonder more than if the diagonal *were* to turn out to be [*20*] commensurable.

We have stated, then, what the nature is of the science we are inquiring into, and what the target is that our inquiry and our whole method of inquiry must hit.

I.3

It is evident, then, that we must acquire scientific knowledge of the causes that are starting-points, since we say that we know each thing when [*25*] we think we know its primary cause. Now, things are said to be causes in four ways.[4] In one way, we say the substance or the essence is the cause, since the ultimate thing to which the why leads us is the account, and the why that is primary is the cause and starting-point. In another, it is the matter or the underlying subject. In a third, it is the starting-point from which the movement derives. [*30*] In a fourth, the cause opposite to this, that is, the for-the-sake-of-which and the good, since this is the end of all coming-to-be and of all movement.

We got an adequate theoretical grasp on these in our works on nature. All the same, let us call also on those prior to us [*983b*] who undertook the investigation of beings and philosophized about the truth. For it is clear that they too speak of certain starting-points and causes. So reviewing them will be of some assistance to the present method of inquiry, since either we shall discover some other kind (*genos*) of cause [*5*] or trust all the more in those we mentioned just now.

Of those who first philosophized,* then, most thought that the starting-points of all things were of the material kind (*eidos*) only. For that from

which all beings come, and from which as a first thing they come-to-be and into which they cease-to-be in the end, the substance that persists throughout as an underlying subject while its attributes change—this, they say, is element [*10*] and this starting-point of beings. And because of this they think that nothing either comes to be or is destroyed, since a nature of this sort is always preserved. Just as we do not say either that Socrates unconditionally comes-to-be when he comes-to-be noble or musical or that he is destroyed when he loses these states, [*15*] because the underlying subject—Socrates himself—persists, so too they do not say that anything does so in the other cases. For there must be some nature, whether one or more than one, from which the other things come-to-be while it is preserved.

They do not all agree, however, on the number and kind (*eidos*) of such a starting-point. Thales, the one who started this sort of philosophy, says it is water (because of this, he also declared that {540} the earth [*20*] rests on water), perhaps reaching this supposition from seeing that the nourishment for all things is moist, that the hot itself comes-to-be from this, and what is alive lives by this* (and what they come-to-be from is starting-point for all). Because of this, then, he reached this supposition, [*25*] and because the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and water is the starting-point of the nature of moist things.

Some people think that even the ancients who lived long before the present generation and who first theologized held similar beliefs about nature, since they made Ocean and Tethys [*30*] the parents of coming-to-be, and made the gods swear their oath by the water they called Styx.[5] For what is oldest is what is most estimable, and what is most estimable is what we swear an oath by. That this belief about nature is in any way ancient or even old is perhaps [*984a*] unclear, but Thales at any rate is said to have declared this about the primary cause (for no one would consider Hippo[6] worthy of inclusion with these, because of the shabbiness of his thought).

Anaximenes and Diogenes posit air as prior to [*5*] water and as more than anything else the starting-point of the simple bodies. Hippasus of Metapontium posits fire, as does Heraclitus of Ephesus. Empedocles, however, posits four things, positing earth along with those already mentioned as a fourth (for these, he says, always persist and do not come-

to-be, except in quantity or smallness, aggregating into [*10*] one and disaggregating from one).[7]

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was prior to Empedocles in age but in works later, says that the starting-points are unlimited. For he says that pretty much all the homoeomerous things (like water and fire) come-to-be and are destroyed in this way, namely, through aggregation and disaggregation alone. Otherwise, they neither come-to-be nor are destroyed but [*15*] persist and are eternal.

From this, we might think that the only cause is the so-called material kind (*eidos*). But as people progressed in this way, the facts themselves showed them the way and compelled them to inquire further. For however much all coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be may be from some one thing (or even from more than one thing), *why* does this happen? That is, what is *the cause*? [*20*] For at any rate the underlying subject itself does not make itself change. I mean, for example, that neither the wood nor the bronze is a cause of either of them changing, nor does the wood make a bed or the bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change, and to [*25*] look for this is to look for another starting-point—the starting-point from which the movement derives, as we would say.

Well then those who at the very start latched onto this method of inquiry, and said that the underlying subject was one, had no misgivings about this. But *some* of those who said that it was one, as if defeated by this inquiry, [*30*] said that the one, that is, nature as a whole, is immovable—not only as regards coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be (for this is an ancient view agreed to by all), but also as regards every other sort of change, and this view is special to them. Of those [*984b*] who said that the All is one, then, none managed to discover a cause of this sort, except perhaps Parmenides, insofar as he posited causes not only as one but also somehow as two. Accordingly, for those who make a plurality [of underlying subjects] it is more possible to state [what this sort of cause is]—for [*5*] example, for those [who posit] hot and cold or fire and earth. For they treat fire as having a nature that initiates movement, and treat water, earth, and things of that sort in the contrary way.

After these people and these sorts of starting-points, which were found inadequate to generate the nature of beings, people were again compelled

by the truth itself, as we said, [*10*] to look for the next sort of starting-point. For that the good or noble state of some beings—or the coming-to-be in that state of other ones—should {541} have fire or earth or anything else of that sort as its cause is presumably not probable, nor is it probable that these people should have thought so. On the other hand, to turn over so important a fact to chance or luck could not be correct either. When one person said, then, that understanding was present (just as [*15*] in living things) in nature too, as the cause of the cosmos and of all, he seemed like a sober person by contrast with his improbability-uttering predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras explicitly adopted these accounts, but Hermotimus[8] of Clazomenae is "charged" with speaking that way earlier. Those who took up [*20*] the matter in this way thus posited the cause of their noble state as a starting-point of beings, and at the same time that this is the sort of cause from which the movement starts for them.

I.4

We might suspect that Hesiod[9] was the first to look for this sort of thing, or someone else who posited love (*erōs*) or appetite among beings as a starting-point, as, for example, Parmenides also did. For he too, in describing [*25*] the coming-to-be of the All, says that first "was devised Love (*Erōs*) among the gods." And Hesiod says,

> Of all things the very first that
> came to be was Chaos, and then
> Broad-breasted Earth,
> And Love (*Erōs*), preeminent
> among all the immortals, on the supposition that there must be some cause among beings to move and draw things together. [*30*] (As for the way these people should be arranged with regard to priority, let us leave it till later to discern.[10]) But since it was evident that the contraries of good things were also present in nature (not only order and nobility but also disorder and baseness, and more [*985a*] bad things than good ones, and more base things than noble ones), someone else accordingly introduced love (*philia*) *and* strife as each singly the cause of one of the two sorts

> of things. For if we were to follow and grasp the *thought* and not the inarticulate words of Empedocles, we would find [*5*] that love (*philia*) is the cause of good things and strife of bad ones. So, if we were to claim that Empedocles in a way says, and was the first to say, that the good and the bad are starting-points, we would perhaps be right—if indeed the cause of all good things is the good itself.

These people then, [*10*] as we say, evidently latched onto two of the causes we distinguished in our works on nature, upon the matter and upon the starting-point of movement. But they did so vaguely and in a not all perspicuous way, like untrained people in fights. For these too, as they circle their opponents, often strike noble blows, but [*15*] they do not do so in virtue of scientific knowledge, just as the others do not seem to know what they are saying, since they apparently make pretty much no use of these causes, except to a small extent.

For Anaxagoras uses understanding as a *deus ex machina* as regards cosmic production, and, when he is puzzled about what the cause is due to which something holds as a result of necessity, he drags understanding in, but in other cases [*20*] he makes anything rather than understanding the cause of things that come-to-be.

As for Empedocles, although he uses these causes to a greater extent than Anaxagoras, he neither uses them adequately nor finds any consistency in them. At any rate, love (*philia*) often disaggregates things for him, while strife aggregates them. For whenever the All is divided up into its elements because of [*25*] strife, the fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of the other elements, and whenever things come together into one again under the influence of love (*philia*), it is necessary that the parts from each get segregated again.

Empedocles, then, going beyond his predecessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause, not making [*30*] the starting-point of the movement one thing, but distinct and contrary {542} ones. Further, he was the first to say that the kinds (*eidos*) of matter, the so-called elements, were four. Yet he does not *use* four but treats them as two only, fire by itself, on the one hand, and its opposites—earth, air, and water—taken as one [*985b*] nature, on the other (as we may gather from studying his

verses). He, then, as we say, spoke about the starting-points in this way and as being of this number.

Leucippus, however, and his associate Democritus say that the full and the void are the elements, [*5*] calling the one "being," and the other "not being," and, of these, the full or the solid is being, while the void is not being (that is why they also say that being no more *is* than not being, because the body no more *is* than the void*[11]), and that these, as matter, are the causes of beings. And just as those who make the underlying substance one [*10*] generate the other things by means of its attributes, positing the rare and the dense as starting-points of these attributes, in the same way, these people too say that the differentiae are the causes of the other things. And these differentiae, they say, are three—shape, order, and position. For they say that being is differentiated by "rhythm," "touch," and [*15*] "turning" alone. And of these rhythm is shape, touch is order, and turning is position. For A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, and Z from N in position. But the question of movement—where it comes from and in what way it belongs to beings—these people, in a quite similar way to the others, carelessly neglected.

So concerning [*20*] the two causes, as we say, this seems to be as far as the earlier philosophers went in their inquiry.

I.6

[*987a28*] After the philosophies we have mentioned came the work of Plato. In most respects it followed these thinkers but [*30*] also had special features that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For having been from his youth familiar first with Cratylus[12] and the Heraclitean beliefs that all perceptibles are always flowing and that there is no scientific knowledge concerning them, these views he also held later. The work Socrates did, on the other hand, was concerned with ethical [*987b*] issues, not at all with nature as a whole. In these, however, he was inquiring into what is universal and was the first to fix his thought on definitions. Plato, accepting him [as a teacher], took it that this fixing is done concerning other things and not the perceptible ones, [*5*] since it is impossible for there to be a common definition of any perceptibles, as *they* at any rate are always changing. He, then, called beings of this other sort "Ideas,"[13] and the

perceptible ones are beyond these and are all called after these. For the many things that have the same name as the Forms* are [what they are] through participation in them.

As for participation he changed only the name. [*10*] For the Pythagoreans say that beings are [what they are] by imitating the numbers, whereas Plato says that they are [what they are] by participation, changing the name. What this participation or this imitation of the Forms could *be*, however, they left an open question.

Further, apart from both the perceptibles and the Forms are the objects of mathematics, he says, [*15*] which are intermediate between them, differing from the perceptible ones in being eternal and immovable, and from the Forms in that there are many similar ones, whereas the Form itself in each case is one only. And since the Forms are causes of the other things, he thought that their elements were the elements of all beings. It is as matter, then, that the great and the small were [*20*] starting-points, and as substance, *the one*. For generated [as they are] from the great and the small by participating in *the one*, the Forms are the numbers.

In saying that *the one* is substance, and is not by being *another* thing said to be one, he spoke in a quite similar way to the Pythagoreans, and in saying that the numbers are the causes of the substance of other things he agreed with them. But instead of making the unlimited one thing making it a dyad [*25*] from the great and the small is {543} special to him. Further, in his view too the numbers are beyond the perceptibles, whereas they say that the things themselves are numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between them.

The fact that he made *the one* and the numbers be beyond the things, not treating them as the [*30*] Pythagoreans did, and that he introduced the Forms, were due to his investigation of accounts (for the previous thinkers had no share of dialectic), and the fact that he made the other nature a dyad was because he thought that the numbers, except those that were prime, were naturally well disposed to being generated from this as from some plastic material. And yet what *happens* is the contrary. For it is not [*988a*] reasonable that it should happen in the way Plato describes. For, as things stand, they make many things from the matter, whereas the Form generates only once, but what is evident is that from one matter comes one table, while the person who imposes the Form, though he is one, makes many.

And the relation of male to female is similar. For the [*5*] female is impregnated by one copulation, but the male impregnates many. And yet these are imitations of those starting-points.

About the topics of inquiry, then, Plato described things this way. It is evident, however, from what has been said, that he made use of only two causes, that of the what-it-is and that of the matter (for the Forms are the causes of the what-it-is [*10*] of other things, as *the one* is of the Forms). And what the underlying matter is, of which the Forms are said in the case of the perceptibles, and *the one* in the case of the Forms, is evidently a dyad, the great and the small. Further, he has assigned the cause of good and bad to both elements, one to each, which we say some [*15*] of the previous philosophers also looked to do—for example, Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

I.9

[*990a34*] . . . As for those who posited the Ideas, first, [1a] in looking to find the causes of the beings that exist here, [*990b*] they introduced others, equal in number to these—as if a person who wished to count the beings were to think that he would not be able to do it while there were so few of them, and so tried to count them by making more. For the Forms are pretty much equal in number to—or no fewer than—the things whose causes they were inquiring into in [*5*] proceeding from them to the Forms. For [1b] in each case there is something that has the same name, both among the other things of which there is a one over many and beyond the substances, both over the things that exist here and over the eternal things.

Further, of the ways in which we show that there are Forms none makes these evident. [2] For from some of these ways no deduction is necessarily generated, whereas from some [*10*] Forms are also generated of things of which we think there are no Forms. For, [2a] according to the arguments from the sciences, there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and [2b] according to "the one over many" there will be Forms even of negations, whereas [2c] according to the argument that there is understanding of a thing that has passed away there will be Forms of things that cease-to-be, since there is an appearance of them.

Further, of the more exact of the arguments, [*15*] [3a] some produce Ideas of relatives, of which we say there is not an intrinsic kind (*genos*), whereas [3b] others introduce the *Third Man*.

[4] And in general the arguments for the Forms do away with the things whose existence we, as people who speak of Forms,* prefer to the existence of the Ideas, since it follows [4a] that it is not the dyad that is primary but number, [4b] and that the relative [*20*] is prior to the intrinsic, as well as all the other things that certain people, by following out the beliefs held about the Ideas, have accepted contrary to the starting-points.

Further, [5a] by the supposition according to which we say that there are Ideas, there will be Ideas not only of substances but also of many other things [*25*] (for [2c] the intelligible object is a one not only where substances are concerned but also in the case of the other things, and [2a] there are sciences not only of substance but also of the other things, and countless other such difficulties arise). On the other hand, [5b] according to the necessities of the case and to the beliefs held about them, if the Forms are to be participated in, there must be Ideas of substances only, {544} for they are not participated in coincidentally but rather a thing must participate in each in this way, [*30*] namely, insofar as it is not said of an underlying subject (I mean, for example, if something participates in double-itself, it also participates in the eternal, but does so coincidentally, since it is coincidental to the double that it is eternal), so that the Forms will be substance. [6] But it is the same things that signify substance here as over there—or what will it mean to say that there is something beyond [*991a*] these things here, the one over the many? And if the Ideas and what participate in them are the same in Form, there will be something common to these. For why should the two be one and the same in the case of the twos that cease-to-be, and in those that are many but eternal, rather than in the case of [two-] itself and some particular [two]? But if [*5*] they are not the same in Form, they would be homonymous, just as if someone were to call Callias and a wooden statue a man, seeing nothing communal between them.

Above all, though, we might go through the puzzles about what on earth the Forms contribute to perceptibles, either to those that are eternal or to those that come-to-be and cease-to-be, [*10*] since [7] they are not the cause of movement or of any change whatsoever in them. [8] But then they are also no help at all either as regards the scientific knowledge of the other things, since they are not their substance (otherwise they would be in them) or [9] in relation to their being, if they are not components of the things that

participate in them. For if they were, they might perhaps seem to be causes in the way that what is white is a cause when mixed [*15*] with a white thing. But this account is all too readily upset—it is one that first Anaxagoras and later Eudoxus[14] and certain others stated. For it is easy to collect many impossibilities against a belief of this sort.

[10] But then neither is it possible to say, in any of the familiar ways of speaking, that the other things *come from* the Forms. To say [*20*] that they are paradigms and that the other things participate in them is utter empty words and poetic metaphors. For what is it that makes things by looking to the Ideas? It is possible for anything both to be like and become like another thing without being copied from it, so that whether Socrates exists or not, someone could become [*25*] like him. And the same would clearly hold even if Socrates were eternal. [11] Also, there will be more than one paradigm for the same thing and so more than one Form—for example, the Forms of the man will be the animal and the two-footed, as at the same time will be man-itself. [12] Further, the Forms will be paradigms not only of the perceptibles but also of themselves—for example, the genus, [*30*] as genus of several species. And so the same thing will be paradigm and copy.

[13] Further, it would seem to be impossible for the substance and that of which it is the substance to be separate. [*991b*] And so how could the Ideas, if they are substances of things, be separate from them?

[14] In the *Phaedo*, however, it is said as follows: the Forms are causes both of the being and of the coming-to-be of things. But even if the Forms do exist, the things that participate in them would still not come-to-be unless there was a moving cause. [*5*] Also, many other things come-to-be—for example, a house or a ring—of which [2a] we say there are no Forms. And so it is clear that it is also possible for the others to be and to come-to-be through the same causes as the things we mentioned just now.

[15] Further, if indeed the Forms are numbers, in what way will they be causes? Is it because the beings are other numbers—for example, this number here [*10*] man, this one here Socrates, and this one here Callias? If so, why are the one lot the cause of the other? For even if the one lot are eternal and the other not, it will make no difference. If, on the other hand, the things that exist here are ratios of numbers (for example, a musical concord), it is clear that there is at least one thing of which they are the

ratios. If, then, this thing—the matter—is something definite, it is evident that the numbers themselves will also be some ratios [*15*] of something to something else. I mean, for example, that if Callias is a ratio, expressible in {545} numbers, of fire, earth, water, and air, it is also of certain other underlying things that his Idea too will be a number. And man-itself, whether it is some sort of number or not, will nonetheless be a ratio, expressible in numbers, of certain things and not a number, and nor, because of this [argument], will any Idea be [*20*] a number.

[16] Further, one number may come-to-be from many numbers, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if it does not come from them themselves but from the things that are in a number (for example, in the myriad), how will it be with the monads? For if they are of the same Form, many strange things follow, as they also do if they are not of the same Form (whether the one lot as each other or all the lots as all the others). [*25*] For in which way will they differ, being without attributes? For these results are neither reasonable nor consistent with our understanding [of monads].

[17] Further, they will have to introduce some other kind (*genos*) of number (with which arithmetic is concerned), as well as all the things called "intermediates" by some thinkers. How are they to exist and from what starting-points? Or why will they be intermediate between the things we find around here and the [*30*] things themselves?

[18] Further, each of the monads in the two comes from some prior two, but this is impossible.

[19] Further, why is number, when taken all together, one? [*992a*]

[20] Further, in addition to what has been said, if indeed the monads are different, Platonists should have spoken like those who say that the elements are four, or two (for each of those says not that what is common—for example, body—is an element but rather fire and earth, [*5*] whether [they think] there is something common to them—body—or not), but in fact they speak as if *the one* were homoeomerous like fire or water. If this is so, however, the numbers will not be substances, rather it is clear that—if indeed there is some one-itself and it is a starting-point—things are said to be one in various ways. That would be impossible otherwise.

[21] When we wish to refer back substances to their [*10*] starting-points, however, we posit that lines come from the short and the long (that is, from a certain sort of small and great), plane from broad and narrow, and solid

from deep and shallow, yet how, then, will either a surface have a line or a solid have a line and a surface? For the broad and narrow is a kind (*genos*) distinct from deep and shallow. [*15*] So, just as number is not present in these, because the many and few is distinct from them, it is clear that none of the higher ones will be present in the lower ones. But then again the broad is not a kind (*genos*) of the deep either, since, then, a body would be a certain sort of plane.

[22] Further, as to the points, from what will their presence in lines come? In fact, Plato used even to contest this kind (*genos*) [*20*] as being a geometrical dogma. Instead, he called it "starting-point of line," and often posited that it consisted of indivisible lines. And yet these lines must have some limit, so that from the account on the basis of which a line exists, a point also exists.

[23] In general, though wisdom inquires into the cause of perceptible things, we left this alone (for we say nothing [*25*] about the cause from which change starts), and—thinking that we are stating the substance of these things—we say that they are yet other substances, but as for the way in which these are substances of those, we state it through empty words. For "participation," as we said earlier, means nothing.

[24] As, then, for the very thing we see to be *the* cause for the sciences, the one because of which every understanding and every [*30*] nature does things, the Forms in no way latch onto this cause either, which we say is one of the starting-points, instead mathematics has become philosophy for the present thinkers, although they say that busying ourselves with it should be for the sake of something else.

[25] Further, the substance that is the underlying subject [*992b*] as matter we might take to be too mathematical, and to be more a predicate and a differentia of the substance and of the matter than matter proper—for example, the great and the small are like the rare and the dense that the physicists also speak about, calling these the primary differentiae [*5*] of the underlying subject, since they are a sort of excess and deficiency.

{546} [26] And as for movement, if these things constitute movement, it is clear that the Forms will move. But if not, where does movement come from? For the whole investigation concerning nature has been done away with.

[27] And what seems to be easy, namely, to show that all things are one, does not come about. For by *ekthesis*[15] [*10*] it does not come about that all things are one, but—if we grant all [their assumptions]—that there is some one-itself, and not even that, if we do not grant that the universal is a genus, which in some cases is impossible.

[28] And there is no account of the lengths, surfaces, and volumes that come after the numbers, either of the way they are or will be or of what capacity they have. For these things cannot be Forms [*15*] (since they are not numbers), or intermediates (since those are the objects of mathematics), or things that cease-to-be, but appear to constitute another fourth kind (*genos*).

[29] In general, to look for the elements of beings without making distinctions, when they are said [to be] in many ways, makes it impossible to find them, and especially if one looks in this way for the sorts of elements they come from. [*20*] For from what elements will doing or undergoing or straightness come? Surely, it is not possible to get hold of them, but if indeed it is possible, it is only for the elements of substances. And so either to look for the elements of all beings or to think that we have found them is incorrect.

[30] And how could we even learn the elements of all things? For clearly we cannot start by already knowing something that is prior to them. [*25*] For just as a person who is learning geometry, though he may have prior knowledge of other things, has no prior knowledge of the things of which geometry is the science and about which he is trying to learn, so it is too, then, in the case of the other sciences, so that if there is a science of all things, of the sort some people say there is, a person who is to learn it should start by knowing nothing whatsoever. Yet all learning takes place through [*30*] things of which there is prior knowledge, either of all of them or of some of them, that is, either [a] though demonstrations or definitions (for we must have prior knowledge of the things from which the definition comes and they must be well-known), and similarly too [b] in the case of learning through induction. But then again if such knowledge were in fact innate, we might wonder *how* [*993a*] we could possess the most excellent of the sciences without being aware of it.

[31] Further, how could we come to know the things from which it comes, and how is this to be made clear? There is a puzzle about this too. For there might be a dispute about it, just as there is about certain voiced syllables. For some people say that ZA comes from S, D, and A, [5] whereas others say that it is another sound, and not any of the well known ones.

[32] Further, as to the things of which there is perception, how could someone come to know them without having the relevant perception? And yet he would have to, if in fact these are the elements from which all things come, just as complex sounds come from the elements that properly belong to them. [*10*]

Book IV

IV.1

[*1003a20*] There is a science that gets a theoretical grasp on being qua being and of the [coincidents] belonging intrinsically to it. But this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences, since none of these investigates being qua being in a universal way. Rather, each cuts off a part of being and gets a theoretical grasp on what is a[n intrinsic] coincident of that—as, for example, the mathematical [*25*] sciences do. But since we are inquiring into the starting-points and the highest causes, clearly these must be [the starting-points and causes] of some nature as it is intrinsically. So if those who were inquiring into the elements of beings were inquiring into these same starting-points, it is necessary that the elements too must be elements of being not coincidentally but qua [*30*] being. That is why it is of being qua being that we too must grasp the primary causes.

IV.2

Something is said to be in many ways, however, but with reference to one thing and one nature—that is, not homonymously. Rather, just {547} as what is healthy all has reference to health, one by safeguarding it, another [*35*] by producing it, one by being a sign of health, another because it is a recipient of it, and what is medical all has reference to the craft of medicine [*1003b*] (for one thing is said to be medical by possessing the craft of medicine, another by being naturally well disposed to it, another by being a result of the craft of medicine), and we shall find other things that are said [to be what they are] in ways similar to these, so, too, something is said to be in many ways, but all [*5*] with reference to one starting-point. For some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are attributes of substances, others because they are a route to substance, or else by being passings away, lacks, or qualities of substance, or productive or generative either of substance or of things that are said to be with reference to substance, or denials of one of these or of substance (that is why we say even of not being that it *is* not being). [*10*]

And so just as of all healthy things there is one science, so it is in the case of the others as well. For not only in the case of things that are said to be in

accord with one thing does it belong to one science to get a theoretical grasp on them, but also in the case of things that are said to be with reference to one nature, since even these are in a way said to be in accord with one thing. So it is clear that in the case of beings too it belongs to one science to get a theoretical grasp on them [*15*] qua beings. In every case, however, a science in the fullest sense is of what is primary, and on which the other things are based, and because of which they are said to be. So if this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must possess the starting-points and causes.

Of every one genus (*genos*) there is both one perception and one science —for example, grammar, which is one science, gets a theoretical grasp on all [*20*] voiced sounds. That is why to get a theoretical grasp on all the sub-kinds (*eidos*) of being qua being belongs to a science that is one in kind (*genos*), and to the sub-kinds (*eidos*) of it to get such a grasp on the sub-kinds (*eidos*).

If then being and one are the same and one nature, in that they follow along with each other, just as starting-point and cause do, but not in that they are made clear by one account (although it makes no difference if we do take them like that, instead [*25*] it in fact helps with our work). For *one human* and *a human who is* and *a human* are the same thing, and no other thing is made clear by an expression that uses two of them, “He is a human and a human who is.” On the contrary, it is clear that the two are separated neither in coming-to-be nor in ceasing-to-be, and similarly in the case of being one. And so it is evident that [*30*] the addition in these cases makes the same thing clear, and that being one is nothing beyond being. Further, the substance of each thing is one in no coincidental way, and similarly is just a certain sort of being.

So there are as many sub-kinds (*eidos*) of being as there are of being one, and to get a theoretical grasp on the what-it-is of each of them belongs to a science that is one in kind (*genos*)—I mean, for example, [*35*] on same, similar, and other such things. Pretty much all of the contraries are referred back to this starting-point. [*1004a*] The theoretical grasp we got on these in the “Selection of Contraries” [16] may suffice.

And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are [sub-kinds] of substances, and so it is necessary for there to be a primary philosophy

among them and one that follows this. For being and being one fall straightaway into kinds (*genos*), which is why the [*5*] sciences will follow these. For a philosopher is said to be what he is just like a mathematician, since mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within mathematics.

But since it belongs to one science to get a theoretical grasp on opposites, and being many is opposed to being one (and to get a theoretical grasp on the denial [*10*] and the lack belongs to one science, because in both cases we are getting a theoretical grasp on the one thing of which it is the denial or the lack, since we either say that unconditionally it does not belong or that it does not belong to some genus, and in the latter case the differentia is present beyond what is in the denial, for the denial is [just] the thing's absence, and in the case of the lack [*15*] a certain nature is also {548} involved that is the underlying subject of which it is said), and [to repeat] being many is opposed to being one, so that to know the opposites of the things we mentioned—other and unlike and unequal, and everything else that is said to be either in accord with these or in accord with being many and being one—belongs to the science we mentioned.

[*20*] But contrariety is also one of these. For contrariety is a sort of difference, and difference a sort of distinctness. So, since things are said to be one in many ways, these things will all be said to be in many ways. Nonetheless, it belongs to one science to know all of them. For it is not when they are said to be in many ways that knowing all of them belongs to distinct sciences, but when they are neither said in accord with one thing nor is there one thing to which their accounts are referred back. But since all things are referred back to what is primary, [*25*] (as, for example, all things that are said to be one are referred back to what is primarily one), this is also what we should say holds of same, other, and contraries generally. And so after determining the number of ways in which something is said to be each of them, we then have to explain, by reference to what is primary in each predication, the way things are said to be in relation to *that*. For some things will be said to be by possessing it, some by producing it, others [*30*] in other such ways.

It is evident, then, that it belongs to one science to have an account of these as well as of substance (which was one of the very puzzles we mentioned*), and that it belongs to the philosopher to be able to get a

theoretical grasp on all of them. For if it does not belong to the philosopher, then who will be [*1004b*] the investigator of whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what a contrary is, or in how many ways something is said to be a contrary? And similarly with other questions of that sort. So, since these things are intrinsic attributes of being one qua being one and of being qua being, [*5*] and not qua being numbers or lines or fire, it is clear that it belongs to that science to know both what each of them is and also their [intrinsic] coincidents. And the error made by those who investigate these questions is not that they are not doing philosophy, but that substance is a topic about which they comprehend nothing.

For just as of number qua number [*10*] there are special attributes (for example, oddness, evenness, commensurability, equality, excess, deficiency), and these belong to all numbers either intrinsically or in relation to each other (and similarly of what is solid, of what is immovable, of what is moving, of what is weightless, and of what has weight there are other special attributes), so too of being qua being there are certain [*15*] special attributes, and it is about these that it belongs to the philosopher to investigate the truth.

A sign of this is that dialecticians and sophists in fact cut the same figure as the philosopher. For sophistic is only apparently wisdom, and dialecticians discuss all [these] things, and being is common to all [these], [*20*] but clearly they discuss them because they properly belong to philosophy. So sophistic and dialectic are indeed concerned with the same kind (*genos*) as philosophy, but philosophy differs from dialectic in the way its capacity is employed, and from sophistic in the life it deliberately chooses. For dialectic employs peirastic about the issues [*25*] philosophy seeks to know about, while sophistic appears to be knowledge but isn’t.

Further, one of the two columns of contraries is a lack, and all of them are referred back to being and not being, and of being one and being many (as, for example, being at rest belongs with being one, moving belongs with being many). And pretty much everyone agrees that beings and substance are composed of contraries; [*30*] at any rate, they all say that the starting-points are contraries. For some say that they are odd and even, some that they are hot and cold, some that they are limited and unlimited, some that they are love (*philia*) and strife. And all the others are evidently also

referred back to being one and being many (let us take this referring back as established), and the starting-points posited by other thinkers also fall completely under one and many [*1005a*] as their kinds (*genos*).

So it is evident from these considerations too that it belongs to one science to get a theoretical grasp on being qua being. For all things either are or are derived from contraries and the starting-points of contraries are being one and being {549} many. And these belong to one science, whether they are said in accord with one thing or [*5*] are not said in accord with one thing (which is presumably in fact the truth). Nonetheless, even if things are said to be one in many ways, the others will be said to be one with reference to the first, and contraries similarly. And because of that—and if being or the one is not a universal and the same over all things or separable, as presumably it isn't, but some things are said to be or to be one with reference to one thing, others [*10*] in virtue of succession—and because of that [to repeat], it does not belong to the geometer to get a theoretical grasp on what a contrary is, or what completeness is, or what being or being one is, or same or other, except on a hypothetical basis.

It is clear, then, that it does belong to one science to get a theoretical grasp on being qua being, and on the attributes that it has qua being, and that the same science will get a theoretical grasp not only on substances but also on their attributes, [*15*] both the aforementioned ones and prior and posterior, genus and species, whole and part, and others of this sort.

IV.3

We do, however, have to say whether it belongs to one science or to distinct ones to get a theoretical grasp both on what in mathematics are called "axioms" and on [*20*] substance. It is evident, then, that the investigation of these does also belong to one science and, besides, that the one in question is the philosopher's. For these axioms hold of all beings, and not of some special genus separate from the others. Also, because they are true of being qua being and each genus is [a genus of] being, all people do use them. However, they use them only so far as is adequate for their purposes, that is, [*25*] so far as the genus extends about which they are carrying out their demonstrations.

So, since it is clear that these axioms hold of all things qua beings (for this is what is common to them), it belongs to the person who knows being qua

being to get a theoretical grasp on them as well. That is why none of those who investigate a part [of being]—neither geometer nor arithmetician—attempts to say anything about them, as to whether or not they are true. [*30*] But some natural scientists, as makes perfect sense, did do this, since they were the only ones who thought that they were both investigating nature as a whole and investigating being. But since there is someone further, higher than the natural scientist (for nature is one particular kind (*genos*) of being), it will belong to the one whose theoretical grasp is universal and concerned with primary substance [*35*] also to investigate these axioms. Natural science, however, is a sort of wisdom too, [*1005b*] but it is not the primary sort.

As for the attempts of some of those who speak about the truth, as to the way in which it should be accepted, they do this because of a lack of educatedness in analytics. For people should come with prior scientific knowledge of analytics, not look for it while listening [to lectures in the science they are learning].

So, that [*5*] it belongs to the philosopher—that is, to the one who gets a theoretical grasp on the nature of all substance—also to investigate the starting-points of deductions is clear. And it is fitting for the one who knows best about each kind (*genos*) to be able to state the most stable starting-points of his subject matter, and so when this is beings qua beings, the [*10*] most stable starting-points of all things. And this person is the philosopher. The most stable starting-point of all, however, is the one it is impossible to be deceived about. For such a starting-point must be both the best known—since it is things that people do not know that they can all be fooled about—and unhypothetical. For a starting-point that must be possessed by anyone who is going to apprehend *any* beings [*15*] is no hypothesis. And what someone must know who knows anything at all, he must already possess. It is clear, then, that such a starting-point is the most stable of all.

What it is, however, we must next state: it is indeed impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and also not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect (and [*20*] let us assume that we have also added as many other qualifications as might be needed to respond to logico-linguistic difficulties). This, then, is the most stable of all starting-points, since it has the aforementioned distinguishing feature. For it is impossible for anyone to take the same thing to be and not to be, as some people think

Heraclitus says. For it is not necessary [*25*] for what someone says {550} to be what he takes to be so. But if it is not possible for contraries at the same time to belong and not belong to the same thing (and let us assume that the usual qualifications have been added to this proposition too), and if what is contrary to a belief is the belief in its contradictory, then it is evident that it is impossible for the same person at the same time to take the same thing to be and not to be, [*30*] since a person who has false views on this point would hold contrary beliefs at the same time. That is why all who are carrying out a demonstration lead it back to this as an ultimate belief, since this is by nature the starting-point of all the other axioms too.

Book VI

VI.1

[*1025b2*] The starting-points and causes of beings is what we are inquiring into, and clearly qua beings. For there is some cause of health and of good physical condition, and of the objects of mathematics there are starting-points and elements and causes, and in general [*5*] every science that proceeds by thinking or that has some share in thinking is concerned with causes and starting-points, whether more exactly or more simply considered. All these sciences, however, mark off a certain being, a certain genus, and busy themselves with it, but not with being unconditionally or qua being, nor do they produce any account of the what-it-is, but starting from it—some [*10*] making it clear by means of the perceptual capacities, some getting hold of the what-it-is as a hypothesis—they in this way proceed to demonstrate the things that belong intrinsically to the genus with which they are concerned in a more necessary or in a weaker way. Which is why it is evident from such an induction that there is no demonstration of substance nor of the what-it-is, but some other way of [*15*] making it clear. Similarly too they say nothing as to whether the genus they busy themselves with does or does not exist, because it belongs to the same sort of thinking to make clear both what-it-is and whether it exists.

But since natural science too is a science concerned with a particular genus of being (for it is concerned with the sort of substance in which the starting-point of movement and [*20*] of rest is internal to itself), it is clear that it is neither a practical science nor a productive one. For in the case of producible things the starting-point is in the producer, whether this is understanding or craft or some capacity, whereas in the case of things doable in action it is in the doer, namely, deliberate choice. For what is doable in action and what is deliberately choosable are the same. And so if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, [*25*] natural science would have to be some sort of theoretical science—but a theoretical science that is concerned with such being as is capable of being moved and with the substance that in accordance with its account holds for the most part only, because it is not separable.

But we must not neglect to consider the *way* the essence or its account is, as without this inquiry produces no result. Of things defined, however, [*30*] that is, of the "whats" that things are, some are the way the snub is, others the way the concave is. And these differ because the snub is grasped in combination with the matter (for the snub is a concave *nose*), whereas the concavity is without perceptible matter. If, then, all natural things are said the way the snub is (for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, [*1026a*] and, in general, animal, and leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant; for the account of none of these is without [reference to] movement, but always includes matter), the way we must inquire into and define the what-it-is in the case of natural things is clear, as is why it belongs to the natural scientist to get a theoretical grasp even on some of the soul, [*5*] that is, on as much of it as is not without matter.

That natural science is a theoretical science, then, is evident from these considerations. Mathematics too is a theoretical one, but whether its objects are immovable and separable is not now clear; however, that some parts of mathematics get a theoretical grasp on their objects insofar as they are immovable and insofar as they are separable is clear. But if there is something that is eternal and immovable and [*10*] separable, it is evident that knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to *natural* science (for natural science is concerned with certain moveable things) nor to mathematics, but to something prior to both. For natural science is concerned with things inseparable but not {551} immovable,* while certain parts of mathematics are concerned with things immovable and not separable but as in matter. [*15*] The primary science, by contrast, is concerned with things that are both separable and immovable. Now all causes are necessarily eternal, and these most of all. For they are the causes of the divine beings that are perceptible. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematical, natural, and theological, since it is quite clear that if the divine belongs anywhere, it belongs in a nature of this sort. [*20*] And of these, the most estimable must be concerned with the most estimable genus. Thus, the theoretical are the more choiceworthy of the various sciences, and this of the theoretical.

We might raise a puzzle indeed as to whether the primary philosophy is universal or concerned with a particular genus and one particular nature. For it is not the same way even in [*25*] the mathematical sciences, but rather

geometry and astronomy are concerned with a particular nature, whereas universal mathematics is common to all. If, then, there is no other substance beyond those composed by nature, natural science will be the primary science. But if there is some immovable substance, this [that is, theological philosophy] will be prior and will be primary philosophy, and it will be universal in this way, [*30*] namely, because it is primary. And it will belong to it to get a theoretical grasp on being qua being, both what it is and the things that belong to it qua being.

VI.2

But since being is said unconditionally of things in many ways, of which one was coincidentally, another as being true, and not being as false, while beyond these [*35*] there are the figures of predication (for example, what a thing is, quality, quantity, place, time, and anything else that "being" signifies in this way), and beyond these again potential being [*1026b*] and active being—since, then, things are said to be in many ways, we must first say about the coincidental sort that there can be no theoretical knowledge about it.

A sign of this is that no science, whether practical, productive, or theoretical, supervises it. [*5*] For someone who produces a house does not produce all the things that coincide with the house at the time it is coming into being, since these are unlimited in number. For there is nothing to prevent the house he has produced from being pleasant to some, harmful to others, beneficial to others, and distinct from practically all other beings. But the craft of building is not productive of any of these. In the same way, a [*10*] geometer does not get a theoretical grasp on what is in this fashion coincidental to his figures, nor whether a triangle and a triangle having interior angles equal to two right angles are distinct. And this happens quite reasonably, since "coincidental" is like "in name only."

. . . Since, then, of the beings, some are always [*27*] the way they are and of necessity so (not in the sense in which we say that something is forced but in the sense in which we say that it does not admit of being otherwise), while others are the way they are neither of necessity nor always but for the most part—*this* [*30*] is starting-point and this the cause of the existence of the coincidental. For what is neither always nor for the most part—that is what we say is coincidental. For example, if in the dog-days we have storm

and cold, we say that it is a coincidence, but not if we have stifling heat, because the latter occurs always or for the most part, the former not. Also, that the human [*35*] is pale is coincidental (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but he is not an animal coincidentally. And that the builder cures someone is coincidental, because it is not the builder who naturally does this [*1027a*] but the doctor—but the builder was by coincidence a doctor. And the gourmet cook, aiming to give pleasure, might produce something healthy, but not in accordance with the craft of gourmet cooking. That is why it was a coincidence, we say, and in a way he produces it, but not unconditionally. For of other things there are sometimes capacities [*5*] that are productive of them,* whereas of some there is no definite craft or capacity. For of things that are or come-to-be coincidentally the cause too is coincidentally [a cause].

And so since not all things either are or come-to-be of necessity and always, but most are for the most part, what is coincidentally must of necessity exist—for [*10*] example, a pale human is neither always nor for the most part musical, but since it happens sometimes [that he is], it will be coincidentally—otherwise everything will be {552} of necessity. And so the matter that is capable of being otherwise than it for the most part is will be the cause of the coincidental.

We must grasp this starting-point [when we ask] whether there is nothing that is neither always [*15*] nor for the most part or whether this is impossible. There is, in that case, something beyond these, namely, what is so by luck and coincidentally. But while it belongs to some things to be for the most part, does it belong to none to be always, or is there something eternal? Well, these topics will have to be investigated later. But that there is no scientific knowledge of the coincidental is evident. For all scientific knowledge [*20*] is either of what always is or of what for the most part is.

For how else could one learn, or teach someone else? For a thing must be defined either by what is always or by what is for the most part—for example, that honey-water is beneficial to a fever-patient for the most part. But the exceptions to this cannot be stated, I mean when this does not happen—for example, on the day of the new moon. For it is either always or for the most part that even [*25*] what happens on the day of the new moon happens. But the coincidental is an exception to that.

We have said, then, what the coincidental is, and due to what cause, and that there is no scientific knowledge of it.

Book VII

VII.1

Something is said to be in many ways, which we distinguished earlier [*1028a10*] in our discussion of the many ways. For on the one hand it signifies the what-it-is and a this-something, and on the other quality, quantity, or one of the other things predicated as these are. But while things are said to be in this many ways, it is evident that primary among these is the what-it-is, which is just what signifies the substance. For when we say how this thing is qualified we say that it is good [*15*] or bad, but not that it is three cubits or a human, whereas when we say what it is we do not say pale or hot or three cubits, but a human, or a god. And the other things are said to be, some by being quantities of what is a being in this way, others qualities, others affections, others something else of this sort.

That is why someone might indeed be puzzled about whether walking [*20*] and being healthy and sitting are each of them a being or not a being, and similarly too in the case of any other thing of this sort. For none of these is either by its nature intrinsically a being or capable of being separated from substance but, if anything, it is the walking thing that belongs among the beings, and the sitting thing, and the one being healthy. These things [*25*] are evidently beings to a higher degree, because there is some definite underlying subject for them (and this is the substance and the particular), which is just what is made apparent in this sort of predication. For good and sitting are not said of things without this. It is clear, then, that it is because of this that each of these other things *is* as well, so that what primarily is—not is something [else] [*30*] but is unconditionally—will be the substance.

Now things are said to be primary in many ways. Nonetheless, the substance is primary in all of them—in account, in knowledge, and in time. For of the various things that are predicated none is separable, but only this. And in account too it is primary, since in the account of each thing its account is necessarily present as a component. And we think we know each thing most of all, [*35*] when we know, for example, what a human is, or fire, rather than when we know the quality or the quantity or the place, since of these things themselves also we know each one when we know, [*1028b*] for example, *what* the quantity or the quality *is*.

Indeed, the question that was asked long ago, is now, and always will be asked, and is always giving rise to puzzles—namely, What is being?—is just the question, What is substance? (For this is what some people say is one, others more than one, and some that it is limited, others [*5*] that it is unlimited.) And that is why we too must most of all and primarily and practically even exclusively get a theoretical grasp on what it is that is a being in this [substantial] way.

VII.2

Substance seems to belong most evidently to bodies. That is why we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural {553} bodies, such as fire, [*10*] water, earth, and each thing of this sort, as well as such things, whether all or some, as are parts of these or from which they are composed (for example, the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun), but whether these alone are substances, or others as well, or some of these and some others as well, or none of these but some others, is something that must be investigated. [*15*]

It seems to some people that the limits of body—for example, surface, line, point, and unit—are substances, and more so than body and solid. Further, some think that beyond the perceptible things there is not anything of that sort, whereas others think that there are more [substances than that] and that they are beings to a higher degree, because they are eternal. Thus Plato thought that the Forms and the objects of mathematics were two sorts of substances, and that [*20*] the substance of perceptible bodies was a third. And Speusippus[17] thought that there were even more substances, starting from the one, as well as starting-points for each sort of substance, one for numbers, another for magnitudes, and then another for the soul. And by going on in this way he multiplies the substances. And some say that the Forms and the numbers have the same nature, [*25*] and that the others—lines and planes—follow after them, right up to the substance of the heaven and the perceptibles.

Concerning these topics, then, what is said correctly or incorrectly—that is, which things are substances, and whether there are any beyond the perceptible ones or not, and the way these latter ones are, and whether there is any substance that is separate, and if so why and in what way, [*30*] or

whether there is none beyond the perceptibles—must be investigated. But first we must give a sketch of what the substance is.

VII.3

Something is said to be the substance, if not in more ways, at any rate most of all in four. For the essence, the universal, and the genus seem to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly, [*35*] the underlying subject of these.

The underlying subject is that of which the other things are said, but which is itself never said of any other thing, which is why we must first determine what it is. For the primary underlying subject seems most of all to be substance. [*1029a*]

Well, in one way the matter is said to be a thing of this sort, in another way the shape, and in a third what is composed of these. (By the matter I mean, for example, the bronze; by the shape, the configuration of the perceptible form; and by what is composed of these, the statue—the compound.) And so if the [*5*] form is prior to the matter and more of a being, it will also be prior to what is composed of both of them, for the same reason.

It has now been said in outline what the substance is, namely, what is not said of an underlying subject, but of which the other things are said. But we should not say only this, since it is not enough, and furthermore the matter becomes substance. [*10*] For if this is not substance, it escapes us what else is. For when the others are stripped away, we do not see anything remaining. For while the others are affections, products, and capacities of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances (for the quantity is not substance). Rather, [*15*] that primary thing to which these belong, *that* is substance. But when length, breadth, and depth are stripped away, nothing apparent remains, unless it be something that is given definition by these, so that the matter alone must appear to be substance for those who investigate in this way. (By matter I mean that which, intrinsically, is neither said to be something, nor some quantity, nor anything else [*20*] by which being is given definition. For there is something that each of these is predicated of, whose being is distinct from that of each of the things predicated. For while the other things are predicated of the substance, this is predicated of the matter. And so the last thing [in this series] will not be intrinsically something, or a quantity, or

anything else—nor indeed is it the denials of these, since they too [*25*] belong to it coincidentally.) Well then, for those who try to get a theoretical grasp on things in this way, the matter turns out to be substance. But this is impossible. In {554} fact both separability and being a this-something seem to belong most of all to the substance, and because of this the form and the thing composed of both would seem to be substance more than the matter is. But the substance that is composed of both (I mean [*30*] from both the matter and the shape) should be set aside. For it is posterior, and evident. And the matter too is in a way evident. But the third must be investigated. For it is most puzzling.

It is agreed that some perceptibles are substances, and so it is among these that it should first be looked for. For [*1029b3*] it advances the work to proceed toward what is more knowable. For learning comes about for all in this way—through things by nature less knowable toward ones that are more knowable. And just as with things in the sphere of action [*5*] the work is to begin from things that are good for each and make things that are wholly good good for each, so too the work here is to begin from things more knowable to oneself and make the ones that are by nature knowable knowable to oneself. But the things that are knowable and primary for particular groups of people are often only slightly knowable and have little or nothing of the being in them. Nonetheless, beginning from things that are poorly known but known [*10*] to ourselves, we must try to know the ones that are wholly knowable, proceeding, as has just been said, through the former.[18]

VII.4

Since at the start we determined in how many ways we define the substance, [*1029b*] and of these one seemed to be the essence, we must get a theoretical grasp on it. And first let us say some things about it in a logico-linguistic way, because [*1029b13*] the essence of each thing is what it is said to be intrinsically. For the being for you is not the same as the being for musical. For you are not intrinsically musical. [Your essence], therefore, is what you are [said to be] [*15*] intrinsically.

But not, certainly, all of this. For what is intrinsic in this way is not so in the way that pale is to surface, because the being for a surface is not the

same as the being for pale. But neither is it the being that is composed of both, namely, the being for a pale surface, because surface itself is added. Hence the account in which the thing itself is not present, but it itself is said, this is the account of the essence for each thing. [*20*] And so if the being for a pale surface is the same as the being for a smooth surface, then the being for pale and for smooth will be one and the same.

But since there are composites from the other categories too (for there is some underlying subject for each—for example, for the quality, the quantity, the time, the place, and the movement), whether there is also an account of the [*25*] essence for each of these must be investigated, and whether the essence belongs to them as well—for example, to pale human. Let us, then, give this the name "cloak." What is the being for a cloak? But then this is not one of the things said to be intrinsically either. Or, are things said intrinsically not to be in two ways, one being from an addition and the other [*30*] not? For in one case what is being defined is said to be by being added to another thing—for example, if someone defining the being for pale were to state the account of pale human; in the other case, what is being defined is said to be by another thing not being added to it—for example, if the cloak signified pale human, but someone were to define the cloak as pale. (The pale human is indeed pale in that case, but not, surely, what being for pale was.) [*1030a*]

But [what about] the cloak? Is the being for it an essence at all? Or not? For the essence is just what something is.* But when one thing is said of another, it is not just a this-something—for example, the pale human is not just a this-something, if indeed the "this" [*5*] belongs only to the substances. And so there will be an essence only for those things whose account is a definition. We have a definition, however, not when a name and an account signify the same thing (for then all the accounts would be definitions, since there will be a name answering to any account whatever, so that even the *Iliad* will be a definition), but when the account is of something primary; and primary things are those that are said [*10*] *not* by way of saying one thing of another. Hence the essence will belong to things that are species of a genus and to nothing else. For these {555} seem not to be said by way of participation and by way of being an attribute, or in a coincidental way. But there will be an account of each of the other things too and what it signifies, [stating] if is a name, that this belongs to this, [*15*] or, instead of a simple

account, a more exact one. There will not, however, be a definition or an essence.

Or is something said to be the definition in many ways too, just like the what-it-is? For in fact the what-it-is signifies in one way the substance and the this-something, and in another way it signifies each of the other things that are predicated—quantity, quality, and the like. [*20*] For just as *is* (*to estin*) also belongs to all of them, but not in the same way, but to one in a primary way and to the others in a derivative one, so too the what-it-is belongs unconditionally to the substance and *in a way* to the others. For we can also ask what quality is, and so quality too is something with a what-it-is—but not unconditionally. Rather, just as in the case of what is not (*to mē on*), some people say in a logico-linguistic way [*25*] that what is not is (not that it is unconditionally but that it is what is not), so too with the quality.

We must, then, also investigate how we should speak about each of them, but not more than how the thing in fact is. That is why now too, since what is said is evident, it is also evident that the essence will belong in a similarly primary and unconditional way to the substance, and derivatively to the others, just as [*30*] with the what-it-is—not the unconditional essence, but the essence for a quality, or for a quantity. For it must either be homonymously that we say that these things are beings, or by adding something or by subtracting something, just as what is not scientifically known is scientifically known. (For what is correct, surely, is that they are said [to be] neither homonymously nor in the same way, but as with "medical," with reference to [*35*] one and the same thing—not saying one and the same thing, but not speaking homonymously either. [*1030b*] For a patient, a function, and an implement are said to be medical neither homonymously nor in accord with one thing but rather with reference to one thing.) But whichever of the two ways we propose to say these things [are beings] makes no difference. This, however, is evident: that in the primary and unconditional way definition and the essence belong to the [*5*] substances. Not that they do not also equally belong to the other things, except not in the primary way.

For it is not necessary, if we accept this view, for there to be a definition of this sort whenever a name signifies the same thing as an account, but as an account of a certain sort, and this occurs if it is of something that is one—not by continuity, like the *Iliad*, or by being tied together, [*10*] but one in

the ways in which things are said to be one. But things are said to be one as they are said to be, and being signifies on the one hand the this-something and on the other some quality or quantity. That is why there will be an account of pale human and a definition, but in another way than there is of pale and of substance.

VII.6

But whether each thing is the same as or distinct from its essence [*15*] must be investigated. For this will advance the work relating to the investigation concerning substance. For each thing seems to be nothing other than its own substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each.

Well, in the case of things said [to be what they are] coincidentally they certainly seem to be distinct—for example, a pale human seems to be distinct from the being for a pale [*20*] human. For if they were the same, the being for human and for the pale human would be the same. For a human [who is coincidentally pale] and a pale human are the same, as they say, so the being for a pale human and for a human would be the same too. Or is there no necessity for things that are coincidentally [the same] to be the same? For the extreme terms do not become the same in the same way. But [*25*] perhaps *this* might seem to follow, namely, that the extreme terms would be the same coincidentally*—for example, the being for pale and the being for musical. But it seems not to.

In the case of things that are said to be intrinsically, however, is it necessary that the thing be the same [as its being or essence]? For example, if there are some substances to which no substances or any other natures are prior, of the sort that some people say the [*30*] Ideas are? For if the good-itself and the being for a good are distinct, also animal [-itself] and the being for an animal, {556} also the being for a being and being, then there will be other substances and natures and Ideas beyond those that were mentioned, [*1031b*] and these other substances will be prior too, if the essence is substance, and if the two are detached from each other, then there will be no scientific knowledge of the former ones and the latter ones will not be beings. (By “detached from each other” I mean if the being for good neither belongs to the good itself [*5*] nor being good to the being for a good.) For there is scientific knowledge of each thing when we know its essence. And what holds in the case of the good holds equally for the

others, so that if not even the being for good is a good, then neither will the being for a being be a being nor will the being for one be a one. Similarly, either all the essences are, or none of them are, so that if not even the essence for a being is a being, then none of the others is either. [*10*] Further, that to which the essence for a good does not belong is not a good.

The good, then, is necessarily one with being for a good, and similarly beauty and being for a beauty, and so with all things that are not said to be with reference to something else but are intrinsic and primary. For it is in fact enough if this feature belongs to them, even if they are not Forms, but more so, presumably, if they are Forms. At the same time, however, it is also clear that if indeed [*15*] the Forms are as some people say, the underlying subject will not be substance. For the Forms are necessarily substances, but not by being [predicated of] an underlying subject. For then they will be by way of being participated in.

On the basis of these arguments, then, each thing itself and its essence are one and the same, and not in a coincidental way; also, because to scientifically know each thing is just this, [*20*] to scientifically know its essence, so that even by *ekthesis* the two must be one and the same.

On the other hand, of what is said to be coincidentally, for example, the musical or the pale, because it has a double signification, it is not true to say that it and its essence are the same. For both what is coincided with and what does the coinciding are pale, so that [*25*] in one way it and its essence are the same, and in another not the same. For the pale is not the same as the human, that is, as the pale human, but it is the same as the attribute [pallor].

An absurdity would become apparent if we assigned a name to each of the essences. For beyond this original one, there will be another—for example, for the essence for a horse there will be another essence. [*30*] Yet what is to prevent, even as things stand, some things from being their essences straightaway, if indeed the essence is substance? But then, not only are they one, but also the accounts of them are the same, as is clear even from what has been said. [*1032a*] For it is not coincidentally that one and the being for one are the same. Further, if they are distinct, it goes on without limit. For on the one hand there will be an essence for the one and on the other hand there will be the one, so that the same argument will apply to these as well.

It is clear, then, that in the case of the things that are primary and that are said to be intrinsically, [*5*] the being for each thing and the thing are one and the same. And it is evident that sophistical refutations of this thesis are to be resolved using the same resolution as in whether Socrates and the being of Socrates are the same. For there is no difference either in the materials on the basis of which we would raise our questions or in those on the basis of which we would find a resolution of them.

We have said, then, in what way the essence of each thing is the same as the thing and in what way [*10*] it is not the same.

VII.7

Of things that come-to-be, however,* some do so by nature, some by craft, and some from chance, but they all come-to-be both as a result of (*hupo*) something and of or from (*ek*) something, and they all come-to-be something (*ti*)—the "something" I mean may be of any category, since things come-to-be a this, or of some quality, or of some quantity, or somewhere. [*15*]

The natural comings to be are those of the things whose coming-to-be is from (*ek*) a nature. What they come-to-be of (*ek*) is what we call matter; that as a result of which they come-to-be is something that is by nature a being; and the something they come-to-be is a human or a plant or something else of this sort, which we {557} say are substances most of all. And all the things that come-to-be either by nature or by craft have matter. [*20*] For each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this is the matter in each. In universal terms, then, that from (*ek*) which is a nature, and that in accord with which is a nature (for what comes-to-be has a nature, for example, a plant or an animal), and also that as a result of which. This is the one that is said to be the nature that is in accord with the form, which is the same in form [as what comes-to-be], but in another thing—for human begets human.

That, then, is the way [*25*] things come-to-be that come-to-be because of a nature. The other comings to be are called *productions*. All productions come either from craft, or from some capacity, or from thought. But some of them, however, may come about from chance or from luck, in a way quite similar to the ones found in those that come-to-be from a nature. For sometimes [*30*] there too some of the same things come-to-be either from

(*ek*) seed or without seed. But we must investigate these later. From craft, though, come-to-be the things whose form is in the soul. And by form I mean the [*1032b*] essence of each thing and the primary substance. For even contraries in a way have the same form. For the opposing substance is the substance of the lack. For example, health is the substance of disease, since disease is [defined] by its absence. And health is the account in the soul and the scientific [*5*] knowledge [of the form]. So what is healthy comes-to-be when one has understood as follows: Since this is what health is, necessarily if the thing is to be healthy this must be present—for example, a uniform state—and if the latter is to be present, there must be heat, and the doctor goes on, always understanding in this way, until he is led to a final this that he himself is able to produce. Then the movement from this point onward is called a production—the one that leads to being healthy. [*10*] And so it turns out that in a way health is produced from (*ek*) health, and a house from (*ek*) a house, the one that has matter from (*ek*), the one without matter. For the craft of medicine and the craft of house-building are the form of health and of a house. By the substance without matter I mean the essence.

Of comings into being and movements, one part is called understanding and the other [*15*] producing—what proceeds from the starting-point and form is understanding, what proceeds from the final stage of understanding is producing. And each of the other things—the ones in between—comes-to-be in the same way. I mean, for example, if he is to be healthy, he must be made uniform. But what is it to be made uniform? This—and that will come about if he is made warm. And what is it to be made warm? This. [*20*] And this is present potentially; and for it to be actually present is up to [the doctor] himself. What produces, then, and what the process of becoming healthy starts from, if it is from craft, is the form in the soul, but if it is from chance, it is from whatever it is that is a starting-point of producing for what produces from craft. For example, in the case of healing the starting-point is presumably from the warming, [*25*] which the doctor produces by rubbing. Warmth in the body, therefore, is either a part of health or else something similar that is part of health follows it, either immediately or by way of several steps, and this last thing is the part that produces health and is itself in this way a part of health, and of a house (the stones, for

example), and similarly of other things. And so, as is said, [*30*] coming-to-be is impossible if there is nothing preexisting.

Indeed, that some part must be present is evident. For the matter is a part, since it is this that is present within the thing and comes-to-be it. But is it also one of the things in the [*1033a*] account? Well, we do speak in both ways when we say what brazen circles are, speaking of the matter when we say that it is bronze, and of the form when we say that it is a shape of such-and-such sort (shape being the genus in which it is first placed). The brazen circle, then, does have the matter in its account.

As for that from (*ek*) which as [*5*] matter they come-to-be, some, when they have come-to-be, are said not to be *that* but *of* that—for example, a statue is not said to be stone, but of stone. The human being who is of health, by contrast, is not said to be of that from which (*ek*) he comes.* The cause of this is that although he comes-to-be from (*ek*) both the lack and from (*ek*) the underlying subject, which we call the matter (for {558} example, it is both the human and the sick that come-to-be healthy), [*10*] it is rather from (*ek*) the lack, nevertheless, that he is said to come-to-be—for example, healthy comes from (*ek*) sick rather than from (*ek*) human. That is why the healthy one is not said to be sick, but is said to be human, and the human said to be healthy. In cases where the lacks are unclear or nameless, however, such as the lack of whatever shape it happens to be in bronze, or in bricks and timbers that of a house, the thing seems to come-to-be from (*ek*) these materials as [*15*] in the previous case it did from being sick.

That is why, just as in that case the thing is not said to be what it is from, so in these cases too the statue is not said to be wood (*xulon*), but by derivation, wooden (*xulinos*), and brazen, not bronze, and of stone, not stone, and the house is said to be of bricks but not bricks. But it is not the case either that a statue *comes-to-be* from (*ek*) wood, or a house from (*ek*) bricks, since if someone [*20*] looked intensely, he would not say this unconditionally, because what something comes-to-be from (*ek*) must change, and not remain. That, then, is why we speak in this way.

VII.8

Since what comes-to-be, comes-to-be as a result of something (by which I mean the starting-point that the coming-to-be is from) and from (*ek*) something (and let [*25*] this be not the lack but the matter—for we have

already determined the way in which we say this) and comes-to-be something (and this is either a sphere or a circle or whichever of the others it happens to be), just as the producer does not make the underlying subject (the bronze), so he does not make the sphere either, except coincidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere [*30*] and he does make the former. For to make the this-something is to make a this-something from (*ek*) what is wholly the underlying subject.

I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make the round or the bronze but a distinct thing, namely, this form in something else. For if the producer makes something, he must make it from (*ek*) something else (for we assumed this). For example, he makes a brazen [*1033b*] sphere, but in such a way that from (*ek*) this, which is bronze, he makes this, which is a sphere. If, then, he also made this [matter] itself, it is clear that he will make it in the same way, and the productions will go on without limit.

It is evident, therefore, that neither does the form itself—or whatever we ought to call [*5*] the shape that is in the perceptible thing—come-to-be,* nor is there any coming-to-be of it, or of the essence (for it is this that comes-to-be in something else, whether as a result of craft or as a result of nature or of some capacity). But the producer does make a brazen sphere to be. For he produces it from (*ek*) bronze and sphere. For in this he produces the form, and the result is a brazen sphere. [*10*] But if there is going to be a coming-to-be of the being of sphere in general, then it will have to be a something [that comes-to-be] from (*ek*) something. For whatever is coming-to-be must always be divisible, and be on the one hand this and on the other this. I mean, that it must be on the one hand the matter and on the other the form. If, then, a sphere is the shape that is equidistant from its center, then one component of this is what the producer makes will be in, and the other is what will be in that one, and the whole thing is what has come-to-be—for [*15*] example, the brazen sphere. It is evident, then, from what has been said, that what is said to be the substance as form does not come-to-be, but that the compound that is said with reference to this, does come-to-be, and that in everything that comes-to-be matter is present, and that it is on the one hand this and on the other this.*

Is there, then, any sphere beyond these ones, or any house beyond the one of bricks?* [*20*] Or would there never have been any coming-to-be of any this-something, if there were, but instead sphere or house signifies such-

and-such sort of thing, and not a this and a definite thing, and a maker makes or begets from (*ek*) this [matter], such-and-such sort of thing, and when it has come-to-be, it is this thing of such-and-such sort? And the whole this—for example, Callias or Socrates—is like this brazen sphere, while the animal and the human are like [*25*] brazen sphere in general.

It is evident, therefore, that the cause consisting of the Forms (if these are the way some people are accustomed to say the Forms are, namely, {559} things beyond the particulars), is of no use, at any rate where comings to be and the substances are concerned, and they would not be intrinsically substances because of these, at any rate.

In some cases indeed it is even evident that the begetter is of this same sort as the begotten [*30*] (not that they are the same thing, certainly, nor one in number, but one in form)—for example, in the case of natural things. For human begets human—unless what is begotten is contrary to nature, as when a horse begets a mule. (And even these are similar. For what would be common to both horse and donkey, the closest genus, does not have a name, but would presumably be both, [*1034a*] like a mule.) And so it is evident that there is no need to fabricate a Form as a paradigm (for it was in the case of natural things that Forms were looked for most of all, since these are most of all substances), rather, the begetter is adequate to produce the thing, and is the cause of the form being in the matter. And once we have the whole, [*5*] such-and-such sort of form in this flesh and bones, this is Callias or Socrates. And they are distinct because of their matter (for that is distinct), but the same in form (for the form is indivisible).

VII.10

Since, however, the definition is an account, and every account has parts, [*1034b20*] and as the account is to the thing, so the part of the account is to the part of the thing, a puzzle already arises as to whether the account of the parts needs to be present in the account of the whole or not. For in some cases they evidently are present, but in some not. For the account of the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas that of the [*25*] syllable does contain that of the phonetic elements. And yet the circle divides into the segments just as the syllable divides into the phonetic elements.

Further, if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle and the finger is part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle and the finger to the human. But the wholes seem to be [*30*] prior. For in the account the parts are described in terms of the wholes, which are also prior with respect to being without each other.

Or perhaps something is said to be a *part* in many ways. Of these, one way is: what measures with respect to quantity. But this we may set aside. On the other hand, the things from which the substance is composed as parts—this [way of being a part] must be investigated. If, then, there is the matter, the form, and the thing composed of them, and [*1035a*] the matter, the form, and the thing composed of them are substance, then there is a way in which even the matter is said to be a part [of the thing], and a way in which it is not it that is said to be a part but rather the things of which the account of the form is composed. For example, of the concavity flesh is not a part (for this is the matter in which it comes-to-be), but of the snubness [*5*] it is a part. And of the compound statue the bronze is a part, but of what is said to be a statue as form it is not a part. For each thing may be said to be the form, or the thing insofar as it has the form, but may never be said to be intrinsically the material component.

That is why the account of the circle does not contain that of the segments, whereas that of the syllable does contain that of the phonetic elements. [*10*] For the phonetic elements are parts of the account of the form, and are not matter, whereas the segments are parts in this way, namely, as matter in which the form comes-to-be—although they are closer to the form than the bronze is to the circle when circularity comes-to-be in bronze. But there is a way in which not even all phonetic elements will be present in the account of the syllable—for example, these here in the wax [*15*] or the ones [that are movements] in the air. For these too are already part of the syllable as perceptible matter. For even if the line when divided passes away into the halves, or the human into the bones, sinews, and flesh, it is not the case that because of this they are composed of these as being parts of the substance, but rather as from matter; and of the [*20*] compound, they are parts, but of the form and what the account is of they are not parts at all. That is why they are not present in the accounts either.

In the account of some things, then, the account of the parts that are such as these will be present, whereas in that of others it must not be, that is, if it

is not of the combination [of the matter and the form]. For this is why some things {560} [come-to-be] from those [materials] as starting-points into which they cease-to-be, whereas other things do not.

Things, in fact, that are combinations of the [*25*] form and the matter, for example, the snub or the brazen circle, are the ones that cease-to-be into these parts, and a part of them is the matter. On the other hand, things with which the matter is not combined, but are without matter, are things whose accounts are of the form alone, and these do not cease-to-be, either at all or not in *this* way. And so of the combinations these are starting-points and parts, [*30*] but of the forms they are neither parts nor starting-points. And that is why the statue of clay passes away into clay, the [brazen] sphere into bronze, Callias into flesh and bones, and furthermore the circle into the segments (for as something combined with the matter it does do this). For something is said to be the circle homonymously, [since the term is applied] both to the one said to be such unconditionally [*1035b*] and to the particular one, because there is no name special to the particular ones.

The truth has now been stated, but nonetheless let us take up the topic again and state it yet more perspicuously. For the parts of the account, into which the account is divided, are prior to it—either [*5*] all or some. The account of the right angle, however, does not divide into the account of the acute angle, rather, that of the acute divides into the right. For the person defining the acute makes use of the right. For the acute angle is one that is less than a right. Similarly related too are the circle and the semicircle. For the semicircle is defined by the circle and so is the finger by the [*10*] whole, since a finger is such-and-such sort of part of a human. And so those things that are parts as matter, into which a thing divides as into matter, are posterior, whereas those that are parts as parts of the account and of the substance, namely, the one that is in accord with the account, are prior—either all or some.

Now since the soul of animals (for this is substance of the animate) is the substance that is in accord with the account and [*15*] is the form and the essence of such-and-such sort of body (certainly each part, if it is to be defined correctly, will not be defined without its function, which it could not have without perception), it follows that the parts of this are prior, either all or some, to the compound animal, and similarly, then, to each particular animal, whereas the body and its parts will be posterior, [*20*] and what is

divided into these as into matter is not the substance but the compound. These bodily parts, then, are in a way prior to the compound, but in a way not, since they cannot even exist when they are separated. For it is not a finger in any and every state that is the finger of an animal, rather, a dead finger is only homonymously a finger. Some of these parts, however, are simultaneous, namely, the ones that are controlling and in which [*25*] the account and the substance are first found—for example, the heart, perhaps, or the brain (for it makes no difference which of them is of this sort).

The human and the horse, though, and things that are in this way set over the particulars, that is, [taken] universally, are not substance but rather a compound of a sort, [consisting] of this account and this matter taken universally. As a particular, though, Socrates is already composed of the ultimate matter, [*30*] and similarly in the other cases.

A part, then, can be a part either of the form (by form I mean the essence), or of the compound that is composed of the form and the matter itself.* But only the parts of the form are parts of the account, and the account is of the universal. For the being for circle and circle and the being for soul [*1036a*] and soul are the same. But of what is already a compound such as this circle, that is, one of the particular ones, whether perceptible or intelligible (by intelligible ones I mean for example the mathematical ones, by perceptible ones, for example the brazen or wooden ones)—of these there is no definition, but it is with [*5*] understanding or perception that they are known, and when they depart from this actuality it is not clear whether they are or are not. But these are always said to be and are always known by means of the universal account. But the matter is intrinsically unknowable. Some matter is perceptible, however, while some is intelligible—perceptible matter being, for example, bronze, wood, and any matter that is movable, [*10*] and intelligible matter being the sort that is in the perceptible things but not insofar as they are perceptible, such as the objects of mathematics.

{561} The way things stand concerning whole and part and concerning the prior and posterior has now been stated. And it is necessary to say in response, when someone asks whether it is the right angle, the circle, and the animal that are prior or the things into which they are divided [*15*] and from which they are composed, that it cannot be answered simply. For if even the soul is animal or animate thing, or each thing is its soul, and if the

circle is being for the circle, and the right angle is being for the right angle (that is, the substance of the right angle), then some [whole] should be said to be posterior to some [parts], for example, to the parts in the account and to the parts of the particular right angle, since both the one with the [*20*] matter, the brazen right angle, and the one in particular lines are posterior to these. The right angle without matter, by contrast, is posterior to the parts in the account, but prior to the parts in the particular right angle—unconditionally prior to its parts, however, it should not be said to be. If, on the other hand, the soul is a distinct thing and is not animal, even then some parts must be said to be prior and some must not be said to be, as was stated. [*25*]

VII.11

A puzzle quite sensibly arises, however, as to what sorts of parts are parts of the form and what sorts are not parts of it but rather of the combination. And yet if this is not clear it is not possible to define each thing. For the definition is of the universal and of the form. If, then, it is not evident which sorts of parts are parts as matter and which sorts are not, the account of the thing will not be evident either. [*30*]

In the case of things that evidently come-to-be in different kinds (*eidos*) [of materials], as circle does in bronze and stone and wood it seems clear that these, [for example,] the bronze or the wood, are no part of the substance of the circle, because of being separate from them. But in the case of things that are not seen being separate, nothing prevents the situation from being similar, [*35*] just as if all the circles that had ever been seen were of bronze. [*1036b*] For nonetheless the bronze would still be no part of the form, but it would be difficult to subtract it in thought. For example, the form of the human is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this sort. Are these, then, also parts of the form and of the account? Or are they not [parts of these], [*5*] but rather matter—but because the form never comes-to-be in anything else it is impossible to separate it?

Since, however, this does seem to be possible, but unclear when, some people already raise the puzzle even in the case of the circle and the triangle, supposing that it is not proper to define these in terms of lines and the continuous, but that all these too should be said [of things] in the way [*10*] flesh and blood are of the human or bronze and stone of the statue. And

so they lead everything back to numbers, and say that the account of line is that of [the number] two. And of those who accept the Ideas, some say that the dyad is the line-itself, some that it is the Form of the line, since while in some cases the Form [*15*] and what it is the Form of are the same (for example, the dyad and the Form of the dyad), in the case of the line this is not at all so.

It follows, then, that there is both one Form of many things whose forms are evidently distinct (which is just what followed for the Pythagoreans too), and that it will be possible to make one Form-itself of all things, and make the others not Forms—and yet in this way all things will be one. [*20*]

That there is a puzzle, then, where definitions are concerned, and due to what cause, has been stated. And that is why to lead all things back to Forms in this way and to subtract the matter is beside the point. For some things presumably are this in this, or these things in this state. And the comparison in the case of animal that Socrates the younger[19] used to make is not correct. [*25*] For it leads away from the truth and makes us suppose that the human can exist without the parts, as the circle can without the bronze. But the case is not similar. For the animal is something capable of perception,* and it is not possible to define it without movement, nor, therefore, without the parts in a certain state. For it is not the hand in any and every state [*30*] that is a part of the human, but one that is capable of fulfilling its function, and so is animate, and that if not animate is not a part.

{562} Where the objects of mathematics are concerned, though, why are the accounts of the parts not parts of the accounts, as the semicircles are of the circle? For it is not as if *these* are perceptible. Or does this make no difference? For there will be matter even of some things that are not perceptible. [*35*] And in fact there is some sort of matter in everything that is not an essence and [*1037a*] intrinsically a form, but a this-something. The semicircles, then, will not be parts of the universal circle but will be parts of the particular ones, as was said before. For while there is one sort of matter that is perceptible, there is another that is intelligible.

It is clear too that the soul is the primary substance, [*5*] whereas the body is matter, and the human or the animal is the thing composed of both taken universally. Socrates (or Coriscus), on the other hand, if the soul is also Socrates, is twofold. For some take him to be a soul, others the compound.

But if he is unconditionally this soul here and this body here, then as the universal is so too is the particular.

Whether there is, beyond [*10*] the matter of these sorts of substances, another sort of matter, and whether to look for another sort of substance, such as numbers or something of this sort, must be investigated later. For it is for the sake of this that we are trying to make some determinations about the perceptible substances, since in a certain way it is the function of natural science and secondary philosophy to have theoretical knowledge of perceptible substances. [*15*] For it is not only about the matter that the natural scientist must know but also about the substance that is in accord with the account—in fact more so.

The way the things in the account are parts in the case of the definitions and why the definition is an account that is *one* (for it is clear that the thing is one, but one *in virtue of what*, given that it certainly has parts?) must also be investigated later. [*20*]

What the essence is, then, and what way it is intrinsically, has now been stated universally where every case is concerned, and also why the account of the essence of some things contains the parts of the definiendum, but that of other things does not. And we have stated that in the account of the substance the parts as matter will not be present—for they are not parts even of that substance, [*25*] but of the compound one, and of this there is in a way an account and in a way not. For of the compound with the matter there is not an account (for it is indefinite), but with respect to the primary substance there is—for example, of human, the account of the soul. For the substance is the form present in the thing, from which together with the matter the compound substance is said to be composed—for example, the concavity. For from [*30*] this and the nose both snub nose and the snubness are composed (indeed in these the nose will be present twice). But in the compound substance—for example, in snub nose or in Callias—there will be matter present as well.

It has also been stated that the essence [of a thing] and the thing [itself] are in some cases the same—for example, in the case of the primary [*1037b*] substances, such as curvature and being for curvature, if this is a primary substance.* By a primary substance I mean what is not said to be by being one thing in another, that is, in an underlying subject as matter. But things that are [said to be] as matter or as combinations with matter are not the

same [as their essence], nor are those that are one coincidentally, [*5*] such as Socrates and the musical (for these are coincidentally the same).*

VII.12

Let us now, however, first speak—to the extent that we have not already discussed it in the *Analytics*—about definition.[20] For the puzzle that was stated there advances the work of our arguments about the substance. I mean [*10*] this puzzle: why on earth is something one when the account of it is what we call a definition? For example, let the account of the human be the two-footed animal. Why, then, is this one and not instead many—animal *and* two-footed? For in the case of human and pale they are many when one does not belong to [*15*] the other, but they are one when it does belong and the underlying subject, the human, has a certain attribute (for, then, one thing comes-to-be and we have the pale human).

In the present case, by contrast, one does not participate in the other. For the genus does not seem to participate in the differentiae (for if it did the same thing would participate in contraries at {563} the same time, since the differentiae that divide the genus [*20*] are contraries). But even if it did participate, the argument is the same, if indeed the differentiae are many—for example, footed, two-footed, featherless. Why are these one and not instead many? For it is not because these are present [in one genus], since that way there will be one from all. But surely the things in the definition must be one. For the definition is a certain account that is [*25*] one and of substance, so that it must be the account of one something. For the substance signifies one something and a this-something, as we say.

We should first investigate definitions that are by division. For there is nothing else in the definition except the genus that is mentioned first and the differentiae; the other [*30*] genera are in fact the first one along with the differentiae combined with it. The first, for example, may be animal, the next two-footed animal, and next again featherless two-footed animal, and similarly if it is said by means of more differentiae. And in general it makes no difference [*1038a*] whether it is said by means of many or of few—nor, therefore, whether by means of few or by means of just two. And of the two one is differentia and the other genus—for example, in the two-footed animal, the animal is genus and the other differentia.

If, then, the genus is unconditionally nothing beyond the species as species of a genus, [*5*] or if it is, it is as matter (for the voiced sound is genus and matter, and the differentiae produce the phonetic elements from this), then it is evident that the definition is the account composed of the differentiae.

But in addition the division should take *the differentia of the differentia*—for example, the footed is a differentia of animal, and next again we should know the differentia [*10*] of the footed animal insofar as it is footed. So we should not say that of the footed there is on the one hand the feathered and on the other the featherless, if indeed we are to speak correctly (on the contrary, it is through lack of ability that we will say this), but rather that there is on the one hand the cloven-footed and on the other the not cloven-footed. For these are differentiae of foot. For the cloven-footed is a sort of footed. And [*15*] we should try to proceed always in this way until we reach the undifferentiated [species]. At that point there will be precisely as many species of foot as there are differentia, and the footed animals will be equal in number to the differentiae.

If, then, this is how things stand, it is evident that the ultimate differentia will be the substance and the definition of the thing, if indeed we should not state the same thing many times [*20*] in the definitions, since that would be wasted work. And this is certainly what does happen. For when we say two-footed footed animal we have said nothing other than animal with feet with two feet. And if we divide this too by a proper division, we shall be saying the same thing several times over—as many times as there are differentiae. If, then, we take a differentia of a differentia, one differentia—the [*25*] ultimate one—will be the form and the substance. But if we divide coincidentally—for example, if the footed were divided into the pale and the dark—there will be as many differentiae as there are cuts.

Thus it is evident that the definition is the account composed of the differentiae, or, if it is in accord with the correct procedure, from the ultimate one. This would be clear if we were to change the order [*30*] in such definitions—for example, in that of the human, saying footed two-footed animal. For it is wasted work to say footed when two-footed has been said. And there is no order in the substance, since how could we understand one thing as being prior and another posterior?

Where definitions by division are concerned, then, let this much suffice as a first statement as to what they are like. [*35*]

VII.13

Since, however, it is with substance that the investigation is concerned, we should return to that. [*1038b*] Just as the underlying subject and the essence are said to be substance, so also is the universal.* Now, about two of these we have already spoken, namely, about the essence and the underlying subject, which underlies in two ways, either by being a this-something (as the [*5*] animal underlies its attributes) or as the matter underlies the actuality. But the universal too seems to some people to be most of all a cause, and the universal most of all a starting-point. So let us turn to that too. For it seems impossible for any of the things said [of something] universally to be substance.

{564} For first the substance of each thing is special to it, in that it does not belong to anything else.* [*10*] A universal, by contrast, is something common, since that thing is said to be a universal which naturally belongs to many things. Of which of these, then, will it be the substance? For it is either the substance of none or of all. And it cannot be the substance of all. But if it is the substance of one, all the others will be this one as well. For things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are also themselves one.

Further, substance is said to be what is not said of an underlying subject, [*15*] whereas a universal is always said of an underlying subject.

But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is, can yet be present in it—for example, as the animal is present in that of the human and the horse? Well then, clearly there is some account of it. And it makes no difference even if it is not the account of everything in the substance. For nonetheless this [universal] will be the substance [*20*] of something, as the human is of the human in whom it is present. And so the same result will again follow, since it (for example, the animal) will be the substance of that in which it is present as something special to it.*

Further, it is both impossible and absurd for the this (that is, the substance) —if it is composed of something—not to be composed of substances or of the this-something but of a quality. [*25*] For then non-substance (that is, the

quality) will be prior to substance (that is, to the this). Which is just what is impossible. For neither in account nor in time nor in knowledge can the attributes be prior to the substance.* For then they will also be separable.

Further, in Socrates substance will be present, and so it [the universal] will be the substance of two things.

And in general it follows—if the human [*30*] and whatever is said of things in that way are substance—that none of the things in their account is substance of any of them or is separate from them or in something else. I mean, for example, that there is not some animal—or any other of the things in the account—beyond the particular ones.

If we get our theoretical grasp on the issue on the basis of these considerations, then, it is evident that nothing that belongs universally to things is substance, and [*35*] that none of the things that are predicated in common signifies a this-something but [*1039a*] a such-and-such sort. If not, many other difficulties result, and especially the *Third Man*.

Further, it can also be made clear in this way. For it is impossible for substance to be composed of substances that are actually present in it. For things that are actually two in this way are never actually one, although if they are potentially [*5*] two, they can be one. For example, the double line is composed of two half lines, at any rate *potentially*. For their actuality separates them [and so destroys the double line]. And so if the substance is one, it will not be composed of substances present in it and present in this way, as Democritus rightly says. For he says that it is impossible for one to be composed of two or two from one. For he makes the indivisible magnitudes [*10*] the substances. It is clear therefore that the same will hold in the case of number, if indeed number is composed of monads, as some people say. For two is either not a one, or there is no monad actually present in it.*

But this result involves a puzzle. For if no substance whatsoever can be composed of universals because [*15*] they signify the such-and-such sort but not this-something, and if also no substance can be actually composed of substances, then every substance is incomposite, so that there cannot even be an account of any substance whatsoever. But then it *seems* to everyone, and was stated long ago, that definition is either of substance only or of it most of all, whereas now it seems not even to be of it. [*20*] So there will not be a definition of anything at all. Or else in one way there will

be one, but in another way there will not. What is being said will be more clear on the basis of what comes later.[21]

VII.15

Substance is in distinct ways, both as the compound [*1039b19*] and as the account [*20*] (I mean that the first is substance in this way, the account combined {565} with the matter, whereas the other is wholly the account).* Accordingly, of those said to be such in the first way there is ceasing-to-be (for there is coming-to-be as well), but there is none—in the sense of being in the process of ceasing-to-be—of the account, since there is no coming-to-be either (for the being for house does not come-to-be, but the being for *this* house), rather, [*25*] without coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be, they are or are not. For it has been shown that no one begets or makes these.

This is also why there is neither definition nor demonstration of the substances that are perceptible and particular, [namely,] because they have matter whose nature is such that it admits of both being and not being (which is why all the particular ones of them [*30*] can cease-to-be). At all events, if demonstration is of the necessary things and definition is capable of embodying scientific knowledge, and if scientific knowledge cannot be scientific knowledge at one time and ignorance at another, but it is belief that is like that, so that neither definition nor demonstration can be that way either, but it is belief that is of what admits of being otherwise, then it is clear that there will not be [*1040a*] either definition or demonstration of such things. For things that cease-to-be are unclear to those who have scientific knowledge, when they have departed from perception, and, though the same accounts are preserved in their soul, there will still not be either definition or demonstration. That is why, [*5*] in issues relating to definition, when someone is defining one of the particular things, we must not be ignorant of the fact that it is always possible to do away with his definition, since particulars cannot be defined.

Nor indeed can any Idea be defined. For the Idea is a particular, so they say, and separable. But its account must be composed of names, and the definer cannot make up a name [*10*] (since it would be an unknown). Yet each of the established names are common to all. Hence they must belong to something else as well. For example, if someone were defining you, he

would say that you are an animal that is thin or pale or something else that will also belong to something other than you. And if someone were to say that nothing prevents all these taken separately from belonging to many things, but that taken all at once they belong only to this one, we should reply: First, [*15*] they also belong to both components—for example, the two-footed animal belongs to the animal and to the two-footed. In fact, in the case of the eternal things this is even necessary, because the components are prior to and parts of the composite. More than that, they are also separable, if indeed the human is separable. For either neither is separable or both are. But if neither is, the genus will not exist beyond the species, and if [*20*] it does, so will the differentiae. Second, they [the animal, the two-footed] are prior in being [to the two-footed animal]. But things that are prior to others are not done away with together with them. Again, if the Ideas are composed of Ideas (for the things they are composed of are less composite), it will furthermore be necessary that the things from which the Idea is composed—for example, the animal and the two-footed—be predicated of many things. If not, how will they come to be known? For there will then be an Idea [*25*] that cannot be predicated of more than one thing. That does not seem to be the case, though. On the contrary, every Idea seems to admit of being participated in.

As has been said, then, the impossibility of defining [particulars] escapes notice in the case of eternal things, especially those that are unique—for example, the sun and the moon. For people err by adding the sort of things whose removal would leave it still [*30*] being the sun, such as going around the earth or being hidden at night. For [this would entail] that if it stood still or was visible then, it would no longer be the sun. But if it were not, that would be absurd. For the sun signifies a certain substance. Further, [they err not only in that way but also by mentioning] things that can belong to something else—for example, such that if a second thing of the relevant sort comes-to-be, it is clear that it will be a sun—with the result that the account is common to both. But the sun was supposed to be a particular, just like [*1040b*] Cleon or Socrates.

After all, why is it that none of these [who believe in] Ideas put forth a definition of them? For it would become clear, if they tried, that what has just been said is true.

[*1041a6*] Let us make, as it were, a fresh start and say again what, and what sort of thing, substance should be said to be. For perhaps from this we may also make clear that substance, whatever it is, that is separated from the perceptible substances. Since, then, the substance is some sort of starting-point and cause, let us pursue it from there.

The why is always inquired into [*10*] in this way: why does one thing belong to another? For to inquire into why the musical human is a musical human is either, as we just said, to inquire into why the human is musical, or [why it is the] other. But to inquire into why a thing is itself is to inquire into nothing. For the fact that it exists and that the attribute belongs to it should [already] clearly be the [*15*] case—I mean, for example, that the moon is eclipsed. But that a thing is itself—of that there is one account and one cause in all cases, [as in] why the human is human or the musical is musical. Unless someone were to say that it is because each thing is indivisible from itself, and this is what it is for it to be one. But *that* at any rate is common to all cases and too concise. We *can*, however, inquire into why [*20*] the human is an animal of such-and-such sort. It is clear, accordingly, that this is not to inquire into why a human is a human.

It is when something is [predicated] of something, then, that we inquire into why it belongs to that thing (but that it does belong must be clear, since if things are not that way, there is nothing to inquire into). For example: Why does it thunder? is Why is there noise in the clouds? For [*25*] this way what we are inquiring into is one thing [predicated] of another. And why are these—for example, brick and stones—a house? It is evident, accordingly, that we are inquiring into the cause. This, logico-linguistically so to speak, is the essence. But in some cases it is what the thing is for the sake of (for example, it is presumably this in the case of a house or a bed), and in some it is what first initiated the movement, since this is also a cause. [*30*] But the latter is inquired into in cases of something's coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, whereas the former is inquired into also in the case of a thing's being.

What we are inquiring into most easily escapes notice, however, in cases where one thing is not said of another. For example, human, when we are inquiring into what it is, it escapes notice, because it is said simply, [*1041b*] and we do not distinguish that these things are this. But we must divide up

before inquiring. Otherwise, inquiring into nothing and inquiring into something will become joint inquiries. But since the holding and the belonging must be the case, it is clear, accordingly, that what we are inquiring into is why the matter is something. For example, [*5*] why are these things a house? Because the essence of house belongs to them. Why is this—or rather this body in this state—a human?* So what is being looked for is the cause (and this is the form)* in virtue of which the matter is something—and this is the substance. It is evident, accordingly, that in the case of things [said] simply there is neither inquiry nor teaching, but instead another way than inquiry belongs to them. [*10*]

Since what is composed of something in such a way that the all is one, not like a heap but like a syllable— The syllable is not its phonetic elements, BA is not the same as B and A, nor is flesh fire and earth. For when they—for example, the flesh and the syllable—are dissolved they no longer exist, whereas the phonetic elements exist, and so do [*15*] the fire and the earth. The syllable, then, is something—not only its phonetic elements, the sounded [= A] and the unsounded [= B], but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold but also something else.

—If, therefore, that something else must be either [1] an element or [2] composed of elements, then [1] if it is an element the same argument will apply again, [*20*] since the flesh will be composed of this and fire and earth, and something else again,* so that the process will go on without limit. If, on the other hand, [2] it is composed of an element, it is clear that it must be not only from one but from more than one, or else that one will be the thing itself, so that again in this case we can state the same argument as in the case of the flesh and syllable. But it would seem to be *something*, and not [*25*] an element, and a cause in fact of this being flesh and this being a syllable. And similarly in the other cases.

{567} This, however, is the substance of each thing, since it is the primary cause of their being. But since not all things are substances, rather, those things are substances that are in accord with nature and composed by nature,* this nature would seem to be their substance, [*30*] and it is not an element but a starting-point. An element, by contrast, is what a thing can be divided into and which is present in it as matter—like the A and the B of the syllable.

Book VIII

VIII.1

[*1042a24*] . . . Now, however, we should go through the agreed upon substances. These are the perceptible ones. And the perceptible [*25*] substances all have matter. Now the underlying subject is substance, and in one way this is the matter (by the matter I mean what not being actively a this-something is potentially a this-something); in another way, it is the account and the shape, which being a this-something is separable in account; and in a third way, what is composed of them, of which alone there is coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, and which is unconditionally separable. [*30*] For of substances that are in accord with the account some are separable and some are not.

That matter too is substance is clear. For in all changes from one opposite to another there is something that underlies the changes. For example, in change in place, there is what is now here and later on there; in change in growth, there is what is now one size and later on [*35*] larger or smaller; in change involving alteration, there is what is now healthy and then again sick; and similarly in change in substance, there is what is now [*1042b*] coming into being and later ceasing-to-be, and now is underlying subject as a this-something and then again as being so with reference to a lack. The other sorts of changes follow along, then, with this sort, but this one does not follow along with either one or both of the others. For if a thing [*5*] has matter for change of place, it is not necessary that it also have it for coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. (What the difference is between unconditional coming-to-be and coming-to-be that is not unconditional has been stated in our works on nature.) VIII.2

Since substance as underlying subject and as matter is generally agreed upon, and this is the one that is potentially, it remains to say what substance *as activation* [*10*] of the perceptibles is.

Now Democritus for his part seems to think that there were three differentiae. For the underlying body and the matter are one and the same, but it is differentiated either by rhythm (that is, shape), or by turning (that is, position), or by touching (that is, order). It is evident, however, that there are many differentiae. Some things are said to be, for example, [*15*] due to

the mode of combination of their matter, like those said to be due to blending (such as honey-water), or due to tying (such as a bundle), or due to gluing (such as a book), or due to nailing (such as a box), others due to more than one of these. Others are said to be due to position—for example, a threshold or a lintel (for these differ due to how they are placed); others due to time (such as dinner and [*20*] breakfast); others due to place (such as the winds); and others due to the attributes [special] to perceptibles (such as hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness), some due to some of these, others due to all—and in general some due to excess, some to deficiency.

So it is clear that something is said to be [*25*] in that many ways too. For a threshold *is* because it is placed thusly, and the being for a threshold signifies its being placed thusly, and the being for ice signifies its being solidified thusly. And in some cases their being will even be defined by all of these, due to some parts being mixed, some blended, some bound, some solidified, and some [*30*] making use of the other differentiae, as do hand and foot.

We must, then, get hold of the kinds (*genos*) of the differentiae—for these are going to be starting-points of the being. For example, the ones differentiated by the more and less, or by dense and by rare, or by the others of this sort. For all these are [kinds of] excess and deficiency. And if something is differentiated by shape, or by smoothness [*35*] and roughness, all these are differentiated by [kinds of] straight and curved. And for other things being is being mixed and not being is the opposite. [*1043a*] From these cases, then, it is evident—if indeed its substance is the cause of {568} each one's being—that it is in these differentiae that we must look for what the cause is of the being of each of them.

Now none of these differentiae is substance, not even when it is coupled [with matter], nonetheless in each case it is what is analogous to it. And just as in substances what is [*5*] predicated of the matter is the activation itself, so in the other definitions too it is what is most of all this. For example, if we had to define a threshold, we would say wood or stone placed this way; and a house, bricks and timbers placed this way (or, again, in some cases the for-the-sake-of-which is included too); and if ice, water frozen or solidified this way; and harmony, high [*10*] and low mixed such-and-such a way. And the same way in the other cases. It is evident, then, from these

that the activation of one matter is different from that of another, and so is the account. For of some things, it is the mode of combination, of others the mixing, and of others some other of the things we mentioned. That is why of [1] those who give definitions, the ones who in saying what a house is say that it is stone, bricks, and timbers [*15*] are speaking of what is potentially a house, since these are matter. [2] Those, on the other hand, who propose* that it is a receptacle to shelter property and bodies, or something else of that sort, are speaking of the activation. But [3] those who combine both of these speak of the third sort of substance, the one composed of them. For it seems that [2] the account that it is given in terms of the differentiae is of the form and the activation, while [1] the one that is composed of [*20*] the constituents is an account of the matter instead. And similarly for the sorts of definitions that Archytas[22] used to accept, since [3] they are of both combined. For example, what is stillness? Quietness in a large quantity of air. The air is matter; the quietness is activation and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of sea. The underlying subject as matter is the sea; the activation and [*25*] the shape is the smoothness.

It is evident, then, from what has been said, what the perceptible substance is, and how it is. For there is the one as matter, the one as shape and activation, and the one composed of these.

VIII.3

But we should not be ignorant of the fact that sometimes it escapes notice whether the name signifies the composite substance or the activation and [*30*] the shape—for example, whether "house" is a sign for the joint thing, because it is a covering composed of bricks and stones placed this way, or for the activation and the form, because it is a covering, or whether a line is a two in length or a two, or whether an animal is a soul in a body or a soul (for a soul is substance and activation of a certain sort of body). [*35*] "Animal" might in fact be applied to both, not as something said in one account but rather with reference to one thing. But though this makes a difference in relation to another issue, in relation to our inquiry into the perceptible substance it makes none, since the essence belongs to the form and the activation. [*1043b*] For a soul and being for a soul are the same, but being for a human and a human are not the same, unless the soul too is also

going to be said to be a human—in which case, in one way they are the same, in another way not.

It is evident, then, to those who investigate it that the syllable is not composed of the phonetic elements plus [*5*] a mode of combination, nor is the house bricks plus a mode of combination as well. And this is correct. For neither the mode of combination nor the mixing is composed of the things of which it is a combination or a mixing. And similarly in the other cases. For example, if the threshold is due to position, the position is not composed of the threshold, but more the latter of the former. Nor indeed is the human the animal plus [*10*] two-footed, but there must be something else beyond these, if these are matter—something that is neither an element nor composed of elements, but is rather the substance. And it is once people do away with this that they state only the matter. If, then, this is cause of the being, and if this is substance, they will not be stating the substance itself.

(This substance, then, must either be eternal or it must be capable of ceasing-to-be without being in the process of ceasing-to-be, and must {569} have come-to-be [*15*] without ever being in the process of coming-to-be. For it has been shown and made clear in another discussion that no one makes or begets the form, but instead it is a this that is made, and the thing composed of [matter and form that] comes-to-be.

As to whether the substances of things that can cease-to-be are separable, though, nothing is yet clear—except that it is clear that it is impossible in *some* cases, such as those where it is impossible for them to be beyond the particular instances, like a house or [*20*] a tool. Perhaps indeed neither these nor any of the other things that are not composed by nature are substances at all. For one might take the nature to be the only substance found in things that can cease-to-be.) So the puzzle that the followers of Antisthenes[23] and similarly uneducated people used to puzzle over has a certain timeliness, namely, that it is impossible to define the what-it-is (for a definition [*25*] is a "long story"), although it is actually possible to teach people what sort of thing it is.* For example, silver—what it is we cannot say, but that it is like tin, we can say. So of one sort of substance there can be a definition and an account, namely, of the compound sort, whether perceptible or intelligible, but of the primary parts of which this is composed, there cannot be any, if

indeed [*30*] the definitory account signifies something [predicated] of something, one of these playing the part of matter and the other of shape.

It is also evident why, if indeed substances are in a way numbers, they are so in this way and not, as some people say, as numbers of monads. For a definition is a sort of number, since it is divisible, and indeed into indivisibles (for the accounts are not unlimited), [*35*] and number is like that. And just as when one of the parts of which a number is composed is subtracted from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been subtracted or added, so too neither the definition nor the essence [*1044a*] will any longer be the same if anything is subtracted or added. And in fact the number must be what makes something one, though they cannot now say what makes *it* one, if indeed it is one. For either it is not one but rather a sort of heap, or if indeed it is one, they should say what it is that makes it one from many. The definition [*5*] is one as well, but similarly they cannot say what makes it one either. And this result makes perfect sense, since the argument is the same [in both cases].

The substance is also one in this way, and not—as some say—by being a sort of monad or point, but rather each is an actuality and a sort of nature. And just as the number does not admit of more and less neither does the substance that is in accord with the form, [*10*] but if indeed any does it is the one with the matter.

Concerning the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of what are said to be substances, then, and in what way it is possible and in what way not, and concerning the leading back of things to numbers, let this much be determined.

Book IX

IX.6

Since we have spoken about the capacity [or potentiality] that is said [of things] with reference to movement, [*1048a25*] let us make some determinations about activity, both what it is and what sort of thing it is. For the capable too will at the same time become clear as we make our determinations, because we do not say only of that which naturally moves something else, or is moved by something else, that it is capable, whether unconditionally or in a certain way, but also use the term in a different way, which is why in the course of our inquiry we went through the former. [*30*]

Activity, then, is the existence of the thing not in the way in which we say that it exists potentially. And we say, for example, that Hermes exists potentially in the wood and the half-line in the whole, because it could be abstracted from it, and also we say that even someone who is not contemplating is a scientific knower if he is capable of contemplating. And by contrast we say that other things exist actively.

What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, [*35*] and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend {570} the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, [*1048b*] and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. [*5*] But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter.

But the unlimited, the void, and things like that are said to be potentially or actively in another way [*10*] from many of the other beings—for example, from what sees or walks or is seen. For the latter things can sometimes also be truly said to be unconditionally. For what is seen [is said to be seen] on the one hand because it is being seen and on the other because it is capable of being seen. But the unlimited is potential not in that

way, namely, that it will be actually separable, but in coming-to-be. For it is the division's not [*15*] coming to an end that allows this activity to be potential, and not the unlimited's being separated.

Since, though, of the actions that have a limit none is an end, but all are in relation to an end—as for example, making thin is. For the things themselves, when one is making them thin, are in movement in this way, [*20*] [namely,] that what the movement is for the sake of does not yet belong to them. These [movements] are not cases of action, at least not of complete action, since none is an end; but the sort in which the end belongs really *is* an action. For example, at the same time one is seeing [a thing] and has seen [it], is thinking and has thought, is understanding [something] and has understood [it], whereas it is not the case that [at the same time] one is learning [something] and has learned [it], nor that one is being made healthy and has been made healthy. Someone who is living well, however, at the same time has lived well, [*25*] and is happy and has been happy [at the same time]. If this were not so, these would have to come to an end at some time, as when one is making [something] thin. But as things stand it is not so, but one is living and has lived. Of these, then, one sort should be called movements and the other activities. For every movement is incomplete, for example, making thin, learning, walking, building. These are movements and are certainly incomplete. For it is not the case that at the same time [*30*] one is walking and has taken a walk, nor that one is building [something] and has built [it], or is coming-to-be [something] and has come-to-be [it], or is being moved [in some way] and has been moved [in that way], but they are different, as are one's moving and having moved [something]. By contrast having seen and seeing are at the same time and are the same thing, as are understanding and having understood. The latter sort, then, I call an activity, the former a movement.

What actual being is, then, and [*35*] what sort of thing it is should be clear to us from these and other similar considerations.

IX.8

Since it has been determined in how many ways things are said to be prior, it is evident that activity is prior to potentiality. And I mean [*1049b5*] by potentiality [or capacity] not only that defined sort that is said to be a starting-point of change in another thing or in another thing insofar as it is

other, but also all starting-points of change or remaining at rest in general. For nature is also in the same kind (*genos*) as potentiality. For it is a starting-point of movement—not, however, in another thing but in the thing itself insofar as it is itself. To all this sort of potentiality, then, [*10*] activity is prior both [1] in account and [3] in substance, whereas [2] in time it is prior in one way and in another not.

[1] Well, that it is prior in account is clear. For what is in the primary way potential is potential because it admits of becoming active—for example, by capable-of-building I mean what is capable of [actively] building, and by capable-of-seeing what is capable of [actively] seeing and by capable-of-being-seen what is capable of [actively] being seen. [*15*] And the same account also applies in the other cases, so that it is necessary for the account and the knowledge of the one to precede the account and knowledge of the other.

{571} [2] In time activity is prior in this way: the active that is the same in form, though not in number, is prior. I mean this, that to this human who is already actively what he is and to the corn and to what is actively seeing, [*20*] the matter and the seed and the capable-of-seeing, which are potentially a human and corn and seeing, but not yet actively so, are prior in time. Prior in time to these, however, are other things that are actively what they are, from which these came to be. For it is always the case that what actively is comes-to-be from what potentially is as a result of what actively is (for example, human from [*25*] human, musician as a result of musician), there being always a first mover, and the mover already actively is. For it was stated in the accounts concerned with substance that everything that comes-to-be, comes-to-be something, from something, and as a result of something, and this is the same in form as it. . . .

[*1050a4*] [3a–i] But then it is also prior even in substance, first, because the things that are posterior in coming-to-be are prior in form and in substance—for example, man to boy [*5*] and human to seed (for the one already has the form, while the other does not)—and because everything that comes-to-be proceeds toward a starting-point and an end (for the for-the-sake-of-which is a starting-point, and the coming-to-be is for the sake of the end), and the activity is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the capacity [or potentiality] is acquired. For it is not the case that animals see in order that they may have sight, rather [*10*] they have sight in order that

they may see, and similarly too they have the craft of building in order that they may build and the capacity to contemplate in order that they may contemplate. But they do not contemplate in order that they may have the capacity to contemplate, except those who are practicing, and they do not contemplate except in this way, or because they have no need to contemplate.*

[3a–ii] Further, the matter is potentially something because it may come in the form of it—at any rate, when [*15*] it is actively something, then it *is* in the form of it. Similarly too in the other cases, even those in which the end is a movement. That is why, just as teachers think that they have delivered the end result when they have demonstrated [their student] in activity, nature also does likewise. For if it does not happen in this way, it will be like Pauson's Hermes, since it will even be unclear whether the scientific knowledge is [*20*] inside or outside, just as with that figure. For the function is the end, and the activity is the function, and this is why the name "activity" is said of things with reference to the function, and extends to the actuality.

[3a–iii] And, whereas in some cases it is the use that is the ultimate thing (for example, seeing in the case of sight, and nothing else beyond this comes-to-be from the function of sight), from other things [*25*] something [else] does come-to-be (for example, from the craft of building a house comes-to-be that is beyond the activity of building), yet the use is in the former case no less the end, and in the latter case more the end, than the capacity is. For the activity of building is in what is being built and comes-to-be and is at the same time as the house. In the cases, then, where what comes-to-be is some other thing beyond the use, [*30*] in those cases the activity is in what is being produced—for example, the activity of building is in what is being built, the activity of weaving is in what is being woven, and similarly in the other cases, and in general the movement is in what is being moved. But in all the cases where there is not some other work beyond the activity, the activity is in the relevant things—for example, the [*35*] seeing is in the one who sees, the contemplating in the one who contemplates, and the living in the soul (which is why happiness is also in it, since it is a certain sort of living). [*1050b*] So it is evident that the substance and the form are activity.

In accord with this argument, then, it is evident that activity is prior in substance to potentiality, and, as we have said, one activity always precedes another in time until we reach the [*5*] activity of what primarily and eternally causes movement.

[3b] But then activity is also prior in a more controlling way. For eternal things are prior in substance to things that cease-to-be, and nothing eternal is potential. Here is the reason. Every capacity [or potentiality] is at the same time for something and for the contradictory. For while what is incapable of belonging cannot belong to anything, everything that is capable admits of not {572} being active. [*10*] So what is capable of being admits both of being and of not being. So the same thing is capable both of being and of not being. But what is capable of not being admits of not being. And what admits of not being can cease-to-be, either unconditionally or in that way in which it is said to admit of not being, namely, with respect to place, or to quantity, or to quality—unconditionally [*15*] is with respect to substance. So none of the things that cannot unconditionally cease-to-be are unconditionally potential (although nothing prevents it from being so in a certain respect—for example, with respect to quality or place). So all of them are actively [what they are]. Nor are any of the necessary beings potential ones (and yet these are primary things, since if they were not, nothing would be). Nor, then, is movement potential, if some movement is eternal. Nor, if there is something that is eternally moved [*20*] is it moved in accord with a capacity [or potentiality], except from-where to-where (for nothing prevents matter for this sort of movement from belonging to it).

That is why the sun, the stars, and the whole heaven are always active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, which is what those concerned with nature fear, nor do they get tired doing this. For movement is not for them connected with a capacity for the contradictory, as it is for [*25*] things that can cease-to-be, so that the continuity of the movement is laborious, since the substance that is matter and potentiality, and not activity, is what causes this.

The things that cannot cease-to-be are also imitated by things that are involved in change—for example, earth and fire. For these too are always active, since they have their movement both intrinsically and within themselves. But the [*30*] other capacities, from what has been determined about them, are all for something and for the contradictory. For what is

capable of moving something in this way is also capable of moving it not in that way—at any rate, in all cases that are in accord with reason. And the same nonrational capacities will, by their presence or non-presence, be for something and for its contradictory.

So if there are some natures or substances of the sort that the people involved in accounts say [*35*] the Ideas are, then there will be something that is much more of a science than science-itself, and much more of a movement than movement [-itself]. For the former are more activities and [*1051a*] the latter capacities for them.

That activity is prior both to potentiality and to every starting-point of movement, then, is evident.

Book XII

XII.4

The causes and starting-points of distinct things [*1070a31*] are distinct in a way, but in a way—if we are to speak universally and analogically—they are the same for all. . . . [*b11*] For example, the elements of perceptible bodies are presumably: as *form*, the hot and, in another way, the cold, which is the *lack*; and, as *matter*, what is potentially these directly and intrinsically. And both these and the things composed of them are substances, of which these are the starting-points (that is, anything that comes-to-be from the hot and the cold that is one [something-or-other], such as flesh or bone), since what comes-to-be from these must be distinct from them. [*15*] These things, then, have the same elements and starting-points (although distinct things have distinct ones). But that all things have the same ones is not something we can say just like that, although *by analogy* they do. That is, we might say that there are three starting-points—the form and the lack and the matter. But each of these is distinct for each category (*genos*)—for example, in colors they are white, black, and surface, [*20*] or light, darkness, and air, out of which day and night come-to-be.

But since not only the things present in something are causes, but also certain external things, for example, the moving cause, it is clear that starting-point and element are distinct. Both, though, are causes, while what is so in the sense of moving or causing rest is a sort of starting-point,* and starting-point is divided into these two [sorts].* So analogically there are three elements, [*25*] and four causes and starting-points. But distinct things have distinct ones, as was said, and the direct cause in the sense of a moving cause is distinct for distinct things. Health, sickness, body—the moving cause is the craft of medicine. Form, disorder of such-and-such sort, bricks—the {573} moving cause is the craft of building. And since the moving cause in the case of natural things [*30*] is for a human a human,* and in those that come from thought it is the form or its contrary, there will be in a way three causes, while in a way there are four. For the craft of medicine is in a way health, and the craft of building is form of a house, and human begets human; and, furthermore, beyond these there is what as the first of all [movers] moves all things.

But since some things are separable and others are not separable, the former are substances. And because of this the same things are causes of all things, because, without substances, [*1071a*] there are no attributes or movements. Next, these causes will presumably be soul and body, or understanding and desire and body.

Further, there is another way in which the causes are analogically the same, namely, activity and potentiality. But these too are not only distinct for distinct things but also apply to them [*5*] in distinct ways. For in some cases the same thing is sometimes active and sometimes potential—for example, wine or flesh or human. But these also fall under the aforementioned causes. For the form *actively* is, if it is separable; as is what is composed of both [matter and form]; as is the lack—for example, darkness or sickness; the matter, on the other hand, *potentially* is, since this is what is [*10*] capable of becoming both. But active and potential differ in another way in the case of things whose matter is not the same, of which the form is not the same but distinct—just as, for example, the cause of a human is both his elements, fire and earth as matter and the special form [as form], and furthermore some other external thing, such as the father, and beyond these the sun and its [*15*] movement in an inclined circle, which are not matter, form, or lack, and are not the same in form [as father or son], but are, rather, movers.

Further it must be observed that some causes can be stated in universal terms, whereas others cannot. The this that is first active, then, and a distinct thing that is potential, are the starting-points of all things. Well, these are not universals, since the particular [*20*] is the starting-point of the particulars. For while human is the starting-point of human universally, no particular human is—instead, Peleus is of Achilles, and your father of you, and this B of this BA, and B in general of BA unconditionally.

Next, the causes and elements of substances (but distinct ones of distinct ones) are already, as has been said, the causes and elements of things that are not in the same kind (*genos*)—of [*25*] colors, sounds, substances, quantity—save by analogy. And those of things in the same species are distinct, not in species but because the causes of the particular ones—your

matter and form and moving cause and mine—are distinct, but in universal account they are the same.

When we inquire, then, about the starting-points or elements of substances, relations, and qualities, [*30*] as to whether they are the same or distinct, it is clear that when they are said of things *in many ways* they are the same, but when these are distinguished the starting-points and elements are not the same but distinct—except that in a way the causes of all are the same. And in one way they are the same or analogous because matter, form, lack, and moving cause are omnipresent; in another way the causes of substances may be considered as the causes of all things, because if substances are done away with, all things are done away with; furthermore, [*35*] [3] the first in terms of actuality is a cause of all things. In another way, though, there are distinct direct causes, namely, the contraries that are said of things neither as genera nor in many ways, and furthermore the matters.

What the starting-points of perceptible things are, [*1071b*] how many they are, and in what way they are the same and in what way distinct, has now been stated.

XII.6

Since there were three sorts of substances, two of them natural and one immovable, concerning the latter it must be said that it is necessary for there to be an eternal immovable substance. For substances are primary among beings, [*5*] and if they are all capable of ceasing-to-be, everything is capable of ceasing-to-be. But it is impossible that movement either came into being or passed away (for in any case it was), or that time did, since {574} there cannot be a before and an after if there is no time. Movement too is continuous, then, in the way that time also is, since time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of it. But there is no continuous movement [*10*] except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous.

But then if there is something that is capable of moving things or acting on them, but that is not actively doing so, there will not [necessarily] be movement, since it is possible for what has a capacity not to activate it. There is no benefit, therefore, in positing eternal substances, as those who accept the Forms do, unless there is to be present in them some starting-point that is capable of [*15*] causing change. Moreover, even this is not

enough, and neither is another substance beyond the Forms. For if it will not be active, there will not be movement. Further, even if it will be active, it is not enough, if the substance of it is a capacity. For then there will not be *eternal* movement, since what is potential may possibly not be. There must, therefore, be such a starting-point, the substance of which is activity. Further, accordingly, [*20*] these substances must be without matter. For they must be eternal, if indeed *anything* else is eternal. Therefore they must be activity. . . .

XII.7

[*1072a19*] Since it is possible that things are this way, and if they are not this way, they would have come from night, or all things together, or from not being, these issues may be taken as resolved. [*20*] And there is something that is always moved with an unceasing movement, which is in a circle (and this is clear not from argument alone but also from the facts). So the primary heaven must be eternal. There is, therefore, also something that moves it. But since what is moved and also moves something is something medial, there is something that moves without being moved,* [*25*] being eternal, substance, and activity.

This, though, is the way the object of desire and the intelligible object move things: they move them without being moved. Of these objects, the primary ones are the same. For the [primary] object of appetite is the apparently noble, and the primary object of wish is the really noble. But we desire something because it seems [noble] rather than its seeming so because we desire it. For the starting-point is the active understanding. And understanding is moved by intelligible objects, and what is intrinsically intelligible [*30*] is the one column [of opposites],[24] and in this substance is primary, and in this the simple one and an activity—oneness and simplicity are not the same, since unity signifies a measure, whereas simplicity signifies that the thing itself is a certain way. But the noble, too, and what is choiceworthy because of itself are in the same column, [*35*] and what is primary is always best or analogous to the best.

That the for-the-sake-of-which can exist among the [*1072b*] immovable things is made clear by a distinction. For the for-the-sake-of-which is both the one *for whom* and *that toward which*, and of these the latter is

immovable and the former is not. And it produces movement insofar as it is loved, and by moving [something in this way] it moves the rest.

Now if something is moved, it admits of being otherwise than it is, so that if the primary spatial movement, for its part, is an activity, insofar as it is being moved, [*5*] in this respect, it admits of being otherwise—with respect to place, even if not with respect to substance. But since there is something that moves while it itself is immovable, though it is in activity, it can in no way admit of being otherwise. For spatial movement is primary among the sorts of change, and of these, that in a circle is primary; and this it produces. Therefore, it [the prime mover] of necessity is; and insofar as it is by necessity, [*10*] it is in noble fashion, and in this way a starting-point [of movement]. For something is said to be necessary in a number of ways—as what is forced contrary to natural impulse, as that without which what is good does not exist, and as what does not admit of being otherwise, but is unconditionally necessary.

This, therefore, is the sort of starting-point on which the heaven and nature depend. And its pastime is like the best that we can have—and have for a short time (for it is always in that state {575} [of activity], [*15*] whereas we cannot be)—since its activity is also pleasure. And it is because of this that waking, perceiving, and active understanding are a very great pleasure, and expectation and memory because of these. Active understanding, though, is intrinsically of what is intrinsically best, and the sort that is to the highest degree best is of what is to the highest degree best. And the understanding actively understands itself by partaking of the intelligible object. (For it becomes an intelligible object [*20*] by touching and understanding one, so that understanding and intelligible object are the same.) For what is receptive of the intelligible object and of the substance is the understanding, and it is active when it possesses it, so that this rather than that seems to be the divine thing that understanding possesses,* and contemplation seems to be most pleasant and best. If, then, that good state [of activity], which we are sometimes in, the [primary] god is always in, that is a wonderful thing, and if to a higher degree, that is yet [*25*] more wonderful. But that is his state. And life too certainly belongs to him. For the activity of understanding is life, and he is that activity; and his intrinsic activity is life that is best and eternal. We say, then, that the god is a living

being that is eternal and best, so that living and a continuous and everlasting eternity belong to the god, since this is the god.

Those who [*30*] take it, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that the noblest and best is not present in the starting-point, because, while the starting-points of plants and animals are causes too, noble beauty and completeness are in what comes from these, are not correct in their thinking. For the seed comes from other things that are prior and complete, and the [*35*] first thing is not seed but the complete thing, as we might say "the man is prior [*1073a*] to the seed"—not the one who came to be from it but another one from whom the seed came.

That there is, then, a substance that is eternal and immovable and separate from perceptible things is evident from what has been said. It has also been shown that [*5*] this substance cannot have any magnitude, but must be without parts and indivisible. For it moves something for an unlimited time, and nothing finite has unlimited capacity. And, since every magnitude is either unlimited or finite, it cannot have a finite magnitude, because of what we said, and it cannot have an unlimited magnitude because there is not unlimited [*10*] magnitude at all. But then it has also been shown that it is impassive and inalterable. For all the other movements are posterior to that with respect to place.

It is clear, then, why things are this way.

XII.9

Issues concerning the [divine] understanding [*1074b15*] involve certain puzzles. For while it seems to be the most divine of the appearances, the question of how it can have that character involves certain difficulties. For if on the one hand it understands nothing, where is its dignity? It would be just like someone asleep. And if on the other hand it does understand something, this other thing controls it (since what it is, its substance, is not active understanding, but a capacity), and it would not be the best substance. For it is because of [*20*] actively understanding that esteem belongs to it.

Further, whether it is understanding [as a capacity] or active understanding that is the substance of it, what does it understand? For it is either itself or something else. And if something else, then either always the same thing or sometimes this and sometimes that. Does it, then, make a difference or none

at all whether it actively understands the noble or some random object? Or are there not certain things that it would be absurd for it to think of? It is clear, therefore, that [*25*] it actively understands what is most divine and most estimable and does not change [its object], since change would be for the worse, and would already be a sort of movement.

First, then, if its substance is not active understanding but rather a capacity [to understand], it is reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its active understanding is laborious to it. Next, it is clear that something else would be more estimable than the understanding, namely, what is understood. [*30*] And indeed [the capacity] to understand and active understanding will belong even to someone who actively understands the worst thing, so that if this is to be avoided (for there are even some things that it is better not to see than to see), the active understanding would not be {576} the best thing. It is itself, therefore, that it understands, if indeed it is the most excellent thing, and the active understanding is active understanding of active understanding.

It appears, though, that scientific knowledge, perception, [*35*] belief, and thinking are always of something else, and of themselves only as a byproduct. Further, if to understand and to be understood are distinct, in virtue of which of them does the good belong to it? For the being for an act of understanding is not the same as the being for a thing understood. Or is it that in some cases the scientific knowledge *is* the thing? In the case of the productive sciences [*1075a*] isn't it the substance and the essence without the matter? In the case of the theoretical sciences isn't the account, the thing, and its active understanding? In the cases, then, where the thing understood and the active understanding of it are not distinct, namely, in those where the thing understood has no matter, they will be the same, and the active understanding will be one with the thing understood.

A further puzzle remains as to whether the thing understood is composite. [*5*] For if it were, then the [divine] understanding would undergo change in understanding the parts of the whole. Or is not everything that has no matter indivisible? (Just as the human understanding [of such things] is, or the understanding even of composite things in a certain time—for it does not possess the good in [understanding] this or that [part], rather, in [understanding] a certain whole it possesses the best, being something else.)

[*10*] And is not this the condition of this understanding which, for all eternity, is an understanding of itself?

XII.10

We must also investigate in which way the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best—whether as something separated and intrinsic, or as its organization. Or is it rather in both ways, like an army? For the good of an army is in its organization, and is also the general—and more so the latter. For he is not due to the organization, but it is due to him. [*15*] All things are jointly organized in a way, although not in the same way—even swimming creatures, flying creatures, and plants. And the organization is not such that one thing has no relation to another but, rather, there is one. For all things are jointly organized in relation to one thing—but it is as in a household, where the free men least of all do things at random, but all or most of the things they do [*20*] are organized, while the slaves and beasts can do a little for the common thing, but mostly do things at random. For this is the sort of starting-point that the nature is of each of them.* I mean, for example, that all must at least come to be segregated [into their elements]; and similarly there are other things which they all share for the whole. . . .

Beings, though, do not wish to be badly [*1076a3*] governed: “To have many rulers is not good; let there be one ruler.” *

Book XIII

XIII.10

[*1086b14*] Let us now discuss an issue that presents a certain puzzle both to those who accept the Ideas and to those who do not, and which was stated before, at the start, when going through the puzzles. [*15*] For if we do not posit substances to be separated, and in the way in which particular things are said to be separated, we will do away with the sort of substance we wish to maintain. But if we posit substances as separable, in what way should we posit their elements and starting-points to be?

[1] For if they are [*20*] particular and not universal, [1a] there will be just as many beings as there are elements, and [1b] the elements will be scientifically unknowable. For [1a] suppose that the syllables in voiced sound are substances and that their elements are the elements of substances. Then there must be only one BA and one of each of the [other] syllables, if indeed they are not universal and the same in form [*25*] but, rather, each is one in number and a this-something and not a thing the same in name [as something else]. (Besides, these thinkers posit that *the what a thing is*, is in each case one.*) But if the syllables are this way, so too are the things they are composed of. There will not, therefore, be more A's than one, or more than one of any of the other elements either, based on the same argument on which in the case of the syllables there will not be more {577} than one instance of the same one.* [*30*] But then if this is so, there will not be other being beyond the elements, but only the elements.

[1b] Further, the elements will not be scientifically knowable either. For they are not universal, but scientific knowledge is of universals, as is clear from demonstrations and from definitions. For a deductive proof that this triangle has its interior angles equal two right angles does not come about unless every triangle [*35*] has interior angles equal to two right angles, nor that this human is an animal, unless every human is an animal.

[2] On the other hand, if the starting-points *are* universal, either the substances composed of them are also universals, or non-substance will be prior to substance.* [*1087a*] For the universal is not a substance, but the element or the starting-point is universal, and the element or the starting-point is prior to the things of which it is element or starting-point.

All these difficulties, then, follow quite reasonably, when these thinkers make the Ideas be composed of elements and also claim that beyond the [*5*] substances that have the same form there are Ideas, [each of which] is a single separate thing. But if, as in the case of the elements of voiced sound, there is nothing to prevent there being many A's and B's without there being any A-itself or a B-itself beyond the many, then, in view of this, there will be unlimitedly many similar syllables.

The fact that [*10*] all scientific knowledge is universal, so that the starting-points of beings must also be universal and not separate substances, involves the greatest puzzle of those mentioned. But though there is surely a way in which what is said is true, there is another way in which it is not true. For scientific knowledge, like knowing scientifically, is twofold, [*15*] one potential, the other active: the capacity [or potential], being as matter, universal and indefinite, is of what is universal and indefinite, whereas the activity, being definite, is of what is definite—being a this-something it is of a this-something. But it is only coincidentally that sight sees universal color, because this [particular instance of] color that it sees is *a* color, and so what the grammarian theoretically grasps, namely, [*20*] this [particular instance of] A, is *an* A. For if the starting-points must be universal, what comes from them must also be universal, as in the case of demonstrations. And if this is so, there will be nothing separable and no substance either. However, in one way scientific knowledge is universal, but in another it is not. [*25*]

1. A student of the Sophist Gorgias of Leontini.
2. A poet from Iulis on Ceos (c. 556/532–466/442 BCE). None of his surviving poems explain the allusion to him.
3. Puppets operated by a concealed inner mechanism.
4. These are usually referred to as formal, material, efficient, and final causes.
5. Tethys is the daughter of Earth and Heaven and the sister of Ocean (Hesiod, *Theognis* 136). Styx is the eldest of the daughters of Ocean and Tethys, and, later, the river in the Underworld.
6. An eclectic philosopher of the time of Pericles (c. 495–428 BCE), who also thought that the starting-point of things was water.
7. Aristotle is probably paraphrasing DK 31B17.

8. A somewhat legendary figure, said to have been a previous incarnation of Pythagoras.
9. One of the oldest known Greek poets, author of the *Theogony*, *Works and Days*, and the *Catalogue of Women*.
10. A promise unfulfilled in our text of the *Metaphysics*.
11. The body = the full or the solid.
12. Little is known about Cratylus beyond what Aristotle tells us about him here and at IV.5 $1010^{a}7$–15, and what we can glean from Plato's *Cratylus*.
13. Ideas (capital "I") = Platonic Forms (capital "F" to distinguish them from Aristotelian forms).
14. An important mathematician, astronomer, and philosopher (c. 390–c. 340 BCE) who developed the general theory of proportion for incommensurable as well as commensurable magnitudes. He was acquainted with Plato and is thought by some to have been his colleague in the Academy.
15. The Platonic method, embodied in the "one over many" argument, of exhibiting or setting out a single Form for each many (VII.6 $1031^{b}18$–22).
16. The reference is probably to the work *Peri enantiōn* (Rose, F118–124 = Barnes, 2427–2429) mentioned in DL V [22], 286.
17. The son of Plato's sister Potone and of Eurymedon of Myrrhinous. A member of the Academy, he became its head on Plato's death in 348/7 BCE, and remained such for eight years.
18. This paragraph follows "we must get a theoretical grasp on it" (VII.4, 1029b13) in the mss.
19. A follower of Socrates and a contemporary of Theaetetus. In later life he was a member of Plato's Academy.
20. See *APo*. II.3–10, 13.
21. See especially VII.15 and VIII.6.
22. Archytas, who flourished c. 400–350 BCE, was a Pythagorean mathematician and philosopher from Tarentum.
23. A follower of Socrates, present at his death.
24. The two columns of opposites are columns of starting-points, which, as such, are objects of understanding.

Nicomachean Ethics

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

There are three works of moral philosophy in the Aristotelian corpus: the Eudemian Ethics, the Magna Moralia (considered by many scholars not to be a genuine work of Aristotle), and the Nicomachean Ethics. Of these it is the last—one of the greatest works in all of moral philosophy—that represents the culmination of his mature thought.

In the extensive excerpts provided below, Aristotle discusses happiness and human good (Book I); the nature of moral virtue (Book II); moral responsibility, deliberation, and praise and blame (Book III); justice (Book V); the intellectual virtues and practical wisdom (Book VI); lack of self-control (Book VII); friendship (Book IX); and pleasure, happiness, and contemplation (Book X).

{578} Book I

I.1

Every craft and every method of inquiry and likewise [*1094a*] every action and deliberate choice seems to seek some good. That is why they correctly declare that the good is 'that which all seek'.[1]

A certain difference, however, appears to exist among ends. For some are activities while others are works of some sort beyond the activities themselves. [*5*] But wherever there are ends beyond the actions, in those cases, the works are naturally better than the activities. But since there are many sorts of actions and of crafts and sciences, their ends are many as well. For health is the end of medicine, a ship of shipbuilding, victory of generalship, and wealth of household management.

Some of these fall under some one capacity, however, as [*10*] bridle making falls under horsemanship, along with all the others that produce equipment for horsemanship, and as it and every action in warfare fall under generalship, and, in the same way,* others fall under different ones. But in all such cases, the ends of the architectonic ones are more choiceworthy than the ends under them, since these are pursued [*15*] for the sake also of the former. It makes no difference, though, whether the ends of the actions are the activities themselves or some other thing beyond them, just as in the sciences we have mentioned.

I.2

If, then, there is some end of things doable in action that we wish for because of itself, and the others because of *it*, and we do not choose everything because of something else (since if *that* is the case, it will go on without limit [*20*] so that the desire will be empty and pointless), it is clear that this will be the good—that is, the best good. Hence regarding our life

as well, won’t knowing the good have great influence and—like archers with a target—won’t we be better able to hit what we should? If so, [*25*] we should try to grasp in outline, at least, what the good is and to which of the sciences or capacities it properly belongs.

It would seem to be the one with the most control, and the most architectonic one. And politics seems to be like this, since it is the one that prescribes which of the sciences need to exist in cities and which ones each group in cities should learn and up to what point. [*1094b*] Indeed, we see that even the capacities that are generally most honored are under it—for example, generalship, household management, and rhetoric. And since it uses the other practical sciences* and, furthermore, legislates about what must be done and what avoided, [*5*] its end will circumscribe those of the others, so that it will be the human good.

For even if the good is the same for an individual and for a city, that of a city is evidently a greater and, at any rate, a more complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it should content us to acquire and preserve this for an individual alone, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation and city. And so [*10*] our method of inquiry seeks the good of these things, since it is a sort of politics.

I.3

Our account will be adequate if its degree of perspicuity is in accord with its subject matter. For we must not look for the same degree of exactness in all accounts, any more than in all products of the crafts.

Noble things and just things, which are what politics investigates, admit of so much difference and [*15*] variability that they seem to exist by conventional law alone and not by nature. Good things seem to admit of variability in the same way too, because they result in harm in many cases, since some have in fact been destroyed because of wealth, others because of courage. So it should content us, in an account that concerns and is in accord with such things, to show the truth roughly and in outline, [*20*] and —in an account that concerns things that hold for the most part and is in accord with them—to reach conclusions of the same sort too. It is in the same way, then, that we also need to take each of the things we say. For it is characteristic of a well-educated person to look for the degree of exactness in each kind of {579} investigation that the nature of the subject itself

allows. [*25*] For it is evident that accepting persuasive arguments from a mathematician is like demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician.

But each person correctly discerns the things he knows and is a good discerner of these. Hence a person well educated in a given area is a good discerner *in that area*, while a person well educated in all areas is an unconditionally good discerner. [*1095a*] That is why a young person is not a suitable audience for politics. For he has no experience of the actions of life, and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these.

Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial for him to be in the audience, since the end is not [*5*] knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency is not a matter of time but is due to living and pursuing each thing in accord with his feelings. For to people like that, knowledge turns out to be profitless in just the way it does to those who lack self-control. For those who form their desires and do their actions in accord with reason, however, [*10*] it will be of great benefit to know about these things.

So much for the prefatory remarks concerning the audience, how our discussion is to be received, and what we are proposing to do.

I.4

Let us, then, resume our account. Since every sort of knowledge and every deliberate choice reaches after some good, let us say what it is [*15*] politics seeks—that is, what the topmost of all the good things doable in action is.

About its name, most people are pretty much agreed, since both ordinary people and sophisticated ones say it is ‘happiness’ and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy. Concerning happiness, however, and what [*20*] it is, they are in dispute, and ordinary people do not give the same answer as wise ones. For ordinary people think it is one of the plainly evident things, such as pleasure or wealth or honor—some taking it to be one thing, others another. And often the same person thinks it is different things, since when he gets a disease, it is health, whereas when he is poor, it is wealth. But when these people are conscious of their own ignorance [*25*] they are wonder-struck by those who proclaim some great thing that is over their heads. And some people did used to think that,

beyond these many good things, there is another intrinsically good one that causes all of them to be good.

Now it is presumably quite pointless to inquire into all these beliefs, and enough to inquire into those that are most prevalent or that seem to have some argument for them.

We must not let it escape our notice, however, [*30*] that arguments leading from starting-points and arguments leading to starting-points are different. For Plato too was rightly puzzled about this and would inquire whether the route was leading from starting-points or to starting-points—as, in a stadium racecourse, that of the athletes may lead away from the starting-point toward the boundary or in the reverse direction. [*1095b*] We must indeed start from things that are knowable. But things are knowable in two ways, since some are knowable to us, some unconditionally. So presumably we should start from things knowable to us.

That is why we must be nobly brought up if, where noble things, just things, and the topics of politics as a whole are concerned, [*5*] we are to be an adequate audience. For the starting-point is the fact that something is so, and, if this is sufficiently evident, we do not also need the explanation of why it is so. A nobly brought up person, then, either has the starting-points or can easily get hold of them. And as for someone who neither has nor can get hold of them, he should listen to Hesiod: Best of all is the one who understands everything himself, [*10*] Good too is that person who is persuaded by one that has spoken well.

But he who neither understands it himself nor listening to another

Takes it to heart, that one is a useless man.[2]

{580} I.5

But let us take up our account at the point where we digressed. People seem (which is not unreasonable) to get their suppositions about the good—that is, happiness—from their lives. [*15*] For ordinary people, the most vulgar ones, suppose it to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of indulgence. For there are three lives that stand out: the one we just mentioned, the political, and, third, the contemplative.

Now ordinary people do seem wholly slavish, because the life they deliberately choose is one that is characteristic of grazing cattle. [*20*] They

have an argument for their choice, though, because many of those in positions of authority feel the same as Sardanapalus.[3]

Sophisticated people, on the other hand, and doers of action, deliberately choose honor, since it is pretty much the end of the political life. It, however, is apparently more superficial than what we are looking for, since it seems to be in the hands of the honorers more than of the honorees, whereas [*25*] we have a hunch that the good is something that properly belongs to us and is difficult to take away. Further, people seem to pursue honor in order to be convinced that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honored by practically-wise people, among people who know them, and for virtue. It is clear, then, that according to them, at least, virtue is better.

Maybe one might even suppose that *it* is more [*30*] the end of the political life than honor is. But even virtue is apparently too incomplete, since it seems possible to have virtue even while sleeping or being inactive throughout life or while suffering evils and bad luck of the worst sort. Someone who was living like *that*, however, [*1096a*] no one would call happy unless he was defending a thesis at all costs. That is enough about these issues, since they have also been adequately discussed in the works that are in circulation.

The third life is the contemplative one, which we shall undertake to investigate in what follows.

The life of a moneymaker [*5*] is in a way forced, and wealth is clearly not the good we are looking for, since it is useful and for the sake of something else. Hence we might be more inclined to suppose that the things already mentioned are the end, since they are liked because of themselves. But they are apparently not the end either—indeed, many arguments have been presented against them. So we may set them aside. [*10*]

I.7

Let us return to the good we are looking for and [*1097a15*] what it could possibly be. For it is apparently different in different actions and different crafts, since it is one thing in medicine, a different one in generalship, and likewise for the rest. What, then, is the good characteristic of each? Or isn’t it the thing for whose sake the rest of the actions are done? In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in building a house, and in other crafts

something else, and in [*20*] every action and deliberate choice it is the end, since it is for the sake of the end that everyone does the rest of the actions. So if there is some end of all the things doable in action, this will be the good doable in action, and if there are more than one, it will be these.

Taking a different course, then, our account has reached the same conclusion. But we should try to make this yet more perspicuous.

Since there are evidently many [*25*] ends, and we choose some of them because of something else, as we do wealth, flutes, and instruments generally, it is clear that not all ends are complete. But the best one is apparently something complete. So if one thing alone is complete, this will be what we are looking for, but if there are more, it will be the most complete of them.

We say that [*30*] what is intrinsically worth pursuing is more complete than what is worth pursuing because of something else, that what is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than things that are both intrinsically choiceworthy and choiceworthy because of it, and that what is unconditionally complete, then, is what is always intrinsically choiceworthy and never choiceworthy because of something else.

Happiness seems to be most like this, since *it* we always choose because of itself and never because of something else. [*1097b*] But honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue, though we {581} do choose them because of themselves as well (since if they had no further consequences, we would still take each of them), we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that because of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, [*5*] no one chooses for the sake of these things or because of anything else in general.

The same conclusion also apparently follows from self-sufficiency, since the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By ‘self-sufficient’, however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally, [*10*] since a human being is by nature political. Of these, some defining mark must be found, since, if we extend the list to ancestors and descendants and to friends’ friends, it will go on without limit. But we must investigate this on another occasion. In any case, we posit that what is self-sufficient is what, on its own, makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and this, [*15*] we think, is what happiness is like.

Further, we think it is the most choiceworthy of all things, when not counted among them—for if it is counted among them, it clearly would be more choiceworthy with the addition of the least of goods. For what is added would bring about a superabundance of goods, and of goods, the greater one is always more choiceworthy.

Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, [*20*] since it is the end of what is doable in action.

But to say that happiness is the best good is perhaps to say something that is apparently commonplace, and we still need a clearer statement of what it is. Maybe, then, this would come about if the function of a human being were grasped. For just as for a flute player, a sculptor, [*25*] every craftsman, and in general for whatever has some function and action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, the same also seems to hold of a human being, if indeed there is some function that is his.

So are there some functions and actions of a carpenter and of a shoemaker but none at all of a human being? And is he by nature inactive? Or, rather, just as of eye, [*30*] hand, foot, and of each part generally there seems to be some function, may we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these?

What, then, could this be? For living is evidently shared with plants as well, but we are looking for what is special. Hence we must set aside the living that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order [*1098a*] is some sort of perceptual living. But this too is evidently shared with horse and ox and every animal.

There remains, then, some sort of practical living of the part that has reason. And of what has reason, one part has it by dint of obeying reason, the other by dint of actually having it and exercising thought. But ‘living’ is said of things in two ways, [*5*] and we must take the one in accord with activity, since it seems to be called ‘living’ in a fuller sense.

If, then, the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accord with reason or not without reason, and the function of a sort of thing, we say, is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (as in the case of a lyre player and an excellent lyre player), and this is unconditionally so in all cases when we add to the function [*10*] the superiority that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and of an excellent one to do it well)—if all this is

so, and a human being's function is supposed to be a sort of living, and this living is supposed to be activity of the soul and actions that involve reason, and it is characteristic of an excellent man to do these well and nobly, and each is completed well when it is in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it [*15*] —if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete. Furthermore, in a complete life, for one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day. Nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make someone blessed and happy.

Let the good, then, be sketched [*20*] in this way, since perhaps we should outline first and fill in the details later. It would seem, though, that anyone can develop and articulate the things in the outline that have been correctly done, and that time is a good discoverer and co-worker in such matters. This is even the source of advances {582} in the crafts, since anyone can produce what is lacking. [*25*]

We must also remember what was said before and not look for the same exactness in everything but, in each case, the one that is in accord with the subject matter and the degree sought by the method of inquiry that properly belongs to it. For a carpenter and a geometer inquire differently about the right angle. A carpenter does so to the degree that is useful [*30*] for his work, whereas a geometer inquires about what it is or what sort of thing, since he is a contemplator of the truth. We must do things in just the same way, then, in other cases, so that side issues do not overwhelm the works themselves.

Nor should we demand the cause in all cases alike. Rather, in some cases it will be adequate [*1098b*] if the fact that they are so has been correctly shown—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned. And the fact that something is so is a first thing and a starting-point.

We get a theoretical grasp of some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and others through other means. In each case we should follow the method of inquiry suited to their nature and make very serious efforts [*5*] to define them correctly. For they are of great and decisive importance regarding what follows. It seems indeed that the starting-point is more than half the whole and that many of the things we were inquiring about will at the same time become evident through it.

We must investigate it, however, not only in accord with the conclusions and premises of our argument but also in accord with the things we say [*10*] about it. For all the data are in tune with a true view, whereas they soon clash with a false one.*

Goods, then, have been divided into three sorts, with some said to be external, some relating to the soul, and some to the body. The goods relating to soul are most fully such, and, we say, are goods to the highest degree, and we take the actions and activities of the [*15*] soul to be goods relating to soul. So what we have said is correct, according to this view at least, which is long standing and agreed to by philosophers.

It is correct even in saying that actions and activities of some sort are the end, since that way the end turns out to be one of the goods relating to soul, and not one of the external ones.

The saying that someone who is happy [*20*] both lives well and does well is in tune with our argument too, since happiness has been pretty much defined as a sort of living well and doing well.

Again, all the things that are looked for where happiness is concerned apparently hold of what we have said it is. For to some it seems to be virtue, to others practical wisdom, to others some sort of theoretical wisdom, while to others it seems to be these or one of these involving pleasure or not without pleasure. [*25*] Other people include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many and are long standing, while others are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong but, rather, that they are right on one point at least or even on most of them.

Now with those who say that happiness is virtue or some sort of virtue, our argument is in tune, [*30*] since activity in accord with virtue is characteristic of that virtue. But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we suppose the best good to consist in virtue’s possession or in its use—that is, in the state or in the activity. For it is possible for someone to possess the state while accomplishing nothing good—for example, if he is sleeping [*1099a*] or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activity, since he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest

who get the victory crown but the competitors (since it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also [*5*] among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.

Further, their life is intrinsically pleasant. For being pleased is among the things that belong to soul, and to each person what is pleasant is that thing by reference to which he is said to be a lover of such things—as, for example, a horse in the case of a lover of horses, and a play in that of a lover of plays. In the same way, just things [*10*] are pleasant to a lover of justice and the things in accord with virtue as a whole are pleasant to a lover of virtue.

{583} The things that are pleasant to ordinary people, however, are in conflict because they are not naturally pleasant, whereas the things pleasant to lovers of what is noble *are* naturally pleasant. And actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that they are pleasant both to such people and intrinsically.

Their life, then, has no need of a pleasure that is superadded to it, [*15*] like some sort of appendage, but has its pleasure within itself. For besides what we have already said, the person who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not good. For no one would call a person just who did not enjoy doing just actions, or generous if he did not enjoy doing generous ones, and similarly as regards the others. [*20*]

If that is so, however, actions in accord with virtue will be intrinsically pleasant. But they are also good, of course, and noble as well. Further, they are each of these things to the highest degree, if indeed an excellent person discerns them correctly—and he does discern them that way.

Hence happiness is what is best, noblest, and most pleasant. And these qualities are not distinguished in the way [*25*] the Delian inscription[4] says:

The noblest thing is the most just; the best, to be healthy.
The most pleasant, however, is to get the thing we desire.
For the best activities possess them all. And it is these—or the one among them that is best—that we say is happiness. [*30*]

All the same, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said, since it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies. For just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political [*1099b*] power. Then again

there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks. For we scarcely have the stamp of happiness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or [*5*] were good but have died.

Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added. That is what leads some to identify good luck with happiness and others to identify virtue with happiness.

I.9

It is also what leads people to puzzle about whether happiness is something acquirable by learning or by habituation or by some other sort of training, or whether it comes about in accord with some divine dispensation or even by luck. [*10*]

Well, if anything is a gift from the gods to human beings, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is also god given—especially since it is the best of human goods. Perhaps this topic properly belongs more to a different investigation, yet even if happiness is not a godsend but comes about through virtue and some sort of learning or [*15*] training, it is evidently one of the most divine things, since virtue's prize and end is evidently something divine and blessed. At the same time, it would also be something widely shared, since it is possible for it to be acquired through some sort of learning or supervision by all those not disabled in relation to virtue.

If it is better to acquire it in that way than to be happy by luck, [*20*] however, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how we do acquire it, if indeed what is in accord with nature is by nature in the noblest possible condition. Similarly with what is in accord with craft or with any cause whatsoever—above all, what is in accord with the best one. To entrust what is greatest and noblest to luck would strike a very false note.

The answer we are looking for is also entirely evident from our argument. [*25*] For we have said that happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue, while of the remaining goods, some are necessary conditions of it, others are by nature co-workers and useful as instruments. This also would agree with what we said at the start. For we took the end of politics to be the best end. And its supervision aims above all at producing

[*30*] citizens of a certain sort—that is, good people and doers of noble actions.

It makes perfect sense, then, that we do not say that an ox, a horse, or any other animal {584} whatsoever is happy, since none of them can share in this sort of activity. This is the [*1100a*] explanation of why a child is not happy either, since he is not yet a doer of such actions because of his age. Children who are said to be blessed are being called blessed because of their prospects, since for happiness there must be, as we said, both complete virtue and a complete life. For many reversals of fortune [*5*] and all sorts of lucky accidents occur in life, and the most prosperous may meet with great disasters in old age—just as is said of Priam in the story of the events at Troy.[5] And no one counts someone happy who has suffered strokes of luck like that and dies in a wretched way.

I.13

[*1102a5*] Since happiness is some activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we must investigate virtue, since maybe that way we will also get a better theoretical grasp on happiness. It seems too that someone who is truly a politician will have worked most on virtue, since he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws. A paradigm case is provided by the Cretan [*10*] and Spartan legislators and by any others there may have been that are like them.[6] If this investigation belongs to politics, however, it is clear that our present inquiry will be in accord with the deliberate choice we made at the start.

It is also clear that the virtue we must investigate is human virtue. For it is in fact the human good we are looking for, and human happiness. [*15*] By ‘human virtue’, though, we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness, we say, is an activity of the soul. But if all this is so, it is clear that a politician must in a way know about what pertains to the soul, just as someone who is going to take care of people’s eyes must know about the body generally—more so, indeed, to the extent that politics is more estimable [*20*] and better than medicine—and that doctors (the ones who are more sophisticated) occupy themselves greatly with knowing about the body. It is also for a politician, then, to get a theoretical grasp on what concerns the soul. But his theoretical grasp should be for the sake of the

things in question and of an extent that is adequate to the things being looked for, since a more exact treatment is perhaps harder work than [*25*] the topics before us require.

Enough has been said about some aspects of the soul in the external accounts too, and we should make use of these—for example, that one part of the soul is nonrational whereas another part has reason. Whether these are distinguished like the parts of the body or like anything else that is divisible or whether they are two in definition but inseparable by nature (like [*30*] convex and concave in a curved surface) makes no difference for present purposes.

Of the nonrational part, one part seems to be shared and vegetative—I mean, the cause of nutrition and growth. For this sort of capacity of soul is one that we suppose is present in all things that take in nourishment, even embryos, and that this same one [*1102b*] is also present in completely grown animals, since that is more reasonable than to suppose a different one to be present in them.

Hence the virtue of this capacity is apparently something shared and not distinctively human. For this part and this capacity seem to be most active in sleep, and a good person and a bad one are least clearly distinguished during [*5*] sleep (leading people to say that the happy are no different from the wretched for half their lives, which makes perfect sense, since sleep is idleness of the soul in that respect with reference to which it is said to be excellent or base), unless—to some small extent—some movements do get through to us and, in this way, the things that appear in the dreams of decent people are better than those of any [*10*] random person. But that is enough about these things, and we should leave the nutritive part aside, since by nature it has no share in human virtue.

Another natural constituent of the soul, however, also seems to be nonrational, although it shares in reason in a way. For we praise the reason —that is, the part of the soul that has reason—of a person with self-control and of a person without it, since [*15*] it exhorts them correctly {585} toward what is best. But they also have by nature something else within them besides reason, apparently, which fights against reason and resists it. For exactly as with paralyzed limbs (when their owners deliberately choose to move them to the right, they do the contrary and move off to the left), so it is in the case of the soul as well, [*20*] since the impulses of people who lack

self-control are in contrary directions. In the case of the body, to be sure, we see the part that is moving in the wrong direction, whereas in the case of the soul we do not see it. But presumably we should nonetheless acknowledge that in the soul as well there is something besides reason, countering it and going against it. How it is different, though, is not important.

But this part [*25*] apparently also has a share of reason, as we said, at any rate, it is obedient to the reason of a self-controlled person. Furthermore, that of a temperate and courageous person, presumably, listens still better, since there it chimes with reason in everything.

Apparently, then, the nonrational part is also twofold, since the vegetative part does not share in reason in any way but the appetitive part (indeed, the desiring part as a whole) does so [*30*] in some way, because it is able to listen to reason and obey it. It has reason, then, in the way we are said to have the reason of our fathers and friends and not in the way we are said to have that of mathematics. The fact, though, that the nonrational part is persuaded in some way by reason is revealed by the practice of warning people and of all the different practices of admonishing and exhorting them.

If we should say that it too has reason, [*1103a*] however, then the part that has reason will be double as well—one part having it fully and within itself, the other as something able to listen to it as to a father.

Virtues are also defined in accord with this difference, since we say that some are of thought, others of character. Theoretical wisdom, comprehension, [*5*] and practical wisdom are virtues of thought; generosity and temperance virtues of character. For when we talk about someone’s character we do not say that he is theoretically-wise or has comprehension but that he is mild-mannered or temperate. But we do also praise a theoretically-wise person with reference to his state, and—among the states—it is the praiseworthy ones [*10*] that we call virtues.

Book II

II.1

Virtue, then, is twofold, of thought and of character. That of thought both comes about and grows mostly as a result of teaching, [*15*] which is why it requires experience and time. That of character (*ēthikē*), on the other hand, results from habit (*ethos*)—indeed, this is the source of the name *ēthikē*, which derives with a minor variation from *ethos*.

From this it is also clear that none of the virtues of character comes about in us naturally, since nothing natural can be habituated to be otherwise—for example, a stone that naturally [*20*] moves downward cannot be habituated to move upward, not even if to habituate it you threw it upward ten thousand times, nor will fire move downward, nor can anything else that is naturally one way be habituated into being another way. Hence the virtues come about in us neither by nature nor against nature, rather we are naturally receptive of them and are brought to completion through [*25*] habit.

Further, in the case of things that are provided to us by nature, we first receive the capacities for them and later exhibit the activities. (This is clear in the case of the perceptual capacities. For it was not from frequent acts of seeing or of hearing that we acquired the perceptual capacities, rather it was the reverse—we used them because we had them, we did not have them because we used them.) [*30*] The virtues, by contrast, we acquire by first engaging in the activities, as is also true in the case of the various crafts. For the things we cannot produce without learning to do so are the very ones we learn to produce by producing them—for example, we become builders by building houses and lyre players by playing the lyre. Similarly, then, we become just people by doing just actions, temperate people [*1103b*] by doing temperate actions, and courageous people by doing courageous ones.

What happens in cities also testifies to this, since legislators make citizens good by habituating them; that is to say, this is the *wish* of every {586} legislator, and those legislators who do not do it well fail in their purpose, [*5*] and it is in this respect that one constitution differs from another, a good one from a base one.

Further, it is from the same things and through the same things that each virtue both comes about and is ruined. The case of a craft is similar as well, since it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre players come about. And something analogous holds in the case of builders and all the rest, since it is from [*10*] building houses well that good builders arise and from doing so badly, bad ones.

If it were otherwise, there would have been no need whatsoever of a teacher, but they would all have been born either good or bad at their craft. This, then, is also how it is with the virtues, since it is from acting as we do in our transactions with other human beings that some of us become just and others unjust, [*15*] and from acting as we do in terrible circumstances and from becoming habituated to feel fear or confidence that some of us become courageous and others cowards. Something similar also holds of circumstances involving appetites and those involving feelings of anger, since some people become temperate and mild-mannered, whereas others become intemperate and irascible—the one group from conducting themselves in one way in such circumstances, the other [*20*] from doing so in another way. In a word, then, states come about from activities that are similar to them.

That is why the activities must exhibit a certain quality, since the states follow along in accord with the differences between these. So it makes no small difference whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on [*25*] the contrary, it makes a huge one—or rather, *all* the difference.

II.2

Since, then, the present work is not undertaken for the sake of theoretical knowledge, as our others are (for we are engaging in the investigation not in order to know what virtue is but in order to become good people, since otherwise there would be nothing of benefit in it), we must investigate what relates to actions, that is, in what way they are to be done. For actions also control [*30*] what sorts of states will come about, as we said.

That we should act in accord with the correct reason, though, is a common view and is to be taken as basic—we shall talk about it later,[7] both about what the correct reason is and about how it is related to the various virtues.

Let us take it as agreed in advance, however, that the entire account of issues relating to the actions* we must do has to be stated in outline [*1104a*] and not in an exact way, and—as we said at the start—the sorts of accounts we demand should be in accord with the subject matter. For things in the sphere of action and advantageous things have no fixed identity, just as healthy ones have none.

While that is what the universal account is like, [*5*] the account dealing with particular cases is still less exact. For these do not fall under any craft or any set of rules whatsoever, and the agents themselves always have to inquire to find out what it is opportune to do, just as in the case of medicine and navigation. But even though this *is* what the present [*10*] account is like, it must still try to provide help.

First, then, we must get a theoretical grasp on the fact that states like these are naturally ruined by deficiency and excess (for we must use evident cases to testify on behalf of obscure ones), just as we see happen in the cases of strength and health. For both athletic training regimens that are excessive and those that are deficient [*15*] will ruin our strength, and routines of drinking and eating too much will ruin our health, whereas those involving proportionate amounts produce, increase, and preserve it.

It is also that way, then, with temperance, courage, and the other virtues. For someone who avoids and fears everything and endures nothing [*20*] becomes cowardly, whereas someone who fears nothing at all and goes to face everything becomes rash. Similarly, someone who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes intemperate, whereas someone who avoids all of them, as boorish people do, becomes insensible in a way. Temperance, then, {587} and courage are ruined by [*25*] excess and deficiency and are preserved by the medial condition.

It is not only that the coming about, growth, and ruin of the virtues result from the same things and are caused by the same things, however, but also that their activities are found in the same ones, since this holds in the other more evident cases as well—for example, in that of strength. [*30*] For strength comes about from taking much food and enduring much exertion, and it is a strong person who is most capable of doing these very things.

It is also that way in the case of the virtues, since from abstaining from pleasures we become temperate and, having become so, are most capable of abstaining from them. Similarly, [*35*] in the case of courage, since if we are

habituated to despise frightening things [*1104b*] and to endure them, we become courageous and, having become so, are most capable of enduring frightening things.

II.3

We must take the pleasures and pains that supervene on a person's works as an indication of his states. For someone who abstains from bodily [*5*] pleasures and enjoys doing just this is temperate, whereas someone who is annoyed is intemperate, and someone who endures terrible things and enjoys doing so—or at least is not pained by it—is courageous, whereas someone who is pained is cowardly. For virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pains. Indeed, it is because of pleasure that we do base actions and because of pain [*10*] that we abstain from doing noble ones. That is why we must be brought up in a certain way straight from childhood, as Plato says, so as to enjoy and be pained by the things we should, since this is what the correct education is.[8]

Further, the virtues are concerned with actions and feelings, and every feeling and every action entails pleasure and pain. That is also why virtue is concerned [*15*] with pleasures and pains. Punishments also reveal this, since they take place by means of pleasure and pain. For punishments are medical treatments of a sort, and medical treatments are naturally effected by means of contraries.

Further, as we said just now, the sorts of things that by nature cause every state of soul to become worse or better are the ones the state is by nature related to and the ones it is concerned with. [*20*] Again, it is because of pleasures and pains that people become base—by pursuing and avoiding these, either the ones they shouldn't or when they shouldn't or in the way they shouldn't or in whatever other ways are distinguished in the account. That is also why people define the virtues as a sort of absence of feeling or a sort of being at rest. But they do not define them well if they say this unconditionally and do not [*25*] add 'as we should' or 'as we shouldn't' and all the other distinctions.

Hence we may take it that virtue is the sort of state concerned with pleasures and pains that is a doer of the best actions, and that vice is the contrary state.

It will become evident to us from the following considerations, in fact, that virtue and vice are concerned with the same things. For there are three proper objects of choice and three [*30*] of avoidance: what is noble, what is advantageous, and what is pleasant, and their contraries, what is shameful, what is harmful, and what is painful. Where all these are concerned, a good person is able to be correct and a bad one unable not to err—most of all, though, where pleasure is concerned, since it is both shared with animals and entailed by every object of choice. [*35*] For what is noble or what is advantageous appears pleasant too.

Further, [*1105a*] pleasure has grown up with all of us from infancy. That is why it is difficult to rub out this feeling that is dyed into our lives. Also, we measure our actions, some more and others less, by the standard of pleasure and pain. That is why, then, our entire work must [*5*] be concerned with these, since whether someone enjoys or is pained well or badly makes no small difference in his actions.

Further, it is more difficult to fight against pleasure than to fight against spirit, just as Heraclitus says, and both craft and virtue are always concerned with what is more difficult, since to do well what is more difficult is in fact a better {588} thing.[9] So that is also why [*10*] our entire work, both as a contribution to virtue and as a contribution to politics, must be concerned with pleasures and pains, since someone who uses these well will be good and someone who uses them badly will be bad.

Let us say, then, that virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, that the things from which it comes about are also the ones by which it is increased and (if they come about differently) ruined, and that the things from which [*15*] it has come about are also the ones concerning which it is active.

II.4

Someone might raise a puzzle, however, about how we can claim that people must do just actions to become just, and temperate ones to become temperate. For if people are doing what is just or temperate, they are already just and temperate, in the same way that if they are doing what is grammatical [*20*] or musical, they already know grammar or music.

Or doesn’t that hold in the case of the crafts either? For it is possible to produce something grammatical either by luck or on someone else’s

instruction. Someone would be a grammarian, then, if he produced something grammatical and produced it in the way a grammarian would. And this is to do it in accord with the craft knowledge of grammar that is internal to himself. [*25*]

Further, the case of crafts is *not* similar to that of virtues. For the things that come about by means of the crafts have their goodness internal to them, and thus it is enough if they come about in such a way as to be in a certain state. The things that come about in accord with the virtues, by contrast, are done justly or temperately not simply if they are in a certain state but if the one who does them [*30*] is also in a certain state. First, if he does them knowingly; second, if he deliberately chooses them and deliberately chooses them because of themselves; and third, if he does them from a stable and unchangeable state.

Where the various crafts are concerned, these factors do not count, except [*1105b*] for the knowing itself. Where the virtues are concerned, however, knowing has little or no strength, whereas the other factors have not just a little but, rather, *all* the significance, and these are the very ones that come about from frequently doing just and temperate actions.

Actions are said to be just and temperate, then, [*5*] when they are the sort that a just or a temperate person would do, whereas a just or temperate person is not the one who does these actions but the one* who, in addition, does them in the way a just or temperate person does them. So it is correct to say that a person comes to be just from doing just actions, and temperate from doing temperate ones, [*10*] and that from not doing them no one could have even the prospect of becoming good.

Ordinary people, however, do not do these actions but, taking refuge in argument, think that they are doing philosophy and that this is the way to become excellent—thus behaving a bit like sick people who listen carefully to their doctors but do [*15*] none of the things that are prescribed. So just as people who take care of themselves in that way will not have a body that is in a good state, people who do philosophy in a similar way will not have souls that are in a good one either.

II.5

Next we must investigate what virtue is. Since the things that come about in the soul are of three sorts—feelings, capacities, and [*20*] states—virtue will

be one of these.

By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, enjoyment, love, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, and generally whatever entails pleasure and pain. By capacities I mean that by dint of which we are said to be susceptible to these feelings—for example, by dint of which we are capable of feeling anger, or pain, or pity. By states I mean [*25*] the things by dint of which we are well or badly off in relation to feelings—for example, in relation to anger, if we feel it too intensely or too weakly, we are in a bad state; if {589} we feel it to a medial degree, we are in a good one; and similarly in relation to the others.

Virtues and vices are not feelings, then, because we are not called 'excellent' or 'base' on account of our feelings, whereas we are so called on account of our virtues. [*30*] Nor are we praised or blamed on account of our feelings (for it is not the person who fears or gets angry who is praised nor the person who simply gets [*1106a*] angry who is blamed but, rather, the one who gets angry in a certain way). We *are* praised or blamed, though, on account of our virtues and vices.

Further, we become angry or feel fear without deliberate choice, whereas the virtues are deliberate choices of a sort—or, rather, not without deliberate choice. Besides, we are said to be moved on account of our feelings, but [*5*] on account of our virtues and vices we are said not to be moved but, rather, to be disposed in a certain way.

For these reasons virtues are not capacities either. For we are not called 'good' for having the capacity simply to feel things, nor are we called 'bad', nor are we praised or blamed. Further, we have the capacities by nature, whereas we do not become good or bad by nature—we talked about this earlier.

If, [*10*] then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, it remains for them to be states. We have now said what the genus of virtue is.

II.6

We should not say only that virtue is a state, however, but also what sort of state it is.

We should say, then, that every virtue, regardless of what thing it is the virtue of, [*15*] both completes the good state of that thing and makes it perform its function well—as, for example, the virtue of an eye makes both

the eye and its function excellent, since it is by dint of the eye's virtue that we see well. Similarly the virtue of a horse makes the horse excellent—that is, good at running, carrying its rider, [*20*] and standing firm against enemies. If, then, this holds in every case, the virtue of a human being will also be the state by dint of which he becomes a good human being and will perform his own function well. How that will come about, we have already said. But it will also become evident if we get a theoretical grasp on the sort [*25*] of nature that virtue has.

In everything continuous and divisible, then, it is possible to take more, less, and equal, and these either *in relation to the thing itself* or *in relation to us*—where equal is some sort of mean between excess and deficiency. By 'the mean in relation to the thing', I mean what is equidistant from each of its two extremes, which is precisely [*30*] one in number and the same for all. The mean in relation to us, by contrast, is what takes neither too much nor too little. It is not one thing and is not the same for all. For example, if ten are many and two are few, we take six as the mean in relation to the thing, since it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount. That is the mean in accord with arithmetical [*35*] proportion. But the mean in relation to us must not be ascertained in that way. For if ten minae is a lot to eat and two minae a little, the trainer [*1106b*] will not prescribe six minae.[10] For that is presumably also a lot or a little for the person who is to eat it—a little for Milo[11] but a lot for someone starting his athletic training regimen. Similarly in the cases of running and wrestling. In this way, then, everyone with scientific knowledge avoids excess and [*5*] deficiency and looks for the mean and chooses it—the mean not in the thing but in relation to us.

If, then, every science does complete its function well in this way, looking to the mean and bringing its works into conformity with it—which is why people regularly say of works that are well made that nothing could be taken away [*10*] or added, since excess and deficiency ruin what is well done whereas the medial condition preserves what is well done, and good craftsmen, as we say, accomplish their works by looking to the mean—and if virtue is more exact and [*15*] better than any craft, just as nature also is, virtue will be able to aim at and hit the mean.

{590} I am speaking of virtue of character, since it is concerned with feelings and actions and it is in these that there is excess, deficiency, and the

mean. For example, it is possible to feel fear and confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and pleasure and pain generally, both too much and too little and in both ways [*20*] not well.

To feel such things when we should, though, about the things we should, in relation to the people we should, for the sake of what we should, and as we should is a mean and best and precisely what is characteristic of virtue.

Similarly where actions are concerned, there is excess, deficiency, and the mean. But virtue is concerned with feelings and actions in which excess is in error [*25*] and subject to blame, as is deficiency,* whereas the mean is subject to praise and is on the correct path (and both these features are characteristic of virtue). Hence virtue is a sort of medial condition because it is able to aim at and hit the mean.

Further, it is possible to err in many ways (for the bad belongs to what is without a limit, as the Pythagoreans portrayed it[12] and the good to what is determinate), [*30*] whereas there is only one way to be correct. That is why erring is easy and being correct difficult, since it is easy to miss the target but difficult to hit it. So because of these facts too, excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice, whereas the medial condition is characteristic [*35*] of virtue: 'for people are good in one simple way, but bad in all sorts of ways'.[13]

Virtue, then, is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person [*1107a*] would define it. Also, it is a medial condition between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Further, it is also such a condition because some vices are deficient in relation to what the relevant feelings and actions should be and others are excessive, but virtue both finds the mean [*5*] and chooses it.

That is why—as regards its essence and the account that states its what it is to be—virtue is medial, but, in relation to the best and doing well, it is extreme.

But not every action or every feeling admits of the medial condition, since in some cases they are named in such a way that they are united with baseness from the start—for example, spite, [*10*] shamelessness, and envy, and (in the case of actions) adultery, theft, and murder. For all these and things like them—and not the excessive varieties of them or the deficient

ones—are said to be what they are because they are base. It is never possible, then, to be correct where they are concerned but it is necessary always to be in error. Nor is there a doing well or not well [*15*] where such things are concerned (committing adultery with whom we should, when we should, in the way we should), but, rather, simply to do any of these things is to err.

So it is like thinking that there are also medial conditions and an excess and a deficiency where unjust and cowardly and intemperate actions are concerned—since that way, at any rate, there will be a medial condition of excess and of deficiency [*20*] and an excess of excess and a deficiency of deficiency. But just as in temperance and courage there is no excess and deficiency, because the mean is in a way an extreme, so in these other cases too there is no mean and no excess or deficiency either, but, however they are done, they are errors. For, putting it generally, there is neither a medial condition of excess [*25*] and deficiency nor excess and deficiency of a medial condition.

II.7

We should state this not only in universal terms, however, but we should also state how it fits the particular virtues and vices. (For in accounts concerned with actions, whereas the universal ones are common to more cases, the [*30*] ones that apply to a part are truer, since actions are concerned with particulars and our account should be in harmony with them.) We should ascertain these, then, from the chart.[14]

{591} Where feelings of fear and confidence are concerned, then, courage is the medial condition, whereas of those people who are excessive, the one who is excessive in his fearlessness is nameless [*1107b*] (many indeed are nameless), the one who is excessive in his confidence is rash, and the one who is excessively fearful and deficient in confidence is cowardly.

Where pleasures and pains are concerned (not all of them and even less so where pains are concerned), the medial condition is [*5*] temperance and the excess is intemperance. But people deficient in pleasure are scarcely found, which is why people of that sort have not even acquired a name. Let us call them ‘insensible’.

Where giving and getting wealth are concerned, the medial condition is generosity, whereas the excess and deficiency are wastefulness and acquisitiveness. [*10*] In the case of these states, people are excessive and deficient in contrary ways, since the wasteful person is excessive in giving wealth and deficient in getting it, whereas the acquisitive person is excessive in getting it but deficient in giving. (For the moment we are speaking in outline and in headline form, satisfying ourselves with just this much. A more exact definition of these virtues [*15*] will come later.) Where wealth is concerned there are also other dispositions: the medial condition is magnificence (for the magnificent person differs from a generous one, since the former is concerned with great sums, the latter with small), the excess is tastelessness and vulgarity, and the deficiency is niggardliness. These vices differ from the ones where [*20*] generosity is concerned. How they differ will be discussed later.

Where honor and dishonor are concerned, the medial condition is greatness of soul, whereas the excess is called a sort of conceitedness, and the deficiency smallness of soul. And just as we said generosity was related to magnificence, differing from it in being concerned with small sums, so there is also something [*25*] related in this way to greatness of soul (which is concerned with great honor) that is concerned with small honor. For we can desire honor as we should or more or less than we should. A person who is excessive in these desires is said to be an honor lover, whereas someone who is deficient in them is indifferent to honor, and the medial person nameless. Also nameless are the corresponding dispositions, with the exception [*30*] of that of an honor lover, which is called ‘love of honor’. This is why the extremes lay claim to the middle ground—that is, we sometimes say that a medial person is an honor lover and sometimes that he is indifferent to honor, and sometimes we praise an honor lover and sometimes one who is indifferent to honor. Why [*1108a*] we do this will be discussed in what follows. For now, let us speak about the rest in the way we have laid down.

There is also excess and deficiency and a mean where anger is concerned, but, since these are pretty much nameless, and since a medial person [*5*] is said to be mild-mannered, let us call the medial condition ‘mild-manneredness’. Of those at the extremes, let an excessive one be irascible

and his vice irascibility, and a deficient one inerascible and his vice inerascibility.

There are also three other medial conditions that have a certain similarity to each other but differ from each other. [*10*] For all of them are concerned with communal relations in words and actions, but they differ because one is concerned with the truth in them while the others are concerned with what is pleasant—in amusements, {592} in the case of one, and in what bears on life generally, in the case of the other. So let us talk about these too in order to see more clearly that in all cases the medial condition is praiseworthy, whereas the [*15*] extremes are neither praiseworthy nor correct but blameworthy. Now of these, most are also nameless. But we should try, just as in the other cases, to make up names for them ourselves for the sake of perspicuity and ease in following.

Where truth is concerned, then, let us call a medial person ‘a truthful sort’, and let us call the mean ‘truthfulness’. [*20*] Pretense that exaggerates will be boastfulness and a person who has it will be boastful. Pretense that minimizes will be self-deprecation and a person who has it will be a self-deprecator.

Where what is pleasant in amusements is concerned, a medial person is witty and the disposition is wit. The excess is buffoonery and one who has it is a buffoon, whereas a deficient person [*25*] is a sort of boor and the state is boorishness. Where the remainder of what is pleasant is concerned (that in life generally), let us call ‘friendly’ a person who is pleasant in the way we should be and the medial condition friendliness. An excessive person (if he is not so for the sake of something specific) will be ingratiating or (if he is so for his own benefit) a flatterer. And a deficient person [*30*] (who is unpleasant in everything) will be a quarrelsome sort of person and disagreeable.

There are also medial conditions in feelings and concerned with feelings. For shame is not a virtue, yet a person with a sense of shame is praised as well. And in these cases, in fact, one person is said to be medial, whereas another is said to be excessive (as in the case of a bashful person, who is ashamed of everything). Someone who is deficient in shame [*35*] or who does not feel it at all is shameless. And a medial person is said to have a sense of shame.

Indignation is a medial condition between envy and spite, all of which are concerned with [*1108b*] pleasure and pain at what happens to neighbors. The indignant person is pained by those who do well undeservedly. The envious person exceeds him in being pained by everyone's doing well, whereas the spiteful person is so deficient in [*5*] being pained that he even enjoys this.

There will be an opportunity to discuss these issues later. But, where justice is concerned, since the term is not said of things only unconditionally, we shall (after that) distinguish its two varieties and say in what way each is a medial condition—and, similarly, where the virtues of [*10*] reason are concerned.

II.9

We have spoken adequately about these topics, [*1109a20*] then, saying that virtue of character is a medial condition and in what way, that it is a medial condition between two vices (one of excess and the other of deficiency), and that it is such because it is able to aim at and hit the mean both in feelings and in actions.

That is why it takes work to be excellent, since in each case it takes work to find the mean [*meson*]—for example, not everyone can find the midpoint [*meson*] of a circle, [*25*] but, rather, someone with knowledge. In the same way, getting angry is also something everyone can do and something easy, as is giving or spending money. Determining whom to give it to, though, and how much, when, for the sake of what, and in what way—that is no longer something everyone can do or something easy. That is why doing it well is a rare thing and a praiseworthy and noble one.

Hence a person who is aiming to hit the mean must first [*30*] steer clear of what is more contrary to it, as Calypso too advises: 'from that surge and spray keep your ship well clear'.[15] For one of the extremes is more in error, the other less. So since it is extremely difficult to hit the mean, the second best course, as they say, is to ascertain the lesser of the evils, and that [*35*] will best be done in the way we say.

We should also investigate [*1109b*] what we ourselves are easily drawn toward, since different people are naturally inclined toward different things. This will become known to us from the pleasure and pain that the things

bring about in us. And it is in the contrary direction that we should drag ourselves off, since it is by pulling well away from {593} [*5*] error that we shall attain the mean—as people do in rectifying distortions in pieces of wood.

In everything, though, we must most of all guard against what is pleasant (that is, against pleasure), since we are not unbiased judges of it. So precisely the way the elders of the people felt about Helen,[16] that is the way we ourselves should feel about pleasure, and on each occasion [*10*] we should repeat what they uttered, since that way we shall send it off and be less in error.

To speak in headline form: if we do these things, we shall be most able to hit the mean. But presumably it is difficult to hit it, most of all in particular cases, since it is not easy to define how, with whom, about what, or for how long [*15*] a time we should be angry. We ourselves indeed sometimes praise people who are deficient in anger, saying that they are mild-mannered, and sometimes those who are harsh, calling them ‘manly’.

It is not a person who deviates a little—whether toward excess or toward deficiency—who is blamed, however, but one who does so a lot, since someone like that does not escape notice. But up to what point [*20*] and to what extent a person’s deviation is blameworthy is not easy to define in an account—nor indeed is anything else among perceptibles, for such things lie in the particulars, and their discernment lies in perception.

This much, then, makes clear that the mean state is praiseworthy in all cases but that we should sometimes incline toward excess and sometimes toward deficiency, [*25*] since that way we shall most easily hit the mean and what constitutes doing well.

Book III

III.1

Since virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, then, and [*30*] it is the voluntary ones that are praised and blamed, while the involuntary ones elicit sympathetic consideration and are sometimes even pitied, it is perhaps necessary for those who are investigating issues relating to virtue to make some determinations about what is voluntary and what involuntary. This is also useful to legislators regarding honors and punishments.

Now what is involuntary seems to be what comes about by force [*35*] or because of ignorance. Also, what is forced is what has an external starting-point, [*1110a*] that is, the sort of starting-point where the agent, or the one being affected, contributes nothing—as, for example, if the wind or human beings with control over him took him off somewhere.

Actions done because of fear of greater evils or because of something noble—for example, if a tyrant with control over your parents and children orders you [*5*] to do something shameful and, if you do it, they will be saved, whereas, if you do not do it, they will be put to death—give rise to disputes about whether the actions are involuntary or voluntary.

The same sort of dispute also arises where cases of throwing cargo overboard in a storm are concerned, since, unconditionally speaking, no one throws it overboard voluntarily, but to preserve himself and all the rest, [*10*] anyone with understanding does do it.

These sorts of actions are mixed, then, although they more closely resemble voluntary ones, since they are choiceworthy at the time when they are done and the end of the actions is in accord with the opportune moment. Both ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, then, should be ascribed with reference to the time at which the agent does these actions. And the agent does do them voluntarily, since the starting-point of his moving [*15*] his instrumental parts in actions of this sort is in fact internal to himself, and—since the starting-point is internal to himself—it is also up to him whether to do them or not. Such actions, then, are voluntary. Unconditionally, though, they are presumably involuntary, since no one would choose anything of this sort for what it intrinsically is.

People are sometimes even praised for actions of this sort, when [*20*] they endure something shameful or painful for great and noble things, whereas if it is the reverse, they are blamed, since to endure the most shameful things for something {594} not at all noble or only moderately so is characteristic of a base person. And to some people it is not praise we give but, rather, sympathetic consideration, when someone does some action he shouldn't do because of things that overstrain human nature and that no [*25*] one could endure.

In some cases, however, there is presumably no being compelled. On the contrary, rather than do them we should die having suffered the most terrible things. For the things that compelled Euripides' Alcmaeon to kill his mother are evidently ridiculous.[17]

But it is sometimes difficult to distinguish what should be chosen for what or what should be endured for what, and [*30*] more difficult still to stand by what we have determined, since the expected consequences are for the most part painful and what we are compelled to do shameful. That is what leads people to give praise or blame to those who are compelled or not.

What sorts of things, then, should we say are forced? Or is it that things are unconditionally [*1110b*] forced, when their cause lies in external factors and the agent contributes nothing? But the ones that are intrinsically involuntary, though choiceworthy on this occasion for these things, and where the starting-point is internal to the agent—these, though intrinsically involuntary, are, on this occasion and done for these things, voluntary. [*5*] But they more closely resemble voluntary ones, since the actions lie in the particulars and these particular actions are voluntary. What sorts of things should be chosen for what, though, is not easy to give an account of, since there are many differences that lie in the particulars.

If someone were to say that pleasant things and noble things force us (since they are external and compel us), then for him everything would be [*10*] forced, since everyone does every action for the sake of these. Moreover, people who are forced to act and act involuntarily find it painful, whereas those who act because of what is pleasant or what is noble do it with pleasure. It is ridiculous, then,* for the agent to hold external things responsible but not himself for being easily ensnared by such things, and to

hold himself responsible for his noble actions but pleasant things responsible for his shameful ones.

That which comes about by force, then, seems [*15*] to be that whose starting-point is external, nothing being contributed by the one who is forced.

All of what is done because of ignorance, however, is *not voluntary*, although it is *contra-voluntary* when involving pain and regret.[18] For a person who has done whatever it is because of ignorance, but sees nothing repulsive in his action, has not acted voluntarily, [*20*] because he did not know what he was doing. But neither has he acted contra-voluntarily, because he is not pained by it. Of those people, then, who act because of ignorance, the one who regrets what he did seems a contra-voluntary agent. The one who does not regret, since he is a different case, let him be a non-voluntary agent. For since he is different, it is better for him to have a special name.

Acting because of ignorance, however, seems to be different from acting in ignorance. [*25*] For the person who is drunk or angry does not seem to act because of ignorance but because of one of the aforementioned conditions, although he does not act knowingly but in ignorance. Now every depraved person is ignorant of the things he should do and the things he should abstain from, and it is because of this sort of error that unjust people—and bad people generally—come about.

But a case is not meant to be called ‘involuntary’ if someone [*30*] is ignorant of what things are advantageous. For ignorance in our deliberate choice is not a cause of something’s being involuntary but of depravity, and neither is ignorance {595} of the universal (since people are blamed for ignorance of this sort) but, rather, ignorance of the particulars in which the action lies and with which it is concerned. For in these lie the basis for both pity and [*1111a*] sympathetic consideration, since it is a person who is ignorant of one of these who acts involuntarily.

So perhaps it is not a bad thing to make some determinations about these, what they are and how many they are. When someone acts, then, we can ask [1] who? [2] what? and [3] concerning what? or [4] in what? and sometimes [5] with what? (for example, with what instrument?), [6] for the

sake of what? (for example, preservation), and [7] in what way? [*5*] (for example, weakly or intensely).

Now no one who is not a madman could be ignorant about all of these nor, clearly, about [1] who is doing it. For how could he be ignorant about *himself?* But about [2] what he is doing, he might be ignorant, as when people say that things 'just slipped out' while they were talking or that they 'didn't know they were a secret', as Aeschylus said about the Mysteries[19] or that they 'wished to do a demonstration [*10*] and it went off', as the man said about the catapult. Or someone might think that [3–4] his son was the enemy, as Merope did,[20] or [5] that a spear had a guard on the point or that the stone was pumice stone or he might give someone a drink [6] with a view to preserving his life but end up killing him or [7] mean to give someone a light tap (as sparring partners do) and knock him out.

Now since about all these things [*15*] ignorance is possible and these are the ones in which the action lies, a person who is ignorant of one of them seems to have acted involuntarily—most of all so if he is ignorant of the ones with most control. And the ones with most control seem to be the ones in which the action occurs and what it is for the sake of. What is called 'involuntary' on the basis of this sort of ignorance, then, must also cause pain and [*20*] regret.

Because what is involuntary consists, then, of what comes about by force or because of ignorance, what is voluntary would seem to be what has its starting-point in the agent himself, when he knows the particulars in which the action lies.

For actions done because of spirit or appetite are presumably not correctly said to be involuntary. For, first of all, [*25*] none of the other animals will then act voluntarily and neither will children. Second, are none of the actions we do because of appetite or spirit done voluntarily, or are the noble ones voluntary and the shameful ones involuntary? Or is that certainly ridiculous, since they have a single cause? But presumably it is strange to call the things we should desire 'involuntary'. And we should be angry [*30*] at certain things and have an appetite for certain ones, such as health and learning. It also seems that involuntary things are painful, whereas those in accord with appetite are pleasant.

Further, what difference in involuntariness is there between errors made on the basis of rational calculation and those made on the basis of spirit? Both indeed are to be avoided. But the nonrational feelings seem to be no less human, with result that [*1111b*] actions resulting from spirit and appetite are no less the actions of human beings. So it would be strange to count them as involuntary.

III.2

Now that we have made these determinations about what is voluntary and what involuntary, the next task is to discuss deliberate choice, since it seems to belong most properly [*5*] to virtue and to be a better discerner of people's characters than their actions are.

Deliberate choice, then, is apparently something voluntary, although not the same as what is voluntary, which extends more broadly. For children and other animals share in what is voluntary but not in deliberate choice, and sudden actions are voluntary, we say, but are not in accord with deliberate choice.

Those who say[21] [*10*] that deliberate choice is appetite, spirit, wish, or some sort of belief do {596} not seem to be correct. For deliberate choice is not something shared by nonrational creatures, whereas appetite and spirit are. Also, a person who lacks self-control acts from appetite but not from deliberate choice, whereas a person who has self-control does the reverse, acting from deliberate choice but not from appetite. Also, appetite [*15*] is contrary to deliberate choice but not to appetite. Also, appetite is concerned with what is pleasant and what is painful, whereas deliberate choice is concerned neither with what is painful nor with what is pleasant. Still less is deliberate choice spirit, since actions done because of spirit seem least of all to be in accord with deliberate choice.

Then, again, it is not *wish* either, although it appears to be a close relative of it. For there is no deliberate choice [*20*] of impossible things, and if someone were to say he was deliberately choosing them, he would seem silly. But there is wish for impossible things*—for example, immortality. There is also wish concerning the sorts of things that could never come about through ourselves—for example, that a certain actor or athlete should win a victory prize. No one deliberately chooses things like that, but things

he thinks can come about [*25*] through him. Further, wish is more for the end, whereas deliberate choice is of the things that further the end. We wish to be healthy, for example, but we deliberately choose the things through which we shall be healthy. We wish to be happy too, and say so, whereas it is not fitting to say that we deliberately choose to be happy, since deliberate choice generally seems to be concerned with what is up to us.

Neither, then, [*30*] would it seem to be belief. For belief seems to be concerned with all things and no less concerned with eternal ones and impossible ones than with ones that are up to us. And beliefs are divided into false and true, not into bad and good, whereas deliberate choices are more divided into bad and good.

Presumably no one does claim that deliberate choice is the same as belief in general, but neither is it the same as a specific sort of belief. For [*1112a*] it is by deliberately choosing good things or bad things that we are people of a certain sort, not by believing them. Also, we deliberately choose to take or avoid some such thing, whereas we have beliefs about what it is or to whose advantage it is or in what way. But whether to take it or avoid it is scarcely something we hold a belief about. Also, [*5*] deliberate choice is praised more for being of what it should be of, or for correctness in this sense, whereas belief is praised for being true. Also, we deliberately choose things that we most know to be good, whereas we have beliefs about things we scarcely know to be good. Also, the people who make the best deliberate choices do not seem to be the same as the ones who form the best beliefs, on the contrary, some people form better beliefs but because of vice choose what they [*10*] shouldn't. Whether there is belief preceding deliberate choice, though, or following it, makes no difference, since it is not this we are investigating but whether deliberate choice is the same as a specific sort of belief.

What, then, or what sort of thing, is deliberate choice, since it is none of the ones we mentioned? To be sure, it is something voluntary, apparently, although not everything voluntary is deliberately chosen. Well, is it something reached by prior deliberation at least? For deliberate [*15*] choice involves reason and thought and even its name [*prohairesis*] seems to indicate something's being chosen [*haireton*] before [*pro*] other things.

Do people deliberate about everything, and is everything a proper object of deliberation or are there some things about which there is no deliberation? And presumably we should call ‘a proper object of deliberation’ not what a silly sort of person or a madman would deliberate about [*20*] but what a person with understanding would.

No one deliberates about [1] eternal things, then, about the universe, for example, or about the fact that the diameter and sides of a square are not proportionate; or about [2a] things that include change but that always come about in the same way, whether from necessity (or indeed [2b] by nature) or due to some other cause, such as the solstices or the risings of the heavenly bodies; [*25*] or about [3] things that happen sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, such as droughts and rains; or about [4] things that come about by luck, such as discovering a treasure; or about all human affairs either—for example, no Spartan deliberates about the best form of government {597} for the Scythians, since none of these things comes about through ourselves.

We do deliberate, though, about [*30*] things that are up to us and doable in action, and these in fact are the remaining ones. For the causes of things seem to be nature, necessity, luck, and, furthermore, understanding and everything that comes about through a human being. Among human beings, however, each group deliberates about what is doable in action through itself.

There is no deliberation, however, where sciences that are both exact and self-sufficient are concerned—where [*1112b*] writing the letters of the alphabet is concerned, for example, since we have no hesitation about what way to write them. We do deliberate, however, about those things that come about through ourselves but not always in the same way (for example, about the things that medicine or moneymaking deals with). And we deliberate more about navigation than about athletic training, insofar as [*5*] navigation has been less exactly worked out. Further, deliberation is involved in a similar way where the rest are concerned but more where crafts are concerned than sciences, since we are more hesitant about them.

Deliberation is found, then, in the sphere of what holds for the most part but where it is unclear what way things will turn out and where there is an element of indefinability. And we call on partners in deliberation on

important questions, when we mistrust [*10*] ourselves as not being adequate to determine the answer.

We deliberate not about ends, though, but about the things that further ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether to cure or an orator about whether to persuade or a politician about whether to produce good government, nor do any of the rest deliberate about their end. Rather, they take the end for granted and investigate in what way and through which things [*15*] it will come about. And if it appears that it can come about through several, they investigate through which ones it will most easily and best come about. But if it is brought to completion through only one, they investigate in what way it will come about through this and through which things it, in turn, will come about, until they arrive at the first cause, which is the last thing in the process of discovery. For a deliberator seems to inquire and analyze [*20*] in the way we said just as though he were dealing with a diagram—but whereas it is evident that not all inquiry is deliberation (for example, mathematical inquiry), all deliberation is inquiry. And the last thing found in the analysis seems to come first in bringing about the result.

Also, if people encounter something impossible, they give up (for example, if wealth is needed but [*25*] there is no way to provide it), whereas if it appears possible, they set about doing the action. But possible things are ones that could come about through ourselves. For what comes about through our friends comes about through ourselves in a way, since the starting-point is in us.

We inquire sometimes about instruments, sometimes about what way they are to be used, and similarly for the rest—sometimes through whom, sometimes in what way, [*30*] and sometimes through which things.

It seems, then, as we said, that a human being is a starting-point of actions and that deliberation is about what is doable in action by him, while the actions are for the sake of other things. For what is deliberated about is not the end but the things that further ends, and neither, of course, is it particulars (for example, whether this thing is a loaf or whether it is cooked in the way it should be), since these are matters for perception. [*1113a*] And if we deliberate at every point, we shall go on without limit.

Proper objects of deliberation and proper objects of deliberate choice are the same, except that proper objects of deliberate choice are already something determinate, since it is what has been discerned as a result of

deliberation that is a proper object of deliberate choice. For each of us stops inquiring about what way to act when [*5*] he brings back the starting-point to himself and, within himself, to the leading element, since this is what deliberately chooses. This is also clear from the ancient constitutions that Homer described, since the kings announced to the common people what kings had deliberately chosen.

Since a proper object of deliberate choice is a proper object of deliberation and of desire that {598} is among the things that are up to us, deliberate choice too [*10*] will be a deliberative desire of things that are up to us. For having discerned as a result of deliberation, we desire in accord with our deliberation.

So much, then, by way of an outline of deliberate choice, of the things it is concerned with and that it is about the things that further ends.

III.4

[*15*] Wish is for the end, as we said, but some people think it is for the good, others that it is for the apparent good.

For those who say that the proper object of wish is the good, it follows that when someone who has not deliberated correctly wishes for something, what he wishes for is not a proper object of wish at all (for if it is a proper object of wish, it will also be a good thing, but, as it happens, it was a bad one).

For those,[22] on the other hand, who say that the proper object of wish* is the apparent good, it follows that [*20*] nothing is by nature a proper object of wish, but what seems good to each person is so, with different things—even contrary ones, as it happens—appearing so to different ones.

Supposing, then, that these results do not satisfy us; should we say that unconditionally and in truth the proper object of wish is the good, but to each person it is the apparent good? To an excellent person, it is what is truly the proper object; to a base one, [*25*] it is whatever random thing it happens to be. It is just the same in the case of bodies. The things that are healthy for those in good condition are the things that are truly healthy, whereas for those that are diseased, it is different ones, and similarly with bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, and each of the others. For an excellent person

discerns [*30*] each of them correctly and, in each case, what is true is apparent to him.

For each state has its own special set of things that are pleasant or noble, and an excellent person is perhaps distinguished most by his seeing what is true in each case, since he is like a standard and measure of them. In the case of ordinary people, however, deception seems to come about because of pleasure, which appears to be a good thing when it is not. So they choose what is pleasant as good [*1113b*] and avoid what is painful as bad.

III.5

. . . Suppose that someone were to say that [*1114a32*] everyone seeks the apparent good but that we do not control its appearance. Instead, whatever sort of person each of us happens to be also determines the sort of end that appears to him. [*1114b*] Well, if each individual is somehow responsible for his own state of character, he is also somehow responsible for the appearance in question. If not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing but does evil things because of ignorance of the end, thinking that because of doing them he will achieve what is best for him. [*5*] His seeking of the end in question is not self-chosen, rather, we must be born possessed of a sort of sight by which to discern correctly and choose what is truly good, and a person in whom this by nature operates correctly is naturally well disposed. For this is what is greatest and noblest and is not the sort of thing we can get from someone else or learn but the sort of thing whose condition at birth is the one in which it will later be possessed and, [*10*] when it is naturally such as to be in a good and noble condition, will be the naturally good disposition in its complete and true form.

If all this is true, then, how will virtue be any more voluntary than vice? For to both the good and the bad alike the end appears—or is determined by nature or by whatever it is—and whatever other actions they do, [*15*] they do with reference to that end. If it is not by nature, then, that the end appears to each person in whatever way it does, but there is also something contributed by the person himself or, if the end is something natural, but an excellent person's virtue is voluntary because he does the rest of the actions voluntarily, vice will be no less voluntary than virtue. Similarly, in the case of the bad person there is [*20*] something that comes about in his actions through himself, even if not in his end. So if, as is said, the virtues are

voluntary (since we are in a way ourselves contributing causes of our states and it is by being people of a certain sort that we suppose the end to be of a certain sort), the vices will also be voluntary, since the two [*25*] are alike.

{599} We have now discussed in outline the virtues collectively and their genus, saying that they are medial conditions and states, that the sorts of things they arise from are the very sorts virtues lead us to do in accord with themselves, and that they are up to us and voluntary and such as the correct reason prescribes.

Actions and states are not voluntary in the same way, [*30*] since we control our actions from their starting-point up to their end because we know the particulars. With states, however, we control their starting-point but the particulars of their development are not known to us any more [*1115a*] than with diseases. But because it was up to us to use the states in a given way or not in that way, they are voluntary. . . .

Book V

V.1

[*1129a*] As regards justice and injustice, we must investigate what sorts of actions they are concerned with, what sort of medial state justice is, and what that which is just is a mean between. And let our investigation [*5*] follow the same method of inquiry as our preceding discussions.

We see, then, that what everyone means to say about justice is that it is the sort of state from which people are doers of just things—that is, from which they do just actions and wish for what is just. It is the same way where injustice is concerned—it is the state from which people do injustice and wish for what is unjust. That is why [*10*] the first thing we should do in our outline is to assume these things.

For capacities and sciences do not operate in the same way as states. For the same capacity or science seems to result in contraries, whereas a state that is contrary to another does not result in contraries—for example, from health we do not do contrary actions but, rather, [*15*] healthy ones only (for we say that someone is walking in a healthy way when he walks in the way a healthy person would).

So a state that is contrary to another can often be known from its contrary, and states, often from their underlying conditions. For if the good state is evident, the bad one also becomes evident, and from what conduces to the good state, the good state becomes evident, [*20*] and from it, the things that conduce to it. For if the good state is firmness of flesh, the bad state must indeed be flabbiness of flesh, and what produces the good state must be what produces firmness in flesh.

It for the most part follows that if one of a pair of contraries is said of things in more than one way, the other is also said of things in more than one way—for example, if ‘just’ is, ‘unjust’ is as well. [*25*]

It seems, though, that ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ *are* said of things in more than one way but that the homonymy escapes notice because of their closeness and is less clear than when the ways are further apart (for here there is a big difference in their appearance)—as, for example, the clavicle of an animal and the thing we open a door with are said to be [*30*] ‘keys’ homonymously.[23]

Let us find out, then, the number of ways in which someone is said to be unjust. Well, an unlawful person seems to be unjust, as does a greedy or unfair one, so it is clear that a lawful person will be just and so will a fair one. Hence what is just will be what is lawful and what is fair, and what is unjust will be what is unlawful and what is unfair.

Since [*1129b*] an unjust person is greedy, however, he will be concerned with goods—not with all of them but with those that are matters of good and bad luck, which are always good, unconditionally speaking, but for this or that person, not always so. (These are the ones we human beings pray for and pursue. But we shouldn't. Instead, we should pray that unconditionally good things will also [*5*] be good for us, while choosing the ones that are good for us.) An unjust person does not always choose more. Instead, he actually chooses less in the case of the unconditionally bad things. But because the lesser evil also seems somehow good and greed is for what is good, he seems to be greedy. {600} In fact, he is unfair, since this term circumscribes the two cases and [*10*] is what they have in common.

But since, as we saw, an unlawful person is unjust and a lawful one just, it is clear that all lawful things are somehow just, since the things defined by legislative science are lawful and each of these, we say, is just. The laws, for their part, pronounce about all matters, aiming either at the common advantage of all or at that of the best people or [*15*] of those who—in accord with their virtue* or in accord with some other such thing—are in control. So, in one way, the things we call 'just' are the ones that produce and safeguard happiness and its parts for the political community.

The law, however, also prescribes that the works of a courageous person be done (for example, not breaking rank or fleeing [*20*] or throwing down one's weapons), as well as those of a temperate person (for example, not committing adultery or wanton aggression) and those of a mild-mannered one (for example, not striking people or verbally abusing them). Similarly, where the other virtues and types of depravity are concerned, the law orders some things and forbids others—correctly, if established correctly, less well if carelessly formulated.

This [*25*] sort of justice, then, is complete virtue—not unconditionally but in relation to another person. And that is why justice often seems to be the most excellent of the virtues, with the result that 'neither the evening star

nor the morning star is so wondrous',[24] and, as the proverb says, 'in justice is all virtue summed'.[25] And it is complete virtue in the highest degree, [*30*] because it is the complete use* of complete virtue. It is the complete use because someone who possesses it is able to use his virtue in relation to another person and not solely with regard to himself. For many people are able to use their virtue in what properly belongs to themselves but unable to do so in issues relating to another person.

And that is why Bias'[26] saying, 'ruling office [*1130a*] shows forth the man', seems good, since a ruler is automatically in relation to another person and in a community with him. It is also because of this very same thing that justice, alone of the virtues, seems to be the good of another, because it is in relation to another person, since it does what is advantageous for someone else, whether ruler or community member.

The worst sort of person, [*5*] then, is the one who uses his depravity both in relation to himself and in relation to his friends, whereas the best sort is not the one who uses his virtue in relation to himself but the one who uses it in relation to another person, since *that* is difficult work.

This sort of justice, then, is not a part of virtue but is virtue as a whole, nor is the injustice contrary to it a part of vice but is vice as a whole.

Besides, the difference [*10*] between virtue and justice of this sort is clear from what we have said, since they are the same state but their being [or essence] is not the same. Instead, insofar as the state is in relation to another person it is justice, whereas insofar as it is unconditionally a state of a certain sort, it is virtue.

V.2

What *we* are looking for, however, is the justice that is a part of virtue, since there is [*15*] one, so we say, and similarly where the injustice that is a part of vice is concerned.

An indication of their existence is this: a person whose activities are in accord with the other sorts of depravity actually does an unjust action but is not at all greedy—for example, someone who throws down his shield because of cowardice, who engages in verbal abuse because of harshness, or who does not help someone with his wealth because of acquisitiveness. On the other hand, when someone is greedy, often his action is not in

accord with any of these vices and certainly [*20*] not with all of them. Yet it is in accord with some sort of wickedness, at least, since we blame it—namely, with injustice. Hence there is another sort of injustice that is a part of the whole, and another way for something to be unjust by being a part of what is unjust in the sense of being unlawful.

Further, if one person commits adultery for profit and makes money on it, while another does it—spending and so losing money on it—because {601} of appetite, [*25*] the latter would seem to be intemperate rather than greedy and the former to be unjust but not intemperate. Hence it is clear that this is because the former does it to make a profit.

Further, where every other sort of unjust action is concerned, its coming about is always attributed to some particular sort of depravity—for example, if someone has committed adultery, to intemperance; if he broke rank, to cowardice; [*30*] or if he struck someone, to anger. But if the action was one of making a profit, it is attributed to no sort of depravity besides injustice.

So it is evident that there is another sort of injustice beyond injustice as a whole, that is a part of it. It has the same name, because its definition places it in the same genus, since they both exercise their capacity in relation to another person. [*1130b*] The former is concerned with honor, wealth, or preservation (or—if we had a name for it—whatever includes all these) and is concerned with them because of the pleasure of making a profit, while the latter is concerned with all the things that are the concern of [*5*] an excellent person.

It is clear, then, that there are several sorts of justice and that there is a distinct sort beyond virtue as a whole. What it is and what sort of thing, we must now ascertain.

Well, in the case of what is unjust, we distinguished between what is unlawful and what is unfair, and in the case of what is just, between what is lawful and what is fair. The injustice discussed above is the unlawful sort. Since [*10*] the unfair and the unlawful are not the same, however, but differ as part from whole (since everything unfair is unlawful but not everything unlawful is unfair), so this unfair sort of what is unjust and injustice are not the same but different from the other sort, the former as parts, the latter as wholes. For this injustice is a part of injustice as a whole, and similarly this justice is a part [*15*] of justice as a whole. Hence we must also speak about

the justice that is a part, about the injustice that is a part, and about what is just and what is unjust in this way.

We may set aside, then, the justice and injustice that are prescribed in accord with virtue as a whole, since the first is the use of virtue as a whole in relation to another person and the second the use of vice. [*20*] And it is evident how we should distinguish what is just and what is unjust in accord with these. For the majority of lawful actions are pretty much the ones prescribed by virtue as a whole, since the law prescribes living in accord with each virtue and forbids living in accord with each sort of depravity.

Moreover, what produces virtue as a whole are the actions that are ordained by the laws [*25*] concerned with education that looks to the common good. (Whether the education concerned with a particular individual, on the basis of which he is unconditionally a good man, is a matter for politics or for another science, is something we must determine later.[27] For being a good man is presumably not in every case the same as being a good citizen.) One form of the justice that is a part, and of what is just in this way, [*30*] is the form found in the allocation of honor, wealth, or any of the other things that are to be divided among members of a constitution, since, in the case of these things, it is possible for one person to have a share that is equal or unequal to another's.

Another form is rectification in transactions. Of it, there are two parts, [*1131a*] since some transactions are voluntary, others involuntary. The voluntary ones are such things as selling, buying, lending with interest, pledging, giving free use of something, depositing, and hiring out (these are called 'voluntary' [*5*] because the starting-point of the transactions is voluntary). Of the involuntary ones, some are clandestine (for example, theft, adultery, poisoning, pimping, enticing away slaves, murder by treachery, and betrayal), whereas others involve force (for example, assault, imprisonment, murder, abduction, disabling, verbal abuse, and insulting treatment).

V.5

It seems to some people, however, that [*1132b21*] reciprocity is unconditionally just, which is precisely what the Pythagoreans asserted, since they defined what is just unconditionally as what stands in a

reciprocal relation to another. But reciprocity does not fit either the case of what is just in an allocation or the case of what is just in a rectification, since in many ways it clashes with them. {602} (And yet people interpret even Rhadamanthys' [*25*] line about justice—'If a person suffered what he did, right justice would be done'[28]—as saying that it fits what is just in a rectification at least.) For example, if a ruling officer strikes someone, he should not be struck in return; and if a ruling officer was the person struck, the one who struck him should not only be struck back but punished too. Further, voluntariness and [*30*] involuntariness make a great difference.

In communities based on exchange, however, what binds the parties together is what is just in this way, namely, reciprocity that is proportionate and not equal. For it is proportionate reciprocity that keeps a city together. For people either seek to return evil for evil (and if they do not, it seems like slavery) or good for good (and if [*1133a*] they do not, no giving in exchange takes place), and it is by giving in exchange that they keep together. That is why cities erect the temple of the Graces [*Charites*] in a conspicuous place, in order that there might be a return for what is given. For this is the special characteristic of gratitude [*charis*], since we should not only do a service in return for someone who has done us a favor [*ho charisamenos*] but, on another occasion, start by doing a favor too.

What produces [*5*] proportionate exchange is diagonal coupling. Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, and D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the shoemaker's work and give him his own work in return. So if there is first [*10*] proportionate equality and then reciprocity is achieved, the condition we mentioned will be met. But if not, there is no equality and nothing to keep the parties together, since there is nothing to prevent the work of one of them from being more excellent than that of the other. These works, then, must be equalized.* For it [*16*] is not from two doctors that a community comes about but from a doctor and a farmer and, in general, from people who are different and not equal. And these must be equalized. That is why everything that is exchanged must be in some way commensurable.

It is for this purpose that money has been introduced and becomes a sort of mean. For since it measures everything, [*20*] it also measures excess and deficiency and how many shoes are equal to a house or food. Just as builder

is to shoemaker, then, so must such and such number of shoes be to a house or food. For if this does not happen, there will be no exchange and no community. And it will not happen unless the things in question are in some way equal. Hence they must all be measured by some one thing, [*25*] as we said before. In truth, this one thing is need, which binds everything together. For if people neither needed things nor needed them to a similar extent, either there would be no exchange or not the same one. But as a sort of exchangeable representative of need, money came into existence on the basis of convention and is called ‘money’ [*nomisma*] because of this, because it exists not by nature but by conventional law [*nomos*], [*30*] and changing it or rendering it useless is up to us.

Reciprocity will exist, then, when equalization has taken place, with the result that just as farmer is to shoemaker, so a farmer’s work is to a shoemaker’s. But we must not introduce them as terms in the figure of proportion when they have already made the exchange (otherwise [*1133b*] one extreme will have both of the excess amounts) but when they both still have what is their own. That way they will be equals and community members, because this sort of equality can come about in their case: A is a farmer, C food, B a shoemaker, and D his equalized work. But if reciprocity could not be achieved in this way, [*5*] there would be no community.

That it is need that binds them together, since it is, as it were, one thing, is made clear by the fact that when the parties are not in need of each other—whether mutual or one-sided—they make no exchange, just as when someone needs what one has oneself, for example, when people permit the export of corn in return for wine. Hence this proposed exchange must be equalized. And in the name of future [*10*] exchange, even if we need nothing now, were we to need something in the future, money acts as a sort of pledge that it will be available to us, since it must be possible for the person who brings *it* to get what he wants.

{603} The same thing also happens to money, certainly, since it does not always have equal purchasing power. All the same, it tends to be rather steadfast. That is why everything must be assigned a price, since that way there will always be exchange, and—if it exists—community. [*15*] Money, then, acts like a measure that by making things proportionate equalizes them. For there would be no community without exchange, no exchange without equality, and no equality without proportionality. In truth, to be

sure, it is impossible that things so different should become proportionate, but in relation to our needs they can become adequately so.

There must, then, be some single measure, [*20*] but it will be one based on a hypothesis, which is why it is called ‘money’. For money makes everything proportionate, since everything is measured in money. A is a house, B ten minae, C a bed: A is half of B, provided a house is worth five minae, or is equal to them, and the bed C is a tenth part of B. It is clear, therefore, how many beds equal [*25*] a house—five. And that this is how exchange took place before there was money is clear, since it makes no difference whether it is five beds in return for a house, or the value of five beds.

We have now said what it is for something to be unjust and what it is for it to be just. And with these defined, it is clear that just action is a mean [*30*] between doing injustice and suffering injustice, since the one involves having too much and the other having too little.

Justice is something medial, not in the same way as the other virtues but because it is productive of a mean, and injustice of the extremes. Also, justice is the state in accord with which a [*1134a*] just person is said to do in action what is just and to do so in accord with his deliberate choice; and to allocate things—whether to himself and another or to two other people—not in such a way that too much of what is choiceworthy goes to himself and too little to his neighbor; and the reverse with what is harmful, but rather the proportionately [*5*] equal amount to both—and similarly where the allocation is to two other people.

Injustice, which is the contrary, is related in that way to what is unjust, while what is unjust is excess and deficiency of what is beneficial and what is harmful, contrary to what is proportional. So injustice is excess and deficiency because it is productive of excess and deficiency. In the agent’s own case, this is an excess of what is unconditionally beneficial and a deficiency [*10*] of what is harmful. In the case of other people, it is generally the same, but it can be contrary to what is proportional in either of the two directions. In the case of an unjust action, getting too little is what constitutes suffering injustice, while getting too much constitutes doing injustice.

So much for justice and injustice, then, what the nature of each is, and similarly [*15*] for what, in universal terms, is just and what unjust.

V.10

We must next say something about decency [*1137a32*] and what is decent—about the way decency is related to justice and the way what is decent is related to what is just. For on investigation these appear to be neither unconditionally the same nor different in genus. For sometimes we praise what is decent and a decent man, so that we even [*35*] transfer the term ‘decent’ to other things we are praising, in place of ‘good’, [*1137b*] making it clear that what is more decent is better. But sometimes, on following out the argument, it appears strange that what is decent, if it is something apart from what is just, should be something praiseworthy. For either what is just is not something excellent or what is decent isn’t,* [*5*] if it is different from what is just; or if both are excellent, they are the same.

It is pretty much because of these considerations, then, that a puzzle arises about what is decent. Yet in a way they are all correct and none is contrary to any of the others. For what is decent, although better than what is in a certain way just, is still just and is not better than what is just by way of being a thing of a different genus. Hence what is just and what is decent are the same, and while both are excellent, [*10*] what is decent is more excellent.

What produces the puzzle is that while what is decent is just, it is not what is just according to the law but, rather, a rectification of what is legally just. The cause of this is that all law is universal, but about some sorts of things it is not possible to pronounce correctly in universal terms. {604} So in the sorts of cases where it is necessary to pronounce in universal terms but not possible to do so correctly, the law picks [*15*] what holds for the most part, not unaware of the error involved. And it is no less correct for doing so, since the error is not in the law or in the legislator but in the nature of the thing itself. For what is doable in action consists of this sort of subject matter right from the outset. So whenever the law makes a universal pronouncement and a particular case arises that is contrary to [*20*] the universal pronouncement, at that time it is correct (insofar as the legislator has omitted something and he has made an error in pronouncing unconditionally) to rectify the deficiency—to pronounce what the legislator himself would have pronounced had he been present and would have put into his law had he known about the case.

That is why what is decent is just and better than what is in a certain way just. It is not better than what is unconditionally just, however, but only better than the sort that, because it pronounces universally, makes an error. [*25*] And this is the very nature of what is decent—a rectification of law insofar as it is deficient because of its universality. For this is also the cause of not everything's being regulated by law—namely, that there are some cases where it is impossible to establish a law, so that decrees are needed. For the standard of what is indeterminate is itself indeterminate, just like the lead standard used in Lesbian [*30*] building.[29] For the standard is not fixed but adapts itself to the shape of the stone, and a decree adapts itself to the things themselves.

What it is to be decent, then, and that it is both just—and better than what is in a certain way just—is clear. And it is also evident from this what a decent person is. For the person who deliberately chooses to do—and actually does—decent things [*35*] and is not a stickler for justice in the bad way but takes less than his due even if [*1138a*] he has the law on his side, is decent and his state is decency, which is a sort of justice and not some different state.

Book VI

VI.1

Since we have previously said that we should [*1138b17*] choose the mean, not the excess and not the deficiency, and the mean is as the correct reason says, let us distinguish this. [*20*] For in the case of all the states we have discussed, and as regards the others as well, there is some target on which a possessor of the reason keeps his eye as he tightens or loosens, and there is some sort of defining mark of the medial states, which we say are between excess and deficiency since they are in accord with the correct reason.

But though this is true to say, [*25*] it is not at all perspicuous. For in the other types of supervision where there is scientific knowledge, it is also true to say that we should exert ourselves or relax neither too much nor too little but mean amounts and in the way the correct reason says. If we know only this, however, we are no better off—for example, as regards what sorts of treatments to apply to [*30*] the body, if we are told that we should apply those that medicine prescribes and in the way the one who possesses it would. That is why, with regard to the states of the soul as well, we should not only assert this much of the truth but also determine what the correct reason is and what its defining mark.

In distinguishing the virtues of the soul we said that some are [*35*] virtues of character and some of thought. [*1139a*] The virtues of character, we have discussed. So let us now speak about the others as follows, after first saying something about the soul. Previously, then, we said that there are two parts of the soul, one that has reason and one that lacks reason. Let us now divide in the same way the part that has reason. [*5*] Let us take it that there are two parts that have reason—one through which we get a theoretical grasp on those beings whose starting-points do not admit of being otherwise and one through which we do so on those that do admit of being otherwise, since where beings differ in kind, parts of the soul that differ in kind are naturally suited to each of them, [*10*] since it is on the basis of a certain similarity and kinship that they have knowledge.

Let us call one of these ‘the scientific part’ and the other ‘the rationally calculative part’. {605} For deliberating is the same as rationally calculating, and no one deliberates about what does not admit of being

otherwise. So the rationally calculative part is one distinct part of the part that has reason.

Hence we must ascertain [*15*] what the best state of each of these parts is, since this is the virtue of each of them and the virtue relates to the proper function.

VI.2

Three things in the soul control action and truth—perception, understanding, and desire. Of these, perception is not a starting-point of any action. This is clear from the fact that [*20*] wild beasts have perception but do not share in action.

What assertion and denial are in the case of thought, that, in the case of desire, is precisely what pursuit and avoidance are. So, since virtue of character is a deliberately choosing state and deliberate choice is deliberative desire, it follows that both the reason must be true and the desire must be correct, if indeed the deliberate choice is to be an excellent one, and the very things the one asserts, [*25*] the other must pursue. This, then, is practical thought and truth. In the case of thought that is theoretical, however, and neither practical nor productive, the good state and the bad state are truth and falsity (since that is the function of every part involving thought) but in the case of the part involving practical [*30*] thought, the good state is truth in agreement with correct desire.

Of action, then, the starting-point—the source of the movement, not what it is for the sake of—is deliberate choice, and of deliberate choice, the starting-point is desire and reason that is for the sake of something. That is why, without understanding and thought on the one hand and a state of character on the other, there is no deliberate choice, since there is no doing well in action or its contrary without thought and character. Thought [*35*] by itself, however, moves nothing. But the one that is for the sake of something and practical does. Indeed, it even rules productive thought. For every producer produces for the sake of something, [*1139b*] and what is unconditionally an end (as opposed to in relation to something and for something else) is not what is producible but what is doable in action. For doing well in action is the end, and the desire is for it. That is why deliberate choice is either desiderative understanding or thought-involving desire, and this sort of starting-point is a human being.

Nothing [*5*] that happened in the past, though, is an object of deliberate choice—for example, nobody deliberately chooses to have sacked Troy. For nobody deliberates about what happened in the past but they deliberate about what will happen in the future and what admits of being otherwise, and what is past does not admit of not having happened. That is why Agathon[30] is correct: Of one thing alone is even a god deprived, [*10*]

To make undone what is done and finished.

Of both of the parts that involve understanding, then, the function is truth. So the states in accord with which each most grasps the truth are, in both cases, their virtues.

VI.3

Let us start, then, from a more general perspective and speak afresh about these. Let the states in which the soul grasps the truth by way of assertion and denial [*15*] be five in number: craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and understanding. For supposition and belief admit of falsehood.

Now what scientific knowledge is, will be evident from the following, if one is to speak in an exact way and not be guided by mere similarities. For we all suppose that what we know scientifically does not at all admit of [*20*] being otherwise, whereas, in the case of things that do admit of being otherwise, whenever they fall outside our theoretical grasp it escapes notice whether they hold or not. Hence what admits of being known scientifically is by necessity. Hence it is eternal. For the things that are unconditionally necessary are all eternal, and eternal things cannot come-to-be or cease-to-be. . . .

{606} VI.5

[*1140a24*] Where practical wisdom is concerned, we may get hold of it once we get a theoretical grasp on what sort of person we say is practically-wise. It seems, then, to be characteristic of a practically-wise person [*25*] to be able to deliberate correctly about what is good and advantageous for himself, not partially (for example, about what sorts of things further health or further strength) but about what sorts of things further living well as a

whole. An indication of this is that we also speak of people as practically-wise in some area, when they rationally calculate well about what furthers some excellent end, concerning which no craft exists. Hence in the case of the whole too [*30*] it is the deliberative person who will be practically-wise.

Also, nobody deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise or about things that do not admit of being done in action by himself. So, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, and the things whose starting-points admit of being otherwise cannot be demonstrated (for all of them also admit of being otherwise) and it is not [*35*] possible to deliberate about what holds by necessity, [*1140b*] practical wisdom cannot be either scientific knowledge or craft knowledge—not scientific knowledge because what is doable in action admits of being otherwise, not craft knowledge because action and production differ in kind. Hence the remaining possibility is for practical wisdom to be a true state involving reason, a practical one, concerned with what is good [*5*] or bad for a human being. For the end of production is something other than production, while that of action is not something other than action, since doing well in action is itself action's end.

That is why we think Pericles[31] and people of that sort to be practically-wise—because they have a theoretical [*10*] grasp on what is good for themselves and for human beings, and we think household managers and politicians are like that.

That is also why we call temperance (*sōphrosunē*) by this name, as being what preserves practical wisdom (*sōzousan tēn phronēsin*). And it does preserve the sort of supposition in question. For what is pleasant or painful does not ruin or distort every sort of supposition (for example, that triangles do or do not contain two right angles) but it does do this to the one about what [*15*] is doable in action. For the starting-points of things doable in action are the end for which the things doable in action are done. But once someone is ruined by pleasure or pain, to him it does not appear a starting-point or that it is for the sake of *it* and because of *it* that he should choose and do everything, since vice is ruinous of the starting-point. So practical wisdom must be a true state involving reason, [*20*] concerned with human goods, and practical.

Well, of craft knowledge there is certainly a virtue, whereas of practical wisdom there is not one. And, in the case of a craft, someone who makes errors voluntarily is preferable but with practical wisdom he is less so, as is also the case with the virtues. It is clear, then, that it is some sort of virtue and not a craft.

Since there are two parts of the soul [*25*] that have reason, however, it must be a virtue of one of them—namely, of the part that forms beliefs. For belief is concerned with what admits of being otherwise, as too is practical wisdom.

But it is not a state involving reason only. An indication of this is that there is forgetfulness of a state like that, but of practical wisdom there [*30*] isn't.

VI.6

. . . If, then, the states by which we grasp the truth [*1141a3*] and never have false views about what cannot—or indeed can—be otherwise are scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and understanding, [*5*] and it cannot be any of the three of these (by the three I mean practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, and theoretical wisdom), the remaining alternative is for understanding to be of starting-points.

VI.7

Wisdom in crafts we ascribe to the most exact practitioners of the relevant craft (for example, calling Phidias a wise sculptor in stone and [*10*] Polyclitus a wise sculptor in bronze), here signifying nothing else by wisdom, indeed, than that it is the virtue of a craft. There are, however, some people we think are wise about things as a whole, not wise in some area or wise in some other {607} particular way, as Homer says in the *Margites*:[32] 'him the gods made neither a digger nor a ploughman [*15*] nor wise in any other particular way'. So, it is clear that theoretical wisdom must be the most exact of the sciences.

Hence a theoretically-wise person not only must know what follows from the starting-points but also must grasp the truth where the starting-points are concerned. So theoretical wisdom must be understanding plus scientific knowledge—scientific knowledge, having a head as it were, of the most estimable things. For it would be strange to think—if anyone does—that

politics [*20*] or practical wisdom is most excellent, unless the best thing in the universe is a human being.

Now if health or goodness is different for human beings than for fish, for example, but whiteness and straightness are always the same, anyone would say that theoretical wisdom is the same for all but that practical wisdom is different, since the one who has a theoretical grasp of the good of a given sort of being [*25*] is the one human beings would call ‘practically-wise’, and it is to him that they would entrust such matters.* That is why even some of the wild beasts are said to be practically-wise—those that appear to have a capacity for forethought about their life.

It is evident too that theoretical wisdom cannot be the same as politics. For if people are to call the science that deals with what is beneficial to themselves ‘theoretical wisdom’, there will be many [*30*] theoretical wisdoms, since there will not be one dealing with the good of all animals but a different one for each sort. For there is not even one science of medicine for all beings. And if human beings are the best of the other animals, it makes no difference, since there exist other things that are far more divine in nature even than human beings—the most evident ones, certainly, being those from which the universe [*1141b*] is composed.

From what has been said, then, theoretical wisdom is clearly scientific knowledge combined with understanding of the things that are naturally most estimable. That is why Anaxagoras and Thales and people of that sort are said to be wise—but not practically-wise when we see them to be ignorant of what is advantageous to [*5*] themselves—and why what they know is said to be extraordinary, wondrous, difficult, and worthy of worship but useless, because it is not human goods they seek.

Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with human affairs and what can be deliberated about. For of a practically-wise person we say that most of all this is the function—to deliberate well. [*10*] And nobody deliberates about what cannot be otherwise or about the sorts of things that do not lead to some specific end, where this is something good, doable in action. The unconditionally good deliberator, however, is the one capable of aiming at and hitting, in accord with rational calculation, the best for a human being of things doable in action.

Nor is practical wisdom knowledge of universals only. On the contrary, it must also know particulars. [*15*] For it is practical, and action is concerned

with particulars. That is why, in other areas too, some people who lack knowledge—most of all, those with experience—are more effective *doers* of action than are others who have knowledge. For if someone knows that light meats are digestible and healthy but is ignorant about which sorts of meat are light, he will not produce health; but someone who knows that bird meats are* healthy will produce health [*20*] more. But practical wisdom is practical, so one must possess both sorts of knowledge—or this one more.

But here too there will be a sort that is architectonic.

VI.8

Politics and practical wisdom are the same state, but their being [or essence] is not the same. Of the practical wisdom concerned with the city, the architectonic part is legislative science, while the [*25*] part concerned with particulars has the name common to both—'politics'. This part is practical and deliberative, since a decree is doable in action, as the last thing. That is why only these people are said to take part in politics, since it is only they who do things in just the way handicraftsmen do.

{608} It also seems that the practical wisdom concerned with oneself as an individual is most of all practical wisdom, and [*30*] it is this that has the name common to all the sorts. Of the other sorts, one is household management, another legislative science, another politics, and of the latter, one part is deliberative and the other judicial.

Now knowledge of what is good for oneself will certainly be one type of knowledge, but it admits of much difference.

It certainly seems that someone who knows about and spends his time on the things that concern himself is practically-wise [*1142a*] and that politicians are busybodies. That is why Euripides[33] says: How can I be practically-wise, when I could have minded my own business,
and been numbered among the ranks of the army,
sharing equally? [*5*]

> For those who aim too high and occupy themselves too much. . . .

For people seek what is good for themselves and think that this is what they should do. From this belief, then, has come the view that such people are the ones with practical wisdom. And yet a person's own welfare cannot be

achieved, presumably, without household management or without a constitution. Further, how the things that pertain to his own welfare are to be managed [*10*] is unclear and must be investigated.

An indication of what has been said is that while young people become geometers and mathematicians and wise in such things, they do not seem to become practically-wise. The explanation is that practical wisdom is concerned also with particulars, knowledge of which comes from experience. But there is no young person who is experienced, since it is quantity [*15*] of time that produces experience.

(Indeed, we might also investigate why it is that a child can become a mathematician but not a theoretically-wise person or a natural scientist. Or isn't it that the objects in mathematics are given through abstraction, while the starting-points in theoretical wisdom or natural science come from experience, so that the young lack conviction there but only talk the talk, whereas in mathematics it is quite clear to them what each of the objects is?) Further, [*20*] the error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular—in supposing either that all heavy types of water are bad or that this particular water is heavy. But that practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident. For it is concerned with the last thing, as we said, since what is doable in action is such. It stands opposed, then, to understanding. [*25*] For understanding is of the terms for which there is no reason, but practical wisdom concerns the last thing, of which there is not scientific knowledge but rather perception—not the perception of special objects but like the sort by which we perceive that the last thing among mathematical objects is a triangle, since there too will come a stopping point. Practical wisdom, however, is more [*30*] this perception, but it is of a different form than the other.*

VI.9

Inquiry and deliberation are different, since deliberation is inquiry *of a certain sort*. But we must also grasp what good deliberation is. . . . [*1142b16*] Good deliberation is a certain sort of correctness of deliberation. That is why we must inquire first what this correctness is* and what it concerns. Since correctness is of more than one sort, however, it is clear that it will not be any and every sort. For a person who lacks self-control or a base person will reach as a result of rational calculation what he proposes

should be done, and so will have deliberated correctly but will have got hold of something very bad. But it seems to be a good thing [*20*] to have deliberated well. For it is this sort of correctness of deliberation that is good deliberation—the sort that reaches something good.

We can also reach this by a false deduction, however—that is, reach the thing that should be done but not by the means we should, the middle term being false. It follows that this is not {609} yet good deliberation—where one reaches what should be done, yet not [*25*] by the means we should.

Further, one person may deliberate a long time to reach it, while another does so quickly. So the former is not yet a case of good deliberation, which is correctness in accord with what is beneficial and about what to do, how to do it, and when to do it.

Further, it is possible to deliberate well either unconditionally or to further a specific end. Unconditionally good deliberation correctly furthers the unconditional end, the specific sort, [*30*] some specific end. If it is characteristic of practically-wise people to have deliberated well, then good deliberation will be the sort of correctness that is in accord with what is advantageous in furthering the end about which practical wisdom is true supposition.

VI.11

[*1143a29*] . . . It is in being discerning in matters with which a practically-wise person is concerned that someone exhibits comprehension and sound consideration [*30*] or sympathetic consideration, since decency is common to all good people in relation to another person. And among particulars—that is, things that come last—are all the things doable in action. For a practically-wise person must also know these, and comprehension and consideration are concerned with things doable in action; and these are things that come last.

Also, understanding is concerned with things that come last in [*35*] both directions. For concerning the primary terms and the things that come last, there is understanding but no reason—that is to say, on the one hand, in the case of demonstrations, [*1143b*] understanding is of the unchanging and primary terms; on the other hand, in the case of those that are practical, it is of the last thing and the one that admits of being otherwise and the other premise, since these are starting-points of the end, as it is from particulars

that universals come. So of these we must have perception, and this is understanding. [*5*] That is why these things even seem to be natural—and why, while nobody seems wise by nature, people do seem to have consideration, comprehension, and understanding by nature.

An indication of this is that we also think these states correspond to the stages of life and that a particular stage brings understanding and consideration, as if nature were the cause. That is why understanding is both starting-point and end, since demonstrations are from these [*10*] and concerned with these. So we should attend to the undemonstrated sayings and beliefs of experienced and older people or practically-wise ones, no less than to the demonstrations, since, because they have an eye formed from experience, they see correctly.

We have said, then, what practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom are and what each of them is concerned with [*15*] and that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.

VI.12

We might, however, go through some puzzles about what use they are. For surely theoretical wisdom will not have a theoretical grasp on any of the things from which a human being will come to be happy (since it is not concerned with anything's coming to be). Practical wisdom, though, certainly [*20*] does have this. But what do we need it for? For if practical wisdom is indeed the virtue concerned with things just and noble and good for a human being and these are the ones it is characteristic of a good man to do, and knowledge of them in no way makes us better *doers* of them (if indeed states are what the virtues are), then it will be exactly the same as in the case of things relating to health or things relating to good physical condition [*25*] (I mean those so called not for producing the state but for resulting from it), since we are in no way better doers of them because of knowing medicine or physical training.

If, on the other hand, we are to say that being practically-wise is useful not for this but for becoming good, to those who are excellent it will be of no use. Further, it will be of none to those who are not such, since it will make no difference whether they have it themselves [*30*] or they put their trust in others who have it—that is, it would be enough for us to do just as we also

do in the case of health. For we wish to be healthy but, all the same, we do not learn medicine.

{610} In addition to all this, it would seem absurd if practical wisdom, though inferior to theoretical wisdom, were to have more control than it. Yet it is what produces a thing that rules and issues prescriptions concerning it. About [*35*] these topics, then, we must speak, since so far we have only raised the puzzles relating to them.

Well, first, let us say that these states must be intrinsically choiceworthy [*1144a*] (since each is the virtue of one of the two parts that have reason) even if neither of them produces anything at all.

Next, they do indeed produce something; not, however, as medicine produces health but as health does. *That* is also how theoretical wisdom produces happiness, since as a part of virtue as a whole, [*5*] by being possessed and actualized, it produces happiness.

Further, our function is completed in accord with practical wisdom and virtue of character. For virtue makes the target correct, and practical wisdom what furthers it. Of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, there is no virtue of this sort, since there is no action that is up to it to do [*10*] or not do.

With regard to our being in no way better doers of noble actions and just actions because of practical wisdom, let us start a little further back, taking the following as a starting-point. For we also say that some people who do just things are still not just (for example, those who do what is prescribed by the laws either involuntarily, [*15*] because of ignorance, or because of something else, and not because of the actions themselves), even though they at least do the actions they should and do everything an excellent person must do. Likewise, it seems, there is the case of being so disposed, when doing all these actions, as to be a good person—I mean, for example, to do them because of deliberate choice and for the sake of what is done in the actions themselves.

Virtue, then, makes the deliberate choice correct, [*20*] but as to whatever should naturally be done for the sake of carrying it out—that is not the business of virtue but of a different capacity. However, we must get scientific knowledge of these things and discuss them in a more perspicuous way.

There is, then, a capacity called cleverness, and this is the sort of thing that, when it comes to the things that further hitting a proposed target, is able to do these and to hit upon them.* [*25*] If, then, the target is a noble one, this capacity is praiseworthy, but, if it is a base one, it is unscrupulous.[34] That is why both practically-wise people and unscrupulous ones are said to be clever.* Practical wisdom, however, is not the capacity of cleverness but does not exist without this capacity.

But the state, the one pertaining to this eye of the soul, does not come about without virtue, as [*30*] we have said and is clear. For practical deductions have a starting-point, 'since the end—that is, the best one—is such and such', whatever it may be (let it be any random thing for the sake of argument); this, however, is not apparent except to a good person, since depravity produces distortion and false views about practical starting-points. [*35*] So it is evident that it is impossible to be practically-wise without being good.

VI.13

Virtue, then, must also be investigated again. For virtue [*1144b*] is also in much the same situation: as practical wisdom is related to cleverness—not the same but similar—so natural virtue is related to full virtue. For everyone thinks that each character trait is possessed in some way naturally, since we are in fact just, disposed to temperance, courageous, [*5*] and the rest straight from birth. All the same, we look for what is fully good to be something else and for such qualities to be possessed in another way. For to both children and wild beasts these natural states also belong; but without understanding they are evidently harmful. At any rate, this much we can surely see: that just as a heavy body moving around [*10*] without sight suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it happens in this case too.

But if someone should acquire understanding, it makes a difference in his action; and his state, though similar to the one he had, will then be full virtue. So, just as in the case of the part that forms beliefs there are two forms of condition (cleverness and practical wisdom), so also in the part responsible for character there are two {611} [*15*] (natural virtue and full virtue), and of these, full virtue does not come into being without practical wisdom.

That is why indeed some people say that all the virtues are types of practical wisdom and why, in one sense, Socrates used to inquire correctly but, in another sense, erroneously. For in thinking that all the virtues were types of practical wisdom, he was in error, but in saying that they did not exist without practical wisdom, [*20*] he spoke correctly.

Here is an indication of this: even now everyone, when defining virtue and having named the state and what it is concerned with, adds ‘the one in accord with the correct reason’—and the correct one is the one in accord with practical wisdom. It would seem, then, that all people somehow have a hunch that this sort of state is virtue—the one in accord with practical wisdom. [*25*]

We, however, should go a little further. For it is not the state that is only *in accord with* the correct reason that is virtue but the one that also *involves* the correct reason. And the correct reason about such matters is practical wisdom. Socrates, then, thought that the virtues *were* cases of reason (all being cases of scientific knowledge), whereas we think that they *involve* reason.

It is clear, then, from what we have said, [*30*] that it is neither possible to be fully good without practical wisdom nor practically-wise without virtue of character. And in this way we can also resolve the argument by which someone might contend dialectically that the virtues are separate from each other on the grounds that the same person is not naturally well disposed in the highest degree where all of them are concerned, so that he will at some point have acquired one when he has not yet acquired another. [*35*] In the case of the natural virtues, indeed, this is possible, but in the case of those in accord with which someone is called ‘unconditionally good’, it is not possible, since at the same time [*1145a*] that practical wisdom, which is one state, is present, they will all be present.

And it is clear that even if practical wisdom were not practical, we would need it because it is the virtue of its part; clear too that deliberate choice will not be correct without practical wisdom or without virtue, since virtue makes us do the actions that the end consists in whereas deliberate choice [*5*] makes us do the actions that further it.

But yet it does not control either theoretical wisdom or the better part any more than medicine controls health, since it does not use it but sees to its coming into being. So it prescribes for its sake, but not to it. Besides, it

would be like saying that politics rules the gods, [*10*] because it prescribes with regard to everything in the city.

Book VII

VII.1

. . . But about lack of self-control and softness [*1145a34*] (or effeminacy), [*35*] we must now speak, as well as about self-control and resilience, since we must not suppose that either of the two is concerned with the same states as virtue and depravity [*1145b*] or that it is of a different kind than the other.

We must, as in the other cases, set out the things that appear to be so and first go through the puzzles, and in that way show preferably all the reputable beliefs about these ways of being affected, or if not all of them then most of them, and [*5*] the ones with the most control. For if the objections are resolved and the reputable beliefs are left standing, that would be an adequate showing.

Now, both self-control and resilience seem to be excellent things and praiseworthy ones,* whereas lack of self-control and softness seem to be base as well as blameworthy.*

Also, a self-controlled person seems to be the same as one [*10*] who is also such as to stand by his rational calculation, and a person who lacks self-control seems to be the same as one who is also such as to depart from his rational calculation. A person who lacks self-control, knowing that the actions he is doing are base, does them because of feeling, whereas one who has self-control, knowing that his appetites are base, does not follow them, because of his reason.

Also, some people say that a temperate person is self-controlled and resilient, some saying that all of the latter sort are temperate, others that they aren't, [*15*] but all also saying that an intemperate person lacks self-control and that one who lacks self-control is intemperate, lumping both together. Others, however, say these sorts of {612} people are different. Sometimes, they say that it is impossible for a practically-wise person to lack self-control, although sometimes they say that some people who are practically-wise and clever do lack self-control.

Further, people are said to lack self-control regarding [*20*] spirit, honor, and profit.

These then are the things that are said.

VII.2

Someone might be puzzled about what sort of correct supposition a person has when he acts in a way that is not self-controlled.

Some people certainly deny that he can have scientific knowledge, for it would be terrible, as Socrates used to think,[35] for scientific knowledge to be in someone but controlled by something else and dragged around like a slave. For Socrates used wholly to combat this account, on the supposition that [*25*] there is no such thing as lack of self-control. For no one, while supposing that he is doing so, acts contrary to what is best but acts that way only because of ignorance.

This argument certainly contradicts what plainly appears to be the case, and so we must inquire about the way the agent is affected, if he acts because of ignorance, as to what manner of ignorance it turns out to be. [*30*] For *before* he is affected, at any rate, it is evident that an agent who lacks self-control does not think that he should do the action.

There are some people who concede some parts of this but not others, since they agree that nothing is stronger than scientific knowledge but do not agree that no one acts contrary to what he believes to be better and, because of this, [*35*] they say that it is not when a person who lacks self-control has scientific knowledge that he is controlled by pleasures but when he has belief.

Yet if it is belief, not scientific knowledge (if it is not a strong supposition that is resisting but a weak one, like that found in people [*1146a*] who hesitate), there will be sympathetic consideration for failure to stand by such beliefs in the face of strong appetites. But for depravity there is no sympathetic consideration, nor for any other blameworthy thing.

What, then, if practical wisdom is what is doing the resisting? For it is something very strong. But that would be a strange thing, since the same person would be [*5*] at the same time practically-wise and lacking in self-control, and no one would say that it is characteristic of a practically-wise person to do the worst actions voluntarily. Besides, it was shown earlier that a practically-wise person is a doer of action (for he is concerned with last things) and has the other virtues.

Further, if someone cannot be self-controlled unless his appetites are strong and base, [*10*] a temperate person will not be self-controlled or a self-controlled one temperate, since it is not characteristic of a temperate

person to have appetites that are too strong or ones that are base. Yet they must be both. For if his appetites are good, the state that prevents him from following them must be base, so that not all self-control will be excellent. On the other hand, if they are weak and not base, self-control will be nothing dignified, whereas [*15*] if they are base and weak, it will be nothing great.

Further, if self-control makes someone such as to stand by every belief, it is base—for example, if it makes him do so even when the belief is false. Also, if lack of self-control makes a person such as to depart from every belief, there will be a sort of lack of self-control that is excellent. For example, Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, since he is praiseworthy for not standing by [*20*] what Odysseus persuaded him to do, because it pains him to tell a falsehood.[36]

Further, a certain sophistical argument constitutes a puzzle. For because they wish to refute in a way that is contrary to beliefs in order to be clever when they engage in ordinary discussions, {613} the resulting deduction turns into a puzzle. For thought is tied up when it does not wish to stand still, because what has been concluded [*25*] is not pleasing but cannot move forward, because of its inability to resolve the argument. There is a certain argument, then, from which it follows that foolishness combined with lack of self-control is virtue. For because of lack of self-control an agent acts contrary to the ways he supposes he should, but what he supposes is that bad things are good and that he should not do them, with the result that he does the good and not the [*30*] bad actions.

Further, a person who, by being persuaded and by deliberate choice, does or pursues pleasant things seems to be better than someone who does them not because of rational calculation but because of lack of self-control. For the first one is more easily cured, because he might be persuaded to act otherwise. A person who lacks self-control, on the other hand, is subject to the proverb: 'When water is choking you, what will wash it down?' For if [*35*] he had been persuaded to do what he is doing, he would have stopped if he was persuaded to act otherwise. [*1146b*] But he is already persuaded, yet nonetheless does something else.*

Further, if there is lack of self-control and self-control concerning all things, who is it that is unconditionally lacking in self-control? For no one

has every sort of lack of self-control. And yet we do say that some people are [*5*] unconditionally such.

These, then, are the sorts of puzzles that arise, and thus some things must be confuted, others left standing, since the resolution of a puzzle constitutes a discovery.

VII.3

We must investigate first, then, whether a person who lacks self-control acts knowingly or not and in what way knowingly and second, what sorts of things should we take a person who lacks self-control and a person who has it to be concerned with—I mean, whether they are concerned with every sort [*10*] of pleasure and pain or with some determinate sorts. Also, we must investigate a self-controlled person and a resilient one to see whether they are the same or different; and similarly where other matters germane to this theoretical investigation are concerned.

The starting-point of the investigation is whether a person who has self-control and a person who lacks it differ in the things they are concerned with or in the way [*15*] they are concerned with them—I mean, whether a person who lacks self-control lacks it solely by being concerned with such-and-such things or solely by the way he is concerned with them, or as a result of both. Next, whether there is lack of self-control and self-control concerning all things, or not. For a person who unconditionally lacks self-control is not concerned with all things but, rather, with the very same ones as an intemperate person, nor does he unconditionally lack self-control by having a state that is unconditionally related [*20*] to these (since then it could be the same as intemperance) but, rather, by having one related to them in a certain way. For an intemperate person is deliberately choosing when he is led on, since he believes that he should always pursue what is pleasant at present. One who lacks self-control does not think this but pursues anyway.

As regards the view that it is contrary to true belief but not to scientific knowledge that people act without self-control—well, it makes no difference to the argument. [*25*] For some people with belief are not hesitant but think they know in the most exact way. If, then, it is because of the weakness of their convictions that those with belief are more likely than those with scientific knowledge to do actions contrary to their supposition,

scientific knowledge will be no different here from belief. For some people have no [*30*] less conviction about what they believe than others do about what they know scientifically—something Heraclitus makes clear enough.[37]

But since we speak of knowing scientifically in two ways (since both the person who has but is not using his scientific knowledge and the one {614} who is using it are said to know scientifically), there will be a difference between having knowledge of and not actively contemplating and having knowledge of and actively contemplating the actions we should not do (for this is what seems bizarre, although not if we are *not* actively contemplating them).

Further, since there are two ways of presenting premises, nothing prevents [*1147a*] someone who has both from acting against his scientific knowledge, provided he makes use of the universal one but not of the partial one, since here the particulars are what is doable in action. And there is also a difference as regards the universal one. For one part is directed to the agent himself and the other to the thing itself—for example, that dry foods [*5*] are advantageous for all human beings and that he himself is a human being or that this sort of food is dry. But whether this is of that sort —*that* is what the agent either does not have or is not activating. Between these ways, then, there is an enormous difference, so that to know in the way described seems not at all strange but, in the other way, amazing.

Further, human beings can have scientific knowledge in a way other than the ones we have just [*10*] described. For among those who have but are not using it we see a difference in the having of the state, so that someone both has it in a way and does not have it—for example, if he is sleeping, mad, or tipsy. But surely this is the way people who are indeed in the grip of their feelings are disposed. For spirited feelings, sexual appetites, [*15*] and some things of this sort clearly alter the condition of the body as well and in some people even produce states of madness. Clearly, then, we should say that people who lack self-control have scientific knowledge in a way similar to these people.

The fact that they talk the talk that stems from scientific knowledge signifies nothing, since those in the grip of their feelings can recite demonstrations and verses of Empedocles. [*20*] And those who have first learned something string the words together but do not yet know what they

have learned, since it must grow to be a natural part of them, and that takes time. So we must suppose that those who are acting without self-control are also talking like actors on a stage.

Further, we might look into the cause of acting without self-control by appealing to natural science. For one is a universal belief, whereas the other is concerned with [*25*] particulars, which perception already controls. But when a single belief comes about from these, the soul, in one sort of case, necessarily asserts what has been concluded, whereas in productive cases it acts straightaway. For example, if everything sweet should be tasted and this (as one of the particulars) is sweet, it is necessary for someone who is able and not [*30*] prevented also to do this at once. So when one universal premise is in the agent preventing tasting, as well as another (that everything sweet is pleasant) and this is sweet (and this one is active) and there happens to be an appetite in him, the one premise says, 'Avoid this!' but the appetite leads him on (since each of the parts can move), the result is that [*35*] from reason, in a way, and from belief he acts without self-control. The belief, however, is not intrinsically [*1147b*] but coincidentally contrary (since what is contrary is the appetite, not the belief) to the correct reason.

(So it is also because of this that wild beasts do not lack self-control, namely, that they do not have a universal supposition but only imagination and memory of particulars. [*5*] As for how the ignorance of an agent who lacks self-control is resolved and he recovers his scientific knowledge, the account is the same as in the case of a tipsy person and a sleeping one and is not special to this way of being affected; it is one we must hear from the natural scientists.) Since the final premise both is a belief about something perceptible, however, and controls the action, either an agent who lacks self-control does not have this [*10*] or he has it in such a way as not to have scientific knowledge of it but, rather, to talk the talk, like a tipsy person with the verses of Empedocles. And because the last term is not universal and does not seem to be scientifically knowable in the way the universal is, even the result Socrates was looking for would seem to come about. For neither is it full scientific knowledge [*15*] that seems to be actively present when this way of being affected comes about, nor is *it* what is dragged around because of feeling but, rather, the perceptual sort.

{615} So much, then, for knowing and not knowing and for how it is possible to know and yet to act without self-control.

Book IX

IX.8

[*1168a27*] There is also a puzzle about whether a person should love himself most or someone else. For people admonish those who like themselves most, calling them ‘self-lovers’, on the supposition that this is actually something shameful. It seems too [*30*] that a base person does all his actions for the sake of himself, and the more depraved he is the more he does so—people complain, therefore, that he ‘does nothing from himself’.[38] A decent person, by contrast, seems to act because of what is noble, and the better he is the more he does so, and for the sake of a friend, disregarding his own interests.

With these accounts, however, our results clash, [*35*] which is not surprising. For the results say that we should love most the [*1168b*] one who is most a friend, and the one who is most a friend is the one who wishes good things to the person he wishes them to for that person’s own sake, even if no one will know. But these features are found most in a person’s relations to himself, as of course are all the others by which a friend is defined. For, as we said, it is from oneself that all the [*5*] features fitted to friendship also extend to others. All the proverbs are of one mind about this as well—for example, ‘one soul’,[39] and ‘what friends have they have in common’, and ‘equality is friendship’, and ‘knee is closer than shin’.[40] For all these things are found most in a person’s relations to himself. [*10*] For he is a friend to himself most of all, and should, then, love himself most.

It is reasonable to be puzzled, then, as to which side we should follow, since both carry conviction. Now presumably in cases like these we need to draw distinctions in connection with the arguments and determine to what extent and in what ways they grasp the truth. If, then, we were to find out what those on each side mean by ‘self-love’, perhaps that would be clear.

Now those who reduce it to a term of reproach call ‘self-lovers’ [*15*] those who allocate to themselves the greater share in money, honors, and bodily pleasures. For these are the things ordinary people desire and take seriously, on the supposition that they are the best goods—which is why they are fought about. Those people, then, who are greedy where these things are

concerned gratify their appetites and their feelings and the nonrational part of the [*20*] soul generally. And ordinary people are like this, which is why the term has come about, deriving from the most ordinary case, which really is a base one. Those who are self-lovers in this way, then, *are* justly objects of reproach.

That it is those who allocate goods of this sort to themselves that most people are used to calling ‘self-lovers’ is clear enough. For if someone were always taking more seriously than anything else the doing of just actions [*25*] or temperate ones or whatever else might be in accord with the virtues, and in general were always keeping for himself what was noble, no one would call *this* person a ‘self-lover’ or blame him.

A person of this sort, though, would seem to be *more* of a self-lover. At any rate, he allocates to himself the good things that are noblest and the ones that are best of all and gratifies the element in himself that has most control, [*30*] obeying it in everything. But just as a city too, or any other complex system, seems to be most of all its most controlling part, so also does a human being. A person is most of all a self-lover, then, who likes this part and gratifies this part.

Also, a person is called ‘self-controlled’ or ‘lacking in self-control’ depending on whether or not his understanding is in control, on the supposition that this is what each person *is*, and [*35*] it is actions involving reason that people seem most {616} of all to do themselves and to do voluntarily. [*1169a*] So it is clear enough that this part is what each person is or is most of all and that a decent person likes this part most.

That is why a decent person is most of all a self-lover, but of a different form than the one that is reproached and differing from it as much as living in accord with reason does from living in accord with feeling and as much as desiring [*5*] what is noble does from desiring what seems advantageous.

Those, then, who *par excellence* take seriously the doing of noble actions are welcomed and praised by everyone. And if everyone competed for what is noble and strived to do the noblest actions, everything would be as it should as regards the common good, and each person as an individual would have the greatest of [*10*] goods, if indeed virtue is such. And so a good person should be a self-lover (for by doing noble actions he will both profit himself and benefit others), whereas a depraved person should not be

one (for he will harm both himself and his neighbors, since he follows his base feelings).

For a depraved person, the things he should do clash with [*15*] the ones he does, whereas the things a decent person should do are the very ones he does. For every understanding chooses what is best for itself, and a decent person obeys his understanding.

It is true of an excellent person too that he does many actions for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, even dying for them if need be. For he will give up wealth, honors, [*20*] and fought-about goods generally, in keeping for himself what is noble. For he will choose intense pleasure for a short time over weak pleasure for a long one; living life nobly for a year over many years lived in random fashion; and a single noble and great action over many small ones. This is presumably what happens with those who die for others. [*25*] They are choosing, then, something of great nobility for themselves. And they will give up wealth on the condition that their friends get more. For while the friend gets wealth, the excellent person himself gets what is noble. The greater good, then, he allocates to himself.

Where honors and ruling offices are concerned he is the same way. For he will give up all these for his friend, [*30*] since this is noble and praiseworthy for himself. It makes perfect sense, then, that he seems excellent, choosing as he does what is noble before anything else. It may be that he will even give up actions in favor of his friend, however, since it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend’s doing the action than to do the action himself.

In the case of every praiseworthy [*35*] thing, then, an excellent person evidently allocates the greater share of what is noble to himself. In this way, then, we should be self-lovers, as [*1169b*] we said. But in the way ordinary people are, we shouldn’t.

Book X

X.1

The next topic we should discuss is, [*1172a19*] presumably, pleasure. For it seems to be most intimately attached to our kind, which is why those who educate [*20*] the young steer them by means of pleasure and pain. And it seems too that with regard to virtue of character the biggest thing is enjoying what we should and hating what we should. For these extend throughout the whole of a person's life and have a powerful influence with regard to both virtue and the happy [*25*] life, since people deliberately choose pleasant things and avoid painful ones. . . .

X.4

What pleasure is or what sort of thing it is will [*1174a13*] become more evident if we take up the question again from the start. For seeing seems at any time to be complete, since it does not lack anything whose coming to be [*15*] at a later time will complete its form. Pleasure also seems to be like this. For it is some sort of whole, and we can at no given time find a pleasure that by coming to be for a longer time will have its form completed.

That is why pleasure is not a process either. For every process (for example, building*) is in time and relates to some end and is complete when it has produced [*20*] what it seeks to produce—in other words, in this whole time that it takes.* And all processes are incomplete in their parts (and during the corresponding time), which differ in form both from the whole process and from each other. For putting together {617} the stones is different from fluting the column, and both of these are different from producing the temple. Also, the production of the temple is a complete production, since it lacks nothing as regards what was proposed. [*25*] The production of the foundation and of the triglyph, though, are incomplete, since each is the production of a part. They differ in form, then, and it is not possible during any part of the time taken to find a process that is complete in form, but if indeed such a process is to be found, it is in the whole time taken.

Similarly too in the case of walking and the rest. For if locomotion is a process of moving from one place to another, there are differences [*30*] in form here as well—flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only that but there are also differences in walking itself, since the from-where and to-where are not the same in a whole stadium racecourse as they are in a part of it or the same in one part as in another; nor is traversing this line the same as traversing that one, since we do not travel only along a line but also along one that is in a certain place, [*1174b*] and this place is different from that. Well, we have discussed 'process' in an exact way in other places, and it does seem that it is not complete at every time but, rather, that its many sub-processes are incomplete and different in form, if indeed the from-where and to-where constitute their form.

Of pleasure, by contrast, the form [*5*] is complete at every time whatsoever. So it is clear that movement and pleasure are different from each other and that pleasure is something whole and complete. This would also seem to follow from the fact that it is not possible to be in process and not take time, but it is possible to be pleased, since what occurs in the 'now' is a sort of whole. From these considerations it is also clear that it is not correct to say, as people do, that there is a process or a coming to be *of* pleasure,* [*10*] since these are not said of everything but only of things that are divisible into parts and are not wholes. For there is no coming to be of seeing, either, or of a point or of a unit, nor is any of these a process or a coming to be. Of pleasure too, then, there is neither of these, since it is a sort of whole.

Since every perceptual capacity is active in relation to its perceptible object, and completely so when it is in good condition in relation to the noblest of its [*15*] perceptible objects (for a complete activity seems to be most of all something of this sort, but whether it is the perceptual capacity itself that is said to be active or the subject that perceptual capacity is in makes no difference), in the case of each perceptual capacity, the best activity will be, then, the activity of the subject that is in the best condition in relation to the most excellent of its objects. And this activity will be the most complete and most pleasant. For with every perceptual capacity there is [*20*] a pleasure connected, and the same holds for both thought and contemplation. But the most pleasant is the most complete, and the most complete is the activity of a subject that is in good condition in relation to

the most excellent of the relevant objects. And pleasure is what completes the activity . . . not as the state does by being present in something but as a sort of supervenient end, like the bloom on men in their prime of youth. . . .

X.5

. . . Since activities differ in decency and baseness, [*1175b24*] however, and some are choiceworthy, some to be avoided, [*25*] and some neither, the same goes for pleasures as well, since for each activity there is a pleasure that properly belongs to it. So the pleasure that properly belongs to an excellent activity is decent, and the one that properly belongs to a base activity is depraved. For appetites too are praiseworthy when they are for noble activities and blameworthy when for shameful ones. And the pleasures that are in the activities more properly belong to these than do the corresponding desires. [*30*] For the desires are distinguished from the activities both in time and in nature, whereas the pleasures are closely related to the activities and so little distinguished from them that disputes arise as to whether the activity and the pleasure are not the same thing. Still, pleasure does not seem to be thought or to be perception (since that would be strange), [*35*] but, rather, because it is not found separated, it appears to some people to be the same as them.

Just as activities differ, then, so too do the corresponding pleasures. . . . But in the case of human beings, at any rate, pleasures do vary quite a lot, since [*1176a10*] the same things delight some {618} people and give pain to others, and while to some they are painful and hateful, to others they are pleasant and lovable. . . . [*15*] In all such cases, however, it seems that what *is* so is what appears so to an excellent person. And if this is correct, as it seems to be, and it is virtue and a good person (insofar as he is such) that are the measure of each thing, then pleasures will be those that appear to be pleasures to him, and the things that are pleasant will be the ones that he enjoys. But if the things he finds repellant seem pleasant to someone, it is no wonder, [*20*] since there are many ways for human beings to get ruined or spoiled. Pleasant, however, these things are not, except to these people and to people in this condition. It is clear, then, that pleasures agreed to be shameful should be said not to be pleasures at all, except to people who have been ruined.

Of those pleasures that seem to be decent, however, which sort or which particular one should we say is characteristic of a human being? Or isn't this clear from the corresponding activities, [*25*] since the pleasures are entailed by these? So whether the activities of a complete and blessed man are one or more than one, the pleasures that complete these will be said to be characteristically human pleasures in the full sense, and the rest will be so in a secondary or many-times-removed way, as are the activities.

X.6

[*31*] . . . It remains for us to discuss happiness by giving an outline of it, since we take it to be the end in human affairs. Accordingly, our account will be more concise if we first recapitulate what we said before about this.

We said, then, that happiness is not a state, since, if it were, it might be possessed by someone who was asleep his whole life, living the life of plants or by someone suffering the greatest misfortunes. If these implications [*35*] are not satisfying, then, we should, rather, class happiness as a sort of activity, as [*1176b*] we said before. And if some activities are necessary and choiceworthy because of other things, whereas others are intrinsically choiceworthy, it is clear that happiness must be classed as one of those that are intrinsically choiceworthy, not as one of those choiceworthy because of something else, since happiness lacks nothing but instead is self-sufficient. [*5*]

The ones that are intrinsically choiceworthy, however, are those from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And actions in accord with virtue seem to be like this, since doing noble and excellent actions is one of the things that are choiceworthy because of themselves. . . .

X.7

But if happiness is activity in accord with virtue, [*1177a12*] it is quite reasonable that it should be in accord with the one that is most excellent, and this will be the virtue of the best element. Whether, then, this element is understanding or something else that seems by nature to rule, lead, and understand what is noble and divine, whether by being something divine itself [*15*] or by being the most divine element in us—the activity of *it*, when in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it, will be complete happiness. That it is contemplative activity we already said.

And this would seem to be in agreement both with what was said before and with the truth, since this activity is also most excellent. For not only is understanding the most excellent element in us, but also, of [*20*] knowable objects, the ones that understanding is concerned with are the most excellent ones. Further, it is the most continuous activity, since we can contemplate more continuously than we can do any action whatsoever.

Moreover, we think that pleasure must be mixed in with happiness, and the most pleasant of the activities in accord with virtue is agreed to be the one in accord with theoretical wisdom. At any rate, philosophy seems to involve pleasures that are wondrous [*25*] for their purity and stability, and it is quite reasonable that those who have attained knowledge should pass their time more pleasantly than those who are looking for it.

Moreover, the self-sufficiency that is meant will belong most of all to contemplative activity. For while a theoretically-wise person as well as a just one and people with the other virtues all need the things necessary for living, when these are adequately supplied, the just one still needs [*30*] people to do just actions for and with, and similarly for a temperate person, a courageous person, and each of the others. But a theoretically-wise {619} person, even when by himself, is able to contemplate, and the more wise he is, the more he is able to do so. He will do it better, presumably, if he has co-workers, but all the same he is most self-sufficient.

Moreover, this activity, and only this, would seem to be liked because of itself [alone]. [*1177b*] For nothing arises from it beyond having contemplated, whereas from the practical ones we try—to a greater or lesser extent—to get for ourselves something beyond the action.

Moreover, happiness seems to reside in leisure, since we do unleisured things in order to be at leisure, and wage war in order to live in peace. [*5*] Now the activity of the practical virtues occurs in politics or in warfare, and the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisured and those in warfare completely so (for no one chooses to wage war for the sake of waging war, or to foment war either, since someone would seem completely bloodthirsty, [*10*] if he made enemies of his friends in order to bring about battles and killings). But the activity of a politician too is unleisured and beyond political activity itself if he tries to get positions of power and honors or, at any rate, happiness for himself and his fellow citizens—this

being different [*15*] from the exercise of politics and something we clearly seek on the supposition of its being different.

If, then, among actions in accord with the virtues, those in politics and war stand out in nobility and magnitude but these are unleisured and seek some end rather than being choiceworthy because of themselves, whereas the activity of understanding seems to be superior in excellence because it is contemplative, to seek no end beyond itself, and to have its [*20*] own proper pleasure, which increases the activity by its own increase, and if in addition the self-sufficiency, leisured quality, and unweariness (so far as this is possible for a human being), as well as all the other attributes assigned to the blessed, are evidently attributes of it, then this activity will be the complete happiness of a human being, if it receives a complete span of life (since nothing is incomplete [*25*] that is characteristic of happiness).

But such a life would be more excellent than one in accord with the human element, since it is not insofar as he is a human being that someone will live a life like that but insofar as he has some divine element in him, and to the degree that this element is superior to the compound, to that degree will its activity also be superior to that in accord with the other sort of virtue. If, then, understanding is something divine in comparison with the human element, so also a life in accord with it [*30*] is divine in comparison with human life. We should not, however, in accord with the makers of proverbs, ‘think human things, since you are human’ or ‘think mortal things, since you are mortal’ but, rather, we should as far as possible immortalize, and do everything to live in accord with the element in us that is most excellent. For even if it is small in bulk, in its power and esteem it far [*1178a*] exceeds everything.

It would seem too that each person actually *is* this, if indeed it is the controlling and better element. So it would be strange if he were to choose not his own life but that of something else. Moreover, what we said before will fit now as well. For what properly belongs to each thing by nature is most excellent [*5*] and most pleasant for each of them. For each human being, then, the life in accord with understanding is so too, if indeed this most of all is a human being. Hence, this life will also be happiest.

X.8

Happiest, but in a secondary way, is the life in accord with the other virtue, since the activities in accord with it are human. For just actions, brave actions, and [*10*] other actions that we do in accord with the virtues, we do in relation to each other in contracts, catering to needs, and in every sort of action and in feelings as well, by keeping closely to what is appropriate to each person. And all of these are evidently human. Indeed, some of them even seem to arise from the body, and virtue of character seems in [*15*] many ways to be intimately attached to feelings.

Practical wisdom too is coupled together with virtue of character, and it with practical wisdom, if indeed the starting-points of practical wisdom are in accord with the virtues of character and the correctness of these virtues is in accord with practical wisdom. And connected as these virtues also are with feelings, they will be concerned with the compound. But the virtues of the compound [*20*] {620} are human. So too, then, are both the life and the happiness that is in accord with them. The virtue of understanding, though, is separated. (About it, in fact, let just that much be said, since to develop an exact account of it is a greater task than the one we have set before us.) It would seem too that it has little need of external supplies or less need than virtue of character does. For let us grant that they both need the necessary ones [*25*] and to an equal extent, even if the politician does labor more in relation to the body and suchlike, since any differences here would be small. As regards the activities, though, there will be a large difference. For a generous person will need money for doing generous actions, and so will a just one, then, for repaying debts (for wishes are not manifest things, [*30*] and people who are not just pretend to wish to do just actions). And a courageous person will need power, if indeed he is to bring to completion anything that is in accord with his virtue, and a temperate one will need authority. For how else will it be manifest that he or any of the others is what he is?

Moreover, it is disputed whether it is deliberate choice or action that is the more controlling element in virtue, on the supposition that it depends on both. [*35*] Well, its completeness clearly does depend on both. For [*1178b*] the actions, though, many things are needed and more of them the greater and more noble the actions are.

A person who is contemplating, by contrast, needs none of these things, at any rate for the activity. On the contrary, one might say that they are even

impediments, at any rate to his contemplating. But insofar as he is a human being and is living with many other people, [*5*] he chooses to do the actions that are in accord with virtue and so will need such things for living a human life.

But that complete happiness is some contemplative activity will also be evident from the following considerations. The gods, in fact, we suppose to be the most blessed and happy of all. But what sorts of actions should we assign to them? Just ones? [*10*] Won't they appear ridiculous if they engage in transactions, return deposits, and so on? Courageous ones, then, enduring what is frightening and facing danger because it is a noble thing to do? Or generous ones? To whom will they give? It will be a strange thing, if they actually have money or anything like that. And their temperate actions, what would they be? [*15*] Or isn't the praise vulgar, since they do not have base appetites? If we were to go through them all, it would be evident that everything to do with actions is petty and unworthy of gods. Nonetheless, everyone supposes them to be living, at least, and hence in activity, since surely they are not sleeping like Endymion.[41] If, then, living has doing actions taken away from it and still [*20*] more so producing, what is left except contemplating? So the activity of a god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be contemplative. And so the activity of humans, then, that is most akin to this will most bear the stamp of happiness.

A further indication of this is that other animals do not share in happiness, being completely deprived of this sort of activity. Hence [*25*] the life of the gods is blessed throughout; that of human beings is so to the extent that it has something similar to this sort of activity, whereas of the other animals, none is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends indeed just as far as contemplation does, and those to whom it more belongs to contemplate, it also more belongs to be happy, not coincidentally [*30*] but, rather, in accord with contemplation, since this is intrinsically estimable. And so happiness will be some sort of contemplation.

But to the extent that someone is a human being, he will also need external prosperity, since his nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but his body needs to be healthy and provided with food and other sorts of care. [*35*] Nonetheless, we should not think that a person who is going to be happy needs many things and grand ones, [*1179a*] even if it is not possible

for him to be blessed without external goods. For self-sufficiency does not lie in an extreme amount of these and neither does action. But it is possible to do many noble actions even without ruling land and sea, since even from moderate resources a person can do actions [*5*] in accord with virtue. (This is plain {621} enough to see, since private individuals seem to do decent actions no less, or even more, than people in positions of power). It is enough, then, to have that amount, since the life of a person who is active in accord with virtue will be happy.

Solon too was presumably depicting happy people correctly when he described them as moderately [*10*] supplied with external goods but as having done what he regarded as the noblest actions and lived their lives temperately. For it is possible with moderate possessions to do the actions we should. Anaxagoras[42] also seems to have supposed a happy person to be neither rich nor in a position of power when he said that it would be no wonder if a happy one appeared to be a strange sort of person to ordinary people. For these [*15*] judge by external goods, since these are the only ones they can perceive. The beliefs of wise people, then, would seem to be in harmony with our arguments.

But while these sorts of considerations also carry a certain conviction, the truth in practical matters must be discerned from the facts of our life, since these are what have the controlling vote. When we examine what has been previously said, then, it must be discerned by bringing it to bear on the facts [*20*] of our life, and if it is in harmony with the facts, we should accept it, but if it clashes, we should suppose it mere words.

The person whose activity is in accord with understanding, however, and who takes care of it, would seem to be both in the best condition and the one most loved by the gods. For if the gods exercise a sort of supervision over human affairs, as indeed they seem to, it would also be quite reasonable [*25*] both that they should enjoy what is best and most akin to themselves (and this would be understanding) and that they should reward those who most like and honor it for supervising what they themselves love and for acting correctly and nobly. But that all these attributes belong most of all to a wise person is quite clear. Therefore, he is most beloved by the gods. [*30*] And the same person is also likely to be the happiest, so that in this way too a wise person will be most happy of all.

[*1179b4*] . . . If arguments were self-sufficient for making people decent, 'many and large the wages they would earn', [*5*] as Theognis says,[43] and justly so, and arguments would be what need to be provided. As things stand, however, they appear to have the strength to encourage and stimulate those of the young who are free minded, and to make ready to be possessed by virtue a character that is well bred and that truly loves what is noble but to be unable to encourage [*10*] ordinary people toward noble-goodness.

For ordinary people naturally obey not shame but fear and abstain from base things not because of their shamefulness but because of the sanctions involved. For living by feeling as they do, they pursue the pleasures that are properly their own as well as the things through which these come about, and avoid the opposing pains. Of [*15*] what is noble and what is truly pleasant, however, they have no understanding at all, not having tasted it.

What sort of argument, then, could reform such people? For it is not possible—or not easy—to alter by argument what has long since been locked up in traits of character. Presumably, though, we should be content if, when we have all the things through which it seems we become decent people, we achieve some [*20*] share of virtue.

Now some people think that it is by nature that we become good, whereas some think that it is by habit and others by teaching. Well, nature's contribution, it is clear, is not up to us, but because of some divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate. Argument and teaching, on the other hand, surely do not have strength in everyone but, rather, the soul of the audience must be prepared beforehand through habits to enjoy and [*25*] hate in a noble way, like earth that is to nourish seed. For someone who lives in accord with his feelings will not listen to—or, what is more, comprehend—argument that encourages him to turn away. And in a state like that how is it possible to persuade him to change his ways? Moreover, - feeling generally {622} seems to yield not to argument but to force. Character, then, must in some way be there beforehand and properly suited for virtue, liking what is noble [*30*] and repelled by what is shameful.

It is difficult, however, for someone to get correct guidance toward virtue from childhood if he has not been nurtured under laws of the appropriate sort, since a moderate and resilient way of living is not pleasant for ordinary

people, most of all when they are young. That is why laws must prescribe their nurture [*35*] and practices, since these will not be painful when they have become habitual.

But it is not enough, presumably, that when people are young they get the correct nurture and supervision. [*1180a*] On the contrary, even when they have grown into adulthood they must continue to practice the same things and be habituated to them. And so there will need to be laws concerning these matters as well and, in general, then, concerning all of life. For ordinary people obey force rather than argument; and they obey penalties rather than what is noble.

That is why [*5*] some think that legislators should, on the one hand, exhort and encourage people toward virtue for the sake of what is noble (on the supposition that those who have been decently guided in the formation of habits will listen), and, on the other hand, impose punishments and sanctions on those who disobey and are not naturally well disposed, while entirely expelling those who are incurable. For a decent person, they think, living as he does with a view to what is noble, [*10*] will obey reason, whereas a base one, whose desire is for pleasure, needs to be punished by means of pain, like a beast of burden. That too is why they say that the sorts of pains inflicted should be those that are most opposed to the pleasures liked.

Whatever about that; if, as we said, someone who is to be good should be nobly nurtured and habituated and then [*15*] live that way in decent practices and neither involuntarily nor voluntarily do base actions, this would happen if people lived their life in accord with a sort of understanding and correct constitutional arrangement and this had the requisite strength. . . .

The most excellent thing, then, is that there should be communal supervision that is correct. But if things are [*30*] communally unsupervised, it would seem appropriate for each individual to further the virtue of his own children and friends—to be capable of doing it,* or, at any rate, of deliberately choosing it. But he would be more capable of doing this, it seems, given what has been said, if he becomes competent in legislative science. For it is clear that communal types of supervision come about through laws and that decent ones do so through excellent laws. [*35*] Whether the laws are written or unwritten, though, would seem to make no

difference, nor [*1180b*] would it make a difference whether one or many are thereby educated—anymore than it does in the case of music, physical training, or any of the other practices. . . .

Further, particularized education is actually superior to communal education, just as in the case of medicine. For while rest and abstinence from food are in universal terms advantageous for a feverish patient, for a particular patient, presumably, they may not be, nor does a boxing instructor prescribe the same style of fighting for everyone. [*10*] It would seem, then, that a particular case is treated with more exactness when there is individual supervision, since each person is more likely to get what suits him. But the best supervision in each particular case will be provided by the doctor, athletic trainer, or whoever else has knowledge of the universal and knows what applies in [*15*] all cases or in these sorts (since the sciences are said to be—and actually are—of what is common).

But, despite that, there is nothing to prevent a single individual from being correctly supervised even by someone who lacks scientific knowledge but who has—due to experience—seen exactly what happens in each particular case, just as some people seem to be their own best doctors even though they would be of no assistance at all to another person. Nonetheless, it seems, presumably, that someone who *does* wish to become expert in a craft [*20*] or in a theoretical science should take steps toward the universal and come to know it as well as possible, since that, we said, is what the sciences are concerned with.

Maybe, then, someone who wishes to make people—whether many or few—better because of his supervision should also try to acquire legislative science, if it is through laws that we can {623} become good. For [*25*] producing a noble disposition in anyone whoever—in anyone put before him—is not a matter for some random person, but if indeed anyone can do it, it is a person who has knowledge, just as in medicine and in all other matters that involve a sort of supervision and practical wisdom.

Hence shouldn’t we next investigate from what sources and in what way someone might become competent in legislative science? . . . [*1181b12*] So since our predecessors have left the subject of legislation unexamined, it is presumably better if we ourselves investigate it and indeed constitutions generally, so that as far as possible our philosophy of human affairs may be brought to completion.

First, then, [*15*] if there is anything that has been correctly said by our predecessors on some part of the subject, let us try to go through it and then, on the basis of the collection of constitutions, try to get a theoretical grasp on what sorts of things preserve and destroy cities, what sorts of things preserve or destroy each sort of constitution, and what causes some cities to be well governed and others the opposite. For when we have gotten a theoretical grasp on these matters, [*20*] maybe we shall also be better able to see which constitution is best, how each should be arranged, and what laws and habits it should use.

Let us discuss this, then, starting from the beginning.

1. Attributed to Eudoxus (who may be one of 'they' referred to at X.2 1172b9–10, where 'all things' clearly means 'all animals').
2. Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 293, 295–297.
3. An Assyrian king (669–626 BCE) whose luxurious lifestyle was legendary.
4. The inscription in the temple on the island of Delos.
5. Priam was the king of Troy. His family and city were destroyed by the Greeks.
6. The constitution of Crete is discussed in *Pol.* II.7; that of Sparta in II.6, VIII.4.
7. See VI.1 $1138^{b}18$–20.
8. The reference is probably to *Laws* II 653a–c. See also *Republic* III 401d–402a.
9. Aristotle elsewhere (*Pol.* VIII.9 $1315^{a}30$–31, *EE* II.7 $1223^{b}22$–24) quotes Heraclitus as saying only that it is difficult to fight 'against spirit' (DK 22 B85). He may be referring to that passage here or to some other, lost passage.
10. A *mina* (pl. *minae*) was the weight of 100 drachmas (or, as an amount of money, the 100 drachmas themselves). A drachma weighed about 0.15 ounces. So a mina weighed 15.15 ounces, or just about 1 pound.
11. A famous wrestler. He supposedly ate an entire cow in a single day.
12. In their table of opposites.
13. Source unknown.
14. *Chart*: A chart of the virtues, with their associated excesses and deficiencies is given in *EE* II.3 1220b38–1221a12:

Excess	**Deficiency**	**Mean**
irascibility	insensitivity to pain	mild-manneredness
rashness	cowardice	courage

shamelessness	bashfulness	sense of shame
intemperance	insensibility	temperance
enviousness	nameless	indignation
profit	loss	justice
wastefulness	acquisitiveness	generosity
boastfulness	self-deprecation	truthfulness
flattery	surliness	friendliness
ingratiation	churlishness	dignity
luxuriousness	toughness	resilience
conceit	smallness of soul	greatness of soul
extravagance	niggardliness	magnificence
unscrupulousness	unworldliness	practical wisdom

The instruction in our text suggests that this (or a similar) chart was available to Aristotle's audience, perhaps displayed on the wall of his lecture room. The list differs most conspicuously from the one employed in the *NE* in that it includes practical wisdom as a mean state.

15. *Odyssey* XII.219–220. Circe, not Calypso, gives this advice.

16. *Iliad* III.156–160. The abduction of Helen, wife of the Greek king Menelaus, by Paris, the son of Priam, king of Troy, was the purported cause of the Trojan War. What the elders said is that Helen should be sent away, lest her irresistible beauty ruin Troy.

17. Aristotle refers to the lost *Alcmaeon* from which he quotes at V.9 $1136^{a}13$–14. Alcmaeon's father, Amphiaraus, foresaw that he would meet his death on an expedition that his wife, Eriphyle, had compelled him to join. In revenge, he ordered Alcmaeon to kill Eriphyle, threatening to put a curse on him for noncompliance.

18. Aristotle usually uses *akousion* ('involuntary') as equivalent in meaning to *ouch hekousion* ('not voluntary'). Here, however, he somewhat confusingly uses the same term to apply to what is not voluntary and regretted as opposed to what is simply not voluntary. 'Contra-voluntary' is intended to capture this special sense of *akousion*.

19. The religious cult of Demeter and Kore at Eleusis included some rites—the so-called Eleusinian Mysteries—that initiates were forbidden to reveal. Aeschylus seems to have been formally charged with violating this injunction but was acquitted.

20. In Euripides' lost play *Cresphontes*, 'Merope, on the point of killing her son, recognizes him in time' (*Po*. 14 $1454^{a}5$–7).

21. Aristotle's reference is unclear.

22. Plato, *Gorgias* 466a–468e.

23. The clavicle, or collar bone, may be called a key (*kleis*) because it rotates on its axis when the shoulder is abducted or drawn back, or because its somewhat hooked shape was like that of an early sort of key, which was a hook pushed through a door from the outside to raise the latch.

24. Euripides, *Melanippe*, *fr.* 486.

25. *Theognis of Megara*, ln. 147.

26. Bias of Priene was one of the so-called Seven Sages, men famous for their wisdom.
27. See X.9 $1180^{a}14–^{b}28$.
28. Hesiod, Fr. 286. Rhadamanthys, the son of Zeus and Europa, was one of the judges of the dead in Hades.
29. This seems to have been a flexible lead device used to find a match for an irregularly shaped stone that was already set in position.
30. A distinguished Athenian tragedian of the late fifth century BCE. Fr. 5 is quoted here.
31. A leading Athenian politician.
32. A lost burlesque recounting the deeds of a ridiculous hero that Aristotle regards as having prefigured comic drama in certain respects (*Po.* 4 $1448^{b}28–1449^{a}2$).
33. *Philoctetes, frs.* 787–788.
34. An unscrupulous person is one who 'greedily takes anything from anywhere' (*EE* II.3 $1221^{a}36–37$).
35. See *Protagoras*, 352b3–c2.
36. Neoptolemus is the son of Achilles, the most prominent of the Greek heroes in the Trojan wars. Odysseus is another very prominent Greek hero. In his *Philoctetes*, Sophocles makes Neoptolemus a companion of Odysseus in the expedition to Lemnos to bring the bow of Heracles, which Philoctetes possesses, back to Troy. Odysseus persuades Neoptolemus to lie, win Philoctetes' trust, and take the bow. Neoptolemus does do this but—deeply moved by the subsequent plight of Philoctetes—confesses the truth to him and returns the bow.
37. 'For if belief is intensely stable and unalterable by persuasion, it will not differ at all from scientific knowledge, since belief will carry with it the conviction that things are as they are believed to be, for example, Heraclitus of Ephesus has this sort of belief about what he believes' (*MM* II.6 $1201^{b}5–8$).
38. The precise meaning of *aph' heautou* ('away from himself') is obscure. If it is supposed to be cognate with 'disregarding his own interests (*to d'hautou pariēsin*)' ($1168^{a}33$), as seems likely, *apo* has its quasi-spatial sense, so that the meaning is something like (1) a base person does nothing *away from* himself or his own interests.
39. 'When we wish to describe a very intense friendship, we say 'my soul and his are one'' (*MM* II.11 $1211^{a}33–34$).
40. Theocritus, *Idylls* XVI.18. The meaning is close to 'Charity begins at home'.
41. Loved for his great beauty by Selene, goddess of the moon, Endymion was made immortal by her but was cast into a deep sleep in a cave on Mount Latmus in Caria so that she might descend and visit him during the dark phase of the lunar month.
42. DK 59 A30.
43. Lines 432–434: 'If the god had given the power to doctors / To cure men's badness and muddled wits / Many and large the wages they would earn'. Lines 437–438 read: 'But by teaching / You will never make a bad man good'.

POLITICS

Translated by C.D.C. Reeve.

ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS* AND Plato's *Republic* are the two great works of ancient political philosophy. But unlike the *Republic*, the *Politics* was probably not written as a single work; it is, rather, a collection of essays unified by a common theme. In the excerpts included below, Aristotle discusses the definition and structure of the state (Book I); criticizes the ideal societies proposed by Plato and others (Book II); classifies constitutions and such forms of government as democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy (Book III); and presents his own account of the best state (Book VII).

Book I

I.1

Since we [*1252a*] see every city to be a sort of community, and every community to be formed for the sake of some good (for everyone does every action for the sake of what seems to be good), clearly, then, while every community aims at some good, the community that has the most control of all, and circumscribes all the others, aims both at the good that has the most control of all and does so to the highest degree. [*5*] And this community is the one called a city, the community that is political.

Now those who think that the positions of politician, king, household manager, and master [of slaves] are the same, are not correct.[1] For they think that each of these differs with regard to large or small number, but not in kind (*eidos*)—for [*10*] example, if someone rules few people, he is a master, if more, a household manager, if still more, he has the position of politician or king—the assumption being that there is no difference between a large household and a small city. And as for the positions of politician and king, they {624} say that someone who is himself in charge has the position of king, whereas someone who, in accord with the reasons belonging to this sort of science, takes his turn [*15*] at ruling and being ruled, has the position of politician. But these claims are not true.

What I am saying will be clear, if we investigate the matter in accord with the method of inquiry that has guided us elsewhere.[2] For as in other cases, a composite must be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since these are the smallest parts of the whole, so too it is [*20*] by investigating the parts of which a city is composed that we shall see better both how these differ from each other, and whether or not it is possible to gain some craft-like expertise concerning each of the things we have mentioned.

I.2

If we were to see how these things grow naturally from the start, we would in this way, as in other cases, get the best [*25*] theoretical grasp on them.[3] First, then, those who are incapable of existing without each other

necessarily form a couple, as female and male do for the sake of procreation (they do not do so from deliberate choice, but, like other animals and plants, because the urge to leave behind something of the same sort as themselves is natural), and as what rules by nature and [*30*] what is by nature ruled do for the sake of preservation. For if something is capable of looking ahead by using its thought, it is by nature a ruler and by nature a master, whereas whatever can labor by using its body is ruled and is by nature a slave. That is why the same thing is advantageous for both master and slave.

Now by nature female is distinguished from slave. [*1252b*] For, unlike the blacksmiths who make the Delphian knife,[4] nature produces nothing in a stingy way, but instead makes one thing for one [function]. For each one of the instruments will be completed best if it serves one function rather than many. Among barbarians, however, a woman and a slave [*5*] occupy the same position. The cause of this is that they have no element that is by nature a ruler, but rather their community is that of male and female slave. That is why the poets say "it is reasonable for Greeks to rule barbarians," on the supposition that a barbarian and a slave are by nature the same.

From these two communities, then, the household was first to arise, and Hesiod was correct [*10*] when he said in his poem, "First and foremost a house, a woman, and an ox for the plow."[5] For to poor people an ox takes the place of a servant. The community that is formed to satisfy everyday needs, then, is the household in accord with nature, whose members are called "meal-sharers" by Charondas and "manger-sharers" by Epimenides the Cretan.[6]

The first community, consisting of several households, [*15*] for the sake of satisfying needs other than everyday ones, is the village. And above all the village in accord with nature seems to be a colony of the household, consisting as it does of what some have called "sharers of the same milk," sons and the sons of sons. That is why cities were at first ruled by kings, as [barbarian] nations still are. For those who came together were living under kingly rule, since every household [*20*] is ruled by the eldest as a king. And so the same holds in the colonies, because of the kinship [of the villagers]. That is what Homer is describing when he says: "Each one lays down the law for his own wives and children."[7] For they were scattered about, which

is how people used to dwell in ancient times. And it is because of this that all people say that the gods too are ruled by a king, namely, that they themselves were ruled by kings in ancient times, and some still are. [*25*] And human beings model not only the forms of the gods on their own, but their way of life as well.

The community, coming from several villages, when it is complete, is the city, once it has {625} already reached (one might almost say) the limit of total self-sufficiency. It comes to be for the sake of living, but it exists for the sake of living well. That is why every city exists by nature, [*30*] since the first communities also do. For this one is their end, and nature is an end. For what each thing is when its coming to be has been completed, this we say is the nature of each—for example, of a human, of a horse, or of a household. Further, its for-the-sake-of-which—namely, its end—is best, and self-sufficiency is both end and best.

From these considerations, then, [*1253a*] it is evident that a city is among the things that exist by nature, that a human is by nature a political animal, and that anyone who is without a city, not by luck but by nature, is either a wretch or else better than human, and, like the one Homer condemns, he is "clanless, lawless, and homeless."[8] [*5*] For someone with such a nature has at the same time an appetite for war, like an isolated piece in a game of checkers.[9]

It is also clear why a human is more of a political animal than any bee or any other gregarious animal. For nature does nothing pointlessly, as we say, and a human being alone among the animals has speech. Now, the voice [*10*] is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature does extend this far, namely, to having the perception of pleasure and pain and signifying them to each other). But speech is for making clear what is advantageous or harmful, and so also what is just or unjust. For this [*15*] is special to humans, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city.

Also the city is prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For it is necessary for the whole to be prior to the part. [*20*] For if the whole body is put to death, there will no longer be a foot or a

hand, except homonymously, as one might speak of a stone “hand” (for, once dead, the hand will be like that). For everything is defined by its function and by its capacity, so that when they are no longer in that condition they should not be said to be the same things but homonymous ones. It is clear, then, that the city both exists by nature and is prior in nature to the individual. [*25*] For if an individual is not self-sufficient when separated, he will be in a similar state to that of the other parts in relation to the whole. And anyone who cannot live in a community with others, or who does not need to because of his self-sufficiency, is no part of a city, so that he is either a wild beast or a god.

Now, although the impulse [*30*] toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone, the person who first put one together was also the cause of very great goods. For just as when completed a human is the best of the animals, so when separated from law and judicial proceeding he is worst of all. For injustice is harshest when it possesses weapons, and a human grows up possessed of weapons for practical wisdom and virtue to use, which may be used for absolutely contrary purposes. [*35*] That is why he is the most unrestrained and most savage of animals when he lacks virtue, as well as the worst as regards sex and food. But justice is something political. For justice is a political community’s order, and justice is discernment of what is just.

I.3

Since it is evident from what parts the city is composed [*1253b*] we must first discuss household management, for every city is composed of households. And the parts of household management correspond in turn to the parts of which the household is composed, and a complete household is composed of slaves and free people. But since we must first inquire into each thing in terms of its smallest parts, and the primary [*5*] and smallest parts of a household are master and slave, husband and wife, and father and children, we shall have to investigate these three things to see what each of them is and what sort of thing each must be. The three in question are: mastership, “marital” {626} science (for we have no word to describe the union of woman and man), and, third, “procreative” science (this too has not [*10*] been given a name that is special to it). Let these three that we mentioned stand. But there is also a part, which some believe to be identical

to household management, and others believe to be its largest part. We shall have to get a theoretical grasp on how things stand with it too. I am speaking of what is called the craft of wealth acquisition.

But let us first discuss master and slave in order to see the things that are related to [*15*] necessary use, and also to see whether we can acquire something in the way of knowledge about these things that is better than what it is supposed at present. For some people believe that mastership is a sort of science, and that household management, mastership, politics, and kingship are all the same, as we said at the start. But others believe that it is contrary to nature [*20*] to be a master. For it is by law that one person is a slave and another free, whereas by nature there is no difference between them. That is why to be a master is not just either, since it is based on force.

I.4

Since property is part of the household, the craft of property acquisition is also a part of household management. For we can neither live nor live well without the necessities. So, just as the specialized crafts [*25*] must have their proper instruments if they are going to perform their functions, so too the same applies to a household manager. Of instruments, however, some are inanimate and some are animate—for example, for the ship's captain a rudder is an inanimate instrument, whereas his lookout is an animate one. For in the crafts an assistant belongs in the kind (*eidos*) that consists of instruments. So too [*30*] a piece of property is an instrument for living, and property [in general] a number of such instruments, a slave is a sort of animate piece of property, and all assistants are like instruments for [using] instruments. For if each instrument could perform its own function on command or by anticipating instructions, and if—like the statues of Daedalus [*35*] or the tripods of Hephaestus (which the poet describes as having "entered the assembly of the gods of their own accord")—shuttles wove cloth by themselves, and plectra played the lyre, an architectonic craftsman would not need assistants and masters would not need slaves.[10]

Now, what are commonly said to be [*1254a*] instruments are instruments for production, whereas a piece of property is action-involving. For something comes from a shuttle beyond the use of it, but from a piece of clothing or a bed we get only the use. Further, since production and action

differ in kind (*eidos*), [*5*] and both need instruments, their instruments must differ in the same way as they do. Life (*bios*), though, is action not production. That is why a slave is an assistant in the things related to action. And something is said to be a piece of property in the same way as it is said to be a part. For a part is not just a part of another thing, but is *wholly* that thing's, and the same [*10*] also holds of a piece of property. That is why a master is just his slave's *master*, not simply his, while a slave is not just his master's slave, but wholly his.

From these considerations it is clear what the nature and capacity of a slave are. For anyone who, though human, is by nature not his own but someone else's is by nature a slave. [*15*] And a human being is someone else's when, though human, he is a piece of property, and a piece of property is an instrument that is for action and separate [from its owner].

I.5

But whether anyone is like that by nature or not, and whether it is better and just for anyone to be a slave or not (all slavery being, on the contrary, against nature)—these are the things we must investigate next. And it is neither difficult to get a theoretical grasp on the answer by argument nor [*20*] to learn it from what actually happens. For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary, they are also advantageous, and some things are set apart straight from birth, some to rule, others to be ruled. And there are many kinds (*eidos*) of rulers and ruled, and the rule is always better when the {627} ruled are better—for [*25*] example, rule over humans is better than rule over wild beasts. For a function that is accomplished by something better is a better function, and where one thing rules and another is ruled, there is a certain function belonging to these. For in whatever is composed of a number of things, whether continuous with each other or discontinuous, and becomes one communal thing, a ruler and a ruled are always seen, [*30*] and this is present in animate beings on the basis of their entire nature. For even in things that do not share in living some rule exists—for example, in a harmony.[11] But these topics presumably lie far outside our investigation.

In the first place, a living being is composed of soul and body, and of these the first is by nature the ruler, the latter by nature the ruled. [*35*] And one must investigate what is natural in things whose condition is in accord

with nature, not in corrupted ones. That is why we must also get a theoretical grasp on the human being who is in the best possible condition, both of soul and of body, since in him this is clear. For in depraved people, and those in a depraved condition, the body will often seem to rule [*1254b*] the soul, because their condition is base and in disaccord with nature.

But it is, as we were saying, in a living being, that we can first get a theoretical grasp on both the rule of a master and political rule. For the soul rules the body with the rule of a master, whereas the understanding rules desire with political rule [*5*] or kingly rule. In these cases, it is evident that it is in accord with nature and advantageous for the body to be ruled by the soul, and for the affective part to be ruled by the understanding and the part that has reason, whereas if the relation were equal or reversed it would be harmful to all concerned. And again in the case of a human being and the other animals the same holds. [*10*] For domestic animals are by nature better than wild ones, and it is better for all of them to be ruled by human beings, since in this way they secure their preservation. Further, the relation of male to female is that of what is better by nature to what is worse, and that of ruler to ruled. And [*15*] it must be the same way in the case of all human beings.

Those people, then, who are as different [from others] as body is from soul or beast from human (and they are in this condition if their function is to use their bodies, and this the best thing to come from them)—those people are by nature slaves. And it is better for them to be subject to this rule, if indeed it is also better for the other things we mentioned. [*20*] For he is by nature a slave who is capable of belonging to someone else, belongs to someone else because of this, and shares in reason to the extent of perceiving it but not to the extent of having it himself. For the other animals assist not because they perceive the reason but because of feelings. Also, the difference in the use made of them is small. For in relation to the necessities bodily help comes from [*25*] both, both from slaves and from domestic animals.

Now, nature tends indeed to make the bodies of free people and slaves different, the latter strong enough to be used for necessities, the former upright in posture and useless for that sort of work, but useful for political [*30*] life—which is itself divided into what is useful for war and what is useful for peace. But the contrary also often happens, namely, some have

the bodies of freemen, whereas others have the souls. For this at any rate is evident: if people were to become in body alone as distinguished as the statues of the gods, [*35*] everyone would say that those who fell short deserved to be their slaves. And if this is true in the case of the body, it is even more just to make this distinction in the case of the soul. But it is not as easy to see the beauty of the soul as it is to see that of the body.

It is evident, therefore, that [*1255a*] by nature some people are free and others are slaves, for whom slavery is both advantageous and just.

I.6

But that those who make the contrary claim are also right in a way is not difficult to see.[12] For someone is said to be being ruled as a slave, or to be a slave, in two ways, since *by law* too a person can be a slave [*5*] or be ruled as a slave. For the law [in question] is a sort of agreement by which what is conquered in war is said to belong to the {628} conquerors. Against the justice of this, then, many of those versed in the law bring a writ of illegality, analogous to that brought against a [legislative] speaker, on the grounds that it is a terrible thing if what is overcome by force is going to be the slave of, and ruled by, what is able to use force and is superior in power.[13] [*10*] And some hold the latter view, others the former, even among the wise.

The cause of this dispute, and what produces a going back-and-forth in the arguments, is that in a way virtue, when it is equipped with resources, is most able to use force, and what conquers is always superior in something good, so that it seems [*15*] that there is no force without virtue, the dispute being only about justice. For because of this view one side believes that justice is goodwill, whereas the other believes that justice is precisely this—the rule of the stronger. At any rate, if these arguments are left aside, the other arguments have neither strength nor anything to persuade us that [*20*] the one who is better in virtue should not rule, that is, be master.

Some people, though, cleave exclusively to what they think is a sort of justice (since the law is something just), and maintain that enslavement in war is just. But at the same time they say that it is not just. For it is possible for wars to be started unjustly, and there is no way in which someone would say that the person who does not deserve to be in a condition of slavery [*25*]

is a slave—otherwise, it could turn out that those believed to be the most well-bred are slaves or the children of slaves, if any of them happen to be taken captive and sold. That is why indeed the people who hold this view are not willing to say that *these* are slaves, but only that barbarians are. And yet, in saying this, what they are seeking is nothing other than what is by nature a slave—which [*30*] is just what we talked about at the start. For they have to say that some people are slaves everywhere, others nowhere.

It is the same way with good-breeding. For people think of themselves as well-bred not just when they are in their own country, but wherever they are, whereas they think of barbarians as well-bred only at home, on the supposition that it is one thing to be *unconditionally* well-bred and free, [*35*] and another to be so but not unconditionally—as the Helen of Theodectes does when she says: "Sprung from divine roots on both sides, who would think that I deserve to be called a hired servant?"[14] But when people say this, it is by nothing but virtue and vice that they are defining slave and free, well-bred and [*40*] ill-bred. For they think that in just the way that human comes from human, [*1255b*] and wild beast from wild beast, so too good people come from good ones. But, though nature tends to do this, it is nonetheless often unable to do so.

It is clear, then, that there is some reason for the dispute and that the one lot are not always slaves by nature nor the other free. [*5*] But it is also clear that in some cases there is such a distinction—cases where it is advantageous and just for the one to be ruled as a slave and the other to rule as a master, and where the one should be ruled and the other should exercise the rule that is natural for him (so that he is in fact ruling as a master), and where misrule is disadvantageous to both. For the same thing is advantageous for both part and whole, body and [*10*] soul, and a slave is a sort of part of his master—a sort of living but separate part of his body. That is why there is in fact a sort of mutual advantage and mutual friendship for such masters and slaves as deserve to be by nature so related. When their relationship is not that way, however, [*15*] but is in accord with law, and they have been subjected to force, the contrary holds.

Let us now get a general theoretical grasp on all property and the craft of wealth acquisition, [*1256a*] in accord with our guiding way [of inquiry], since in fact a slave has turned out to be a part of property. The first puzzle we might raise is whether the craft of wealth acquisition is the same as household management, or a part of it, or an assistant {629} to it. And if it is an assistant, whether it is in the way [*5*] that shuttle-making is to weaving, or in the way that bronze-smelting is to statue-making. For these do not assist in the same way, but rather the first provides instruments, whereas the second the matter. (By the matter I mean the underlying subject from which the product is made—for example, wool for the weaver and bronze for the statue-maker.) Now, it is clear that household management is not the same as the craft of wealth acquisition, [*10*] since the former uses resources, while the latter provides them. For [if they are identical] what science will there be that uses what is in the household, except that of household management? But whether the craft of wealth acquisition is a part of household management or a science of a distinct kind (*eidos*) is a matter of dispute. For if it belongs to someone who possesses the craft of wealth acquisition to get a theoretical grasp on the various sources of wealth and [*15*] property, and property and wealth include many parts, we shall first [have to investigate] whether farming—and, in universal terms, the supervision and acquisition of food—is a part of wealth acquisition or some distinct kind (*genos*) of thing.

But then there are indeed many kinds (*eidos*) of food, because the ways of life of both animals and humans are also many. [*20*] For it is impossible to live without food, so that differences in food have produced different ways of life among the animals. For some beasts live in herds and others live scattered about, whichever is advantageous for getting their food, because some of them are carnivorous, some herbivorous, and some omnivorous. [*25*] And so with a view to their convenience and their preference in these matters, nature has made their ways of life different. And since the same things are not naturally pleasant to each, but rather different things to different ones, among the carnivores and herbivores themselves the ways of life are different.

The same is also true of human beings. For their ways of life differ greatly. [*30*] The most idle are herders. For they—without effort and while at leisure—get their food from their domestic animals. Although, when it is

necessary for their herds to change pasture, they too have to move around with them, as if they were farming a living farm. Others live from hunting, and different sorts from different sorts of it: [*35*] some from raiding; some —those who live near lakes, marshes, rivers, or a suitable sort of sea—live from fishing; and some off birds or wild beasts. But the kind (*genos*) of human being that is most numerous lives off the land and off cultivated crops.[*40*]

The ways of life, then, at any rate those that naturally develop of themselves and do not provide food through exchange or commerce, are pretty much these: nomadic, raiding, fishing, [*1256b*] hunting, farming. But some people live pleasantly by mixing together several of these, supplementing their way of life where it happens to be deficient with regard to self-sufficiency—for example, some live both a nomadic and a raiding life, others, both a farming and a hunting one, [*5*] and similarly in the case of the others, each passing their time in the way need, together with other things, necessitates.

Property of this sort, then, is evidently given by nature itself to all living things straight from when they are first conceived, and similarly too when they have reached completion. And in fact some animals produce at the start, together with their offspring, [*10*] enough food to last the latter until such time as it is able to get it for itself—for example, those that produce grubs or eggs. Animals that give birth to live offspring, on the other hand, carry food for their offspring in their own bodies for a certain period—namely, the natural substance called milk. It is clear, then, in the case of developed things too, that we must suppose [*15*] both that plants are for the sake of animals, and that the other animals are for the sake of humans, domestic ones both for using and eating, and if not all, nonetheless most, wild ones for food and other sorts of support, so that clothes and other instruments may be got from them. If then [*20*] nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing pointlessly, it must be that nature made all of them for the sake of humans. That is why even warfare, since hunting is a part of it, will in a way be by nature a craft of property acquisition—one that should be used not only against wild beasts but also against those humans who are naturally suited to be ruled but unwilling to be, on the supposition that [*25*] this sort of warfare is by nature just.

{630} One kind (*eidos*) of craft of property acquisition, then, is by nature a part of household management, in that either there must be available, or it itself must arrange to make available, a store of what is both necessary for living and useful to the community of city or household. At any rate, true [*30*] wealth seems to consist of such things. For self-sufficiency in this sort of property, with a view to living the good life, is not unlimited, as Solon in his poetry says it is: "No boundary to wealth has been laid down for human beings."[15] For one has been laid down just as in the other crafts. For there is no instrument of any craft that is unlimited in quantity [*35*] or size, and wealth is a collection of instruments for politicians and household managers.

It is clear, then, that there is a natural sort of craft of property acquisition for household managers and politicians, and what the cause of this is.

I.9

But there is another kind (*genos*) of craft of property acquisition, which they most of all call—and [*40*] justly so—*the craft of wealth acquisition*. It is because of it that wealth and property seem to have no limit. [*1257a*] For many people think that the craft of wealth acquisition is one and the same thing as what we talked about, because the two are close neighbors. But it is neither the same as what we were talking about nor all that far from it. One of them, though, exists by nature, whereas the other does not exist by nature, but comes more from a sort of experience and craft knowledge.

Concerning the latter, let us take [*5*] the following as our starting-point. Each piece of property has two uses, both of which are uses of it intrinsically, but not uses of it intrinsically in the same way. Instead, one properly belongs to the thing, while the other does not properly belong to it —for example, as regards a shoe, its use in wearing it and its use in exchange. For both are uses to which a shoe can be put. For someone who exchanges [*10*] a shoe, in return for money or food, with someone who needs a shoe, is using the shoe insofar as it is a shoe. But this is not the use that properly belongs to it. For it does not come to exist for the sake of exchange. And it is the same way with other pieces of property as well. For the craft of exchange applies to all of them, and first started from [*15*] the natural circumstance of some human beings having more than enough and

others less. (It is also clear from this that the craft of commerce does not by nature belong to the craft of wealth acquisition, since it was up to the point at which they had enough that it was necessary for them to engage in exchange.) It is evident, then, that in the first community, that is, the household, there is no function for exchange, [*20*] but only when the community already consists of more members. For the members of the household used to share all their own things, whereas those in separate households in turn shared many others things, and it was necessary to make a trade of these in accord with the need, as many barbarian peoples still do, through exchange. For [*25*] they exchange useful things for other useful things, but nothing more that that—for example, they take and give wine in return for corn, and so on with everything else of this sort.

This sort of craft of exchange, then, is neither contrary to nature nor is it any kind (*eidos*) of craft of wealth acquisition. For it existed as a replenishment of a self-sufficiency that is in accord with nature. [*30*] Nevertheless, the craft of wealth acquisition arose from it, and did so in accord with reason. For when supplies came from increasingly foreign sources, because of importing what was needed and exporting the surplus, the use of money had of necessity to be devised. For not all the natural necessities are easily transportable. And that is why with a view to exchange people agreed [*35*] with each other to give and take something that was itself one of the useful things and that was easily adaptable to the needs of living—for example, iron, silver, and anything else of that sort. At first, its value was determined simply by size and weight, but finally people also put a stamp on it, in order to save themselves the trouble of measuring it. [*40*] For the stamp was put on to signify the amount.

Once money was devised, necessary exchange [*1257b*] gave rise to the second of the two kinds (*eidos*) of crafts of wealth acquisition, namely, the craft of commerce. At first, it was presumably a simple {631} affair, but then through experience it became more of a craft of how and from what sources the greatest profit could be made through exchange. That is why it seems that the craft of wealth acquisition is most of all concerned [*5*] with money, and that its function is to be able to get a theoretical grasp on the sources from which a quantity of wealth will come. For it is productive of wealth and money. For wealth is often assumed to be a quantity of money,

because this is what the craft of wealth acquisition and the craft of commerce are concerned with.

But sometimes, contrariwise, money seems to be empty trash and [*10*] to exist entirely by convention and not by nature at all, because, when changed by its users, it has no value and is useless for acquiring the necessities, and often someone who is rich in money will be unprovided with the food that is necessary. Yet it is absurd for something to be wealth if someone well provided with it will die of hunger, like [*15*] Midas in the fable, when everything set before him turned to gold in answer to his own greedy prayer. That is why people seek another notion of what wealth and the craft of wealth acquisition are, and correctly so. For the craft of natural wealth acquisition and natural wealth are of another sort, and it is [a part of] household management, whereas the craft of commerce [*20*] is productive of goods, not in every way, but through their exchange. And it seems to be concerned with money, since money is the element and limit of exchange.

And the wealth that derives from this sort of craft of wealth acquisition *is* unlimited. For just as the craft of medicine aims at unlimited health, and [*25*] each of the crafts aims to achieve its end in an unlimited way (since each tries to achieve it as fully as possible), whereas the things that further the end are not unlimited (for the end is the limit of all of them), so too of this sort of craft of wealth acquisition there is no limit where its end is concerned, since its end is wealth of this sort, namely, the possession of money. The sort of craft of wealth acquisition that is a part of household management, on the other hand, [*30*] does have a limit. For this [unlimited wealth] is not the function of household management. That is why, in one way it appears to be necessary for all wealth to have a limit, and yet, if we look at what actually happens, the contrary seems true, since all acquirers of wealth go on increasing their money without limit. The cause of this is the close relation between the two. For the use, [*35*] being of the same thing, goes back and forth between the two sorts of crafts of wealth acquisition. For the use is of the same property in both cases, but not with respect to the same thing. Instead, in one case the end is increase, in the other, something else. So it seems to some people that this is the function of household management, and so they end up thinking that they should either preserve the substantial amount of money they have or increase it without limit.

The cause, [*40*] though, of their being so disposed is that what they take seriously is living, not living well. And since their appetite for living is unlimited, [*1258a*] they also have an appetite for an unlimited amount of what is productive of it. But even those who do aim at living well seek what furthers bodily gratification, so that since this too appears to depend on having property, they spend all their time acquiring wealth. And [*5*] the other kind (*eidos*) of craft of wealth acquisition arose because of this. For since their gratification lies in excess, they seek the craft that is productive of the excess needed for gratification. And if they cannot provide it through the craft of wealth acquisition, they try to do so by means of some other cause of it, using each of their capacities not in accord with nature. [*10*] For it does not belong to courage to produce wealth but to produce confidence in the face of danger, nor does it belong to generalship or medicine to do so, but rather to produce victory and health, respectively. These people, however, make all of these into the craft of wealth acquisition, on the supposition that acquiring wealth is the end, and that everything must further the end.

About the craft of unnecessary wealth acquisition, what is, and what the cause is [*15*] of our need of it, we have said what we have to say, and also about the necessary sort, that it is a distinct sort, that it is a natural part of household management, being concerned with food, and that it is not unlimited like the other, but has a defining mark.

I.10

Clearly, we have also found the solution to the puzzle raised at the start about whether [*20*] the craft {632} of wealth acquisition belongs to a household manager and a politician, or whether this is not so, but wealth must rather be available to him.[16] For just as politics does not make humans, but takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature must provide land or sea or something else as a source of food, so a household manager must manage what comes from these sources in the appropriate way. For it does not belong to weaving to make wool [*25*] but to use it, and to know which sorts are usable and suitable or bad and unsuitable.

For someone might be puzzled as to why the craft of wealth acquisition is a part of household management, whereas the craft of medicine is not, even

though the members of a household need to be healthy, just as they need to live and have every other necessity. [*30*] But since there is a way in which it does belong to a household manager and a ruler to see even to health, whereas in another way it does not belong to them, but rather to a doctor, so too in the case of wealth there is a way in which it belongs to a household manager to see to it, and another in which it does not belong to him but to an assistant craft. But above all, as was said earlier, nature must ensure that this is on hand. For it is a function of nature to provide food for what is [*35*] born, since the leftovers of what they are born from is food for each one. That is why in all cases the craft of acquiring wealth from crops and animals is in accord with nature.

But since it is of two sorts, as we said, one belonging to the craft of commerce and the other to household management, and the latter is necessary and praiseworthy, whereas the craft of exchange is justly blamed (for it is not in accord with nature [*1258b*] but involves taking from others), usury is most reasonably hated, because it gets wealth from money itself, rather than just what money was provided for. For money was introduced for the sake of exchange, but interest makes money itself grow bigger. That in fact is how it got its name. [*5*] For offspring (*tokos*) resemble their parents, and interest (*tokos*) is money that comes from money. And so of all the sorts of crafts of wealth acquisition this one is the most unnatural.

I.13

It is evident, accordingly, that household management is more seriously concerned with [*1259b20*] humans than with inanimate property, with their virtue more than with its (which we call wealth), and with the virtue of free people more than with that of slaves.

Now the first puzzle to raise about slaves is whether the slave has some other virtue, beyond those he has as an instrument or servant, that is more estimable, such as temperance, courage, justice, and other such states of character, or whether he has none beyond those having to do with [*25*] the bodily assistance he provides. For there is a puzzle either way. For if slaves do have these other virtues, in what respect will they differ from free? If they do not, it is strange, since slaves are human and have a share in reason. Pretty much the same question arises concerning woman and child, as to whether there are virtues proper to them—whether a woman must be [*30*]

temperate, courageous, and just or not, and whether there are temperate and intemperate children or not.

This question, then, about what is ruled by nature and what is ruling by nature must be investigated in universal terms, as to whether their virtue is the same or distinct. For if both of them must share in noble-goodness, why should one of them rule and the other be ruled [*35*] once and for all? (For it cannot be that the difference between them is one of more or less. For being ruled and ruling differ in kind [*eidos*], not in degree.) On the other hand, if the one must share in it, whereas the other must not, that would be a wonder. For if the ruler is not going to be temperate and just, how will he rule well? And if the ruled is not going to be, how will he be ruled [*40*] well? For if he is intemperate and cowardly, he will do none [*1260a*] of his duties. It is evident, therefore, that both must share in virtue, though there must be differences (*diaphora*) in it, just as there are in those who are by nature ruled.

Consideration of the soul leads at once to this view. For in it there is by nature a part that rules [*5*] and a part that is ruled, and the virtue of each, we say, is distinct, namely, that of the part that has reason and that of the non-rational part. It is clear, furthermore, that the same holds in the {633} other cases as well, so that most instances of ruling and being ruled are by nature such. For free rule slaves, male rules female, and a grown man rules a child in different ways, [*10*] because, while the parts of the soul are present in all these people, they are present in different ways. For a slave does not have the deliberative part of the soul at all; the female has it but it lacks control; a child has it but it is incomplete.

We must take it, therefore, that the same necessarily also holds concerning the virtues of character, namely, that all must share in them, but not [*15*] in the same way—instead, each must have a sufficient share for his own function. That is why a ruler needs to have complete virtue of character. For his function is unconditionally that of an architectonic craftsman, and his reason is an architectonic craftsman. And each of the others must have as much virtue as pertains to them. So it is evident that all those mentioned have virtue of character, [*20*] and that the temperance of a man is not the same as that of a woman, and neither is the courage or justice, as Socrates supposed, but rather men have ruling courage and women assistant courage, and the same holds of the other virtues.

This will also be clear if we instead investigate each particular one. For people who speak in universal terms are deceiving themselves when they say that [*25*] virtue is good condition of the soul, or correct action, or something of that sort. For it is far better to enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias does, than to define them in this way. That is why the way the poet[17] spoke about woman is the way we must think about every case. He said "to a woman silence is a crowning glory"—whereas to a man [*30*] this does not apply. Since a child is incomplete, it is clear that his virtue too is not his in relation to himself, but in relation to his end and his leader. And the same holds of a slave in relation to his master. But we said that a slave is useful in relation to the necessities, so of [ethical] virtue too he clearly needs only a little—just so much as will [*35*] prevent him from being deficient in his functions because of intemperance or cowardice.

If what has now been said is true, however, someone might raise the puzzle of whether craftsmen too need to have virtue. For shortcomings often occur in their works through intemperance. Or is this case very different? For a slave shares in his master's living, whereas a craftsman is at a greater remove, and virtue pertains [*40*] to him just to the extent that slavery does. For a vulgar craftsman has a kind of limited slavery. Moreover, a slave [*1260b*] is among the things that exist by nature, whereas no shoemaker is, nor any other sort of craftsman. It is evident, therefore, that the cause of such virtue in a slave must be the master, not the one who possesses the science of teaching him his functions. That is why those people do not speak correctly who withhold reason from slaves, [*5*] but tell us to make use only of prescriptive commands. For slaves should be warned more than children.

Well, where these matters are concerned let them be determined in this way. As for man and woman, father and children, the virtue relevant to each of them, [*10*] what is good in their relationship with each other and what is not good, and how to achieve the good and avoid the bad—it will be necessary to go through all these in connection with the constitutions. For since every household is part of a city, and these are parts of a household, and the virtue of the part must look to the virtue of the whole, it is necessary to look to the constitution in educating [*15*] both women and children, if indeed it makes any difference to the excellence of a city that its children be

excellent, and its women too. And it must make a difference. For the women are half of free population, and from children come those who share in the constitution.

So, since we have determined these matters, [*20*] and must discuss the rest elsewhere, let us put aside the present accounts as complete and make a new beginning to our discussion. And let us first investigate those who have expressed views about the best constitution.

Book II

II.1

Since our deliberately chosen project is to get a [*25*] theoretical grasp on which political community {634} is superior to all others for people who are able to live as far as possible in the way they would pray to live, we must investigate other constitutions too, both some of those used in cities that are said to be in good legislative order, [*30*] as well as any others that happen to have been spoken about by anyone and that seem to be in good condition. Our aim is to see what is correct and useful in them, and further, to show that we are undertaking our methodical inquiry, and seeking something else that is beyond the presently existing constitutions, not because we wish to devise subtleties but because they are not in fact in good condition. [*35*]

We must make a start, however, at what is just the natural starting-point of this sort of investigation. For all the citizens must share either everything, or nothing, or some things but not others. Now it is evidently impossible for them to share nothing. For a constitution is a sort of community, and so [*40*] they must, in the first place, share their location. For the location of one single city is a single one, and citizens are sharers of that one single city. [*1261a*] But of the things that it is possible to share, is it better for all of them to be shared in a city that is to be well managed, or is it better for some of them to be shared but not others? For the citizens could share children, women, and property with each other, [*5*] as in Plato's *Republic*. For Socrates claims there that children, women, and property should be held communally. Is the condition we have now better, then, or one that is in accord with the law described in the *Republic*?

II.2

For the women to be common to all both involves many other difficulties, [*10*] and this one especially, namely, that what causes Socrates to say that things must be legislated in this way is not evidently what follows from his arguments. Further, the end he says his city should have is impossible, as in fact described, yet nothing has been determined about how we should define it. I am talking about its being best for a city to be as far as possible

entirely *one*. For this is the hypothesis Socrates adopts.[18] And yet [*15*] it is evident that the more a city becomes one the less of a city it will be. For a city is in its nature a sort of multitude, and as it becomes more one, it will turn from a city into a household, and from a household into a human being. For we would say that a household is more one than a city, [*20*] and an individual than a household. So even if someone could achieve this, it should not be done, since it will destroy the city.

A city consists not only of a larger number of human beings [than a household], however, but of human beings of different kinds (*eidos*). For a city does not come about from those who are alike, since a city is different from a military alliance. For a military alliance is useful because of the weight of numbers, even if [*25*] they are all of the same kind (*eidos*), since an alliance naturally exists for the sake of providing assistance in the way that a heavier weight does when placed on a scale. A nation will also differ from a city in this sort of way, when the multitude is not separated into villages, but is like the Arcadians.[19] But things from which one thing must come about, differ in kind (*eidos*).

That is why reciprocal equality [*30*] preserves cities, as we said earlier in the *Ethics*, since this is also what must exist among people who are free and equal.[20] For they cannot all rule at the same time, but each can rule for a year or in accord with some other time scheme. In this way, then, the result is that they all do rule, just as, if they changed places, [*35*] all would be shoemakers and carpenters rather than the same people always being shoemakers and carpenters. But since it is better to have it this way also where a political community is concerned, it is clearly better, where possible, for the same people always to rule. But among those where it is not possible, because all are in nature equal, it is at the same time also just for all to share in ruling (regardless of whether it is good [*1261b*] or bad to rule), and for those who are equal to take turns, and to be similar when they are out of office, imitates this. For they rule and are ruled in turn, just as if they had become other people. It is the same way among those who are ruling, [*5*] some hold one office, some another.

{635} It is evident from these considerations, therefore, that a city is not in nature one in the way some people say it is, and that what is said to be

the greatest good for cities[21] destroys them. Yet what is good for a given thing in fact preserves it. It is also evident in another way that to seek to produce too much oneness [*10*] in a city is not a better thing. For a household is more self-sufficient than an individual, and a city than a household, and a city tends to come into being at the time when the community of its multitude is self-sufficient. If, then, what is more self-sufficient is indeed more choiceworthy, to be less one is more choiceworthy [*15*] than to be more one.

II.3

But then even if this is best for a community, namely, to be as far as possible one, this does not seem to have been proved by the argument that all at the same time say "mine" and "not mine" (for Socrates takes this as an indication that his city is completely one).[22] For "all" is ambiguous. If it means [*20*] "each individually," perhaps what Socrates wants will more come about, since each will call the same person his son, the same woman, of course, his wife, the same things his property, and so on, then, for each of the things that fall to him. As things stand, however, this is not how those who treat women and children as common will speak. Instead, though all [will say "mine" and "not mine], they will not do so [*25*] each individually, and similarly for property too—all, but not each individually. Therefore, it is evident that a sort of fallacy is involved in "all say." For "all," "both," "odd," and "even," are ambiguous, and produce contentious deductions[23] even in arguments. That is why [*30*] in one way it would be noble if all said the same, although this is not possible, whereas in another way it is not at all productive of harmony.

In addition, what is said [by Socrates] is also harmful in another way. For what is held communally by the most people gets the least care. For people give most thought to what is their own, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to each of them to give. For apart from anything else, [*35*] the supposition that someone else is attending to it makes them neglect it more, just as, in the case of household services, many servants sometimes give worse service than few. Each of the citizens acquires a thousand sons, although not as an individual, but rather any random one is [*40*] likewise the son of any random citizen. So all will be likewise neglected by them all.

Further, [*1262a*] each says “mine” of anyone among the citizens who is doing well or badly, and says “mine” in this sense, that he is whatever fraction he happens to be of a certain number.[24] What he really means is “mine or so-and-so’s,” referring in this way to each of the thousand or however many compose the city, and even then he is in doubt. For it is not clear who has had a child born to him, [*5*] or whether any that were born survived. Yet is this way of calling the same thing “mine” as practiced by each of two or ten thousand people really better than the way they say “mine” in cities as things stand? For the same person is called “my son” by one person, “my brother” by another, “my cousin” by a third, or [*10*] something else in virtue of some other sort of kinship, whether of blood or connection by marriage—his own marriage, in the first instance, or that of his relatives. Still others call him “my fellow clansman” or “my fellow tribesman.” It is better, in fact, to have a cousin of one’s own than a son in that [Socratic] way.

Nevertheless, it is not even possible to prevent people from having some suspicions about who their own brothers, sons, fathers, [*15*] and mothers are. For the resemblances that occur between parents and children will necessarily be taken as sure signs of this. And this is just what actually happens, according to the reports of some of those who write accounts of their world travels. For they say that some of the inhabitants of upper Libya hold their women communally, and yet distinguish the children they bear [*20*] by resemblances. And there are some women, as well as some females of other animals, such as mares {636} and cows, that have a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling their sires, like the mare in Pharsalus called “Just.”[25]

II.4

Further, there are also other such difficulties that it is not easy [*25*] for those establishing this sort of community to avoid, such as voluntary or involuntary homicides, assaults, or verbal abuse. None of these is pious when committed against fathers, mothers, or not too distant relatives (just as none is so even against outsiders). But they will necessarily occur even more frequently among those who do not know their relatives than among

those who do—and [*30*] when they do occur, the latter can perform the customary expiations, whereas the former cannot.

It is also strange that while making sons communal, he forbids only sexual intercourse between lovers, but does not prohibit sexual love itself or the other practices which, between father and son or a pair of brothers, are most unseemly, [*35*] since even the love alone is so. It is strange, too, that Socrates forbids such sexual intercourse not for any other causes but solely because the pleasure that comes from it is so strong, but thinks that the lovers being father and son or brother and brother [*40*] makes no difference.[26]

It would seem more useful to have the farmers rather than the guardians share their women and children. For there will be less friendship [*1262b*] where women and children are held communally. But, with a view to obedience and to prevent rebellion, it is the *ruled* who should be like that.

In general, the results of such a law as this must of necessity be the contrary of those that a correctly laid down law should cause, [*5*] and the contrary of what caused Socrates to think that matters concerning children and women should be ordered in this way. For we think friendship to be the greatest of goods for cities, since in this way people are least likely to engage in faction. And Socrates most of all praises a city's being one—something that seems to be, and that he himself claims to be, the function of friendship. [*10*] Similarly, in the accounts of erotic love, we know that Aristophanes says that lovers, because of their intense friendship, have an appetitive desire to grow together and become one instead of two.[27] The result in such circumstances, however, is that one or both have necessarily perished. And in a city friendship necessarily becomes watery through [*15*] this sort of community, and the fact that a father hardly ever says "mine" of a son, or son of a father. For just as adding a lot of water to a drop of sweet wine makes the mixture imperceptible, so the same happens here with the kinship connections expressed in these names, it being hardly ever necessary in a constitution [*20*] of this sort for a father to take care of his sons as sons, or a son his father as a father, or brothers each other as brothers. For there are two things above all that make human beings care and feel friendship, what is special [to them] and what is beloved—neither of which can exist among people under such a constitution.

But then about the transference of the children, once born, from [*25*] the farmers and craftsmen to the guardians, and vice versa, there is also much confusion about the way it will be done—that is, those who do the transferring and receiving must know who has been transferred to whom.

Further, in these cases what we mentioned earlier—I mean assaults, love affairs, and murders—must of necessity happen even more often. [*30*] For those who have been transferred to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians "brothers," "children," "fathers," or "mothers," nor will those who have been transferred to the guardians use these terms of the other citizens, so as to avoid, through kinship, committing any such offenses.

About the community of children and women, then, [*35*] let this be the way our determinations are made.

{637} II.5

[*1263a21*] . . . The communal ownership of property, then, involves these and other similar difficulties. The way we have now, if adorned by [the relevant] habits and by the order characteristic of correct laws, would be superior, and not by a little, since it would have the good of both (I mean both of the property's being communal [*25*] and of its being private). For while property should in a way be communal, in general it should be private, since dividing up the care of it will produce not mutual accusations, but rather will lead to greater care being given, as each will be attending to his own. But where use is concerned, it is thanks to virtue that, in accord with the proverb, "friends share everything communally."

Even now [*30*] this way of arranging things exists in outline in some cities, on the supposition that it is not impossible. In well-managed cities, in particular, some elements of it exist, while others could come about. For although each citizen does have his own private property, he makes available some things to be useful to his friends, and others to be useful communally. For example, in Sparta they use each other's slaves [*35*] (one might almost say) as their own, and horses and dogs as well, and if they need supplies when on a journey, they may find them in the farms throughout the territory. It is evident, therefore, that it is better for property to be private, but for its use to be made communal. And to see that people become disposed in such a way is the special function of the legislator.

Further, it also makes an untold difference to one's pleasure [*40*] to regard something as one's own. For it is not perhaps pointless that each self loves himself, but is rather something natural. [*1263b*] Self-love is blamed, though, and justly so. This is not loving oneself, however, but rather loving oneself more than one should, just as in the case of the love of money (since, one might almost say, everyone *does* love each of the things of this sort). But then, too, it is very pleasant [*5*] to assist one's friends, guests, or companions, and do them favors, and this happens when one has property of one's own. These things, then, do not take place for those who make the city too much one thing, and in addition it is evident that they do away with the function of two of the virtues, namely, temperance in regard to women (for to keep away from another man's woman due to temperance is noble work) [*10*] and generosity with one's property (for one cannot show oneself to be generous, nor perform any generous action, since it is in the use made of property that generosity's work lies).

Such legislation indeed looks attractive and may seem to be philanthropic. [*15*] For anyone who hears of it accepts it gladly, thinking that all will have a wondrous friendship for all, especially when someone blames the evils now existing in constitutions on property's not being communal (I mean lawsuits against each other [*20*] over contracts, perjury trials, and flattery of the rich). Yet none of these bad things comes about because property is not communal but because of depravity. For we see that those who own and share property communally have far more disagreements than those who own their property separately. But in theory we take those who disagree over what they own communally to be few in number, [*25*] because we compare them to the many whose property is private. Further, it would be just to mention not only how many bad things people will be deprived of by sharing, but also how many good things. But their life appears altogether impossible.

The cause of Socrates going astray, we have to think, is that his assumption [*30*] is incorrect. For a household and a city should indeed be one in a way, but not in every way. For as a city proceeds in this direction, there is a point at which it will in one way cease to be a city and at which, in another way, while it will still be a city, as it will come closer to not being a city, it will be a worse city. It is as if one were to reduce a harmony to a unison, or a rhythm to a single beat. [*35*] But because a city is a

multitude, as we said before, it must be unified and made into a community through education. It is strange that the one who intends to introduce education, and who believes that through it the city would be excellent, should think to rectify it by measures of this sort, and not by habits, philosophy, and laws, just as [*40*] in Sparta and Crete the legislator made property communal by means of communal messes.

{638} And we must not ignore this point either, namely, that we should [*1264a*] consider the immense period of time and the many years during which it would not have gone unnoticed if these measures were any good. For pretty much everything has been discovered, although some things have not been collected, and others, though known, are not used. The matter would become especially evident, however, if one could [*5*] see by the facts a constitution established in this way. For it is impossible to produce a city without separating the parts and dividing [them], some into communal messes, others into clans and tribes.

So nothing else will result from the legislation except that the guardians will not farm—which is just what the Spartans are trying to do even as things stand. [*10*]

Neither, for that matter, has Socrates said what mode of the constitution as a whole applies to those who share in it, nor is it easy to say. And yet the multitude of the other citizens is pretty much the entire multitude of his city, but nothing has been determined about whether the farmers too should have communal property or [*15*] each his own private property, or, further, whether both their women and their children should be private or communal.

If, in fact, all is to be held communally by all in the same way, how will the farmers differ from the guardians? And what more will they get by submitting to their rule? Or what will they learn to make them submit to it —unless the guardians adopt some clever stratagem like that of the Cretans? [*20*] For they allow their slaves to have the same other things as themselves, and forbid them only the gymnasia and the possession of weapons.

On the other hand, if the farmers too are to have such things, as they do in other cities, what way will their community be ordered? For of necessity there will be two cities in one, and those opposed to [*25*] each other. For Socrates makes the guardians into a sort of garrison, whereas he makes

citizens of the farmers, craftsmen, and the others.[28] Accusations, lawsuits, and such other bad things as he says exist in other cities will all then exist among them too. And yet Socrates claims that because of their education they will not need many regulations [*30*] (for example, town or market ordinances, or others of that sort), though he gives this education only to the guardians.

Further, he gives the farmers control of their property, although he requires them to pay a tax. But this is likely to make them much more difficult to deal with and full of their own ideas than the helots,[29] serfs, and slaves that some people have today. [*35*]

But whether the same things are indeed similarly necessary for the farmers or not, has in fact nowhere been discussed—and neither has the related question of what constitution, education, and laws they are to have. It is not easy, either, to discover what sort of people these are, nor is the difference it makes to the preservation of the community of the guardians a small one. But [*40*] if at any rate Socrates is going to make their women communal and their property [*1264b*] private, who will manage the household in the way the men manage things in the fields? Who will manage it, indeed, if the farmers' women and property are communal? It is also absurd to draw a comparison with wild beasts in order to show that women should engage in the same practices [*5*] as men, since wild beasts have no share in household management.[30]

The way Socrates appoints his rulers is also unstable. For he makes the same people rule all the time, which is a cause of faction even among people who have no recognized worth, and all the more so, of course, among spirited and warlike men. But it is evident that it is necessary for him [*10*] to make the same people rulers. For the gold from the god has not been mixed into the souls of one lot of people at one time and another at another, but always into the same ones. For he says that the god, immediately at their birth, mixed gold into the souls of some, silver into others, and bronze and iron into those who are going to be craftsmen and farmers.[31]

Further, even [*15*] though Socrates does away with the happiness of the guardians, he says that the legislator should make the whole city happy.

{639} But it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless all, or most or some, of its parts possess happiness. For [*20*] happiness is not the same thing as evenness, since it is possible for the latter to be present in the whole without being present in any of the parts, whereas happiness cannot.

But if the guardians are not happy, who is?[32] Surely not the craftsmen or the multitude of those who are vulgar.

These, then, are the puzzles raised by [*25*] the constitution Socrates describes, and there are others that are not inferior to these.

Book III

III.1

[*1274b33*] For someone investigating constitutions, that is, what each is and what sort of thing it is, pretty much the first investigation concerns the city, to see what on earth the city is. For as things stand, there are disputes about this, some saying that it is the city that performed a certain action, whereas others say that it is not the city but [*35*] rather the oligarchy or the tyrant. And we see that the entire business of the politician and the legislator concerns cities, and that the constitution is itself a certain ordering of those who inhabit the city. But since the city belongs among composite things, and things that are wholes and composed of many parts, it is clear that the first thing that must be [*40*] investigated is the citizen. For a city is a particular sort of multitude of citizens. So who should be called a citizen, and what the citizen is must be investigated. [*1275a*] And in fact there is often a dispute about the citizen as well, since not everyone agrees that one and the same person is a citizen. Indeed, someone who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy.

Now we should leave aside those who acquire [*5*] the title of citizen in some other way—for example, the ones who are created citizens. Nor is the citizen a citizen through dwelling in a place, since resident aliens and slaves share the dwelling place. Nor are those people citizens who share in matters of justice to the extent of undergoing trial or suing, since parties to treaties can also do that. [*10*] (In fact in many places even resident aliens do not share completely in these things, but must find a "sponsor,"[33] so that they participate in this sort of community in an incomplete sort of way.) Like children who are too young to be enrolled in the citizen lists[34] or old people who have been discharged, [*15*] these people must be said to be citizens in a way, not unconditionally so, but rather with the addition of "incomplete" or "superannuated" or something else of this sort (it makes no difference what we add, since what we mean is clear). For we are inquiring about the unconditional citizen, the one who has no defect of this sort that needs to be rectified, since one can also [*20*] go through and solve similar puzzles about those who have been disenfranchised or exiled.

The unconditional citizen is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judgment and office. But some offices are delimited in time, so that in some cases they cannot ever be held twice by the same person, or only after a definite period. [*25*] Another, however, holds office indefinitely, such as the juror or the assemblyman. Now perhaps someone might say that the latter are not officials at all, and do not, because of doing what they do, share in office. And yet surely it would be absurd to deny that those with the most control are officials. But let this point pass, since the argument is about a name. For what is common to a juror and [*30*] an assemblyman lacks a name that could apply to both. For the sake of distinguishing it, let us call it "indefinite office." We take it, then, that those who share in office in this way are citizens.

The definition, then, that best fits all those called citizens is pretty much one of this sort. But we must not neglect to consider that in the case of things in which the underlying subjects [*35*] differ in kind (*eidos*), with one coming first, another second, and so on, either the common element {640} is not present at all, insofar as these things are what they are, or only in some slight way. We see, though, that constitutions differ in kind (*eidos*) from each other, and that some are posterior and others prior. For erroneous or deviant constitutions [*1275b*] are necessarily posterior to those that are not erroneous. (What we mean by "deviant" will be evident later.[35]) So the citizen in each constitution must also be different.

That is why the citizen that was mentioned is above all a citizen in a democracy, [*5*] and may possibly be so in other constitutions, but not necessarily. For in some constitutions there is no democratic body, nor is there a legally recognized assembly but rather specially summoned councils, and judicial cases are tried in special courts. For example, in Sparta some cases concerning contracts are tried by one overseer, others by another, whereas cases of homicide are tried by the senate, and other cases [*10*] by perhaps some other official. And it is the same way in Carthage, since there particular officials judge all judicial cases.

But our definition of a citizen admits of correction. For in the other constitutions, it is not the holder of indefinite office who is assemblyman and juror, but someone whose office is definite. [*15*] For it is either to some

or to all of the latter that deliberation and judgment, whether about some or about all matters, is assigned.

Who the citizen is, then, is evident from these considerations. For whoever is authorized to share in deliberative or judicial office, we can now say, is a citizen of the relevant city, and a city, unconditionally speaking, is a multitude of such people adequate [*20*] for self-sufficiency in living.

III.2

But the definition that gets used in practice is that a citizen is someone who comes from citizens on both sides, and not just on one—for example, on the father's or on the mother's. And some go even further back, looking for two or three or more generations of ancestors. But quick, political definitions of this sort lead some people to raise a puzzle [*25*] about how that third or fourth generation ancestor will be a citizen. Hence Gorgias of Leontini,[36] half perhaps to raise a real puzzle and half ironically, said that just as mortars are things made by mortar-makers, so Larisaeans too are what are made by official craftsmen, since some craftsmen are Larissa-makers. But the puzzle is a simple one. [*30*] For if the ancestors shared in the constitution in the way that is in accord with the definition just given, they were citizens. For "what comes from a citizen father or mother" cannot even be applied to the first inhabitants or founders.

But more of a puzzle is perhaps raised by the case of those who come to share in a constitution after its being changed, such as the citizens created in Athens [*35*] by Cleisthenes[37] after the expulsion of the tyrants. For he enrolled many foreigners and alien slaves in the tribes. But the dispute in the case of these people is not about which of them is a citizen, but whether they are justly or unjustly so. And yet a further puzzle might be raised as to whether someone who is not justly a citizen is a citizen at all, as [*1276a*] "unjustly" and "falsely" seem to have the same force. But since we see that there are also some people holding office unjustly, whom we say *are* holding it, albeit not justly, and since a citizen is defined as someone who holds a sort of office (for someone who shares in such office is a citizen, as we said), it is clear that [*5*] these people too must be said to be citizens.

III.3

The puzzle about justly and not justly is connected to the dispute we mentioned earlier.[38] For some people raise a puzzle about how to determine whether a city has or has not performed an action—for example, when from oligarchy or a tyranny a democracy comes about. At these times, some do not wish to honor treaties, [*10*] as it {641} was not the city, but its tyrant who entered into them, or many other things of the same sort, on the grounds that some constitutions exist by the exercise of power and not because of being for the common advantage. Accordingly, if indeed some cities are democratically ruled in this way, it must be conceded that the actions of this constitution [*15*] are the actions of this very city in the same way as those of the oligarchy or the tyranny.

This argument seems to be akin to the puzzle of when we ought to say that a city is the same, or not the same but a distinct one. Now, the most obvious way to inquire into this puzzle is by looking to the location and the human inhabitants. For it is possible [*20*] for a city's location and its human inhabitants to come apart, and for some to live in one place and some in another. This is why the puzzle must be taken to be a rather tame one. For the fact that something is said to be a city in many ways makes inquiry into such puzzles in a way easy.

Things are similar if one asks when the humans inhabiting the same location [*25*] should be considered to be one city. Not, certainly, because it is enclosed by walls, since one wall could be built around the Peloponnese. Perhaps Babylon is like this, or anywhere else that has the dimensions of a nation rather than a city. At any rate, they say that after its capture [*30*] a part of the city was not aware of it for three days.

But it will be useful to investigate this puzzle on another occasion. For the size of the city, both as regards numbers and as regards whether it is advantageous for it to have one or several [locations], should not be overlooked by the politician.

But where the same human beings are inhabiting the same place, is the city to be called the same as long as the inhabitants remain of the same stock (*genos*), [*35*] even though all the time some are passing away and others coming to be—just as we are accustomed to say that rivers and springs remain the same, even though all the time water is flowing in and flowing out? Or are we to say that while human beings can remain the same

due to this sort of cause, the city is different? [*40*] For if indeed a city is a sort of community, [*1276b*] namely, a community of citizens sharing in a constitution, then, when the constitution becomes another one in form (*eidos*), that is, becomes different, it would seem that the city too cannot remain the same. At any rate, just as we say that a chorus that is at one time comic and at another tragic is a different chorus, [*5*] even though the human beings in it are often the same, so too we say that any other community or composite is different if the form of the composite is different. For example, we say that a harmony composed of the same notes is a different harmony if it is at one time Dorian and at another Phrygian. If, then, this is how things are, it is evident that we must say [*10*] that a city is the same city by looking above all to its constitution. But the name to call it may be different or the same one whether its inhabitants are the same or completely distinct human beings.

But whether it is just to honor or not to honor agreements when a city changes to a different constitution, [*15*] requires another argument.

III.4

Connected with the topics we have just now discussed is the investigation of whether to take the virtue of a good man and of an excellent citizen to be the same or not the same. But then if *this* is what we should investigate, surely the virtue of a citizen must first be grasped in some sort of outline.

Now just as a sailor is one of the members of a community, so [*20*] too, we say, is a citizen. And though sailors are dissimilar in their capacities (for one is an oarsman, another a captain, another a lookout, and others have other sorts of titles), it is clear both that the most exact account of the virtue of each sort of sailor will be special to him and that there will also be some common account that fits them all [*25*] alike. For the preservation of the ship while sailing is a function of all of them, since this is what each of the sailors desires. In the same way, then, the citizens too, even though they are dissimilar, have the preservation of the community as their function, and the constitution is the community. [*30*] That is why the virtue of a citizen must be relative to the constitution. If, then, there are indeed several kinds (*eidos*) of constitutions, it is clear that there cannot be one virtue that is the virtue of an excellent citizen, namely, complete virtue. But the good man, we say, is such in accord with one virtue, {642} namely, the complete one. It is

evident, then, that it is possible for someone to be an excellent citizen without [*35*] having acquired the virtue in accord with which someone is an excellent man.

By going through the puzzles in a different way, the same argument can be made about the best constitution. For if it is impossible for a city to be composed entirely of those who are excellent, but each must at least perform his own intrinsic function well, and this is doing it out of virtue, [*40*] and since it is impossible for all the citizens to be similar, then there cannot be one virtue of a citizen and of a good man. For that [*1277a*] of an excellent citizen must belong to all (since this is necessary if the city is to be best), but the virtue of a good man cannot be had by all, unless it is necessary for all the citizens of an excellent city to be good men.

Further, since a city consists of dissimilar inhabitants—that [*5*] is, just as an animal straightaway consists of soul and body, a soul of reason and desire, a household of man and woman, and property of master and slave, so a city too consists of all these, and of other dissimilar kinds (*eidos*) in addition—the virtue of all the citizens cannot be one virtue, [*10*] just as the virtue of the leader of a chorus and that of one of its ordinary members cannot be one virtue either.

Why the virtue of man and of a citizen are not unconditionally the same, then, is evident from these considerations, but will the virtue of a certain sort of excellent citizen and that of an excellent man be the same? Well, we say that an excellent ruler is good and practically-wise, and a politician [*15*] is of necessity practically-wise. Also, some say that the education of a ruler is different right from the start—as is evident in the case of the sons of kings, who are educated in horsemanship and warfare, and in Euripides,[39] when he says, "no subtleties for me . . . but what the city needs," (the supposition being that there is a sort of education proper to a ruler). But if the virtue of [*20*] a good ruler and of a good man are the same, and if the one who is ruled is also a citizen, then the virtue of a citizen would not be unconditionally the same as that of a man (although that of a certain sort of citizen would be), since the virtue of a ruler and a citizen would not be the same. Perhaps this is why Jason[40] said that he went hungry except when he was being tyrant, on the assumption that he lacked the scientific knowledge of how to be a private citizen.

But then someone is surely *praised* [*25*] for being able to rule and be ruled, and being able to do both of them well seems to be the virtue of a reputable citizen. If, then, we take a good man's virtue to be ruling virtue, but a citizen's to be both ruling and ruled, then the two virtues would not be praiseworthy in the same way.

Since, then, they seem to be distinct in some cases, and that it is not the same things that should be learned [*30*] by the ruler and the ruled, whereas a citizen should have scientific knowledge of both and share in both, we may see what follows from that.

For there is rule of a master—by which we mean the kind concerned with the necessities. It is not necessary for the ruler to have scientific knowledge of how to perform these [functions], but rather of how to use [those who do]. In fact, the former is servile. [*35*] (By the former I mean the capacity to do in someone's service the actions of a servant.) But there are several kinds (*eidos*) of slaves, we say, since the kinds of work they do varies. Of these, one part is that done by manual laborers. These are people, as their name itself signifies, who live by their hands. The vulgar craftsman is included among them. That is why among [*1277b*] some peoples craftsmen did not share in office in former times, until extreme democracy arose. Thus the functions performed by people ruled in this way should be learned neither by the good politician nor by the good citizen, unless [*5*] for himself out of some need of his own, since then it is no longer a case of one person becoming master and the other slave.

But there is also a sort of rule exercised over those who are similar in kind (*genos*) and free. For this is what we say is political rule, and the ruler must learn it by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry-commander by serving {643} under a cavalry-commander, to be a general [*10*] by serving under a general, and [similarly] under a major, or company-commander. That is why this too is well said, namely, that one cannot rule well unless one has been [well] ruled. And while the virtues of these are distinct, the good citizen must have the scientific knowledge needed and the capacity both to be ruled and to rule, and this is the virtue of a citizen, to know the rule of free people [*15*] from both sides.

In fact, the good *man* has both virtues, even if a distinct kind (*eidos*) of justice and temperance is characteristic of a ruler. For if a good man is ruled, but is a free citizen, it is clear that his virtue (justice, for example) is

not one thing, but includes one kind (*eidos*) for ruling and another for being ruled, just as a man's and a woman's [*20*] courage and temperance are distinct. For a man would seem a coward if he were courageous in the way a woman is courageous, and a woman would seem garrulous if she were moderate in speech in the way a good man is. Household management, indeed, is also of distinct sorts for a man and a woman. For his function is to acquire property and hers to preserve it. Practical wisdom, by contrast, [*25*] is the only virtue special to a ruler. For the others, it would seem, must be common to both rulers and ruled. At any rate, the virtue of someone ruled is not practical wisdom but true belief. For those ruled are like makers of flutes, whereas rulers are like the flute players who use them.

Whether, then, the virtue of [*30*] a good man and that of an excellent citizen are the same or distinct, and in what way they are the same and in what way distinct, is evident from these considerations.

III.5

One of the puzzles about the citizen, though, still remains. For is it really the case that a citizen is someone to whom it is open to have a share in office, or should vulgar craftsmen also be taken as citizens? If, indeed, [*35*] those who do not share in office should be taken as citizens, then the sort of virtue we discussed cannot belong to every citizen, since these craftsmen will then be citizens. On the other hand, if none of these sorts is a citizen, in which part of the city should they each be put? For they are neither resident alien nor foreigner.

Or shall we say that nothing absurd follows—at any rate, not because of this argument? For slaves [*1278a*] and freed slaves are not among those just mentioned, either. In fact the truth is that not everyone without whom there would not be a city is to be taken as a citizen, since not even children are citizens in the same way that men are. Instead, the latter are unconditional citizens, whereas the former are so on the basis of a hypothesis, since, though they are citizens, [*5*] they are incomplete ones. Now among some peoples in ancient times the vulgar element was slave or foreign, which is why most of them are such even now. The best city, however, will not confer citizenship on a vulgar person. But if [in other cities] even this sort of person is a citizen, then what we have characterized as a citizen's virtue cannot be ascribed to everyone, or even to all free people, but only to those

[*10*] who are released from the necessary functions. Of the necessary ones, those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, those who perform them for the community are vulgar and hired laborers.

It will become evident, if we carry our investigation a little further, how things stand where these people are concerned. In fact, it is clear from what we have said. For since there are several constitutions, there must also be several kinds (*eidos*) of citizens, [*15*] and above all of citizens who are being ruled, so that in some constitutions the vulgar element and the hired laborer must be citizens, whereas in others it is impossible—for example, in any so-called aristocracy, that is, the one in which offices are awarded in accord with virtue and in accord with worth. For it is impossible to engage in virtuous pursuits [*20*] while living the life of a vulgar person or a hired laborer.

In oligarchies, on the other hand, while it is not possible for hired laborers to be citizens (for participation in office is based on high property assessments), it is possible for a vulgar person, since in fact many craftsmen become rich. (In Thebes, though, there used to be a law that anyone who had not kept away [*25*] from the market for ten years could not share in office.) But in many constitutions the law goes so far as to invite even some foreigners to be citizens. {644} For in some democracies the descendant of a citizen mother is a citizen, and in many places the same holds of bastards too. Nevertheless, since it is because of a shortage of legitimate citizens that they make such people [*30*] citizens (since it is because of under population that they employ laws in this way), when they are well supplied with a mob of them, they gradually disqualify, first, those with a slave as father or mother, then those with citizen mothers [alone], until finally they make citizens only of those who come from citizens on both sides.

It is evident from these considerations, then, that there are several kinds (*eidos*) of citizens, and that [*35*] the one who is above all said to be a citizen is the one who shares in the honors of office, as Homer too implied when he wrote, “like some disenfranchised alien.”[41] For the one who does not share is like a resident alien. And whenever this sort of thing is kept concealed, it is for the sake of deceiving their fellow inhabitants.

And whether, then, [*40*] to take the virtue in accord with which a man is good and a citizen is excellent as the same or as distinct is clear from

[*1278b*] what has been said: in one sort of city the good man and the excellent citizen are the same, whereas in another they are distinct. And that man is not just anyone, but the politician, that is, the one who controls or is capable of controlling, either by himself or with others, the supervision of community [*5*] affairs.

III.6

Since these issues have been determined, the next thing to investigate is whether we should take it that there is one constitution or several, and, if there are several, what they are, how many they are, and how they differ.

Now, a constitution is an ordering of a city's various offices, and above all of the office that controls everything. For the governing body controls [*10*] the city everywhere, and the constitution is governing body. I mean, for example, that in democratic cities the people are in control, whereas in oligarchic ones, on the contrary, the few are. And we say that the constitution too is different in these cases. And we shall give the same account of the others as well.

First, then, we must set down what [*15*] a city is set up for, and how many kinds (*eidos*) of rule are concerned with human beings and their community in living.

In our first discussions, then, where determinations were made about household management and rule of a master, it was also said that a human being is by nature a political animal. That is why, even when they do not need each other's assistance, [*20*] people desire no less to live together. Nevertheless, it is also true that the common advantage brings them together, to the extent that some share of noble living falls to each. It is especially this, then, that is the end both of all communally and of each separately. But they also join together and maintain the political community for the sake of living itself. For there is presumably some share of [*25*] the noble present even in living itself alone, as long as the hardships of life are not too excessive. In any case, it is clear that most human beings are willing to endure much misery in order to cling to living, on the supposition that there is a sort of joy in it and a natural sweetness.

But then it is also easy to distinguish at any rate the modes of rule that are spoken about, [*30*] since even in the external accounts[42] they are often

discussed. For rule of a master, although in truth the same thing is advantageous for what is by nature a master and what is by nature a slave, is nevertheless rule exercised with a view to the master's own advantage, though [*35*] coincidentally with a view to that of the slave (since if the slave is destroyed, the mastership cannot be preserved).

On the other hand, rule over children, wife, and the household (*oikia*) generally, which we for that reason call household management (*oikonomikē*), is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to both ruled and ruler. Intrinsically, it is for the sake of {645} the ruled, as we also see in the various [*40*] crafts—for example, medicine and athletic training. But coincidentally [*1279a*] it may be for the rulers as well. For nothing prevents a coach from sometimes being one of those he is training, just as a ship's captain is always one of the sailors. A coach or a ship's captain looks to the good of those he rules, but when [*5*] he too becomes one of them himself, he shares coincidentally in the benefit. For in the one case he is a sailor, and in the other, though still a coach, he becomes one of the trained.

That is why, in the case of political offices too, where it is has been set up in accord with the equality of the citizens and their similarity, they expect to rule in turns. In the past, [*10*] as is natural, they expected to perform public service when their turn came, and then to have someone look to their good in turn, just as they had previously looked to his advantage when they were ruling. Nowadays, however, because of the benefits to be had from public funds and from ruling office, people wish to rule continuously, as if they were sickly and would come to be healthy by always ruling. [*15*] At any rate, the latter would presumably pursue ruling office in that sort of way.

It is evident, therefore, that those constitutions that aim at the common advantage are—in accord with what is unconditionally just—correct, whereas those that aim only at the advantage of the rulers are erroneous ones, and deviations from the correct constitutions. [*20*] For they are like the rule of a master, whereas a city is a community of free people.

III.7

Now that these matters have been determined, the next thing is to investigate how many constitutions there are and what they are, starting

with the correct constitutions. For the deviations will be evident once these have been defined.

Since “constitution” and [*25*] “governing body” signify the same thing, and the governing body is what has control in cities, and the one in control must be either one person, or few, or many, then, whenever the one, the few, or the many rule for the common advantage, these constitutions must be correct, whereas if they aim at the private advantage, whether of the one, the few, [*30*] or the multitude, they are deviations. For either those who share should not be called citizens, or they should share in the advantages.

Now of monarchies, the one that looks to the common advantage is usually called a kingship, and rule by a few, but more than one, an aristocracy (either because the best people rule, [*35*] or because they rule with a view to what is best for the city and those who share in it), whereas when the multitude governs for the common advantage, the constitution is called by the name “polity (*politeia*),” which is common to all constitutions (*poleteiai*). Moreover, this happens reasonably. For while it is possible for one or a few to be superior in virtue, where more people are concerned it is already difficult [*40*] for them to be exact practitioners of every sort of virtue—the major exception being military virtue, [*1279b*] since this does come about in a multitude. That is why in this constitution the element that goes to war for it is the one with the most control, and why those who possess their own weapons are the ones who share in it.

Deviations from the aforementioned are tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy, [*5*] and democracy from polity. For tyranny is monarchy for the advantage of the monarch, oligarchy for the advantage of the rich, and democracy for the advantage of the poor. But none of them is for the common profit.

III.8

We should say a little more about what each of these [*10*] constitutions is. For certain puzzles are involved, and, where each methodical inquiry is concerned, it is appropriate for the person who is carrying it out in a philosophical manner, and not merely with a practical purpose in view, not to overlook or [*15*] omit anything, but to make clear the truth about each.

A tyranny, as we said, is a monarchy that exercises the rule of a master over the political community, an oligarchy is when those who control the

constitution are the ones who have the properties, and a democracy, on the contrary, is when those who control it do not have much property, but are poor.

The first puzzle concerns definition. For suppose that [*20*] the majority were rich and controlled the city, and that it is a democracy whenever the {646} majority control it. In the same way again suppose that the poor are fewer in number than the rich, but are stronger and control the constitution, but that when a small group is in control it is said to be an oligarchy. It would seem, then, that we have not correctly [*25*] defined these constitutions.

But then even if one were to combine being few with being rich, in the one case, and being a majority with being poor, in the other, and to describe the constitutions accordingly—oligarchy as that in which the rich are few in number and hold the offices, and democracy as that in which the poor are many and hold them—another [*30*] puzzle arises. For what are we to call the constitutions we just described, those where the rich are a majority and the poor a minority, but each controls in its own constitution, if indeed there is no other constitution besides those we mentioned?

What this argument seems to make clear, therefore, is that it is a coincidence that the few or the many have control [*35*] in oligarchies on the one hand or in democracies on the other, and that this is because the rich are everywhere few and the poor many. That is why, in fact, the causes just mentioned are not the causes of the differences (*diaphora*) between them. What does differentiate democracy and oligarchy from each other is poverty and wealth: [*40*] whenever some, whether a minority or a majority, rule because of their wealth, [*1280a*] the constitution is necessarily an oligarchy, and whenever the poor rule, it is necessarily a democracy. But it turns out, as we said, that the former are in fact few and the latter many. For only a few people are rich, but in freedom all share. And it is due to these [*5*] causes that both groups dispute over the constitution.

III.9

The first thing one must grasp, however, is what they say the defining marks of oligarchy and democracy are, and what both oligarchic justice and democratic justice are.

For all grasp a sort of justice, but they only go to a certain point and do not discuss the whole of what is just in the strictest sense. [*10*] For example, justice seems to be equality, and it is—not for everyone, however, but for equals. Justice also seems to be inequality, and in fact it is—not for everyone, however, but for unequals. They do away with this—the *for whom*—and so judge badly. The cause is that the judgment concerns themselves, and pretty much most people are bad judges [*15*] about their own affairs.

So since what is just is just for certain people, and consists in dividing both things and people in the same way, (as we said earlier in the *Ethics*), they agree about equality in the thing but disagree about it in the people. This is mostly because of what was just mentioned, namely, that they judge badly about what concerns themselves, [*20*] but also because, since they are both speaking up to a point about a sort of justice, they consider themselves to be speaking about justice in the unconditional sense. For one lot, if they are unequal in one respect (for example, wealth), think that they are wholly unequal, whereas the other lot, if they are equal in one respect (for example, freedom), think that they are wholly equal. About what has the most control, however, they do not speak. For if it were for the sake of property [*25*] that people formed a community and came together, then they would share in the city to the extent that they shared in property, and the oligarchic argument would as a result seem to be a strong one. For [they would say] it is not just for someone who has contributed [*30*] one mina to share equally in a hundred minas with the one who has contributed all the rest, whether of what was there at the start or of the interest.

But [1] they do not do these things only for the sake of living, but more for the sake of living well. For otherwise there could also be a city of slaves and of the other animals, while as things stand there is not one, because these share neither in happiness nor in living in accord with deliberate choice.

Nor [2] do they do them for the sake of an alliance, to safeguard themselves from being treated unjustly by [*35*] anyone, or [3] because of exchange and their usefulness to each other. For otherwise the Etruscans, the Carthaginians, and all those who have treaties with each other would be like citizens of one city. At any rate, they have import agreements, treaties about not doing injustice, and formal documents of alliance. No offices,

{647} however, [*40*] that are common to all of them have been put in place to deal with these matters, but rather each city has distinct ones. Nor are [*1280b*] those in one city concerned that those in the other should be of a certain quality, not even that those covered by the agreements should not be unjust or depraved in any way, but only that they should not act unjustly toward each other. By contrast, political virtue and vice [*5*] are closely investigated by those concerned with good legislative order. Thus it is quite evident that the city must be concerned about virtue—at any rate, the city that is truly, and not just for the sake of argument, so called. For otherwise the community becomes an alliance, differing only in location from others in which the allies live far apart, and law becomes an agreement, and, as Lycophron[43] [*10*] the sophist said, "a guarantor of just behavior toward each other," but not such as to make the citizens good and just.

It is evident that this is the way it is. [4] For even if their territories were brought together into one, so that the city of the Megarians and that of the Corinthians were fastened together by surrounding walls, it still would not be a single city. Nor would it be so [*15*] if their citizens intermarried, even though this is one of the sorts of community that is special to cities. Nor, similarly, if there were some who lived in separate places, yet not so far apart as to share nothing communally, and had laws against doing injustice to each other in their business transactions (for example, if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, [*20*] another a shoemaker, another something else of that sort, and their number were ten thousand), yet their community was in nothing else besides such things as exchange and alliance—not even in this case would there be a city.

What, then, is the cause of this? Surely, it is not because their community is scattered. For even if they lived closer together while having such a community—each [*25*] in fact treating his own household like a city, and the others like a defensive alliance formed merely to provide assistance against those committing injustice—even so, they would still not seem to be a city to those who get an exact theoretical grasp on such things, if indeed they continued to associate with each other in the same manner when together as they did when separated.

It is evident, therefore, that a city is not [4] a community of location, nor one [3] either for the sake of preventing mutual injustice [*30*] or for the sake

of exchange. On the contrary, while these must be present if indeed there is to be a city, when all of them are present it is still not yet a city. Rather the city is [1] the community in living well for both households and families, namely, complete and self-sufficient living. But in fact this will not be possible unless they inhabit one and the same [*35*] location and practice intermarriage. That is why marriage connections arose in cities, as well as brotherhoods, religious sacrifices, and the pastimes characteristic of living together. And things of this sort are the function of friendship, since the deliberate choice to live together is friendship. The end of the city is living well, then, but these other things are for the sake of the end. And the city is the community of families and villages [*40*] in complete and self-sufficient living, which we [*1281a*] say is living happily and nobly.

So political communities must be taken as being for the sake of noble actions, not for the sake of living together. That is why those who contribute the most to this sort of community have a larger share in the city [*5*] than those who are equal or superior in freedom or family but unequal in political virtue, and those who are superior in wealth but inferior in virtue.

That all those who dispute about constitutions, then, speak about a part of justice [*10*] is evident from what has been said.

III.10

There is a puzzle, though, as to which part is to be in control of the city. For surely it is either the majority, the rich, the decent people, the one who is best of all, or a tyrant. But all of these apparently involve difficulties. For what if the poor, because they are the majority, divide up the property of the rich, is this not unjust? [*15*] “Well, by Zeus, it seemed just to the body in control.” But what then should we say is the extreme *injustice*? Again, if the majority, having seized everything, divides up the property of the minority, it is evident that they are destroying the city. But {648} surely virtue does not destroy what has it, nor is justice something capable of destroying a city. So it is clear that [*20*] this law cannot be just. Further, all the actions done by a tyrant were necessarily just as well. For he, being stronger, uses force, just as the majority do against the rich.

Then is it just for the minority [*25*] and the rich to rule? If they act in the same way, plundering and confiscating the property of the majority, and this

is just, then the other case is as well. Therefore, it is evident that all these things are bad and unjust.

Then should the decent people rule and have control of everything? In that case, everyone else will necessarily be deprived of honors, since they are denied the honors of holding political office. [*30*] For offices are positions of honor, we say, and when the same people always rule, the rest will necessarily be deprived of honor.

Then is it better that the one who is most excellent should rule? But this is even more oligarchic, since those deprived of honors are more numerous.

But perhaps someone might say that it is a bad thing in general for a human being rather than the law to be in control, [*35*] since at any rate he has the feelings that arise in the soul. But if law is oligarchic or democratic, what difference will it make where the puzzles we raised are concerned? For the things we have described will happen all the same.

III.12

[*1282b15*] Since in every science and craft the end is a good, and the greatest and best good is the end of the one that has the most control of all, this is the capacity of politics. But the just is the political good, and this is the common advantage. Now it seems to everyone that the just is some sort of equality, and up to a point, at least, they agree with what has been determined in those philosophical accounts in which ethical matters were determined. For justice is something to some people, and [*20*] they say that it should be something equal to those who are equal. But what sort of equality and what sort of inequality—we should not neglect to consider that. For this also involves a puzzle for political philosophy.

For perhaps someone might say that offices should be unequally distributed in accord with superiority in every good, provided people do not differ in their remaining qualities but happen to be similar, [*25*] since for people who are superior something other [than an equal share] is just and in accord with worth. But if this is true, then those who excel in complexion, height, or any other good whatsoever, should get more of what is distributed by political justice. And is this not obviously false? Evidently, in the case of the [*30*] other sciences and capacities, it is. For where flute players are equally proficient in their craft, better flutes are not given to those who are better-bred (since they will not play the flute any better), rather it is the one

who is superior with respect to his function who is to be given the superior instruments. If what has been said is not yet clear, it will become still more [*35*] evident if we take it further. For if someone is superior in flute playing, but is very inferior in good-breeding or beauty, then, even if each of these (I mean birth and beauty) is a greater good than flute playing, and is proportionately more superior to flute playing than he [*40*] is superior in flute playing, he should still be given the superior flutes. For it is to the function that the superiority [*1283a*] should contribute, and superiority in wealth and in good-breeding contribute nothing to it.

Further, according to this argument at any rate, every good would have to be comparable in contribution to every other. For if a certain height counted more, height in general would be in competition both with wealth and [*5*] with freedom. So if this person is more superior to that one in height than that one is in virtue, and in general virtue is superior to height, then all goods would be comparable. For if this much size is better than this much [virtue], it is clear that that much is equal to it. But, since this is impossible, it is clear that in the case of politics, too, it is reasonable not [*10*] to dispute over political office in accord with every sort of inequality. (For if some are slow runners and others fast, they should not have any more or any less a share of office because of this—but it is in athletic competitions that this sort of superiority wins honor.) Rather, the sorts from which a city is composed are the ones in terms of which the dispute must be formulated. [*15*] That is why it is reasonable for the well-bred, the free, and the rich to lay claim to the honor of {649} office. For both those who are free and those who have assessed property are needed, since a city cannot consist entirely of poor people, any more than of slaves. But then if these things are needed in a city, it is clear that justice and political virtue are as well. For a city cannot be managed without these. [*20*] Except that without the former a city cannot exist, and without the latter it cannot be well managed.

Book VII

VII.1

Anyone who is going to make an inquiry into the best constitution [*1323a15*] in the appropriate way must first determine what the most choiceworthy life is. For if this remains unclear, what the best constitution is must also remain unclear. For it is appropriate for those people to do best who govern themselves in the best way that their circumstances allow—provided nothing contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. That is why there should first be agreement about what the most choiceworthy life is for (one might almost say) everyone, and then [*20*] determine whether it is the same or distinct for all communally as for each separately.

Considering many things said about the best way of living even in the external accounts to be adequate, then, we should make use of them here as well. For, to tell the truth, as regards one way of dividing them at any rate, no one would dispute that, since there are three groups—external goods, goods in [*25*] the body, and goods in the soul—all of them must belong to those who are blessed. For no one would say that someone is blessed who has no shred of courage, temperance, justice, or practical wisdom, but is afraid of the flies buzzing around him, stops at nothing, no matter how extreme, when he has an appetite to eat or [*30*] drink, kills his dearest friends for a pittance, and has thought as foolish and deluded as a child’s or a madman’s.

But while these claims are ones that almost everyone would agree with, people disagree about their quantity and their relative superiority. [*35*] For they consider any quantity of virtue, however small, to be sufficient, whereas of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like they seek unlimited excess. We, however, will say to them that it is easy to achieve conviction on these matters even from the facts themselves. For we see that [*40*] the virtues are not acquired and safeguarded by means of external goods, but rather it is the other way around, and living happily for human beings, whether it consists in enjoyment or virtue [*1323b*] or both, is possessed by those who have cultivated their characters and minds excessively, but have been moderate in their acquisition of external goods,

rather than by [*5*] those who have acquired more of the latter than they can possibly use, but are deficient in the former.

But to those who investigate the matter in accord with argument, the point is also easily seen. For external goods have a limit, just like any instrument, and everything useful is useful for something, and in excess must either harm or bring no benefit to their possessors. Where each of the goods of the soul is concerned, by contrast, the more [*10*] excessive it is, the more useful it is—if one should assign to these goods too not only nobility but also utility.

It is generally clear too, we shall say, that the best condition of each thing relative to others is in accord with the superiority of those things whose conditions we say they are. [*15*] So, if indeed the soul is more estimable, both unconditionally and to us, than property and the body, its best condition must be proportionately better than theirs. Further, it is for the sake of the soul that these things are naturally choiceworthy, [*20*] and every practically-wise person should choose them for its sake, and not the soul for their sake.

Let us take it as agreed, then, that to each person falls just as much happiness as he has virtue, practical wisdom, and action done in accord with them. We may use the [primary] god as evidence of this, who is happy and blessedly so, not because of any external goods but because of himself and by being in his nature of a certain quality. [*25*] This is also why good luck and happiness are necessarily different. For chance or luck is the cause of the goods external to the soul, but no one is just or temperate by luck or because of luck.

The next point, and one depending on the same arguments, is that the happy city [*30*] is the one that is best and acts nobly. But it is impossible for {650} those who do not do noble things to act nobly, and there is no noble function, either belonging to a man or to a city, that is separate from virtue and practical wisdom. But the courage, justice, practical wisdom, and temperance of a city have the same capacity and form as those in which each [*35*] human being who is said to be courageous, just, practically-wise, and temperate should share.

But let these remarks, as far as they go, serve as a preface to our account. For not to touch on these topics is impossible, but neither can we go through all the arguments pertaining to them, since that is the function of

another leisured discussion. But for now, let us assume this much, that the best life, both [*40*] for each separately and for cities collectively, is one involving virtue that is sufficiently furnished with the resources needed to participate in actions that are in accord with virtue. [*1324a*] With regard to those who dispute this, we must ignore them in our present methodical inquiry, but investigate their objections later, if anyone happens not to be persuaded by what has been said.

VII.2

But whether we should say that the happiness [*5*] of each individual human being is the same as that of a city or not remains to be discussed. But here too the answer is evident. For everyone would agree that they are the same. For those who suppose that living well in the case of an individual is a matter of wealth will also count blessed a whole city, if it is rich. And those who have the highest esteem for the tyrannical life [*10*] would say that the city that rules the greatest number is happiest. And if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue, he will also say that the more excellent city is the one that is happier.

But now there are two questions that need to be investigated. First, which life is more choiceworthy, the one that involves being active in politics with other people and sharing in the city, [*15*] or the life of an alien, detached from the political community? Further, what constitution and what condition of the city should be taken to be best—regardless of whether sharing in a city is choiceworthy for everyone or for most but not for some? Since [to answer] this question, but not the one about what is choiceworthy for each, is a function of political thought and theoretical knowledge, [*20*] and this is the sort of investigation we have deliberately chosen to undertake now, the first is a side issue, whereas the second is a function of our methodical inquiry.

Now it is evident that the best constitution is necessarily that order in accord with which anyone might be able to do best and live blessedly. [*25*] But the very people who agree that the most choiceworthy life is the life that involves virtue are the ones who dispute about whether the political and action-involving life is choiceworthy or rather the one detached from all external concerns—some sort of contemplative life, for example, which some say is the only life for a philosopher. For it is evident that these two

lives are pretty much the ones that the human beings most ambitious for virtue [*30*] deliberately choose, both in earlier times and at present. The two I mean are the political life and the philosophic one. And it makes no small difference on which side the truth lies. For at any rate the person who thinks correctly must order his affairs by looking to the better target—and this applies to each human being and to the constitution communally.

Some people think, though, [*35*] that ruling as a master over one's neighbors involves one of the greatest injustices, and that political rule, while it involves no injustice, does involve an impediment to the ruler's own joy in life. But others hold beliefs that are almost the contrary. For they think that the action-involving and political life is the only one for a man. [*40*] For the actions resulting from each virtue are not more open to private individuals than to those who are active in communal affairs and participate in politics. Some, then, [*1324b*] give this reply, but others say that the mode of constitution that rules as a master or a tyrant is the only happy one. Among some peoples, indeed, this is the defining mark of the constitution and the laws—to rule as a master over neighbors.

That is why, although [*5*] most laws have been laid down in most cases (one might almost say) at random, nonetheless if there is some one thing to which the laws do to some extent look, it is the exercise of power that they all aim at. For example, in Sparta and Crete it is pretty much {651} entirely with a view to wars that education and most of the laws are ordered. Further, among all the [barbarian] nations that have the power to get more [*10*] this power is esteemed—for example, among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts. For in some cases they even have laws that spur them on to this sort of virtue. In Carthage, for example, so it is said, they receive armlets as decorations for each campaign they serve in. There was once a law in Macedonia too, [*15*] that any man who had not killed an enemy must wear as his belt a rope used to tether a horse to a manger. Among the Scythians, anyone who had not killed an enemy was not permitted to drink from a cup passed around at a certain feast. And among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they plant as many small obelisks around a man's tomb as the number of enemies he has killed. [*20*] And there are many other things of this sort among other peoples, some sanctioned by the laws, others by customs.

Yet it would presumably seem quite absurd to those wishing to investigate the matter, if the function of a politician involved being able to get a theoretical grasp on how to rule or master his neighbors, whether they wish it or do not wish it. [*25*] For how could this be up to a politician or a legislator, when it is not even *lawful*? And it is unlawful to rule not only justly but also unjustly (although it is in fact possible to exercise power unjustly).

Moreover, this is not what we see in the other sciences either. For it is not the doctor's or the ship-captain's function to persuade or otherwise [*30*] use force against his patients (in the one case) or his passengers (in the other). But many seem to think that mastership *is* politics, and the very same thing they all deny to be either just or advantageous for themselves, they are not ashamed to practice on others. For they seek just rule among themselves, [*35*] but toward others they care nothing about justice. It would be strange, though, if by nature one thing were not suited to be ruled by a master and another suited not to be ruled by a master. So if indeed things are that way, one must not try to rule as a master over everyone, but only over those who are suited to be ruled by a master, just as one must not hunt human beings for a feast or a sacrifice, [*40*] but rather what is suited to being hunted for this—and any wild animal that is edible is suited to being hunted.

Moreover, it is possible for a single city to be happy even by itself (that is, one that is governed in a good way), [*1325a*] if indeed it is possible for a city to be settled somewhere by itself and employ excellent laws, and whose constitution will not be ordered with a view to war or to controlling its enemies—for we are assuming that it has none.

It is clear, therefore, that although all [*5*] military pursuits are to be taken as noble, they are not to be taken as the highest end of all, but rather as being for the sake of that end. And [the function] of an excellent legislator is to see how a city, a race (*genos*) of human beings, or any other community can come to have a share in good living and in the happiness that it is possible for them. There will be differences, of course, in some of [*10*] the laws that are prescribed, and it belongs to legislative science to see, if there are neighboring peoples, what sorts of things should be practiced in relation to what sorts of people and how the appropriate ones are to be used in relation to each.

But this topic—namely, [*15*] what end the best constitution should aim at—will receive a proper investigation later.

VII.3

As regards those who agree that a life that involves virtue is most choiceworthy, but disagree about the use of it, we must say to both sides that they are both in part correct in what they say and in part incorrect. For those on one side reject political offices, since they consider that the life of a free person is different from that of a politician and is also the most choiceworthy one of all, [*20*] while those on the other side consider that the political life is best, since it is impossible for someone who does no action to do well, and that doing well in action and happiness are the same.

On the one side we have that the life of a free person is better than that of a master. This is indeed true. For there is certainly nothing dignified about using a slave as a slave, [*25*] since giving orders about necessities has no share in what is noble. But to consider that every rule is rule of a master is surely incorrect. For there is no less a distance between rule over free people and rule {652} over slaves than between being by nature free and being by nature a slave. We have determined enough about these [*30*] in our first accounts.

On the other side, to praise inaction more than action is not correct. For happiness is action, and furthermore the actions of those who are just and temperate achieve an end of many things that are noble.

Yet perhaps someone might take these determinations to imply that control of everyone is best, since in that way [*35*] one would control the greatest number of the actions that are noblest. And so someone who has the power to rule should not let rule pass to his neighbor, but rather take it away from him. And a father should take no account of his children, or a child of his father, or in general a friend of his friend, or give any thought to them in comparison to this. For what is best is most choiceworthy, and [*40*] doing well in action is best.

Well, perhaps what they say is true, if indeed the most choiceworthy thing there is will belong to those who commit robbery and use force. [*1325b*] But presumably it cannot belong to them, and this assumption is false. For his actions can no longer be noble if he is not as superior [to those he rules] as a man is to a woman, a father to his children, or a master to his slaves.

And so the transgressor can do nothing [*5*] to later correct so great a previous deviation from virtue. For among those who are similar, the noble and the just thing is to take turns [in ruling and being ruled], since this is equal and similar treatment. But unequal shares for equal people or dissimilar ones for similar people is contrary to nature, and nothing contrary to nature is noble. That is why, when someone else is more excellent in [*10*] virtue and in his action-involving capacity to [implement] what is best, it is noble to follow him and just to obey him. But he must possess not virtue alone, but also the capacity in accord with which he will be a doer of action.

If the things we have said are correct, and we should take it that happiness is doing well in action, then the best life, both for the whole city collectively and for each individual, [*15*] would be an action-involving life. Yet it is not necessary, as some suppose, for an action-involving life to be lived in relation to other people, nor are those thoughts alone action-involving that arise for the sake of the consequences of doing an action, rather, much more so are the acts of contemplation and thought that are their own ends and are engaged in for their own sake. [*20*] For doing well in action is the end, and so action of a sort is the end too. And we say that the ones who above all do actions, even external actions, in a controlling way are their architectonic craftsmen who do them by means of their thoughts.

Moreover, it is not necessary for even those cities to be inactive that are situated by themselves and have deliberately chosen to live that way, since actions can take place even among their parts. [*25*] For the parts of the city have many communal relations with each another. Similarly, this also holds of any individual human being. For otherwise the [primary] god and the entire cosmos could scarcely be in a noble condition, since they have no external actions beyond the [internal] ones that are proper to them.

It is evident, then, that the same life [*30*] is necessarily best both for each human being and for cities and human beings collectively.

VII.13

But we must now discuss the constitution itself, and of which and of what sorts of people the city that is going to be blessedly happy and [*1331b25*] govern itself in a good way should be composed.

There are two things in which well-being consists in all cases: one of these is setting up the target and end of action correctly, the other is discovering

the actions that carry us toward it. For it is possible for these either to clash with each other or to be in harmony. For sometimes [*30*] the target is well set up, but people make an error in what they do to hit it; sometimes they achieve everything that furthers the end, but the end they set up is a base one; and sometimes they make both errors, as in connection with medicine, for example. For sometimes they neither make a correct judgment about what sort of condition a healthy body should be in [*35*] nor hit upon the things that are productive in furthering the defining mark they set before themselves. But in the crafts and sciences both of these must be mastered, the end and the actions that are toward the end.

{653} Now it is evident that everyone aims at living well and at happiness. But while it is possible for some to achieve these ends, [*40*] it is not open to others, either because of some stroke of luck or because of nature. For living in a noble way also needs certain supplies, although fewer are needed by those in a better condition, [*1332a*] more by those in a worse one. But others straightaway seek happiness in an incorrect way, although it is possible for them to achieve it.

Since what we are proposing to do is to look at the best constitution, however, and it is the one in accord with which a city will be governed in the best way, and it would be best governed [*5*] in accord with a constitution that would make it most possible for the city to be happy, it is clear that we must not neglect to consider what happiness is. And we say—and have given this definition in our ethical works (if anything in those discussions is of benefit)—that it is a complete activation and use of virtue, and this not on the basis of a hypothesis but unconditionally. By on the basis of a hypothesis I mean [*10*] what is necessary, by unconditionally I mean those that are done nobly. For in the case of just actions, for example, just penalties and punishments spring from virtue, but are necessary, and their nobly done has the character of necessarily done. For it is a more choiceworthy situation if no man or city needs any such things. By contrast, just actions that aim at honors and [*15*] prosperity are unconditionally noblest. For the former involve choosing something bad, whereas the latter are the contrary, since they establish and generate good things.

An excellent man, of course, would use poverty, disease, and other sorts of bad luck in a noble way, but blessedness [*20*] involves their contraries. For in accord with the definition in our ethical accounts, an excellent man is the

sort for whom, because of his virtue, unconditionally good things are good. It is clear, then, that his use of them must also be unconditionally excellent and noble. That is why people consider [*25*] the causes of happiness to be external goods—as if a lyre rather than craft knowledge were taken to be the cause of brilliant and noble lyre-playing.

It follows, therefore, from what has been said, that some things must be there to start with, whereas others must be established by the legislator. That is why we pray for the composition of the city to be successful concerning the things that luck controls (for we take it that luck does control them). [*30*]

The city's being excellent, however, is no longer a function of luck but of scientific knowledge and deliberate choice. But surely a city is excellent at any rate by its citizens—those who share in the constitution—being excellent. And in our city all the citizens share in the constitution. This, therefore, must be investigated, namely, how a man becomes [*35*] excellent. For even if it is possible for all to be excellent without each citizen being so individually, the latter is still more choiceworthy. For if each individually is excellent, it follows that all are.

But surely people become good or excellent because of three things. These three are nature, habit, and reason. For one must be born, first of all, [*40*] a human being, and not one of the other animals. Similarly, one's body and soul must be of a certain quality. But in the case of some qualities, being born with them is of no benefit, because habits make them change. For some qualities, because of [*1332b*] their nature, play a double game, going toward the worse or toward the better because of one's habits. But, whereas the other animals mostly live by nature alone, while to a small extent some also do so by habit, the human being lives by reason as well. For the human being alone has reason. So these must [*5*] harmonize with each other. For people do many actions contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason, if they are persuaded that some other way is better.

Now, we determined earlier what sort of nature people should have if they are going to be easily handled by the legislator. What is left at this point is a function of education, since some things are learned by habituation and [*10*] others by listening.

Since the end is evidently the same for human [*1334a11*] beings both communally and individually, and since it is necessary for there to be the same defining mark for the best man and for the best constitution, it is evident that the virtues for leisure {654} must be present. For, as has often been said, the end of war is peace, and that [*15*] of unleisure is leisure. But the virtues useful with a view to leisure and passing the time include both those whose function lies in leisure and those whose function lies in unleisure. For many necessities must be present in order for being at leisure to be possible. That is why temperance is appropriate for our city as are courage and resilience. For as the proverb says, there is no [*20*] leisure for slaves, and those who are incapable of facing danger courageously are the slaves of their attackers.

Now, courage and resilience are for unleisure, philosophy for leisure, and temperance and justice are useful during both, and particularly when people remain at peace and are at leisure. [*25*] For war compels people to be just and temperate, but the enjoyment of good luck and the leisure that accompanies peace make them wantonly aggressive instead. Much justice and temperance are needed, therefore, by those who seem to do best and who enjoy all the things regarded as blessings—people like those, if there are any, [*30*] as the poets say there are, who live in the Isles of the Blessed.[44] For these above all will need philosophy, temperance, and justice, to the extent that they are at leisure amidst an abundance of such goods.

It is evident, then, why a city that is going to be happy and excellent should share in these virtues. [*35*] For it is shameful to be incapable of making use of good things, but it is even more shameful to be incapable of making use of them in leisure—when being unleisured or when at war appearing to be good, but slavish when at peace and leisure. That is why one must not cultivate virtue as the city of the Spartans does. [*40*] For the Spartans are not different from the others in this way, namely, in not considering the same things as they do to be the greatest [*1334b*] goods, but in considering that these are brought about particularly by means of a certain virtue. But since . . . these goods and the enjoyment of them to be greater than that of the virtues . . . and that . . . because of itself, is evident

from these considerations. [*5*] What must be theoretically grasped, then, is how and through what means this will come about.

We made a distinction earlier, accordingly, to the effect that nature, habit, and reason are needed. And of these, what sort the citizens must be as regards their nature was determined earlier. It remains to get a theoretical grasp on whether they are to be educated by means of reason first or by means of habits. For these must harmonize with each other, and the harmony must be the best one. For it is possible [*10*] for reason to be in error about the best hypothesis, and for it to be led because of habits in the same direction.

This, then, is at any rate evident. First, just as in other cases, coming to be proceeds from a starting-point, and the end that proceeds from a certain starting-point is starting-point for another end. [*15*] But reason and understanding are our nature's end, and so it is to further these that the coming to be and the training of our habits should be established.

Second, just as soul and body are two, so we see that the soul has two parts as well: the non-rational and the one that has reason. And the states of these are also two in number, one of which is desire and the other the understanding. And just as the coming to be of the body [*20*] is prior to that of the soul, so the non-rational part is prior the rational. This too is evident. For spirit and wish, and furthermore appetite, are present in children straight from birth, whereas rational calculation and understanding naturally arise as they grow. That is why supervision of the body must come first, [*25*] prior to that of the soul, and then supervision of desire, but supervision of desire must be for the sake of the understanding, and that of the body for the sake of the soul.

1. See Plato, *Pol*. 258–261a. Xenophon, *Mem.* III.iv.12, III.6.14.
2. See *Ph*. I.1 $184^{a}1–^{b}3$. See also *HA* I.1 486a5–14, *PA* II.1 646a8–24.
3. See *Mete*. IV.12 389b28–390a7.
4. Apparently a multipurpose, cheaply made tool of some sort.
5. *Works and Days* 405.

6. Charondas: A sixth-century BCE legislator from Catana in Chalcidice in the southern part of Macedonia. Epimenides the Cretan: A religious teacher of the late sixth and early fifth centuries. The works from which Aristotle quotes are lost.
7. *Iliad* x.114–115.
8. *Odyssey* ix.63–64. Homer is describing a man who "loves fighting with his own people."
9. Checkers (*pettoi*): A *pettos* (plural: *pettoi*) is an oval-shaped stone used in playing checkers, backgammon, or the like. Since any game played with a *pettos* is a game of *pettoi*, it is not clear to which game in particular Aristotle is referring, or what precisely an *azux* ("isolated piece") is, or why someone like it has "an appetite for war."
10. Daedalus: A legendary craftsman and inventor, whose statues were so lifelike that that they ran away unless tied down (*DA* I.3 406b18–19, Plato, *Men*. 97d). Hephaestus: Hephaestus was the armorer and blacksmith to the gods. The description of his tripods is that of Homer, *Iliad* xviii.376.
11. The reference is to the *mēsē* or *hēgemōn* ("leader"), which is the dominant note in a chord.
12. That slavery is unjust.
13. A legislative speaker in the Athenian assembly was liable to a writ of illegality or *graphē paranomōn* if he proposed legislation that contravened already existing law.
14. Theodectes was a mid-fourth-century tragic poet who studied with Aristotle. Helen is Helen of Troy, the wife of Menelaus, whose abduction by Paris precipitated the Trojan Wars.
15. Solon (c. 640–560 BCE) was an Athenian statesman and poet, and architect of the Athenian constitution.
16. At I.8 1256a3–10.
17. Sophocles, *Ajax* 293.
18. At *Rep*. V 462a.
19. In Aristotle's day, these were organized into a confederacy of cities.
20. *NE* V.5 1132b31–1133a31.
21. At *Rep*. X 608e.
22. At *Rep*. V 462a–e.
23. "If the goal is apparent victory, the argument is contentious; if it is apparent wisdom, it is sophistic" (*SE* 11 171b32–33).
24. See *Rep*. V 463e2–5.
25. So-called because by producing a colt that resembled the sire she showed herself to be a just or faithful mate.
26. *Rep*. III 403a–c.
27. Aristophanes, the comic dramatist (c. 455–c. 386 BCE), appears as a character in Plato's *Symposium*, and in his account of erotic love, which is one of several, expresses the views under discussion (192c–193a).
28. See *Rep*. III 415a–417b, IV 419a–421c, VIII 543b–c.
29. The slave population of Sparta.
30. See *Rep*. V 451d–e.
31. See *Rep*. III 415a–c.
32. See *Rep*. IV 420b–421c, VII 519–520d.
33. Resident aliens in Athens had to have a citizen to sponsor them, but they could represent themselves in legal proceedings. In other places, it seems that their sponsor had to do this for them.
34. At the age of eighteen young Athenians were enrolled in the citizen list kept by the leader of their *deme* or district. Older men were released from military service and also perhaps from jury duty and attendance at meetings of the assembly.
35. See III.6–7.

36. A famous orator and Sophist, who visited Athens in 427 (DK B82). In Larissa, and other places, the word *dēmiourgos*, which means “craftsman,” is also the title of a certain sort of public official. A Larissaean was both a citizen of Larissa and a kind of pot made there. Hence Gorgias’ joke.
37. A sixth-century Athenian statesman whose wide-ranging reform of the Athenian constitution was as significant and abiding as that of Solon.
38. At III.1 1274b34–36.
39. The quotation is from his lost play *Aeolus*. King Aeolus is apparently speaking about the education his sons are to receive.
40. Tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly (c. 380–370 BCE).
41. *Iliad* ix.648, xvi.59. Achilles is complaining that he is being treated like a disenfranchised alien by Agamemnon.
42. *Exōterikoi logoi* (“external accounts”) were popular works written by Aristotle himself and “in circulation” (*NE* I.5 1096a3) outside the Lyceum, or accounts or arguments, not necessarily developed by him, that are generally known.
43. A follower or imitator of Gorgias.
44. A paradise where good people, usually after their death, were thought to live in eternal happiness. See Hesiod, *Works and Days* 168–173.

{655} SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

THE PRESOCRATICS AND THE SOPHISTS

There are good bibliographies in A. A. Long, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: 1999), and in Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford: 2008). Additionally, the following Internet resources (most from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; those on the Milesians from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) include short accounts of Presocratic philosophers and problems, along with notes and further bibliographies.

On Presocratic Philosophy and the Problem of Sources:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presocratics/ (Patricia Curd)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doxography-ancient/ (Jaap Mansfeld)
The Milesians:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/thales/ (Patricia O'Grady)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximan/ (Dirk L. Couprie)
http://www.iep.utm.edu/anaximen/ (Daniel W. Graham) **Alcmaeon and Pythagoreanism:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alcmaeon/ (Carl Huffman)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pythagoras/ (Carl Huffman)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pythagoreanism/ (Carl Huffman)
Xenophanes:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/xenophanes/ (James H. Lesher)
Heraclitus:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/ (Daniel W. Graham)
Parmenides and Zeno:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/parmenides/ (John Palmer)
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zeno-elea/ (John Palmer)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/ (Nick Huggett) **Anaxagoras:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anaxagoras/ (Patricia Curd) **Empedocles:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empedocles/ (Richard Parry) **Presocratic Atomism:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leucippus/ (Sylvia Berryman) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democritus/ (Sylvia Berryman) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-ancient/ (Sylvia Berryman) **Philolaus:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philolaus/ (Carl Huffman) **The Sophists, Political Theory, and Theories of Soul:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/ (C. C. W. Taylor and Mi-Kyoung Lee) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-political/ (Melissa Lane) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ (Hendrik Lorenz) {656} PLATO

The following entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy contain reliable discussions and regularly updated bibliographies.

General:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/ (Richard Kraut) **Ethics:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics/ (Dorothea Frede) **Metaphysics and Epistemology:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/ (Allan Silverman) **Psychology:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ (Hendrik Lorenz) **Socrates:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/ (Debra Nails) **Sophists:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sophists/ (C. C. W. Taylor) **Euthyphro, Apology, Crito:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics-shorter/ (Paul Woodruff) **Symposium:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-friendship/ (C.D.C. Reeve) **Republic:**
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics-politics/ (Eric Brown) **Timaeus:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-timaeus/ (D. Zeyl)

Parmenides:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides/ (S. Rickless)

ARISTOTLE

An excellent bibliography can be found in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). More detailed bibliographies of works on Aristotle are available online in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

General:

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle/#Bib (Christopher Shields) **Metaphysics:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#Bib (Marc Cohen) **Biology:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-biology/#Bib (James Lennox) **Psychology:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-psychology/#Bib (Christopher Shields) **Ethics:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-ethics/#Bib (Richard Kraut) **Politics:**

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aristotle-politics/#Bib (Fred Miller)

{657} CONCORDANCE FOR THE PRESOCRATICS AND THE SOPHISTS

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{660} Prodicus (DK 84)

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{661} ABBREVIATIONS FOR ARISTOTLE

WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

APo.	Posterior Analytics
APr.	Prior Analytics
Cael.	On the Heavens (*De Caelo*)
Catg.	Categories
DA	De Anima (On the Soul)
Div. Somn.	On Divination in Sleep
EE	Eudemian Ethics
Fr.	Fragments
GA	Generation of Animals
GC	On Coming-to-be and Ceasing-to-be (*De Generatione et Corruptione*)
HA	History of Animals
IA	Progression of Animals (*De Incessu Animalium*)
Insomn.	On Dreams
Int.	*De Interpretatione*
Juv.	On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration
LI	On Indivisible Lines
Long.	On Length and Shortness of Life
MA	Movement of Animals

MM	*Magna Moralia*
Mem.	On Memory
Met.	Metaphysics
Mete.	Meteorology
Mu.	*De Mundo*
NE	Nicomachean Ethics
Oec.	Economics
PA	Parts of Animals
Ph.	Physics
Peri Id.	*Peri Ideōn*
Po.	Poetics
Pol.	Politics
Pr.	Problems
Protr.	*Protrepticus*
Resp.	On Respiration
Rh.	Rhetoric
SE	Sophistical Refutations
Sens.	Sense and Sensibilia
Somn.	On Sleep
Top.	Topics

Other Works

DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6ed* (Berlin, 1951).
DL	Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, ed. T. Dorandi (Cambridge, 2013).

FP	M. Frede and G. Patzig, *Aristoteles Metaphysik Z: Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar* (München, 1988).
OCT	*Oxford Classical Texts*
Primavesi	O. Primavesi, *Metaphysics A: A New Critical Edition with Introduction*. In C. Steel (ed.), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha* (Oxford, 2012).
RossDA	W. D. Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford, 1961).
RossM	W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1924).
RossP	W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936).

{662} NOTES ON THE TEXT OF ARISTOTLE

16b22: Reading οὐδὲ γὰρ for OCT οὐ γὰρ.

18a35: Reading ὥστε εἰ for OCT εἰ γὰρ (‘for if’).

72b22: Placing the comma after ποτε.

73b7: Retaining the manuscript reading τὸ λευκόν.

74a29: Retaining the manuscript reading καθόλου.

188b1–2: Taking οὐκ ἐκ μουσικοῦ (lit., ‘not from musical’) to be idiomatically equivalent to ἐξ οὐ μουσικοῦ (‘from not-musical’).

190b2: Deleting ἄλλα, with RossP.

190b22: Deleting τοὺς λόγους, with Diels and RossP.

191b20–21: Reading κύων ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο (‘a dog should come-to-be from a horse’) with mss. and the Greek commentators. RossP (OCT) has κύων <ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος> ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο (‘a dog should come-to-be from a dog, or a horse from a horse’), arguing that ‘there is no reason why Aristotle should illustrate his point by so fantastic a supposition, when the ordinary case of generation of dog by dog . . . would serve his purpose’ (RossP, 495). But the ordinary case would not serve, since what it illustrates is how one *F* can generate another, whereas Aristotle needs a case in which something that is **not** *F* becomes *F* (as his ‘it was already [an animal]’ makes clear).

193b11: Reading τέχνῃ (‘art’), with mss., in place of RossP’s φύσις (‘nature’).

194a29–30: Reading, with mss., τέλος, τοῦτο ἔσχατον (‘that last thing is also what it is for’) for RossP’s τέλος, τοῦτο <τὸ> ἔσχατον (‘that is the last thing and what it is for’). Alexander reads ἔσχατον, τοῦτο τέλος, giving this sense to the whole passage: ‘when there is something that

comes last in a continuous process of motion, that is its end and what it is for'. But that hardly explains why the poet's remark is ludicrous.

194b2: Reading ἡ δὲ ἀρχιτεκτονική, with Prantl, for mss. ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική.

197b23: Reading μὴ γένηται τῷ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ('when that for the sake of which it was done does not occur'), with Prantl, for mss. μὴ γένηται τὸ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ('when what is for the sake of another thing does not come-to-be for the sake of that thing').

256a15: Deleting κινουμένου, with Spengel and RossP.

258b29: Deleting κινούντων, with RossP.

415b10: Deleting αὕτη with RossDA.

415b19: Deleting καὶ with RossDA.

416b20: Transposing ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον [416b20] καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ [b21] πρώτη ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ [b22] δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή with RossDA.

417b14: Omitting ὥσπερ εἴρηται with RossDA.

428a11: Reading μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ' οὔ with Ross.

428a23: Retaining ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ' οὔ.

428a28: Reading δῆλον ὅτι with Hamlyn and mss.

428b20: Reading ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς here not at 428b24 with OCT.

430a20: Omitting τὸ δ'αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, which recurs at III.7 431a1–3, and is out of place here. Also omitting ἀλλ'.

430b2: Omitting φῇ, τὸ λευκὸν καὶ.

430b17: Reading κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἐκεῖνα, διαιρετὰ ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ᾗ {663} <ἐκεῖνα,> ἀδιαίρετα with the mss. but

punctuating with Ross and accepting his addition of ἐκεῖνα, although with a comma.

431a25: Reading ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα.

431b15: Reading τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα ὥσπερ, εἴ τὸ σιμὸν ᾗ μὲν σιμὸν οὔ, κεχωρισμένως δὲ ᾗ κοῖλον ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον—οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά οὐ κεχωρισμένα, ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα.

434a10: Retaining αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην.

434a14: Reading νικᾷ δ’ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλεσιν, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα for OCT νικᾷ δ’ ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν αὕτη ἐκείνην, ὁτὲ δ’ ἐκείνη ταύτην, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα <σφαῖραν>.

640a23: Reading συνιστὰν (‘gives rise to’), with Platt and Peck, for the mss. συστὰν (‘previously constituted’).

642a14: Reading δῆλόν γε πειρᾶσθαι ποιεῖν, δῆλον, with Balme.

642b2: Deleting καὶ ἡ ἔξοδος (‘and outflow’), with Michael and Düring.

982b15: Reading τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων with Primavesi for OCT τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων (‘the strange things that were close at hand’).

982b18: Reading φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλόσοφος πῶς with Primavesi for OCT ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πῶς (‘the myth-lover is in a way a philosopher’).

983a14: Reading τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν (‘when they do not have a theoretical grasp on their cause’) with the mss. OCT brackets it for deletion here and reads it following πᾶσι (‘everyone’) at 983a16.

983a16: Reading εἴ τι τῶν οὐκ ἐλαχίστων μὴ μετρεῖται with Primavesi for OCT εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται (‘that there is a thing that cannot be measured even by the smallest magnitude’).

983b6: Reading πρῶτον with Primavesi for OCT πρώτων (‘of the first philosophers’).

983b24: Reading καὶ τὸ ζῷον τούτῳ ζῶν with Primavesi for OCT καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (‘and it lives by this’).

985b8: Reading τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα with Ross and Primavesi for OCT τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος (‘the void no more is than the body’).

987b9: Reading τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων [ὁμώνυμα] with Primavesi for OCT τὰ [πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων] ὁμώνυμα (‘the things that have the same name’).

987b21: Reading τὰ εἴδη εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς for OCT τὰ εἴδη εἶναι [τοὺς ἀριθμούς] (‘are the Forms’) and Ross [τὰ εἴδη] εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς (‘are the numbers’), and treating the previous clause ἐξ ἐκείνων γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς as explanatory.

988a1: Reading νῦν μὲν γὰρ with Primavesi for OCT οἱ μὲν γὰρ (‘For they’).

990b18: Reading οἱ 6έγοντες εἴδη, which OCT brackets for deletion.

1004a31: Retaining ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη.

1026a13: Reading περὶ ἀχωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητα with the mss., for OCT περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀκίνητα (‘things that are separable but not immovable’).

1027a5: Reading αἱ ποιητικαί. OCT brackets αἱ for deletion.

1030a2: Reading ὅπερ γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι for OCT ὅπερ γάρ <τόδε> τί ἐστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (‘for the essence is just what is a this-something’).

1031a26: Reading τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταὐτὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός with FP for OCT τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (‘that the extreme terms, the ones that are coincidentally, would be the same’).

1032a11: Reading τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων with Ross for OCT τῶν γιγνομένων (‘Of things that come-to-be’).

{664} **1033a7:** Reading ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ὑγιαίνων οὐ λέγεται ἐκείνον ἐξ οὗ with FP for OCT ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ὑγιαίνων οὐ λέγεται ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ (‘The human who is of health, by contrast, is not said to be that of or from which’).

1033b5: Reading φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος . . . οὐ γίγνεται with Ross and FP for OCT φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι [οὐδὲ] τὸ εἶδος . . . οὐ γίγνεται (‘It is evident, therefore, that the form . . . itself does not come-to-be’).

1033b18: Reading τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται with FP for OCT τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται (‘what is said as form or substance does not come-to-be’).

1033b19: Reading ἢ οἰκία παρὰ τὰς πλινθίνους with FP for OCT ἢ οἰκία παρὰ τὰς πλίνθους (‘or any house beyond the bricks’).

1035b31: Reading τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης αὐτῆς with FP for OCT τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς (‘the compound that is composed of the form and the matter, <or of the matter> itself’).

1036b27: Reading αἰσθητ<ικ>ὸν γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον with FP for OCT αἰσθητὸν γάρ τι τὸ ζῷον (‘the animal is something perceptible’).

1037b1: Reading οἷον καμπυλότης καὶ καμπυλότητι εἶναι, εἰ πρώτη ἐστίν, which OCT brackets for deletion.

1037b5: Reading οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν with FP for OCT οὐδ’ <εἰ> κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕν (‘nor are they the same if they are coincidentally one’).

1038b1: Reading λέγεται δ’ ὥσπερ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία εἶναι καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων], καὶ τὸ καθόλου with FP. OCT includes the bracketed clause: ‘and the thing composed out of these’.

1038b9: Reading οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου ἴδιος ἑκάστου with FP and ᾗ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ with Bostock for OCT οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ, ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ (‘the substance of each thing is what is special to it, which does not belong to anything else’).

1038b22: Reading ἐν ᾧ ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει with Ross and FP for OCT ἐν ᾧ εἴδει ὡς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει (‘it will be the substance of that species . . .’).

1038b27: Reading οὔτε λόγῳ γὰρ οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε γνώσει with FP for OCT οὔτε λόγῳ γὰρ οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε γενέσει (‘neither in account nor in coming to be nor in knowledge’).

1039a13: Reading ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστι μονὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ with FP for OCT ἢ οὐκ ἔστι μονὰς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ (‘there is not a monad in it actually’).

1039b21: Reading ὁ λόγος ὅλως with Ross and FP for OCT ὁ λόγος ἁπλῶς (‘as simply or unconditionally the account’).

1041b7a: Reading ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο ὠδὶ ἔχον with FP for OCT ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον (‘Why is this—or rather this body having this—a human?’).

1041b7b: Reading (τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος), which OCT and FP bracket for omission.

1041b21: Reading ἔτι ἄλλου with Ross and FP for OCT ἔ τι ἄλλου.

1041b29: Reading καὶ φύσει with Ross and FP, which OCT brackets for deletion.

1043a15: Reading προτιθέντες with Ross for OCT προσθέντες (‘those who add’).

1043b25: Reading ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι with Ross for OCT ἀλλὰ ποῖον μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται [καὶ] διδάξαι <ὁρίσασθαι δ᾽οὔ>.

1050a13: Retaining ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν δέονται θεωρεῖν.

1070b23: Reading τὸ δ’ ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὖσα. OCT omits; Ross reads τὸ δ’ ὡς κινοῦν ἢ ἱστὰν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐσία (‘what is so in the sense of moving or causing rest is a sort of starting-point and substance’).

1070b24: Reading καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή here rather than at b24, and deleting it {665} at b30–31, where it is repeated in most mss. OCT brackets both occurrences for deletion.

1070b30: Reading τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος for OCT τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς <τὸ ὁμοειδὲς οἷον> ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος (‘the moving cause in the case of natural things is what is the same in form—for example, for a human a human’).

1072a24: Reading ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν μέσον, ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ for OCT ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον . . . τοίνυν ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ.

1072b22: Reading ὥστ’ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τούτου ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν with the mss. for OCT ὥστ’ ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον

ἔχειν.

1075a22: Reading τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν with Ross and the mss. for OCT τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν (‘for this is the sort of starting-point of each of them that the nature is’).

1076a4: Reading οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω for OCT οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος (‘To have many rulers is not good; one ruler’).

1086b27: Reading ἔτι δ’ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἓν ἕκαστον τιθέασιν, which OCT brackets for deletion.

1086b29: Reading κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὅνπερ οὐδὲ [τῶν ἄλλων] συλλαβῶν ἡ αὐτὴ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη with Ross for OCT κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὅνπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων συλλαβῶν ἡ αὐτὴ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη.

1086b36: Reading ἢ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαι καθόλου <ἢ> ἔσται μὴ οὐσία πρότερον οὐσίας with Ross for OCT [ἢ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαι καθόλου] ἔσται μὴ οὐσία πρότερον οὐσίας.

1094a13: Reading δὲ for OCT δὴ (‘in the same way, then’).

1094b4: Reading ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς. OCT omits πρακτικαῖς (‘practical’).

1098b12: Omitting ταληθές (‘the truth’). If it is retained, the sense is: ‘whereas the truth soon clashes with a false one’.

1104a1: Reading πρακτέων for OCT πρακτῶν (‘the things doable in action’).

1105b7: Retaining ὁ (‘the one’) with the mss.

1106b26: Reading ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ψέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις for the mss. ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται (‘excess is in error and deficiency is blamed’). OCT deletes ψέγεται (‘excess and deficiency miss the mark’).

1110b13: Reading δὴ (‘then’) for OCT δὲ (‘But it is ridiculous . . .’).

1111b22: Omitting καὶ. Or (keeping it) ‘There is wish for impossible things as well [as possible ones]’.

1113a20: Retaining τὸ.

1129b16: Retaining κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν.

1129b31: Reading χρῆσις τελεία for OCT χρῆσις (‘use’).

1133a14–16: Omitted.

1137b4: Omitting οὐ δίκαιον with some mss. OCT reads ἢτὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον (‘or what is decent is not just’).

1141a22–25: Reading εἰ δ᾽ *(‘If health’) at* a22 for OCT εἰ δὴ (‘If, then, health’) and τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν ἂν αὐτά (‘for the one that has a theoretical grasp of the good of a given sort of being is the one they would call “practically-wise”, and it is to him that they would entrust such matters’) at a25–26 for OCT τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐ πιτρέψει αὐτά (‘For the one who sees well each of the things that concern himself is the one they call “practically-wise”, and it is to him that they entrust such matters’).

1141b20: Omitting κοῦφα καὶ (‘light and’).

1142a29–30: Reading μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἡ φρόνησις for OCT μᾶλλον αἴ σθησις ἢ φρόνησις (‘[mathematical perception] is more this perception than it is practical wisdom’). A third alternative is μᾶλλον αἴσθησις {666} ἢ ἡ φρόνησις (‘[mathematical perception] is more perception than practical wisdom is’).

1142b16: Omitting ἡ βουλὴ (‘what this deliberation is’).

1144a25: Reading τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν for OCT τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ (‘to hit or hit upon it’).

1144a27–28: Reading διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ τοὺς πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι for OCT διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους

φαμὲν εἶναι (‘that is why even practically-wise people are said to be unscrupulous and clever’).

1145b8–9: Reading τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν for OCT τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ *[*τῶν*]* ἐπαινετῶν (‘excellent and praiseworthy conditions’).

1145b9–10: Reading φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν for OCT φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν (‘base and blameworthy’).

1146b1–2: Reading νῦν δὲ πεπεισμέωος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει with the ms. OCT inserts ἄλλα after δὲ and brackets ἄλλα after ἧττον (‘But in fact, though already persuaded to act otherwise, he still does the act he does’).

1169a5–6: Reading καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ κατὰ πάθος for OCT καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ κατὰ πάθος (‘and either desiring what is noble or desiring what seems advantageous’).

1174a20: Reading οἰκοδόμησις for OCT οἰκοδομική (‘craft of building’).

1174a21: Reading χρόνῳ τούτῳ for OCT χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. The sense of the entire OCT clause is: ‘in other words, in the whole time, then, that it takes or at this [final] one’.

1174b10: Reading τῆς ἡδονῆς, as at 1174b13, for OCT τὴν ἡδονήν (‘pleasure’). If we follow OCT, we should translate: ‘It is not right to say, as people do, that pleasure is a process or a coming to be’.

1180a30: Transposing καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι from 1180a30 (where it is deleted in the OCT) to 1180a32.

1255a17: Reading εὔνοια δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι with Dreizehnter and the mss. for OCT ἄνοια δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι (‘one side believes that justice is nonsense’).

1255b6: Reading καὶ δίκαιον with Saunders, which OCT brackets for deletion.

1256a15: Reading ἥ δὲ κτῆσις with ms. Γ for OCT ἥ γε κτῆσις.

1256a18: Reading μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς for OCT μέρος τι τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

1260a4: Reading τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων with Dreizehnter and Saunders for OCT τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων.

1262a28: Reading καὶ with the mss.

1262a30: Reading γνωριζόντων with Saunders and the mss. for OCT γνωριζομένων.

1275b24: Reading οὕτω δὲ ὁριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως with ms. Γ for OCT οὕτω δὲ ὁριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ παχέως (‘but coarse, political definitions of this sort’).

1276a33: Reading [π]ότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει with Simpson and some mss. for OCT πότερον ἔθνος ἓν ἢ πλείω συμφέρει (‘whether it is - advantageous for it to consist of more than one race or not’).

1277b4: Reading τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν. OCT brackets the first οὐδὲ τὸν for deletion.

1283a19: Reading τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς with OCT and Schütrumpf. Dreizehnter reads τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς (‘military virtue’).

1332a17: Reading τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος αἵρεσίς ἐστιν with the mss. for OCT τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσίς ἐστιν.

{667} GLOSSARY FOR ARISTOTLE

ACCOUNT: see ***logos*** **ACTION (*praxis*):** The noun *praxis* (verb: *prattein*) is used in a broad sense to refer to any intentional action, including one performed by a child or wild beast, and in a narrower one to refer exclusively to what results from deliberation (*bouleusis*) and DELIBERATE CHOICE (*prohairesis*), of which neither wild beasts nor children are capable.

ACTIVITY (*energeia*): see ACTUALITY

ACTUALITY (*entelecheia*): Mostly used as a synonym of *energeia* ('activity') but with a slightly different connotation. Both are Aristotelian coinages: *energeia* is action, activity, and movement oriented; *entelecheia* is end (*telos*) or completion (*enteles*) oriented. Both are contrasted with POTENTIALITY.

Although *energeia* is movement and action oriented, Aristotle distinguishes it from *kinēsis*. The reason is that an *energeia* is COMPLETE, whereas MOVEMENT is an incomplete actuality. See MOVEMENT.

Aristotle sometimes distinguishes between two levels of actuality. A first-level actuality is an existing capacity that is not being exercised, such as the ability to speak Chinese that one may possess when silent or even asleep. A second-level actuality is the exercise of a first-level actuality, such as exercising the capacity to speak Chinese by actually doing so. At *DA* II.2 412b5 he describes the SOUL as 'the first actuality (*entelecheia*) of a natural instrumental body'.

AFFECTION: see ATTRIBUTE

***aisthēsis*:** see PERCEPTION

***aisthēton*:** see PERCEPTIBLE OBJECT

***aition, aitia*:** see CAUSE

ALL, THE (*to pan*): see UNIVERSE

***alloiōsis*:** see ALTERATION

ALTERATION (*alloiōsis*): Alteration is MOVEMENT (*kinēsis*) with respect to QUALITY, such as COMING-TO-BE pale or musical, in which a SUBSTANCE acquires a quality that is the CONTRARY of one that it previously had.

***antikeimenon*:** see OPPOSITE

***apeiron*:** see INFINITE

***apodeixis*:** see DEMONSTRATION

***aporia*:** see PUZZLE

APPEAR (*phainesthai*): (1) *Phainetai* + infinitive means ‘appears to be’ but strongly suggests ‘may not actually be’. (2) *Phainetai* + participle means ‘appears to be (and very likely is)’. In sense (2), *phainetai* is usually translated ‘evidently is’.

APPEARANCES (*phainomena*): The way things seem or APPEAR. But note the ambiguity of ‘APPEAR’.

APPETITE (*epithumia*): Appetite is a DESIRE (*orexis*) for what is pleasant and an aversion to what is painful (*DA* II.3414b5–6; *NE* III.2 1111b16–17).

***archē*:** see STARTING-POINT

***aretē*:** see VIRTUE

ART: see CRAFT

ATTRIBUTE, PROPERTY (*pathos*, plural *pathē*): What X *paschei* (‘suffers’ or ‘undergoes’) is what happens to him, so that he is passive with respect to it, as opposed to what he *poiei* (‘does as an agent’, or ‘produces’). When Y does something to X, X is affected by it, so his *pathē as a result are, in one sense, his affections or attributes and, in another, his passions or feelings.*

BELIEF (*doxa*): Belief presupposes rational calculation, which is why animals do not have beliefs (*DA* III.11 434a5–11). Unlike calculation and deliberation, however, which are {668} types of inquiry, what one believes is a form of assertion, which is why believing is not up to us.

CAPACITY, POTENTIALITY (*dunamis*): The term *dunamis* is used by Aristotle to capture two different but related things. (1) As in ordinary Greek, it signifies a power or capacity something has, especially to move something else (productive *dunamis*) or to be moved by something else (passive *dunamis*). (2) Contrasted with *energeia* and *entelecheia*, it signifies a way of being, namely, potential being as opposed to ACTIVITY or ACTUALITY. A potentiality is a potentiality for its corresponding actuality; for example, an acorn is a potential oak tree, since it has within it the capability (given the appropriate circumstances) of becoming an actual one.

CATEGORIES, PREDICATIONS (*katēgoriai*): A category is a collection of PREDICATES that all answer the same question about some SUBJECT. Thus, predicates in the category of QUALITY answer the question 'What is it like?'; those in the category of quantity answer the question 'How much is it?'; and so on.

Although Aristotle is not always consistent about which or even how many categories there are, *Catg*. 1b27–2a4 lists these ten: substance, quality, quantity, relative, where, when, being arranged, having on, doing, being affected. *Top*. I.8 103b10 offers essentially the same list, but it calls the first category 'WHAT-IT-IS' rather than 'substance'. (Aristotle seems to reconcile the two lists at *Met*. VII.4 1030a17–24: 'the what-it-is signifies in one way the substance and the this-something, and in another way it signifies each of the other things that are predicated—quantity, quality, and the like. . . . For we can also ask what quality is, and so quality too is something with a what-it-is').

A central and recurrent theme in Aristotle's writings is the claim that beings in categories other than that of substance are ontologically dependent on those in the category of substance. Even though we can say of a quality, for example, what-it-is (that is, we can DEFINE it or state its ESSENCE), it is still dependent for its existence on its presence in some substance as its subject.

CAUSE, REASON, EXPLANATION (*aition, aitia*): Aristotle distinguishes four causes (or, perhaps, four senses of 'cause'): (1) MATTER ('that FROM which, as a component, a thing comes to be'); (2) FORM ('the

account of the essence . . . and the parts included in the account'); (3) STARTING-POINT of MOVEMENT ('that from which the change or the resting from change first starts'); and (4) that FOR WHICH ('the end, and this is the for-the-sake-of-which') (*Met.* V.2 1013a24–b3, *Ph.* II.3 194b17–195a4). These have been traditionally called (although not by Aristotle) the 'material', 'formal', 'efficient', and 'final' causes, respectively.

In answering a 'why?' question, one cites an *aition*. The kinds of things that can be cited as *aitia* vary widely, and can include substances, states, and events.

CHANGE (*metabolē*): Change for Aristotle is always linked to a given category within which it occurs: ALTERATION is a change of QUALITY; growth or diminution are changes of quantity; SPATIAL MOVEMENT is a change of place; and COMING-TO-BE and ceasing-to-be (passing away) are changes in respect to SUBSTANCE. He almost always uses the term *metabolē* interchangeably with MOVEMENT (*kinēsis*), but sometimes distinguishes the two, marking off *kinēseis* in particular from *metabolai* in general by classifying substantial changes (comings-to-be and ceasings-to-be) as *metabolai* but not *kinēseis* (see *Ph.* V.1–2).

This distinction probably reflects the fact that in a change of quality (or quantity, or place) an underlying subject loses one quality (or quantity, or place) and gains another (e.g., goes from pale to dark, or from Athens to Sparta)—all cases of qualified coming-to-be. But in a change of substance, the subject does not migrate from one substance to another (e.g., from elm to horse). Rather, a change in respect to substance involves the UNQUALIFIED coming-to-be or ceasing-to-be of, e.g., an elm or a horse.

***chōriston*:** see SEPARABLE

CITIZEN (*politēs*): A *politēs haplōs* ('unconditional citizen') is someone who shares in judicial and deliberative office of a CITY. But the {669} term *politēs* also applies more broadly to those who do not share in the constitution. In a kingship, for example, only the king is an unconditional citizen, but kings, unlike tyrants, are said to have fellow citizens as their bodyguards; those who share in the advantages of office, but not in office itself, are citizens; and women and children are implicitly included among

the citizens. Some of this apparent disunity is explained by the fact that a citizen is defined relative to a city and a constitution, so that a person might be referred to as a citizen even if he counted as a citizen only relative to some constitution. But it is also no doubt true that Aristotle sometimes uses the term in the loose and popular sense to apply to anyone who passes a pragmatic test of citizenship such as having parents who are citizens.

CITY (*polis*): A *polis* (plural: *poleis*) is a unique political arrangement, something like a city and something like a state (hence 'city', 'state', and 'city-state' are common translations). For unlike a typical city a *polis* enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern nation-state (it could possess its own army and navy, enter into alliances, make war, and so on), whereas unlike a typical state, it was a politically, religiously, and culturally unified small community. Because a *polis* is a multitude of citizens, Aristotle's conception of it inherits some of the complexity inherent in his notion of a CITIZEN.

A *polis* is not simply a multitude of citizens, however, but a community of citizens sharing a constitution, so that *poleis* with different constitutions are also different. Moreover, while a *polis* includes women, children, and slaves, strictly speaking only the unconditional citizens, who share in judicial and deliberative office, are genuine parts of it. A *polis* is the natural community for human beings to live in, since there, and only there, can they achieve the happiness that is their natural end.

COINCIDENT (*sumbebēkos*): 1. Aristotle contrasts having an attribute coincidentally or contingently (*kata sumbebēkos* or *per accidens* in Latin), with having it INTRINSICALLY or noncontingently (*kath' hauto* or *per se* in Latin). Coincidental attributes of this sort are of no interest to science, since they cannot be demonstrated to belong to their subjects. This is typically what he means by this term.

2. But Aristotle recognizes another sort of coincidental attribute, one which is INTRINSIC to its subject although not part of its ESSENCE. These '*per se* accidents' are not included in a thing's DEFINITION but are demonstrable from it, as having internal angles equal to two right angles is demonstrable from the definition of a triangle.

COME-TO-BE (*gignesthai*), COMING-TO-BE (*genesis*): Aristotle distinguished two kinds of coming-to-be: (1) SIMPLE or unqualified coming-to-be (*genesis haplē), and (2) qualified coming-to-be, i.e., becoming something* (*gignesthai ti*). In (2) it is the *ti* (‘something’) that states the qualification.

(1) includes cases in which a substance comes into existence. If *x* comes-to-be *haplōs* at time *t*, then *x* did not exist prior to *t*. In (2), a pre-existing SUBJECT (typically a SUBSTANCE) undergoes some kind of CHANGE, such as ALTERATION (change in QUALITY), growth (change in quantity), or MOVEMENT (change of place). The subject of qualified coming-to-be existed before the change, and persists through it.

Coming-to-be is contrasted with ceasing-to-be (*phthora*, literally ‘perishing’). But Aristotle holds that these two processes are correlative: ‘the ceasing-to-be of *A* is the coming-to-be of *B*’, and vice versa (*GC* I.3 318a24–25). When a pale thing becomes dark, it ceases to be pale, and when it ceases to be dark, it becomes pale.

COMMUNITY (*koinōnia*): A *koinōnia* (sometimes translated as ‘partnership’) consists of people of different kinds, who engage in a common enterprise that involves sharing something in common (*koinos*) (*Pol.* II.1 1260b39–40), and who are bound to one another by a sort of friendship and a sort of justice as a result. Thus a household is a *koinōnia*, a city is a *koinōnia*, but so are a master and a slave, or the partners in a business {670} transaction, or even fellow travelers (*Pol.* II.5 1263a17). The political *koinōnia*, however, subsumes all or most of these.

COMPLETE (*teleios*): A thing is complete when it has achieved its END, i.e., its FINAL CAUSE; see FOR SOMETHING. The adjective *teleios* derives from *telos* (‘end’, ‘goal’), and is related to *entelecheia* (ACTUALITY). But not every actuality is complete; MOVEMENT is an incomplete actuality.

CONSTITUTION (*politeia*): A *politeia* is ‘a sort of way of life (*bios*) of a CITY’ (*Pol.* IV.11 1295a40–b1); ‘a certain ordering of those who inhabit the city’ (*Pol.* III.1 1274b38) or of its various offices, ‘above all of the office that CONTROLS everything’ (*Pol.* III.6 1278b8–10). ‘It is by seeking HAPPINESS in different ways and by different means that individual groups

of people create different ways of life and different constitutions' (*Pol*. VII.8 1328a41–b2).

CONTEMPLATIVE (*theōrētikos*): The adjective *theōrētikos* is usually translated as 'contemplative' when applied to a type of life or activity (*NE* X.7 1177a18) in contrast to a practical (*praktikos*) one or one focused on doing actions, but as 'theoretical', when applied to a type of science or thought (*NE* VI.2 1139a27).

CONTRADICTORY (*antiphasis*): Propositions are contradictories of one another if and only if (1) they cannot both be true and (2) they cannot both be false. 'Every man is ill' and 'Some man is not ill' are contradictories—necessarily, exactly one of them is true.

Two ATTRIBUTES are contradictories of one another if and only if they cannot both belong to the same SUBJECT, but every subject must have one or the other. For example, white and not-white are opposites, since even colorless things, such as numbers, are not-white. See CONTRARY, OPPOSITE.

CONTRARY (*enantion*): A pair of OPPOSITE ATTRIBUTES are contraries of one another if and only if (1) they belong to the same GENUS, and (2) they cannot both belong to the same SUBJECT in the same respect at the same time, but (3) there are subjects that possess neither of them. For example, white and black are contraries since they are mutually exclusive colors; but (a) there is a range of intermediate colors between them, such as gray, which is neither black nor white, and (b) there are things such as numbers that possess no attributes from the genus of color.

A pair of propositions are contraries of one another if and only if they cannot both be true, but they may both be false. 'Every man is ill' and 'No man is ill', for example, are contraries. See OPPOSITE, CONTRADICTORY.

CONTROL (*kurios*): Control is fundamentally executive power or authority or the power to compel, so that a general is *kurios* over his army (*NE* III.8 1116a29–b2) and a political ruler is *kurios* over a city and its inhabitants. Since what is *kurios* in a sphere determines or partly determines what happens within it, it is one of the most estimable or important elements in the sphere. Aristotle also uses the adverb *kuriōs* with a term to mean 'in the full or strict sense' of the term.

CRAFT, ART (*technē*): A craft is a science concerned with production rather than action or contemplation.

DECENT (*epieikēs*): *Epieikēs* is sometimes used interchangeably with *agathos*. In a narrower sense, an *epieikēs* person is characterized in particular by an attitude to legal justice that pays more attention to fairness than to the letter of the law. What makes an *epieikēs* person decent is that he is fair-minded and considerate of others. When contrasted with the majority, the *epieikeis* are the ones who are better off and more respectable.

DEDUCTION (*sullogismos*): In the broad sense, a deduction is a logical inference from one set of propositions (premises) to another proposition (conclusion). The premises of a deduction are typically general principles from which a more particular conclusion is derived. In a narrower sense, a *sullogismos* is an inference pattern (called a 'syllogism' in {671} English) involving three terms contained in two premises and a conclusion, as described in Aristotle's *APr*.

DEFINITION (*horismos*): A definition of something is a FORMULA that states the ESSENCE of that thing (*Top*. I.5 101b34). *Horismos* is cognate with *horos* ('defining mark'), whose root meaning derives from a stone marking the boundary or limit of a territory or piece of land in a visible way.

In *APo.* II.10, Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of definition: (1) one that gives an account of what a name signifies (93b30), and (2) one that states what something is by giving an account of why it is (93b35). Definitions of type (1) are what have come to be called 'nominal definitions'; those of type (2), 'real definitions'.

An Aristotelian definition of a SPECIES is typically given by citing its GENUS and DIFFERENTIA.

DELIBERATE CHOICE (*prohairesis*): We wish for the end or target, we 'deliberate about and deliberately choose what furthers it' (*NE* III.5 1113b3–4). Deliberate choice (*prohairesis*) is thus a matter of choosing (*haireisthai*) one thing before or in preference to (*pro*) another (III.2

1112a16–17), and so of deliberating about what things should be done earlier than or in preference to others in order to further the desired end.

DEMONSTRATION (*apodeixis*): A DEDUCTION whose premises (1) are immediate or indemonstrable (hence arrived at by INDUCTION), (2) inspire our total confidence, and (3) are NECESSARY (and so, of course, true) in a special sense: the predicates in them belong to the subjects in every case, INTRINSICALLY, and UNIVERSALLY (*APo*. I.4 73a24–27). See also DIALECTIC.

DESIRE (*orexis*): There are three kinds of desire: (1) rational desire or wish (*boulēsis*), directed toward an END regarded as good; (2) APPETITE (*epithumia*) directed toward what is pleasant; and (3) emotion (*thumos*), connected to shame, honor, and anger.

DIALECTIC (*dialektikē*): 1. A competitive method of inquiry involving a questioner and an answerer. A problem (*problēma*) is posed in the form of a yes/no question. The answerer must respond either yes or no. The questioner must refute him by asking questions—by offering him premises (*protaseis*) to accept or reject. The questioner succeeds if he forces the answerer to accept a proposition contrary to the one he undertook to defend. The questioner fails if the answerer always accepts or rejects premises in a way consistent with that proposition. Much of Aristotle's *Topics* is devoted to dialectic.

2. Dialectic is also a method for dealing with puzzles or perplexities (*aporiai*).

3. In Aristotle's own methodology, dialectic plays an important role in establishing the STARTING-POINTS (first principles) of a given science, for Aristotle holds that these are not susceptible of proof or DEMONSTRATION. See *Top*. I.2 101a34–b4.

dialektikē: see DIALECTIC

diaphora: see DIFFERENTIA

DIFFERENTIA (*diaphora*): An attribute, or collection of attributes, that distinguishes one SPECIES from others of the same GENUS.

DISTINCTIVE PROPERTY, SPECIAL ATTRIBUTE, PROPER (*idion*): 'An *idion* does not reveal the essence of a thing yet belongs to

that thing alone and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is an [*idion*] of a human to be receptive of grammar, since if someone is human he is receptive of grammar, and if he is receptive of grammar he is human' (*Top*. I.5 102a18–22). *Idion* in this sense will be translated as 'distinctive property' or 'special attribute'.

Aristotle also describes a perceptible object that is proper or peculiar to a given sense as *idion* to that sense. In these cases, *idion* will be rendered as 'proper'. The proper object of a given sense is (1) not perceived by any other sense, and (2) what that sense perceives whenever it perceives at all. For example, color is *idion* to sight and sound to hearing.

{672} ***doxa*:** see BELIEF

***dunamis*:** see CAPACITY

EFFICIENT CAUSE: see CAUSE

***eidenai*:** see KNOWLEDGE

***eidos*:** see FORM

ELEMENT (*stoicheion*): The term *stoicheion* literally means 'letter' of the alphabet. Letters, we might say, are the elements of which words are composed, and Aristotle extends this usage in using the term to refer to the basic material ingredients of all physical objects. On his theory, there are four elements or 'primary bodies' (earth, air, fire, and water) composing all material objects in the sublunary realm. (There is a fifth element—*aithēr*—of which the heavenly bodies are composed.) Each element has its own NATURE, including its own natural MOVEMENT.

***enantion*:** See CONTRARY

END, GOAL (*telos*): 'The end is the best and last thing for whose sake all the other things are done' (*EE* II.1 1219a10–11; *Met*. V.16 1021b29–30). The *telos* (from which we get 'teleology') is that FOR WHICH or FOR-THE-SAKE-OF-WHICH something is done. It is also called (although not by Aristotle) a FINAL CAUSE (from the Latin *finis*, which corresponds to the Greek *telos*).

***endoxa*:** see REPUTABLE BELIEFS

***energeia*:** see ACTUALITY

***entelecheia*:** see ACTUALITY

epagōgē: see INDUCTION

***epieikēs*:** see DECENT

epistēmē: see KNOWLEDGE

***epithumia*:** see APPETITE

***epi tou pollou*:** see FOR THE MOST PART

ergon: see FUNCTION

ESSENCE (*ti ēn einai*): The essence of *x* is the WHAT-IT-IS of *x*, what *x* is INTRINSICALLY; it is what the definiens in the (real) DEFINITION of *x* refers to. The curious phrase '*to ti ēn einai F*' (literally, 'the what it was to be for *F*')—where '*F*' is a general term in the dative case—is meant to convey the idea of what it is (and always been) for something to count as an *F*.

Aristotle also has other terms for a thing's essence. He often shortens '*to ti ēn einai F*' to '*to einai F*', again with '*F*' in the dative, (literally, 'the being for *F*'); he sometimes uses the expression 'the SUBSTANCE (*ousia*) of *x*' or 'the FORM of *x*' to refer to the essence of *x*; he also uses '*x* is *hoper F*' (literally, '*x* is the very thing that is an *F*') to express the idea that *F* is the essence of *x*, especially where *F* is a genus of which *x* is a species. See also NATURE, WHAT-IT-IS.

***eudaimonia*:** see HAPPINESS

FINAL CAUSE: see CAUSE, FOR WHICH, END

FOR THE MOST PART (*epi tou pollou*): The fact that things in a given area of study hold for the most part does not preclude there being a demonstrative science of them (*APr*. I.13 32b18–22; *APo*. I.30 87b19–27; *Met*. VI. 2 1027a19–21). Theorems of natural sciences hold for the most part (*APr*. I.13 32b4–8), as do those of ethics or politics (*NE* V.10 1137b13–19, IX.2 1164b31–33). Only strictly theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy, and theology, have theorems that hold universally and with unconditional necessity (*NE* VI.3 1139b18–24).

FOR WHICH, FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH (*hou heneka*): Aristotle calls a thing or process ‘for something’ (*heneka tou*) if it is goal-directed, aimed at some END. The end at which it aims is what it is *for*, that for the sake of which (*hou heneka*) it exists or is done.

FORM, SPECIES, SORT (*eidos*): In the most general sense, the *eidos* of something is the sort or type of thing it is. In this sense, it is more or less equivalent to *genos* (GENUS) in its most general sense, and Aristotle often uses the two terms interchangeably.

{673} In a narrower sense, *eidos* (species) is contrasted with *genos*: an *eidos* is a species of some larger genus (as tigers, for example, are a species of animal). The species of a given genus are marked off from one another by their DIFFERENTIAE. The genus is PREDICATED of its species; both a genus and its species are predicated of the PARTICULARS that fall under them.

In a related narrower sense, *eidos* (form) is contrasted with *hulē* (MATTER): a SUBSTANCE is a compound of form and matter. Form in this sense is predicated of matter.

Aristotle also uses this term for what gets specified in a DEFINITION; in this sense ‘form’ and ‘ESSENCE’ pick out the same thing. See CAUSE.

FORMULA: see *logos* **FUNCTION (*ergon*):** A function is: (1) an activity that is the use or actualization of a state, capacity, or disposition; or (2) a work or product that is the further result of such an activity. The END or FINAL CAUSE of a thing is intimately related to its function, and its good or doing well ‘seems to lie in the function’ (*NE* I.7 1097b26–27). Finally, the NATURE, FORM, or ESSENCE of such things as flesh, or bones, or hands, is intimately related to their function, and so ‘they are all defined by their function’ (*Mete*. IV.12 390a10). Aristotle attributes functions to a wide variety of things, whether living or nonliving.

***genos*:** see GENUS

GENUS (*genos*), pl. GENERA (*genē*): In the most general sense, the *genos* of something is the sort or type of thing it is. In a narrower sense, a *genos* is a broad classification that can be subdivided into a number of SPECIES. See FORM.

***gignesthai, genesis*:** see COME-TO-BE

***gnōsis*:** see KNOWLEDGE

***haplōs*:** see SIMPLY

HAPPINESS (*eudaimonia*): The word *eudaimonia*, derived from *eu* ('well') + *daimōn* (a personal divine being of lower status than a god), is traditionally but somewhat misleadingly translated as 'happiness', which wrongly conveys the idea of pleasure or euphoria. Aristotle in fact explicitly denies that *eudaimonia* is pleasure (*EN* X.1–5). 'Human flourishing', 'prospering', or 'living well' come closer to what Aristotle has in mind. *Eudaimonia* is the highest good—living and acting in accordance with VIRTUE. It is the END of a COMPLETE life.

***hē(i)*:** see INSOFAR AS

***heneka tou*:** see FOR WHICH

***hexis*:** see STATE

HOMONYMOUS (*homōnumon*): Things are said to be homonymous when they have only a name in common, but do not share the same DEFINITION. (It is the things, not their names, that Aristotle calls homonymous.) In examples of sheer homonymy, there is virtually nothing in common between the homonyms. (E.g., briefcases, court cases, and grammatical cases are all cases, but homonymously.) Aristotle also distinguishes between genuine *F*s and non-genuine ones by saying that the latter are *F*s 'only homonymously'. (E.g., the hand of a statue or a corpse is a hand 'only homonymously').

He contrasts homonymous things with those 'spoken of in many ways' (*pollachōs legomena*). These are things that have the same name but more than just that in common, so that they are not sheer homonyms. A diet and a complexion may both be healthy, but not in the same sense: the former is conducive to health, the latter symptomatic of it (*Met.* IV.2 1003a35–b4). But they have in common that they are defined in terms of health. Famously, being is spoken of in many ways (*Met.* V.2 1003b5–10, VII.1 1028a10), since both SUBSTANCES and QUALITIES are beings, with the latter defined in terms of the former.

***horismos*:** see DEFINITION

***hou heneka*:** see FOR WHICH

hulē: see MATTER

***hupokeimenon*:** see SUBJECT

***idion*:** see DISTINCTIVE PROPERTY

{674} **IMAGINATION (*phantasia*):** The noun *phantasia* is cognate with the verb *phainesthai*, APPEAR, and in its broadest sense it means the way something appears to someone. More specifically, imagination is a CAPACITY that results from PERCEPTION and is related to BELIEF. See *DA* III.3 428a1–429a7.

INDUCTION (*epagōgē):* A method of reasoning that proceeds from the PARTICULAR to the UNIVERSAL (as opposed to DEDUCTION, which proceeds the other way around). Aristotle describes the inductive method in *APo*. II.19.

INFINITE, UNLIMITED (*apeiron*): *Apeiron* means literally 'without limit (*peras*)', but in mathematical contexts Aristotle applies it to series that do not have a last member, so that no matter how many members have been listed, there are still more. It thus closely approximates the contemporary mathematical notion of infinity.

INSOFAR AS, QUA (*hē(i)*): *Hē(i)* is the dative case of the relative pronoun, and means literally 'by which' or 'in virtue of which'; 'qua', its literal translation into Latin, has been adopted into English. (We have mainly used 'insofar as' in these translations, but 'qua' is commonly found in many others.) Its meaning is best illustrated by an example. A single individual may be both a man and a doctor, but it is insofar as he is a doctor that he cures his patients, and insofar as he is a man that he is an animal. Thus, '*x* is *F* qua *G*' means that *x*'s being *G* is what explains *x*'s being *F*, in that *x*'s being *G* is the INTRINSIC CAUSE of *x*'s being *F*.

INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT (*noēton*): An intelligible object or content (*noēma*) is a FORM (*eidos*) (as at *Met.* I.1 981a10), which is usually encoded in an APPEARANCE, and can be grasped by the UNDERSTANDING (*nous*) when it CONTEMPLATES (*theōrein*) that appearance (*DA* III.7

431a14–b10). It differs from an appearance in being an affirmation, evaluable as true or false (*DA* III.8 432a8–12).

INTRINSICALLY, IN ITS OWN RIGHT, WITH RESPECT TO ITSELF, *PER SE* (*kath' hauto*): A PREDICATE *F* belongs intrinsically to a subject *G* just in case it is related to *G* in one of four ways: (1) *F* is in the account or DEFINITION of what *G* is, or of *G*'s SUBSTANCE or ESSENCE (*APo.* I.4 73a34–37); (2) *G* is a complex subject—for example, odd number or male animal—and *F* is in the definition of one of *G*'s parts; (3) *F* just is *G*'s essence; or (4) *F* is not a part of *G*'s essence or identical to it but stems causally from it, so that being *G* is an intrinsic CAUSE of being *F* (*APo.* I.4 73a34–b2). Aristotle contrasts *kath' hauto* with *kata sumbebēkos*. See COINCIDENT.

***katēgorein*:** see PREDICATE

***katēgoriai*:** see CATEGORIES

***kath' hauto*:** see INTRINSICALLY

***kath' hekaston*:** see PARTICULAR

***katholou*:** see UNIVERSAL

KIND: see GENUS, SPECIES

***kinēsis*:** see MOVEMENT

KNOWLEDGE (*epistēmē, gnōsis*): Aristotle uses three different verbs corresponding to the English 'know': we render *epistasthai* as 'know scientifically', and both *gignōskein* and *eidenai* as 'know'. The latter two are more generic; the first has the more specific meaning of a kind of knowledge (*epistēmē) that can be established* DEDUCTIVELY as the conclusion of a piece of scientific reasoning.

Aristotle usually divides *epistēmai* into three types: THEORETICAL (contemplative), PRACTICAL (action related), and productive (CRAFTS). But sometimes a more fine-grained classification is employed, in which sciences previously classified as theoretical (such as physics, biology, and others dealing with the sublunary world) are reclassified as 'natural sciences' and distinguished from theoretical sciences in the strict sense

(such as astronomy and theology), which deal with the superlunary sphere of eternal things.

As for knowledge of first principles, or STARTING-POINTS, Aristotle invokes a state of mind he calls *nous*, a kind of knowledge that is not established by deducing it from first {675} principles (since they are not susceptible of DEMONSTRATION). Rather, *nous* (usually translated as 'understanding', 'mind', or 'intellect') is a direct grasp of first principles on the basis of INDUCTION or DIALECTIC. See UNDERSTANDING.

***koinōnia*:** see COMMUNITY

***kurios*:** see CONTROL

LACK: see PRIVATION

LEISURE (*scholē*): Aristotle's way of thinking about leisure (*scholē*) overlaps with ours, but differs from it in important ways. We think of leisure time as time off from work in which we can do as we choose. Aristotle agrees that leisure time and work time are distinct, but thinks that to be entirely leisurely an activity must be choiceworthy solely because of itself. He counts as leisurely such scientific activities as the exercise of theoretical wisdom or mathematical knowledge, which we might think of as work.

***logos*:** This slippery term can mean a variety of things (both in Aristotle and in other Greek authors): reason, account, language, statement, sentence, argument, ratio, formula, DEFINITION, FORM. Humans differ from animals in having *logos* (reason); this rational CAPACITY is expressed in *logos* (language), which consists in *logoi* (sentences) that are used to make *logoi* (statements) that in turn compose *logoi* (arguments); among these statements are the *logoi* (formulas) that constitute definitions that state a thing's *logos* (form) or ESSENCE.

LUCK (*tuchē*): What happens by luck in the broad sense is what happens COINCIDENTALLY or contingently (*APo*. I.30 87b19–22; Met. X.8 1065a24–28). What happens by luck in the narrow sense of practical luck is what has a coincidental FINAL CAUSE. If a tree's being by the backdoor is the sort of thing that might be an outcome of deliberative thought, it is a candidate final cause of ACTION—an END we aim at (*Ph*. II.5 197a5–8, II.6 197b20–

22). If wish, which is the DESIRE involved in deliberation and DELIBERATE CHOICE, is what causes it to be there, the tree's being by the backdoor is a genuine final cause. If not, its being there is a coincidental final cause. Unlike chance (*to automaton*), which applies quite generally to whatever results from coincidental EFFICIENT CAUSES, practical luck applies only to what could come about because of action and deliberate choice. Hence it is the sphere relevant to action: 'For luck and the results of luck belong to things that are capable of being fortunate and in general capable of action, and that is why luck has got to involve action' (*Ph.* II.6 197b1–2). The sphere of practical luck is also that of the practical and productive sciences (*PA* I.1 640a27–33; *Rh*. I.5 1362a2). Goods external to the soul are controlled by luck (*MM* VII.3 1206b33–34), goods internal to it, such as VIRTUE, are not (*NE* I.10 1100b7–21; *Pol*. VII.1 1323b27–29).

MATTER (*hulē*): 'By matter I mean that which, INTRINSICALLY, is neither said to be something, nor some quantity, nor anything else by which being is given DEFINITION' (*Met*. VII.3 1029a20–21). It is, basically, the stuff of which SUBSTANCES are composed. Matter is the SUBJECT of which FORM is PREDICATED.

Whether or not something is matter depends on the level of organization at which that thing is being considered—the distinction between a thing and the matter of which it is composed is relative. Thus, wood is the matter of which a table is composed, and earth is the matter of which wood is composed. In this case, wood is considered the proximate, or 'closest', matter of the table, and earth is its remote matter. Relative to the table, wood is matter; relative to earth, it is not.

Aristotle may think (although this is often disputed) that there is a lowest level of matter ('prime matter') which persists through all CHANGES and which is pure POTENTIALITY, having no ESSENTIAL properties of its own. See *Ph*. II.1 193a17–21, *GC* II.5 332a17–20, and *Met*. VII.3.

metabolē: see CHANGE

MOVEMENT, MOTION, PROCESS (*kinēsis*): 'Movement' and 'motion', the traditional {676} translations of *kinēsis*, are really too specific, since for Aristotle changes in QUALITY (e.g., color) or quantity (e.g., size) also count as *kinēseis*. What we mean by 'movement' Aristotle

would call *phora* (SPATIAL MOVEMENT, or locomotion), which is a *kinēsis* with respect to place only. *Kinēsis* is the broader notion of change or process in general, applying to changes of QUALITY and quantity, as well place. But we have reserved 'change' as a translation of *metabolē, which includes not only kinēseis* but also changes with respect to SUBSTANCE, i.e., SIMPLE COMING-TO-BE and ceasing-to-be. See also ALTERATION.

Aristotle defines movement as 'the ACTUALITY of that which POTENTIALLY is, QUA potentially' (*Ph.* III.1 201a11). The precise meaning of this definition has been a matter of scholarly dispute, but the general consensus seems to be that movement is an incomplete actuality. House building, for example, exists when and only when the house is actually in the process of being built (and hence is still incomplete) and the process ceases to exist when the house is COMPLETE. The process of house building is actual, but is essentially incomplete in that it ceases to exist as soon as its END (the house) becomes actual.

NATURE (*phusis*): Aristotle uses the term *phusis* in two related senses.

1. In the *Physics*, he defines a nature as 'a starting-point of change and rest (with respect to place, or to growth and withering, or to qualitative change)' (II.1 192b13–15). In his view, not just plants and animals but all material objects have natures, since even the four ELEMENTS (of which all material objects in the sublunary realm are composed) have natures. A nature in this sense is roughly the same as an ESSENCE.

2. In a global sense, *phusis* means the entire natural world of material objects, that is, everything that has a nature in the first sense. Aristotle's *Physics* is a study of nature in the global sense.

NOBLE-GOODNESS (*kalokagathia*): 'Noble-goodness is complete virtue' (*EE* VIII.3 1249a16–17; also *MM* II.8 1207b20–27). See also *Pol.* II.9 1270a20.

***noēton*:** see INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT

***nous*:** see UNDERSTANDING

OPPOSITE (*antikeimenon*): Opposites are either CONTRARIES or CONTRADICTORIES. Opposites include both opposed ATTRIBUTES, e.g., white

and black, which cannot both belong to the same SUBJECT in the same respect at the same time, and opposed propositions, e.g., ‘Every man is ill’ and ‘No man is ill’, which cannot both be true at the same time.

***orexis*:** see DESIRE

***ousia*:** see SUBSTANCE

***pan*:** see UNIVERSE

PARTICULAR (*kath’ hekaston*): 1. True particulars are individual things taken one at a time. A particular is ‘what is not of a nature to be PREDICATED of many things’ (*Int.* 17a39-40), i.e., what is not UNIVERSAL.

2. But Aristotle sometimes refers to a thing as *kath’ hekaston* if it is less universal in comparison to something else (such as a species in comparison to its GENUS). Thus while true particulars are indefinable (*Met.* VII.15 1039b27–29, 1040a27–b4), it is ‘easier to define the *kath’ hekaston* than the universal’ (*APo*. II.13 97b28), and a DEFINITION of a universal ‘divides it into *kath’ hekasta*’ (*Ph*. I.1 184b2–3), where these are things that are particular in the sense of being ‘indivisible in species’ (*PA* I.4 644a30–31).

3. There are true particulars in every CATEGORY. Just as there are particular humans, e.g., Socrates and Callias, that are not predicated of anything else, so too there are particular qualities, e.g., ‘this individual white’ (*to ti leukon*, *Catg*. 1a27), that are not shared by many SUBJECTS.

***pathos*:** see ATTRIBUTE

PERCEPTIBLE OBJECT (*aisthēton*): A perceptible object or content (*aisthēma*) is an ATTRIBUTE that can be grasped by one or more of the five senses. It is contrasted with an INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT. See PERCEPTION.

{677} **PERCEPTION (*aisthēsis*):** Perception proper encompasses the special perceptual CAPACITIES (sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch), whose primary objects are *proper perceptibles*, which only a single perceptual capacity can detect, such as colors, odors, sounds, and so on. But it also includes the common perceptual capacity—or so-called common sense (*DA* III.7 431b5; *Mem.* 1 450a10–11)—which is the ‘something’ responsible for the awareness of the ACTIVITY or inactivity of

the various special perceptual capacities (*DA* III.2 425b12–25). The common sense is also responsible for the simultaneous perception of two or more proper perceptibles in a single act, the perception of two or more proper perceptibles as distinct, the control of waking up the special perceptual capacities or letting them sleep (*Somn.* 2 455a12–26), and perhaps also the perception of common perceptibles (*koina aisthēta*)—which are accessible to more than one perceptual capacity—such as CHANGE, rest, shape, size, number, unity, and perhaps others (*DA* III.1 425a14–20). As opposed to scientific KNOWLEDGE and UNDERSTANDING, which are concerned with UNIVERSALS, perception controls our cognitive access to PARTICULARS (*DA* II.5 417b22–23).

PERISHING: see COMING-TO-BE

***phainesthai*:** see APPEAR

***phainomena*:** see APPEARANCES

***phora*:** see MOVEMENT

***phronēsis*:** see PRACTICAL WISDOM

***phthora*:** see COME-TO-BE

***phusis*:** see NATURE

***poion*:** see QUALITY

***polis*:** see CITY

***politeia*:** see CONSTITUTION

***politēs*:** see CITIZEN

POLITICIAN (*politikos*): *Politikē*—the art, craft, or science of politics—is the practical science used in ruling a city (*NE* I.9 1099b29–32, 13 1102a18–25, II.1 1103b3–6, VI.8 1141b23–33, VII.11 1152b1–3, X.9 1180b23–1181b23). Someone who knows *politikē* is a true *politikos*—a true politician or true statesman—while, in a looser sense, anyone holding the requisite office is a *politikos*. ‘Statesman’ and ‘political ruler’ are other common translations.

POTENTIAL: see CAPACITY

PRACTICAL WISDOM (*phronēsis*): *Phronēsis* (verb: *phronein*) is used: (1) in a broad sense to refer to thought or (roughly speaking) intelligence of any sort (as at *Met.* IV.5 1009b13, 30); (2) in a narrower sense to refer to the distinctively practical wisdom discussed in *NE* VI.5; and (3) as equivalent in meaning to *sophia* or THEORETICAL WISDOM (*Met.* XIII.4 1078b15, and throughout *Protr*.). (2), in its fullest form, and (3) are distinctively human possessions. But Aristotle does sometimes attribute a weaker form (*HA* VII.1 588a18–31) of (1) to non-human animals, such as deer, hare, cranes, bees, and ants (*HA* I.2 488b15, IX.5 611a15–16, IX.10 614b18; *PA* II.2 648a5–8, 4 650b18–27; *GA* III.2 753a10–17).

***praxis*:** see ACTION

PREDICATE (v. *katēgorein*, n. *katēgoroumenon*): When one says that *x* is *F* (e.g., that Socrates is human, or that man is an animal, or that red is a color) one is, in Aristotle's terminology, predicating *F* of *x*. *F* is the predicate (*katēgoroumenon*, literally, 'thing predicated') and *x* is the SUBJECT (*hupokeimenon*). Subjects and predicates for Aristotle are non-linguistic items: when one says that Socrates is human, it is the SPECIES *human* (not the word 'human') that is being predicated of the subject Socrates.

When one predicates *human* of Socrates, one is classifying Socrates as a human; similarly, when one predicates *color* of red, one is classifying red as a color. In each case, one is classifying something as what-it-is, identifying the fundamental kind of thing that it is. That is, one is answering the question 'What is it?' But when one predicates *red* of a cardinal, {678} for example, one is answering a different question: 'What is it like?' *Red* and *human* answer different kinds of questions, and therefore belong to different CATEGORIES (literally, 'figures of predication'). *Human* belongs to the category of SUBSTANCE; *red* belongs to the category of QUALITY. See CATEGORIES.

PRINCIPLE: see STARTING-POINT

PRIVATION (*sterēsis*): A privation, or a lack, is the absence of an ATTRIBUTE that is gained or lost in a process of change (see MOVEMENT). Aristotle needs the notion of a privation to accommodate the case of the

COMING-TO-BE and ceasing-to-be of SUBSTANCES to his account of coming-to-be in general, since a substance does not have a contrary, and Aristotle bases his account of coming-to-be on the notion of contrariety.

***prohairesis*:** see DELIBERATE CHOICE

PUZZLE, PERPLEXITY (*aporia*): An *aporia* results when there is a subject of inquiry with respect to which there are strong arguments on both sides, or where the sheer size of the issue makes it difficult for us to give an explanation (*Top.* I.11 104b1–17). Puzzles are resolved by means of DIALECTIC.

QUALITY (*poion*): The word *poion* is an interrogative adjective, meaning literally 'like what?' Its literal translation into Latin is *quale*, cognate with the abstract noun *qualitas*, from which the English 'quality' derives. (Although Greek has the abstract form *poiotēs*, Aristotle himself rarely uses it.) Quality is one of the ten CATEGORIES, and a quality is what one cites when answering the question 'What is it like?' Qualities (white, hot, musical, sad, angry, etc.) are the COINCIDENTAL ATTRIBUTES which can be gained or lost in the kind of change or MOVEMENT that Aristotle calls ALTERATION.

Aristotle also uses the word *poion* in a different sense, to indicate the *sort* of thing something is; in this usage, the sort may well be a SPECIES under which something falls ('What sort of thing is it?' 'A tiger'.). A *poion* in this sense is not a coincidental attribute, but something INTRINSIC to its SUBJECT. There is no alteration with respect to a *poion* in this sense.

REASON: see *logos*; see also CAUSE

REPUTABLE BELIEFS (*endoxa*): The 'things that are believed by everyone, by the majority, or by the wise—either by all of them, or by most, or by the most well known and most reputable (*endoxos*)' (*Top*. I.1 100b21–23; repeated 101a11–13). *Endoxa* are the starting point of DIALECTIC.

***scholē*:** see LEISURE

SCIENCE: see KNOWLEDGE

SEPARABLE (*chōriston*): Verbals ending in *-ton*—of which *chōriston* is an example—sometimes have (1) the meaning of a perfect passive

participle (‘separated’) and sometimes (2) express possibility (‘separable’). When Aristotle says that being *chōriston* is the defining mark of a SUBSTANCE, sense (2) is more likely. ‘None of the other things is separable besides the substance, for all of them are said of the substance as of an underlying subject’ (*Ph*. I.2 185a31–32). Such non-substantial PREDICATES as walking and being healthy are ‘incapable of being separated’ from the definite substantial SUBJECTS of which they are predicated (*Met.* VII.1 1028a20–31). It seems reasonable to infer that what a substance is separable from are the things predicated of it. The basic idea is that of ontological independence: when the underlying subject is a substance, it is possible for it to exist without its predicates, but not them without it (*Cat*. 5 2a34–b6; *Met.* V.11 1019a3–4, XIII.2 1077a36–1077b11).

SIMPLY, UNCONDITIONALLY, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION (*haplōs*): Aristotle attaches the adverb *haplōs* to a statement of the form ‘*x* is *F*’ (see PREDICATION) to indicate either (1) that the statement holds as it stands, that its truth does not depend on any further qualification (‘*x* is *F* in such-and-such a respect’, or ‘*x* is *F* in relation to something else’, or ‘*x* is *F* in such-and-such conditions’, etc.), or (2) that the statement does not require {679} any further supplementation to make its meaning clear. For example, to say ‘horses are’ *haplōs* is to say that horses exist. ‘Being *haplōs*’ is contrasted with ‘being something’ (*einai ti*), where the *ti* supplies the qualification (e.g., ‘horses are quadrupeds’). See also COME-TO-BE.

SOUL (*psuchē*): ‘The soul is the primary recipient of life’ (*Met*. V.18 1022a32), so that to have a soul is to be alive. Thus plants, because they can take in nourishment, grow, and reproduce, have the sorts of soul required for these life FUNCTIONS, namely, nutritive soul. Characteristic of animal souls is the possession of two CAPACITIES, which must occur together (*DA* II.2 413b23–24), one ‘to discern things and the other to cause MOVEMENT with respect to place’ (*DA* III.9 432a15–17). The potentiality for discernment is due, first, to the possession of a ‘perceptual part’ (*DA* III.9 432a30), responsible for PERCEPTION proper and various other functions, such as imagination. In human beings, this part consists of the *primary perceptual part*, located in the heart, as well as the various

special senses—sight, smell, hearing, taste, touch—and the common sense. The part responsible for MOVEMENT is the DESIRING part (*orektikon*). It consists of APPETITES, such as hunger and thirst, as well as other desires and emotions of various sorts, which cause movement or action by being modes of receptivity or responsiveness to aspects of reality discerned as pleasant or painful or, in some other way, good or bad, END-furthering or end-frustrating (*DA* III.7 431b8–10). Finally, the human soul also contains a rational part, comprising the scientific part (*epistēmonikon*) and the calculative (*logistikon*) or deliberative (*bouleutikon*) one (*NE* VI.1 1139a5–15), as well as the UNDERSTANDING, which, as responsible for KNOWLEDGE of scientific and deliberative STARTING-POINTS (*NE* VI.6 1141a7–8), is involved in both of them.

SPATIAL MOVEMENT (*phora*): Spatial movement is MOVEMENT (*kinēsis*) with respect to place, i.e., the process of getting from one place to another.

SPECIES: see FORM

SPOKEN OF IN MANY WAYS (*pollachōs legomena*): see HOMONYMOUS

STARTING-POINT (*archē*): *Archē is rendered as 'principium' in Latin, and so is often translated in English as 'principle'. This works well when the archē in question is propositional (such as the principle of non-contradiction) but less so when the archē* is a basic concept or source (such as each of the four CAUSES). We have used 'starting-point' as a generic term for both kinds of *archai*.

In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle claims both (1) that *archai* are the foundations of a science, from which scientific KNOWLEDGE begins, and (2) that in scientific inquiry we aim to discover the *archai* of a science. (1) gives priority to *archai*, while (2) seems to reverse the priority. Aristotle is aware of this, and holds that (1) and (2) are compatible because *archai* of scientific DEMONSTRATION are prior 'by nature' or SIMPLY prior, but are not prior 'to us'. The starting-points of scientific discovery are the PARTICULARS that are 'more familiar' to us; the starting-points of scientific proof, on the other hand, are the UNIVERSALS that are better known and prior in themselves,

without qualification. The latter, therefore, are not themselves capable of being proved scientifically. See KNOWLEDGE.

STATE (*hexis*): A state is a kind of QUALITY. States are relatively stable and long-lasting (*Catg.* 8b27), and not easily changed, as opposed to conditions (*diatheseis*), which are more ephemeral. Aristotle gives knowledge and the virtues as examples of states; conditions, on the other hand, include such things as hotness, coldness, sickness, and health.

***sterēsis*:** see PRIVATION

***stoicheion*:** see ELEMENT

SUBJECT (*hupokeimenon*): The word *hupokeimenon* means literally 'underlying thing', and Aristotle uses it in two different but related ways. (1) A subject is that which has something PREDICATED of it. Note that the subject and predicate are typically non-linguistic {680} items, i.e., the things referred to by the words in (what we would call) a subject-predicate sentence. (2) A subject is that which underlies MOVEMENT or CHANGE. This may be (a) a SUBSTANCE, in the case of a change of, e.g., QUALITY or place, where the subject undergoes a change with respect to an ATTRIBUTE from a CATEGORY other than substance, or (b) MATTER, in a case in which a substance COMES-TO-BE or ceases-to-be (so-called substantial change).

Aristotle typically gives subjects ontological priority over predicates (predicates depend for their existence on the subjects they are predicated of), just as he gives substances ontological priority over items in the other categories. But in *Met.* VII.3, he argues that although matter seems to be the ultimate subject, it is not the correct answer to the question 'What is substance?'

SUBSTANCE (*ousia*): *Ousia* is an abstract noun formed from the verb 'to be' (*einai*), but Aristotle distinguishes *ousiai* from beings (*onta*) in general. There are ten CATEGORIES of beings, and substance is the first of those categories, the one on which beings in the other nine categories are ontologically dependent (see SEPARABLE).

In *Catg.*, Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances: the former are PARTICULARS (individual plants and animals are the examples he gives); the latter are UNIVERSALS—the species (human, tiger)

and GENERA (animal, plant) under which those particulars fall. In the ontology of *Catg.*, primary substances are the most fundamental beings: 'if there were no primary substances, there could not be anything else' (2b5).

But Aristotle begins *Met.* VII with the question 'What is substance?' (1028b5), and although he continues to use the label 'primary substance', it is not clear whether he still applies it to the particular substances of *Catg.* ('by form I mean the essence of each thing and the primary substance' *Met.*VII.7 1032b1–2). And even if the primary substances in this work turn out to be forms, it is unclear whether those forms are particular or universal.

Aristotle also begins to use the expression *ousia* + genitive to mean 'the substance of' something. An *ousia* in this sense is a kind of ESSENCE. And although there seems to be a connection between (a) *ousia* full-stop and (b) the *ousia* of something, it is not universally agreed what that connection is. One possibility is that *ousiai* in sense (b) are the new fundamental entities; another is that a thing's having as its essence an *ousia* in sense (b) is what makes that thing a fundamental entity.

***sullogismos*:** see DEDUCTION

***sumbebēkos*:** see COINCIDENT

***teleios*:** see COMPLETE

***telos*:** see END

THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE (*theōria*): The verb *theasthai*, with which *theōria* is cognate, means 'look at' or 'gaze at'. Hence *theōria* itself is sometimes what someone is doing in looking closely at something, or observing, studying, or contemplating it. *Theōria* can thus be an exercise of UNDERSTANDING (*nous*), which is the element responsible for grasping scientific STARTING-POINTS (*DA* I.1 402b12–13). Hence the cognate verb *theōrein* sometimes means 'to be actively understanding' or 'to be actively contemplating' something.

THEORETICAL WISDOM (*sophia*): *Sophia* is the VIRTUE of the scientific part of the SOUL (*NE* VI.12 1144a1–3) and is the most exact form of scientific KNOWLEDGE (*NE* VI.7 1141a9–b8).

***theōretikos*:** see CONTEMPLATIVE

***theōria*:** see THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE

THIS-SOMETHING (*tode ti*): *Tode* means ‘this’, and *ti* means ‘some’ or ‘something’. So *tode ti* means either ‘this-something’ (e.g., this man, this horse) or ‘some this’ (e.g., a certain man, or a certain horse). In either case, the idea is that of an individual thing of a determinate kind. *Tode ti* is therefore often translated as ‘individual’. Although Aristotle usually applies the term exclusively to SUBSTANCES, {681} he occasionally applies it to non-substances as well. He often contrasts a *this* (which is one in number, i.e., a PARTICULAR) with a *such* (which is UNIVERSAL).

***ti ēn einai*:** see ESSENCE

***tode ti*:** see THIS-SOMETHING

***to ti esti*:** see WHAT-IT-IS

tuchē: see LUCK

UNCONDITIONALLY: see SIMPLY

UNDERLYING SUBJECT: see SUBJECT

UNDERSTANDING, INTELLECT, MIND (*nous*): In the broadest sense of the term, someone with *nous* is someone with sound common sense; the cognate verb *noein*, like *dianoeisthai*, means ‘to think’ (*Mete*. I.3 340b14; *Ph*. IV.1 208b25; *NE* III.1 1110a11). *Nous*, in this sense, is what enables a SOUL to suppose, believe, deduce, calculate, and reason, so that it is possible to *noein* something false (*DA* III.3 427b9). In the narrow sense, *nous* is what makes possible a type of KNOWLEDGE of UNIVERSAL scientific STARTING-POINTS that, unlike scientific knowledge proper, is not DEMONSTRABLE from anything further (*NE* VI.6 1140b33–1141a8, VI.8 1142a25–26). This *nous* is a divine SUBSTANCE (*NE* I.6 1096a24–25, X.7 1177b19–1178a8), or anyway the most divine one in human beings (*NE* X.7 1177a16), and so it shares in the immortality that is characteristic of gods (*DA* III.5 430a23). Consequently, it alone of these parts is SEPARABLE from the human body and can survive its death: ‘*Ho nous* seems to be born in us as a sort of substance, and not to pass away . . . understanding (*noein*) and contemplating (*theōrein*) are extinguished because something

else within passes away, but the understanding itself is unaffectable' (*DA* I.4 408b18–25; also *Long.* 2 465a26–32). Among sublunary animals *nous* is fully possessed only by human beings (*PA* II.10 656a7–8; *NE* X.8 1178b24–25). In fact, a human being is most of all his *nous* (*NE* IX.8 1168b31–32, X.7 1178a2–8). No English term is a precise equivalent for *nous* or *noein* in this narrow sense. 'Intellect', which is in many ways the best choice, lacks a cognate verb in current use. 'Understanding' is better in this respect but shares with 'intellect', 'intelligence', 'intuitive reason', 'apprehension', and other common translations the defect of not being factive or truth-entailing, since *nous* is one of the five states of the soul 'in which the soul grasps the truth by way of assertion and denial' (*NE* VI.3 1139b15–17).

UNLIMITED: see INFINITE

UNIVERSAL (*katholou*): Aristotle defines a universal as 'what is of a nature to be predicated of many things' (*Int.* 17a39), and contrasts universals with PARTICULARS (*kath' hekasta*), which cannot be predicated of many. His definition leaves uncertain whether he means that a universal actually is, or simply might be, so predicated. Universals play a key role in his accounts of KNOWLEDGE and DEFINITION, since (a) universals are the objects of knowledge, and (b) definitions are of universals, rather than particulars. In *Met*. VII.13 he denies that universals are SUBSTANCES, but there is no scholarly consensus as to whether he means (more strongly) that nothing PREDICATED of many things can be a substance, or (less strongly) that nothing predicated universally of something can be the substance of that thing.

UNIVERSE, THE ALL (*to pan*): Aristotle concedes that most people (especially his predecessors) use *to pan* to refer not to the totality of things, but only to the physical world of material objects. The universe in this sense is NATURE as a whole (*Met.* I.3 984a31); it is material and bodily (*Met.* I.5 986b10–11, 17 and I.8 988b22); it COMES-TO-BE and can be divided into the four ELEMENTS by strife (*Met.* I.4 984b26, 985a25). But Aristotle thinks that these people 'clearly err in many ways, for they posit the elements of bodies alone, but not of the incorporeal things, although there are incorporeal things' (*Met.* I.8 988b25–26). These include the

divine SUBSTANCES of *Met.* XII.5, which are ‘without matter’ since they are eternal (1071b21).

{682} **VIRTUE (*aretē*):** Anything that has a function (*ergon*) has a correlative *aretē. Thus it is possible to speak of the aretē* of thieves, scandalmongers, and other bad things that are good at doing what they do (*Met.* V.16 1021b12–23), as well as of the *aretē* of nonliving tools and instruments. For this reason *aretē* is sometimes translated as ‘excellence’. One advantage of the traditional translation ‘virtue’ is that it preserves the link with so-called virtue ethics.

WHAT-IT-IS, THE (*to ti esti*): Socrates asked the question ‘What is it?’ (*ti esti*) in attempting to discover the true essence of a thing, that which makes it count as the (kind of) thing it is. Aristotle converts the interrogative phrase into a noun—the what-it-is of an *F* is what makes it count as an *F*, and is therefore roughly equivalent to the ESSENCE or NATURE of an *F*. See also FORM, DEFINITION.

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